Tactical Missile Defense: A Chink in the Armor?
Abstract
Current tactical ballistic missile defense thinking received a tremendous jolt because of Operation Desert Storm. Though classified a success, the coalition efforts against Iraqi Scuds highlighted an apparent deficiency in total theater air defense. In a matter of months after the war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had rushed to print a new doctrine for theater missile defense and has another in development for tactics, techniques, and procedures for theater air defense in a joint arena. While the purpose is noble, the resulting doctrinal changes further fragment the air defense mission, of which tactical missile defense should be an integral but not independent part. An examination of the evolution of the tactical missile threat, both historical and future, indicates the trend is clearly toward greater numbers of more sophisticated weapons in regions of increasing volatility. An analysis of our Gulf experience reveals why the JCS reacted so quickly in directing new doctrine for missile defense, but the new doctrine is not clearly thought out and therefore does not accomplish its intended purpose. Consolidation of existing doctrine on air defense rather than adding to it will produce the synergism of effort the JCS intends. A similar consolidation of authority for air defense in a single commander who does not do double duty as the Joint Force Air Component Commander is needed to optimize planning for tactical missile defense. We also need to practice this phase of defense in joint and if possible combined exercises.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 19, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA249939
Entities
People
- Earl I. Ficken Jr.
Organizations
- Naval War College