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SIMILARITIES/DIFFERENCES IN COMBAT/PEACETIME LEADERSHIP

BY

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92 F 12 12851

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE			4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army War College		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) AWCA		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Carlisle Barracks Carlisle, PA 17013			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.
			WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.		
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Similarities/Differences in Combat/Peacetime Leadership					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) KNIGHT, Kenneth R., LTC, FA					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Study Project		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 92/04/15	
				15. PAGE COUNT 39	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)					
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20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Dr. J. W. Williams			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 717-245-4427		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL USAMHI

19 (cont'd.)

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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SIMILARITIES/DIFFERENCES IN COMBAT/PEACETIME LEADERSHIP

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Kenneth R. Knight, LTC, FA
TITLE: Similarities/Differences in Peacetime/Combat Leadership
FORMAT: Individual Study Project
DATE: 15 April 1992 PAGES: 37 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

America has fought several wars in this century. Until recently, the most vivid in the minds of Americans has been the Vietnam War. The Persian Gulf War demonstrated that the U.S. Army has changed drastically from the armies that marched to war in the past, especially the army of the Vietnam era. Changes in doctrine, training, leadership and the establishment of an all-volunteer force have caused this change. As an army transitions to war there have always been similarities and differences in the way a leader must lead. This paper is a study of peacetime and combat leadership in today's Army using Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm as a case study. The author describes the process of developing high performance units by achieving a "band of excellence." Leadership comparisons between combat and peacetime are made under the sub-headings of leadership; discipline; training; motivation/morale; health, welfare and safety; family support; and transition from peace to combat. The author concludes that leadership in peacetime and combat is very similar in high performance units and offers recommendations. The primary sources for the study are personal interviews of currently serving commanders, a survey of Army War College students who served as commanders or staff during the Persian Gulf War and the author's personal experience as a combat commander of a field artillery battalion.

SIMILARITIES/DIFFERENCES IN COMBAT/PEACETIME LEADERSHIP

A prince should therefore have no other aim or thoughts, nor take up any other thing for his study, but war and its organization and discipline, for that is the only act that is necessary to one who commands.

Machiavelli

PROLOGUE

War! My generation grew up in the Army hearing our Elders, the Veterans (the captains and the majors), tell about Vietnam and how war really was. We saw and lived through the after effects of Vietnam - the drugs and the racial problems, the draft army, then VOLAR (Volunteer Army) and poor popular support. For years, my generation and our Elders worked to turn this around. We studied and trained hard. We redefined leadership and tactics. We worked training into an art, culminating our efforts with the combat training centers. We asked for and received the very best men and women America had to offer, and we turned them into soldiers. We read and studied the art of war and prepared for combat with the Russian Bear. We wondered how it would be, this phenomenon called war. And while we were as well prepared for it as any army that ever went to war, we had only our background in reading, our training, and the knowledge of our Elders to prepare us for the next clash of arms. Then, without warning,

it came. The Persian Gulf War was an astounding validation of almost twenty years of preparation for war.

Today's soldier and today's Army are much different from the ones that returned from Vietnam in 1972. Combat and our philosophy on how to fight wars have changed - CNN, high-tech weapons and the short war philosophy have caused change.

Our leadership has certainly changed the way we do business in the past twenty years. This paper will discuss the differences and similarities of leadership in today's Army between peacetime and combat. The Persian Gulf War is used as a case study from which to base comparisons.

This paper relies heavily on three sources. The first is a survey that was administered to sixteen Army War College students who served as battalion commanders or staff during the Persian Gulf War. A copy of the survey is at Appendix A. A second source was interviews conducted with four battalion commanders, and their brigade and division commander, all from the 1st Cavalry Division and all veterans of the war. Finally, the author relied heavily on his own experiences as both a peacetime and combat battalion commander.

In order to achieve brevity and to protect some identities, most individual surveys/interviews are not cited directly but are used as general reference material. The term, peacetime, in this paper relates to any time prior to deployment to Saudia Arabia. Combat refers to the time period of both Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Desert Shield was considered a combat period

because units operated in a wartime environment and on a wartime schedule.

