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STUDY
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INACTIVATION: SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE BUILDING DOWN PROCESS

BY

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INACTIVATION: SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE BUILDING DOWN PROCESS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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A million people, civilian and military, will be released from the rolls of the Defense Department by 1996. A reduction of this magnitude can only be achieved through the elimination of force structure in both active and reserve component elements. In the recent past, this activity has been packaged as "Building Down The Force"; but, to those that have to conduct this type of operation, it's simply inactivation. This project examines the challenges of synchronizing the build down of large units from a commander's viewpoint. It demonstrates that the AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine tenet of synchronization is as key to the inactivation effort as it is to applying combat power effectively at the operational and tactical levels. Additionally, the project was conducted in conjunction with a Senior Officers Oral History and includes the observations of Brigadier General Raymond T. Roe, the final Commander of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized).

INTRODUCTION

The 100-hour operation (240400-280800 February 1991) had gone well for the men of Battery B (Target Acquisition), 333rd Field Artillery. The units Q-36 and Q-37 Firefinder Radar teams had been well trained to acquire incoming Iraqi artillery fires and rapidly provide the locations to the artillerymen of the VII US Corps that they supported. They watched in awe as the deadly cannon and rocket counterfire volleys cascaded north into the Iraqi positions. The battery commander was justifiably proud of his 120 soldiers who were performing their demanding missions with true professionalism. They were a high-morale, fully trained, combat unit that had just participated in perhaps the most successfully executed conflict in US history. As the battery deployed to provide radar coverage along the Kuwait-Iraq border that second week of March 1991, little did they know that in less than four months their unit would be inactivated at Ft. Lewis as part of the overall inactivation of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized).

At first glance it would appear there are not many lessons to be learned from the inactivation of this small unit. They redeployed to King Khalid Military City the last week in April, off-loading any remaining ammunition and sensitive material. Within a week they had moved further south to the Dhahran area to turn-in their unit and individual equipment and, by the middle of May, they were waiting for a return flight to Ft. Lewis.

By the first week in June, every soldier had returned to a well-deserved reception followed by two weeks of leave to become reacquainted with family and friends. While the battery was in the desert, organizational and installation property that had been left behind, as well as all of the battery's fixed-base facilities, had been turned-in by other division artillery units. When the 120 men returned from leave, they were immediately reassigned; and, on 17 June 1991, Battery E (Target Acquisition), 33rd Field Artillery passed into history.

Looking beyond the rapid inactivation of this small unit, I can envision many other organizations following a like course in the near future. To reduce active army component end strength from 745,000 (April 1990) to 535,000 by Fiscal Year 1995 (FY 95) can only be accomplished by a large cut in force structure. As a presidential report states, "Projected force structure reductions from FY 1990 to FY 1995 include a drop in Army divisions from 28 (18 active) to 18 (12 active)."(1) This level is already below that envisioned as the minimum by Secretary of the Army Stone and General Vuono, who foresee a force of four corps and twenty divisions by the mid-1990s and "strongly believe this is the minimum force required for the Army to accomplish our strategic goals in support of the national security strategy."(2) These goals may be further jeopardized by the FY 91 Authorization Act which cuts the FY 1995 Army end strength to 520,000.(3) Unfortunately, even this low level may not be the bottom line.

The essence of our plan is to significantly reduce the size of the Army and to limit near-term modernization while

preserving the quality, readiness, and warfighting capabilities of the Total Army, both during the transition to a smaller force and for the future. Achieving and sustaining this end state is going to require the execution of a controlled and rational build-down process that will minimize the turbulence which is so detrimental to readiness and enable us to limit the impacts of involuntary release on soldiers, civilians, and their families.

(4) The Army must execute future inactivations with the same professionalism it demonstrated as it accomplished the warfighting mission in the desert if we are to arrive at our envisioned end state by FY 1995: "an Army trained and ready to defend vital U.S. interests wherever they might be threatened".(5)

This project examines the challenges of inactivating large units from a commander's viewpoint. It demonstrates that the AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine tenet of synchronization is as key to the inactivation effort as it is to applying combat power effectively at the operational and tactical levels. Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, describes synchronization as the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point making it both a process and a result. When commanders synchronize activities, they produce synchronized operations. Hence, synchronization will require explicit coordination among the various units and activities participating in any operation.(6) While many other strategic concepts will have application during inactivation operations, synchronization is clearly the unifying thread that strings the diverse parts of the operation together.

Many of the opinions, observations and techniques are a result of my experience as a battalion and acting brigade commander responsible for the inactivation of an artillery battalion and the division artillery in the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized). This project was conducted in conjunction with a Senior Officers Oral History and includes the observations of Brigadier General Raymond T. Roe, the final Division Commander of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized).

THE ENVIRONMENT

Initially, the most important consideration for a commander, regardless of the level of command, is his ability to maintain the momentum of the organization as it transitions from a traditional combat orientation to inactivation. Colonel Michael A. Andrews points out that commands identified for inactivation must understand that it may be the most challenging, stressful and least rewarding peacetime task that an organization can undertake. It is contrary to every professional instinct - it is self-destruction.(7)

Environments are fragile. Commanders at every level devote considerable time and resources in an attempt to establish a command climate that will foster mission accomplishment, take care of soldiers and their families, and build unit morale. By design, they forge a team along the way

that works together toward common goals, more often than not, under rather adverse conditions. As the organization realizes success, it enhances unit cohesion and pride, multiplying its effectiveness many times. Any soldier who has served in an organization of this type has a special and deep fondness for its accomplishments, history and traditions. You need only to look in the face of a veteran attending a ceremony or parade for his old battalion, regiment or division to understand what the organization continues to mean to him. The organization has become a de-facto family. General Roe recognized and clearly emphasized the importance of this facet of inactivation when he said, "I think that my most important mission was to send the division colors out with style." (8) The process of inactivation can be very challenging in light of these special feelings and high expectations.

