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REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS
The Use of CONUS Replacement Centers to Support
The Warfighting CINC

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On 2 August 1990, Iraqi Armed Forces invaded the peaceful and tiny country of Kuwait. That aggressive action started a series of chain reactions around the world which ultimately ended, through the commitment of the United States and other coalition forces, in the defeat of the Iraqi Armed Forces and the restoration of Kuwait as a free nation.

In the months that followed the August invasion of Kuwait, the United States Army, in OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, began a massive deployment of units to the theater of operations which included the mobilization of hundreds of U.S. Army Reserve units and the call-up of thousands of Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers. Concurrent, the Army Chief of Staff directed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to activate up to three Continental United States (CONUS) Replacement Centers (CRC) to handle the flow of Army individual replacements to the overseas theater.

On 9 December 1990, the CRC at Fort Jackson, SC became operational and the first individual replacements were received,

oriented, trained, equipped, processed and shipped to Southwest Asia (SWA) via Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft out of Charleston AFB, SC. Nearly four months later, following OPERATION DESERT STORM and the coalition forces victory, the CONUS Replacement Centers at Fort Jackson, SC, Fort Benning, GA and Fort Knox, KY, closed after having processed over 21,000 individual "ready to fight" replacements to SWA.

In this paper we will examine the use of CONUS Replacement Centers as part of the personnel function of replacement operations. We will review replacement operations of the past; from WW II, Korea and Vietnam, to learn from history. We will look at the mobilization process and the important part it plays in the activation and resourcing of CRCs. We will focus, most importantly, on the activation, operation and deactivation of the three CRCs used in support of OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. We will look at lessons learned from that experience and examine successes and failures of the system. Finally, we will look at the future to determine whether the use of CRCs is a viable option in the year 2000 and beyond.

BACKGROUND

In World War II, replacement operations were a vital part of the strategic assets available to the Theater Commander (CINC). The replacement system started to grow almost as soon as the theater of operations was defined, because the warfighting CINC depended on the timely arrival of trained replacements to affect

future battles.

"Theaters estimated replacement losses six months in advance, then followed these estimates with requisitions which were consolidated by the Military Personnel Division, Army Services Forces.... Replacements were shipped overseas in the following order of priority: (1) loss replacements (2) filler replacements to theater operating units (3) filler replacements for authorized allotments and (4) rotational replacements."¹

In order to receive, process and ship replacements overseas, Replacement Depots were formed in the United States. These depots were part of the Replacement and School Command which was formed in 1942.² Much like our current TRADOC, these installations received civilians (draftees), indoctrinated them, trained them in basic combat skills (BCT) and specialty skills (AIT) and prepared the soldier for overseas movement.

These depots actually became a "one-stop" center to receive, train, equip and deploy soldiers overseas. This was very similar to the current doctrine of operating CONUS Replacement Centers on TRADOC Basic Training installations.

Replacement operations in WW II were keyed to one important event--mobilization. Because the strategic planners believed the United States would need an Army of up to ten million men, the President authorized the Selective Service System to induct as much manpower as needed. It then became the Army's problem to train, equip and deploy the soldiers needed in the theater.

"During 1942 the War Department was more concerned with shipping units abroad than with the provision of loss replacements and

units were sent overseas as rapidly as they could be organized and trained and shipping facilities could be made available. It was estimated that 10,000,000 men and 350 divisions might be needed to win the war in operations prior to 1 January 1943. During 1943, the Army reached the end of its major expansion and the work of training installations was concentrated on replacements."³

Korea in 1950, however, was a different situation. Unlike WW II, where the Army had virtually unlimited manpower, the U.S. forces in Korea had to deal with troop ceilings and political control of the battlefield. There was no such thing as unlimited manpower resources. In fact, when General Douglas MacArthur asked for more troops, President Truman disapproved his request.

Replacement operations in Korea were simple. Units were deployed to Korea from the United States and soldiers remained in Korea for the duration. Individual replacements were sent directly from their base in CONUS to Korea where a Theater Army Replacement Command received them and forwarded them on to their ultimate unit of assignment. Soldiers deployed from the United States were processed through Replacement Depots very much the same as in World War II.

In Viet Nam, the individual replacement system was most evident. Serving a twelve-month tour meant that one-sixth of the total force in Viet Nam was either in-processing, or out-processing each month. This rotation of expertise out of the theater may have caused the U.S. Army's demise in the war. As some say, "the United States did not fight the war in Viet Nam for ten years, but fought one year at a time for ten years."⁴

Individual replacements on "levy to Nam" were routed through a "Repo Depot" at Fort Ord, California for orientation, limited jungle training, tropical fatigue uniform issue, processing and transport to Viet Nam. The replacement operations at Fort Ord were performed by an Active Component replacement battalion augmented with soldiers from Fort Ord to assist in processing of replacement personnel. This is a key difference from today when there is only one Active Component replacement battalion--the 21st Replacement Battalion in Frankfurt, Germany.

In summary, a review of history shows that the U.S. has depended on an individual replacement system with individual replacements being trained and equipped in CONUS for shipment to the overseas theater. It was not until the early 1980's that the U.S. Army attempted to transition from individual replacements to a system of replacing units when the COHORT replacement system was born.

COHESION, OPERATIONAL READINESS, AND TRAINING (COHORT)

In October 1986, the Army's Chief of Staff approved a unit manning system experiment, (called COHORT), to "align a peacetime and wartime replacement system." This new system would feature the rotation of units between CONUS and overseas commands in lieu of individual replacements and supposedly thereby increase or improve morale, esprit and readiness. The problem the Army encountered with COHORT, was that even though the rotation of some small units might be successful, there was still a need for individual replacements, both in peacetime and in wartime, due to

both programmed and unprogrammed losses.

