



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TOTAL FORCE 2000- RESHAPING THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT OF THE ARMY

by

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ABSTRACT

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Army civilians have been important members of the force since the Continental Army was formed in 1775. These "soldiers without uniforms" have supported the Army in both peace and war throughout history, yet their vital role and contributions have received little emphasis in the course of military studies. Today, the Civilian Component comprises approximately one-third of the active force, and it is the principal component used in running the Army's sustaining base and installations. As the Army downsizes to meet new strategic and budget realities, it must not become so transfixed with the challenges of reshaping the AC/RC force, that it loses sight over what might be considered the Army's "invisible component." This paper: (1) defines the past, present and future role of Army civilians; (2) examines six major forces of change affecting the civilian workforce which must be understood and planned for; and (3) offers four guideposts for reshaping the Civilian Component as it enters the 21st century.

INTRODUCTION

Preface The United States Army, fresh on the heels of decisive victories in the Cold War, Panama and the Persian Gulf, is engaged in yet another test of its mettle and vision—that of reshaping the force to meet a changing defense strategy and a reduced military structure. Under present planning guidance and the Base Force concept, the Army of 1995 will be one-fourth smaller than the force of 1991, with six less combat divisions.¹ This amounts to the largest demobilization of the modern all-volunteer Army in its history, and there are clear indications from Congress that even these bold reductions are considered insufficient in view of the diminished threat and competing budget priorities.

The Army's downsizing efforts have captured center stage in military debate, and it is impossible to review most professional journals without finding a prolific supply of articles on the Total Force, the how to's of restructuring, and the increasingly heated debate over AC/RC force mix. However, conspicuously absent from the dialogue and analysis is any meaningful assessment of the Civilian Component of the Army—other than as an appendant thought. After considerable research, it is my opinion that Army civilians are, by and large, both the least studied and least understood component of the Total Force. Should this myopia of perspective go uncorrected, it will impair the vision of future leaders—making it difficult to effectively reshape today's Army into tomorrow's strategic force.

The intent of this paper is to stimulate thought and further study on what might be called the Army's **invisible component**. Recent initiatives by the Army's senior leadership to engender a "Total Army Culture" which better integrates the active, reserve and civilian components, may prove to be a major turning point in recognizing this problem and in fully implementing the Total Force concept.² Hopefully, this writing will promote a deeper understanding of the Army's Civilian Component by defining its

important contributions, both past and present, and the increasing role it will play in the future. My paper examines six major forces of change impacting Army civilians, and concludes by offering four guideposts for reshaping the Civilian Component as it enters the 21st century.

ARMY CIVILIANS—Definition, Origin and Evolution

Defining Army Civilians The term **Civilian Component** as used in this paper is defined as the corporate body of civilian workers employed by the Army, and paid for by funds appropriated by Congress. Unless otherwise stated, **Army civilians** are meant to include all appointment categories: white-collar GS and GM employees; blue-collar wage-system employees; and foreign national direct and indirect hires. Excluded from this definition and the scope of this paper are: (1) employees of the Army Corps of Engineers performing civil works versus military missions; (2) non-federal employees of the Army's non-appropriated fund (NAF) activities; and (3) personnel employed by private industry under contract with the Army. While the importance of these civilians to the Army is recognized, their non-military roles and/or non-governmental status preclude their incorporation in this writing.

Evolving Definitions In studying early military history and writings, it is not always clear whether the term civilian means to convey Army civilian employee, contract laborer, non-combatant, family member or some other entity. Prior to the establishment of the U.S. Civil Service Commission in 1883, the policies and controls which governed federal civilian employment, to include Army civilians, were quite different than today.³ It is therefore difficult to apply current concepts of Civil Service and the above definitions to the civilian employees of the Army circa 1875. The meaning of the term Civilian Component has also evolved. As recently as 1947 when Secretary of Defense Forrestal established the Committee on Civilian Components (later to be established as the Civilian Components Policy Board), the Committee's purpose was to undertake a comprehensive study of what is now referred to as the **Reserve Component**.⁴ In other words, less than fifty years ago it was the Army's

guard and reserve that were categorized as the Civilian Component of the force—not the civilian workforce.

Seeking to Belong Most Army civilians can probably relate to the occasional difficulty of having to explain their affiliation with the Army to a **real civilian**, i.e., someone who has no ties to, or experience with, the military. To many outside the Army, and indeed even to those within, you are either in the Army or you're not. There is no middle ground, and the term Army civilian in itself suggests a dichotomy to some. In truth, civilians have been an integral part of the United States Army since its early beginnings. They have supported the force in both peace and war; they have been injured, captured and killed in the line of duty; and they have earned a rightful place in the Army's proud heritage.

The First Army Civilians When the Continental Army was formed in June of 1775, civilians were employed that same year by the quartermaster, engineer, medical, paymaster, commissary, and other organizations charged with supporting the force.⁵ During the early years of the Army, civilians performed as clerks, skilled tradesmen or "artificers," physicians, teamsters, and as common laborers. They were used primarily for tasks considered to be of a non-military nature, but were at times used interchangeably with military personnel, creating morale problems because of the lower pay received by enlisted artificers performing the same work as their civilian counterparts.⁶ In some instances, civilian laborers were sought where the work was viewed as too degrading for soldiers.⁷ The precise conditions of their employment varied, but it seems that many of these civilian pioneers resembled more of a contract workforce than today's Army civilians. They were used extensively during the Revolutionary War as transportation workers, serving as wagoners and drivers to not only move supplies, but to tow artillery as well.⁸ Their performance of duty was at times unreliable, hampered by poor working conditions and uncertainty over tenure and wages.⁹ The miserable supply shortages suffered by the Continental Army at Valley Forge and Morristown, were blamed in part on the insufficient number of reliable civilian drivers who could be recruited to brave the harsh winter conditions for the Army's low wages of 30 shillings per day for a driver, wagon and four horses.¹⁰

When the Congress formed the Board of War and Ordnance on 12 June 1776, the predecessor organization of what was to become the War Department in 1781, it provided . . .

that a secretary and one or more clerks, be appointed by Congress, with competent salaries to assist the said board in executing the business of their department.¹¹

Richard Peters, Esq., a lawyer educated at the University of Pennsylvania, and a captain in the Pennsylvania militia was selected to serve as the board's first secretary, and as such, is considered to be the first civilian employee of the War Department.¹² It is noteworthy to state that Mr. Peters served with such distinction that the Congress chose to pass a resolution upon completion of his tenure to thank him "for his long and faithful service in the war department."¹³

The Formative Years Perhaps the most thoroughly documented accounts of civilian contributions are found in the early writings of Army logisticians, and this is probably still true today. In his book, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953, author James A. Huston captures a number of key historical civilian contributions in the formative stages of today's Army. From his research, it is known that over 5,000 civilian mechanics, teamsters and laborers were deployed in central Mexico during the Mexican War of 1846-1847.¹⁴ During the Civil War, the military railroads, used extensively to supply armies in the field, were run by an organization of nearly 25,000 civilian trainmen, dispatchers and superintendents.¹⁵ The U.S. Military Telegraph and several engineer construction corps were also exclusively or predominantly civilian outfits which made important contributions during the Civil War.¹⁶ Even these early chronicles of war seem to suggest an inescapable destiny of teamwork between soldiers and civilians in providing for the Nation's defense. It is clear, however, that no notions of a Total Force concept had even begun to take hold in the corporate military thought of this era.

A Civilianless Army During the period 1903-1912, there was a growing movement within the Army to establish an enlisted General Service Corps which had

two objectives: (1) to eliminate what today's Army refers to as borrowed military manpower, which was causing major troop diversions amounting to 12% of the authorized force; and (2) to reduce or eliminate the use of Army civilians.¹⁷ Pleas for Congressional legislation to form such a corps first appeared in the Chief of Staff of the Army's Annual Report to the Secretary of War in 1903, and was a recurring issue until 1912 when Congress finally approved the formation of a 6,000 man enlisted force to be permanently attached to the Quartermaster Corps.¹⁸ Quoting from the 1905 Report of the Chief of Staff of the Army:

Major-General Wood urgently recommends the organization of a service corps on the grounds of economy, discipline, and efficiency. He says: "Nothing is more needed in the Army today than a general service corps, not only on the ground of economy, but of discipline and efficiency. The constant and heavy drain upon the command to furnish drivers, gardeners, carpenters, etc., would be done away with, and the civilian element, represented by teamsters, packers, etc., which is practically beyond the reach of discipline, would be replaced by men of this corps. The establishment of this corps would result in great economy, in increased efficiency of the Army, and tend to improve discipline. A general service corps is urgently recommended."¹⁹

While the Army was ultimately successful in forming the General Service Corps it had persistently requested for nine years, no evidence was found that the corps effectively achieved either of its original goals, as reports subsequent to 1912 bear little mention of its accomplishments. Since these early Army reports to the Secretary of War contain no accurate accounting of civilian employees in its strength tallies, the impact of this corps on overall Army civilian employment levels was equally indeterminable. What is known from accounts recorded by the Quartermaster Corps in 1917, was that their civilian employment level prior to the declaration of World War I was 9,000 personnel, and at the time of their report it had risen to 30,000.²⁰ The Ordnance Corps similarly reported a pre-war civilian strength of 96 personnel, which grew to 1,600 Army civilians by 1917.²¹ Once again, especially in wartime, we find a seemingly inescapable requirement for teamwork between soldiers and Army civilians.