Senior commanders must also be aware of the effects of inactivation on subordinate commanders, for it is these subordinate commanders that will create and/or maintain the positive environment. General Roe observed that the 9th Infantry Division was inactivating at the same time everyone else was deploying to the Persian Gulf. The division did not get a chance to go. Battalion commanders who had trained throughout their careers to do this sort of thing were clearly anxious and desperately desired to be part of this deployment. Many of them saw their commands being cut short. They came to command in a tactical unit; and, out of a year's command, eight months of it surrounds inactivation. So there is frustration built

into the process. (9) These same concerns and frustrations impact on company level commanders as well.

Inactivation instantly creates unknowns in the mind of each and every soldier and, most importantly, their family members. This population deserves the majority of the commander's focus. To be successful at inactivation requires that these apprehensions be addressed by commanders at all levels as early in the process as possible to maintain that positive environment. Build the bonds of trust by keeping unit members as fully informed as possible. They will understand that the truth sometimes changes.

As a point of departure, I believe that organizations that have attained those desirable command climate characteristics -- i.e., mission orientation, high morale, teamwork, care for others, discipline, pride, etc. -- will transition with relative ease. This type of organization has routinely accomplished the tough missions and will undoubtedly approach inactivation in the same manner. Colonel John A. Van Alstyne, Commander, 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), noted that the same approach that made the unit successful at the National Training Center should be utilized to execute inactivation.(10)

Secondly, we must have a chain of command that recognizes the importance of this difficult mission to our Army. Commanders at every level must put aside personal aspirations and accept inactivation as the primary focus of their organization, approaching it as they would a more

traditional mission. This mental shift is without a doubt the most important part of establishing or maintaining the environment. If the commander is positive and enthusiastic about this mission for the right reasons, his organization will fall in step and the operation will be accomplished in superb fashion. You will not be able to bluff your way through this type of operation. You will be required to walk your talk. Everyone must retain a sense of mission and everyone must understand that there's life after inactivation.(11)

I need to add a note at this point to commanders who would attempt to walk the fence between maintaining some degree of unit readiness/training and orienting on the inactivation mission. General Roe thought his biggest problem was in maintenance. Commanders wanted to keep their gear running to continue training until the very last minute, and then inactivate. Philosophically, General Roe noted, that sounds good, but he found commanders kept training to the detriment of the turn-in process and maintenance as structure shrank. A key point occurs when you are relieved of your traditional mission as General Roe has observed.(12) You need to train and maintain your unit mission readiness until you are officially relieved of your traditional mission. At that point, you must attack your new mission with the same professionalism and determination that was applied to your traditional mission. To do otherwise sends mixed signals to your command, delays and impedes the accomplishment of the inactivation mission, does an injustice to your soldiers,

and wastes resources.

Communication is the final requirement for capturing that positive environment. You must talk to your subordinate leaders, staff, and, most importantly, your soldiers more frequently than you have in the past. A properly oriented staff, along with subordinate commanders who understand the importance of this mission and the associated sensitivity, are key to the team effort in a multitude of areas. But selling the mission and dispelling the accompanying rumors falls squarely on the commander at every level of command. As a battalion commander, I updated all of the soldiers in formation twice weekly on general topics of interest and addressed individual soldier concerns as I toured the battalion on a daily basis. You must keep faith with the individual soldier and answer the mail, even if the soldier does not like the answer. Addressing the concerns of family members is equally important. An evening with the spouses every so often during inactivation can be very rewarding and really appreciated.

Approaching these issues and preparing your command through normal troop-leading procedures as you transition from your traditional mission to inactivation will pay big dividends. You will find that your unit will support you as ardently as they have in the past, you will have maintained a positive environment, and you will be ready to attack the challenging mission of inactivation.

THE MISSION

General Roe provided his commander's intent directly as regarded the mission of inactivation. The mission was to turn-in equipment, prepare and turn in your barracks, and reassign your soldiers. All three of these things happened in some cases simultaneously and in some cases sequentially.(13) This mission directive by the commanding general of the 9th Infantry Division would initiate the inactivation process. It usually included the date on which the unit would be relieved of its traditional mission and an "E" date. This was the official orders date of inactivation -- normally, the day of the formal inactivation ceremony. As an example, on 15 June 1990 the 1st Battalion (Light Artillery and Rocket), 84th Field Artillery was notified that it would be relieved of mission on 15 August 1990 and conduct inactivation operations to be completed not later than 15 January 1991. Eventually, the unit received an inactivation order similar to Figure 1.(14)

During this period of time, the division was still manned with a complete staff complement that provided necessary guidance to subordinate inactivating units through the office of the G-6 who was the staff proponent for inactivation. At this point, the division had some subordinate elements inactivating sequentially while the remainder of the division maintained a normal mission-capable status. For a complete description of staff organization for inactivation at the division level see Lieutenant Colonel Philip L. Curtis' Individual Study Project,

"Inactivation: A Blueprint For A Division".(15) Inactivations continued in this fashion until 1 March 1991 when all remaining subordinate elements of the division were ordered to inactivate. At the same time, the 3rd Battalion, 9th Aviation Regiment (an aviation maintenance battalion) began to centrally schedule and process the turn-in of organizational property for inactivating units under the supervision of a shrinking division staff. On 21 June 1991, the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) formally inactivated. The remaining few units continued to be reduced and inactivated through the 3/9th Aviation until this unit finally inactivated itself on 17 December 1991.

