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THE LOSS OF THE PHILIPPINE BASES: EFFECTS ON
USCINCPAC'S ABILITY TO EMPLOY HIS FORCES

by

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

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The major United States bases in the Republic of the Philippines, Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base, have been indispensable pillars of American foreign policy in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas since the turn of the century. They have provided vital support to American military operations throughout the Pacific theater. As a result of the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, however, Clark Air Base has now been vacated. The Subic Bay/Cubi Point facilities also face closure in December 1992 as a result of the unsuccessful base rights negotiations between the American and Philippine governments. The U.S. government has recognized the possibility of withdrawal from the bases for several years, but had anticipated a phased withdrawal which would have lessened the shock effect on our warfighting capability in the region. The now-precipitous nature of the base closures, however, will result in a significant erosion of USCINCPAC's warfighting capability in the near term, particularly in the areas of sustainment and training. This paper examines how the base closures will affect the operational employment of USCINCPAC's forces, particularly in forward presence and crisis response roles, and recommends steps which should be initiated by USCINCPAC to mitigate these impacts.			
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Abstract of

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USCINCPAC'S ABILITY TO EMPLOY HIS FORCES

The major United States bases in the Republic of the Philippines, Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base, have been indispensable pillars of American foreign policy in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas since the turn of the century. They have provided vital support to American military operations throughout the Pacific theater. As a result of the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, however, Clark Air Base has now been vacated. The Subic Bay/Cubi Point facilities also face closure in December 1992 as a result of the unsuccessful base rights negotiations between the American and Philippine governments. The U.S. government has recognized the possibility of withdrawal from the bases for several years, but had anticipated a phased withdrawal which would have lessened the shock effect on our warfighting capability in the region. The now-precipitous nature of the base closures, however, will result in a significant erosion of USCINCPAC's warfighting capability in the near term, particularly in the areas of sustainment and training. This paper examines how the base closures will affect the operational employment of USCINCPAC's forces, particularly in forward presence and crisis response





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PREFACE

3 March 1993

"U.S. Container Ship Reportedly Attacked In South China Sea"

An American container ship, the M/V President Lincoln, was reportedly attacked last night by aircraft in the South China Sea approximately 350 miles southwest of Manila. While the report has not been confirmed, an American President Line spokesman revealed that the company has been unable to make contact with the ship since yesterday. The report was based on a fragmented distress call from the ship which indicated it had been attacked and was on fire. The extent of damage and casualties is unknown, as is the identity of the attackers, although it seems certain that the attack is connected with the Malaysian/Vietnamese dispute over the Spratly Islands, which exploded into open warfare on 1 March. A State Department spokesman said this morning that "the U.S. deplores this indiscriminate attack on a U.S. vessel in the strongest terms and calls on both governments to cease hostile activities." Reliable sources in the Department of Defense have revealed that U.S. naval forces are enroute to the area to protect American shipping. The nearest U.S. aircraft carrier, USS INDEPENDENCE, was in port in Yokosuka, Japan when the crisis



erupted, and has since departed along with her escorts. It will take her at least five days to reach the crisis area, the source said. . .



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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"In the deterrence of conflict, there is no real substitute for visible presence in force and on the scene."¹

The major U.S. bases in the Philippines, Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, have been indispensable pillars of American policy in the Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters since the turn of the century. The facilities were acquired by Commodore George Dewey in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War of 1898 and have become increasingly more capable and important to U.S. strategic interests ever since. After World War Two, the Philippine bases became vital assets in U.S. efforts to contain Soviet expansionism in the Pacific. From the Philippine bases, the U.S. could project power throughout southeast Asia and control the sea lines of communication between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Chokepoints such as the Malacca Strait, Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait, Makassar Strait and the Strait of Formosa are within easy range of air and naval forces operating from the Philippines. The logistic and training capabilities provided by Clark and Subic are unequalled anywhere in the region, possibly anywhere in the world. On the lighter side, legions of American servicemen



have been schooled in the traditions of Olongapo and Angeles City. The Philippine bases have become significant parts of our military heritage and culture.

