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THE MILITARY, THE PRESS AND THE GULF WAR

BY

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
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The Military, The Press and the Gulf War

An Individual Study Project

by

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15 April 1992

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ABSTRACT

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Through use of Oral History technique, this paper presents first person thoughts of the people that made the War in the Gulf the most public in history. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Public Affairs Officers and news reporters representing broadcast and print media give their accounts. Suggestions are offered for improvements in the Army Public Affairs system and the impact of the press on military strategy. Included are the steps that officers can take in their careers to avoid incidents with the press that can damage the Army and individual careers. Transcripts of interviews with the following individuals were used for this project: Captain Michael Doubleday, US Navy; General Michael J. Dugan, Air Force Chief of Staff (Ret); Mr. Fred Francis, NBC News; Captain Steven M. Hart, US Army 24th Division (Mech); Lieutenant Colonel Larry Icenogle, US Army; MS. Tansill H. Johnson, Office of the Secretary of the Army; Colonel David R. Kiernan, US Army; Colonel Donald P. Kirchoffner, US Army; Major General Barry R. McCaffrey, US Army; Mr. John McCutchen, San Diego Union; Mr. Jim Michaels, San Diego Tribune; Colonel William L. Mulvey, US Army; Mr. Richard F. Olson, 24th Division (Mech); Colonel Ron Sconyers, US Air Force; Colonel John Shotwell, US Marine Corps; Major General Winant Sidle, US Army (Ret); Major General John K. Singlaub, US Army (Ret); MS. S. Lynne Walker, San Diego Union. The interviews and transcripts used in this study are deposited in the archive of the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 17013.

INTRODUCTION

The Gulf War of 1990-1991 was the most publicized in history. New technological advances including telephone transmission of computer information, availability of facsimile machines, photocopiers and real-time satellite broadcasts made unprecedented media coverage possible. Media, for purposes of clarity, includes all means of presenting information to the public at large. Newspapers, magazines, radio and television broadcasts are most common.

Major General William A. Stofft, Commandant of the United States Army War College, encouraged the Class of 1992 to explore subjects outside their areas of expertise. An Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA), I served as part of the Presidential Callup. My unit supported Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I was stationed at Headquarters, J2 FORSCOM (U.S. Army Forces Command), Fort McPherson, Georgia.

Importantly, even though the stream of information from Military Intelligence (MI) sources was great, newspapers, magazines and radio reports were consumed non-stop. Often,

fellow soldiers would comment that after spending long hours on duty in support of the operations in the Gulf they found themselves glued to televisions, radios, newspapers and magazines. Friends, relatives and the general public offered the same experience.

However, the media is traditionally frowned upon by Army leadership. Statements to the press can lead to damage in the areas of security and morale. Media reports can end careers of senior and junior leaders.¹ The purpose of this study is to examine through the oral history method, personal experiences of those who were responsible for telling our story. Interviews were conducted with Public Affairs Officers (PAO) of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines. Media representatives who were in the Gulf give their impressions. Because this writer was not a Public Affairs Officer some viewpoints are offered that are the result of a different viewpoint than had the research been conducted by a Public Affairs Office (PAO) representative. The methodology of this study presents the actual comments and thoughts of the individuals. These primary quotes are taken from a series of interviews by the author and from transcripts in the archives of the Military History Institute.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

It is much to be wished that our printers were more discreet in many of their publications. We see in almost every paper, proclamations or accounts transmitted by the enemy of an injurious nature. If some hint or caution could have been given them on the subject, it might be of material service.

General George Washington

The relation of the military to the press is often at cross purposes. Author Peter Braestrup calls this a "...clash of cultures."² This clash of interests has continued throughout the life of the republic.

During the American revolution (1765-1783), despite General George Washington's statement, he also issued pleas for women to save all available linen and material that could be used for printing newspapers.³ The newspaper New Jersey Gazette, published by Quaker printer Isaac Collins, was used to provide information to the troops. It is evident that even for Washington media coverage was a necessary evil.

In comparison to the modern environment, newspapers of revolutionary times had a circulation of about 40,000. This reflected only a small number of readers, as the newspaper were read to others and passed from person to person. Importantly, it may have taken as long as six weeks for the news of the battles of Lexington and Concord to reach Savannah, Georgia.⁴

In each successive conflict the means of transmitting news

advanced along with technology. The time for news to reach its intended audience lessens. During the Civil War, telegraph reporting made it possible for news to be reported over long distances and appear in print overnight. General William Tecumseh Sherman voiced his displeasure with the press in 1864. One famous story recounts the capture of three reporters traveling with the Union Army of Tennessee. Sherman's sarcastic reaction: "Good, [we] now will have news from hell before breakfast!"⁵

General Sherman had good reason for this statement. New York Herald reporter DeBow Randolph Keim reported that Union intelligence had decrypted Confederate signal flag codes. The report was printed in the Herald 23 June 1864.⁶

Most reporters were not as irresponsible as Keim. Several were shot as spies and about forty seven were killed in battles. Reporters were considered combatants and were used as aides, couriers and dispatch carriers.⁷ George W. Smalley of the New York Tribune rode with General Hooker at the battle of Antietam, carried dispatches and had two horses shot from under him.

The Spanish-American War took place during the period of "Yellow Journalism." This meant that the role of newspapers and their effect on readership was so important that William Randolph Hearst's Journal was given credit for encouraging the United States to go to war with Spain. Many other papers were involved along with the Journal in reflecting the expansionist views of the general public. Once war was encouraged, the same

newspapers were against the war once it began.⁸

Censorship was not effective and, as in the Civil War, the press released information concerning military operations. Even though the military controlled reports transmitted over the underwater cable from Cuba to Florida, the newspapers compensated by fabricating information and rumors.⁹

The lessons of the Spanish-American War were not lost on the military during World War I. President Wilson established the Committee on Public Information to provide information to the public and become a liaison to the newspapers.¹⁰ This forerunner of the Public Affairs Office along with a strong system of accreditation made it possible for the military to control press reports. Cash bonds were posted before leaving the U.S. and once in the theatre of operations, reporters could be expelled under the authority of the American Expeditionary Force's Military Intelligence Service.¹¹

Radio and telephone links changed the technology used to report World War II. Established in June 1942, The Office of War Information handled the distribution of news to the U.S. and foreign media. Beginning in December 1941, the Office of Censorship monitored compliance with the Code of Wartime Practices. The censorship program was voluntarily imposed and followed because the overwhelming support of the press during World War II.¹²

Planning for press and radio coverage as part of military operations began during World War II. Military and civilian

leaders began to realize the importance of public opinion. Press pools were organized during the war. The pool coverage for the D-Day invasion was limited to forty reporters out of five hundred fifty-eight available. The press agreed to these arrangements as the only means of covering the invasion. Even at that time the idea of a limited press pool was not universally accepted.¹³ The belief that reporters would leak matters of military security was not a factor.

Ten days before the invasion of Sicily, General Dwight D. Eisenhower filled in some thirty American reporters on the assault planning down to identifying the specific divisions scheduled to hit the beaches. There were no security breaches at any of these top-secret conferences, and as the invasion progressed, the filed reporters in Sicily agreed, at Eisenhower's personal request, to sit on the most colorful story of the campaign: the famous slapping incident when General George Patton struck a soldier said to be suffering from shell shock. The story was later broken in Washington by Drew Pearson, a popular political gossip columnist, who was not privy to the agreement made in Sicily.¹⁴

It was the Korean and Viet Nam wars that were responsible for the negative view of the military toward the press. Television, a recent invention, did not have an effect on the Korean War but was to greatly influence public opinion during the Viet Nam War. At the opening of the Korean conflict press censorship was voluntarily based on General Douglas MacArthur's guidance that control of the press was not in best interest of the public. General MacArthur did caution against security violations.¹⁵

As the Korean War progressed press censorship was enforced.