Shortly after the war ended, General Norman Schwarzkopf stated in an interview:

I will tell you, the young lieutenant colonels out there who are commanding now today are ten times better than I was as a battalion commander in their level of professionalism. It's a life thing with them. And they study it and they work it and they talk about it actively and that's very healthy.¹

This paper is written as seen through the eyes of those battalion commanders.

INTRODUCTION

"Battle. . . is essentially a moral conflict. It requires . . . a mutual and sustained act of will by two contending parties, and if it is to result in a decision, the moral collapse of one of them. How protracted that will must be, and how complete that moral collapse, are not things about which one can be specific. In an ideal battle the act would be sustained long enough for the collapse to be total"²

John Keegan, The Face of Battle

John Keegan, military historian and former instructor at Sandhurst, goes on to state that battles have one thing in common, men struggling to reconcile their instinct for self-preservation, and their sense of honor and duty to country. The study of battle is therefore a study of fear, will, courage, motivation, training, self-sacrifice, compassion, violence, faith and always, leadership.³




FIGURE 1

In my discussions with combat leaders over the topics of this paper, two factors came through very clearly: Nothing in combat substitutes for good leadership and good training. All else flows from these two factors. In peacetime we live by a set of standards prescribed by regulation and/or the commander. These standards must replicate the parameters of combat as closely as possible. We build high-performance units and a command-and-control structure which capitalizes on the unit's capability. A "band of excellence" is created based on standards and training readiness. As figure 1 shows, factors included in performing within the "band of excellence" are maintenance, morale, character of unit leaders, family support, ethics and spiritual beliefs. In short, the "band of excellence" reflects a balanced command climate.⁴ Units who stay within the parameters of this band are prepared for war. There are many similarities

and some differences in how leaders must prepare their units in each of these areas during peacetime and during combat.

LEADERSHIP

The commander must try, above all, to establish personal and comradely contact with his men, but without giving away an inch of his authority.

Rommel

Leadership styles, and the amount of change between peacetime and wartime, seemed to vary by level of command. The battalion commanders who were interviewed overwhelmingly described their leadership style as decentralized and indirect in peacetime. During combat most said that they did not change their leadership style or techniques much. They tended to become slightly more centralized and direct than during peacetime, but not dramatically. Conversely, their company commanders were centralized and direct during peacetime and became more so during combat.

The leader's challenge in peacetime is to assess his unit's strengths and weaknesses and adopt a leadership style or technique that will develop it into a high-performance unit. His leadership style must be such that he can make the transition to effective combat leadership and maintain the same high performance in the unit. Most importantly, the successful leader must establish a proactive organization, where clear goals and objectives are established and empower subordinate leaders within the framework. The commander's energy has to be focused on ensuring

that his intent is understood. He must have clearly defined standards and an open communication system to ensure that standards are understood. Brainstorming, brief backs and after action reviews can all help to accomplish this both in peacetime and combat. Once standards are understood the leader's focus becomes one of disciplining the command to execute them.⁵

Our doctrine requires leaders who can achieve success on a battlefield of great depth; combat is characterized by subordinate leaders and the independent action of small sections or units who understand and can execute the commander's intent. Most important in this area is the value of the non-commissioned officer in today's Army. In peacetime leaders often fail to give the NCO the authority to perform missions that he is capable of doing. In combat we have no choice but to give him responsibility. During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm the NCOs performed admirably. The challenges to the peacetime commander are to give his junior leaders as much responsibility as possible and to create leadership challenges for them. The combat training centers (CTC) allow us the most flexibility in training. During combat, the small unit leader has to be able to make decisions on his own - and this applies in every arena, from the infantry squad leader to the supply or maintenance sergeant who is far in the rear and not accessible to his commander.

There were leadership failures. The commanders interviewed stated that there seemed to be little difference in the causes for relief of officers or senior sergeants from peacetime to war.

Reliefs were generally for lack of leadership skills (incompetence) or ethical behavior. Commanders were more willing to relieve subordinates in combat because of their concern for secondary or tertiary effects if they did not. Weak leaders, who might have been given second or third chances back at home station, were quickly replaced in the desert. Commanders stated that there were few surprises. The leaders who were weak during peacetime had their weaknesses exposed even more so after deployment. The after effects of their experience, however, may cause veteran commanders to be less tolerant of mistakes or perceived weak leaders in the future. Several former commanders who were interviewed expressed that they would not allow the same latitude for "room to grow" as they had in the past. This feeling prevailed among those commanders who deployed to Desert Shield late (Dec 90/Jan 91) in contrast to the ones who arrived in August through October, 1990, and who had more time to observe and develop their leaders in the desert.