"Soldiers Without Uniforms"—Beginnings of The Total Force

Drawing upon its previous wartime experiences and the early days of World War I, the Army became a quick study in matters of civilian employment and assumed a lead role in the Federal Government by introducing a personnel classification system for organizing and grading the increasing numbers of different civilian jobs/skills required to support the force.²² The Army's system was to be adopted later by the entire War Department during World War II.²³

Army civilian contributions during WWI, WWII, and the Korean War were considerable and are perhaps better recorded in military history than in previous wars. At the peak of WWII, Army civilians numbered 1,881,495, and performed with distinction in many areas including research and development, intelligence, logistics, communications, medicine, as well as many other fields.²⁴

In 1948, well after the Army had reduced its civilian workforce to 401,972 (less than one-fourth of its peak WWII strength), there was a very clear recognition expressed in the Secretary of the Army's Annual Report on the importance of Army civilians to the force.²⁵ Quoting from the report:

In every phase of its operations the Army is dependent to a great extent upon the support of its corps of civilian workers. From manufacturing to the highest policy-making these men and women—"soldiers without uniform"—are engaged in fundamental tasks of the Army.²⁶

The report goes on to express concerns over the difficulty of obtaining qualified and loyal personnel to perform the great diversity of tasks required to support the Department.

Civilian Downsizing—Lessons From WWII Considering the enormous Army civilian demobilization which occurred shortly after WWII, it seemed useful for the purposes of this study to examine the plans which guided this massive effort, and to apply any lessons learned to help downsize today's civilian workforce. The Report on the Status of Demobilization and Postwar Planning, published initially in June 1944 and updated in April 1945, contained a comprehensive accounting of the Army's plans

and problem areas during post-WWII demobilization. Three specific civilian personnel issues emerged in the reports: (1) the handling of civilian reemployment opportunities incident to demobilization; (2) coordinating the discharge of civilian employees with reductions in the Army's strength, and (3) the manner in which civilian personnel would be selected for separation.²⁷ While the War Department's reports clearly recorded its civilian demobilization plans and problem areas for posterity, portions of the reports dealing with plans for the future force made no mention of the civilian workforce. Later, in November 1945, The War Department Basic Plan for the Post-War Military Establishment was published, which set the course and established the policies to reshape the new post-war Army.²⁸ Using today's parlance, this was the War Department's "strategic vision." Remarkably, yet again, not one word is mentioned of Army civilians and the role they would play in the future force. Why the Army's planners could not see the importance of including the civilian workforce (at one point 1.8 million strong) into their future plans, causes one to return to my earlier "invisible component" thesis.

Industrial Mobilization—The Civilian Eclipse of Army Civilians What is significant about the military writings of the post-WWII period is the flood of emphasis and analysis on the subject of industrial preparedness/mobilization, and the civilian manpower requirements of America's industrial war machine. While it is vital to acknowledge the importance of this dimension of national readiness, it seems that a few things fell through the cracks. Lost in comparative obscurity in the military writings of circa 1945-1955 is any critical assessment of what the Army learned about its own internal needs for civilian manpower and the potential implications of lessons learned upon future doctrine, force mix and personnel policy. This blindspot concerning the Civilian Component has been a vision shortfall which has continued to prevail throughout Vietnam, the Cold War and Panama. Simply stated, the Army has neither acknowledged, nor seriously studied, the role and contributions of Army civilians in peace and war with the emphasis it has on the other components. In fact, there is considerably more written on civilian contractors during wartime than on Army civilians. Accordingly, the body of military knowledge—yes, military knowledge—from

which to derive lessons learned and to guide future doctrine concerning the role of the Civilian Component is sorely lacking.

The Past Twenty Years—Growing Recognition Without retreating from the above admonition for greater study, it is fair to say that there has been increasing attention given to civilians over the past two decades in Army historical records. A review of the Army's Annual Historical Summaries since 1970 reflects a subtle, but perceptible, shift in characterization of the civilian workforce. Through most of the 1970s these summaries focused almost exclusively on administrative and personnel management highlights: employment statistics; new personnel policies; civilianization of military positions; high-grade controls and labor relations. Lacking in spirit was any substantive and consistent recognition of Army civilians as a vital component of the Total Force. This started to change in the 1980s, with the appearance of more compelling statements on the importance of civilians to the Army. Some examples taken from select Departmental historical summaries are chronicled below:



Extracts From
Army Historical Summaries

1980—Records major CSA emphasis upon the civilian workforce at the Army Commander's Conference and in his subsequent White Paper. Included is a quote from the SECARMY/CSA Annual Posture Statement. . . "We must recognize that our civilian workforce is a critical element in the readiness equation and it must be adequately supported as such."²⁹

1981—Records that. . . "the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel publicly stated that the shortage of civilian employees was the Army's most important personnel problem, of more concern to the Army staff than active Army and reserve component recruiting."³⁰

1983—Records. . . "The Army Chief of Staff has maintained that a strong peacetime civilian force is necessary not only to meet Army mission needs, but also to ensure that the Army is prepared for the first stages of a future war."³¹

1986—Documents CSA direction to embark upon the "Civilian Personnel Modernization Project" to strengthen the civilian personnel management policies/procedures/systems of the Army, and to establish an Army

Management Staff College to redress civilian training and professional development voids."³²

Suffice it to say that the Army has come a long way from the earlier views expressed by MG Wood in 1905, advocating an Army without civilians. The next segment of this paper addresses the current civilian workforce and why the Army has one today. It will describe present workforce size, cost, and major mission areas where civilians support the force. This will be used to establish a departure point for evaluating future change.

TODAY'S ARMY CIVILIAN WORKFORCE

DOD Manpower Policy—Why DOD Has Civilians Today Departmental policy governing the use of civilians is contained in DODI 1400.5, subject: DOD Policy for Civilian Personnel, dated 21 March 1983. The essence of the directive is summarized by the following policy statement:

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to use civilian employees in all positions that do not require military incumbents for reasons of law, training, security, discipline, rotation or combat readiness, or that do not require a military background for successful performance of the duties involved.³³

Such a broad statement provides considerable latitude for interpretation, and each of the Services have their own implementing guidelines. Army policies contained in AR 570-2, Manpower Requirements Criteria, and AR 570-4 Manpower Management, essentially require, with few exceptions, that. . . "all wartime jobs in the theater of operations (high risk areas which are inappropriate for civilians) will be designated as military positions."³⁴ Otherwise, Army manpower policies tend to support the maximum use of civilians in all TDA or non-tactical units. The Army's tactical forces (TOC elements), are entirely military and are structured according to force designs established by TRADOC combat developers. Of the Services, the Army has the highest ratio of civilian to active component military personnel (.52 to 1 for Army, .45 to 1 for Air Force and .43 to 1 for Navy), suggesting a high level of integration

of civilians into the force and a strong dependency on its Civilian Component.³⁵

Underlying DOD's civilian manpower policy is a long-standing principle of restraint which has guided American psyche and politics—to keep the Nation's military no larger than needed to provide for national security.³⁶ There are usually three dividends which accrue with the use of civilians: (1) continuity of operations enabled by a stable workforce; (2) specialized skills not generally found in military units; and (3) lower overall cost.³⁷ Concerning the latter point, Public Law 93-365, Title V, sec. 502, specifically requires DOD to employ the most cost-effective means of manpower consistent with military requirements.³⁸ It is also a matter of policy for civilian and military strengths to be reduced, wherever possible, through contracting-out activities which do not require in-house government performance and which can be accomplished at lower cost by private industry.³⁹ Thus, the decision logic for determining DOD/Army manpower sources could be defined as follows: (1) use contractors where more economical, unless government policy requires in-house performance; (2) use civilians unless precluded by the military nature of tasks; and (3) use military personnel where contract and civilian performance would be too dangerous or dysfunctional to national security.⁴⁰ Using this logic, the pressures to reduce military force structure will usually be greatest, followed by civilian cuts, then contractors. The Army's manpower glide-path projected from FY91 through 1995 for soldier versus civilian reductions, substantiates this logic, i.e. a 26% cut in AC/RC soldier end-strength versus a 18% cut for civilians.⁴¹ What this means, in a nutshell, is that **tomorrow's Army will be even more dependent on its civilian workforce than today's force.**

