Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPF) in Central Command in the 1990s: Force Multiplier or Force Divider?
Abstract
Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPFs) are an effective and efficient means for Commander in Chief, Central Command (CINCCENT) to achieve national security and military strategy objectives in his area of operations (AOR) in the 1990s and beyond, provided they are properly deployed and employed. The MPF concept was validated during Desert Shield/Storm, as a complement to, not a substitute for, amphibious operations, providing the CINC expeditionary flexibility and employment sustainability. Post-Desert Storm force reductions, and political, military, and fiscal constraints, promise to put our Nation's future expeditionary flexibility in jeopardy. The future effective, efficient, and appropriate use of MPFs requires a thorough understanding of the MPF concept and doctrine, the enemy threat, mission requirements, capabilities and limitations of the forces, resources they need to accomplish the mission, and national interests. The strategy of a two-ship ARG/SPMAGTF/MPS combination, in the near term, in CENTCOM's AOR is feasible, but not suitable or acceptable because of its pernicious effects on operations. In this instance, it is a force divider, not a force multiplier.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA249957
Entities
People
- William T. Decamp Iii
Organizations
- Naval War College