It is no secret to anyone that the issue of continued American use of Clark and Subic has been hotly debated both in the Philippines and the U.S. over the last ten years. This debate came to a head in September 1991 when the Philippine Senate vetoed a tentative accord to extend the basing agreement. This action, coupled with the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, sealed the fate of both Clark and Subic. Clark is now under Philippine control (and a great deal of ash) and U.S. forces will have departed from Subic Bay by 31 December 1992.

It is not my intention to argue the relative merits of retaining the bases or giving them up. That issue has been rendered moot. The problem now is to assess the impact of the loss of these facilities in light of our political and military strategies and to determine whether or not we can still meet the commitments we have set for ourselves in the near term, meaning through 1993.

There are two new factors at work in the calculus of our military capabilities in the Pacific theater. One is the loss of the Philippine bases. The other is the overall draw-down of U.S. military forces and revisions to U.S. national strategy



brought on by the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and the lack of any perceived significant threat to our interests. In the words of the national security strategy of the United States,

"The bitter struggle that divided the world for over two generations has come to an end. The collapse of Soviet domination in eastern Europe means that the Cold War is over, its core issue resolved. We have entered a new era. . . in the realm of military strategy, we confront dangers more ambiguous than those we previously faced. What type and distribution of forces are needed to combat not a particular, poised enemy but the nascent threats of power vacuums and regional instabilities?"²

Before one can assess the impact of the base closures on USCINCPAC's ability to accomplish his mission, we obviously need a clear understanding of what his mission is. It may be derived from our national objectives. Despite the momentous changes in the complexion of world politics, our national interests and objectives have remained relatively constant. As reflected in the national security strategy, they are:

- The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
- A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
- Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
- A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.³

Our national military objectives which devolve from these interests are to:

- Deter or defeat aggression in concert with allies.
- Ensure global access and influence.
- Promote regional stability and cooperation.
- Stem the flow of illegal drugs.
- combat terrorism.

The foundations of our national defense policy which will enable USCINCPAC to achieve these objectives in his assigned area are strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response and force reconstitution.⁴ I intend to focus on forward presence and crisis response, as these are USCINCPAC's major responsibilities which will be impacted by the loss of Clark and Subic.

The mission and geographic responsibility assigned to USCINCPAC is vast. Roughly 52 percent of the world's population and seven of the ten largest armed forces in the world are contained in his area of responsibility⁵, which includes Japan, Korea, and the People's Republic of China, all of southeast and southern Asia and the majority of the Pacific and Indian Oceans from the Arctic to the Antarctic. Considering the sheer size of this area, more than 100 million square miles, it is noteworthy that only 16 percent of the U.S. military is permanently stationed there.⁶ This figure is certain to decrease in the near future. Despite the "new fiscal realities" and the base closures, however, the U.S. will not completely strike its tent in the Pacific. To quote Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney,



"We are a superpower, and we're always going to want to have the capacity to deploy military force to safeguard American interests and preserve our capacity to influence events in the world."⁷

This is USCINCPAC's charter.



CHAPTER II

CLARK AND SUBIC - CAPABILITIES LOST

The most obvious attribute of Clark and Subic is strategic location. From these bases, U.S. forces could maintain maritime surveillance of all the straits between the Indian and Pacific oceans, through which pass approximately half of Asia's oil supply and 80 percent of its strategic materials.⁸

Additionally, this location allows easy surveillance of Cam Ranh Bay and quick projection of power into the South China Sea and Indian Oceans. Although the apparent threat from Cam Ranh Bay has declined, (disappeared?) the Philippine bases are still immensely valuable. They are in an unbeatable position from which to provide logistic support. Table 1 shows various distances and travel times with which our forces in the Pacific must contend. The benefits of the Philippines' location are obvious. Dealing with these distances will be a major factor in the future for CINCPAC planners. More on this later.

Clark Air Base was the largest U.S. military base outside the continental United States. Covering some 131,000 acres (much of it jungle), the base had a 10500 foot runway which could handle C-5 aircraft. It had a 200,000 cubic foot ammunition storage capacity, 3 million square feet of supply storage space and 25 million gallons of fuel storage capacity.

