The Cadre Division

Abstract

Five times in this century the United States has mobilized to fight wars for which they were initially not prepared. After each of these wars, the military was 'down-sized' to meet austere budgets. Given the inability of the country and her leaders to adequately learn the lessons of history, what lessons can we apply to the current restructuring within the U.S. Army? How can we economically maintain structures which have the capability to rapidly expand should the national interests be threatened? How can we keep highly trained professionals within the Army, active and reserve, who can rapidly regenerate fighting forces? The cadre division is the concept which will allow the Army to regenerate fighting divisions in the shortest possible time with the smallest feasible cost to the American taxpayer. This concept puts a cadre of active and reserve soldiers in divisional units to plan and train for expansion of the cadre division to a heavy division which is a combat ready and capable unit. In comparison to an active or reserve component heavy division, the cadre division is relatively cheap, but it is not without cost. To be successful the cadre division must have a relatively large contingent of active duty soldiers.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 20, 1992
Accession Number
ADA250990

Entities

People

  • Henry G. Holcomb

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Active Duty
  • Army Training
  • Artillery
  • Business Administration
  • Command And Control
  • Congress
  • Governments
  • Management Personnel
  • Mobilization
  • National Guard
  • Personnel Management
  • Second World War
  • Security
  • United States
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare
  • Weapons

Readers

  • Maritime Combat Support and Expeditionary Logistics.
  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies
  • Military Mobilization and Reserve Forces Studies.