



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
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THE POST COLD WAR MARITIME STRATEGY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION

In an April 1991 article in Proceedings, entitled "The Way Ahead", The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations posed the question: "What do we do with a maritime strategy formulated during the Cold War, focused primarily on global conflict with the Soviet Union?"¹ The proposed answer to this question was to extract the strategy's enduring principles and then place the strategy back on the shelf, to be retrieved if a global threat again emerges. This position by the top leaders of the U.S. naval establishment would tend to lend credence to earlier critics of the maritime strategy who dismissed it as merely a tool for the Navy to obtain 600 ships. This attitude neglects the basic tenets of the maritime strategy as it was originally articulated by Admiral Watkins in 1986.

In the original maritime strategy Admiral Watkins said:

It is a strategy for today's forces, today's capabilities, and today's threat. It is also a dynamic concept. . . . It offers a global perspective to operational commanders and provides a foundation for advice to the National Command Authorities.²

Placing the maritime strategy on a shelf to be removed and used when the threat matches the plan is neglecting the very foundations of why a strategy is developed. Even if the Navy could, in good faith, neglect the Maritime Strategy it would be letting down its part of the National Military Strategy. Even as the Soviet Union was breaking apart in March of 1990,

the National Security Strategy reflected the importance of the maritime strategy, stating:

The maritime strategy is one element of a national security strategy based on deterrence, forward defense and alliance solidarity. Like the national security strategy it supports, the focus of U.S. maritime strategy has been oriented toward the Soviet Union. The elements of our national power-- diplomatic and political, economic and military - remain formidable. Yet, the relative importance of these different instruments of policy will change in changing circumstances.

In this paper I will look at why we still need a viable maritime strategy, the elements of that strategy, and some future developments and areas of concern that should be addressed when reviewing the strategy.

CHAPTER 1

WHY A MARITIME STRATEGY?

If we accept the basic premise that the global threat to the United States has receded with the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, then why should we be worried about a maritime strategy that is geared toward warfighting? The answer is in the meaning of the term strategy.

Strategy has as many definitions as it has authors to discuss it. Each has a different view of the term and what it means in any given situation. The common link between each of these definitions is the idea that a strategy is the link between your goal and the tools available. In other words the coupling between 'ends' and 'means'. In a maritime strategy the ends are the maritime portion of the National Military Strategy and the means are the military forces available.

Mahan wrote, "The object of naval warfare is a function of national interest and national policy; it is an expression of political goals to be achieved by the employment of sea power generally and naval forces specifically."⁴ Without a strategy how do you size your force? There must be a way of determining how much, and what types of forces, are necessary to obtain the goals established by national policy. This is

especially essential in an era of shrinking military budgets and a call for economic reform. Strategy is a bridge connecting means with ends, and as such is a two way street. Policy makers should not ask too much nor too little of their armed forces, while forces should be developed and applied only for feasible purposes set by policy.⁵ Admiral Metcalf, in reviewing the maritime strategy, stated:

The Maritime Strategy is a warfighting concept. As such it is a resource allocation guide, a guide for planning naval operations and a policy statement to the Soviets and US allies. To remain viable the strategy must evolve with changes in the warfighting environment.⁶

A maritime strategy is essential if the military is to identify and acquire the kinds of forces that will be necessary in the future. A maritime strategy not only defines the types of forces necessary, it sets priorities of effort. In failing to select a particular strategy, the Navy expends much of its energy in more abstract debate. Without some basic choice it is impossible for the Navy to place relative values on its various programs. Evaluation is necessary if, given limited funds, intelligent choices are to be made. Elaboration of the strategy can reveal significant gaps in naval strength, which might otherwise be considered unimportant. Perhaps an equally important aspect is that, by adopting a particular strategy, the Navy can explain itself most effectively to Congress, which assigns its resources.⁷

Rep. John Murtha, D-Pa., recently said the budget, "is another step along the downward path of defense spending.

There is no question that this is the direction we must take as we adjust to changes taking place around the world."⁸ The strategy question is being redefined as "How little is enough?" It remains to be seen whether defense draw down in the 1990s will be accomplished in any more strategically rational a manner than was the defense draw down following the second world war. A draw down which left the country and its military scrambling at the outbreak of the Korean conflict. The U.S. government, and its critics on the left, is behaving as if it now has the clairvoyance it has lacked in the past. It is dealing from the perception that there will be no major conflicts to deal with, and that any contingencies that do arise can be dealt with by a smaller "more capable" force. While there may be no question as to the direction that defense spending must take, without a viable maritime strategy the Navy has no means for justifying force levels and program emphasis to those who hold the purse strings. While it follows that the budget should not drive the strategy, it is also evident that merely buying what is affordable will not necessarily meet the needs of national policy.

Admiral Jeremiah, the Vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has called for reform in the Defense Department in the era of a collapsed communist threat.⁹ Without a strategy how will the Navy assure that its interests are properly considered during this reorganization?

There are those that argue that the Maritime Strategy has

been neglected for far too long. The warfighting aspects of the strategy have been too focused on the global threat of the Soviet Union. While the Navy has never been engaged with the Soviet Union the Maritime Strategy has been useless in supporting the needs of the fleet. This feeling was articulated in a recent issue of proceedings when the author stated:

While the Navy has been fighting what amounts to a tactical war in the Third World, U.S. strategic thinking has been confined by its institutionalized preoccupation with a traditional clash of arms between the great powers. The failure of U.S. strategy to provide conceptual and doctrinal support to its tactically engaged fleet means that U.S. responses to crises outside the set piece of NATO's Central front have often been ad hoc, inappropriate, and ineffective.¹⁰

This statement seems borne out in the fact that between the years 1945 and 1989 the United States used sea power to protect its national interests 187 times.¹¹ In only a handful of these incidents did even the threat of global conflict play a part in any of the considerations on how to employ maritime forces.

The Maritime Strategy has served the nation and the Navy well throughout the Cold War, and may well have contributed to the Soviet buildup which contributed to the collapse of their government. Now that the possibility of global conflict has receded our leaders would like to shelve the Maritime Strategy in favor of operational orders.