Army Civilians—How Many? Army civilian strength in FY91 totaled 365,500 personnel—over one-third of the active force, and nearly one-fifth of the total force.⁴² Approximately 17% of the civilian workforce are foreign national direct and indirect hires.⁴³ While the workforce is predominantly CONUS-based, approximately one-fourth of the Army's civilians are overseas in fifty-two different countries and U.S. territories, with the greatest overseas concentrations found in Germany, Korea, Japan

and Panama.⁴⁴ Between now and FY95, the Army's civilian strength will be reduced by approximately 60,000 personnel, and nearly one-third of the planned cut is expected to be taken out of Europe as a part of major force realignments and base closures.⁴⁵ Some of the Army's personnel losses actually represent functional transfers to other DOD activities resulting from Defense Management Review (DMR) actions such as the consolidation of commissaries and the activation of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). In more genuine terms, the Army's civilian cut amounts to less than 16% from its FY91 baseline.⁴⁶ However, civilian reductions have been on-going since FY89, and measuring from this point, the cut approximates 25%.⁴⁷ Thus far, Army civilian drawdowns have largely been accomplished through attrition and hire-freeze actions to minimize reductions-in-force.

The Price Tag Total civilian personnel costs in FY91 amounted to \$12.5 billion or 17% of the Army budget, compared to \$30 billion or over 41% for military personnel costs.⁴⁸ Total personnel costs for the Army therefore amounted to more than 58% of the FY91 budget.⁴⁹ Substantial cuts in the Army's budget will proportionately require deeper cuts in personnel and force structure than the Navy or the Air Force, whose budgets are less personnel intensive and who can more easily trim expenditures by terminating big ticket items such as the Seawolf and B-2 bomber. This translates to an increasingly smaller, future Army, assuming that anticipated budget cuts materialize or increase, and personnel costs continue to rise as they have in the past decade.

Where and How Civilians Support The Army The Army requires a skilled and diversified civilian workforce to keep it running—over 600 occupational specialties are needed to support the force.⁵⁰ Looking at the civilian workforce in programatic terms, the following table displays actual and projected end-strengths for FY's 91-93 by major defense planning and programming category (DPPC). The far right column summarizes the projected net change in employment by FY93 using FY91 as a start point.

Army Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)
Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in 000's)⁵¹

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>% Total</u> <u>Civ. Force</u>	<u>FY91</u>	<u>FY92</u>	<u>FY93</u>	<u>% Change</u> <u>FY 91</u> <u>vs. 93</u>
Strategic	.05%	0.2	0.1	0.1	- 50 %
Tactical/Mobility	6.65%	24.3	23.2	18.5	- 23 %
Commun/Intel	1.48%	5.4	5.3	4.8	- 11 %
Combat Installations	19.32%	70.6	55.6	53.9	- 23 %
Force Spt Tng	.74%	2.7	2.2	2.1	- 22 %
Medical Spt	7.82%	28.6	29.0	29.6	1 %
Joint Activities	.77%	2.8	4.5	4.5	61 %
Central Logistics	16.69%	61.0	63.8	59.3	- 3 %
Svc Mgt Hqtrs	3.04%	11.1	11.0	10.6	- 20 %
Research/Devel	5.96%	21.8	20.8	20.0	- 18 %
Tng/Personnel	4.95%	18.1	25.4	24.9	15 %
Spt Activities	<u>32.48%</u>	<u>118.7</u>	<u>89.9</u>	<u>81.2</u>	<u>- 29 %</u>
TOTALS	100.00%	365.5	330.8	309.4	- 15 %

Notes: (1) Totals may not add precisely due to rounding.

(2) Endnotes provide explanation of each Major DPPC.⁵²

The largest employers of civilians are the Army's installations, central logistics operations and support activities. In some areas such as logistics and research and development, civilians comprise 80% or more of the entire Army workforce.⁵³ The significant reductions depicted above in Strategic, Tactical/Mobility, Communications/Intelligence, Combat Installations, Force Support Training, Management Headquarters, Research and Development and Support Activities are related primarily to reprogramming and specific force structure cuts, base realignments and DMR efficiencies which are already completed, on-going or planned. Noteworthy are increases in selective programs (Medical, Joint Activities and Personnel Training) suggesting proportionately greater emphasis in some areas, while decline is more the norm. What should be understood from the above chart is that civilians support the force and contribute to the full spectrum of Army missions—they are the principal component used in running the Army's installations and sustaining base.

Army Civilians—Unique Civil Servants Unlike the Civil Service employees of the Federal government engaged in domestic and social programs, Army and DOD civilians are entrusted with the special responsibility of supporting the nation's military forces—in both peace and war. Overseas, Army civilians help man and operate the installations and area support groups which would serve as major combat support/combat service support platforms for war in Europe, Korea and elsewhere. At home, at installations throughout the United States, they perform largely the same base operations support tasks, and staff a much broader array of depots, schools and R&D facilities needed to man, equip, train, sustain and deploy the force. Both at home and abroad, civilians provide many personnel support services that make Army quality of life programs among the best. As recently experienced in the Gulf War, Army civilians are likely to be called upon to deploy with the force in future conflict. The professionalism, productivity and preparedness of the Army's 300,000 civilians will unquestionably affect the performance of tomorrow's Army on the battlefield of the future—just as they have in every conflict since the Continental Army was formed in 1775. Accordingly, it is imperative to undertake the task of downsizing the Civilian Component with care and vision. Six major elements of change appear on the horizon which the Army must both comprehend and plan for to effectively reshape its civilian workforce. The following segment deals with these forces and their potential implications to the Army.

SIX FORCES OF CHANGE—Implications and Insights

#1. The Army's Shrinking Base Structure/Force Structure

Current and Future Plans Over the next five to ten years, the Army will close or return to host nations, at least 337 bases world-wide.⁵⁴ This number will grow as further reviews of both base structure and force structure are conducted in concert with DOD and the Congress, and as the Army moves towards the basing strategy prescribed in its Long Range Stationing Study (LRSS) for the year 2020.⁵⁵ Announced closures to date are located as follows: 236 bases in Europe; 12 in the

Pacific; 13 in Panama; and 76 in the United States.⁵⁶ Additionally, 57 bases in CONUS will be realigned—expanded or contracted—to support activity consolidations, force restationing and improved use of infrastructure and training areas.⁵⁷ In addition to base closures/realignments, on-going and planned civilian reductions related to budget and force structure cuts, will be a major workforce destabilizer. Between FY92-95, over 60,000 civilian positions will be either eliminated or transferred out of the Army.⁵⁸

Savings, Costs and Productivity Over the long-term, these realignments and reductions will produce substantial savings. Over the short-term, there is a high price to pay in personnel movements, transportation, environmental clean-up, separation entitlements and other related costs at closing, shrinking and gaining installations. Realignments of this magnitude are unprecedented in recent history, and will impact not only many local communities, but also a substantial portion of the Army's civilian workforce over the next decade. Beyond the anticipated \$1 billion cost to implement the last round of the Army's base realignment plans, there is the hidden and immeasurable cost of personnel turbulence and lost productivity.⁵⁹ Having personally conducted a number of realignment studies which resulted in activity closures, my experience suggests that the process can have devastating effects on employee morale, job performance, skill retention/balance, and the overall quality of the workforce. The Army's realignment efforts must therefore be viewed as both a significant "taking care of people" issue, and a major force sustainment challenge.

Keeping Faith In studying alternatives to accomplish these actions at lowest possible costs, the Army must carefully consider the manner in which it handles civilian versus military personnel entitlements. In a recent Departmental memorandum, the Director of Army Civilian Personnel advised of actions being taken to seek authority to eliminate current "saved-grade" protection due to RIF demotion, and to reduce "saved-pay" entitlements to two years versus indefinitely.⁶⁰ While other flexibilities being sought are generally more favorable—this is a troublesome indicator. Both entitlements are government-wide, and the Army is essentially looking to deny its civilians an important job and pay security entitlement enjoyed by all Civil Servants.