There are two types of individual replacements (or now known as "nonunit replacement personnel" (NRP)), "fillers" and "casualty replacements." Fillers are soldiers needed to bring peacetime structured units to their full wartime authorizations. Casualty replacements are soldiers needed to replace soldiers killed or wounded by either battle or non-battle losses. Both types of nonunit replacements, fillers and casualty replacements, require management at HQDA by grade and by Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), in order to match the right soldier with the right skill against the right requirement. The real issue at hand however, is how the Army gets the replacement from Point A in the United States to Point B in the overseas command. The use of a CONUS Replacement Center satisfies that requirement, provided that mobilization is declared as part of a national emergency so the CRC can be resourced from the Army Reserve Component.

CHAPTER II

THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS

The activation of a CRC is directly linked to the mobilization process. Without the President's declaration of mobilization the Army Reserve Component units needed to operate the CRC fail to be activated and the CRC becomes an unresourced operation. The Replacement Battalion used in the operation of the CRC is located in the Reserve Component.

"Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency."⁶ This may include the call to active duty of Reserve Component personnel or the federalizing of the Army National Guard. The degree of the mobilization is in relation to the degree of the threat to national security. Mobilization of the Armed Forces could include:

a. **PRESIDENTIAL 200,000 SELECTED RESERVE CALL-UP AUTHORITY:** Allows the President to call to active duty up to 200,000 reservists, from all services, for up to 90 days, with authority to extend for another 90 days to meet operational requirements without the declaration of a national emergency. It is during this 200,000 man call-up authority that selected CRC Replacement Battalions and Companies should be called to active duty to prepare for CRC operations.

b. **PARTIAL MOBILIZATION:** Expansion of the Active Component through the activation of up to one million reservists. This is the time that many reservists would be called to active duty, provided some type of refresher training, and sent through the CRC to the overseas area or remain in CONUS to replace an Active Component soldier for deployment to the theater of operations.

c. **FULL MOBILIZATION:** The activation of all Reserve Component and retired military personnel needed to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency.

d. **TOTAL MOBILIZATION:** Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by the Congress and the President to

organize additional personnel needed to meet the threat of war. This would include the activation of the draft.

The key point to remember about mobilization in regard to the activation of the CRC is that the Personnel Replacement Battalion (PRB) must be one of the first units called to active duty in order to prepare the facilities, establish the replacement system, etc., for the deploying soldiers that follow. You will see later in this paper the adverse impact which resulted by not activating the USAR Replacement Battalion early enough during OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

CHAPTER III

CONUS REPLACEMENT CENTERS

On 24 June 1987, the Vice Chief of Staff of The Army approved the CONUS Replacement Center Concept Plan. From that decision, appropriate actions were taken to field and resource eight CRC Replacement Battalions (PRB) in the U.S. Army Reserve and to align each of those PRBs with one of eight CRC installations. It was envisioned that CRCs would be located at major training installations and be responsible for coordinating the issue of equipment, limited skill training (NBC, weapons zero), verifying soldier readiness (POR) and deployability status, medical screening, and coordination and movement of soldiers from the CRC to the aerial port of embarkation (APOE).

The eight CRC installations and their respective APOEs are:

MACOM

INSTALLATION

APOE

TRADOC	Fort Jackson, SC	Charleston AFB, SC
TRADOC	Fort Benning, GA	Charleston AFB, SC
TRADOC	Fort Leonard Wood, MO	Little Rock AFB, AR
TRADOC	Fort Sill, OK	Tinker AFB, OK
TRADOC	Fort Knox, KY	Louisville Airport
TRADOC	Fort Dix, NJ	McGuire AFB, NJ
FORSCOM	Ft Lewis, WA	McChord AFB, WA
FORSCOM	Fort Ord, CA	Travis AFB, CA ⁷

It is important to recognize that the CONUS Replacement Center is actually the installation....not just the USAR PRB on the installation. The CRC Commander is the installation commander. The organization chart at Appendix I⁸ shows the relationship between the CRC Commander, the installation staff and the replacement battalion. It is important to remember that the replacement battalion is the command and control headquarters for the CRC, but it does not have the necessary manpower structure to accomplish all the required processing functions. The installation staff provides the majority of the support.

INSTALLATION RESPONSIBILITIES AND SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

The installation (CRC) commander is responsible for executing CRC operations. The CRC Replacement Battalion is a resource provided by the Army to assist in the accomplishment of the installation mission. At Appendix II⁹ is a listing of the services/functions provided by the installation staff.

It should be noted that continual planning and training is needed by the installation staff in order to be prepared to complete their support mission. Normally, each year HQDA sponsors and schedules one or more CRC exercises in conjunction with a Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) directed or sponsored exercise. These exercises permit the USAR PRB to be called to active duty

for up to 14 days to work with the CRC installation in refining procedures and actually processing replacement personnel. Such exercises were conducted at Fort Leonard Wood and at Fort Lewis in conjunction with exercise TEAM SPIRIT in Korea. These exercises, however, were extremely small in scope, and involved only a handful of NRP. The first time the CRC concept was ever tested on a full scale was in support of OPERATION DESERT SHIELD in late 1990.

CRC REPLACEMENT BATTALION RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS

The PRB provides command and control to the replacement companies, manages the NRP flow, verifies NRP deployability, and ensures every soldier who is deployed is "fit to fight." The PRB commander coordinates support with the installation staff and usually works directly for the Installation Commander or for the Garrison Commander. The PRB commander also has appropriate UCMJ authority over NRP processing through the CRC as well as the cadre assigned to his battalion.