In an atmosphere of change, amid cries of military reduction and national isolationism, it is even more important that the Navy have a viable, cogent, Maritime Strategy from

which to develop forces and direct the future of not just the Navy, but joint operations. The Maritime Strategy, now more than ever, needs to be dusted off, reevaluated and discussed throughout, not only the Navy, but the entire joint arena. Without a strategy the Navy must rely on what former Secretary of War Stimson called, "The peculiar psychology of the Navy, which frequently seems to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious world where Neptune is God, Mahan his prophet, and the U.S. Navy the only true church."

CHAPTER 2

THE NATURE OF SEA POWER

To understand the elements of the Maritime Strategy it is first necessary to understand Sea Power. Without a fundamental grasp of the necessity of maritime involvement by the United States, it is impossible to justify the necessity for a global maritime presence at all.

Sea Power can be described in the context of the trident, the three pronged spear which has become the symbol of sea power. The center tine of the trident is made up of a strong, modern navy. Only by adding the capabilities of a viable merchant marine and a strong economic and industrial infrastructure can the trident be completed and Sea Power wielded effectively.¹²

Each of these elements exists to support the other. The economic and industrial infrastructure of a country is the ultimate strength and power of that nation, and provides the industrial and military strength. A navy exists to ensure the global supply of raw materials and trade that keeps the economy and the government strong. A merchant marine actually fulfills two vital roles. While it must always maintain the vital flow of trade; in wartime it must support the flow of

military power overseas, through ports and over beaches that naval forces have secured.

While each tine of the sea power trident operates separately, it is easy to recognize that each arm is mutually supportive. If one arm of the trident fails, Sea Power fails to be an option to the nation. This is evident in the breakup of the Soviet Union. While an extensive merchant marine existed alongside the largest navy in the world, the economic and industrial backbone of the country failed, collapsing the entire structure. Now as the country seeks to rebuild its vital infrastructure the Navy flounders, without direction and unable to support forward deployment of its forces.

The Soviet example also emphasizes another aspect of Sea Power. Not all nations depend equally on maritime presence. As a maritime power Russia, was late in developing. This can be attributed to the lack of necessity for maritime trade that other earlier maritime nations required. The Soviet Union did not establish themselves as a major sea power until the 1960's, when following the Cuban Missile Crisis, they realized that their world influence and interests could be threatened in the blue water environment.

While resources and trade on the asian landmass were sufficient to support Russia, Great Britain relied on the support of her colonies to maintain her international power; this required her to become a major maritime power. The United States, while not a major colonial power, became a

maritime power only after establishing a requirement to trade and obtain resources from outside the continent. The fledgling United States did not even plan for a Navy until sea communications were threatened by the Barbary pirates.

In this context it is easy to see that the former Soviet Union can rebuild its economic and industrial infrastructure with the resources available in the immediate landmass of Asia and Europe. While the Soviet Navy is not a viable entity now, as the union breaks apart and the individual countries begin to compete in the world economy, the necessity for oceanic trade may become more decisive in the affairs of the new republics and/or confederations than it ever was in the former Soviet Union. Russia, Georgia, or any other emerging republic could establish the kind of economy and industrial might that would put them in a position to become sea powers.

If we examine the United States with this Sea Power trident it is easy to notice weaknesses in the position of the United States.

The United States does not currently maintain a viable merchant fleet. Less than six percent of the United States' overseas trade is carried in American Flagged ships.¹³ Couple this with the fact that the U.S. relies on almost two billion tons of shipping a year and it is easy to see that, while we are reliant on sea communications for raw materials, we cannot rely on an indigenous merchant marine to support global military operations. This point was dramatically reinforced

during the recent operation Desert Storm/Shield. The U.S. was forced to lease ships from foreign companies to prosecute her national interests.

One might ask, If the nation does not rely on an indigenous merchant marine, why do we require such a large naval force? Certainly the security of shipping cannot be in that much danger. The answer lies in the requirement to insure access to raw materials and markets for trade. With the collapse of colonialism access to raw materials was no longer guaranteed. Today, the emphasis has to be on maintaining global stability to ensure access to markets and materials. Thus the shift in naval presence from protecting merchant shipping from piracy and international interference to stabilizing the new world order. As in Kuwait, Naval strength was essential in restoring the government and insuring the stable access and pricing of oil, which is vital to the country's industrial might.

Figure 1 Sea Power Facts

- 75% of the world is covered by water.
 - 50% of the world's population lives within 500 miles of the coast.
 - 75% of the major industry of the world is within 500 miles of the coast.
 - 90% of world trade travels on the oceans.
-

The ability of the maritime strategy to influence world events can be fully realized when considered with the world

facts reflected in Figure 1. An important aspect of the figure is the importance of the Navy's role in power projection ashore. The development of the carrier, the ballistic missile, and the cruise missile has given the Navy the ability to dominate not only at sea, but to influence actions ashore. Power projection has become the primary role of naval forces!

CHAPTER 3

THE MARITIME STRATEGY

By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor. Naval Strategy is but that part of the maritime strategy which determines the movements of the fleet when the strategy has determined what part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces; for it scarcely needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone.¹

As Admiral Watkins originally stated, the Maritime Strategy does not purport to be a detailed war plan, but a global perspective for operational commanders, and foundation for advice to National Command Authorities. As such, it is easy to see that while naval capabilities, forces, and threats have changed, the basic ideas of the Maritime Strategy are sound. With some minor revision to the basic principles of sea control, and the naval role in the National Military Strategy, the Maritime Strategy can, and should be, a vital national document.

The Maritime Strategy, as it currently exists, is composed of four main elements: Peacetime Presence, Crisis Response, Warfighting, and War Termination. Each of these elements is unique in its strengths and weaknesses. While discussing each individually it is important to keep in mind

that the Maritime strategy is designed to be executed in concert with all of its elements. In this way, it is important that the elements compliment each other. The implementation of Peacetime Presence will affect Crisis Response, which in turn will affect Warfighting and War Termination. Each element is dependent on the previous element for success.