TABLE 1

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>DISTANCE</u>	<u>TRANSIT TIME (DAYS)</u>	
			<u>15 KTS</u>	<u>20 KTS</u>
SAN DIEGO	GUAM	5379	15	11
	SINGAPORE	7736	21.5	16
	SUBIC BAY	6604	18	14
	DIEGO GARCIA	9963	27.5	21
	BANDAR ABBAS	11,117	31	23
	YOKOSUKA	4923	13.5	10
	PEARL HARBOR	2285	6.5	5
YOKOSUKA	GUAM	1352	4	3
	SINGAPORE	2889	8	6
	PEARL HARBOR	3397	9.5	7
	SUBIC BAY	1758	5	7
	BANDAR ABBAS	6270	17.5	13
	DIEGO GARCIA	5116	14	10.5
SUBIC BAY	SINGAPORE	1327	4	3
	GUAM	1499	4	3
	DIEGO GARCIA	3554	10	7.5
	BANDAR ABBAS	4708	13	10
	CAM RANH BAY	700	2	1.5
SINGAPORE	BAHRAIN	3652	10	7.5
	PEARL HARBOR	5881	16	12
	GUAM	2585	7	5.5
	CAM RANH BAY	786	2	1.5
FREMANTLE	DIEGO GARCIA	2850	8	6
	BAHRAIN	5203	14.5	11
GUAM	YOKOSUKA	1352	4	3
	DIEGO GARCIA	4812	13.5	10
	CAM RANH BAY	2112	6	4.5
	BANDAR ABBAS	5966	16.5	12.5

Source: Distances between ports, Defense Mapping Agency (1985)

This capacity cannot be duplicated in the theater. Clark also maintained the 46000 acre Crow Valley Bombing Range, the only instrumented tactical training range in the Pacific, and the only range where the use of live ordnance was authorized.^{9,10} This facility was unique in the theater and will not be easily replaced. Its loss could cause increased aircraft attrition rates, especially early in a conflict. if aircrews are not able to train in-theater. The value of Crow Valley has been summarized as follows in one analysis:

"Crow Valley's significance is not tied to its large acreage alone but to the mountainous jungle terrain that quickly acquaints military personnel with the type of combat conditions they are likely to confront around the western Pacific and parts of the Indian Ocean littoral. Numerous training exercises are conducted at Crow Valley. Perhaps the most important of these is exercise "Cope Thunder," which utilizes the latest in computerized technology, electronic countermeasures, and target mock-ups (hardened artillery sites, airfields, aircraft, truck convoys, etc.) to provide realistic combat practice for air crews from the Navy and Marine Corps as well as the Air Force. "Cope

Thunder" has proven a very effective training method, more so than standard procedures that involve little more than simple target practice. Participants in "Cope Thunder" must take evasive and defensive actions to reach their targets and to return successfully from their training mission. They must face "aggressor intercept maneuvers" designed to simulate enemy tactics. Moreover, the countermeasures encountered and the targets they must reach are constantly being altered or moved to eliminate predictability. Crow Valley provides a training asset that could not be duplicated elsewhere in the Pacific.

During World War II, and even during the Vietnam War, the United States lost aircraft daily, due in part to the number of missions required to "season" the crews in actual combat. The United States cannot afford the time or the costs involved with this process. Training exercises, like "Cope Thunder," help reduce such losses and maintain a high level of combat readiness. The costs of weapon systems, particularly new combat aircraft, have skyrocketed, and the loss in aircrews is

unacceptable . . . Crow Valley thus contributes to the cost effectiveness of U.S. military forces operating in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean."¹¹

It is true that similar training facilities exist in the United States, such as the Navy Fighter Weapons School (Top Gun) at Miramar, California, the Naval Strike Warfare Center (Strike University) at Fallon, Nevada and the Marine Corps Air Warfare Training Center at Yuma, Arizona. Strike University is particularly valuable because it provides an entire carrier air wing with three weeks of intensive training immediately prior to the wing's deployment.¹² This is fine as far as it goes. The problem is that aircrews' skills begin to erode as soon as their deployment begins, and they need periodic "refresher" training in both air combat maneuvering and strike warfare to stay sharp as the deployment drags on. Crow Valley was an ideal solution to this problem. Dropping practice bombs in the wake of the battle group's oiler is not.

