


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MOBILIZATION FOR OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM
LESSONS LEARNED

BY
COLONEL RONALD P. DALE
United States Army


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Concept. Using the lessons learned in Operation Desert Shield/Storm, it will also discuss the need to change Presidential Authority and mobilization plans to call up Reserve Forces that support an evolving national military strategy requiring rapid deployment, lethal and flexible response.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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MOBILIZATION FOR OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM: LESSONS LEARNED

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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Iraqi armored and mechanized divisions crossed the border of its neighbor, Kuwait, early on the morning of 2 August 1990. Within twenty-four hours of its successful attack on Kuwait, Iraq was massing its forces on the border of Saudi Arabia, preparing for what appeared to be an immediate attack. Saudi Arabia requested assistance from the United States. In a quick response, the first elements of the 82nd Airborne Division arrived in Southwest Asia on 8 August. This was the beginning of Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Within three weeks of the attack on Kuwait, the United States realized that it could not go to war without calling on some Reserve Component Forces. The President thus authorized the activation of 200,000 Selected Reserves under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code 673b. This was the first activation of Reserve Forces since the TET offensive in Vietnam in 1968. It was also the first test of General Abrams' Total Force Concept. This study will discuss the historical perspective of United States mobilization policy from its origins to the Total Force Concept. Using the lessons learned in Operation Desert Shield/Storm, it will also discuss the need to change Presidential Authority and mobilization plans to call up Reserve Forces that support an evolving national military strategy requiring rapid deployment, lethal and flexible response.

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"If we're ever going to war again, we're going to take the reserves with us."

General Creighton Abrams
Chief of Staff of the Army

INTRODUCTION

President Bush's Call-Up of 200,000 Selected Reserves on 23 August 1990 was the first mobilization of United States Reserve Forces since President Lyndon B. Johnson called up 35,200 Reservists over 20 years ago during the TET Offensive in Vietnam in January 1968. But this call-up was different. The Presidential 200,000 Call-Up Authority to fill theater requirements as was required in Operation Desert Shield had not been envisioned by the mobilization planners. Instead, Presidential 200,000 Call-Up Authority was envisioned by the planners to provide for mobilization station support, strategic signal support, medical support, port operations and training base expansion. So plans were simply not available for the limited call-up of Reservists to fill theater requirements. This caused many challenges for those in charge of the recent mobilization.

The Army Mobilization Plan (AMP) guided mobilization for Operation Desert Shield. The Department of the Army and United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) mobilization plans were based on the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) and the Department of Defense Mobilization Master Plan. However, these plans were written for a European conflict escalating to Full Mobilization. During Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS), a deficiency in pre-mobilization planning for

less than Full Mobilization for regional conflict was quickly evident. The appended chronology reveals the arduous legislative and authorization process that eventually facilitated mobilization for ODS (see Appendix A).

In the latter part of the 1980s and into the 1990s, momentous global events reshaped the world. The Berlin Wall came down after 30 years; the Warsaw Pact collapsed; satellite countries broke away from the Soviet Union, essentially dissolving it; and communism lost its internal and international hold on peoples and nations. At home in the United States, we were plagued with huge budget deficits caused partially by the unprecedented military buildup to win the Cold War in the 1980s. Now that the Cold War has been won, the call for a "peace dividend" and a large drawdown of military forces has been sounded by politicians, pundits, and the people. Then the crisis in the Persian Gulf halted these internal events. The lessons learned during ODS taught the United States lessons on regional contingencies and power projection. It also taught that America, especially with drastic Active Force cuts, could not go to war without her Reserve Forces.

This paper will discuss emerging U.S. reliance on Reserve Forces from its origins to the Total Force Concept. It will also discuss the new military strategy and doctrine of power projection for regional conflict, which requires an appropriate mix of Reserve Forces. It specifies the need to change Presidential Authority to call up Reserve Forces to support an

evolving military strategy requiring rapid, deployable, lethal and flexible response, calling on lessons learned in ODS.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF U.S. MOBILIZATION POLICY

Origins and History

Mobilization of trained citizen-soldiers has been the primary means of self-defense since the beginning of the New World in the 15th century. Three Massachusetts Bay militia regiments were organized and later mobilized for the Pequot War of 1637. In 1775, they fired the "shot heard round the world" at the battles of Lexington and Concord, thereby beginning the Revolutionary War.¹

The Founding Fathers of the United States placed the "militia clause" in the Constitution so the fledgling nation could defend itself by maintaining a small standing army in peacetime, one which could be rapidly expanded in war by its large, trained citizen-soldier militia.² Therein lies the origins of, and the constitutional basis for, the current Reserve Force structure.

Historically, the U.S. Army has been organized with mobilization as a basis precept. The United States has never maintained a peacetime Regular Army of sufficient size to meet the needs of war; it has always relied on its militia/National Guard and Reserves in all of its nine major wars, including

Vietnam. The nation has called up and relied heavily on the citizen-soldier during eight major wars as well as during minor wars and domestic disturbances. But Vietnam was different. The citizen-soldier, unlike in previous wars, was not called up for America's ninth war. President Johnson made the decision not to mobilize the nation's Reserve Forces during its first three years. After that, only a minuscule mobilization occurred.