PEACETIME PRESENCE

The first element of the Maritime Strategy is peacetime presence. The entire goal of peacetime presence is to enhance deterrence daily. Forward deployment maintains U.S. access to necessary resources, markets, and vital lines of communication. Simultaneously forward presence provides a clear sign of U.S. interest in a given nation or region.

In recent years the U.S. has lost valuable bases in Spain and the Philippines. Simultaneously, allies are hesitant to grant basing rights, or when they do, limit the types and/or amounts of military equipment that may be based in an area. Still, the presence of capable military forces near areas of potential crisis remains a key element of national security.

Deterrence in the maritime realm means deploying sufficient naval forces to project a credible response to any contingency. The goal is to be "ready" as well as "willing" to use force as necessary. The protection of clients is an activity as old as organized conflict. Edward Luttwak ex-

pressed the nub of the matter when he wrote, "Superpowers, like other institutions known to us, are in the protection business. When they cannot protect clients, they lose influence, not just locally but worldwide." ¹⁵

Clearly, with the reduction in global garrisoned forces it is necessary to maintain, if not increase, the presence of deployable forces. This becomes more difficult in a period of reduced economic growth, and the resultant decreased defense budgets. As the Navy reduces in size, the call for a stabilizing presence throughout the globe is increasing. The failure of the Soviet Union has removed the foreign aid many countries relied on to maintain a stable government. Yugoslavia, Korea, and Cuba are feeling the pinch of failing economies. While this may signal the fall of communist systems of government, it also will certainly lead to large periods of internal strife. Only by rewriting the Maritime Strategy can we hope to meet the challenges of the future.

Clearly, one solution to the problem would be to keep the current fleet at sea for longer periods. This solution has several drawbacks. Ships, like all machinery, require regular periodic maintenance and only last so long in an environment of continued hard use. In a period of budgetary cutbacks, the early replacement of ships is not an option. Along with the ships, sailors wear out under long periods of extended deployment. It has taken the Navy a long time to establish a suitable deployment rotation that balances the lives of its

sailors and ships. If the deployment cycle is changed, the loss in trained and experienced sailors could be even more devastating to the Navy than the cost of ship replacement. This concern was recognized by Admiral Kelso, Chief of Naval Operations, when he said, "Perstempo will continue to be very important to us, and we have to learn to be more flexible in how we provide forward presence."¹⁶

In the past, deployment cycles, areas, and battle group composition was based on insuring that, in a global war-at-sea scenario, the U.S. could insure the security of vital sea lanes by controlling world choke points and isolating the Soviet Navy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Navy is freed from the restrictions placed on naval forces by a global war-at-sea scenario. Admiral Kelso has already called for smaller Battle Groups which are able to go to more places and demonstrate more flexible responses.¹⁷ In the current world environment, smaller battle groups could operate in more widely dispersed areas, maintaining the ability to rendezvous and bring their combined power to any crisis that may arise.

With the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, the most probable future conflict scenario is a non-Soviet contingency in the third world. As exemplified by the Iraqi attack of Kuwait, we are living in a period of uncertainty. Warning signs will become increasingly ambiguous and reaction times will be shortened as the identity and motives of potential adversaries and the timing and scenarios of threatening events become more

difficult to discern. The future will require that the U.S. Navy keep its CVBGs forward deployed to maintain an early capability for power protection.

The breakup of the Soviet Union has required an increase in intelligence collection to keep track of the nuclear weapons and technology that is up for grabs in the former Soviet States. Even Congress realizes this necessity. Recently Senator Warren Rudman R-N.H. called the proliferation of nuclear weapons "ominous", and stated, "There's no question that we are going to have to increase our surveillance - both diplomatic and intelligence - of what's going on on nuclear proliferation."¹⁸ The need for intelligence will be a critical factor in forestalling any crisis that may arise. The presence of forward based naval intelligence collection facilities, aircraft, ships and submarines will be key in providing critical coverage in support of our national intelligence collection efforts.

Ideally, if the concept of Peacetime Presence works as designed, a crisis should never break out in a region of the world where we have a national interest. While it would be unrealistic to assume that this would ever be the case, it is necessary to take all steps possible to ensure the stability of countries that represent a national interest. This can best be accomplished through the policy of nation building.

Nation building is a term used by the United States when it is involved in ensuring a stable economy and government in

developing countries throughout the world, and is in itself another form of peacetime presence. This process includes everything from ship visits to grants of foreign aid. The presence of a naval ship in port once every six months may indicate U.S. national interest in a government, but this will do little to deter the populace from uprising, or the military from staging a coup, if the people cannot feed themselves or see any hope for a better future.

In the future the military must take a much more aggressive role in nation building. The infrastructure of emerging countries is frequently an impediment to national growth. Goods developed in the interior have no means of transport to the exterior for export and growth. Education is withheld due to lack of schools and qualified teachers. The military has been involved in these types of projects in Central and South America for several years, with outstanding results. This policy needs to be expanded. Light Army forces can use the training in deployment and support of forward deployed troops, while simultaneously digging wells, building roads and schools, and teaching the military how to work with democracy. Battle Groups can be modified to include facilities for the support of Sea Bee battalions. This will provide valuable training for active forces, while allowing engineers to practice valuable skills and provide needed support to emerging countries.

In a global environment where nations are trying

establish themselves as free and independent states, nation building will be the key element of Peacetime Presence. American forces can build important ties for future influence, should a regional altercation develop, while reducing the stigma attached with U.S. military forces being stationed in the homeland. Nation building is far cheaper than any type of actual military conflict and, with a little support from Congress, can become even more effective in the future. Instead of just granting lump sums to foreign governments, Congress could fence funds for the military to use in deploying, training, and nation building. This would have the advantages of supporting national industry (by providing materials), helping keep the military prepared to conduct operations abroad, and display a willingness to spend money at home to help those abroad instead of just shipping funds out of the country. In the future, Peacetime Presence and Nation Building need to become almost synonymous terms.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Although not specifically addressed in the original Maritime Strategy, nuclear deterrence was and will continue to be a major factor in *Peacetime Presence*. Originally this discussion was not necessary, because during the Cold War the threat of nuclear conflict was in the back of everyone's mind. Indeed, the entire thrust of the Maritime Strategy was to control conflict and ensure that conflict did not escalate to

the nuclear. This is no longer the case. With the destruction of the Soviet Union and the recent advances in nuclear disarmament there is a very real possibility that decision makers in the future may neglect the possibility of conflict with weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, I feel it is necessary to devote some time to discussing the role of nuclear deterrence.