In June 1951 censorship was centered at theatre level, located in Japan. After the assumption of command by General Matthew Ridgway, censorship was eased.¹⁶

The press/military conflict was not in the area of operations but back in the States. Critical analysis of the war and prosecution of the war most contributed to increasingly unfavorable opinions. This same pattern would repeat during the Viet Nam War.¹⁷

Viet Nam was the only major war since the founding of the nation without field press censorship. This was only one of many contributing factors to an adversarial relationship between the military and the media. Television was now in the majority of homes in the U.S. Reports of actual fire fights were, for the first time, brought into the living rooms of the nation. According to Major General Winant Sidle, USA, retired, the mistrust of the press was increased because the Viet Nam war dragged on for years and the press corps grew in numbers. Television became a media force. But the real problem was that early in the war, when U.S. presence was limited to a small numbers of advisors, the press believed it was misled by the military. The Pentagon press corps then began to mirror the reports from reporters in the field.¹⁸

General Sidle's opinion is that, even though the media is blamed by the military for the loss of public opinion at home, there was an effort to get the Army story told.

"I think we knocked ourselves out. We could always handle them by being more truthful with them. It's

just a very unreal, bureaucratic tendency to not want to tell them something and you have to get over that and it takes a while, I know."¹⁹

Army officers that were lieutenants and captains in the Viet Nam era are now lieutenant colonels, colonels and general officers. Younger officers gained experience during the Grenada, Panama and Desert Storm operations. History can yield many lessons, but the impressions of those in service are molded to an even greater extent by personal experiences and impressions.

The gap between the military and the media that began during Viet Nam was allowed to widen during the years leading up to the joint operation in Grenada. Viet Nam, Grenada and Operation Just Cause in Panama form the basis for Public Affairs doctrine during Desert Shield/Storm. Importantly, these events lead us to the mindset of most army leadership from the level of major and above.

Lieutenant Colonel Larry F. Icenogle typifies the experience of Army Public Affairs officers. Currently, the PAO at the Army War College and also an instructor, Colonel Icenogle has published articles in military journals. He is one of those key people who is in a position to influence the future of army-media relations. Let us examine his views:

"Go back to the Grenada Operation in 1983. As you know, a conscious decision was made to exclude the press until D+2 [two days after troop deployment]. Because of the resulting outcry over that, Mr. [Caspar] Weinberger, who was the Secretary of Defense at the time, commissioned Major General (retired) Winant

Sidle to chair a panel which came to be known as the Sidle Commission. [The commission was] made up of some current and former reporters, correspondents, Public Affairs Officers, media executives, and the need to examine the issues and to come up with some recommendations for the Secretary of Defense. One of the by-products of the Sidle Commission's work was the creation of what has come to be known as the Department of Defense National Media Pool. The signatories to that were the major wire services, major networks, major news magazines and newspapers, and a collection of other radio affiliates and news agencies, all agreed to pool their time, and pool their share [of resources], on a rotating basis. Sort of like a duty roster, if you will.

In the period of 1985 - 1986 the Defense Department tested that pool on numerous occasions. It tested it in Honduras; it tested it in California; at Twenty-nine Palms, it tested it at Camp Lejeune once; it tested it at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky; various and sundry environments involving various and sundry military branches doing different operations.

I was involved in Gallant Eagle which was a Central Command exercise at Twenty-nine Palms in the summer of 1986. By 1986, when Operation Earnest Will began, (the operation where we escorted reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Persian Gulf) we sent the DOD pool over there under the aegis of the U.S. Central Command and put them in Bahrain. From there they could join the Middle East Force naval vessels as they plied the waters of the Gulf as they escorted the reflagged Kuwaiti tankers. So,

the pool got some work in 1987 and I believe in 1988. That is the purpose of the pool.

The purpose of the DOD National Media Pool is to ensure that American news representatives are planned for and are part of a unified command's overall operational plans. One of the recommendations was that the media vehicle, the DOD National Pool, be the vehicle for injecting U.S. media representatives into a combat operation. Whenever troops would deploy, the pool would go with the deployed forces maybe not necessarily in the first wave, so to speak, but definitely planned for as early on as possible.

I would submit to you that we got the DOD pool into Saudi Arabia as soon as we could. I was told that the decision to allow the DOD pool into the country was transmitted from Saudi Arabia to Prince Bandar, then to Prince Sandi [who] informed the Secretary of Defense and his staff that it was a go, late the afternoon of Friday, 10 August. Eight days after the invasion, two days after the agreement to commit U.S. forces. Two days after that, on 10 August, the decision was made to notify the pool and get them over there as quickly as possible.

Two hours later I got the phone call and began my preparations to go to Washington the next day, draw some equipment and go on to Saudi Arabia. That's the idea of a DOD National Media Pool. Once the pool is into a combat situation where it was at least on the ground with forward deployed military forces, the idea is to use that pool's capabilities to

provide coverage of whatever military operations take place. It is not to replace open or unilateral coverage, but rather to bridge the gap between the moment that the forces are committed and that moment in time when the host country grants the access which will then facilitate open and unilateral coverage. It is just a bridge as you will.

I would submit to you that the Desert Shield pool did exactly that. It is important that you remember that there was no free press in Saudi Arabia at that time. Saudi Arabia was, and to a large extent still is, a closed society. The Ministry of Information was not accustomed to dealing with the international press in the same fashion that we do. As a result, gradually they got into it: they got accustomed to working with us. And as I say, we had outstanding access from 13 August to 24 August when we disbanded the pool. Frankly, the Secretary of Defense wanted to disband the pool on the night of the 19th. We tried to do that." ²⁰

The Army, faced with a large group of journalists, attempted to meet the needs of the media and get the message home. At the least, that was the intention of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Pete Williams. In his article "The Persian Gulf, The Pentagon, The Press," he views some problems as the creation of the Press themselves.

Generals, it's been said, are always preparing for the previous war. In Operation Desert Storm, the same might be true of journalists.

Press arrangements for the gulf war were not, as some

journalists claim, the most restrictive ever in combat. Some limitations were necessary to accommodate a huge press corps and one of history's fastest-moving military operations. Even so, reporters did get out with with troops, and the press gave the American people the best war coverage they ever had.²¹

The level of access gained by a reporter can vary the quality of the reports. An experienced and recognized Pentagon-watcher has a unique position. Fred Francis of NBC News is an already established and recognized name in American television journalism. He did not require direct access to the war. Because of years of journalistic and television experience, Mr. Francis had access to many higher level players. His decision to remain at Pentagon's nerve center helped to better serve the interests of both the American people and the Army. Part of his decision was based on his experience that restrictions would hamper coverage of the war:

"Since I direct NBC's coverage of national security and military matters I made the decision to stay here during both Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I knew what the present environment was going to be like over there. I knew their restrictions were going to be harsh and that they were going to be extremely limiting to a reporter's ability to gather information freely, unfettered. And having been in this building [the Pentagon] for seven years I knew that I would have no such problems here, learning far more than any journalist could learn in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait or anywhere over there. And that, in fact, proved to be the case.

In the seven months of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, I can honestly say except for the very first day in August when it was announced that the troops were going, that at no time was I ever surprised by any decision. At no time did I not have anywhere from a full day to several weeks warning about exactly what was going to happen and when it was going to happen. And that includes the doubling of the size of the force, the decision taken on November 6. I knew that on October 15, in fact I reported it." ²²

Media representatives covering the war had varying degrees of military experience or background covering military activities. That fact did not adversely affect the coverage of the war, but Public Affairs Officers and senior leaders worry that a lack of media expertise makes it more difficult for the Army story to be pictured accurately. Reporters saw factors besides experience as greater cause for concern. Reporters believed they were hampered by factors such as communications and transportation. The media pool, the result of the Army experience from World War II to Panama, was not a favorite of the news media.

Two reporters and one photographer were sent from San Diego, California newspapers to Saudi Arabia. Ms. S. Lynne Walker is a financial reporter for the San Diego Union. She was accompanied to the Gulf by photographer John McCutchen (Award winning photo, Illustration I). Jim Michaels, a former U.S. Marine officer, represented a sister paper, the San Diego Tribune.