Relief for ethical reasons was more frequent in combat than in peacetime. The nature of our values and the responsibilities that we give our leaders, especially during combat, place them in situations where ethical dilemmas easily occur. An example was the tremendous temptation that confronted leaders to abuse the virtually unlimited funds that were available for local purchase of supplies and equipment from the economy. Those with weak ethical foundations will often fail. This failure is a natural

fallout from war where there is less supervision. Ethics training must be stressed during peacetime training programs.

Stress probably impacted on leadership more than any other factor. In peacetime it is virtually impossible to simulate the stress of the combat environment. The CTCs can create very stressful situations for short periods of time but the reality of combat cannot be duplicated.

Some leaders changed their leadership styles because of their inability to handle stress and not because of the need to stimulate their unit. The most dramatic example of this in the survey was that of a maneuver brigade commander who, after deployment, became "volatile and aggressive towards his six subordinate battalion commanders," placing greater confidence in his staff than in his commanders. He would publicly humiliate and verbally assault his commanders, both on the radio and in public. This change in behavior was a complete reversal from his leadership style during peacetime. Two of his commanders stated that the brigade commander "caused more stress than the entire war." Several attempts by the battalion commanders to talk to the brigade commander one on one about his drastic change in behavior were rebuffed.⁶

The Colonel's brigade was very successful in the war, but there was evidence that morale and confidence was beginning to slip as junior leaders became more and more aware of his behavior. One has to wonder how the brigade would have fared if the war had been prolonged.

During peacetime, leaders at every level should observe their subordinates' leadership closely during stressful situations for signs of instability which could worsen during combat.

DISCIPLINE

A leader should be loved and feared.

Machiavelli

High performing units are highly disciplined in all aspects. Discipline comes in many forms - tactical, personal, moral, etc. Tactical discipline is often taught and reinforced by using drills. For example, units that go through the peacetime CTCs must have very precise, rehearsed combat drills. If they do not they will quickly fail. In combat, the unit must have the discipline to continue the same peacetime drills and not take shortcuts.

A good illustration of this is the attention to detail paid to artillery fires at the National Training Center (NTC). When an artillery battalion masses fires at the NTC, all rounds must land exactly on target; there can be no stray rounds, even if a stray round is just a few meters off target. This standard is a much tougher one than artillery units encounter at their home stations. There, rounds simply have to land within a "safety box." To meet the tough NTC standard, artillery battalions develop drills and checks and balances but still must remain within time standards. In combat, disciplined units do not

deviate from these drills. Fatigue and the desire to be faster often make it tempting to vary from set procedures. It is the discipline of the leader and the well-trained, individual soldier that do not allow this to happen. During Desert Storm this discipline paid off for the artillery: Fires were accurate, predictable and safe.

Personal discipline should be drilled in peacetime and combat just as hard as tactical discipline. During Desert Storm, consumption of water, and maintenance of one's protective mask or individual weapon are just a few examples of personal discipline that could have significant impact on the individual soldier. Personal discipline is often hard to evaluate in training and, therefore, often ignored, even at the CTCs.

Commanders reported differences in the area of soldier indiscipline. During peacetime alcohol was the number one disciplinary problem followed by minor drug use (marijuana) and indebtedness. During combat, indiscipline was usually stress-related -- e.g., insubordination, minor fights and sleeping on duty. The prohibition of alcohol in-country during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was a huge factor in keeping disciplinary problems to a very low level.

TRAINING

*When fear and pressure kicks in . . .
training takes over.*

Soldier - Desert Storm⁷

Training to a standard that every soldier understands is the most important key to success in peacetime or combat for two reasons. If a soldier knows the standard and knows that he can achieve or exceed it, his confidence and morale soars. Second, if a unit is trained to standard and the soldiers know the business of their craft, then they can adapt quickly to any situation.