The challenge of inactivation, regardless of the higher headquarters overwatch position, is to synchronize the turn-in of organization, installation, and billets furnishings property with the repair and turn in of facilities and with the reassignment of the soldiers by the directed "E" date. This challenge may vary from installation to installation and be slightly different in CONUS from an overseas area; but it will generally include the coordinated disposition of property, facilities, and soldiers. The challenge is often complicated by the fact that some unit missions will continue past the relief from mission date. Also, taskings of a "fair share" nature from higher headquarters will continue until the unit is within 90 days of its "E" date. If you turn-in equipment faster than you allow soldiers to leave, suddenly you have a number of soldiers standing around with not much to do. Quite possibly a more undesirable scenario is to allow soldiers to

be reassigned and moved out of the barracks leaving nobody to clean up, and turn in the barracks, and correct the multitude of minor irregularities associated with equipment. General Roe's guidance to the commanders was, "manage this very, very carefully".(16)

Division guidance suggested 210 to 240 days was required to conduct all functional area actions in a typical brigade combat team.(17) The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) depicts a 365-day and a 180-day timeline.(18) There is no magic solution or ideal timeline. What is important is to orient your staff and chain of command to address accomplishing this particular mission in the same fashion and using the same troop-leading procedures as in the past. No standard cookie-cutter approach, formula, or special reorganization can be magically applied to inactivation. Every unit, situation, and environment is unique, in spite of our best efforts at standardization, and possesses its own set of challenges. Hence, planning for this mission has to be conducted with the same diligence as any other mission. The entire sequence of events must be completely integrated, coordinated, and scheduled to synchronize the operation. An example of a sequence of events for the inactivation of a composite field artillery battalion is at Figure 2.(19)

A note of caution is needed at this point. As you and your staff begin your mission analysis and receive guidance from higher headquarters, make sure you clearly understand the "standards for success" in each area. If the guidance

you receive is at all dated, have the designated subject-matter expert on your staff coordinate with the division and/or installation level point of contact to ensure you know the standard. I guarantee that the "truth will change" a number of times during the process of inactivating and cause your soldiers and junior leaders a great deal of frustration. If your staff coordinates -- face-to-face -- early in the planning process with the person who will ultimately receive the property or accept the facility for turn-in, not only will they understand the standard, but they will have established relationships and channels of communication to address any questions that may occur along the way. You must finally ensure that these standards are clearly transmitted to your subordinate units via the plan or order. The staff officer that works his area at this level of detail during the planning process will have properly marked the route for his organization and will encounter fewer difficulties during execution.

CONCEPTS FOR THE OPERATION

While you and your staff are centrally authoring the plan for inactivation and determining the means to control and monitor this undertaking, your subordinate commanders should be hard at work making preparations in at least two major areas: supply and maintenance. While I realize that commanders religiously conduct the frequent inventories required by regulation to ensure property accountability, organizational

documents and supply publications change and equipment often moves as if it has a mind of its own in the name of mission accomplishment. There should be no doubt that the burden of proof on the disposition of equipment is the responsibility of the company commander during inactivation. Further, to gain relief from accountability in any property category is a show-me, document-oriented operation. Property that may not be inventoried routinely -- such as installation, billets furnishings, morale support, and training aids -- must receive attention early to determine its accountability and serviceability. Be especially attentive that your headquarters element commander gets the required time and support to complete his inventories.

The process will also give you a feel for the scope of the excess material condition of your organization. General Roe pointed out that if you do not turn-in your excess early, you wind up in the middle of your inactivation trying to identify excess equipment while you are trying to turn-in everything else. By then, nobody knows to whom it belongs. In preparation for the inactivation of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), Major General Charles H. Armstrong, the previous commanding general, anticipated the challenge accurately and pushed hard to eliminate excess before the inactivation began. (20) Moreover, this property may be more difficult to turn-in because routine maintenance has been neglected since the item was no longer needed/required in the organization.

An overall appreciation of your maintenance posture is essential to ordering the turn-in sequence and allocating resources during plan development. Again, knowledge of the appropriate turn in standard is required. The standard will vary widely in this area based on equipment age and type, ultimate destination, and funds available and allocated for inactivation. You may be maintaining equipment at a level below that required for turn-in and not have the funding to achieve the turn-in standard!

Another major consideration in plan development will be your method for controlling and tracking the execution of your plan. This system will be necessarily tied to the reporting/briefing requirements of your higher headquarters as they centrally control the larger unit inactivation. Status will be tracked in all of your normal functional areas and include the non-standard areas of installation and billets furnishings property and facilities disposition. Standardized formats will have been developed with automated systems designed to feed the refined data to the division staff so they can prepare the data for presentation and analysis. The presentations will be conducted during some type of recurring in-progress review(IPR) that could be chaired by anyone from a division staff member at working group level to the commanding general on occasion. You and your staff may be required to brief and provide clarification in selected areas. These sessions can be very helpful in addressing areas that require additional support

but they can provide a challenging course for attendees who may not have done their homework.