S. Lynne Walker was both an example of a supposedly less knowledgeable reporter and a female. Now, she is a veteran of combat. Ms. Walker served as a pool reporter with the 3rd Armored Division which Major General Paul Funk, commanded. She commented on several aspects of her experience in the area of operations (AOR).

"I covered the Persian Gulf War for The San Diego Union. I arrived in theater shortly before Christmas, 1990, and left Saudi Arabia mid-March 1991. On the day of the U.S. aerial attack on Iraq I was assigned as a combat pool correspondent to the Army. I subsequently ended up with the Army's 3rd Armor Division and remained with that unit until the cease fire was declared. I was with them long before the ground war began, so I was with them throughout the moves in Saudi Arabia and was with them when we crossed the border into Iraq.

There were about 1400 reporters in theater, all of whom wanted to go out with the troops. The military services said that they could not handle all of the journalists, so there was constant in-fighting among reporters over who would get to go out.

One source of the conflict was that reporters from large newspapers and other news organizations. Not just newspapers, but television, radio, and what not felt that they should go out and that reporters from smaller publications and news organizations should not have that right. Simply because the reporters from these larger publications felt that they reached a larger audi-

ence. Therefore, it was more important than someone who had a small circulation in a small town.

We have about 275,000 circulation daily and 450,000 on Sunday. The point that I made was that we are the home of Camp Pendleton, [U.S. Marine Corps]; therefore there were 70,000 Marines assigned from Camp Pendleton to the Persian Gulf. We also had numerous ships, including aircraft carriers and support ships over in the Persian Gulf during the conflict. So there was a tremendous interest; and I think that the Marines, more than the Army, realized that we were a vehicle to speak to the families here [in San Diego].

In other words, through our reports they could get us out to do the kind of stories that we wanted to do and frankly, they [The Army Public Affairs Office] wanted us to do. And we would speak to the people back home, calm them down, tell them what life was like in the field. The feelings, the thoughts. They called them the "Hi Mom" stories (Illustration II). ²³ The Marines certainly felt like we were important to them. The Army did not. We had no Army bases here [In San Diego]. The Navy did. And the Air Force. We hardly even ever talked to them. So, I mean, it was sort of a how can they help me out attitude among the military sources. I felt like, in all fairness, we got a better shot than some other reporters from some other papers of equivalent size, because of the presence of Pendleton and the ships based here. In that sense, I don't think we were unfairly excluded. I got on an Army pool even though there is no Army

base here."

As these comments show, inexperience or lack of connections were not necessarily a handicap, In fact, one of the articles written by S. Lynne Walker well illustrates the bond that a good media relationship can create for the Army.

"Let me tell you a story which is very touching and poignant and I will tell you the bigger picture (Illustration III). Not the driver but I think it was sort of the fellow that sits next to the driver in the general's tank, is from La Mesa. La Mesa is about 15 miles from San Diego.

...I interviewed General Funk, and probably not more than 6-7 days later this young fellow, who sat next to the driver in the general's tank, told me he had talked to his parents the day before. His parents had seen the interview with the general on the front page of our newspaper. We ran that on the front page, even though there is no Army presence here, [in San Diego] with the general's picture(Illustration III).²⁴ The general was describing how he felt and the responsibility he felt in terms of sending young men and women into war. His own son was in one of the brigades. And so he felt the weight of a father. That's what he told me and that's what I wrote. Anyway, this young fellow, this Specialist, told me he had talked to his parents, they had read the story and they said, "We feel so much better now about you and your safety, because of the general that's commanding you. We know about him now through the story. Now you stick close to that three-star, son."

The feedback that I got and the feedback the newspaper got was that people were so hungry for anything, just any information, that they read it with equal interest. Now, the Marine stories they pored over because their loved one's name might be in it, as you understand. But we never got any kind of response other than that people were immensely interested in everything we could pump out of the Gulf.

Now the larger picture is that the newspaper company that owns this paper and others, also owns a wire service. And every story that I wrote moved on the wire.[the Copley News Service] And those went to one hundred papers all over the country.

One of the reasons I think that General Funk was interested in having me stay, aside from the fact that he seemed to feel that I would be fair and accurate, which is of course the most important criteria in reporting on anything, is that he was in Viet Nam. He was a combat pilot, he flew a Cobra and I believe he headed a combat aviation wing. He told me that during the Viet Nam conflict he took around with him, almost throughout the conflict, a CBS reporter, Ann Curtain. And he became very accustomed to having reporters around. TV was a little more cumbersome than print journalists, because we just had a pencil and pad. And he didn't feel like everything they did was nice, but he felt like it was fair. So I think he was a little more open to the coverage and was willing to take more of a chance with me, because he had met me." ²⁵

S. Lynne Walkers's example clearly shows that the experience

factor of reporters could only be judged on an individual basis. Hundreds of reporters, both American and foreign, reported from the Gulf with no problems for the military. As Colonel John. M. Shotwell, U.S. Marine Corps, the Public Affairs Officer at CENTCOM, show other the kinds things that create a negative reputation for the press.

" We had one instance where we actually banned a reporter from the 1st Marine Division. I say "we"- the 1st Marine Division commanding general did. That didn't apply throughout the entire Marine expeditionary force. The circumstances were that this [newspaper] reporter was rather abrupt and abrasive with the Marines. She was, in the view of the escort officers. She demeaned them with the way that she asked her questions and some of the remarks that she made about the way they were forced to live out in the desert. And she just basically offended the people.

She had apparently had very little experience in covering the military. But that wasn't unusual over there. Many of the reporters had little experience covering military. You really had to be patient with these folks and explain in great detail, because if you didn't they really didn't have an understanding. I think our operations officers and the other folks that did the briefings for media took great pains to try to walk them through the operation. [Perhaps and important lesson is that among the many responsibilities of PAO officers was the education of inexperienced news media] It was one of many burdens that they

[PAO's] had to deal with. I don't know that we are ever going to get around that. Unfortunately, the percentage of people in the news media that have had any experience with the military, either have served in the military or even had any degree any experience in covering the military is very small." ²⁶

Reporters sometimes have a difference of opinion on how difficult matters were handled, such as with visas, entry into press pools and influences of large news organizations, such as TV networks and newspaper wire services. Marines were viewed as doing a better job than other services by reporters and other military services. Jim Michaels, San Diego Tribune, explains:

"The main problems were with visas. No one was giving visas out to get into Saudi Arabia. The military, I think, certainly was not making it any easier, they blamed everything on Saudi Arabia. The military, I don't think put any pressures on the Saudi's to grant more visas. So I went to a place called Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates and figured I could try to get into Saudi Arabia from there. Which I ended up going through the Saudi consultant there to get into Saudi. That was on my own, with no help from the military and none expected.

Then I got to Dhahran. There was sort of a cluster there where there were a growing number of reporters and the military was doling out little by little these guided tours. I stayed at the Meridian Hotel in Dhahran. So, I sort of hooked up on some of these tours that the military was giving and most people weren't able to operate outside that system, because they didn't

understand the military and also the geography. The desert is fairly big and unforgiving. So it is not easy to get in your car and drive off.

[Question] Did you get in a pool? How did you get in the Marine Pool as opposed to other pools? Some reporters seemed to be assigned to pools very haphazardly.

Yes, it was very haphazard. The military said that they would leave those assignments to the press corps. I don't know, the whole thing was sort of back and forth. The military said we have "X" amount of slots and then it was given to a peripheral coordinator.

I found out that my colleagues of the press were not as accommodating to me as a reporter from the San Diego Tribune as the military was, quite frankly. It was a clubbish little thing where the large newspapers took care of each other and looked down their noses at the regional papers. When the war started, that morning I went over to the hotel. I had been excluded from the pool system, pretty much entirely. The Marines did say they had a spot open because the Saturday reporter didn't show up. So I got on that slot, through periods, means I stayed with them until the end of the war.