The capabilities of the Subic Bay/Cubi Point complex are even more impressive. Its deep water harbor can easily accommodate aircraft carriers. The colocated ship repair facility has four floating drydocks (but none can dock carriers) and currently conducts 60 percent of all repairs and

services for the Seventh Fleet. The versatility and capacity of this facility was clearly demonstrated during the Vietnam War, when it handled as many as 110 ships at a time. The navy supply depot stocks over 180,000 items in 1.75 million square feet of space and stores over 110 million gallons of POL, making it the largest POL storage facility in the world. The naval magazine at Camayan Point handles about 25,000 tons of ammunition a month and can supply the needs of all major combatant vessels of the Seventh Fleet.¹³ The Zambales Training Range, located nearby at Subic City, provides an ideal amphibious training capability in theater.

The Cubi Point facility, located across Subic Bay from the naval station (a ten minute drive) has the capacity to accommodate 200 aircraft at time, including C-5s and C-141s. It averages 17,000 take-offs and landings a month, including carrier aircraft, cargo aircraft and P-3 aircraft employed in ASW patrols of the South China Sea. It also has a unique ability to berth an aircraft carrier immediately adjacent to the airfield being used by its airwing.¹⁴ The coordination and logistic benefits of this are not insignificant.

The preceding overview of the Clark/Subic facilities only addresses the major capabilities of each. It should be noted, however, that these facilities also house numerous support

activities, including hospitals, communication centers, housing, aircraft repair facilities etc., which make them as capable as any in the U.S. Likewise, one should not overlook the synergistic effect caused by the proximity of Clark and Subic. An example of this is the 43 mile pipeline which transports fuel directly from Subic Bay to Clark.¹⁵ A strong case can be made that the total capability and utility of this complex exceeded those of its component parts. To paraphrase Gregor and Aganon, the Clark/Subic complex "has no counterpart in the southwest Pacific. Without it, the U.S. forward deployment and power projection capabilities would be significantly impaired."¹⁶

Having said that, there is one major caveat to the warfighting value of these bases which should be noted. Actual combat operations staged from them could have been severely restricted or even prevented outright by the Philippine government, as allowed by the military basing agreement. Indeed, the Philippine and Vietnamese governments reached an agreement in 1976 "not to allow any foreign country to use one's territory as a base for direct or indirect aggression and intervention against the other country or other countries in the region."¹⁷ Almost three years later, President Marcos stated that "The Philippine - United States relationship was

defensive in nature and 'not meant for aggressive operation anywhere in southeast Asia.'¹⁸ This situation certainly would have continued even if the new basing agreement had been ratified.

It is also interesting to review the numbers and types of U.S. forces which have been permanently stationed in the Philippines. As can be seen in Table 2, these forces are anything but massive and lean more toward the administration, logistics and training end of the spectrum than to combat forces. Those actual combat forces (especially Air Force) have been employed almost exclusively in the defense of the Philippines and the bases themselves. This is borne out by the fact that no combat missions were flown from Clark during the Vietnam War¹⁹ (although it can be argued that our access to Udorn and Utapao Air Bases in Thailand obviated any need to use Clark). During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, not only was Clark not used for combat operations, it wasn't even heavily used as a logistic hub. Fewer than ten C-5/C-141 flights in support of combat operations were staged through Clark.²⁰ The excellence of Saudi airfields notwithstanding, this is still a telling fact.

TABLE 2

U.S. Forces at Philippine Bases as of 1991

Air Force - 8700 Personnel

13th Air Force HQ* 1 Air Division, 48 Combat Aircraft

1 Wing: 2 Fighter Squadrons
 1 With 24 F-4E
 1 With 24 F-4E/G

1 Special Operation Squadron (MAC)
 With 3 MC-130E, 5 MH-53J

Navy - 5000 Personnel

1 Cruiser Home-Ported

Marines - 800 Personnel

1 MEU (SOC) May Be Deployed

Army - 200 Personnel

* 13th Air Force has already been relocated to Kadena AB, Okinawa.