Vietnam: The Turning Point

Vietnam thus was a major turning point for the restructuring of the Army and the Reserve Component (RC) program. President Lyndon B. Johnson, during the time the Army was mobilizing for war, shocked the defense establishment when he turned down the advice to mobilize RC units.

For long considered an essential backup to the active military establishment in the event of prolonged hostilities, Reserve Forces suffered a grievous setback when, at a crucial point in the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson turned down his Defense Secretary's recommendation for a major mobilization. The years that followed were equally traumatic for the Active and the Reserve Forces. The Active Force was required to undertake a massive expansion and bloody expeditionary campaign without the access to Reserve Forces that every contingency plan has postulated, and the Reserve Forces--to the dismay of long-time committed members--became havens for those seeking to avoid active military service in that war.³

Johnson's decision was a major departure from past U.S. policy and an aberration in U.S. military history.

During the time the U.S. Army was mobilizing for war in Vietnam, the RC--which had mobilized and been called on during America's previous wars--were not going to be allowed to participate. This departure from standard operating procedures was "perhaps the most fateful decision of the entire conflict."⁴ Johnson's apparent motivation came from his reluctance to spread the effects of the war throughout the population. Another reason Johnson did not want to call the Reserves and thereby involve the entire nation was to prosecute the war on a low-key basis and avoid declaring a full-scale war. Johnson "tried to fight a war on the cheap and tried to fight a war without acknowledging that he was fighting a war."⁵ The reasons that caused Johnson to not call up the Reserve Forces during the Vietnam conflict were the very reasons for the American populace's discontent with the war and the war's eventual overwhelming unpopularity.

The Vietnam War taught us that America, without the general population having a stake and commitment through her Reserve Forces, cannot sustain a protracted major war for limited objectives. Karl Von Clausewitz reminds us that warfare is based on what he calls "the remarkable trinity" of the people, their army and their government. He goes on to say that, while the government provides the ends and the army the means, it is "the passions" of the people that are the very engine of war.⁶ The

lessons learned during the Vietnam War have thus precipitated a return to a heavy reliance on Reserve Forces.

Post Vietnam: The Total Force Concept

The United States began the transition from a draft to an all-volunteer force in the early 1970s at the end of the Vietnam War. General Creighton Abrams spent five years in Vietnam from 1967 to 1972, returning to become the Army's Chief of Staff. Abrams, a 40-year veteran and participant in three wars, clearly understood the swings in military readiness before and after wars. He also understood that the key reason the President and Congress did not gain the support of the American people was that the nation was not politically and psychologically mobilized for war. Abrams knew that to accomplish his goals, he must revitalize the Reserve Forces in his Total Force Concept, thereby insuring that by modifying the structural mix of Army forces, mobilization of the RC forces would be a virtual necessity prior to committing the nation to any significant level of combat.

Abrams built a close working relationship with James Schlesinger when he was appointed Secretary of Defense in 1973. This special Schlesinger-Abrams relationship allowed Abrams to put together a complex of initiatives that:

1. Stabilized the Army's strength.
2. Restructured the institution so as to provide more fighting power within a fixed strength.

3. Eliminated entire headquarters and large parts of others.
4. Integrated the Reserve Components into the overall force in a way that virtually ensured their availability in any substantial future conflict.⁷

As a result of Abrams' Total Force Concept, the President and Congress now must address the mobilization question when contemplating sustained use of U.S. combat forces.

Abrams, as Chief of Staff, was determined to ensure that his Total Force Concept was institutionalized. He was determined that:

Never again would a President be able to send the Army to war without the reserves maintained for such a contingency. The vehicle for doing this was a revised force structure that integrated reserve and active elements so closely as to make the reserves virtually inextricable from the whole.⁸

In his implementing policy letter of 13 August 1974, Abrams stated:

Concurrently, we are committed firmly to the essential task of bolstering the readiness and responsiveness of the Reserve Components integrating them fully into the total force.⁹

Two months later, General Abrams died in office. But his Total Force Concept lives on. The Total Force Concept became a reality by 1983, when roughly 50 percent of the Army's combat elements and 70 percent of its combat service (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units resided in the National Guard and Army Reserve.¹⁰

As a result of the Total Force Concept, the Army has become more and more dependent on RC forces to provide the structure

needed to sustain a long-term forward deployment. The nation's political leaders would have to be sure of, or seek, popular support for a conflict which would require the activation of citizen-soldiers to ensure victory. Conversely, if there was no popular political support, then the political leadership would avoid the conflict altogether, thereby avoiding another Vietnam.