Again, unlike a lot of other reporters, I am going to blame that partly on the military for limiting things and the Press Pool System. That's as much as a fault of the other press corps not giving the San Diego Tribune a slot. And again, a lot of people would probably say, well you were a Marine, local press,

that means he is a stooge with the military. Which, is of course, if anyone knows my writing, is a crock of shit. That's probably not really true of me. I think that it is important that obviously that sort of personal...."

Honestly, what I really think is that the whole thing ought to disintegrate. Let people go out. I think what they ought to do is - they can exercise censorship, no one in the Gulf had a problem with censorship, censorship is a boogie man that they bring up. Anyone would be glad to submit their copy to the censors. No one ever screwed with my copy to any significant degree about national security concerns. No problem with that. Anyone who wants to look at it, and I think all the reporters will say the same thing.

But, what is much worse than censorship is controlling access. If you can't get out to the story, you don't know what you are missing or not missing or anything else. By controlling access the military gets to manage the way that the war is portrayed. But, journalists don't get to root around there and portray a true picture. That's the process so it's democracy; it is a messy, ugly process." ²⁷

The military finds it necessary to control access to the battlefield for several reasons. At one point there may have been as many as thirty six American, British, Italian and Norwegian journalists missing. The Army is concerned with the safety of the media as well as censorship and security. ²⁸

John McCutchen, photographer from the San Diego Union, took

the award winning photograph of the first ever night firing of a Tomahawk missile from the battleship USS Wisconsin.

" I understand the need for security and I think most journalists do also. And they are not going to compromise. Hopefully the military will mellow out a bit. I understand the problem, I really do, but they need to realize the media has a job to do too.

And they [the military] also need to realize that they were incredibly lucky, that the technology was not as advanced then as it is going to be two years from now. Two years from now I won't need the military support at any level to make photographs. I will be able to move back by satellite from a backpack, which I can almost do now. ²⁹

Colonel Bill Mulvey, currently the public information officer at SHAPE, distills the difficulties the Army perceives are created by the media.

" I served in Desert Shield/Storm from 1 December to 22 April as Director of the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. [That is] an important distinction there because there was also a Joint Information Bureau in Riyadh, Dubai, and some other places, so I was director of the one in Dhahran, still under Central Command. Currently, I am the Public Information Officer for Supreme Allied Commander - Europe, General Galvin, at SHAPE, Belgium.

One problem that met me soon after my arrival was a story that was done for Life magazine. I think that the article was

titled "Platoon" or maybe "First Platoon" or something like that, maybe it was just "Platoon." But two reporters, or maybe it was a photographer and a reporter from Life had gone out and lived with a unit from the 1st Cavalry Division.

And now we are getting into the personal opinion area, but I read the article and I thought that it was quite realistic, talking about real troops, the type of troops that I had commanded as an Infantry Platoon Leader and Infantry Company Commander in Viet Nam. They talked like real troops, they smelled like real troops in the article, and it was a very down to earth kind of article, real human interest, very close to, using the vernacular that troops use.

The Division Commander [Brigadier General John H. Tilelli, Jr.] didn't like that story. Didn't like it at all, and although a return visit had been set up for Life Magazine, when they showed up to visit that unit, their visit was denied. And in fact, the 1st Cav went for quite a period there in December where they wouldn't take any reporters. Although the commander certainly had a lot of other things on his mind, a lot of it seemed to be either his direct reluctance to take any more press out there because they might write what he felt were negative stories that gave a bad impression of the 1st Cav; dishonored the 1st Cav he felt; or perhaps it was as much his Public Affairs Officer's reluctance to upset the commander and give himself another opportunity to get yelled at because of the reaction which the commander had to this particular article. But again,

the commander didn't like the article, he is certainly entitled to his opinion. [This is] my opinion, and I know the commander, I used to work for him for a short time.

In my personal view, I saw nothing wrong with it. They were his troops and he did see something wrong with it and so because of the way those reporters told the story of that small unit, it caused other reporters to not get access to the Cav. And so a lot of stories weren't told. So that was one problem that comes to mind.

Another one [problem] that should be mentioned was a problem that I think that was in the 24th Division was a television report, I think it was TV, was made that batteries for such things as night vision ...devices- goggles, were not readily available to a, again a very small unit. A squad or platoon didn't have batteries and so they were getting batteries sent from the States. They were having their wives and girlfriends send them batteries, [D cell flashlight batteries]. Which indicated a faulty supply system.

But, you see what this caused was a Division Commander to get upset at the press to have a full scale investigation and I'm not sure where the Division Commander to CENTCOM Commander, General Schwarzkopf, was, but it certainly, this TV report was brought to General Schwarzkopf's attention, General Vouno, the Chief of Staff's attention..[Major General Barry McCaffrey was the division commander]. Everybody over one squad member in a Bradley fighting vehicle saying to a reporter, "Hey, I can't get

any batteries." Big investigation. Lots of man hours. The result of the investigation was that there was no problem systematically in the 24th Infantry, but in fact, one NCO wasn't doing his job picking up or requisitioning batteries at a very, very low level, and this is a mountain being made out of a mole hill." 30

The "mountain out of a molehill" is a difficulty cited by media representatives and military professionals alike. The quandary is that the media is often reporting correctly. The perception is that the senior leader is taken to task for an equipment failure or turn of events over which the commander has no control. Then, an overreaction by higher headquarters or senior officers in the chain of command creates a career ending incident. The incident of the batteries was picked up by a TV crew at the squad or platoon level. From there it expanded. This is one major point where there is agreement on both sides of the fence.

I asked Fred Francis what his advice would be to Army leadership regarding the media:

"I would expect them to hold me at arm's length, because they know better, because they are not taught at the Command and General Staff College level how to deal with the media, they are not taught at the Army War College level how to deal with the media, they are not taught at any level, unless they come into Washington and they get stuck with Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, or they happen to be in a very high visible job, they

don't learn how to do it. I would expect them to keep me at arm's length. And I submit to you that it is a failure of the curriculum of the War College and the Command and General Staff College, that when the American people make up their mind, based on what they see on television, hear on the radio, and read in the newspapers, that for our senior officers, those that we select for higher rank, not to be given a greater opportunity for interaction with me and to understand how it is we work, I submit to you that it is a failure in the curriculum of all of those colleges. I could do nothing about that except volunteer my time to sit down and talk to people to give them an understanding of how we work. Like the burden of handling my camera crew. And why that's necessary."³¹

Navy Captain Michael Doubleday, Director for Plans, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), points out that military leadership can do better. He spoke regarding the Navy role in the Gulf.

"I think it was evident from the early stages that there was certainly interest in Washington for making it possible, for particularly the US news media to cover everything. But the difficulties you get into in the Department of Defense, I don't think you will ever find any kind of direction from Washington, D.C. that says "You, Commander So and So, have a responsibility over and above almost anything else to look after the news media." No, I think that what you normally find is that there is an assumption that as part of the deployment the commander will

realize that there is an importance to entertaining the news media and having them out there to talk to the troops and that sort of thing.

I think that the situation would be helped by a long-range training program where the commander realizes that this is to his advantage. Now, for instance, the present Navy Chief of Information is almost evangelical in this regard. He is Rear Admiral Brandt Baker and I think that he realized many, many years ago that it is going to be important for ship captains or base commanders to appreciate the impact that news media can have. The way he approaches it is, he makes a point to talking to every war college class and every commanding officer class that goes through the school in Newport, Rhode Island. He goes up there and he does several things. First of all he tries to build in them an appreciation for not only using the news media to talk to the American public, but more importantly for the commander it is a means that they can communicate quickly, the quickest way that they can communicate with the families of their people. And so a lot of them had never thought of it in those terms. When you bring it down to something that is going to help morale, it's going to help the readiness of the organization, because of the commercial news media has access way beyond anything that the military has for communicating with families. And, the families are interested in that. So, he spends a lot of time doing that. The other thing that he does is that they actually do a training program with the commanders that show them some of the ins and

outs of dealing with the media. I think that their approach of late has been that they tell people that, if you can handle the electronic news media primarily the television outlets, you can handle anybody. Television really puts you on the spot; and you are visually there, there audibly. So they have a little training course that they put people through. For large groups of people it doesn't provide quite the depth that it does for the one-on-one training that they do. And they do this one-on-one training for all their flag officers, all their civilian senior service people. It has paid off pretty well.