The Replacement Company physically accounts for and escorts all NRP from arrival to the installation, through processing, to departure to the APOE. The replacement company relies on the battalion staff to schedule a smooth flow of soldiers and to coordinate necessary support with the installation staff. Normally, the company cadre in the replacement company are not trainers and rely heavily on the installation DPTSEC to provide qualified instructors to conduct required training.

At Appendix III¹⁰ is the Table of Organization and Equipment

(TOE) for a CRC Personnel Replacement Battalion. It should be noted that the 24 people in the battalion headquarters and the 19 people in each company, do not provide the necessary manpower to meet all the requirements. Often, the installation will have to augment the PRB to accommodate the processing cycle in obtaining the rate of flow of NRP needed by the supported CINC.

THE PROCESSING CYCLE

The doctrine for processing soldiers through the CRC calls for a five-day processing cycle.¹¹ This schedule is based on the amount of processing required (deployment deficiencies to be corrected), training required by the gaining CINC, and the availability of aircraft.

Each CRC Replacement Company consist of four platoons with two NCOs per platoon. Each platoon can control the processing of up to 100 soldiers. Each platoon NCO accompanies his/her assigned replacement personnel through the five-day cycle until they depart the installation. Each platoon NCO will appoint a Senior Platoon Leader (senior member of each platoon) and other key leaders in the platoon, from the NRP, to assist in getting the platoon through the processing cycle. With the PRB normally having four assigned companies, it can receive and process 400 personnel a day. The installation however, must be able to accommodate (billet and feed) a minimum of 1600 soldiers at a time, and with occasional delays in departures, canceled flights, etc., it would be necessary to be able to accommodate up to 2400 soldiers.

A typical five-day schedule is at Appendix IV¹². Note that this schedule must be flexible. During OPERATION DESERT SHIELD the CRCs were required to compress the processing time from five days to three days. This was done by operating nearly 20-hour days in lieu of two 8-hour shifts and shifting responsibilities for some required training from the CRC to the gaining theater commander. The risk you take in compressing the processing cycle however, is cadre burn-out within the CRC, and having NRP arrive in theater who are fatigued. A more significant effect is having a soldier arrive in theater who should not have deployed and who has to be sent home, thereby becoming a burden on the overseas commander. When provided the time and resources, the five-day cycle has proven to work very effectively and has the flexibility to accommodate surges in the number of soldiers being processed through the CRC.

CHAPTER IV

LESSONS LEARNED FROM DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

The best way to examine lessons learned in the operation of CRCs during the Iraqi Gulf War is to look at the events chronologically. Therefore, we need to look at the activation, operation, and deactivation of the three CRCs operated by TRADOC in support of U.S. Army operations conducted during the Gulf War.

ACTIVATION

In August 1990, TRADOC received a warning order from the Army DCSPER to be prepared to activate CRC operations at Fort

Jackson, SC. On 23 August 1990, the TRADOC Commander, General John W. Foss, provided his guidance to his chief of staff and to his installation commanders. That guidance was for the installation commanders to staff the operation of the CRC from existing TRADOC resources rather than to activate a USAR Replacement Battalion. Because the President's initial 200K call-up established a manpower ceiling of up to 48,800 selected reservist, General Foss did not want to use a single USAR soldier to perform a TRADOC mission when the warfighting CINC may need that soldier in theater. General Foss maintained that, further mobilization notwithstanding, TRADOC missions would be accomplished using TRADOC assets. Although General Foss' decision was certainly noble, it created an undue burden at the training centers where the CRCs were to activate, and it did not provide the USAR PRB time to activate, train-up, and do the job they were created to do.

OPERATION

During the period between 15 August 1990 and 1 October 1990, TRADOC developed two CONUS Replacement Centers; one at Fort Jackson, SC and the one at Fort Benning, GA. TRADOC also identified Fort Knox, KY as an alternate site and gave the installation commander at Fort Knox a "be prepared" mission in case hostilities occurred in the Gulf and replacement operations exceeded the capacity of the other two CRCs.

Fort Jackson and Fort Benning established "ad hoc" CRCs. Each CRC was given civilian overhire authority to hire additional

Department of The Army civilian personnel to man the equipment issue facility, the personnel processing center, to open an additional dining facility, etc. The installation commander (CRC Commander) selected an officer to command the "ad hoc" Replacement Battalion and used other military personnel detailed from their primary duty to staff the battalion headquarters. The replacement companies were comprised of officers, NCOs and Drill Sergeants from both Basic Training (BT) companies and One Station Unit Training (OSUT) companies which were either out of cycle (no recruits to train) or simply detailed to the CRC. In either case, the workload at other training companies increased due to the pulling of cadre from the training base to operate the CRC. Each CRC had one battalion headquarters and four replacement companies capable of processing a total of 400 NRP per day per CRC.

The two installations opened World War II barracks and administrative areas to house the replacements. At Fort Jackson, "Tank Hill" was opened, partially renovated, cleaned, painted, and prepared by using troop labor. The site was complete with a dining facility, small post exchange, barber shop, tailor shop, arms rooms, central processing facility and billeting for up to 2,000 replacements. A similar facility at Fort Benning was opened in the Old Harmony Church area which could billet up to 1850 replacements. The central processing facility at each CRC included representatives from the Post AG (MILPO), MEDDAC, DENTAC, SJA, and the Central Issue Facility. Personnel

processing requirements at the facility will be discussed later in this paper.

Responding to the Army DCSPER's guidance, TRADOC was ready to open the two CRCs on 1 October 1990, however there was no mission as individual replacement flow had not been activated. Units which were deployed in SWA were receiving replacements through their home installations. It was the home installation's responsibility to verify the soldiers deployability, issue equipment, conduct orientation training, etc. In late November 1990, FORSCOM requested that TRADOC activate the CRCs at Forts Jackson and Benning in order to process FORSCOM filler personnel from CONUS to the theater. That request was approved and on 9 December 1990, the two CRCs were opened to receive NRP (filler) personnel.