One of the true strengths of the American soldier that was evident during Operation Desert Storm was his ability to be flexible, an ability tied directly to training to standard. The well-trained unit that has stayed within the "band of excellence" in peacetime can adapt itself to any situation. Many times during Desert Shield units adapted their tactics and techniques to desert conditions. By the beginning of Desert Storm, the American army was more adept at desert fighting than the Iraqi army. This phenomenon was a result of soldiers knowing their trade very well in peacetime, and then adapting.

There is no substitute for realistic training. In peacetime commanders must use every resource and every bit of their imagination to ensure that soldiers are exposed to as much realism as possible. Three commanders who were interviewed were all involved in the same armored task force operation during Desert

Storm. It was the first combat action for their soldiers. Both sides took casualties. After it was over all three commanders were amazed at the comparisons that they and their soldiers made of the battle to the training they had received at the National Training Center. They suddenly knew what to expect based on their training experience, and much of their fear of the unknown was eased.⁸

Realistic training is applicable at every level. Soldier morale is directly related to their confidence that "the system works." For example, the perception of the skill of the company medics and lifesavers, the ability to evacuate wounded and the effectiveness of the medical system in the rear, is a critical morale-maintaining factor. During peacetime this system is difficult to exercise and usually given lower priority than other training. During combat it takes on much greater significance. Units that deployed early spent a significant amount of time doing "visible" training. A large number of soldiers were usually involved to increase awareness and confidence. Many units adopted innovative techniques and modified vehicles to increase their medical evacuation capability.

Physical training (PT) was also key. The commanders who were interviewed indicated that their units performed PT four to five hours per week during peacetime. After deployment, every effort was made to continue at this level or higher. When conditions prohibited normal PT activities, such as deep sand or lack of bathing facilities, leaders adapted their PT program to

the conditions. Many focused on activities that were related to the combat skills of their soldiers -- e.g., artillerymen worked on strength and stamina skills by lifting and passing 100-pound projectiles.

Every commander agreed that PT was one of their strongest programs for building confidence and unit cohesiveness, both in peacetime and combat. During the war the payoff came in two forms. First was a very healthy army, especially considering the harsh conditions. Sick call rates were much lower than experienced in garrison. Second, physical conditioning of soldiers led to high stamina during the ground war. The belief that PT will cease when combat begins was false in this war. Units performed PT whenever the conditions were right.

One of the most significant training differences in a peacetime unit and one transitioning to combat is the stability of personnel and the lack of fiscal constraints. Those units that deployed early during Desert Shield had several months of stability to achieve extremely high levels of training. This stability cannot be duplicated in a peacetime army. Turbulence and fiscal constraints often make the development of high performing units a goal with success measured in terms of the progress made towards achieving the highest level versus the actual achievement.⁹ During combat, with its stability and adequate resources, goals were normally attainable.

MOTIVATION/MORALE

Morale is the single greatest factor in successful war.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

The first step in motivating soldiers is to tell them the reason why.

General Bruce C. Clarke

In the Army it has become in vogue to train to a standard and base motivation almost solely on this desire. But soldiers also want to be winners, and they want their unit to be the best. View soldiers at any typical sports day and watch the glow on their faces when their unit wins top honors. A commander in peacetime must instill the winning spirit in his soldiers and keep them out of situations where they are doomed to fail. If his unit has lousy volleyball players but great softball players, the commander should challenge another unit to play softball, not volleyball.

Prior to Operation Desert Shield, one battalion commander required that at battalion PT formation all soldiers be in the Army gray PT uniform (a full year before it was mandatory in the Army). Some of the chain-of-command felt this was harsh since it involved personal expenditure of funds by soldiers to purchase the uniforms. Since this would occur a year later anyway, the commander pushed the issue, and encouraged fund raisers, etc. During the next and subsequent brigade PT runs, the battalion was the only one in a standard PT uniform. Morale and pride soared,

and soon each company within the battalion had purchased distinctive company shirts. Peer pressure kept the momentum going. Units with high morale in peacetime, who think of themselves as winners, will enter into combat with the same attitude and continue to build on it.