However, I think that even the Navy will tell you that, despite all this training, all of the things that go on before the battle begins. Once a commander gets into an operational situation, his overriding concern is the mission and the success of the mission. It takes an exceptional commander to devote any portion of his time to the news media. General Boomer is certainly a prime example of what enormous benefits you can have by paying some attention to the news media. And there were some Navy commanding officers who did the same thing. The commanding officer of the Battleship Wisconsin, spent a lot of time with the news media, had no reluctance whatsoever having the news media on board. That's why almost all the coverage that you have of the Navy participation in the Gulf War shows the Wisconsin and that famous shot of a cruise missile taking off from the ship that was taken by a San Diego Tribune Tribune photographer. [John McCutchen]

I think in retrospect there probably are commanding officers who now wish they had been a little more aggressive in seeking media pools to embark in their unit. But during the heat of the battle it is a pain in the neck to have those people around. Because, of course, they're concerned about security and they're concerned about all the other things that go into the equation. Having outsiders to participate in whatever the operation is, is always a pain in the neck. And it's particularly, I think, it is troublesome to most commanders because it introduces an element into the equation that they have almost no control over.

I think there is probably, if there was sufficient time, you could go through some interesting studies with commanders to let them know that a message delivered once is going to be read by a fairly small percentage of the population. And of the people who read the thing, the piece, the story, there is only a percentage of those who are going to even remember it. And of those who remember it, there is a smaller percentage who remember it accurately, and on and on and on. So the overall impact of the story is the repetition, the overall impression, that a variety of reporters reporting on the story make, not one single story.

For that reason, my recommendation would be that a commander should invite as many media as he can possibly accommodate on as many occasions as he can possibly have them come visit, because it will be to his advantage in the end to do that.

I think that our senior leadership in general appreciates the fact that in this day and age, the news media performs a very

vital function in that it informs the American public. It not only informs them, but it can be a means by which the commander can inform the American public on whatever issue at hand is that he wants to convey. You see the chairmen using that very, very well. I think that you have seen in the last few months General Kelly used that very, very well. When you want to get word out to the American public on an issue that is important, that is really the only way that you can operate. And you have got to use the public media, the mass media, in order to do it effectively. I would think that any commander would be wise to spend a fairly substantial amount of time learning about how the news media operates and how they can become more effective in dealing with the news media." ³²

Major General Barry R. McCaffery, Commanding General of the 24th Division (Mech) had experience with the media before the deployment of his division and in the Gulf. At the announcement of the deployment of the 24th, literally hundreds of media representatives poured into Ft. Stewart. The President of the United States even visited the Division. Major General McCaffery stated:

"...in a tactical sense, our battalion commanders rarely, brigade commanders, rarely run into a situation where we haven't seen those situations before and we don't already know one way that will work. We may know a hundred ways to screw it up, ten ways to do it right. So give me a situation and, boom, I'll give you an answer. And it will be a way that I am sure that will

work. So my instincts and most Army officers' instincts are a whole range of subjects that are rarely off the mark. I really believe that.

Tell me a big maintenance problem, take a battalion commander selected at random, he'll probably come up with a really sensible answer. The only place I think that not to be true is dealing with the news media. I think the instinct of many Army officers, particularly the Viet Nam generation, but most of them, is dead wrong. It perpetuates a problem. The problem is probably there one way or the other, but it perpetuates a problem. Potentially, we don't trust them at all. We don't like their value system: we think that they are dishonest, we think they're going to make trouble for us. That's there's a down side, but no upside in dealing with the press. And so, we think a reasonable way of dealing with the press is the minimalist approach. But, if forced to, we will give them some stuff that's true and then we will get away from them. We'll have one of our agents deal with them, etc. And plus, to boot, we sort of think it is cheesy dealing with the press. It is self-serving, it's egotistical, besides being stupid and dangerous.

I think we have a problem. I don't think most of us are on the mark dealing with these guys. Now, compound[ing the] problem, a lot of those instinctive misgivings are correct. I think many reporters, a majority of them, have a very different value system from the majority of Army officers. They are going

to be trouble to you frequently. When they come up on the net, there's already a divisive, antagonistic, confrontational aspect to it frequently: so most people's dealings with the press is to limit the damage and hopefully not get further enmeshed in it. I don't think we are very good at it. In the Army, if I want to have a superb reputation, there's a bunch of things that you can do. Know my business, take care of soldiers, be personally poised, have good judgement, be thoughtful when people meet me, be a warrior. If we get bad press I'll sort of be seen as not upholding my contract with the Army. If I say something stupid, or even if I don't say something stupid, [but] I'm reported as having said something stupid, I will take a hit.... Not with all of them, not a [General] Sullivan, not a [General] Powell, but in general. It's not a great thing to do to get great articles written about you. This division has dealt with the press very, very effectively. So effectively, that my personal danger is that I now think that I know how to deal with the press more than I probably do.

During Desert Storm, we had a pool come in. NBC, U.S. News and World Report, Stars and Stripes, AP, USA Today, a bunch of them. I briefed each one of them on the operation that was coming up. I said they may not report where we were, where we were going or what our purpose was. You see you can't report the purpose even after we start the attack, because it will not be clear to the Iraqis, that we are going to hit the Euphrates and turn east and move in on the RGFC [Republican Guard]. They may

think that we are going to go into Baghdad. We are going to pin down a whole bunch of divisions up north as long as it's not clear until we take these people apart. Three things you may not talk about, our lives are at stake. You may not take a picture of a non-cooperative U.S. wounded or dead meaning, if you want to interview somebody on TV, you may do so only if he agrees to appear on TV. And if he doesn't, if you do and take pictures of bodies or wounded, I will wreck your cameras. So other than that, you can go anywhere you want to in the division, write any story. We will not censor it, we will facilitate your getting your story out. Which is what we did.

The best defense is that you look at the 24th ID at close range. It is an incredibly brave, competent battle force doing what they were supposed to be doing, doing it superbly. We had no problems with the press at all. As a matter of fact, as it turned out, they were a great help to us. We had a post-cease-fire battle on 2 March. Everybody said, "Well, don't worry about it." First of all I got my one AP reporter that was still there and flew him right in to where the fighting had just gone on and then sent a UH60 seven hours to Dharam to pick up CNN TV. They were on the liberation of Kuwait and they had lost interest in us. I flew them back up there and made available every battalion commander, the brigade commander, and me, the people that were involved in the fight. We told them exactly what happened, let them interview us in the middle of twenty kilometers of burning Iraqi trucks and armor. And lucky that I

did that because the press rediscovered that incident two or three times and started to worry it around. ..., we were on CNN TV explaining it the next morning. We did pretty good with that.

As to whether the press, including radio, print, television, and photography were generally supportive of the division's efforts I wouldn't put it that way. I don't think that being supportive is what they were doing. From my perspective it turned out to be that way. We had a pretty good lot. We took care of them. We told them that we were going to keep them alive, put them in chemical suits, gave them training. They had escorts, HMWV's [High Mobility Wheeled Vehicle]. So we got some pretty accurate reporting and it was pretty laudatory of the soldiers. But that was not a manipulative thing. Because what they were seeing was so overwhelming, they were babbling. The CNN reporter who talked to me on 2 March was babbling that he'd never seen anything like it; his friends couldn't believe the things he was saying. I had a New York Times reporter want to get his picture taken standing with me. It wasn't me. Can you imagine a New York Times reporter two years ago, wanting to have his picture taken with some Infantry Division commander? It was just incredible." 33

The attitude of the Commanding General of the 24th Division had a trickle down effect on junior officers. This was to the benefit of the Army and served the needs of the public. Captain Steven M. Hart deployed with the division to the Gulf and was there during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

"I think that the 24th Division had a very successful, very proactive media relations plan. I think that the reason we were successful has to do with the fact that our policies were that of the CG, General Barry R. McCaffrey, who is a very media conscious individual. He understands the value of the civilian news media." 34

THE SENIOR LEADER AND THE MEDIA

General McCaffrey was able to give a clear picture of the 24th Division relationship with the press and how he influenced that relationship. He also brought up the difficulty of perception by the senior leadership of the army. This historical holdover is that no officer should get any press, either good or bad.

