Joint Fire Support Doctrine--Consensus Please!
Abstract
Operation Desert Shield/Storm permitted the U.S. military a rare opportunity to test doctrine formulated over the fifty-years of the Cold War. However, some of the early lessons learned are not the right ones. Evolving joint targeting and fire support doctrine suffers from a lack of consensus on what occurred in the desert. Prior to Operation Desert Shield/Storm, all Services agreed on joint fire support doctrine. After the war, revised Air Force doctrine scrapped previous joint targeting and fire support doctrine in spite of not being tested. Yet, the air campaign hardly resembled the doctrinal setting. This study reviews joint and Service targeting and fire support doctrine written before and after the Gulf War. Substantive issues exist only between the Army and the Air Force, particularly, the Air Staff. Issues include: availability of aircraft. allocation, importance of close air support, fire support coordination measures, control of airspace, control of indirect fire weapons, battlefield air interdiction, and the biggest issue, joint targeting. A review of history documenting the evolution of air power, and its relationship to ground forces, does not lead the study to reach the same conclusions as the Air Staff after the Gulf War. The study concludes that ongoing efforts between the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command, both charged with developing joint doctrine for targeting and fire support doctrine, are on track.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 27, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA251300
Entities
People
- Stephen M. Seay
Organizations
- United States Army War College