On September 27, 1991, President Bush went before the American Public and put forth a new initiative in the arms race. In calling for the immediate destruction of land based tactical nuclear weapons, the removal from sea of all nuclear cruise missiles and carrier delivered bombs, and the stand down of the alert bomber force, President Bush took an aggressive step toward the reduction of a considerable world nuclear threat. The President also canceled any plans for the development of weapons, other than single warhead I.C.B.M's.

Perhaps as important as what he discussed, is what he did not discuss - the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) inventory of the United States. These missiles have been called "the trump card in the American deck"¹⁹, and represent a considerable commitment by the United States to the concept of flexible response and countervailing strategy. This clearly suggests the role the U.S. Navy will be expected to play in the Strategic Nuclear Policy of the United States in the coming years.

From their initial development the Submarine Launched

Ballistic Missile (SLBM) has been a mainstay in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and considered the primary stabilizing influence in nuclear deterrence. The covert nature of the submarine assures its immunity from preemptive strike, while the missile's relative inaccuracy initially could not threaten the strategic forces of the other side with a counter-force first strike. By contrast ICBMs could threaten each other. It is this stabilizing nature of SLBMs which has caused them to be well protected during arms limitation talks.

During SALT I, the Soviet Union was allowed to increase their SLBM inventory only if it reduced its ICBM inventory; SALT II incorporated ceilings on ICBMs with MIRV warheads and bomber launched cruise missiles, but ignored SLBMs; and START has been primarily interested in reducing Soviet ICBM numbers.²⁰

The two main features of the SLBM which have made it a stabilizing influence in the past have begun to erode with the advancement of technology. Advancement in the field of Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) has made the submarine much more vulnerable to detection and preemptive strike, while guidance and location technology has made the SLBM comparable in accuracy to the ICBM. The Trident C-4 currently in service has achieved the comparable accuracy of the Minuteman III, while the Trident D-5, soon to enter the fleet, will carry nine 475 kiloton warheads and be able to deliver them with a 300-400 foot circular error probable (CEP) accuracy.²¹

A further destabilizing aspect of the SLBM has to do with the clamor for reduced military spending. Even without START the ballistic submarine force is projected to be reduced to 18, from the original 41; with START this number could reach 15. This makes the reduced numbers even more susceptible to an ASW breakthrough, or from the perspective of an emerging military and sea power, a reliance on even fewer submarines of their own force.

During his recent arms reduction initiative, President Bush clearly indicated the importance of the SLBM to U.S. nuclear strategy. While the president called for the stand down of the bomber force, the destruction of tactical land based nuclear weapons, rapid removal of outdated ICBMs, and the storage of sea based tactical nuclear weapons, he made no mention of any change in the SLBM force, either in reduced deployment cycles, reduced MIRV loads, or suspended building programs. This clearly suggests the importance of the SLBM program, especially considering the fact that the majority of U.S. warheads are deployed at sea.

Currently, about the only certainty in the Soviet situation is that it will remain a nuclear superpower, with tens of thousands of nuclear warheads even after a START agreement. No one can be sure into whose hands such weapons might fall in the chaotic situation that now exists in the former Soviet Union.

Asked if the West should be worried about the break up of

the Soviet Union and the loss of control over nuclear weapons, former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Schevardnadze said, " Go ahead and say that I would be terrorized. I don't rule out that nuclear warheads and even complete tactical arms can fall into the hands of some paramilitary formation. It's one of the possible scenarios."²²

Secretary of Defense Dick Chaney recently stated, " As we look around the world's potential tinder boxes, perhaps the most disturbing development we can foresee is the likely proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . . . by the year 2000, the number of developing countries producing their own ballistic missiles is expected to be up to 15 . . . And that list of 15 does not count the countries that could end up buying missiles on the international arms market."²³ Even now reports in the Press show that Iran has purchased three nuclear weapons and Libya is attempting to hire Russian experts for its nuclear program.²⁴

These developments define a role for the United States: deterring any threatened use of that Soviet potential and inducing further weapons reductions in a stable manner. No other country can do so, nor would we want any other to build the arsenals to try.²⁵

While the SSBN is effective at deterring nations from developing the kinds of arsenals that threaten global destruction, one may argue that they are ineffective in deterring those nations which wish to develop a limited nuclear capabil-

ity for coercive purposes. Countries such as Libya or Iraq may feel that the U.S. would not use the large SLBM against a third world country for fear of repercussions, both at home and abroad. It is in this situation that the nuclear armed Tomahawk cruise missile may prove its total worth.

THE SLCM DILEMMA

Traditionally the ship launched cruise missile (SLCM) has been considered a tactical weapon in both its conventional and nuclear forms. It seems hard to reconcile this definition in the face of its capacity to carry a 200 kiloton warhead more than 1500 nautical miles, with an accuracy of 30 meters CEP.²⁶ This weapon has effectively converted the attack submarines, cruisers, and destroyers of the U.S. fleet into strategic platforms. Another compelling argument for the Tomahawk as a strategic weapon is the fact that while the conventional Tomahawk has an anti-ship capability, the nuclear variant is employable against land targets only.

The nuclear Tomahawk gives the United States the capability to deliver a relatively small nuclear payload, with extreme accuracy, over a considerable distance. This weapon provides the necessary threat to third world nations developing a limited nuclear ability. In situations where the U.S. might be reluctant to retaliate with a megaton warhead, it possesses the capability to deliver a smaller kiloton warhead to remote areas where damage would be limited to specific

military targets. A limited response to a limited threat makes the Tomahawk a viable deterrent tool. At the same time the Tomahawk missile poses a threat of limited nuclear war at sea that the Navy would rather avoid.