Source: The Military Balance 1990-1991. The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1990, p.26.

CHAPTER III

ALTERNATIVES AND WORKAROUNDS

The swarm of alternative basing arrangements proposed in various quarters range from the impossible (transfer the whole ball of wax to Guam) to the fiscally suicidal (build a new base at Palau) to the ridiculous (move to Cam Ranh Bay). Most of them tend to gloss over the difficulty of replicating the Clark/Subic capability somewhere else, and they underestimate the potential future need for such a capability. The Center for Defense Information's suggestion offers a case in point:

"Should the U.S. need to engage in small-scale actions, it could simply beef up its logistics capability by transferring some of its functions from the Philippines to other U.S. bases in the Pacific. Should it become necessary, the U.S. has viable alternatives in Guam or the northern Marianas to which it can relocate necessary functions from the Philippine bases."²¹

Apparently Admiral LaRocque and company see no possibility of a need for large scale U.S. action. I confess that I doubt that LaRocque would find this beefing-up of logistics capability "simple" if he were the person charged with making



it work. It will be neither simple nor inexpensive, and it will take time.

In an effort to focus on the problem at hand, the possible near-term (through 1993) alternatives to the Philippine bases, I will not discuss the possibility of new base construction. Such an option is unlikely due to cost (both financial and political) and would not, in any case, help USCINCPAC in the near term. I have reduced the possible alternatives to three: Guam, Singapore, and Japan/Okinawa.

Guam

The 230-square mile island of Guam is located 1,500 miles east of Subic Bay. About one third of its area is occupied by military facilities, including Andersen Air Force Base, the Naval Station, NAS Agana, the Naval Magazine and the Naval Communications Area Master Station. The naval station also houses the Naval Supply Depot and the Ship Repair Facility. Andersen AFB was a major SAC facility until the 43rd Bombardment Wing departed in 1989. It is large enough to supplant Clark as a logistics hub and also has a large amount of unused space, mostly jungle-covered. The naval station also has a great deal of unused land, such as the old Orote Point Airfield, which could be used for prepositioning, for example.

The supply depot is large and could provide adequate support. Probably the most significant of Guam's attributes, however, is the fact that it is a U.S. territory. Our access there is permanent and not subject to negotiation. In light of our experience with the Philippines, this should not be overlooked.

Guam is not perfect, however. Apra Harbor is not roomy or deep enough to handle aircraft carriers, although it can handle LHA/LHD-sized ships. It cannot easily berth large numbers of ships. The naval magazine is much smaller than the one at Subic, although there is an AE homeported on Guam. The naval air station may be lost soon. It shares runways with the civilian airport, and negotiations with the government of Guam to consolidate NAS functions at Andersen AFB are ongoing. This consolidation could cause overloading at Andersen. The ship repair facility is small, expensive and has a low capacity. It does not have a reputation of producing high quality work. It is a far cry from SRF Subic Bay.

Guam is not ideal geographically. It is located directly in the path of many typhoons, which require evacuation of all ships and aircraft. Additionally, aircraft bound for the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean would pass over the Philippines and would thus require overflight rights.²²

In summary, Guam can take up some of the slack, but significant capability gaps would remain.

Singapore

The city-state of Singapore, located at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, is in an ideal position from which to project power into the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. It has excellent facilities already in place, such as the Paya Lebar Air Base and the Sembawang Shipyard. The U.S. already had negotiated rights to some of these; the two governments signed a memorandum of understanding in 1990 allowing access to Sembawang, and the Seventh Fleet Logistic Support Force (Task Force 73) will move its headquarters there in the spring of 1992.²³

Despite its advantageous position and good facilities, Singapore has drawbacks. It is small (only 65 square miles) and thus has little room for expansion. Its airfields cannot handle heavy traffic. Sembawang Shipyard is a commercial facility, which leaves the possibility that Navy work could receive lower priority than commercial work. Its storage capacity is far less than Subic's. Perhaps the most glaring uncertainty about Singapore is political. According to a House



Armed Services Committee delegation which visited Singapore in 1990,

"Singapore wants to be a close friend of the United States but does not want to be an ally. Singapore wants to maintain its non-aligned status. Accordingly, Singapore wants the U.S. to use its facilities on a regular basis, but does not want permanent U.S. bases."²⁴

This raises some uncertainty as to whether Singapore's facilities would be available to us in all circumstances. Further doubts are prompted by Singapore's participation in the 1973 Arab oil embargo against the west.²⁵

Again, like Guam, Singapore fills some gaps, but leaves others.