The nation's current plans for mobilization are founded on a long and complex series of military, congressional and executive initiatives that have evolved from the basic concepts set forth by the Founding Fathers and maintained to the present. The Army today can be described as a relatively small Active Force, backed by a large Reserve Force. The Army RC is made up of National Guard (NG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) forces. The majority of all Reserve Combat Forces are in the NG, while the majority of CS and CSS are in the USAR. Truly Abrams' Total Force Concept had been implemented. If America ever went to war again, she would take her Reserve Forces. Abrams' concept of a Total Force was then tested in America's next major war, the recent ODS.

THE FRAMEWORK FOR DESERT SHIELD/STORM MOBILIZATION

Historically the Army's strategic mobility doctrine has been based on forward deployed forces, pre-positioned equipment, United States Air Force airlift and United States Navy sealift capabilities. The Army's general plan requires reinforcement of forward-deployed forces, and force projection. This doctrine was

based on a rapid escalation to Full Mobilization directed against the Warsaw Pact. The regional conflict of ODS, which required a no-notice start for rapid power projection, was a totally new situation for Army planners. It required new plans and doctrine.

The Mobilization Process

The mobilization process employed was therefore programmed and planned for a rapid progression to Total Mobilization of forces to meet a Warsaw Pact attack in Eastern Europe. The planners of the nation's military strategy envisioned a rapid buildup to Full Mobilization to meet that threat. The levels of mobilization to meet the threat are as follows:

1. Selective Mobilization. Mobilization, by the Congress or the President, of RC units, individual Ready Reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency (e.g., postal strike, flood, earthquake, etc.) that does not involve a threat to the national security.

2. Presidential 200,000 Selected Reserve Call-Up Authority. Activation of not more than 200,000 Selected Reservists by the President, and the resources needed for their support for no longer than 90 days (plus an additional 90 days if warranted) for any operational mission without a declaration of national emergency.

3. Partial Mobilization. Mobilization by the President of not more than 1,000,000 Ready Reservists (units and individual Reservists), for not longer than 24 months, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

4. Full Mobilization. Mobilization by the Congress of all RC units in the existing force structure, all individual, standby, and retired Reservists; retired military personnel; and the resources needed for their support for the duration of the emergency plus six months to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

5. Total Mobilization. An expansion of the Armed Forces by the Congress and the President to organize or generate additional units or personnel beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security."¹¹

These levels of mobilization provided a plan to fill the national military strategy for rapid response for Total Mobilization. It failed, however, to provide a plan for Partial Mobilization for the no-notice start of a regional conflict in ODS. Instead, the 200,000 authorization was envisioned as a step in support of Full Mobilization to conduct large-scale conventional war against a Warsaw Pact force in Europe. It was not envisioned as a means to quickly field a large force capable of conducting a quick contingency action as a key part of a coalition army.

In August 1982, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved a highly sophisticated planning and execution system called the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). In September 1989, the Joint Requirements Council had approved the mission needs statement for JOPES. After almost 10 years in development, JOPES is now "on line" to provide decision-makers with an extensive database and a fully integrated single system

to access. JOPEs is now linked to the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) and is documented in the 10-volume U.S. Forces Command Regulation 500-3, FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS).¹²

All Joint military planning for mobilization planning is conducted within the framework of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and JOPEs. These systems are further linked to the National Security Council System (NSCS) and to the Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS); the latter link provides fiscal reality to the programs which are developed. The Army has its own AMOPS, which incorporates the Department of Defense (DOD) Master Mobilization Plan and JOPEs.¹³

Mobilization for ODS was accomplished within the planning guidance of the AMP, which is derived from the guidance given in the AMOPS, which itself is driven by the DOD Master Plan. FORSCOM is the command responsible for mobilization authority. The FORMDEPS is directive and comes from the JCS, AMP and AMOPS. FORMDEPS is the approval authority for all operations and mobilization plans by Major Army Commands (MACOMS). This authority goes down to RC and includes all RC detachments.¹⁴

These war plans addressed the Warsaw Pact scenarios. They were conceived in a sequential manner from a very low conflict to Total Mobilization; they could be very quickly activated to total military response. The general mobilization schedule was a worst-case, time-phased concept that did not take into account use of the RC on a less than Full Mobilization or their use for

regional contingencies. As ODS evolved, the thrust of the nation's mobilization plans were toward Total Mobilization and not toward power projection for regional contingencies. In short, our mobilization plans simply did not fit the circumstance of ODS.

The Desert Shield/Storm Reserve Call-Up

National law and/or Congressional resolutions allow the President to direct the DOD to incrementally mobilize the Armed Forces, which also includes the RC. Using the variety of statutory authorities previously discussed, the President can order Reservists to active duty without their consent.