This prevailing perception is formed by the perceived danger to one's own career and service to the nation. Because of the magnification of certain instances, the anxiety faced by a senior officer is great. The examples include Patton, MacArthur, and currently Lieutenant General Calvin A.H. Waller and Air Force General Michael J. Dugan. During the Carter Administration there was the example of Major General John K. Singlaub. Fortunately, both Generals Dugan and Singlaub were available to give advice on this difficulty.

Generals Dugan and Singlaub agreed that it was the administration and chain of command that created difficulties for

them. General Singlaub offered an overview on the Gulf War and advice to junior and senior officers:

"I think that reporting on the Gulf War did a great deal to enhance the respect that the American public has for the military. I think that we had some outstanding spokesmen in front of the cameras. They looked good. They knew their business, and by and large the American people rallied behind them. They [the public] accepted them and admired them and I think that is good.

I think that the media was unhappy with the way in which they were controlled, but I have to say that I think the American people got a better report on what really took place in that conflict than they did in Viet Nam.

I continue to remain amazed that our media was able to get away with the dishonest reporting, totally dishonest reporting, in the Viet Nam war. I found it frightening to fly from Saigon to Washington and be here in 22 hours after I left and to see how the way the war I just left was being reported here. It was just very little correlation. I would read the Washington Post of the last week and the way they reported what was really taking place demonstrated a bias that was just frightening to me.

I continued to think that, if World War II had been reported in the same dishonest way, we probably would have never gotten off the continent of Africa after our landings there. But in that war the reporters were using what we call attribution concept of reporting. Nobody cared what their views were, they

would write something and have to attribute it to someone. So they were interviewing, and the object was to find the guy that was most knowledgeable and interview him. If you were a good reporter you were able to get higher and higher levels of authority to interview. The best reporters would end up talking to the commander in chief of the armed forces of the theater. The goal was to reach a level of respectability that was based on getting good interviews and getting to the place where the action was taking place, and to report it honestly.

In Viet Nam, especially with TV, they would create incidents, provide the props for some of the things that were more photogenic than others. They would go to where a battle had taken place, would photograph the dead and interview the survivors in shock and report that minor incident as typical of what was going on in Viet Nam the day before. A platoon had been ambushed, for example. That was thirty men out of the half million who had something bad go wrong, and that's what they would project on the tubes in the United States. It was not at all representative of what was going on. They weren't interested in what was taking place out in the villages where these locals were winning the battles against the Viet Cong. They weren't interested in the construction activity that was taking place. And most of the Americans there were in the construction, and not the destruction business. But, that was not news.

I think exercising the controls that we did in Desert Storm and for a lesser extent in Grenada, and Panama, was a very good

thing.. I think it improved not only the reporting on the conflict, getting the really important issues before the American people, but it created fewer problems for the military who were suddenly surprised by having a story reported on their troops and didn't even know there was a reporter in the area. Certainly, if the reporter was sneaking in and interviewing some privates and getting their point of view on war, we know historically that a private's view of the war is something less than all inclusive and certainly not the way to understand what's going on in such a conflict as we had in Viet Nam.

For the junior officers and soldiers my advice would be don't be entrapped by journalists who promise to project your views so that the folks back home will get a chance to see you, if you will do just certain things that they want you to do. Now not all journalists are that dishonest. But, in fact they have come in and talked to a group of people, and only the person who has a radical view of the situation or has some complaint is interviewed or photographed, or used. That has encouraged others in the unit to take a similar stand that is really not a consensus. It is not a popular view, but by having just one or two radical views expressed, the reporter will make the story that this view is shared many. I have seen young people entrapped by that type of reporting.

For the senior commanders and staff officers, I think it is very important that honesty be projected as the most obvious quality of the relationship. Be as honest with the reporter as

possible. Complete honesty is the best policy. And if there are things that for security reasons should not be reported or projected, then you have to assume that he will cooperate in that. And if he doesn't, then serious sanctions should be taken against him, to bar him from the whole area. I think that can be done. You can really hurt a reporter if he feels he is going to lose his credentials in the area or if he is going to be barred from going to areas because of his dishonest behavior in the past. I think you have to have this mutual trust. An honest relationship is the best way to do it.

I just hope that all military personnel can avoid having some of the serious problems that led to my early retirement. I don't blame the press. I blame the circumstances perhaps and the desire of some of the media to sensationalize." ³⁵ ³⁶

In his recent book "Newsmen and National Defence", Lloyd J. Matthews wonders if the military is rebuilding a wall between military and the media.³⁷ The case of General of the Air Force Michael J. Dugan and his retirement from active duty was a hot topic during Desert Shield.

MYOB. The time tested advice to mind your own business, often applied in other contexts, works here. Officers will rarely misstep if, in interviews with the press, they stick to what they know and to subjects appropriate to their rank and position.

The unfortunate case of General Michael J. Dugan, the former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, is instructive. General Dugan, interviewed by three reporters aboard a plane returning from Saudi Arabia, got fired because Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney thought the General overstepped the mark. Mr. Cheney asserted that the General, who spoke on the record, had discussed strategic decisions that were not his to make, had disclosed

classified information, and had commented on the operations of other services. Senior Air Force officers said later the journalists had abided by agreed ground rules and normal journalistic practices, and even checked with the general's staff to ascertain that he had been quoted accurately and in context.

General Dugan's remarks, which appeared in Sunday editions of The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times, were promptly disavowed on a television news program by Brent Scowcroft, the President's National Security Advisor. The next day General Dugan was dismissed in a penalty that, in this writer's view, was unduly harsh. The nation, the military services, and the Air Force lost because General Dugan had come to office armed with a plan and intended to tell the Air Force story better. His approach was a breath of fresh air after the stifling policy of his predecessor, General Larry D. Welsh.

Ironically, in the same Sunday edition of the Los Angeles Times containing the report on General Dugan was an interview with Army Chief of Staff general Carl E. Vuono, who was asked about a residual force staying in Saudi Arabia, said. "I'm not going to get into that." Queried of a political issue, the General said, "I'm not going to comment." But asked about the shape of the Army over the next five years, General Vuono gave an answer that many in Congress might not like: "If we're forced to take some of the deep cuts that some folks have talked about, and you're not going to have a trained and ready Army, The Nation is going to be the loser." 38 39

General Dugan offers his comments:

"I have had experience with the press since I was a lieutenant through last week, [February 25, 1992] dealing with reporters, both print and electronic. If one wants to affect public policy, if one wants to get the resources to do a public job in our society, this is the way it works: One has to get the support of the Congress, and the way to get the support of the Congress is through the people. The way to get to the people is through the press. And so I have regarded it for a long time. It is important for public officials in general and the military in particular to open direct and clear communications with the

media to affect public policy.

I was a Public Affairs Officer as a lieutenant. I think the stereotype of the media by the typical officer of any service is that they are more liberal than the military officer. The media is more liberal than society. They are somewhat more anti-military. Beyond that their goal in life is to develop news. And good news isn't news.

At the lower levels, people love to talk to the press. The sergeants and the junior officers love the attention that comes with the press. The difficulty comes when Lieutenant So-and-so or Sergeant So-and-so says whatever and the colonel, the general, or the politician gets all excited because this sergeant didn't reflect what happens to be national policy today. First, the sergeant is interested in does his tank work, does his airplane fly, are the spare parts available, and so forth and so on. The politicians are interested in painting the "best picture possible" and having a fully coordinated story. I understand why the Marines like the press. The press is interested in what they do, especially in war. The troops are interested in somebody giving a damn and the people back home know how tough it is in Saudi Arabia.