As an example, Figure 3 is a copy of a feeder report used to track the disposition of organizational equipment provided by the automated property book team chief at the division material management center (DMMC) to the G-4 as of a given date.(21) The G-4 uses the data to track progress and construct presentation slides for the IPR to be conducted in the near future. Figure 4 recaps the current status of the plan (22) while Figure 5 compares the current status to the planned/forecasted status.(23) Any apparent or diagnosed shortcoming will be addressed during the presentation to determine cause and resolution.

These illustrations highlight two significant lessons. The first is that given knowledge of the briefing and analysis system used at higher headquarters, to include a working knowledge of the automated support system, your staff can develop simple complimentary automated systems at your level to identify shortcomings and track your unit's progress. In our example, both the centralized processing of turn-in and/or transfer documentation through the S-4 to the property book team and the creation of a computerized tracking system developed during the planning stage, all but eliminated any challenges in this area. It will be necessary for each staff member to become the expert in his area and take advantage of those in other organizations who have already faced these challenges. It will pay great

dividends as this process unfolds. The second lesson is that subordinate staffs must establish solid working relationships with higher level staff members to be able to anticipate difficulties and address challenges before they become problems that disrupt the flow of inactivation. This again means face-to-face coordination and responsiveness in both directions probably on a daily basis.

Addressing the organization of any special teams will be another important consideration. There are many possibilities in this area but the degree to which unit integrity is maintained, or commodity teams and assembly line procedures are established depends upon the situation and personalities.(24) Maintaining maximum unit integrity is preferable. By carefully sequencing your plan, so as not to overload a subordinate unit, and having the staff clearly mark the route in their overwatch areas, you take advantage of the strength of your chain of command and subordinate unit pride. Additionally, this approach causes your subordinate commanders to think through their supporting plans, set their priorities, and keep your staff honest.

Major organizations will usually require that your inactivation plan be submitted through your higher headquarters. Usually, after review at major organization staff level, you brief your plan to the major organization commander or his representative. Utilize preparatory briefings as a rehearsal for you and your staff, and as a means to identify and modify any shortcomings in the plan that

surface as a result. Presentations to intermediate level commanders and their staffs provide valuable feedback and build support that will ease the plan's reception at the major organization level. Ensure that your subordinate commanders and primary staff members attend each of these briefings if possible to see the results of their efforts recognized, and to hear and respond to the concerns of senior commanders and staff members. The planning process during inactivation will develop young staff officers rapidly and is quite a rewarding experience.

EXECUTION

Before formally initiating the inactivation and following approval of the plan, a briefing on the complete plan to the entire unit is in order. This action gets everyone comfortable with the general sequence of events which will drive the inactivation and affords each of the soldiers an opportunity to ask any questions up front. A more general briefing for family members can also be conducted during this period. Upon completion of the briefing, the company level commanders would brief their implementing plans to their units and address any other concerns.

Major-event scheduling has to be conducted in a centralized fashion to reduce conflicts with external agencies, allow adequate preparation time for your

subordinate units, and maintain a pace that keeps the operation on schedule. As an example, the staff intelligence officer (S-2) may coordinate a date for a subordinate unit to receive a technical inspection on its small arms by appropriate installation level inspectors in preparation for turn-in, allow a period of time sufficient to correct deficiencies, schedule a turn-in inspection with the same inspectors, and schedule a physical turn-in date. Conducting the preparation for and execution of these events can be decentralized to subordinate units. Hence, the company level commander would allocate those assets necessary to accomplish the steps required to turn-in his small arms. Subordinate commanders will want to have the maximum latitude in conducting their operations and every attempt should be made to accomodate this desire. In my experience, many talented junior NCOs in every unit are just awaiting a mission for their soldiers. Inactivation provides a tremendous forum for developing junior leaders in this fashion.

These events become the central elements on the unit training schedule, which will reflect that organization's sequence of events for inactivation. The training schedule will also include the standard events that preserve and enhance the individual readiness of the soldier. Colonel Van Alstyne sees individual and crew-level training as key aspects of inactivation. The objective should be to send every soldier to his new unit physically fit, qualified with his assigned weapon, proficient in individual skills and with as many professional development opportunities under the belt as

he/she can handle.(25)

Along the route to inactivation, unforeseen requirements will cause you to modify your schedule. Some events will require immediate, extraordinary efforts that cannot be avoided. An example of this was a directive to prepare five Light TACFIRE (Tactical Fire Direction Computers) vehicles and associated equipment for transfer to XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery in support of Operation Desert Shield/Storm and to provide a mobile training team to the unit in Southwest Asia. Soldiers understand and accept these challenges as a part of the profession. They do not understand constantly working late or on weekends and changing planned events frequently because supporting outside agencies cannot seem to work the schedule properly. You must protect your organization from frustration of this type by following the training schedule, working normal duty hours, taking diversions as needed, and having the staff deconflict and reschedule as necessary. Just as importantly, you have to understand that your inactivation is not everyone else's highest priority. So, some give-and-take will be required. Work friendly, be ready to execute as scheduled, and be flexible in spite of others. Doing so will quickly establish a reputation that will serve you well throughout the process.