The Navy has realized that the use of nuclear weapons at sea is not in its best interest for quite some time. In 1989 the former Deputy CNO, Vice Admiral Mustin said, "There is a recognition that if there is a nuclear war at sea, we have got a lot more to lose than the Russians . . ."²⁷ Sea lines of Communication are much more vital to U.S. and allied interests than most emerging nations, therefore the risk of nuclear confrontation at sea, where it is generally considered to be less likely that there will be escalation, or residual nuclear damage, is not in the best interest of the U.S. Navy.

The development of the SLCM in the Anti-ship mode has contributed to the commitment to remove tactical nuclear weapons from sea engagements. Admiral Hardesty, Commander in Chief Pacific Command said:

Cruise missiles for our navy represent the most important achievement in modern warfare since the invention of the gun. They give us the combat capability and the combat power we need. We feel we are ahead of the Soviets in cruise missile technology and feel we still have an edge.²⁸

Another indication of the importance of the cruise missile is that it is the only conventional weapon discussed during START. Clearly the Soviets understand the implications of both the nuclear and conventional roles of the SLCM.

The Navy's role in the National Nuclear Strategy has

always been important, stemming from the SLBM's perception as the stabilizing influence of the triad. Even with the large cuts called for by President Bush it is clear that the Navy will be the cornerstone of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy for the immediate future.

In the future the reduction of nuclear SLCMs from the fleet will return an added flexibility to ship assignments in an era of reduced ship numbers. As a ship Naval Scheduler said:

Naval forces, if anything, will have their importance reinforced by this because it increases the credibility of their presence and their ability to respond to crises with a wide range of conventional means. We really become the nation's first line of defense in the third world.²⁹

The need for limited nuclear response will have to be balanced with the need for added flexibility in the face of reduced naval forces. The Maritime Strategy is the ideal vehicle for this discussion.

The failure of an adequate peacetime presence, which includes nation building and nuclear deterrence, will frequently be reflected in the need to implement the next portion of the Maritime Strategy - Crisis Response.

CRISIS RESPONSE

Speaking at the Aspen Institute on 2 August 1990, President Bush said:

In an era when threats may emerge with little or no warning, our ability to defend our interests will depend upon our speed and agility. We will need forces that give us global reach. No amount of political change will alter the geographic fact that we are separated from many of our most important allies and interests by thousands of miles of water.³⁰

Crisis Response may be the true strength of the Maritime Strategy. Because of forward deployments, naval forces maintain a consistently high state of readiness, and can be sustained indefinitely at distant locations, with logistics support relatively independent of foreign basing or overflight rights. Naval forces also bring a wide range of capabilities for any contingency. From collecting intelligence to deep air strikes and the landing of forces ashore, naval forces have a unique flexibility. Perhaps naval force's greatest assets are their relative undetectability and the aggressor's inability to predict what their next action will be. This gives naval forces unique escalation control characteristics. Since naval forces can be intrusive or covert, threatening or non-threatening, easily dispatched or easily withdrawn, the proper force at the proper time can be applied to ensure that a crisis does not escalate too rapidly.

The concept of the "proper force at the proper time" was probably best described by former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, in his description of relevant power. He defined relevant power as that amount of force necessary to be effective in a given situation.³¹

Four factors make up relevant power: appropriateness,

unconstrained mobility, endurance, and availability.³²

In order for a force to be *appropriate* to the situation, it not only has to have the capability to respond to the current situation, it has to be flexible enough to change as the confrontation develops. If a force is to be a valuable tool during response to a crisis, it has to be able to present several options to the National Command Authority.³³

Mobility is necessary if the force is to be able to both respond to the crisis area, and once there bring its force to bear on the areas of interest. The force is useless in responding to an area if it does not have the capability to deploy in the area of unrest, or lacks the mobility to shift itself as the crisis expands or shifts.³⁴

Endurance is vital to the force in the age of protracted revolt and insurgency. In order for crisis response to be effective, forces must be committed early; frequently before the exact nature and length of the crisis can be determined. Clearly, if the antagonist feels that the force lacks endurance it will just extend its plans until the response force is required to withdraw.³⁵

The *availability* of the response forces is a key element in ensuring that options remain available to the National Command Authority. If the force is not on the scene, or does not arrive early and prepared to accomplish the tasks required, it loses its effectiveness. Either the crisis will require the kind of hostilities the force was assembled to

prevent, or the crisis will have been resolved to the nation's disadvantage. Both results have tied the hands of the command authority and thrust the U.S. into a position where it can no longer direct the outcome of the crisis through the implementation of options available.³⁶

When the elements of relevant power are reviewed in concert with the facts presented in Figure 1 it is evident that our naval power-projection capabilities will remain particularly useful in applying U.S. military might at appropriate places and times. However, to meet all the elements of "relevant power" in every contingency, crisis response has to be a joint military endeavor. As the current naval leadership has stated, "Naval crisis response means much more than simply maintaining the capability to keep the sea lines of communication open to our allies and sources of critical material. We must be able to project credible military forces rapidly to meet threats posed to our interests, in places where no friendly forces-in-being exist."³⁷

Figure 2 reflects the current makeup and combat capability available in a carrier battle group. It is easy to see where a smaller battle group of five Aegis vice seven to nine other escorts, or Maritime Action Groups, combining the power of a vertical launch cruiser/destroyer with a Tomahawk equipped submarine, can be a viable tool for forward presence. Additionally, the ability to rendezvous quickly and surge other naval assets to the region creates a strong crisis

Figure 2

CARRIER BATTLE GROUP



- 1- CARRIER
24 F-14 'S / 24 F/A-18 's/ 12 A-6 's/ 5 EA-6/ 5 E-2/ 8 S-3
6 SH-60 'S
2750 TONS AVORD



- 2 CRUISERS
200 SAM 's/ 32 SLCM 's/ 16 HARPOON/ 16 ASROC/ 84 TORPS
4 5" GUNS W/ 2400 RDS / 2 SH-60 HELO 'S



- 2 DESTROYERS
16-90 SLCM 's/ 16 HARPOON/ 40 TORP 's/ 4 5" GUNS W/ 2400 RDS
2 SH-60 HELO 's



- 2 FRIGATES
8 HARPOON/ 72 SAM 'S/ 60 TORP 's/ 2 76MM GUNS W/ 1200RDS
4 SH-60 HELO 's



- 1 SSN
12 SLOW/ 4-8 HARPOON/ 18-22 TORP 's

- 2 FAST SUPPORT SHIPS
AOR/AOE 160,000 BLS FUEL, 600 T AMMO, 200 T STORES
AFS FRUITS/VEGS/FROZEN

response capability. Combined with the capabilities of deployed Marine forces, the Rapid Deployment Force, and indigenous "nation building" forces, the command authority can be presented with all the tools necessary to present "relevant power" to any contingency.