There is over-reaction in lots of places about lots of things. What some buck sergeant thinks about national policy is not going to sway national policy because you have two or three seconds of air time. The effect of any story that is not just overwhelmingly positive is greatly magnified inside the beltway.

They don't give a damn about all that stuff in Pocatello. They know that they pay their taxes. They know that the troops get trained. They know that things don't work perfect, and they expect stuff that doesn't work perfect. Sooner or later it gets worked on. They expect that there are some priorities and that they work on first things first. At Pocatello they are relaxed about it. Inside the beltway there is a huge overreaction.

I am not sure what they [military leaders] can do to prevent damage to themselves. In terms of damage to the service, they need to know the facts. They need to know what's important, that they work in a big organization-- indeed a network-- [that] it has a problem solving process, and that the way to fix it is to fix it within the system. There will be opportunities to deal with the press, but in large measure the people that deal with the press are the policy makers. They are the commanders at division and post level. They are the commanders and senior staff officers in DA [Department of the Army] staff. Those people, in fact, speak for their service functional responsibility, speak for their services, or their major command element. Those are the ones that need to be sensitive to the needs of the press.

I say dealing with the news, you may not be able to save yourself. If there is some kind of animosity on the part of the politician, then it is easy to use a news article that doesn't come out perfect and say, "Well, we are going to replace Dugan." For example the first paragraph in the article (I haven't read it

in a year) in The Washington Post says, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff have decided that..." What followed I don't recall specifically, but, indeed. (A) the Joint Chiefs hadn't decided whatever he said. (B) I didn't tell them that. (C) there's no quote in the paragraph, (D) And indeed the paragraph doesn't say Dugan said it. I don't know where this reporter [got this idea]. He talks to a lot of people. He collects a lot of news. He had information before he went on the trip that led him to conclude that the Joint Chiefs had decided how to pursue war goals even when war came.

The problem with mine is that it got exposure in The Washington Post. Had it shown up on page three it would have been no big deal. It was a slow news day. Politicians are supposed to show up on the front page, not generals.

The second paragraph in the article said, "The targets in priority will be...." And then he lists command and control headquarters and what not. Well, those may or may not be the targets. As a matter of fact, that list of targets-- again, there is no quote on it--doesn't allege that Dugan said them: It just said that the targets will be.... That list of targets came off some kind of computer-generated data base that the reporter read to me. He said, "I understand that if you go to war the Air Force thinks that the type of targets are command and control systems air defense systems...." That's a nice list. It is not my list. This information can come out of any Air Force Journal or any publication that says, you know, control the air, kill the

command and control headquarters, kill the air bases, kill the airplanes. Those were not targets, but those were the things that Cheney alleged that Dugan had identified as targets. That's a dictionary. That's not a set of targets that certainly any Iraqi could redeploy forces to defend and thereby endanger U.S. airmen going to attack those target categories. That way of explaining or telling the story sensationalized the discussion that I had with Rick Atkinson. ⁴⁰

Then there were a number of others. Mr. Cheney had nine specific allegations. I told him as he went through those, I didn't say that. Nothing I said led to that conclusion.

If you give an interview to three individuals simultaneously, there is a competition in the press to see who gets the story first. The idea is that one wants to "break" news. If you deal with people individually, that same kind of pressure, to see that I get it written before Epstein does, in some regard is not there. I think one thing that happened is that I gave this story to three guys, all active, eager, competitive guys. One is from Aviation Week, and he wrote about what I thought I said. The other two are from more political papers. They put the story that I gave them, and they had the center line of the story about right. It was just the facts that they put together were polished off. Like a used car salesman, the thing you do when you get a used car is you polish it before you put it on the lot. They polished off the story that I gave them. They told a much better story than I told them. I gave

them a story on Air Force doctrine. They published a policy piece. If you are going to talk about a sensitive subject it is useful to talk to reporters that you know. I was new on the job, I had met John Broder before, I had not met Rick Atkinson. I did rely on my Public Affairs Officer to pick the right people to put on this airplane. [People] who would listen thoughtfully to what we told them and would tell the story in an objective manner and not in a sensationalized manner. I got some bad advice. I did not get a chance to work on that again." 41

CONCLUSION

From the time of General Washington, U.S. Army commanders have considered the media a necessary evil. Time and commanders have changed. Technology pertaining to the dissemination of information has developed as fast or faster than the technology of the battlefield. Commanders always had the need to control information originating from the battlefield. Because media can finance technology in an unlimited manner, the commander's capability to control the media is decreasing.

Policies must be established to provide guidance for the conduct of commanders at all levels in media relations. A true policy of cooperation should be fostered. Reporting pools will continue as the means of bringing news to the public at the start of conflicts. The methods of pool reporting and the membership of the pools need fine tuning. Communications methods during the Gulf war illustrate that when that public has access

to the same information as the military, it becomes difficult to place blame on media for inaccuracies in reporting or perceptions.

Senior commanders must be trained to respond to interrogations by media representatives. Although reporters may not be versed or knowledgeable concerning the military, they are trained and capable of obtaining information. This ability makes it necessary for the commander to be involved during the reporting process. This is the most effective means that senior leadership has to shape public opinion.

Training for senior leaders must be increased. The military and the public is not well served by a senior leadership that does not communicate well with the media. The Army is not well served when leaders believe they are placed at risk for communicating with the media. The impression that the military is attempting a "cover-up" is the most likely result of our inability to communicate.

It should be the policy of the Army's leadership to insure that our senior Commanders are trained fully in media relations. Further, commanders should understand the difficulties of junior and less experienced personnel. Careers should not be jeopardized because of misunderstandings of the methods of the media and fear of retribution from higher levels.

The Gulf War has illustrated the power of the media to tell our story in a manner that is positive, powerful and truthful. The story was not without drawbacks and penalties to both our

force, our story, and some of our senior officers. We can and will improve our association with the media. We recognize that this is our most potent tool for holding the support of our nation. It is this blessing of the citizens of our nation which allows our soldiers, sailors and air men and women to enter a conflict with the moral confidence that leads to victory.

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


ILLUSTRATION 1

Jan. 18 - Among the first cruise missiles to be used in war, a Tomahawk streaks from the battleship Wisconsin. This photo became an icon of the high-tech war and was published worldwide. Photographer McCutcheon: "Neither the Navy personnel nor the media had ever seen a night launch, so no one knew what to expect."

John McCutcheon / The San Diego Union

WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF

The war is never very far away, but their

By S. Lynne Walker
Staff Writer

NEAR THE IRAQI BORDER — In the cold, still desert nights as darkness shrouds his tiny tent, Army Sgt. Jeffrey Miller closes his eyes and thinks of home.

He sees his 5-year-old son's face light up when he discovers a brightly colored leaf in the Pennsylvania countryside. He hears his 18-month-old daughter squeal with delight and clap her small, soft hands just as she did in the photograph he carries in his worn wallet.

He remembers the Sunday drives he and his family took to witness autumn's surrender to winter.

Then he opens his eyes and sees the frightened young men — scarcely more than kids themselves — who are counting on him to lead them through battle so they can go home again.

Thoughts of his family, of his little girl growing up without him, used to haunt Miller.

"But then I realized it's not going to be fruitful for me to be out here worried about my family when I have these kids to worry about," he said. "I have their lives in my hands."

Like Miller, the men in the 1st Brigade, 3rd Armored Division — who will drive tanks against enemy forces and explode mines the Iraqis have laid — are wondering when, and if, they will see their families again.

Indeed, as the start of the ground war draws nearer, the men's thoughts increasingly turn to their families and the hardship of being so far from home.

"I think about my family every waking moment," said 1st Lt. Paul Tyrell, 27, of Tempe, Ariz. "Every day, we look at our watches and talk about what our families are doing."