While the exact procedures for the disposition of equipment, facilities and personnel will be specifically directed and situationally dependent, some general observations will be useful. Equipment will be disposed of by direct turn-in

to the appropriate Director of Logistics (DOL) supporting division at installation level or by directed lateral transfer. (An additional possibility may be direct transfer to National Guard or Reserve organizations in an "as is" condition. This saves time and funds for the inactivating unit while providing the Guard or Reserve organization equipment that would otherwise be unavailable.) While this may appear to be relatively straightforward, the disposition instructions on much of the equipment will change constantly until the last piece is gone. Working through DOL activities prevents few problems as systems and standards are generally well established. The routing of equipment through the various inspection stages, ensuring paperwork is proper and complete, addressing valid requisitions that are due in, and the occasional "toad-in-the-road" are the normal challenges. Special and/or unique equipment that is not normally handled through DOL activities will create bottlenecks as you and the system wrestle with a solution. Local logistics assistance officers (LAO) can be helpful when addressing these questions. Identify these challenges early and the system will eventually provide a solution. Lateral transfers, however, can be a real nightmare. Lateral transfer directives come from the DMHC through their subordinate property book sections to align equipment with authorizations. These transfer directives are one-on-one actions required between company level units. The challenge for the company commander is managing large numbers of lateral transfers -- sometimes 150 items or more.

Moreover, the environment constantly changes. Authorizations change in an attempt to provide the equipment to organizations who may or may not want it and who will always debate the transfer standard. Clear and direct guidance along with channels for the resolution of conflicts is absolutely essential.

As was mentioned earlier, centralized control of the documentation for organizational property turn-in allows the unit to track its progress and prepare for IPRs at higher levels. It also provides a single coordination point that has total knowledge of the status of all subordinate units for any transaction. This arrangement was especially valuable when dealing with the multitude of rapidly changing lateral transfer directives. Many were eliminated at the property book/ staff logistics officer (S-4) level without involving the company level supply operation. Finally, coordination to dispose of wheeled vehicles, trailers, and power generation equipment was greatly simplified. The maintenance technician only had to notify the S-4 when an item of this type was ready for transfer and provide supporting paperwork, and final paperwork with a turn-in appointment was ready, usually by the next day.

The conduct of maintenance operations was centrally controlled by the battalion maintenance technician (BMT). This decision was reached early in the planning process based on several factors. These included the experience of previously inactivating units; the density of qualified maintenance personnel in the organization; the diversity and amount of equipment; the workload on the subordinate units; and the

subordinate commander's span of control. Additionally, division mandated a change to direct support maintenance arrangements just prior to initiating inactivation that placed my battalion under a new maintenance battalion for inactivation. Hence, in my mind, the BMT was the only one who had the advantage of having established some relationship in the past with both this new direct support maintenance battalion and installation level support activities. This use of the BMT freed company-level executive officers to assist overloaded commanders in other areas while company-level motor personnel responded to the BMT. One important lesson in this area revolves around the use of your low-density military occupational specialty (MOS) soldiers. Large workloads on tracked and wheeled vehicles, trailers, and power generation equipment presented a unique challenge. Allowing maintenance personnel to be placed on other duties would either cause the soldiers to work longer hours and on weekends or jeopardize the turn-in schedule. Similar situations arose for soldiers in the staff personnel officer (S-1) and S-4 areas. Utilizing participative management techniques can pay dividends in such cases. I gave this challenge to my command sergeant major who met with his first sergeants and recommended that I exempt certain types of soldiers from certain duties to ensure their availability. The solution was well accepted and supported because everyone recognized the challenge and the recommendation came up from the ranks.

Dealing with the area of installation/billets property

and facility disposition is challenging for a number of reasons. Installation and billets furnishings property books were operated by separate agencies at the installation level; neither was automated. Each company-level commander had one of each of these property book accounts with widely differing types and amounts of equipment. Since multiple units physically occupied the same facilities, equipment and furnishings had done some moving over time. Early identification during inventory and disposition decisions by installation agencies is critical. Billets furnishings should be moved as little as possible or a large amount of damage and the resultant surveys will occur. Repairs should take place on site as much as possible, conducted by soldiers and supervised by NCOs who have been properly trained by installation personnel.

Clearing facilities will be a demanding operation. With the reduced manpower and funding levels available to installations, your organization will be required to accomplish every type of repair possible before that facility will be accepted. The battalion command sergeant major became responsible for oversight of this area and it took the major portion of his time. You must have inspections by the Director of Engineering and Housing (DEH) inspectors before you begin work to identify standards and point out deficiencies. Insist that the inspector that conducts the initial inspection conducts intermediate inspections along the way to keep you on track and does the final acceptance inspection as well. Troop billets will be the greatest challenge, as years worth of temporary walls

will have to be removed, the building repainted, and all troop level repairs completed - i.e., ceiling and floor tile, door refinishing, window glass, etc. Early coordination should also be made among billets furnishings, installation property, DEH, and unit personnel to determine which areas will be approved for the storage of remaining billets and installation property. This activity must start at the very beginning of the inactivation cycle. The first facility will be the hardest as you learn the ropes, but your soldiers will eventually become very good at achieving the desired standard quite rapidly. Watch the time of year as well. DEH will run out of self-help items, glass, paint, etc., based on the increased demand of inactivation and end of FY budgeting requirements if they do not adequately forecast their requirements. By far the greatest challenge in this area is tailoring your plan to accomodate the preparation of facilities while minimizing the disruption to your soldiers who live in the billets. Possible solutions will include the early reassignment of single soldiers living in the billets, the early movement of soldiers to future units with an agreement to bring them back in a temporary duty status, and the consolidation of soldiers in one building that required only minimum work. Again I utilized the command sergeant major and senior NCOs to address the proper combination of solutions. The only guidance that I provided was that a soldier would move only one time (if a move was required at all) prior to departing the battalion for his future unit. While they provided a solid plan to accomplish

the mission and take care of the soldiers, it is virtually impossible to avoid disrupting the lives of the soldiers living in the billets. You will have to be very watchful of this difficult area.