This activation of the two CRCs was intended to relieve FORSCOM installations from having to process their own filler personnel, and also to help the CRCs gain experience and "de-bug" the processing system. Another important factor was the diminishing stocks of Organizational Clothing and Equipment (OCIE) from operational project stocks. FORSCOM's stocks were exhausted and the only OCIE available was at the CRCs.

Numerous lessons were learned during the first three weeks of operation. Policies and procedures were modified, or in some case invented, in order to get the job done. The cadre of the CRCs did whatever it took to get the soldiers processed and to the APOE to meet their flight. Remember, the concept of CRCs had

never been fully tested and many of the rules were made in the early days and weeks after the two CRCs activated. Fortunate for the Army that the two CRCs did activate on 9 December to handle the FORSCOM filler flow, because on 28 December 1990, (then) the Vice Chief of Staff of The Army, General Gordon Sullivan, asked the TRADOC Commander to call to active duty the three USAR CRC Replacement Battalions and activate the Fort Knox CRC in anticipation to actions tied to the 15 January 1991 United Nations Resolution deadline.

On 2 January 1991 the 347th Personnel Replacement Battalion was called to active duty and reported to Fort Benning, GA; the 360th PRB to Fort Jackson, SC and the 326th PRB to Fort Knox, KY. The three battalions and the three replacement companies of each battalion began the task of getting oriented and trained and replaced the TRADOC "ad hoc" PRBs and companies. In some cases, due to the large number of NRP expected to flow through the CRCs, one or more of the TRADOC "ad hoc" replacement companies remained to expand the PRBs from three companies to four.

LOGISTICS SHORTFALL

One of the largest "warstoppers" for the CRC operation was the shortage of OCIE, to include chemical protective equipment, to issue to deploying soldiers. At Appendix V¹³ is a listing of the equipment issued to each soldier. This listing was unique to a deployment to a desert environment, and could be changed however based on the climatic conditions in the theater of operations.

The first problem in the stockage of OCIE was getting the senior Action Officers at HQDA (DCSLOG) to believe that we might actually have a war and need the OCIE. There was a strong reluctance at the departmental level to obligate the millions of dollars necessary to purchase the OCIE. It was not until late November 1990, until the DA-DCSLOG was directed by the VCSA to cut the funding loose to purchase the OCIE. Then, it was only to discover that many of the needed items (especially chemical protective over-garments) were not available in the operational projects stock and had to be manufactured.

The second problem with OCIE was getting the Army Commander (ARCENT) to agree on exactly what equipment a soldier arriving in theater would need to be issued by the CRC versus what could be issued in country.¹⁴ The list at Appendix V was developed by a Lieutenant Colonel action officer on the TRADOC staff based on his ideas of what a soldier would need in Saudi Arabia. It was not until May 1991, after the ground war was over, that ARCENT provided an answer to TRADOC's repeated query as to what equipment was considered essential for deployment. In the interim, the TRADOC Commander determined that no soldier would deploy without an individual weapon, a protective mask, and chemical protective clothing.

It was through intensive management on the part of many hard working logisticians that every soldier who deployed to SWA was provided a full issue of OCIE. Some items were substituted, such as a M16A1 for a M16A2 rifle or a .45 caliber for a 9mm pistol,

etc., but in the end, every soldier was properly equipped.

PERSONNEL PROCESSING

Army Regulation 600-8-101, Personnel Processing (In-and Out-and Mobilization Processing), dated 12 December 1989, provides basic guidance to ensure soldiers who are deploying overseas are properly prepared from an administrative, legal and medical perspective. The Soldier Readiness Program (SRP) replaces the "preparation of replacements for overseas movement (POR)" program.¹⁵

The difficulty with the regulation, is the vagueness in which it is written. This resulted in numerous soldiers arriving at the CRC in various stages of readiness for deployment. Soldiers arrived without orders, without uniforms, without proper eyewear, without identification tags or cards, and some without any records. There were some single soldiers who had just graduated from AIT that arrived with all of their earthly possessions to include stereo, privately owned vehicle, all their civilian clothes, etc. Certain CONUS installations did a commendable job in making sure their soldiers were fully processed and ready to go to the CRC. Others failed miserably and simply gave the soldier a plane ticket to Columbia, SC or Columbus, GA with instructions to report to the CRC. Their failure to take care of their soldiers resulted in the CRC having to make up SRP deficiencies before the soldier could deploy. Over 16 percent of the soldiers who wore glasses needed extra eyewear (glasses or protective inserts) which were manufactured

at the CRC. Nearly 5 percent of everyone deployed needed some type of dental work to meet the minimum standards for deployment. In one week at Fort Jackson, the MEDDAC administered over 1,100 inoculations to just over 600 soldiers who were deploying.

The lesson learned is that AR 600-8-101 must be revised to have specific language, to include a detailed checklist, that is clearly understandable at every installation. Secondly, the tenets of that regulation must be used in peacetime to deploy soldiers overseas, as well as during periods of mobilization, so that losing installations will be familiar with the procedures.

At Appendix VI are photographs of some of the processing stations used at the Fort Jackson CRC. Similar stations were operated at the CRCs at Fort Knox and Fort Benning. These photographs show soldiers processing through the Central Processing Facility where their personnel, finance, legal, medical and dental readiness was verified. Photographs of the Central Issue Facility (CIF) reflect soldiers being fitted and issued the necessary uniforms and OCIE for deployment. In addition to the ordinary equipment issue, the CIF also ensured each soldier received insect repellent, sun screen, sun glasses, foot powder and personal hygiene kits. Many of these items were purchased by the installation's funds, or donated by the installation Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES).