The statute that President Bush originally used to call up RC forces was Section 673b of Title 10, U.S. Code. This statute enabled the President to authorize the Secretary of Defense to activate up to 200,000 Selected Reservists without their consent for a period of 90 days on 23 August 1990 (Appendix A), with an extension of 90 days if the President determined that it was necessary without declaring a national emergency. (The President, in fact did declare a national emergency early in August to impose economic sanctions on Iraq).¹⁵ However, the Presidential 200,000 Call-Up only allowed Selected Reserve units and individual Selected Reservists designated Individual Military Augmentees (IMA) to be called.¹⁶

Only when Operation Desert Storm began did President Bush on 18 January 1991 (Appendix A), under Section 673 of Title 10, authorize a Partial Mobilization. Section 673 grants a broader RC activation authority. When President Bush invoked this statute on 18 January 1991, the Secretary of Defense was authorized to call up to 1,000,000 Reservists from both the Selected Reserves and Individual Ready Reserves (IRR) for a period of up to two years.¹⁷

The ODS Call-Up thus took place through four stages (Appendix A):

1. 23 August 1990 - The Secretary of Defense authorized (Army, Navy, and Air Force) up to 48,800 DOD Selected Reservists to active duty under provisions of 10 USC 673b. The authorization provided for the Call-Up of no more than 25,000 Army Selected Reserves to provide "combat support and combat service support"--i.e., excluding combat units.
2. 14 November 1990 - The Secretary increased the number of Reservists that could be ordered to active duty from 48,800 to 125,000. This authorization raised the Army's ceiling to 80,000 Selected Reservists and removed the restrictions on activating combat units.
3. 1 December 1990 - The Secretary increased the maximum of DOD Selected Reservists to 188,000. The Army's ceiling on Selected Reservists was raised to 115,000.
4. 19 January 1991 - The Secretary, based on the President's authorization the previous day to invoke provisions of Section 673 of Title 10 (Partial Mobilization), increased the number of Reservists to 360,000. Partial Mobilization allowed the ordering to active duty members of the IRR for the first time. The Army's authorization raised the maximum to 220,000 Selected Reserve and IRR.¹⁸

Peak strength of Army RC personnel activated was 139,931 on 3 March, including 14,138 IRR personnel. Approximately 73,400 Army RC personnel were in the Desert Storm Theater at its maximum strength, about 24 percent of the Total Army strength of 306,000 soldiers. By early February, 604 RC units had been activated, 340 of which went to Southwest Asia and 25 to Europe.¹⁹

The President used his 200,000 Call-Up Authority to activate Reservists initially for ODS instead of his authority to allow for Partial Mobilization early on, which would have allowed military planners more flexibility. The 200,000 Call-Up presented many challenges for the U.S. Army as implemented by the National Command and Department of Defense Authority.

LESSONS LEARNED - OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM

The majority of all the Selected Reserve forces that were activated for ODS were activated under the Presidential 200,000 Call-Up Authority (Title 10 United States Code 673b). The activation is restricted by the authority, which specified what type of units and individuals could be mobilized. The President did not increase the mobilization level through the Partial Mobilization Authority until 18 January 1991, shortly after Desert Storm began (Appendix A). Mobilization under the 200,000 Call-Up Authority caused many problems, particularly since it was not designed for the scenario in Southwest Asia.

Many of the problems and issues identified under Partial Mobilization were caused by deficiencies in pre-mobilization planning. The Army's mobilization plans were developed for Full Mobilization to reinforce pre-positioned and forward-deployed units in Europe--not for power projection and rapid deployment dictated by ODS.

Statutes and Plans

A Presidential 200,000 Call-Up was originally authorized and designed for a very limited duration and a specified number and type of personnel. Statutory and regulatory authority is specific for the Presidential 200,000 Call-Up, Partial, Full and Total Mobilization. The initial 90-day Call-Up by the President under 10 USC 673b was inappropriate, given the scope of ODS. During the early phases of ODS, the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) required RC CS and CSS units. Then as the military strategy changed to one of prolonged sustainment operations, the CINC required the RC forces for a longer time period. The statutory requirements under 10 USC 673b, 200,000 Call-Up failed to provide for the additional time required from the RC units for ODS. As a result, Congress had to extend the duration from 90 to 180 days; likewise, it increased the 200,000 cap (Appendix A). This demonstrated the inadequacy of the 200,000 Call-Up Authority to meet the current needs of the military.

Additionally, AMOPS and FORMDEPS as well as mobilization station plans did not adequately address relatively long-term operations under 10 USC 673b, Presidential 200,000 Call-Up. These plans were written with the assumption that Partial and/or Full Mobilization would quickly follow a 200,000 Call-Up. Deficiencies were noted early on at mobilization stations when the RC support structure required to support sustained activation, mobilization, and deployment operations was not available under the 200,000 Call-Up. The shortfall of RC support personnel was considerable, because mobilization plans did not call for RC mobilization units and IRR to be activated until Full Mobilization.²⁰

Mobilization Tables Of Distribution And Allowances

Mobilization Tables of Distribution and Allowances (MOBTDA) were developed to augment Active Component (AC) and RC TDAs to provide adequate resources for the increased workload to support administrative, logistics, medical, and training base expansion to support mobilization.²¹ MOBTDA were developed and approved for Full Mobilization. During ODS, all AC and RC organizations with a mobilization mission reported personnel and Reserve shortfalls, because MOBTDA were not authorized to be activated to allow for filler personnel and units under a Presidential 200,000 Call-Up or Partial Mobilization. Under current policies and procedures and the AMOP, there is no plan for the gradual

increase of personnel, but only for rapid increase to Full Mobilization. Only then may MOBTDAs be activated.