This would require, as a minimum, support from both OSD and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), followed by Congressional legislative reform. To turn things around, the Army must examine what steps it is taking with respect to its military separations and ask if they are similarly focused on reducing present entitlements, or is the intent more towards liberalizing benefits to ease the transition? The answer is the latter, and this begs the question of equity. As an Army comptroller of many years, I fully comprehend the budget pressures which drive tough choices. I would suggest, however, that the Army's leadership carefully study any proposals to reduce personnel entitlements that convey a double standard—weighing the potential savings against both dollar costs and the price of perceived inequity.

Implications/Insights The Army's long-term base realignments and personnel reductions will have a continuing, destabilizing effect on the civilian workforce. Thoughtful and well-executed planning which includes aggressive placement assistance, early retirement authority, alternate skill development training and innovative steps to minimize adverse personnel impacts is essential. Done properly, the Army can keep faith with its loyal and dedicated civilian workforce, continue to provide quality support to the force from a reduced basing structure, and overcome the difficulties associated with these painful but necessary economies. Civilian and military personnel policies concerning separation and transition entitlements for soldiers/civilians affected by Army downsizing actions should be, to the maximum extent, consistent and compassionate—One Army, one standard.

#2. Civilianization—Military/Civilian Mix

Longstanding Dilemma The use of civilians versus military personnel has been a continuing dilemma for the Army. A Brookings Institution study of the DOD civilian workforce in 1978 conservatively estimated that 377,000 military positions within DOD could be civilianized.⁶¹ At the time the study was conducted, DOD's civilian to military ratio was .49 to 1, and conversion of these positions would have raised the ratio to .82 to 1.⁶² Just prior to this study, the Army had completed a major civilian substitution effort during July 1973 to December 1976, where it had converted 14,080 military positions to civilian.⁶³ A review of the Department of the Army

Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1977 indicates that the Army felt, at that time, that it had reached the upper limit of civilian utilization with the completion of this effort. In fact, the Army's position was that further significant substitutions would inhibit essential military skills development and the rotation base needed to sustain its 16 division force.⁶⁴ Yet over the next decade, further civilianization efforts continued and were later reported as an effective means for returning soldiers to combat and CS/CSS units.⁶⁵ But where does the Army stand today on civilianization? Where should it stand?

The TDA/BASOPS Army In May 1990, as a part of Project Vanguard, 174,581 military positions were documented in the "General Support Forces" of the Army—essentially the TDA force.⁶⁶ Looking only at the base operations (BASOPS) piece of this, approximately 20,000 military positions reside in the Army's installation workforce.⁶⁷ There are those who would argue that the majority of these positions could be filled by civilians at lower cost, releasing soldiers to tactical units and providing greater opportunities for civilians. While many commanders may still prefer a military workforce, it appears that earlier resistance to the use of civilians has passed, and most commanders would not hesitate to further civilianize their workforce if funding could be assured. Given shrinking installation budgets from which to fund civilian pay, and the "free labor" cost of soldiers provided by centralized DA funding of military pay, further civilianization of the force seems remote without budget offsets. Moreover, after recent events in the Gulf War which required the deployment of over 1,500 Army civilians and 3,000 contract civilians to support the force, the Army may need to rethink its civilian substitution and contracting policies for other reasons.⁶⁸

Deployable CS/CSS Structure Overseas in Europe and Korea, where the Army has been deployed and poised to fight for decades, it has imbedded considerable CS/CSS capability within its civilian-staffed installations and TDA activities. General support maintenance, and even direct support maintenance, are routinely provided by Army civilians at both CONUS and OCONUS locations. During the late 1970s and '80s, as systems became more complex, there was a growing tendency to pass back maintenance and to civilianize many logistical support

positions. In the future, should the Army's predominantly CONUS-based force have to rapidly deploy to a bare-based theater of war, it will be essential for these forces to have maximum self-sustainability. As the Army reexamines the CS/CSS structure it has placed into the RC for possible return to the active force, it should also review the CS/CSS capabilities which now reside in the Civilian Component or which have been contracted-out.

Implications/Insights The Army may have gone too far in civilianizing CS/CSS capabilities which will be required on tomorrow's distant, lethal and non-linear battlefield—and not far enough in other installation and support areas which have limited potential for deployment/employment in combat. A closer examination is needed, and the resultant military versus civilian manpower bills/savings should be used to offset one another—placing soldiers in the TOE force and civilians in BASOPS. At the root of the problem is the lack of precise policy on what positions require military incumbency outside the TOE structure. It is a defining parameter of the force which needs to be clearly delineated and constantly reviewed as the nature of warfare and doctrine change. Recent events in the Gulf, and the shift from a forward-deployed force to a CONUS-based Army, suggests it is time.

#3. Contracting-Out—Opportunity or Albatross?

Basic Policies Public Law 100-370, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, and AR 5-20, Commercial Activities Program, prescribe government and Army policy for determining the most economical means for performing work of a commercial or industrial nature.⁶⁹ While the program is complex, the process is based simply upon competition. Cost comparisons are made between the government's most efficient organization (MEO) and bids by private contractors. If work can be accomplished more economically by contract, the government workforce is replaced. Understandably, this is an unpopular program with civilian employees as it presents a major threat to job security.

Track Record to Date DOD's contracting-out efforts have undergone intense scrutiny since FY88. The Congress has been dissatisfied with the administration of the program and has imposed both legislative reforms and punitive

budget cuts. For example, in the 1990 Defense Appropriations Bill, the Army received a \$83 million reduction in civilian manpower because of excessive Commercial Activities (CA) program administration costs and inefficiency, compared with Navy and Air Force reductions of \$36.8 and \$24 million, respectively.⁷⁰ Since FY84, the Army has conducted 306 CA reviews of which 189 operations have gone to contract performance, while 117 remained in-house.⁷¹ Total number of positions reviewed to date is 16,868 (14,140 civilians and 2,728 military).⁷² Concrete savings to the government are difficult to measure, and according to a Congressional committee investigation, DOD reported savings of \$780.6 million since 1979 are a "misrepresentation."⁷³ Quoting from the 1990 DOD Appropriations Bill, . . . "The Committee review has determined that the A-76 Program, as currently implemented in DOD, has actually increased the cost of Defense operations. This negative budgetary consequence can be directly attributed to the substantial costs to administer the Commercial Activities Program and the lengthy time period required to complete individual cost studies."⁷⁴ Judging from figures presented in the Appropriations Bill, the net budgetary cost to DOD could be as much as \$164 million per year.⁷⁵ What seems inarguable, however, is that once competition runs its course, the "winner"—be it the in-house workforce or a contractor—can achieve in excess of 25% savings from pre-competition costs.⁷⁶

Recent Legislation In the 1988/1989 Defense Authorization Act, Congress included a provision known as the Nichols Amendment which required the SECDEF to delegate more authority to installation commanders on the conduct of CA activities—to include the latitude to determine which functions would be studied.⁷⁷ Additionally, exasperated by the length of time DOD was taking to complete studies, Congress in the FY91 Appropriations Act precluded further use of funds to continue "single function" studies more than two years old, and all "multi-function" studies over four years old.⁷⁸ This amounted to 394 studies.⁷⁹ With the latitude provided under the Nichols Amendment, and mandated termination of "over-aged" studies, GAO reports that DOD's CA effort has dwindled from 1,200 studies in 1987 to 115 on-going

reviews.⁸⁰

Army Hardball The Army's CA Program, like the rest of DOD, is at a critical juncture. The specter of continued Congressional cuts remains, while the program is bogged down by installation commanders choosing to not study any more activities because of a cumbersome process, the high cost of running the program and its dysfunctional impact on employee morale. A GAO audit of DOD's A-76 efforts in July 1991, in noting this problem, records that Army CA officials were planning to employ more rigid milestones on study completion that would require the approval of installation commanders or activity chiefs of staff to revise. Following this mindset, the CSA recently dispatched a message which contained the excerpts below:

3. COMPETITION MEANS PLACING EMPLOYEES' JOBS AT RISK, BUT RESHAPING INSTALLATION WORK FORCES IS UNAVOIDABLE. GOOD LEADERSHIP DEMANDS SOUND MANAGEMENT AND HARD CHOICES, NOT 'SALAMI SLICES.' COMPETITION CHALLENGES US TO TAKE A HARD LOOK AT ALL OPERATIONS AND FIND THE BEST WAY TO ACCOMPLISH THEM, WHETHER THE WORK STAYS IN-HOUSE OR GOES CONTRACT.

4. THE NICHOLS AMENDMENT AND ARMY POLICY PROVIDE COMMANDERS WITH THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY TO DECIDE WHICH ACTIVITIES TO COMPETE. THIS DOES NOT MEAN COMMANDERS CAN DO NOTHING; WE WILL COMPETE OUR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES.

