Strategic Sealift: Management of the Ready Reserve Force
Abstract
The Persian Gulf Crisis has once again renewed debate concerning Strategic Sealift and management of the Nations Ready Reserve Force (RRF). Warfighting capabilities are directly tied to peacetime planning and management. As the peacetime manager of the RRF the Maritime Administration (Marad) has been held responsible for the poor condition of the Nations Strategic Sealift assets in general, and performance of the RRF during the Persian Gulf Crisis in particular. Although desired levels of readiness were not met during the surge phase of the operation, most other expectations of the RRF were met or exceeded during the buildup and sustainment phase. Furthermore, those identified areas of weakness were a direct of external constraints imposed upon Marad that prevented implementation of a sound management system. This paper presents a sound argument in defense of Marads performance as manager of the RRF which is reflected in the accomplishments of Sealift assets employed during the Crisis. However, a close review of the RRF vis-a-vis changing National Strategic and Military priorities supports moving managerial responsibilities to the DoD which is ultimately responsible for employment of these assets.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 13, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA249958
Entities
People
- William E. Curtis Jr
Organizations
- Naval War College