During ODS, mobilization stations reported personnel shortfalls. Additional manpower requirements were well documented during the peak periods of mobilization when 24-hour operations were common. In addition to the mobilization mission, all peacetime missions including the training base mission continued. Many civilian employees worked overtime; in many cases some worked without compensation.²²

The lack of authority to activate MOBTDAs impacted on all Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) installations. It was most acute at training installations which performed the additional mission of a mobilization station. Many peacetime missions were either delayed or neglected because of the support required by the mobilizing RC units. This was particularly true for logistics operations. Some logistics missions reported not to have been accomplished were: equipment maintenance, property inventories, building preventive maintenance inspections, validating/editing requisitions, monitoring contractor performance on service contracts, and supply receipt processing.²³

Mobilization stations required additional manpower during ODS to accomplish their assigned mobilization missions. But such personnel were not authorized under the 200,000 Call-Up, only for Full Mobilization. As mobilization for ODS progressed, the manpower requirements increased incrementally. Had incremental

MOBTDA authority to activate matched the increased mission requirements, mobilization stations would then have had access to the units and personnel necessary to accomplish the mobilization mission under the 200,000 Call-Up.

Individual Military Augmentees

The mobilization planners developed procedures and plans to allow for Full or Total Mobilization. These plans were designed to meet requirements of war or national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. The Presidential 200,000 Call-Up of Selected Reserves was envisioned to meet the requirements of internal operations and to provide IMAs. Mobilization plans call for IMAs to reinforce the AC at mobilization stations to enable a large number of Reserve units to be mobilized and validated for movement to theater operations. Such was not the case during mobilization for ODS. The units were mobilized by existing resources at mobilization stations. No (or perhaps a very few) IMAs, mobilization station support units, training base support units or IRRs were activated under the Presidential Call-Up. This caused a considerable strain on the already reduced training base. Mobilization stations had to continue their training mission with the added burden of mobilizing thousands of Reserves without the support of IMAs, as previously planned.²⁴

Mobilization sites located primarily at TRADOC training bases found early on that their plans were written to support Full Mobilization. Although these plans mention the Presidential 200,000 Call-Up and Partial Mobilization, there were no provisions to provide personnel resources to support these two levels of activation of RC forces. During Full Mobilization, the mobilization sites depend on personnel augmentation to accomplish required functions and training missions. This augmentation relies heavily on IMAs to provide command/control and training, personnel processing and maintenance support.²⁵

During ODS mobilization sites were not allowed to call IMAs to active duty after requests made to TRADOC headquarters were denied. The TRADOC commander made the decision not to call IMAs based on the fact that the large numbers of IMAs that were in mobilization plans would subtract from the 200,000 being deployed to Southwest Asia. He felt strongly that activating IMAs would reduce the CINC's war fighting capability.²⁶ At that point, no one knew that the President would move Reserve activation to the Partial Mobilization level in January 1991 (Appendix A). If IMAs were not included as part of the 200,000 Call-Up of deploying forces, the need for authorization to activate IMAs would not present a problem for future contingencies. IMAs are planned for early activation in Total or Full Mobilization plans. However, their planned use was to assist with Partial or perhaps Full Mobilization. They were not planned to be used as part of a contingency force. However, in ODS, they were needed immediately

to assist in fielding and sustaining that force. Instead, they were included in that force.

Individual Ready Reserve

Under the authority of the Presidential 200,000 Call-up, only individuals not assigned to units who are designated IMAs are allowed to be mobilized. The IRR is a manpower pool consisting of individuals who have previously served in the Active Forces or with Selected Reserves. IRR members are liable for involuntary active duty for fulfillment of mobilization requirements in accordance with Title 10, United States Code, section 673. The IRR can only be mobilized under Partial and Full Mobilization, not the Presidential 200,000 Call-Up.

The IRR is the largest single source of pretrained individuals available to expand the force during mobilization. During ODS, mobilization plans did not allow immediate access to IRR personnel to fill deploying RC units to acceptable levels of readiness. It was discovered early on during ODS that personnel procedures designed to support mobilization were not applicable under the 200,000 Call-Up. This restricted access to qualified troops in the IRR caused cross-leveling actions to be taken in RC units back at home station prior to movement to mobilization stations.²⁷

Many of the RC units required significant MOS-trained filler personnel to meet requirements for deployment. The practice of

cross-leveling personnel to deploying units caused significant shortfalls in the units that had not deployed; likewise, it created morale problems across the board. Had early access to IRR personnel been authorized during the 200,000 Call-Up, this practice would have been reduced and possibly eliminated.²⁸

Derivative Unit Identification Codes

During ODS, the theater of operations created a demand for specialized individuals and small teams of Reserves with special skills, but not whole units. Therefore, entire units were not called up, only parts because the 200,000 Call-Up placed a restrictive ceiling on the number of RC personnel who could be activated. In order to accomplish these specific manning requirements, derivative Unit Identification Codes (UICs) were used to activate Reserve individuals with "specific skills" or to activate "specific elements" of certain units.²⁹ This method of obtaining the necessary skills not only caused second and third order effects, but it circumvented the intent of the Presidential Call-Up Authority. The second and third order effects caused by this method were problematic.