WARFIGHTING

The warfighting element of the Maritime Strategy comprises three phases; The Transition to War, Seizing the

Initiative, and Carrying the Fight to the Enemy.

The Transition to War seeks to win the crisis and control escalation. The original Maritime Strategy, as devised by Admiral Watkins, spoke of deterrence in terms of deterring a global war with the Soviet Union. During this phase the importance of proving U.S. resolve, rapidly implementing sea lift and embarking Marine forces were key elements.³⁸

A quick transition to war status is essential in ensuring that any aggressor understand American determination toward the conflict, and to prevent early, rapid escalation of hostilities. This is why we have maintained three sets of prepositioned equipment and sustainability on 13 naval ships, with each set capable of equipping and sustaining a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This pre-positioning program proved its worth despite the short warning time and long distances of Operation Desert Shield.

An area of major concern in any conflict is the first engagement with the enemy. The first salvo becomes even more important in a world where limited sea powers develop the capability for weapons of mass destruction. A country which realizes that it cannot match the U.S. or allied navies at sea, may be tempted to use a mass destruction weapon against maritime forces. This becomes a tempting option if the country feels that U.S. and/or a coalition will be hesitant to retaliate against land targets where civilian personnel may be killed. The resulting delay while the U.S. tries to rebuild

its force may give the opposing country the time it needs to accomplish limited war aims or even break apart coalitions and forge favorable world opinion. One need only think what might have happened if Iraq had used a limited nuclear weapon on naval forces in the opening of Desert Storm? Would the U.S. have retaliated? Would the coalition have supported retaliation? Would the aims of the conflict have shifted? In the future, with limited assets, will the United States be in a position to mobilize the industrial base and replace lost maritime assets in sufficient quantities to be decisive should the crisis expand to war, even on a limited scale? With limited resources and a smaller force it is essential that the U.S. not be forced to face a conflict in which the first salvo is launched without a decisive national policy being in place.

Perhaps the most important lesson to be retained from this section of the Maritime Strategy is that, " . . . speed and decisiveness in national decision making are crucial to the strategy's over all execution."³⁹ If national consensus is not demonstrated early, then not only will the forces be placed in the position of accepting unnecessary losses, but forces may lose their ability to *seize the initiative* and *take the fight the enemy* - the next two crucial phases of War-fighting.

While the original Maritime Strategy talks almost exclusively about the Soviet threat when discussing *Seizing the Initiative*, the basic premise is still valid. It is

essential to seize the initiative as far forward as possible and apply direct pressure on the enemy to control the type and tempo of the conflict.

While few navies in the future will have the types of forces which can threaten allied supply lines, it is still important to seize the initiative as far forward as possible. This action shows U.S. resolve and helps solidify coalitions. Finally it shortens the time required to bring immediate force against the enemy; shortening the conflict and preventing further escalation.

Submarine warfare is vital to this phase of the engagement. Submarines can enter the area before we have secured air and surface superiority. Here they can pursue the elimination of enemy submarines, and pursue strike, intelligence, and special operations missions that are essential to the transition and seizing the initiative phases of the maritime strategy. Currently, some 41 nations besides that United States and the Soviet Union own more than 400 submarines. With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the anticipated division of the fleet this number of independent countries will increase. ⁴⁰

All three phases of warfighting are equally important and, while discussed separately, should be prosecuted as soon as possible. The emphasis of Phase III; *Carrying the Fight to the Enemy* is the complete destruction of the enemy fleet. This destruction allows the U.S. fleet to gain control of the

battle space, which includes the surface, subsurface, and air in the area of the engagement. This control is essential if coalition forces are to project forces ashore, use maritime forces to threaten flanks or open another front with amphibious forces. The actions support the ground forces by limiting redeployment of enemy forces while ensuring reinforcement and resupply of friendly forces.

WAR TERMINATION

Once the maritime strategy moves from Crisis Response to Warfighting the ultimate goal must be kept in mind. That goal is War Termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies. The entire focus of warfighting is to bring the conflict to a rapid close with as little escalation as possible.

It becomes even more essential that a conflict is brought to rapid close in the era of nuclear proliferation. The enemy must never be allowed to perceive that a balance of aggression can be attained through the escalation to nuclear confrontation.

War Termination may be the most difficult portion of the entire Maritime strategy. The military must be prepared to carry out tasks based on the terms dictated by national policy. These policies may not be clear cut and/or easily defined. Even after the cessation of hostilities the military will be deeply involved in stabilizing the area. Currently,

one year after Desert Storm, the Navy is still enforcing UN sanctions. Eight ships of a CVBG and three ships of a marine Corps Expeditionary unit are still there.⁴¹ Military commanders must keep in constant communication with command authorities, and be prepared to moderate the level of hostilities at any moment; shifting at any time from hostilities to peacekeeping and possibly back again.

CHAPTER 4

THE ALLIANCE FACTOR

The original Maritime strategy did not mention the role of the alliance. In the emerging world order and with the limited budgets that the U.S. military is going to face in the future it is imperative that the new strategy address the importance of alliances to the Maritime strategy.