PROCESSING CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES

Although mobilization might have appeared to affect only the

military community, in reality the entire Army work force had to be increased to field a larger warfighting force. Base operations support functions were heavily civilianized, as were critical maintenance functions on sophisticated equipment. It became apparent early that mission essential civilians would have to be deployed to the theater.

Difficulties arose almost immediately. While previous mobilization exercises had tested the CRC concept to a minimum degree with processing soldiers, there was no experience or established procedures for civilians. The problem became even more complicated when it was discovered that some civilians, mostly contractors, had made it to the theater without any processing, by either deploying with a CONUS unit, or by commercial aircraft into Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The exact number of DoD civilians, contractors, and other civilians (such as Red Cross workers) was not known, but suspected to be in excess of 2,200 by December 1990.¹⁶

Because there were no established procedures and policies for moving civilians through the CRCs, PERSCOM and TRADOC quickly developed them by using the military processing procedures as a model. Such issues as HIV testing requirements for non-DoD employees, pregnancy testing for female civilian employees (mandatory for female soldiers), equipment issue, reimbursement by contractor personnel, etc. had to be resolved.

The CRC at Fort Jackson was designated the sole CRC to process civilian personnel. Although many civilians employed by

the Army Material Command (AMC) had been deployed through Fort Devens, the CRC at Fort Jackson became the one CRC to process civilians. This new procedure was not quickly accepted by AMC who continued to use the "ad hoc" system out of Fort Devens until directed by HQDA to send their civilians through the CRC at Fort Jackson.

The important lesson learned in processing civilian personnel through a CRC was in the clear establishment of which agency was in charge. The DCSPER staff, the Civilian Personnel Directorate of PERSCOM, the Mobilization Directorate of PERSCOM and the Civilian Personnel Directorate of TRADOC all washed their hands of the problem and looked to the Adjutant General of TRADOC, who had functional responsibility for the operation of the CRCs, to resolve the problem. In the final analysis, after holding many after action reviews, responsibility to establish policy rest with the Army DCSPER and procedures are established by PERSCOM and TRADOC.

DEACTIVATION

The success of the coalition forces in Kuwait in achieving a military victory in 100 hours of the ground war created havoc in the three CRCs in CONUS.

As early as 1 February 1991, the DA DCSPER not knowing the duration of the war, requested TRADOC to increase the flow rate from 400 soldiers per CRC per day to 600 per CRC per day. The DA DCSPER also requested that the processing cycle be reduced from five days to three days in order to get additional soldiers in

theater.

During the peak period from 1 February 1991 to 1 March 1991, the three CRCs were processing nearly 2,000 soldiers a day and holding (billeting, feeding) almost 6,000 who were being processed.¹⁷ The problem that faced the Army after the 100-hour war, was how to shut off the flow and what to do with the soldiers in the CRCs once they were not needed in the theater.

The first part was simply a matter of PERSCOM not issuing any further assignment instructions to move soldiers from CONUS to SWA. That was done quickly. However, many soldiers had already received their notice, signed out of their last unit, gone on leave and were in transit to the CRCs. Because the CINC established a ceiling on the number of soldiers allowed in theater, and because ARCENT was above that ceiling, the DA-DCSPER personally approved all soldiers, by MOS, that would be allowed to deploy to SWA. With over 6,000 soldiers at the three CRCs and up to 1,500 more already on orders, it became a significant emotional event to decide who would go and who would not go. In the end, after victory, and after the sense of urgency to get replacements in theater as soon as possible diminished, PERSCOM provided disposition instructions on where to send the soldiers that had not deployed.

Because the soldiers in the CRCs were a mixture of active duty soldiers on a PCS move to SWA, USAR Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers called to active duty, National Guard soldiers who had volunteered to go to SWA, and Initial Entry Training (IET)

active duty soldiers who came straight out of the training base without having a "home station", it became obvious that disposition instructions would have to be developed for each category.

PERSCOM tackled the problem and the solution was to identify all the National Guard volunteers, who still wanted to go to SWA, and whose MOS was critical to the CINC's needs, and deploy them. If they did not want to volunteer, or if their MOS was not critical, the CRC sent them back to their home state. Active duty soldiers on PCS orders were either returned to the unit they just departed, or issued new PCS orders by PERSCOM. USAR IRR soldiers were discharged from active duty and sent home. IET soldiers were given assignment instructions for their new assignment and sent home on a well deserved 10-day leave.

Another problem the CRCs faced because of the reduced flow to SWA after the war, was the deterioration in the morale of the soldiers being processed. Amazingly, it was high when soldiers believed they were going to SWA and it dropped when they were told they were not going. The majority were very disappointed and many attempted to "pull strings" with PERSCOM to go. The CRC Commanders and staff did a great job in keeping the soldiers busy by conducting extra training sessions and intense physical training while out-processing the soldiers.

By 15 March 1991, the CRC at Fort Knox was down to only 60 NRP and the Fort Benning CRC was completely empty. A decision was made by the CG, TRADOC to close the Forts Benning and Knox

CRCs on 15 April 1991. The Fort Jackson CRC was kept open until 15 May 1991, to handle residual flow and return to duty personnel needed in theater. By 31 May 1991, all USAR Replacement Battalions and Replacement Companies were off active duty and back at their home stations.

The focus at HQDA, PERSCOM and HQ, TRADOC then became the capture of lessons learned and the much needed refinement of policies and procedures concerning mobilization and the use of CONUS Replacement Centers.