5. YOU HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY TO DECIDE WHICH ACTIVITIES TO COMPETE. USE THAT FLEXIBILITY. WE HAVE OPPORTUNITIES AT EVERY POST IN CONUS. REVIEW THE CA PLANS YOUR COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN WORKING ON AND LET ME KNOW WITHIN THE NEXT 30 DAYS WHICH ACTIVITIES WILL COMPETE IN FY92.⁸¹

This directive could be interpreted as an infringement of authority delegated to installation commanders by the Nichols Amendment which says **they will determine** what activities will be studied for cost comparison. While the message concedes to a commander's flexibility to decide, it forecloses on the option not to study. This is a contradiction. More importantly, in my opinion, the message conveys an uncharacteristically uncaring tone which says—"get on with it," and "whoever wins—wins." No constructive initiatives or assistance are offered. Compare this approach with Air Force actions to improve their CA program.

Air Force Innovation The GAO audit notes that the Air Force has undertaken three significant CA improvements:

- development of an automated cost-study computation program that the Air Force plans to have operational in October 1991,
- establishment of a central data base of work statements that Air Force officials hope will facilitate the development of future work statements, and
- formation of a team composed of representatives across the Air Force that will address streamlining the Air Force's A-76 program.⁸²

In contrast to the Army's approach, the above Air Staff initiatives provide meaningful tools to accelerate the process and take a Total Quality Management (TQM) approach to developing further ways to streamline the program.

Alternative Approaches The Army needs to develop a greater awareness to several things about the CA program: (1) civilians tend to view it as a serious threat to their livelihoods; (2) directives which convey indifference to the in-house workforce and which infringe upon delegated authority are counter-productive; (3) Army modernization efforts must not overlook the civilian workforce, especially where new technology/equipment increases productivity and provides a competitive edge; and (4) a TQM approach to improve the study process and promote a "Team Army" spirit is needed. Building on the latter point, I offer a recommendation taken from a study done by the Logistics Management Institute in September 1984, entitled How Winners Win: . . . "OSD establish a clear **goal of winning Commercial Activities (CA) competitions with its in-house workforce.** . . ."⁸³ The significance of LMI's recommendation is one of employer commitment. It says to its Army civilians: "let's trim costs and work smarter—the Army wants you to remain on the team—we can beat the competition." What happens in the end will be determined by fair competition and federal acquisition law, but the journey has been redefined by a leadership attitude that says "we're in this together." This distinction, in my judgment, will pay big dividends.

Implications/Insights To get the most from its A-76 efforts, and the most from its workforce, the Army needs to change from a "compete to see who wins"—to a "let's compete to win" philosophy. It further needs to move from a directive focus, to a TQM approach which supports teamwork, modernization and higher headquarters assistance. By doing so the Army can achieve compliance with A-76 provisions,

promote greater competition to reduce costs and increase productivity, and demonstrate a commitment to its civilian workforce which both recognizes their faithful service and instills a will to win.

#4. Army Inc.—The Move to Business Practices

Dollar Controls vs. Manpower Controls The days of civilian end-strength ceilings, voluminous manpower justifications, costly on-site surveys, and billet-level documentation of civilian manpower are gone—and with it, a substantial bureaucratic workload. Recent Departmental initiatives have radically altered the Army's way of managing its civilian employee resources, shifting from tight, centralized control of manpower requirements/authorizations, to decentralized management based on funded workload. Manage Civilians to Budget (MCB) is now the operative method for installation and activity commanders to staff their operations. These are welcome changes, but the Army must assure that these reduced controls do not cause it to lose track over the civilian workforce needed to support the total force in peace and war. This is an easy trap to fall into should the Army become too reliant upon decentralized management, and too transfixed on the problems of AC/RC downsizing to see what's happening to its Civilian Component. History has shown that the civilian workforce can drop from the Army's radar screen during periods of major demobilization, rendering it invisible. To ensure that its Civilian Component is right-sized, the Army should provide guidelines for downsizing which preserve essential capabilities that might otherwise fall victim to the budget axe for lack of peace-time value, popularity or powerful constituency.

DOD Consolidations—Eroding Rotation Base The DMR process continues to consolidate many common support functions within the Services, creating new DOD-wide agencies such as the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) and the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA). Moreover, the role of existing activities such as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) are being expanded. While this is expected to result in DOD economies, there are certain personnel impacts on the Army. Using DFAS as an example, by FY93, the majority of civilian employees working in the finance and accounting operations of the Army world-wide will be transferred to

DFAS.⁸⁴ This represents virtually the entire body of professional accountants in the Army's Comptroller career field. With the loss of these personnel and their positions, career managers will have no way of acquiring and developing accounting expertise within the Army's ranks—something commonly done today. It is essential for future Comptrollers and DCSRM's, in their role of supporting installation/MACOM commanders and soldiers, to have this expertise since they will continue to be held accountable for all matters of fiscal law, and will retain responsibility for certifying the official accounting reports which DFAS produces for their activities. Similar losses in skills and rotation base may be occurring in other civilian career fields of the Army, such as logistics, and it is important to recognize this and plan for appropriate remedies.

Pay-As-You-Go Support There is an avalanche of change taking place in how DOD provides for and finances its goods and services. Within the next two to three years, virtually all support provided on DOD installations will be furnished on a "user pays" basis. Non-reimbursable base operations support, once provided by Army garrisons world-wide to their tenants, will be a thing of the past. In furtherance of this concept, DOD has established an industrial super fund called the Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF), and is restructuring the financial systems of the Services to support more business-like operations which relate costs to output.⁸⁵ Other major changes taking place in the Army's logistics system are expected to save \$1.2 billion by FY95.⁸⁶ This includes, among other initiatives, a change in the Army's free issue policy for major end-items drawn from depot stocks. Units must now pay for these items (e.g. engines and transmissions) out of their operating funds, after deducting a turn-in credit for salvageable items. Another business concept being implemented is the establishment of industrially funded Public Works Centers (PWC's) which would replace installation engineers (DEH's) and industrial/logistical activities (DOL's). These PWC's will provide service, for a fee, in competition with other PWC's and private industry. Veterans of financial and logistics management agree that the magnitude and rapidity of this change is unprecedented in Army history. What this means to soldiers and civilians alike is that the Army will be increasingly run, down to

unit level, by business principles of output, cost and economy of operations.

Implications/Insights MCB, DBOF, PWC's and the increasing number of DOD consolidations are permanently changing the Army's financial and logistical support systems, even its culture. Some of the DMR systems, policies and realignments required to transform today's Army into "Army Inc." are still being developed, so it might be premature to turn in one's night vision goggles for green eye shades. As changes occur, however, there will be a disproportionate impact on the civilian community for several reasons: (1) civilians comprise the vast majority of the Army's logistics and financial community who will be relied upon to implement these reforms; (2) significant personnel realignments and cuts are possible, and in some cases, budget and manpower levels have already been reduced in advance of fielding the new systems upon which DMR savings are predicated; and (3) the emphasis on cost and competition will place extraordinary added demands to cut costs, and improve service, all while adapting to major changes in policies/procedures. The goals established by DBOF and other DOD management improvements are worthy and must be pursued. At the same time, the distinctions between running a business and keeping a fighting force trained and ready must be acknowledged. The Army must not become so transfixed on decentralized management that it loses visibility over the essential civilian skills, rotation base and mobilization capability needed to support the force in peace and war.

#5. Gulf War Lessons—Reshaping Doctrine

Major Success—Major Disconnects I was very proud to learn of the important contributions made by many of my fellow civilians in supporting Desert Shield/Desert Storm—especially from the more than 1,500 personnel, mostly volunteers, who deployed to the Gulf.⁸⁷ They performed as engineers, air traffic controllers, port safety officers, automation/computer specialists, personnel and MWR specialists, and were extensively involved in preparing and fielding new equipment and complex systems.⁸⁸ In studying the many early policy messages, after action reports, and other documents which pertain to the Civilian Component's experiences during the war, I am struck by several things beyond the overwhelming success of the

operation. First, how unprepared the Army was from a policy, systems and doctrine standpoint to deploy and employ civilians in a war zone. Second, how straight-forward and penetrating the findings and after-action reports seem to be in acknowledging these deficiencies (the PERSCOM after action report itself contained twenty-two major civilian personnel issues).⁸⁹ Third, and most importantly, it is evident that major steps are now being taken across the board to learn from and correct these problems. While the detailed write-ups themselves read more like a "Murphy's Law" digest, the following excerpt, taken from the HQDA. Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report, September 1991, does a good job in summarizing what the Army learned.