The partial or fractional organizations and isolated individuals that were assigned to other units by using derivative UICs were not anticipated under traditional and authorized force structure policy and procedures. These derivative units lacked command and control as well as other administrative and logistic

functions. Morale suffered because of the lack of personnel support, and personnel accountability presented a serious problem. The use of derivative UICs created hollow units and left empty ones not capable of performing their missions. If ODS required escalation to Full Mobilization, many of the RC Units that gave up individuals or sections would not have been able to deploy. They simply would not have had the capability to perform the primary mission assigned them under the Army Authorization Documents System (AR 310-49).³⁰

Cross-Leveling

Personnel cross-leveling during Full or Partial Mobilization is accomplished only at the mobilization station as authorized by the AMP. The AMP prohibits cross-leveling of soldiers between activated and non-activated units. This prohibition serves to eliminate hollow units that have not been activated in the event further mobilization requires all units to be eventually activated to perform their primary combat mission. However, during ODS, cross-leveling took place at home stations. Many Reserve units required extensive cross-leveling to meet the readiness levels for personnel in order to meet deployment requirements. As a result, units that had not been activated were adversely affected, some so seriously that they were not deployable.³¹ If the AMP allows cross-leveling in the future at home stations, then force structures must be changed accordingly

and the Mobilization Cross-leveling System administered by PERSCOM must be changed.

The lessons learned in ODS have demonstrated that the nation's military strategy of power projection to regional conflicts must be supported by constructive changes in current Presidential Authority and Joint Mobilization Plans. Detailed mobilization plans were not available for mobilization under the limited authority of the Presidential 200,000 Call-Up. Many of the lessons learned in ODS were caused by a deficiency in pre-mobilization planning which was focused on Full Mobilization. Legislative and regulatory changes must be drafted, passed and incorporated into the manpower mobilization plans in order to meet the new strategy based on current threat and risk assessment requirements for rapid power projection.

CONCLUSIONS

The likelihood of global war has decreased with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the reorganization of the Soviet Union. Correspondingly, the likelihood of lesser conflicts has increased due to the end of a bipolarized world that tended to subjugate intraregional conflicts. The United States, as a result of these changes, has prudently reduced its Active and Reserve Force structure. However, it remains essential that the United States retain the capability to foresee and respond decisively to tomorrow's challenges presented by regional conflicts wherever

United States' interests are threatened. While planning for future contingencies, CINCs must anticipate using Reserve Forces as a result of the reduction of the Active Forces and lessons learned in ODS. In order to execute these new operational plans, changes in the current Presidential Authority for Reserve Call-Up and mobilization regulations and plans are necessary.

The lessons learned in the ODS regional conflict taught the United States lessons on regional contingencies and the strategy of power projection. It also taught that America, with drastic Active Force cuts, will not go to war without her Reserve Forces. The need to mobilize Reserve Forces to put together a force capable of victory in ODS also helped to gain overwhelming support from Congress and the average citizen. General Abrams' Total Force Concept was tested and proven successful in ODS.

The Presidential 200,000 Call-Up Authority was never envisioned by the nation's mobilization planners to be used to fill theater operational requirements, as was required in ODS. The Presidential 200,000 Call-Up Authority was envisioned by the planners to provide for mobilization station support, strategic signal support, medical support, post operations and training base expansion. Plans were not available for the limited Call-Up of Reservists to fill theater requirements. This caused many challenges for mobilization plans implementors. Mobilization plans were written for a European conflict, which could have rapidly expanded to global war, necessitating Full Mobilization. During ODS, a deficiency in pre-mobilization

planning for less than Full Mobilization for regional conflict was evident.

The mobilization process employed was programmed and planned for a rapid progression to Total Mobilization of forces to meet a Warsaw Pact attack in Eastern Europe. The planners of the nation's military strategy envisioned a rapid buildup to Full Mobilization to meet that threat. All mobilization plans provided for a rapid response toward Total Mobilization. They failed to provide a plan for Partial Mobilization for the no-notice start for regional conflict as was experienced in ODS. Future contingency operations will face the same difficulties in mobilization unless we change our legislative authority for Call-Ups and change our mobilization plans in the light of lessons learned from ODS.