CHAPTER V

REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS OF THE FUTURE

LIGHT-INTENSITY VERSUS HIGH-INTENSITY CONFLICTS

With the changes within the Soviet Union and the demise of the communist party, the threat which has faced the United States over the past forty years has changed dramatically. Although the republics which comprised the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe still maintain formidable ground forces with tactical nuclear weapons, it is believed the U.S. will face smaller threats from third world nations which will threaten our national interest. Our focus will be on light-intensity conflicts versus high-intensity or global conflicts.

The decision on the use of a CRC for replacement operations in a light-intensity conflict will be tied directly to mobilization. If the President does not declare some phase of

mobilization, then the CRC concept should not be considered. Individual replacement operations would then be conducted using other systems such as deployment from a unit's home station. This is the system that was used during OPERATION URGENT FURY with the U.S. invasion into Grenada and OPERATION JUST CAUSE in Panama. If only active component units are needed for the operation and if follow on forces will be limited, a small individual replacement system can be used and operated by the deployed unit's CONUS home station. The activation and use of a CRC should only be done in conjunction with mobilization and a full-scale, multiple corps, conflict. With mobilization, the PRBs located in the Reserve Component will be needed at the CRCs to handle the flow of reservist activated and needed to support the warfighting CINC.

BUILDING DOWN THE ARMY

Force reductions coupled with budgetary cuts will force the Army to re-look doctrine and find new ways of doing business. The Wartime Replacement System Study (WTRSS), completed in 1987 and which gave birth to COHORT units, may have to be re-examined. So should the concept of using CONUS Replacement Centers.

The current doctrine which designates eight CONUS installations as CRCs, needs to be re-looked in light of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions. Further, with two MACOMs having CRC installations (FORSCOM and TRADOC) it would be difficult for TRADOC to be the Army's Executive Agent for the operation of CRCs when the CRC is a FORSCOM installation.

Perhaps a better solution would be to reduce the number of CRC installations to four....four of the six currently under TRADOC.

Another resource constraint will be the manpower earmarked in the Reserve Component to staff the CRCs. As of now there are eight USAR PRBs headquarters and twelve Personnel Replacement Companies in the Reserve Component force structure. The units recently underwent conversion from Personnel and Administration (P&A) Battalions to PRBs and from Replacement Regulating Detachments (RRD) to PRCs. Although the manning for the battalion headquarters and companies is minimal, the question arises to the need to have eight PRBs. I would recommend four PRBs with twelve PRCs, thereby creating a manpower savings of four PRB headquarters. Each of the four PRBs could easily be earmarked to one of the four CRC installations for training purposes and for peacetime coordination with the installation staff. The twelve PRCs could be earmarked to a PRB and to the same CRC installation as the PRB headquarters. I recommend Forts Jackson, Benning, Knox and Leonard Wood be designated as the four CRC locations due to their heavy training loads of combat, combat support and combat service support soldiers.

MOBILIZATION EXERCISES AND TRAINING

One of the major flaws which was most evident during CRC operations in support of the Gulf War was the lack of training conducted at the CRC installation for the BASEOPS staff and the USAR Replacement Battalion staff. Although mobilization exercises such as NIFTY NUGGET were conducted in the past, they

did not provide adequate training, nor were there established standards with which to evaluate. This resulted in no standardization, i.e., the Fort Knox CRC made policies and procedures different from Fort Jackson. Many of the problems which surfaced at one installation surfaced at another and it took extensive interaction between the three CRCs, HQ TRADOC and PERSCOM, to solve some of the problems. What is needed now is to institutionalize training at all the CRCs.

A series of mobilization exercises are needed where CRC installations can be tested and evaluated. TRADOC, as the Army's Executive Agent for CRC operations, needs to develop evaluation standards and be present at the CRC installation during mobilization exercises to evaluate the system. It is important that the USAR PRB be involved. Therefore the mobilization exercise must be scheduled at the same time as the battalion's yearly active duty for training period. It will take a coordinated effort between DA DCSPER, TRADOC, PERSCOM, the CRC installation staff and the MUSARC, to develop a comprehensive and effective program. But unless it is done, the next mobilization effort in response to a national crisis may not allow us the training time to accomplish meet the mission.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

History has shown us that the Army depends on a replacement system to sustain the warfighting commander and allow him to continue the offensive and plan tomorrow's battles. Whether that replacement system should focus on individual replacements, small units(squads, teams or crews), or on unit rotations (COHORT), will depend on the situation and timing. The use of a CONUS Replacement Center to prepare individual replacements for movement to the overseas area is another part of the replacement operations plan which must be considered dependent on the situation, timing and whether mobilization has been declared.

If there is a time in the future when the United States must mobilize its armed forces to meet national security interest, I firmly believe the CONUS Replacement Center concept will work to support the Army's replacement operations plan. It was tested during a time when our Army was in the midst of reorganizing and it worked. It was tested when there were no standard procedures, no formal organizations and precious little experience and it worked. It worked because it is a good system which ensures the right soldiers, in the right numbers, get to the right places at the right time to make a difference. And finally, it worked because of the hard work, dedication and conviction of a few hundred Army soldiers and Army civilians who made it work.

I believe the Army needs to continue to refine and resource

the CRC concept, as it is directly related to readiness and can be considered a force multiplier. In the next war, the warfighting CINC will depend on replacements and the CRC concept can help provide them.