DOD and Contractor Civilian Personnel: The Army had limited recall of its extensive previous practical experience in planning for the use of, processing, training and equipping both DOD and contract civilian personnel for use in contingency operations. These civilians were required in highly skilled positions, but there was no overall coordinator to assist in resolving personnel related issues such as identification and deployment of 'emergency essential' personnel, pay and allowances, benefits, training, equipping, preparation for overseas movement and reception into theater. . .Future contingencies will require the use of these civilian assets and planning must be accomplished now to establish the necessary policies to alleviate identified problem areas.⁹⁰

Recall or Doctrine I draw your attention to the opening lines of the above quote. . ."the Army had limited recall. . ." and return to my early thesis of the invisible component. Over one hundred years ago, in the Regulations of the Army of the United States, 1881, there was written policy on the arming of civilian employees (Article 2535), and the jurisdiction of military authorities over civilian employees while in the field, under hostile conditions (Article 895).⁹¹ Both issues surfaced in the Gulf and seemed to have caught the system in a state of amnesia. Having to re-learn old lessons is not a phenomenon unique to the Civilian Component, and I would hope that the next time the Army's efforts will be guided more by clear policy and doctrine on the employment of civilians in conflict, and less on fallible recall. To the credit of the Army's leadership, and the hard work evident from progress I have observed to date, the Army is on track.

Civilian Mobilization Corps—One Alternative There are many steps being taken to improve the preparedness of Army civilians to deploy in conflict. One possible alternative not already under consideration is the establishment of a Civilian Mobilization Corps which would have the following characteristics: (1) an all volunteer civilian force, with a mission to rapidly deploy to a war zone to support the military force; (2) comprised of highly skilled and motivated Army civilians; (3) includes all functional specialties and career programs needed in war-time; (4) configured in different support packages; (5) trained and regularly exercised to deploy and operate under field conditions; (6) readily identifiable in a centralized personnel data base; (7) required to meet soldier fitness standards; (8) eligible for pre-legislated pay and entitlement incentives; (9) centrally funded by HQDA (as a minimum during deployments via open allotment—ideally, all year); (10) established in a separate RIF competitive zone for protection to preserve their critical skills; (11) career-tracked by Civilian Personnel Directorate, PERSCOM; and (12) each member personally, professionally and administratively capable of wheels-up deployment in 72 hours. The size and composition of such a corps of civilians requires considerable study, and lessons learned from the Gulf would be a good start point. Given the civilian support package deployed to SWA, a relatively small corps is anticipated. The full mobilization requirements in support of the CONUS support base is essentially defined by existing MOBTDA documents. While these need, and are receiving HQDA attention, a fast deploying mobilization corps such as the one described would fill a present void.

Implications and Insight The Gulf War taught the Army that the Total Force concept, was not supported by Total Force doctrine, policies or systems in so far as the Civilian Component is concerned. Air/Land Battle Doctrine (ALB), for all of its exceptional qualities, does not address the employment of Army civilians in a CS/CSS role in division and corps rear areas.⁹² In October 1985, the Army Science Board issued its Final Report of the 1985 Summer Study on Manning Implications of Logistics Support for Air/Land Battle, which addressed how the Army could assure the supportability/sustainability of ALB.⁹³ True to form. . . no mention was made of Army civilians, and only a one-liner comment on contractors. The good news is that the

Army's vision and perspective have become much clearer. Fitted with corrective lenses furnished by the Gulf War, the Army is making progress towards the doctrine, policy and system reforms needed to fully operationalize the Total Force concept. Beyond the extensive reforms already underway/under study, I believe that the suggested establishment of a Civilian Mobilization Corps is a worthwhile goal.

#6. "Paradigm Shift"—Towards the Future The Army's recognition that it must learn to look at the Civilian Component in much the same way as it views the other components, has spawned the term "Paradigm Shift" and has helped birth the concept of "Total Army Culture." Thoughtfully developed and implemented, this initiative has enormous potential to change the Civilian Component for the better and to increase its value and visibility to the Army. The senior leadership is wasting no time in getting a program underway to make Total Army Culture happen, and to further galvanize the One Army concept by forging closer ties between Army civilians and soldiers. Key program elements focus upon: (1) promoting mutual understanding between the military and civilian workforce through education, command support and emphasis of shared values; (2) greater professional development of civilians, focusing on leaders; (3) closer alignment and equity between civilian and military personnel systems concerning performance ratings, training, rank/promotion, career management and benefits; and (4) removing regulatory barriers which require different rules, but add no value.⁹⁴ By and large, the initiatives being undertaken under the umbrella of Total Army Culture seem to be good ones. However, it is important to remain sensitive to the perceptions of both the military and civilian workforce as the Army moves towards the goal of a common, but not single, culture.

Implications/Insights The Army's leadership must guard against developing an inertia of change which does not recognize the important and lawful distinctions between its separate, but integral, components. Each of the components possess inherent strengths which derive from the properties which make them different, and these force multipliers must be preserved. Where these differences offer no benefit, they should be selectively challenged and changed. Shifting from one paradigm, which cannot see beyond the differences—to yet another—which sees no differences

at all, is not the solution. What the Army needs as it sets its corporate azimuth towards the 21st century, is **One Army cohesion and a clear vision of the precise role and end-state for each component of the Total Force.**

TOMORROW'S ARMY

Rendezvous Point—A Strategic Force In the preceding section, I suggested and evaluated six forces of change which will significantly affect the civilian workforce over the next decade. Each issue presents both opportunities and risks, and its impact will largely be decided by the competency and vision of the Army's leadership. The goal is to lead, manage, and maneuver the Civilian Component workforce, through the forces of change, to reach the objective—a "strategic force" as defined by Secretary of the Army, The Honorable Michael P.W. Stone, and Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, in their U.S. Army Annual Posture Statement, FY93. This joint statement specifies that. . .

Tomorrow's Army must be:

- **Trained to Fight as a Joint or Combined Team**
- **Versatile**
- **Deployable**
- **Expansible**
- **Capable of Decisive Victory.**⁹⁵

The Army's Four Challenges To achieve this vision, the senior leadership has further defined four challenges in transitioning today's Army into tomorrow's strategic force. These major guideposts for change are condensed below.



Extract From THE ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT FY93

1. **To Maintain the Edge** in warfighting that was demonstrated in Panama and the Persian Gulf by balancing the imperatives that ensure our success—*quality soldiers who have been trained to razor sharpness,*

supported by dedicated civilian employees, outfitted with the most *modern equipment*, led by *tough and component leaders*, structured in an *appropriate mix of forces* by component and type, and employed according to an *effective warfighting doctrine*.

2. **To Reshape the Force** by tailoring active and reserve forces to accommodate the new strategy. We are reducing our presence in Europe by nearly 60%; we have already eliminated two divisions in CONUS; and we must be allowed to reduce the Cold War vestige of unneeded reserve component force structure -- and return to programmed reductions this fiscal year. The Army will also recast training and war plans to accommodate a regional focus and the rapid deployment capability of units based in the continental United States, and evolve our doctrine to reflect changes in modern battlefield dynamics as well as the emphasis on joint, combined, and coalition warfare and the use of Army forces across the continuum of military operations.
3. **To Provide Resources to the Force** by improving the force structure to preserve readiness despite budget constraints, by making tough management decisions, and by becoming ever more efficient stewards of America's treasure.
4. **To Strengthen the Total Force** by fully integrating our active and reserve components, keeping early-deploying units fully "mission ready," establishing strong training relationships and by fully integrating Total Army readiness standards and operating systems.⁹⁶

Civilian Component Challenges—Strategies for Change Using the Secretary's and CSA's vision and challenges as a guide, I offer the following addendum to the senior leadership's four challenges which focuses squarely on the Civilian Component. It brings together key elements of vision, challenges and strategies needed for contending with the forces of change affecting Army civilians.

Maintain the Edge Effectively employ Army civilians to keep the fighting force trained and ready. Do this, in part, by ensuring that Army civilians are equally trained, ready, modernized and competently lead to support the force. Recognize that training and readiness are not the exclusive domain of the warrior, and that effective doctrine must address the distinct role of civilians as part of the Total Force.

Reshape the Force Carefully and compassionately downsize the Civilian Component, while preserving and strengthening essential capabilities needed to support tomorrow's Army—as defined by the Secretary's/CSA's vision. Avoid numbers-driven, civilian reductions which are guided exclusively by affordability, and are not the

product of coherent force planning, supported by penetrating assessment of capabilities and requirements. Preserve and strengthen civilian elements of the force which support deployability, and tailor civilian training and development to promote an understanding of joint, combined and coalition operations.