Being well-trained, and knowing it, certainly builds morale in combat. Before the ground war started, at least one division took the opportunity to "blood, or season the troops," by running several low-risk combat operations. During a series of feints and probes, battalion, and brigade-sized units were able to test their tactics and firepower against the Iraqi army without becoming decisively engaged. The success of these operations boosted morale and confidence tremendously. When the ground war actually started soldiers knew that their equipment and their tactics would work.¹⁰

Every combat commander interviewed remarked on his ability to get closer to the troops than peacetime situations allowed. By doing so, he was able to listen to soldiers and to show that the chain-of-command cared. Soldiers saw their leaders sharing the same hardships and concerns, and they developed a close bond with each other. Leaders learned in combat that genuine concern for soldiers received a much closer examination than during peacetime. Genuine concern means more than just taking care of troops. It is a deep, internalized, authentic love of the soldier for what he is and does. In war, this love cannot be faked; the soldiers know if it is real or not.¹¹

There has never been a soldier more informed about the events that were occurring during a war than the American soldier in this war, especially considering the remoteness of the desert. Every section had a radio; and, if they were lucky, it was a shortwave. Even in the most remote areas the BBC or Voice of America could be received. It was very important that the commander keep the troops informed and that leaders deciphered the news reports to ensure that the truth was being reported accurately, both the good and the bad. This was extremely important for morale. Soldiers thirsted for news. As a battalion commander I spoke to each of my batteries weekly, often using a map to show them the situation. Only the most secret information was withheld. Within hours of the cease-fire announcement, I did the same thing. I can think of nothing that was more important, a fact validated by every commander interviewed.

Today's soldier is the most intelligent the Army has ever fielded. They have great ideas. The good leader will listen to those ideas and incorporate as many as practical. It gives the soldier ownership in what he is being asked to do. The greatest challenge to the commander is to create an environment in his unit that allows the good ideas to bubble up to his level.

The surfacing and using of ideas works well in both combat and peacetime environments, but it is usually easier in combat. There the leader is less constrained by peacetime rules and regulations and is able to adapt to the surroundings and

environment. Examples from the commanders' survey included innovative handling of combat ammunition loads, training with lasers in the desert, adapting new tactical movement and employment techniques, and making sensible modifications to vehicles and equipment to make them more effective. The leader who supports and encourages new ideas and innovations creates a win-win situation: His unit's performance improves, and his troops gain confidence in themselves and their unit's ability to achieve success.

HEALTH, WELFARE AND SAFETY

Man for man, one division is just as good as another - they vary only in the skill and leadership of their commander.

General Omar Bradley

The health, welfare and safety of soldiers is a difficult leadership challenge, especially in combat. While not meaning to detract from the significant effort that goes into this area during peacetime, the process of our environment generally takes care of it. In combat, many of the things that we take for granted in peacetime are simply not there.

In Saudia Arabia, simple things like latrines, showers, tents, cots, food and its preparation, water and its consumption, sleep plans, laundry, sick call, and physical and mental conditioning all took a tremendous amount of effort and time on the part of commanders, staffs and every leader. During a short

field training exercise in peacetime, many of these areas can be ignored and solved upon return to garrison. During combat deployments, mission failure could result if health-and-welfare problems are not solved or issues not addressed.

The commanders took these issues seriously and conducted inspections and brief backs. I required my battalion Command Sergeant Major and the Surgeon to spend at least half of their time on health, welfare and safety inspections. After just a short time, these inspections became a drill with both leaders and soldiers, just like any other training exercise in good units. Not only were soldiers healthy, but they took great pride in the appearance of their living areas.

One of the peacetime lessons learned that affected every unit commander interviewed was the poor preparedness of most units to live in a field environment for extended periods. In peacetime, training exercises are usually for short periods, and it is easy for troops to "tough it out." Essential items such as tents, cots, portable showers, latrines, lanterns, and stoves were not maintained at high levels during peacetime nor were they available in quantities to support every soldier in the unit. Field sanitation kits, carpenter kits, barber kits, etc. were often poorly maintained or had shortages. The 14 day (or 30 day depending on unit SOP) supply of war reserve expendables such as foot powder, water purification tablets, etc. were not properly maintained. When the time came to deploy, even units with four or five weeks' notice were not able to overcome these shortages,

and this situation caused problems after deployment. Simple things like a water can, diesel can or jack missing from the basic issue of a truck could be show stoppers in the desert where vehicles often operated independently and long distances from their base. Although many items such as tents and cots were issued to units out of Army war reserve stock, in some cases these supplies were not immediately forthcoming. Items like tools, jacks and water cans were eventually supplied. Some were bought through local purchase but these were often very poor quality. The peacetime leader must establish and enforce tough standards to ensure sets, kits and outfits are complete and maintained. In a war that has no Desert Shield-like prelude the commander will have to live and fight with what he owns.