Japan/Okinawa

The existing facilities in Japan and Okinawa to which the U.S. has access appear to have the most potential to replace Clark and Subic. The naval base at Yokosuka is already the homeport of the USS INDEPENDENCE Battle Group. The ship repair facility, although expensive, produces a large quantity of high quality work. Moreover, it has the capability to drydock carriers.²⁶ An amphibious ready group is currently homeported in Sasebo.

Air Force commands already based in Japan include the 5th Air Force at Yokota AB and the 13th Air Force, which recently moved from Clark AB to Kadena AB, Okinawa.²⁷

While the facilities in Japan are large and capable, there is little room for further expansion. Political factors, such as the current economic mud-slinging, also make expansion of these bases unlikely. The Japanese government has also imposed restrictions on combat operations originating from Japan, stipulating that the U.S. may launch combat operations from Japanese bases solely for the purpose of supporting Japan or South Korea. In the past, it has also refused permission for transfer of B-52s from Guam to Japan for typhoon evasion.²⁸

As we have seen with Guam and Singapore, Japan is not a panacea, either.

It is apparent that no single facility or complex exists in USCINCPAC's AOR which can replace the Philippine bases. As Alvin Cottrell and Robert Hanks have asserted, they are simply irreplaceable.²⁹ The best alternative will be to station forces at the locations already discussed, along with other locations as future alliances and coalitions may allow. In general, we will have to spread our forces throughout the Pacific.

CHAPTER IV

CAN USCINCPAC STILL GET THE JOB DONE?

Given that USCINCPAC's forces will soon be fewer in number and more widely scattered about his AOR, the obvious question arises: "Can USCINCPAC still accomplish his mission?" After this question is answered, it will be worthwhile to note some unique capabilities which we will not soon regain despite a new basing structure in the Pacific.

In Chapter I, I referred to the Navy's mission of strategic deterrence only in passing, since this mission is in the purview of USCINCPAC, not USCINCPAC. I should point out, however, that this mission will not be affected at all by the closure of the Philippine bases. Some Filipino muckrakers, who claim that the U.S. operates a ballistic missile submarine base in huge atom bomb-proof caverns hollowed out of the Zambales mountains,³⁰ undoubtedly disagree.

Assessing USCINCPAC's ability to carry out his forward presence mission will be more problematical. To begin with, it is very easy to play fast and loose with one's definition of "presence." Does it mean a CVBG on every street corner, or will a surface action group deployed in theater six months of the year suffice? Do U.S. activities other than military force deployments constitute presence? The bottom line is that the

CINC and the National Command Authority must arrive at an agreement on the definition of presence, and how much of it is enough. In a recent interview with the Asian Defense Journal, USCINCPAC, Admiral C. R. Larson, hinted at his definition of presence:

"In the Pacific, that force will continue to be forward deployed and principally maritime, with strong amphibious elements, quick reaction air assets, and rapidly deployable ground reinforcements."³¹

Although debate on force draw-downs and future force structure has just begun, I believe the presence mission can be accomplished with the force structure it appears we will have. The force structure may only allow 'tripwire' forces, however. The problem for USCINCPAC will be how to sustain those forces if they must operate far from their bases. A battle group operating in the mid-Indian ocean, for example, will have a logistics tail stretching roughly 5000 miles to Guam (almost 10,000 to San Diego), whereas it would be "only" 3500 miles from Subic Bay. (See Table 1). In order to keep that CVBG supplied, USCINCPAC will be faced with a difficult choice. He can:

- Keep the CVBG on a shorter leash, which will result in shorter on-station times.
- Acquire more sealift to move supplies forward from CONUS.
- Reduce the size (and effectiveness) of the CVBG, so the supplies carried by the BG's Replenishment Ships will last longer.