Tyrell, who serves as executive officer of an Army M-1A1 tank company, carries the only letter he's received from his wife and 3-year-old in his flak jacket in the pocket over his heart.

In the gun turret of his killing machine, Tyrell taped pictures of his young family.

When he looks at the photographs, Tyrell thinks of the second child he and his wife are expecting in June.

He hopes they'll have a girl. But more than anything, he hopes that the war will be over so he can be

Silent prayer



Associated Press
Army Pfc. Robert Edwards of Carson, Calif., stands guard at a forward position in Saudi Arabia.

there for the birth.

"Samantha Bryn," he said with a sigh. "I've already got the name picked out."

Thinking about their families helps

the men survive their tough assignment "because you know what you've got to look forward to. You get a little feeling in the pit of your stomach," Tyrell said, "but you can han-

ILLUSTRATION BY

thoughts are of home

die that."

For newlyweds who were married as the war was launched — as for veterans of many years of marriage — thoughts of the families they left back home are a buffer against the harsh realities of war.

In this desert, a place barren of life and emotional warmth, the soldiers crave the intensity of personal relationships. Even a nagging wife would be welcome, they said, in this cold, desolate place where they feel only emptiness inside.

"My wife can beat me, she can scream, she can make me wash the dishes and I'll be right there," said Capt. Larry Jackson, 31, a hard-boiled company commander from Abbeville, S.C. "We're going to have to fight our way home, we all know that. I just can't wait until we get there."

For Pfc. Jeff Coulter, a 19-year-old from Wichita, Texas, who married just four months ago, his bride is "the driving force behind everything I do."

"She's all I ever think of," he said. "I just keep thinking about home and being together again."

Time hangs heavy on the soldiers

as they wait to be sent into battle. There are hours of guard duty, at sunset and during the cold, pre-dawn hours before the sun rises again.

Sometimes the soldiers pass the time on dusty dunes by making plans for life after the war.

Tyrell has already decided he's going to a fishing village in Baja California, where he'll kick back, drink beer and eat lobster.

Randy LaClair, 22, plans to take his wife to a "beautiful little lake" in Germany's countryside where they vacationed before the war.

Other times, the soldiers escape the loneliness by picturing themselves 10,000 miles away in a warm house filled with love and laughter.

When Sgt. Gerry Boguhn, 23, of Buffalo, N.Y., closes his eyes, "I can see my wife in the living room playing with our little girl. It's so tough being here because my daughter is so young. She's changing every day."

Boguhn writes a letter home every night, telling them that sooner or later, this will be all over.

"I tell them that God watches over all of us," he said, "and that I'll be home safe."

C.O. thinks of lives in his hands

Armor general's own son is among men that he may soon be leading into battle

This pool report was subject to review by U.S. military censors.

By S. Lynne Walker
Staff Writer

NEAR THE NORTHERN SAUDI BORDER — He read the passage in a book long ago. Still, it remains with Army Maj. Gen. Paul Funk, even as he prepares his troops for war:

"You may have to order the death of someone you love."

The words stick with the leader of the 3rd Armored Division, who now must put command before compassion and order soldiers into battle against the army of Iraq.

Himself the father of the captain of a tank unit under his command, Funk thinks about the parents of his young soldiers, of how he would feel if his eldest child were killed in battle.

He thinks about "the sons and daughters of America" whose lives rest in his hands.

"No other profession requires it and I don't take the responsibility lightly," said Funk, 50. "We're not going to spend our soldiers' lives needlessly."

In a war where the number of
See C.O. on Page A-6



Defense Department Photo

Maj. Gen. Paul Funk
3rd Armored commander

C.O.: General thinks of lives in his hands, his son among them

Continued from A-1

Army casualties could reach 15,000, Funk said, the loss of even one life is cause to mourn.

The recent death of an Army lieutenant who accidentally shot himself with an M-16 rifle grieved the general, who called it a failure of his command.

"The young man did it to himself, but somehow, I feel it could have been prevented. I blame us, I blame the chain of command when something like this happens," Funk said, shaking his head. "I hated signing the letter to his mother."

The memories of the Vietnam War, when he commanded an Air Cavalry unit that suffered heavy casualties, linger with Funk.

"I've thought a lot about the kids who died," he said. "They still walk through the background of my mind."

"They were such heroes in a war that didn't seem to mean much to most people. It was never easy to tell their families that they'd died. It was hard when I was a captain and it is hard now that I'm a general."

Funk, a former commander of the Army National Training Center in the Mojave Desert, drilled his soldiers relentlessly to sharpen their fighting skills so there would be no "useless" deaths.

"We have been pretty hard on ourselves, but we had to be," he said. "If I order this division to cross the line, it will be with the certainty that we are prepared for the task. I would hate to commit my people to a battle that was stupid because we weren't prepared."

The crusty general is described by his troops as a "soldier's soldier" who treats the men and women of the new Army with respect.

"He understands even the lowest private. He knows what their problems are," said Sgt. Kerry Holly, 28, of Millbrook, Ala., who will command the general's armored personnel carrier in battle. "He roots for the underdog. He's real down-to-earth."

The general calls his soldiers "young thinkers" whose courage inspires him as he prepares for battle.

"They ask for a hot meal, mail and a newspaper once in a while," said Funk. "And they ask to be led by good leaders. I don't think that's too much to expect of the Army."

Funk, a balding, cigar-chomping general who has smoked Anthony & Cleopatra Coronas since he was 30, is widely viewed as a capable and compassionate leader by the soldiers under his command.

"He is a brilliant man who understands his business," said Capt. John Scudder, 34, of Berkeley, who serves as the aide-de-camp to the general.

"You hate to let him down," Scudder said. "But if you give 100 percent and you still make mistakes, he'll forgive you. He does not hold a grudge."

The 6-foot-4 Montana native has engendered such loyalty among his staff that Holly said: "If he has to die in battle, I hope I go too. I don't want to go on if he's not here."

Funk abandoned his dream of becoming a rancher to join the Army and then went on to earn a doctorate in education. It was after he began his career with the military that he fell in love with the desert.

Unlike others who were intimidated by its unforgiving terrain, Funk was captivated by the beauty of the sweeping landscape. Thus, when he took over the command of the National Training Center, he earned a reputation as the Army's "desert general."

So great is his love for the desert that, even as he readies his troops for war, Funk worries about the impact of the massive military deployment on Saudi soil and the nomads who make their home here.

ILLUSTRATION III

"I want you to look out for the livestock down there," the general cautioned his helicopter pilots as they flew over the desert recently. "I'm a country boy and I wouldn't like it if someone did that to me. I don't want anybody flying over sheep, goats and camels."

Funk does like to fly over his division to see what is happening. He said he likes the idea of being up in the air in his Black Hawk helicopter in order to see his division "functioning full-up, the way it was designed."

Yet, he said if the Persian Gulf conflict is resolved short of a full-scale ground offensive, there will be joy rather than disappointment that the division stopped short of the attack it has been training for.

Despite the division's rigorous training, there are certain to be mistakes that will cost lives during the ground offensive.

"War isn't in any way precise," Funk said. "All of the things that happen to people — fear, elation, terror, cowardice, killing, dying — all of those things are what war is all about."

"I think one of the problems with the Army is that we always talk about weapons systems and effectiveness. It's not about guns and tanks. It's more a matter of will and heart and humanness."

As the start of a ground offensive seems to near, the general has been talking with his troops about how they will react in war, which he describes as "the ultimate in human experiences."

"You always fear that you'll react improperly under fire," Funk said. "It's very natural."

"I don't know how to measure true courage before combat. You can never tell who's going to be the bravest. The big guy who's always spit-shined might fold under pressure and a little scrawny guy might show up and save the day."

Meanwhile, Funk continues to drill his soldiers, to get them ready for what Saddam Hussein predicted will be "the mother of all battles."

For the general, "the desire to do better burns with blue-flame intensity."

"Everyone can improve," he said. "If we can do that in every unit, in every piece of equipment then we will be victorious."