The majority of all the Selected Reserve forces that were activated for ODS were activated under the Presidential 200,000 Call-Up Authority under the provisions of 10 USC 673b. The Presidential Call-Up of Selected Reserves was envisioned to meet the requirements of internal operations and emergencies. The Call-Up was intended to provide IMAs and mobilization units to reinforce the AC at mobilization stations; they would thereby support mobilization of the large number of Reserve units requiring validation for movement to theater operations and Total Mobilization. This did not happen during mobilization for ODS. The units that were mobilized were utilized for support of Active Forces in the theater of operations and not for internal

operational support as previously planned and authorized under Title 10 USC 673b. However, this problem was overlooked by Congress because of the enormous popularity and support from U.S. citizens for ODS. In addition, the authority for the President under procedures for the 200,000 Call-Up was extended from 90 to 180 days by Congress. Again, this was not the intent of the Presidential 200,000 Call-Up Authority. This, however, did set a precedent for further change in Presidential Authority, which is required to tailor a Reserve force mix to support Active Forces in future regional conflicts.

The lessons learned during ODS have demonstrated that the nation's military strategy of power projection for regional conflicts must be supported by changes to current Presidential Authority and joint mobilization plans. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and JOPES down to the CINCs must incorporate the changes in the manpower mobilization plans to meet the new strategy based on current threat and risk assessment requirements for regional conflict.

In summary, the threat that was formerly posed by the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies has been reduced significantly by recent events in Eastern Europe. The need for forward-deployed forces has been reduced, as has the threat of a massive attack on Europe or the danger of global war. This new era will allow for a smaller United States military force. The total force will rely heavily on RC forces to provide support and sustainment to Active combat forces. This "new world order" has

changed our military strategy and doctrine to one of power projection. It will require us to be able to rapidly deploy lethal, versatile forces. We must be capable of sustaining these forces in all regions of the world.

ODS has shown us the importance of planning for regional conflicts which are very likely and which will differ greatly. Different regions will require different force mixes; but we will rely heavily on RC forces with a wide variety of specialized skills. RC CS and CSS units as well as individual skill levels will have to be identified in future mobilization plans. They must be prepared to meet the requirements of short-warning and short-notice rapid deployments that will be necessary to meet varied regional contingencies.

Mobilization plans will have to be modified from an orientation toward Full Mobilization to meet the Soviet global threat to orientation toward Partial Mobilization to meet regional contingencies with little or no warning. The JSCP, JOPES and all CINCs' operational plans must be changed and modified to mobilize an Active and Reserve force mix that will ensure a quick and decisive end to regional contingencies.

The AMP, AMOPS, FORMDEPS, and AR 310-49, the Army Authorization Document System will all have to be modified to allow for incremental MOBTDAs activation of Reserve mobilization support units to accomplish new military strategy and doctrine. This will eliminate personnel shortages at mobilization stations and provide for a more efficient and rapid deployment of forces.

Mobilization stations with only TDA personnel to fill technical requirements need additional support to be able to continue normal workloads along with the additional requirements for mobilization. This workload will increase significantly with the drawdown of Army civilian and military personnel. IMA requirements have to be identified early on, and plans must automatically activate IMAs early in the mobilization cycle. The plans must also include the appropriate number of IMAs to be activated during each level of mobilization from the 200,000 Call-Up to Total Mobilization. In addition, the IMAs, which should be activated early on to support command/control and training, personnel processing and maintenance of the mobilized force, must not be included in the 200,000 authorized number. This will eliminate the reluctance of commanders to activate IMAs, as happened in Desert Shield, because of the fact they would be subtracted from the 200,000 deploying force.

The need to use derivative UICs during ODS pointed to a deficiency in the Reserve organizational structure. The use of the derivative UICs created hollow units and other previously mentioned problems. Unactivated Reserve units would not have been able to perform their primary mission if mobilization continued to Full Mobilization. It is imperative that the force structure of RC units be reviewed and updated to provide units with the necessary capabilities without the use of derivative UICs.

Mobilization planners should seek authorization for early use of the IRR. Authority to call up members of the IRR, which is not included under the Presidential 200,000 Call-Up, is necessary to prepare for regional conflicts. The special skills of individuals and units must be identified for regional contingencies early on. These special skills must be identified and planned for by the CINCs in future operational war plans and orders.

Finally, Congress must grant mobilization authority to the President to support the nation's war plans for regional conflicts that do not require Total Mobilization. ODS demonstrated that the Presidential 200,000 Call-Up must be modified to allow a specific Reserve force to be mobilized for an appropriate duration to allow military planners the flexibility needed for regional conflicts. The Presidential 200,000 Call-Up Authority needs to be changed to expand the time for activation under this authority from 90 to 180 days. Using ODS as a model, the policies and procedures developed during that operation should be incorporated into the nation's mobilization plans and regulations.

Following enactment of legislation to change the Presidential 200,000 Call-Up Authority, the DOD must incorporate these changes into the JSCP and JOPES. The CINCs should then include the new mobilization plans into their force structure and operational plans. Finally, exercises should be developed and executed to practice mobilization under the revised Presidential

Authority. These exercises should be conducted at specific mobilization stations designated for a particular CINCs' regional Area of Operations (AOR).

The United States, entering a new era, will focus its military strategy on power projection to regional AORs. The ability to project power to regional contingencies will depend on the appropriate mix of Active and Reserve Forces. The President and his military planners must be able to select and call up the appropriate forces to support an evolving military strategy that requires a rapid, deployable, lethal and flexible response.