Obviously, none of these choices is very palatable. To further complicate matters, USCINCPAC must be prepared, not only to operate this logistic train, but also to defend it. The loss of even a few of our sealift or airlift assets could have a devastating impact on our ability to sustain any type of military operation, regardless of service(s) involved. Increased access to foreign resupply ports is not the answer, either. Time spent transiting to and from a resupply port is time spent off station. At any rate, the supplies would still have to be shipped from CONUS. In short, sustaining forces operating forward is going to be more difficult and risky, no matter what USCINCPAC does.

The ability of USCINCPAC to respond to a crisis will be similarly affected, particularly if the response requires naval action or support. Here the key issue is distance combined

with transit times. Another look at Table 1 reveals the potential magnitude of the problem. Assume, for example, an emergent requirement to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations in the vicinity of Singapore. If the closest carrier battle group and amphibious ready group were in port in Yokosuka and Sasebo, respectively, they would take about six days at 20 knots or about eight days at 15 knots to get to Singapore. Forces sent from San Diego would take 16 days at 20 knots and almost 22 days at 15 knots. Forces staged in Subic Bay would have taken three to four days. The impact of these transit times on a sensitive operation, when hours may decide success or failure, is crucial. We will not have the luxury of taking three weeks or a month to get forces in place if we expect to effectively respond to a crisis. Air power alone, while quickly deployable, is not the only answer, and in fact would be of little use in the previous example. This time and distance problem has no easy solution. There are, however, at least two areas which, if properly emphasized, could ameliorate it somewhat. They are timely indications and warning and prepositioning.

Timely indications and warning is easier said than done. As events leading up to 2 August 1990 clearly showed, we haven't gotten it down to an exact science yet. Nevertheless,



our ability to respond quickly absolutely depends on it. Indications and warning is not solely the province of national agencies. The CINC has a vital role to play. In conjunction with assigned country teams, he must maintain close contact with information sources throughout his AOR, including political, religious and military leaders, economic power brokers, and local media representatives. If the CINC is able to develop trusting relationship of this sort, our chances of longer crisis warning times may be enhanced. The CINC may even find he has the ability to influence events through these contacts alone.

Another way of maintaining close ties with other countries in the region is through combined exercises and deployments for training (DFTs). As Richard L. Armitage has written,

"As a substitute for permanent presence, we must make much greater use of exercises and deployments for training (DFTs). Team spirit, the joint ROK-U.S. exercise, should be dramatically scaled back and increasingly replaced by JCS exercises to widen and deepen ties and to enhance interoperability with other Asian allies. There is no better way to effectively institutionalize a lasting security relationship based on mutual

benefit. And these links should not be viewed solely in a military light. Time and again defense relationships have been safety nets which have moderated the effects of great shocks in political and economic relations."³²

Shore-based and afloat prepositioning assets are relatively inexpensive force multipliers which can help offset the impacts of force draw-downs and the Philippine base closures. In a remarkably prescient article, General George B. Crist, USMC (Ret.) said:

"Prepositioned equipment and material in or adjacent to likely crisis areas can enable sharp reductions in response time and total lift needed. Ashore, stockpiles can be constructed and maintained by civilian contractors and guarded by the host nation's military. There is no need for the kind of high profile American military presence at prepositioning sites which so often has been the target of terrorist attacks and local anti-American agitation. Moreover, arrangements could be made whereby prepositioned stocks could also be made available to the host nation in time of crisis, thus

permitting tradeoffs between selective and rapid U.S. material assistance to the threatened nation and the actual dispatch of U.S. troops."³³

There are currently two maritime prepositioning ship squadrons in the CINCPAC AOR; one at Diego Garcia and the other near the Marianas. They are roughly 4800 miles (10-14 steaming days) apart. I believe that, given the current politico-military situation in Europe, the need for the third MPS squadron in the eastern Atlantic is low. POMCUS assets already in Europe are sufficient to meet current need. This squadron is much more likely to be needed in the Pacific. USCINCPAC should therefore initiate action to get this squadron relocated to the vicinity of Singapore. It can be easily supported there, and it will be in an ideal position to quickly augment either of the other squadrons should the need arise.