Finally, in the area of personnel, initial decisions should address how many soldiers are needed to accomplish the mission. Keeping too many soldiers is not as bad as keeping too few given the mission (inactivation plus whatever additional missions/taskings will be required), but you will probably not need your full authorized complement. You will need to consider providing additional manpower to your staff personnel officer (S-1), S-4, and maintenance activities to accomodate the increased workloads you will experience in these areas. As another rule of thumb, I would not reassign any low density soldiers until their equipment is gone. For example, until all of the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) equipment has been turned-in, I would not reassign any MOS-54 series soldiers. These early decisions and the support of higher headquarters as to the reassignment availability of your soldiers are going to be essential to accomplishing the inactivation mission. As soon as you lose your traditional mission, every unit on the installation will have a valid personnel shortage that can be immediately filled from your organization.

Reassignment of soldiers can be placed in two general categories. Soldiers will either transfer to another unit and remain on the installation or they will exit/be reassigned

across the Army. By working with higher headquarters and installation personnel, soldiers remaining on the installation can be given some degree of choice on their future unit of assignment. It needs to be made clear that the needs of the Army will be the primary consideration and that assignments could change based on other requirements. For soldiers being reassigned across the Army, the procedures are generally the same as normal except that earlier or later reporting dates can be coordinated. As long as soldiers understand the system and are kept informed of changes, this area will not present any significant challenges. The bottom line in this area is that you have to coordinate the reassignment with the decreasing workload and the evacuation of unit facilities; therefore, the losing unit commander has to be the final authority on the departure of his soldiers.

MOVING INTO HISTORY

Certainly officials up and down the chain of command did not pretend that inactivation was just another mission. That's how they approached the execution of it, but they certainly did not soft-pedal the difficulties involved, nor did they trivialize the event. The meaning of inactivation was preserved with dignity, especially during the final chapter - the inactivation ceremony itself.(26)

While we can see that the mission of inactivation is challenging, contrary to our professional instincts and not

business as normal, it is nonetheless a mission that requires a most thoughtful, organized, flexible, positive leadership approach to sustain organizational effectiveness. My research in various sources, my personal command experience in inactivating several dissimilar units, and my interview with General Roe all reinforce a singular overriding precept: This mission, as with others, is about taking care of soldiers. A myriad of challenges must be addressed along the route of march, and many external factors will impact on your operation. For all that, the same orientation on the organization's most important asset -- its soldiers -- will carry the day during inactivation as it does during any other mission.

In conclusion, I would offer the following ten guidelines that have been discussed in greater detail earlier, not as a schoolhouse solution, but as a point of departure and food for thought for those that will surely follow this route of march in the near future:

1. Approach inactivation as you would any other mission. Foster a strong team orientation and positive attitude.

2. Centrally coordinate and monitor your plan. Do your homework. Brief everyone. Synchronize. Resynchronize. Track religiously.

3. Understand the standards and Rules of Engagement. Have the staff mark the route.

4. Conduct initial inventories and inspections early. Be ready to adapt.

5. Gain and maintain contact with the key players and organizations. Keep them in the net. Understand that inactivation is not everyone's highest priority. Work friendly.

6. Decentralize the execution of your plan. Maintain a flexible response capability. Do it right the first time. Police the battlefield as you go.

7. Protect the force. Work normal duty hours. Don't panic. Take time for diversions and maintain morale. Stress safety.

8. Begin work on the buildings and facilities early.

9. Surface the challenges. Insulate your unit from frustration. Have the system help address the challenges.

10. Orient on the soldiers. Talk to them often to keep them informed. Hand carry each one. Keep commanders visible, communicating and where the action is. Provide rewards. Close with meaningful ceremonies. Don't forget families.

These ten guidelines highlight the indispensable role that the AirLand Battle concept of synchronization plays in the operation of inactivation. Further, I recognize that many of these observations and experiences are not unique to inactivations. They are common guidelines that have been employed by commanders as they have conducted the more standard training/operational missions throughout the existence of their organizations. Certainly, they have been recognized and enumerated, in one fashion or another, by those I have studied and researched. In the final analysis, it is the thoughtful, complete and creative synchronization of every

aspect of inactivation that will successfully move your unit into history while fostering an environment in which everyone continues to learn and grow.

On December 10th, the 1st Battalion, 84th Field Artillery Regiment took its turn. Retired Command Sergeant Major Raymond Jones, the honorary command sergeant major of the 84th Regiment, and Retired Colonel Harry A. Stella, the honorary colonel of the 84th Regiment - both of whom served proudly with this unit during their distinguished 30-year careers - helped case the regimental colors and stood by as the battle streamers were removed from the staff. The moment was a metaphor for the entire inactivation process; soldiers, their equipment and even their history, were being absorbed into the great equalizing olive green of the Army.(27)

APPENDIX 1

FIGURES 1 - 8

**THIS APPENDIX INCLUDES SAMPLE INACTIVATION ORDERS,
MILESTONES, AND IN PROGRESS REVIEW INFORMATION**

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters Forces Command
Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330-6000**

PERMANENT ORDERS 202-5

31 OCTOBER 1990

**1ST BATTALION, 84TH FIELD ARTILLERY, FC, (WDGPAA), FORT LEWIS,
WASHINGTON 98433-5000**

Following organization/unit action directed.