Soldiers know if their leaders care. During Desert Shield my battalion worked long, hard hours during the three and one half months before Desert Storm. Even so, we tried to give soldiers at least one day off per week, usually Sunday. Lots of recreational activities were planned, if the soldier wanted to participate. Additionally, we tried to show a movie during the evening five nights a week. Accomplishing these goals took extraordinary effort on the part of every leader, but the payoff in esprit and morale was worth it.

FAMILY SUPPORT

Man has two supreme loyalties - to country and to family . . . so long as their families are safe, they will defend their country, believing that by their sacrifice they are safeguarding their families also. But even the bonds of patriotism, discipline and comradeship are loosened when the family itself is threatened.

B. H. Liddel Hart

Today's soldier is older than the soldier in the draft Army of twenty years ago. The average age today of the enlisted married soldier is 29. Fifty-five percent are married and have families.¹² The emphasis on the family has also increased significantly since the Vietnam era and is a key morale factor.

The establishment of family support groups is an area that has many similarities and few differences between combat and peacetime. Like training, family support groups and programs need to be well-established in units during peacetime, long before a unit deploys for combat. They make significant contributions to unit cohesion by giving the entire family, and not just the soldier, a sense of belonging to the organization. During absences of the soldier on training deployments or even short, local field training exercises, the family support group can fill the void until the soldier's return. During emergencies, and even death, the family support group can become as important as the church and becomes a surrogate family to those involved whose relatives are far away.

During times of combat, well-established family support groups simply increase their tempo and level of activities. Uncertainty, fear, financial issues and injury and death are key areas that are normally dealt with. While these issues are no different from peacetime, the level intensifies with combat. The intensity of involvement of leaders' spouses increases from a few hours a week during peacetime to almost full-time during combat. The challenge to the commander is significant. During peacetime he must establish family support groups, and ensure that the spouses of the leaders are well-educated in all aspects of family support and associated regulations. While in combat, one of the commander's top priorities must be keeping the family support groups informed of the situation. During Desert Shield/Storm soldiers had better communications with their families than during any previous war. Mail and FAX messages were reasonably quick and many soldiers had limited access to phones. It was very easy for rumors to get started. Well-informed family support groups were key to solving this problem. To help alleviate this problem and others, most commanders left good officers and NCOs behind to assist family support groups, especially at brigade level and higher. For example, the 1st Cavalry Division left a former battalion commander behind at division level. Each brigade had a major or captain stay behind and the battalions each left a senior NCO.

It is also extremely important that the family support groups receive adequate support from their post in a number of areas. These areas include administrative support for newsletters, meetings and social events; counseling; casualty assistance; support for solving problems; and most of all, information. Feedback from commanders and their spouses give mixed reviews concerning the quality of post support, even from units with the strongest family support groups. The Army needs to do better in the future.

Every commander interviewed agreed that strong family support groups eased the burden of command and were an important morale booster for both the unit and the family. All agreed that the success of this program in combat is directly related to how well it was established during peacetime.

TRANSITION FROM PEACE TO COMBAT

Men will not fight and die without knowing what they are fighting and dying for.

General Douglas MacArthur

It is important that the leader understand and appreciate the mental transition that occurs from peace to combat. This is a transition rarely experienced during peacetime. In peacetime it will occur to some degree during a long or stressful training deployment, such as a REFORGER (Reinforce Germany) exercise or a CTC deployment. It is particularly important that this

transition is understood by the junior leader, especially at the lieutenant and captain level.