The following quote from Brigadier General R. L. Dilworth, Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations Support, HQ, TRADOC says it all:

" I firmly believe the concept of the CRCs was confirmed beyond a shadow of a doubt. The system worked albeit that the war came at a time in history where the CRC replacement battalion and companies were just being converted. It proves that the CRC concept will serve our Army of the future as we move more to a forward presence Army rather than a forward deployed Army."¹⁸

ENDNOTES

1. The Replacement System in The U. S. Army, Office of Chief, Military History, Sep 1950, p.33.
2. Ibid.,p 13.
3. Ibid.
4. Personal recollection from discussions with (then) BG Dave Palmer, ADC(S), 8th Inf Div, July 1982.
5. U.S. Department of The Army, HQDA Msg 121812Z Nov 86, GEN Wickham Sends, SUBJECT: Unit Manning System", p.1.
6. U.S. Department of the Army, DRAFT DA Pamphlet 600-XX: CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) Handbook, Washington, D.C., 6 Jan 1991, pages not numbered.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Listing of equipment compiled by DCSLOG, TRADOC with concurrence from DA-DCSLOG and DCSLOG, FORSCOM, for soldiers deploying to Southwest Asia in OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM.
14. CDR TRADOC Lessons Learned Conference, JULLS Number 14457-69700(00006), Title: Items Issued to Soldiers Passing Through the CRCs, 24 May 1991.


15. U.S. Department of The Army, Army Regulation 600-8-101: Personnel Processing (In-and Out-and Mobilization Processing), (Washington, D.C.: 12 December 1989), p.20.

16. U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command, Lessons Learned from OPERATION DESERT STORM, Fort Monroe, VA, June 1991, p.5.

17. Personal recollection from data collected while assigned to HQ, TRADOC, Fort Monroe, VA.

18. Memorandum, HQ TRADOC, From BG Dilworth, DCSBOS, to LTG Reno, HQDA, DCSPER, SUBJECT: CRC Operations Lessons Learned, 8 April 1991.

APPENDIX I
ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE
CONUS REPLACEMENT CENTER



————— Command
..... Coordination

APPENDIX II

INSTALLATION RESPONSIBILITIES AND SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

1. Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security (DPTSEC):

- Coordinate, evaluate and execute mobilization plans that support CRC operational requirements.
- Coordinate Class V (ammunition) for weapons zeroing.
- Provide firing range for NRP weapon zero.
- Ensure installation mobilization TDA supports CRC requirements.
- Coordinate all training requirements for NRP which satisfy deployment requirements.
- Provide applicable reports to TRADOC and PERSCOM.

2. Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA):

- Develop a mobilization plan to support CRC operations.
- Coordinate with AAFES for issue of non-stocked uniform items if operational project stocks are not available.
- Coordinate with AAFES for establishment of post exchange and barber shop facilities in the PRB area.
- Establish and operate a personnel processing facility to verify deployment requirements.
- Coordinate finance requirements.

- Coordinate Chaplain support for the CRC.
- Coordinate Inspector General support for the CRC.
- Coordinate Staff Judge Advocate support for the CRC.
- Coordinate Public Affairs matters for the CRC.

3. Directorate of Installation Support (DIS):

- Develop logistics support plan for the CRC.
- Provide transportation support for the CRC to include both on post and off post transportation to the APOE.
- Establish and operate a 1,600 to 2,000-man dining facility to support CRC operations.
- Requisition, stock and issue OCIE, clothing, weapons and chemical defense equipment (CDE) as required.
- Coordinate for storage or shipment to home of record of personal clothing and equipment.
- Coordinate sewing support for NRP uniforms (patches, name strips, insignia, etc.).
- Provide installation property to support the PRB.
- Provide billeting for 1,600 to 2,000 replacements.
- Provide administrative areas for replacement battalion and companies.

4. Installation Medical and Dental Activities (MEDDAC & DENTAC):

- Develop a mobilization plan to support CRC operations.
- Conduct HIV screening, as required, and provide screening to the PRB within 48 hours.
- Provide immunization screening and immunize as required.

- Conduct eye exams and provide eyeglasses and protective mask inserts within 48 hours of exam.
- Provide physical exams, as required, for flight personnel and USAR personnel called to active duty.
- Take panographic X-rays of NRP as required.
- Provide emergency medical and dental services as required.

5. Directorate of Information Management (DOIM):

- Develop a mobilization plan to support CRC operations.
- Provide computer support, to include training, to the PRB staff for NRP command and control reporting requirements via FLOWCAP.
- Provide telephone support to PRB as required, to include commercial telephones for use by NRP.
- Provide to PRB other communications equipment as required to include hand held radios, TELEFAX machines, etc..
- Coordinate publications and blank forms account for PRB.

APPENDIX III

CONUS REPLACEMENT CENTER

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT (TOE)

HHD, Replacement Battalion 12056J300

SRC 1206L AA

Para	Line	Description	GR	MOS	BR	ID	REQ	AUTH
101	00	Command Section						
101	01	Commander	05	42B	AG	K	1	1
101	02	Executive Officer	04	42B	AG	K	1	1
101	03	S-2/S-3	04	42B	AG	K	1	1
101	04	S-1	03	42B	AG	K	1	1
101	05	S-4	03	92B	QM	K	1	1
101	06	CSM	E9	00Z50	NC	I	1	1
102	00	Detachment HQ						
103	00	S-1 Section						
103	01	PSNCO	E7	75Z40	NC	I	1	1
103	02	Clerk	E3	71L10		I	1	1
104	00	S2/S3 Section						
104	01	Asst Opns Officer	03	42B	AG	K	1	1
104	02	Movements Con Off	03	88B	TC	K	1	1
104	03	Pers Opns SGT	E8	75Z50	NC	I	1	1
104	04	Movements Supv	E6	88N30	NC	I	1	1
104	05	Pers Mgt Supv	E6	75C30	NC	I	1	1
104	06	Movements Spec	E5	88N20	NC	I	1	1
104	07	Movements Spec	E4	88N10		I	1	1