Action: Unit INACTIVATED

Assigned to: Control of Headquarters Department of the Army

Mission: Not applicable

Effective date: 15 January 1991

Military structure strength: 36 Off; 1 WO; 406 Enl; 443 Aggr

Military Authorized strength: 36 Off; 1 WO; 408 Enl; 445 Aggr

Civilian structure strength: Not applicable

Civilian authorized strength: Not applicable

**Accounting classification: Appropriate allotments will be
obligated to the extent necessary (AR 37-100 series).**

Authority: AR 310-9, para 2-11

Additional instructions:

a. MTOE: 06165DFC09 FC1189

b. TPSN: 03009

**c. Personnel assets made available through this inactivation
will be reassigned locally to the maximum extent possible; others
will be reassigned in accordance with current procedures.**

**d. Equipment will be disposed of in accordance with AR 710-2
and FORSCOM Suppl To AR 710-2.**

**e. Flags, Colors and Guidons will be processed in accordance
with AR 840-10. Organizational historical files will be
processed in accordance with AR 870-5. Other records in
accordance with AR 25-400-2. Organizational historical files
will be packed and shipped in accordance with Appendix A (File
No. 228-08), AR 340-2.**

**f. Historical property will be processed in accordance with
AR 870-20, Army Art will be processed in accordance with
AR 870-15, other unit fund property will be processed in
accordance with AR 40-1.**

Format: 740

FOR THE COMMANDER:

**TRACEY S. SHEER
Colonel, USA
Chief, Documents Division, J3**

Appendix 1, Figure

Annex H (Milestones) to 1-84 FA OPORD 22-90 (Inactivation)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
15 Jul 90	*Initial technical inspections begin *Unit 100% inventory begins.
19 Jul	*Verify vehicle and equipment serial numbers. *Review DEH work orders. (cancel as appropriate) *Begin repair of property and facilities to prescribed standards. (identify shortfalls)
27 Jul	*ID soldiers with early expiration term of service (ETS), P-3 physical status, bars and investigations. *ID soldiers not critical to inactivation and available for reassignment. *ID soldiers on present duty assignment (PDA), education benefits, other reenlistment options, and stabilized tours. *ID soldiers in critical positions.
31 Jul	*Coordinate G6/DEH building/FMB/Installation property pre-turn-in inspections.
01 Aug	*100% key and lock inventory. (arms room) *Begin turn-in of maps and NATO documents.
10 Aug	*All operations order(OPORD) annexes to S3.
13 Aug	*Complete map turn-in.
15 Aug	*Turn-in/transfer communications-electronics, command and control information, and communications and security documentation.
20 Aug	*Coordinate small arms turn-in/transfer dates with Provost Marshal.
29 Aug	*Identify soldiers in critical positions/with special skills who will be retained through inactivation to G1. *Complete NATO document turn-in.
30 Aug	*Begin processing adjustment documents. *Complete technical inspections of equipment and facilities. *Complete unit 100% inventories.
31 Aug	*Submit OPORD to Divarty and Division.
01 Sep	*ID soldiers who will be TDY during inactivation.
04 Sep	*Provide turn-in plan to Logistics Activity Group (LAG). *Turn-in COMSEC/CCI to 1-84 FA COMSEC vault.
	Sequence:
	A Btry 4 Sep
	B Btry 5 Sep

Service	6 Sep
HHB	6 Sep
C Btry	7 Sep
*Turn-in Comm-Elec to 1-84 FA Commo Platoon Headquarters.	
Sequence:	
A Btry	4-7 Sep
B Btry	10-14 Sep
Service	17-21 Sep
HHB	24 Sep - 4 Oct
C Btry	9-19 Oct
Make-ups	22 Oct - 2 Nov
*Notify PM/DSEC on clearance of arms rooms and joint security interior intrusion detection system(JSIIDS).	
*Notify DSEC of personnel transferred to other units.	
07 Sep	*Brief OPORD to Division.
10 Sep	*Commanders complete soldiers reassignment interviews.
11 Sep	*Brief turn-in plan to LAG.
13 Sep	*Brief OPORD/turn-in plan to assistant division commander.
14 Sep	*Complete light TACFIRE preparation for turn-in.
17 Sep	*Brief all battalion soldiers on OPORD/turn-in plan.
	*Coordinate property turn-in schedule with DEH, Directorate of Logistics(DOL), and G4.
18 Sep	*Initiate DOL acceptance technical inspections.
20 Sep	*Complete ID of soldiers for early BTS.
21 Sep	*Turn-in COMSEC equipment to Division Central Office of Records(DCOR).
28 Sep	*Brief division commander on OPORD/turn-in plan.
30 Sep	*Complete acceptance technical inspections.
01 Oct	*Transfer special duty soldiers to gaining units.
10 Oct	*ID release dates for all soldiers.
15 Oct	*Stop Prescribed Load List(PLL) replenishment.
16 Oct	*End of external taskings.
	*Turn-in all Training Aids Service Center(TASC) equipment.
17 Oct	*End of formal unit status reporting(USR).
	*Produce final OER and EER report shells.
	*Turn-in hazardous waste.
	*Develop final unit historical report.
27 Oct	*Turn-in small arms and crew-served weapons.