The transition to combat comes in many forms. Major General Barry McCaffery, Commander of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), has called today's soldier the "most religious since the Army of Northern Virginia."¹³ The pornography that we were used to seeing in the hands of the soldiers in the '70s and '80s has been replaced by more sophisticated literature. Often in Saudi Arabia it was the Bible, especially as combat grew closer.

The key to spiritual issues is not to force them but to find out what the soldiers want. For instance, they may be satisfied with a battalion prayer led by the battalion chaplain, or they may organize their own group prayer at platoon level. They may want nothing at all. An excellent example came out in the survey. In one battalion, a young specialist met the need of a large number of soldiers by conducting an informal gospel service. Initially the battalion chaplain took offense at this because the soldier drew a larger following than he did. Army Regulations also prohibit a soldier from conducting formal services without being approved and certified. The young soldier was filling a need for a number of soldiers located in a remote location with little contact from home or the outside world. The commander permitted the young soldier to continue his services and took action to integrate his skills and influence with those of the chaplain. Another win-win situation was created.

While no one wants to dwell on death, there comes a time when the leader needs to talk about it with his soldiers. There were several techniques used. The most effective seemed to be using soldiers who had been in combat before to talk about their experiences and their fears.

As combat becomes imminent, little things become important: leader presence, last letters home, symbolic gestures. The leader needs to allocate time for this. Knowing that the American people supported them, prayed for them and wanted them to win and survive was extremely important to soldiers. This public support was an area that leaders emphasized.

At the soldier level, the section or squad becomes very important, followed closely by the platoon. Loyalty becomes fierce within these groups. Soldiers who share common hardships and danger develop bonds that last a lifetime. Most soldiers who have trained hard together will fight for each other and for leaders they respect before almost any other cause or principle. This loyalty has been validated time and time again in war. Leaders must recognize and build upon this fact. Unit integrity must be stressed as much as possible, and missions must be assigned with this in mind. Personnel and leadership changes, or any other drastic change, must be considered very closely to determine the positive or negative effect on morale and motivation. Combat leaders must remember that "every order is subject to the unspoken vote of the unit."¹⁴

CONCLUSION

Combat and peacetime leadership . . .
I found them to be remarkably similar. The same high disciplinary standards coupled with tough, realistic training seemed to work well, both in peace and war.

LTC Hans Van Winkle
Former Commanding Officer
8th Engineer Battalion
1st Cavalry Division

Many of the commanders interviewed for this paper concluded with a statement similar to that of Colonel Van Winkle. Leadership in combat and peacetime is very similar. Leadership styles in peacetime generally do not change during combat. When they do change, it is usually caused by stress. The quality of success hinges on practicing and developing leadership and command habits that will be used in war. Commanders who develop high-performance units and who maintain them within a "band of excellence" then have the flexibility to adapt to the situation and the environment that war may place them in.

The commander who allows his unit to fall below standard, even in one area, could find himself in a situation where he must change his leadership style to accomplish the mission. Strong leaders in peacetime become even better in combat. Weak, incompetent leaders are generally already identified and quickly replaced during combat.

Training to basics/standards has been mentioned throughout this paper and, without doubt, is a key to success. This type of training is an area where today's Army excels during peacetime, a

fact validated by the war. The stress, fear, violence and fog of war that combat brings cannot be duplicated in peacetime. Even so, units that are within the "band of excellence" will overcome these factors because they have high morale and confidence in their leaders, their equipment and themselves.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Maximize leadership participation at the CTCs. This is the best replication of combat leadership available in a realistic training environment.

2. Increase emphasis on ethical instruction, both in the TRADOC schools and at the unit level.

3. Develop policies to stabilize personnel in units for longer tours of duty. Stabilization equates directly to higher levels of training.

4. Increase unit training emphasis on skills and techniques for living in the field for extended periods.

5. Increase leadership training on transition from peace to combat.

6. Revise family support issues using Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm lessons learned. Formal family support training needs to be included in all officer and non-commissioned officer schools. Spouses of leaders should be encouraged to attend formal family support training.

APPENDIX A

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE - MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM QUESTIONNAIRE

FOR: _____ BOX _____

FROM: LTC KEN KNIGHT, BOX 168

The purpose of this survey is to solicit your comments on the differences/similarities between combat and peacetime leadership. The results will be used for two purposes: (1) research for an MSP, and (2) background material to assist in an oral history interview of a current serving Division Commander.