In peace and war, allies function both as problems and as solutions in statecraft and strategy. Besides NATO, the U.S. has defense treaties with forty-three separate nations, and common military interests with many more. By definition, the United States as a superpower has interests of differing intensities in many regions. Similarly, the United States is an ocean away from its "barrier allies" and can, indeed is obliged to, consider properly the security concerns of a particular ally only with reference to global considerations.⁴²

Admiral Watkins wrote in the original Maritime strategy that, "Strategy is a design for relating means to ends." The follow on justification being that the means to accomplish the ends was the 600 ship Navy. This is no longer an alternative, nor need it be. Allies need to be familiar with the Maritime Strategy and realize what they need to bring to effect the

implementation of that strategy.

Allies need to be prepared to assume, or resume, control over their own security futures. The United States is no longer in the position of being able to place upon its armed forces the heroic scale of burdens for global security guardianship which the early 1990s have inherited from the radically different conditions of the early 1950s.

Alliances need to be reviewed with an eye toward what kinds of support both sides can bring to the maritime strategy. It is doubtful that any nation will be able to support or build the type of power projection capability that the U.S. enjoys. However, local governments should be responsible for mine warfare and coastal maritime forces. These are essential for homeland defense and security of their own maritime concerns. Also, alliance countries should look to their militaries to insure that they can be viable in the international setting. This involves the problems of interoperability and the ability to maintain an effective defense until coalition forces arrive, in the case of external aggression.

The problem of burden-sharing, the never ending debate on whom should provide what to the common effort has the potential to break the alliance. A clear understanding of the roles of members of the alliance will help direct all members of the alliance in their budgeting and sense of common defense.

CHAPTER 5
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A NEW MARITIME STRATEGY

In a recent interview Admiral Jeremiah, the Vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said:

The population will double by 2025. About 90 percent of the world's population will live in underdeveloped nations and about 25 percent will be hungry most of the time. You'll see competition for resources, not just oil, but increasingly, with that kind of population, you're going to see competition for things as simple as fresh water.⁴³

If the United States, as the sole remaining Superpower, is to assume the role of honest broker and stabilizing influence in the world the military will need to emphasize an even wider variety of missions than it currently performs. Beyond the traditional missions, such as strategic deterrence and protection of American lives and property, which have been with us for years, others-such as, humanitarian assistance, nation-building, security assistance, peacekeeping, counter narcotic, counter-terrorist, and counter-insurgency, will become areas of concern for the military. If strategy truly is the link between "means" and "ends", then these missions need to be addressed, and the perfect tool is the Maritime Strategy.

Admiral Metcalf, in discussing the transitional maritime

strategy, wrote, "A strategic planning process is a dynamic one, fundamental theories of a strategy may not change, but plans for implementation are continually altered and updated as circumstances dictate."⁴⁴ The basic theories of the Maritime strategy are sound, but the planning needs to be updated.

Figure 3

Key Elements of Maritime Power:

- Organization and partial subsidization of continental allies in a maritime-continental coalition.
 - A modest but noticeable continental commitment of soldiers on the ground, intended to fight alongside continental allies in the main theater of operations.
 - Maritime blockade/economic warfare to isolate continental enemies from overseas supply (an activity much enhanced in effectiveness when continental allies close landward frontiers to the enemy).
 - A peripheral raiding strategy on the continental flanks of the enemy (Reflecting the limited merit in B. H. Liddell Hart's advice, ("Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea based power possesses").
-

One barrier to the successful implementation of the Maritime Strategy, is the misconception that the Maritime strategy is the sole purview of the Navy. Maritime strategy is the process of implementing maritime power. Figure 3⁴⁵ concisely describes the key elements of maritime power. A cursory review will indicate the importance of not only the other services, but allies and alliances.

Advances in technology have already changed the way the Navy is viewing maritime forces. The cruise missile has given the submarine and the destroyer the ability to become strike platforms. This alone means that smaller groups of ships can carry out the functions required of larger forces in the past.

While the military is adapting to a different warfighting environment, the nations and alliances which it supports are changing. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the realities of the Third World, and fiscal priorities are forcing changes in political and military thinking, both in the United States, and around the world. Within the United States, political and military leadership will be responding to political and budgetary challenges and, most significantly for the maritime leg of the National Strategy, technology.

A well defined Maritime Strategy is essential if the United States is to make use of the rapid advancements in technology. Information technology alone will transform the way that the military operates, and present a multitude of options for pursuing aspects of the Maritime Strategy. Instantaneous communications and data distribution will allow rapid decision making and quicker crisis response. Interconnectedness and compatibility is the major problem facing the military today. During Desert Storm the *Seizing the Initiative* phase was complicated by the Navy and the Air Force's inability to communicate the Air Tasking Order through compatible computer and communication systems.

Space technology is almost begging us to use it. Instead of thinking in terms of the millions of square miles of opaque ocean, we should be thinking in terms of a planet seen as the size of a basketball. Future advances in satellite technology will allow enhanced intelligence collection, allowing fewer assets to be dedicated to intelligence missions, while allowing early notification for rapid crisis response. Viewed in the realm of warfighting, space will be the new high ground; command, or control, of space will be every bit as important as controlling elevated terrain on earth. Developments in space based weaponry and targeting, could transform the role of peacetime presence and make *Taking the Fight to the Enemy* an almost instantaneous event.

The Maritime strategy provides a theme for tactical and technical development. The strategy is a statement of problems to be challenged, and provides a framework for establishing priorities in technological thought and procurement which would otherwise soak up scarce talent and funds.

Journals of the military and political profession are full of articles addressing where military emphasis should be placed in the coming years. What is lacking, is a framework from which to evaluate these ideas. The Maritime Strategy is the ideal guide to both tactical and technological development in the marine environment. It should serve as a measure of the value of proposed tactics and weapons, and thus achieve maximum effectiveness from a necessarily limited total defense

budget.