29 Oct	*Schedule CG for a billets inspection.
30 Oct	*Complete reports of survey and adjustment documents.
31 Oct	*Coordinate barracks TV cable termination dates.
01 Nov	*Reassign remaining soldiers not critical to inactivation.
15 Nov	*Complete food service technical inspections.
16 Nov	*Complete inventory of unit historical property.
28 Nov	*CG inspects billets and facilities.
01 Dec	*Close remaining mailroom. *Complete final actions on UCMJ and chapter cases.
05 Dec	*Conduct residual equipment distribution(RED) meeting.
10 Dec	*Complete all final draft OERs and EERs.
14 Dec	*Consolidate automated data processing(ADP) packets for turn-in to the DAMO. *Package and ship unit historical property. *Separate all soldiers within 90 days of BTS.
15 Dec	*Final organizational equipment turn-in. *Terminate Army Oil Analysis Program(AOAP) and calibration.
20 Dec	*Turn-in all unnecessary forms, records and publications.
27 Dec	*Notify PM of vacated buildings/facilities. *Turn-in final unit historical report to PAO.
30 Dec	*Turn-in conex containers. *Complete billets pre-clearance inspections.
15 Jan 91	*Complete final OER/EER actions. *Close out meal card account. *Conduct inactivation ceremony.
16 Jan	*Reassign all but minimum essential personnel.
20 Jan	*Submit final administrative reports. *Close out organizational property book.
30 Jan	*Vacate all buildings and facilities. *Close out FMB and installation property books.
04 Feb	*Final ADP turn-in. *Reassign remaining personnel.

RELIABLE PRIDE UPDATE REPORT

1/84 FA BN AS OF: AUGUST 27 (1990)

	WHEELS			TRACKS			GEN/ENG			WEAPONS			CTA		
	LT	TI	TOT	LT	TI	TOT	LT	TI	TOT	LT	TI	TOT	LT	TI	TOT
BEGIN	47	145	192	0	1	1	6	46	52	8	1321	1329	24	590	614
COMPLETE	10	0	10	0	1	1	4	2	6	1	206	207	13	107	120
REMAIN	37	145	182	0	0	0	2	44	46	7	1115	1122	11	483	494
%COMPLETE	21	0	5	0	100	100	67	4	12	13	16	16	54	18	20

	COMMO			COMSEC			NON/STD			MTOE		
	LT	TI	TOT	LT	TI	TOT	LT	TI	TOT	LT	TI	TOT
BEGIN	128	1052	1180	65	354	419	201	96	297	146	1853	1999
COMPLETE	38	29	67	19	0	19	26	16	42	20	73	93
REMAIN	90	1023	1113	46	354	400	175	80	255	126	1780	1906
%COMPLETE	30	3	6	29	0	5	13	17	14	14	4	5

TOTAL EQUIPMENT	6083		
TOTAL TURN-IN	5458		
TOTAL LT	625		
TURN-IN COMPLETED	434	% COMPLETED TO DATE	8
LT COMPLETED	131	% COMPLETED TO DATE	21
TOTAL COMPLETED	565	% COMPLETED TO DATE	9

REMARKS

START DATA AS OF 25 JUN 90

LOGISTICS STATUS (TRANSFER/TURN-IN) G4 SECTION

1. UNIT: 1-84

2. STATUS AS OF 27 AUG 90

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>% INVENTORY</u>	<u>TRANSFER TURN-IN</u>	<u>TOTAL %</u>
ORGANIZATION	6083	100	565	9%
INSTALLATION	1347	100	0	0%
FMB	5376	100	0	0%
FACILITIES	22	100	0	0%


3. EQUIPMENT STATUS REPORT (ORGANIZATION)

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>TRANSFER</u>	<u>TURN-IN</u>	<u>TOTAL %</u>
WHEEL VEH	192	10	0	5%
TRACK VEH	1	0	1	100%
GEN/EN EQUIP	52	4	2	12%
WEAPONS	1329	1	206	16%
CTA	614	13	107	20%
COMMO	1180	38	29	6%
COMSEC	419	19	0	5%
NON-STND	297	26	16	14%
MTOE	1999	20	73	5%
TOTAL	6083			

Appendix 1, Figure 6

Note: This chart provides more detailed analysis of a unit.
Use with trend analysis to review compliance with milestone.

1-84 EQUIPMENT TURN-IN STATUS G4 SECTION (TREND ANALYSIS)



Appendix 1, Figure 7

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6. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: 5 May 1986), 17.

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9. Roe Interview, Tape #1, Side #2, Count #067.

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11. LTC Randall C. Williams, "Inactivation: The Reality of Building Down," Field Artillery (Ft. Sill, OK: June 1991), 19.

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14. U.S. Department of the Army, Permanent Orders 202-5 (Ft. McPherson, GA: Headquarters Forces Command, 31 October 1990).

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20. Roe Interview, Tape #2, Side #1, Count #272.

21. U.S. Department of the Army, Reliable Pride Update Report, 1/84 FA BN (Ft. Lewis, WA: Property Book Section, Division Material Management Center, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), 27 August 1990), 1.

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24. Andrews, 21.

25. Van Alstyne, 1.

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27. Ibid., 41.

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