You were selected to participate in the survey based on your experience on Operations Desert Shield/Storm. If you were not a commander, base your answers on the staff or section you supervised.

Please use the continuation sheet at the end of the survey if additional space is required for an answer. Thanks for your cooperation.

PLEASE RETURN TO BOX 168 NLT 10 DECEMBER.

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT

TITLE OF FORM: COMBAT/PEACETIME LEADERSHIP SURVEY

AUTHORITY: 10 USC 4503

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:

The data collected with the attached form are to be used for research purposes only. When identifiers (name or social security number) are requested they are to be used for administrative and statistical control purposes only. Full confidentiality of the responses will be maintained in the processing of these data.

MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION:

Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. Individuals are encouraged to provide complete and accurate information in the interests of the research, but there will be no effect on any individuals for not providing all or any part of the information.

COMBAT/PEACETIME LEADERSHIP SURVEY

1. What was your duty position and unit in Southwest Asia (SWA)?
2. How long had you been in this position before deploying to SWA?

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS PERTAIN TO PRE-DEPLOYMENT/PEACE TIME.

3. How would you describe your pre-deployment leadership style?
4. What were your most successful motivational techniques in your unit during peacetime?
5. Did you relieve any subordinates before deployment? If yes, describe why in general terms.

6. How often did your unit perform PT prior to deployment?

7. What were the most significant discipline problems in your unit prior to deployment? How did you handle them?

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS PERTAIN TO DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

8. Did you change your leadership style when your unit entered SWA? If so, in what way?

9. Did you notice a leadership style change in your subordinate leaders after deployment? Explain.

10. What were your most successful motivational techniques in SWA?

11. Did your motivational techniques/strategies change between Desert Shield and Desert Storm? If yes, please describe. Which worked best?

12. Did you relieve any subordinates during Desert Shield/Desert Storm? If yes, describe why in general terms.

13. Did your standards for relief change between pre-deployment (peacetime) and deployment (combat situation)? Explain.

14. What did you do to transition your unit from a peacetime mentality to a combat mentality? Did you conduct special classes or specialized training?

15. How often did your unit perform PT during Desert Shield/Storm?

16. How would you assess the physical conditioning of your unit during Desert Storm? Was it a factor in the morale of your unit? Explain.

17. How did your unit prepare spiritually for combat?

18. Was there an increased religious awareness in your unit after deployment to SWA? Before Desert Storm? Please describe.

19. What were the biggest fears soldiers expressed about facing combat? What did you do to alleviate fears?

20. What were the most significant discipline problems in your unit after deployment to SWA? How did you handle them?

26. Did you have a strong family support system during peacetime? After deployment?

27. Did you deal with family support issues differently in a combat environment vs peacetime? What kind of issues did you have?

28. Please add any additional comments that relate specifically to the similarities/differences in leadership that you experienced between a combat and peacetime environment.

ENDNOTES

1. Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, Stormin' Norman (Zebra Books, 1991) 112-113.
2. John Keegan, The Face of Battle, (London, Penguin Books, 1978), 302.
3. Ibid.
4. LTC Mike Parker, "Pursuit of Excellence Has No Finish Line," (Draft paper written for publication), interview by author, 8 January 1992, Ft. Hood.
5. Ibid.
6. "Combat/Peacetime Leadership Survey," administered by LTC Kenneth R. Knight, (Army War College Class of '92, 1991).
7. MG Barry McCaffrey, "Combat Leadership," (Address to the Army War College Class of 92, 1991). Used with permission.
8. COL Randy House and LTC Mike Parker, interview by author, 8-9 January 1992, Ft. Hood.
9. Ibid.
10. MG John Tilelli, interview by author, 6-7 January 1992, Ft. Hood. Used with permission.
11. Peter S. Kindsvatter, "Cowards, Comrades and Killer Angels: The Soldier in Literature," Parameters, (VOL XX, No.2, June 1990), 31-49.
12. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Army Liaison Office, "Statistics, Personnel," computer program, (Washington D.C., Pentagon, 1 June 1991)
13. MG Barry McCaffrey, "Combat Leadership."
14. Ibid.

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