Viewed in concert with the Maritime Strategy, arguments about reducing deployments as an answer to reduced budgets are not credible. This course of action requires giving up the first element of the Maritime Strategy - Peacetime Presence. Senator Nunn's proposal that CVBGs compete with long range Air Force bombers with tanker support for the mission of sea control⁴⁶ shows the hazard of not being familiar with the Maritime Strategy or the ideas of Sea Control and relevant power. If the United States had a clear maritime strategy, with a discussion of alliance responsibilities, would Congress have passed a 1992 defense authorization bill ordering the Navy to buy three mine countermeasure ships instead of the two it wanted?⁴⁷

As the military approaches the concept of Total Quality Management, and the inherent requirement for the evaluation of ideas from throughout the chain of command, it will become even more important to have a valid structure for evaluating these ideas. Currently there are calls for evaluation of a broad variety of ideas including:

- A modified aircraft carrier to deliver large numbers of troops and heavy equipment a long distance in a short time.⁴⁸
- Polaris boats fitted with Fuel-air mixture missiles to give a conventional punch to third world threats.⁴⁹
- Using the Wasp and Tarawa class amphibious assault ships (carrying 8-10, AV-8B Harriers) to plus up maritime forces if the carrier is not available. This was proven during Desert Storm when the Nassau's Harriers dropped more than one million pounds of bombs on Iraqi positions.⁵⁰

While providing the framework for evaluating our need to exploit the tactical advantages and flexibility of distributed firepower with sophisticated, state-of-the-art weapons, the Maritime Strategy acts as a reminder of our need for guns and other less-complex weapons that meet the needs of the strategy.

As Norman Friedman wrote in his book The US Maritime Strategy, "Perhaps most important of all, the strategy, or at least most of it, is public." It should be published and well read throughout the military as a genesis and focus for ideas. The strategy becomes a weapon of deterrence itself when read by third world and emerging nations that may not understand U.S. global commitment.

In the hands of allies the strategy helps focus their efforts to build a stronger alliance and anticipate U.S. response to crises in their regions.

With the strategy available to Congress, legislators begin to realize the importance of strategic thought in concert with "ends" and "means". As Colin Gray wrote in War, Peace, and Victory, "an appreciation by officials that some important legislators were becoming adept at strategic argument could not fail to raise the quality of official strategic thinking."

Finally, as Admiral Watkins stated, "Our strategy is not without risk. The strategy depends on early reaction to crises and the political will to make difficult decisions

early." If the executive is forced to understand the concepts of the strategy, so as to respond to Congress, it can only help when there arises a need to implement the aggressive portions of the strategy. With fewer ships deployed around the globe, it will be even more essential that the executive recognize developing crises early, and understand their role and options as soon as possible.

The acceptance of an explicit strategy does have its drawbacks. The Maritime Strategy implies a process of choice, producing winners - and losers - within the bureaucracy, both in kinds of forces supported and in kinds of technology purchased. Since the Maritime Strategy stretches across all military forces it is bound to be the source of controversy at all levels from planners to programmers to Congress. Second, the strategy runs the danger of becoming too explicit. It is important to emphasize that the strategy is a guide to implementing forces and not a specific campaign plan. If the strategy is developed with specific scenarios and contingencies in mind, and those scenarios do not arise the entire strategy runs the danger of being dismissed as something it was never intended to be. Also, the more explicit the strategy, the more black and white the underlying assumptions; which may become sources of controversy themselves, either at home or in allied governments, thereby drawing attention away from the basic themes of the strategy.⁵¹

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

The Maritime Strategy retains the basic elements that have made it a viable tool to CINCs and planners since its conception in the 1980s. However, the changing world situation is in danger of negating the entire strategy. One has only to glance at the initial paragraphs of the strategy, entitled: *The Era of Violent Peace*, and *Soviet Military Strategy* to notice that its basic premise is out of date. At this point the uninitiated will set the document aside without considering the basic tenets that underlie the complete strategy.

If the Maritime Strategy is to remain a viable tool for planners and CINCs it will need to be updated to reflect the changing environment and concerns of the last major maritime power. The Maritime Strategy needs to address the part all the branches of the military will play in the maritime role of our National Military Strategy. The new Maritime Strategy needs to emphasize the entire military, and not just the Navy, because in the future joint operations will be required to complete the Strategy. If the strategy is to be tool for the CINCs, then by necessity it must reflect all branches of the military, for those are the forces the CINC uses to accomplish

his plans.

It is necessary that, as the National Military Strategy changes, that portion which is the Maritime Strategy, change also. As the National Military Strategy is generated to help define U.S. objectives and forces, so too must the Maritime Strategy be reevaluated to insure that maritime forces are properly generated. Maritime forces are not only naval and marine forces, but sealift and rapid deployment forces, which also contribute to the overall strategy.

Today, more than ever, the nation needs the Maritime Strategy. Perhaps, as important as a new strategy is, is the need for all branches of the government to understand that the Maritime Strategy is a 'Joint' document reflecting the fact that the nation is a maritime power. The document needs to address all the aspects of maritime power as delineated in Figure 3. The early Maritime Strategy was an important document which was all but dismissed outside naval circles as merely the justification for the 600 ship Navy. In its full context the Maritime Strategy is a document for all CINCs, not just the Atlantic and Pacific Command. Perhaps Julian Corbett said it best when he wrote:

. . . Naval strategy is not a thing by itself, that its problems can seldom or never be solved on naval considerations alone, but that it is only a part of maritime strategy - the higher learning which teaches us that for a maritime State to make successful war and to realize her special strength, army [air force] and navy must be used and thought of as instruments no less intimately connected than are the three arms ashore.⁵²

How then should the new Maritime Strategy be developed? Clearly, the Navy and Marine Corps need to be the lead developers of the strategy. After the National Military Strategy has been developed, the Chief of Naval Operations, through the Plans and Policy division (OP-06) needs to establish the role of the Navy in accomplishing that strategy. The basic elements of the strategy have not changed, but they need to be reapplied to the changing national strategy and then fleshed out to encompass the new roles for the military, such as Nation Building and Nuclear deterrence in the third world. Lastly this Maritime Strategy needs to be approved not only in naval channels, but joint arenas. The other branches of the military need to understand what the Navy is prepared to do and not do. Likewise they need to understand what the Navy views their role to be in the strategy and the Navy needs to feel assured that they have portrayed that role accurately.

If the Maritime Strategy is to link the "ends" of the National Military Strategy with the "means" of congressionally mandated budgets, then the Navy needs to ensure that it has a thorough and well developed document with which to discuss force planning on capital hill while simultaneously training and developing those forces for maritime deployment.

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