Provide Resources for the Force Recognize the combat multiplier of stewardship, and the need for continuous leadership involvement in the resource management and acquisition processes of the Army—too often left to predominantly civilian-staffed activities who do not always possess the requisite military training and perspective to guide prioritization and decision-making. Imbed more stewardship into military training, and imbed more warfighting into civilian training—grow leaders and managers who can see both imperatives.

Strengthen the Total Force Define more precise roles, missions, skills and resource levels for the Civilian Component based upon: (1) a careful study of military history and lessons learned; (2) the inherent strengths and limitations of civilian manpower; (3) sound doctrine which specifically acknowledges its use; and (4) essential capabilities required to support the future force. Nurture integration and esprit de corps among all components through education, affiliation and commonality of policies and systems wherever possible.

CONCLUSION

Visibility Is Improving Hopefully, this paper has served to develop a better understanding of the Civilian Component and the importance of Army civilians to the Total Force. As the Army proceeds with the tough task of downsizing, it must not lose sight of these specific truths: (1) civilians have been important members of the Army team since the beginning; (2) they have supported the force in peace and war, and have earned a rightful place in the Army's proud heritage; (3) tomorrow's smaller Army will be even more dependent on its Civilian Component than today's Army; (4) there are major and unique challenges to downsizing the civilian workforce which must be understood, planned for and carefully carried-out; and (5) further study of the "invisible

component" is needed to bring its past, present and future contributions and challenges into focus. Only in this way will future Army leaders be empowered with the perspective needed to fully integrate and shape the Total Force. This writing only scratches the surface, and it is my hope that much more exhaustive analyses are undertaken to build upon this neglected aspect of military study and history.

Closure It is fitting to conclude this writing with a quote taken from Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, in his interview with Soldier Magazine, shortly after he became the 32d Chief of Staff of the United States Army. His words were a stimulus for this paper.

. . . I would say that one aspect of the Army that doesn't get as much play as it should is the civilian workforce. Look back into the history of the United States Army. . . and you'll find that civilians have been with us from the outset. . . and they're still with us. And they were with us in the Gulf; we sent civilians from Anniston Army Depot over to work on some equipment and prepare it for battle. . . and that event right there has done a great deal, I think, to cause the Army to recognize the important role that the civilians play on a day-to-day basis in the operation of this great army.⁹⁷

Post Script "Well said and lead on, Chief". . . from the foxhole of this Army civilian.

ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
ALB	Air/Land Battle
CA	Commercial Activities
CONUS	Continental United States
CS/CSS	Combat Support/Combat Service Support
CSA	Chief of Staff, Army
DA	Department of the Army
DCSRM	Deputy Chief of Staff Resource Management
DeCA	Defense Commissary Agency
DEH	Directorate of Engineering and Housing
DFAS	Defense Finance and Accounting Service
DMR	Defense Management Review
DOD	Department of Defense
DOL	Directorate of Logistics
DPPC	Defense Planning and Programming Category
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	General Accounting Office
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
LMI	Logistics Management Institute
LRSS	Long Range Stationing Study
MOBTDA	Mobilization Table of Distribution and Allowances
MWR	Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
NAF	Non-appropriated Fund
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PERSCOM	HQDA Total Army Personnel Command
PWC	Public Works Centers
RC	Reserve Component
RIF	Reduction In Force
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SWA	South West Asia
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TQM	Total Quality Management
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command

ENDNOTES

¹Per Department of the Army, The United States Army Posture Statement FY93, presented to the Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives. 2nd Session, 102nd Congress, pp. 40-41, the Army's Base Force of 4 corps and 20 divisions (12 AC, 6 RC, 2 cadre) will be attained by FY95. According to the Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, D.C.: February 1992), p. 138, the Army's FY91 force consisted of 26 divisions (16 AC and 10 RC). Using data contained in the latter report, projected FY95 military end-strengths (535K AC and 550K RC) contained in the Association of the United States Army, The Army Budget for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. An Analysis (Arlington: Institute of Land Warfare, May 1991), p. 29, and the 298.8K FY95 civilian end-state specified in the Posture Statement FY93, p. 57—total force reductions from FY91 to FY95 are projected to amount to 26%. The statement contained in the Posture Statement FY93, p. 9 which specifies that "the Base Force of 1995 will be one-third smaller than today" therefore appears to be technically incorrect. Measuring the FY95 Base Force against yesterday's Army of FY89 (770K AC, 776.2K RC, 402.9K civilians) derives a Total Force cut of 29%, which more closely approximates the one-third cut mentioned, but still falls short. The Army must be careful to avoid portraying reductions for "effect" which cannot be substantiated, and which later become "prophetic."

²Information on Total Army Culture obtained from materials presented at Total Army Culture (TAC) Executive Planning Board, held at Radisson Park Plaza Hotel, Alexandria, VA, 10-12 February 1992. See page 26 in main body of paper for discussion of major program features.

³Paul P. Van Riper, History of The United States Civil Service (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1958), 94. A complete discussion of the history of Civil Service reforms is contained in pages 533-549.

⁴Department of Defense, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vol. II, The Test Of War by Doris M. Condit, (Washington, D.C.: 1988), 105.

⁵CPM Newsletter No. 2-76, (Washington, D.C. GPO.: April-July, 1976), 1.

⁶James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), 39.

⁷Ibid., 35.

⁸Ibid.

⁹CPM Newsletter, 8.

¹⁰Huston, Pages 61-65 provide a detailed account of military campaigns at Valley Forge, Morristown and Jockey Hollow, and civilian contributions and difficulties. CPM Newsletter, p.7 summarizes these accounts.

¹¹CPM Newsletter, 1, 5.

¹²*ibid.*, 1.

¹³*ibid.*

¹⁴Huston, 154.

¹⁵*ibid.*, 200-201.

¹⁶*ibid.*, 170.

¹⁷The War Department, Annual Reports of the Chief of Staff 1903-1920 (Washington, D.C.: Date not given), 1903, p.144 and 1905, p. 376-377.

¹⁸Huston, 295.

¹⁹The War Department, 1905, p. 377.

²⁰*ibid.*, 1917, p. 13.

²¹*ibid.*, 1917, p.14.

²²Van Riper, 252.

²³*ibid.*

²⁴Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (DIOR) Selected Manpower Statistics FY90 (Washington, D.C.: 30 September 1991), p. 25. DIOR/MO1-90.

²⁵Department of the Army, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army 1948 (Washington, D.C.: 1949), 253.

²⁶*ibid.*

27The War Department, Special Planning Division, Report on the Status of Demobilization and Postwar Planning (Washington, D.C.: 30 June 1944), pp. 65-66; and The War Department, Special Planning Division, Report on the Status of Demobilization and Postwar Planning (Washington, D.C.: 15 April 1945), pp.108-109.

28The War Department, Basic Plan for the Post War Military Establishment (Washington, D.C.: November 1945), 1-72.

29Lenwood Y. Brown, ed., Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1980 (Washington, D.C.: 1983), 100.

30Christine O. Hardyman, ed., Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington, D.C.: 1988), 101.

31Cheryl Morai-Young, ed., Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1983 (Washington, D.C.: 1990), 70.

32Marilee S. Morgan, ed., Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1986 (Washington D.C.: 1989) 26-27.

33Department of Defense, DOD Policy for Civilian Personnel No. 1400.5 (Washington, D.C.: 21 March 1983), 1.

34Department of the Army, "Manpower Management." Army Regulation 570-4. (Washington, D.C.: 25 September 1989), p. 35, para. 6-6.

35Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, D.C.: February 1992), 135. Data derived from Table B-1, Military and Civilian Personnel Strength.

36Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1985 (Washington, D.C.: 1 February 1984), 86.

37 Martin Binkin, Herschel Kanter and Rolf H. Clark, Shaping the Defense Civilian Work Force (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978), 42-52. Provides detailed analysis of overall military versus civilian costs, which establishes that civilian employee costs are generally lower.

38Public Law 93-365, Statutes at Large, 88 Title V, sec. 502, 404 (1976).

39Department of the Army, U.S. Army War College, Army Command and Management Theory and Practice 1991-1992 (Carlisle Barracks: 1991), ch.16, p. 56.

40Binkin, 6-7. Provides a similar, but slightly different manpower decision logic.

⁴¹Data derived from three sources: Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress, (Washington, D.C.: February 1992), 135; The United States Army Posture Statement FY93 Presented to the Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, 2nd Session, 102nd Congress, p.57; Association of the United States Army, The Army Budget for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. An Analysis (Arlington: Institute of Land Warfare, May 1991) 29. See endnote 1.

⁴²Annual Report to the President and Congress, 135. Data derived from Table B-1.