104	08	Pers Mgt Spec	E4	75C10	I	2	2
104	09	Movements Spec	E3	88N10	I	2	2
104	10	Pers Mgt Spec	E3	75C10	I	2	2
105	00	S4 Section					
105	01	Supply NCO	E7	76Y40 NC	I	1	1
105	02	Property Book NCO	E5	76Y20 NC	I	1	1
105	03	Supply Spec	E4	76Y10	I	0	1
105	04	Supply Spec	E3	76Y10	I	1	0
				Total		24	24

Para	Line	Description	GR	MOS	BR	ID	REQ	AUTH
101	00	Company HQ						
101	01	Company Commander	03	42B	AG	K	1	1
101	02	First Sergeant	E8	75Z5M	NC	I	1	1
101	03	Armorer	E4	76Y10		I	1	1
101	04	Supply Spec	E3	76Y10		I	1	1
102	00	CO Operations Sec						
102	01	Operations Off	03	42B	AG	K	1	1
102	02	Personnel SGT	E7	75Z40	NC	I	1	1
102	03	Sr Pers Mgt Sp	E5	75C20	NC	I	1	1
102	04	Pers Mgt Spec	E4	75C10		I	2	2
102	05	Pers Mgt Spec	E3	75C10		I	2	2
103	00	Replacement Platoons (4)						
103	01	Personnel SGT	E7	75Z40	NC	I	4	4
103	02	Pers Mgt Spec	E4	75C10		I	4	4
Total							19	19

APPENDIX IV
CONUS REPLACEMENT CENTER
5-DAY PROCESSING SCHEDULE

DAY ZERO

- Personnel arrive at CRC between 0001 and 2400 hours
- Bn conducts an initial screen of NRP
- Bn assigns 100 NRP to the 1st platoon of each company
- platoons receive NRP, conduct initial briefing, issue bedding and assign personnel to billets

DAY ONE

- Bn reports 400 personnel to begin processing to PERSCOM and receives air movement data. Departure from the APOE will be from 72 hours to 96 hours after the report is submitted to PERSCOM. (Groups smaller than 400, but able to fill aircraft, will be processed with concurrence with PERSCOM.)
- Bn reports to PERSCOM the number of NRP who have arrived but who have not begun processing.
- NRP validate soldier readiness qualifications (orders, immunizations, HIV testing, etc.).
- Personal equipment is inventoried, stored or sent back to soldiers home of record.

DAY TWO

- OCIE issue to include weapon, protective mask, uniforms, chemical protective clothing, etc.
- Make up of any soldier readiness qualifications identified during day one.
- Conduct mandatory training as required by gaining CINC.
(Example: Rules of engagement, customs and traditions of area, force protection, Status of Forces Agreements.)
- Free time for personal business.

DAY THREE

- March/bus to firing range to zero weapon.
- NBC skills testing to include testing of protective mask in gas chamber.
- Weapons maintenance.
- Prepare for departure.
- Free time for personal business.

DAY FOUR

- Depart CRC for APOE.
- Depart CONUS for overseas theater.
- Bn reports departures by-name to PERSCOM via FLOWCAP.

NOTE: With 400 soldiers reporting to the CRC each day, the CRC may have up to 1,600 soldiers at any point in time. Some soldiers will be in day one, some in day two, day three, etc. The process is designed for soldiers to arrive any day, seven days a week. Or, soldiers may arrive every Monday and depart every Friday, depending on the required flow rate.

APPENDIX V

ORGANIZATIONAL CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT (OCIE) ISSUE

HOT WEATHER

Hat, Sun, Camouflage	1
Coat, Camouflage Desert	2
Canteen, Water, 2 QT	2
Cover, Water Canteen 2 QT	2
Hat, Camouflage, Desert	1
Insect Bar Field Type	1
Parka, Camo Desert Night	1
Liner, Camo Parka Desert Night	1
Trousers Camo Desert Night	1
Trousers Camo Desert	2
Cover Field Pack, Desert	1
Boots, Hot Weather	2
Neckerchief, Mens Cotton Brown	2
Cover, Armor Protective Vest Desert	1

AVIATION

Body Armor for Aviators	1
Helmet, Flyers SPH-4A	1
Jacket, CW Aircrew	1
Bag, Flying Helmet	1
Hood, M7 Mask Aircraft	1
Mask, Protective M24, Aircraft	1
Canister for M24 Mask	1
Filter Insert for M24 Mask	1
Gloves, Flyers Nomex	2

ARMOR

Goggles, Sun/Wind/Dust	1
Hood, Mask Tank M5	1
Mask, Protective Tank M25A1	1
Canisters for M25A1	1
Filter Insert for Mask	1
Helmet, CVC DH132AM	1
Gloves, Summerweight CVC	1
Coverall CVC, Nomex	3
Hood, CVC	1
Liner, CVC Trousers	1
Liner, CVC Coverall Coat	1
Armor, Body CVC	1


PERSONAL

Bag, Duffle	1
Belt, trousers, cotton	2
Buckle, belt, black	1
Coat, Woodland, HWBDU	2
Drawers, Boxer, Brown	7
Glove, Inserts	2
Gloves, Shell, Leather, Black	1
Handkerchief	6
Trousers, HWBDU	4
Socks, Wool-Nylon	7
Towel, Bath, Brown	4
Undershirt, Brown	7

NOTE:

This listing is an example of the equipment which the CRC would issue a soldier deploying to a hot weather area. In addition to the above, the CRCs used during OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, issued weapons, chemical protective clothing, bayonets, entrenching tools, and many personal hygiene items such as soap, shampoo, toothbrushes/paste, deodorant, etc.

APPENDIX VI
REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS
CONUS REPLACEMENT CENTER
FORT JACKSON, SC











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