APPENDIX A

RESERVE COMPONENT CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1 Aug 90 Iraq pulls out of talks on the two-week old border, oil and money dispute with Kuwait.
- 2 Aug 90 Iraq invades Kuwait.
- 3 Aug 90 Iraq masses troops on Saudi Arabian border. United States makes serious offer to defend Saudi Arabia.
- 4 Aug 90 President decides on military action.
- 6 Aug 90 United Nations imposes sanctions on Iraq.
- 7 Aug 90 Desert Shield: Deployment order for initial forces.
OCAR, FMF Division, activates OCAR-CAT.
- 8 Aug 90 First elements of 82nd ABN DIV arrives in SWA.
- 10 Aug 90 OCAR FMF Division reviews, analyzes FORSCOM's 200K Troop List, sees initial troop/equipment shortages.
- 13 Aug 90 HQDA Army Opns Center staffs 200K Call-Up alert.
- 14 Aug 90 USAR volunteers are authorized, up to 179 days.
IMA mobilization procedures set for DCSOPS DA review.
- 15 Aug 90 VCSA visits HQ FORSCOM to discuss USAR Call-Up.
- 17 Aug 90 Civil Reserve Air Fleet I (CRAF I) activated.
FORSCOM message on cross-leveling RC units when alerted; non-deployables to remain at home station.
- 18 Aug 90 AGR deployment guidance issued by DCSPER.
- 22 Aug 90 President authorized Selected Reserve (SELRES) activation under 10 USC 673b.

23 Aug 90 Army authorized initial 25K Call-Up ceiling.
Call-Up procedures set for units, individuals.
Recruiting for activated RC units stopped.

24 Aug 90 Alert to RC units.

25 Aug 90 Presidential Orders #1 and 2 Federalizing SELRES.

26 Aug 90 CENTCOM HQS established in Saudi Arabia.

7 Sep 90 First Reserve Units deploy to SWA.

11 Sep 90 Sec Army authorizes involuntary recall of up to
500 retirees (180 days).

24 Sep 90 Unit Status: 96 Activated,
16 Deployed.

27 Sep 90 Authority to draw equipment from RC units.

29 Sep 90 Unit Status: 144 Activated,
48 Deployed.

5 Oct 90 President Bush requests briefing on possible
offensive operations from CINC CENTCOM.

10 Oct 90 CENTCOM plan cannot guarantee success with one
corps and requires another corps of three heavy
divisions.

5 Nov 90 Defense Appropriation Act authorizes call-up of
SELRES combat units for 90 + 180 days.

13 Nov 90 RC Call-Up extended to 180 days.
Unit Status: 145 Activated,
89 Deployed,
29 CONUS support.

14 Nov 90 Army authorized Call-Up ceiling of 80K.

1 Dec 90 Army authorized 115K Call-Up ceiling.

5 Dec 90 Unit Status: 302 Activated,
122 Deployed,
42 CONUS support.

10 Dec 90 Unit Status: 401 Activated,
134 Deployed,
42 CONUS support.

20 Dec 90 Almost 122,000 USAR and NG personnel have been mobilized for ODS (all services).

28 Dec 90 One out of every four US personnel in SWA is an RC member, according to Washington Post.

11 Jan 91 370,000 US soldiers in SWA.

13 Jan 91 USAR, NG personnel activated for ODS total 146,106, of which 102,172 are Army.

15 Jan 91 Unit Status: 509 Activated,
269 SWA,
23 Europe.

16 Jan 91 Desert Storm: offensive air campaign initiated.

17 Jan 91 Unanimous Senate vote supporting Bush, US troops.

18 Jan 91 Presidential Executive Order (10 USC, 673) for Partial Mobilization, Call-Up of Ready Reserve.
Sec Def implements CRAF II for airlift.

19 Jan 91 Pentagon prepares to call up 170,000 Reservists.
Army authorized 220K Call-Up ceiling for 12 months.
Initial 20K IRR Call-Up, effective 31 Jan 91.

20 Jan 91 USAR and NG personnel activated for ODS equals 163,753, of which the Army equals 112,511.

3 Feb 91 USAR and NG personnel activated for ODS equals 184,742, of which the Army equals 121,623.
MG Pagonis reports 60% of 40,000 log force is RC.

4 Feb 91 Unit Status: 604 Activated,
340 SWA,
25 Europe.

22 Feb 91 RC Units assigned to USCINCEUR as backfill.

1 Mar 91 Desert Calm.

10 Mar 91 Re-deployment begins.

20 Mar 91 CONUS replacement centers at Forts Knox and Benning close.

29 Mar 91 FORSCOM publishes personnel demobilization
processing guide.

6 Apr 91 Iraq Agrees to UN cease-fire terms.

15 Apr 91 Commander, Combined Civil Affairs TF and 352 CA
CMD assumes command of Task Force Freedom, Kuwait.

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