In summary, USCINCPAC will be able to accomplish his forward presence and crisis response missions, but not without some significant problems, as already discussed. Additionally, there are some unique capabilities which we will not be able to regenerate any time soon. These are primarily in the training area. The importance of the Crow Valley Weapons Range has already been discussed. There is currently no substitute. If

none is developed, USCINCPAC will be faced with the alternatives of either accepting reduced aircrew readiness or accepting reduced on-station times for these units so they can return to the U.S. for periodic training. The Pacific Air Force staff is currently conducting a survey of various ranges in Australia, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Alaska in order to choose an alternate site. Although the survey team's report is not due until March 1992, it appears that the leading candidate is a range at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska.³⁴ While this range has the advantages of varied terrain, large area and guaranteed U.S. control, it is far from potential trouble spots in southeast and southwest Asia. While Air Force units based in Japan, Okinawa and Korea would be able to train at this range without significant disruption of their missions, Navy air wings deployed aboard carriers would still be in the situation they are in now. It makes little sense to deploy a carrier from San Diego to the Indian Ocean by way of Alaska. We need to establish a suitable range in the western Pacific so our carrier air wings will be as proficient at the end of a deployment as they are at the beginning. Similar arguments can be made for the establishment of new naval gunfire support ranges and amphibious training facilities. USCINCPAC should press for a cooperative agreement which would result in high

quality training facilities, not just for U.S. and host-nation benefit, but for all friendly countries in the area. This type of arrangement will go far toward establishing the interoperability that will be required in the coalition warfare of tomorrow.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The impacts of the loss of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base can be summarize as follows:

- o USCINCPAC will be unable to train or support forward deployed (especially naval) forces in the manner to which we are accustomed. On-station times of deployed forces may be correspondingly reduced.
- o USCINCPAC will be able to support "tripwire" forces in the area of responsibility, but his ability to bring heavy naval forces to bear quickly will be diminished due to the size of the AOR and the transit times involved.
- o Future significant military operations in the CINCPAC AOR will of necessity be coalition affairs. This will influence the availability of allied/friendly forces and facilities.

Therefore,

- o Training and support functions previously located in the Philippines should be relocated to facilities

throughout the theater, primarily in Japan, Singapore and Guam.

- o USCINCPAC must develop the degree of intimate regional politico-military ties which will help provide timely indications and warning of impending conflicts and assure the countries in the region of our continuing interest and commitment. We must increase the emphasis on combined exercises and deployments for training.

- o Additional emphasis on ashore and afloat prepositioning is required in the CINCPAC AOR. Relocation of the maritime prepositioning ship squadron currently in the eastern Atlantic to Singapore is a viable short-term solution.

- o USCINCPAC must have contingency plans available for various coalition operations and must be prepared to operate forces from facilities we may not have previously used. We must develop as many alternate training locations as possible to maximize our familiarity with the potential theater of combat

operations, and with our potential allies and enemies.

While the loss of the Philippine bases will cause us significant problems, it is not the end of the world. We have the opportunity to establish new relationships throughout the vast Pacific - Indian Ocean area which will contribute to regional stability and the accomplishment of our national strategic objectives. We must remain active in the Pacific theater, and we must not allow the loss of the Philippine bases to stop us. The words of Fairfield Osborn, written almost fifty years ago, are still hauntingly appropriate today:

" 'Look to the West!' This is in the destiny of the people of America. The voyage of the Mayflower, the building of the continent, the experiences of later years in the Pacific -- all of our epic movements have been westward. As this is written, we have a far-flung battle line over the vast areas of the ocean beyond our western shore. When the battles are over, destiny will still be calling for us there. Our soldiers and sailors who are there today will be succeeded by untold numbers of



American people busying themselves in the ways of
peace. It is not written otherwise."³⁵

NOTES

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6. Ibid.
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18. The New York Times, 8 January 1979, Quoted in Cottrell and Hanks, p.18.

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20. Source: USCINCPAC J-5 Staff. (LtCol Robinson) They actually claim only five flights.

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