⁴³Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (DIOR) Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical Area (Washington, D.C.: 30 September 1991), 36-39. DIOR/MO5-91/04. Data derived from Table 309B.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁵The Army Budget for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. An Analysis, 11.

⁴⁶Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower Requirements Report, FY 1992 (Washington, D.C.: February 1991), A-2 and A-3. Data provided in reference shows 16K civilian spaces transferring out of the Army into DOD activities, thus reducing "real" reductions to end-strength by 2%.

⁴⁷Annual Report to the President and Congress, 135. (Civilian FY89 end-strength); and The United States Army Posture Statement FY93, 57. (FY95 projected strength).

⁴⁸Manpower cost derived from Manpower Requirements Report, FY 1992, pp. VIII-12 and VIII-13, Table VIII-4, using a FY91 total budget figure of \$73 billion obtained from Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management. The Army Budget: FY92/93 President's Budget. (Washington D.C.: April 1991), 5.

⁴⁹Cumulative costs of manpower explained in endnotes 47 and 48.

⁵⁰Department of the Army, Manual (Washington, D.C.: October 1989), Chapter 6, 38.

⁵¹Department of Defense, Manpower Requirements Report, FY 1993, (Washington, D.C.: February 1992), III-4.

⁵²*Ibid.*, Appendix C, pp. C-1-C-5. DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY DEFINITIONS:

STRATEGIC. The Strategic category consist of those nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces that have as their fundamental objective deterrence of and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, our military forces and bases overseas, and our allies. Contains program elements for the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).

TACTICAL/MOBILITY. The Tactical/Mobility category consists of land forces (Army and Marine Corps), naval forces (Navy), and mobility forces (Army, Air Force, and Navy). Special operations forces are imbedded in this DPPC. Includes Army divisional and theater forces.

COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE. This category contains program elements for centrally managed communications and intelligence gathering activities.

COMBAT INSTALLATIONS. This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the strategic, tactical, airlift and sealift commands (Programs, 1,2, and 4), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, installation audiovisual support, and air traffic control. Also included are resources for installation headquarters administration and installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions.

FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING. This category primarily contains program elements for Air Force and Naval training and certain Army and Marine Corps unit and force-related training activities. Included are resources for fleet readiness squadrons, and Air force combat crew training squadrons.

MEDICAL SUPPORT. This category contains program elements for medical care in DOD regional medical facilities, including medical centers and laboratories; and for medical care to qualified individuals in non-DOD facilities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of medical research, medical equipment and systems, and health care in station hospitals and medical clinics.

JOINT ACTIVITIES. This category contains program elements for those manpower billets which are outside of service control. They include manning requirements of such organizations as the Joint Staff, Unified Commands, and the like.

CENTRAL LOGISTICS. This group includes DPPCs for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities. Contains program elements for: the operation of supply depots and centers, inventory control points, centralized procurement offices; centralized repair modification, and overhaul of end items of equipment and their components conducted at depots, arsenals, reprocessing facilities and logistic centers, and centralized logistics activities, other than supply and maintenance.

SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS. This category contains the program elements for the service combat and support commands. Examples are : U.S. Army, Europe, and headquarters of military Service support commands.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES. This category includes program elements for major defense wide activities conducted under centralized OSD control, except those for weapons systems for which procurement is programmed during the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) projection and for program elements identifiable to a Support Activities DPPC such as Medical or Personnel Support.

TRAINING AND PERSONNEL. This category contains the staff and faculty program elements for formal military and technical training and professional education of military personnel conducted under centralized control of Service training commands. Contains program elements for provision of varied services in support of personnel, including recruiting and examining, the overseas dependents education program, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally-funded welfare and morale programs.

SUPPORT ACTIVITIES. The DPPCs in the Support Activities category consist of the base operating support functions for support installations and centralized activities. Contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, and administrative commands. Included are supporting real property maintenance, base communications and family housing activities. This category contains miscellaneous Service program elements that provide centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs.

INDIVIDUALS. The DPPCs in this group account for military personnel who are not considered force structure manpower. They are transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, students, trainees, and cadets/midshipmen.

NOTE: No entry show for this DPPC since the chart only pertains to civilian personnel.

⁵³Department of the Army, Manual, Chapter 6, 38.

⁵⁴The United States Army Posture Statement FY93, 50.

⁵⁵ibid., 50 and U.S. Army War College, Army Command and Management Theory and Practice 1991-1992, Chapter 16, 3.

⁵⁶The United States Army Posture Statement FY93, 50.

⁵⁷ibid.

⁵⁸Association of United States Army, "Managing Army Strength Reductions and Related Personnel Issues," Summary of AUSA Issue Conference, (Arlington, 25 July 1991) 11.

⁵⁹The United States Army Posture Statement FY93, 50.

⁶⁰Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, "Civilian Downsizing Initiatives," (Washington, D.C.: 9 January 1992), 2.

⁶¹Binkin, 73-74.

⁶²*Ibid.*, 29. Ratios derived from Table 4-1.

⁶³Rae T. Panella, ed, Department of the Army Historical Summary. Fiscal Year 1977 (Washington, D.C.: 1979), 52-53.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

⁶⁵Christine O. Hardyman, ed, Department of the Army Historical Summary. Fiscal Year 1981, (Washington, D.C.: 1988), 102-103; and Marilee S. Morgan, ed., Department of the Army Historical Summary. Fiscal Year 1986 (Washington D.C.: 1989), 11.

⁶⁶Department of the Army, Project VANGUARD, working paper, TDA Army. Source: TAADS Submission, January-April 1990.(Management of Change (MOC), May 1990), 1.

⁶⁷Base Operations Program Evaluation Group Team, BASOPS PRIMER, (Washington, D.C.: May 1991), 4.

⁶⁸Department of the Army, Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report Vol. I, p. 12; Vol. II, VII-Employment-90 (Washington, D.C.: September 1991). Provided deployment data on Army civilians and contractors

⁶⁹U.S. Army War College, Army Command and Management Theory and Practice 1991-1992, Chapter 16, 56.

⁷⁰Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1990 [To accompany H. R. 3072] 101st Cong., 1st sess.,(1 August 1989), 70.

⁷¹U.S. Army War College, Army Command and Management Theory and Practice 1991-1992, Chapter 16, 57. Subsequent studies have been conducted since Aug 91, which is the date of source reference.

⁷²U.S. Army War College, Army Command and Management Theory and Practice 1991-1992, Chapter 16, 57.

⁷³Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1990 [To accompany H. R. 3072].
69.

74Ibid.

75Ibid., 69. Language specifies annual savings of \$27-136 million per year, versus program administration costs of \$150-300 million per year.

76John B. Handy, and Dennis J. O'Connor, How Winners Win, (Bethesda: Logistics Management Institute, 1984), p. ii, reports savings averaging 27%. U.S. Army War College, Army Command and Management Theory and Practice 1991-1992, Chapter 16, 57, reports workforce reductions of 25%.

77General Accounting Office, Legislation has Curbed Many Cost Studies in the Military Services (Washington D.C.: 30 July 1991), 2. B-244249.

78Ibid.

79Ibid., 3.

80Ibid.

81Department of the Army, DACS-ZA, "Commercial Activities (CA) Cost Competitions," 1.

82Legislation has Curbed Many Cost Studies in the Military Services, 8-9.

83Handy, iii.

84Annual Report to the President and Congress, 31-32. Specific dates of transfer of Army finance and accounting operations to DFAS control under development.

85Ibid., 35.

86Ibid., 36-37.

87Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report Vol. I, 12.

88Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report Vol. II, VII-Employment-90.

89Department of the Army, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command. After Action Report-Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.:26 July 1991), Annexes W, X, Y, Z.

90Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report Vol. II, V-Mobilization-49.

⁹¹The War Department, Regulations of the Army of the United States and General Orders in Force on the 17th of February, 1881 (Washington, D.C. GPO: 1881), 89, 269.

⁹²After Action Report—Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, p. III-W-6—III-W-7.

⁹³Department of the Army, Army Science Board Final Report of the 1985 Summer Study on Manning Implications of Logistics Support for Airland Battle. (Washington, D.C.: 21 January 1986), 1-48.

⁹⁴Information on Total Army Culture obtained from materials presented at Total Army Culture (TAC) Executive Planning Board, held at Radisson Park Plaza Hotel, (Alexandria, VA, 10-12 February 1992), conference briefing slides.

⁹⁵Posture Statement FY93, summarized from pages 13-16.

⁹⁶*ibid.*, 8-9.

⁹⁷Gordon R. Sullivan, "One-On-One With The Chief," Interview by Soldiers Radio and Television, Soldiers, Volume 46, No.8 (August 1991): 8.

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