


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OVERCOMING THE CULTURAL BARRIERS TO TQM IN THE ARMY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Ryan M. Zimmerman
United States Army

Colonel Robert A. Brace
Project Advisor



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The Army is in the process of considering a change to its leadership and management philosophy to the concepts of Total Quality Management (TQM). TQM is an organizational philosophy which focuses on customer orientation, statistical thinking, and continuous improvement of process. It is a leadership and management philosophy that demands decentralization, experimentation, risk taking, and empowerment of people. To inculcate the TQM philosophy into the Army will require a significant change in the Army's current culture. The senior leadership of the Army must change the old culture and embed the new TQM culture into the Army. There are many cultural barriers to TQM that exist in the Army, such as the leadership itself, an overabundance of regulations, and the focus on action oriented, short term results. The senior Army leadership can overcome these cultural barriers by changing their own behavior, changing evaluation, recognition and assignment systems, modifying procedural mechanisms such as Army regulations, and by changing the attitudes and behaviors of the people in the Army.

Introduction

The Army is embarking on a mission to change its leadership and management philosophy to embrace the concepts of Total Quality Management (TQM). The impetus to adopt the TQM philosophy in the Army started in 1988 when the Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci, issued a memorandum which mandated that the entire Defense establishment embrace the TQM philosophy.¹ His decision to adopt TQM was driven by two major factors. First and foremost, was the shrinking Defense budget and the need to maximize scarce resources. Secondly, he envisioned a much more competitive environment within the Department of Defense, which would require all agencies to practice common business techniques such as lowest cost per unit. The other uniformed services have launched TQM and are in various states of implementation. The Army has been a little slower out of the chute, but is now in the process of formulating policy and strategy to make TQM happen Army-wide.

If the Army is to be successful in its drive to inculcate the TQM leadership and management philosophy into its everyday business, some paradigm shifting will be required. Paradigm shifting is the establishment of "a new set of rules" or ways of doing things that defines the way reality is perceived.² The culture of the Army which is its shared values and beliefs, serves as the carrier of its basic leadership and management philosophy. It is the culture and philosophy of the Army that must be changed to accommodate the "leap of faith" required for TQM to become a reality. TQM cannot just be implemented, it must be inculcated. It is a philosophy of leadership and management that requires "true believers" to break old paradigms and to view workers, leadership, management, systems, and processes in an entirely different light than normally perceived.

Three major victories in Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm, and the Cold War have the Army on an emotional and professional high. Because the Army has been so successful, it will be difficult to convince ourselves that a change in our basic leadership and management philosophy will be worthwhile and constitute an improvement.

The purpose of this paper is to identify those aspects of Army culture which will act as barriers to TQM and to provide recommendations to the senior Army leadership on how to remove the barriers. To that end, this paper will discuss the importance and role of culture in organizations and draw a clear linkage between culture and the TQM philosophy.

This paper does not attempt to capture and present a detailed study and analysis of culture as it exists in the Army today. That assessment is beyond the scope of this paper and requires a multitude of sophisticated techniques and complex analyses.³ However, pertinent aspects of Army culture that are barriers to the TQM leadership philosophy will be presented. The pertinent aspects of Army culture presented, are a composite of research and my own personal perceptions.

The Importance of Culture in Organizations

Virtually all of the well known quality experts, such as Deming and Juran, who will be discussed later, talk about a quality culture. Almost any book or periodical on the subject of TQM talks about the cultural changes required for TQM to become successfully inculcated into an organization. To understand these cultural changes and to be able to identify the cultural barriers to TQM, it is first necessary to define culture and to understand its influence in organizations.

"Organizational culture may be defined as a pattern of beliefs and expectations shared by organizational members. These shared beliefs and expectations generate products and services, conversation, and other verbal expressions, behaviors, and emotions."⁴ Culture manifests itself in virtually every aspect of organizational life and pervades everything.⁵ Culture encompasses the dominant values of the organization, to include, all "observed behavioral regularities", working group norms, rules of the game, organizational climate, stories, myths, rituals, and work and recognition ceremonies.⁶

Within organizations, culture acts as an anxiety reducing safety net for employees, guiding their behavior and their interpretation of organizational events.⁷ Culture also gives employees and the organization as a whole, the capacity to develop internal processes to "survive and adapt" to the changes and stresses of the external environment.⁸ Put another way, culture serves as a mechanism, a "rulebook", for employees to cope with the everyday stress and strain of organizational life.

The knowledge of how culture is formed and embedded, is probably the most important aspect of culture that the senior Army leadership should understand. Culture formation results from a complex outcome of external environmental pressures, internal potentials, and "responses to critical events", or crises.⁹ Leaders play the dominant role in culture imbedding and reinforcement. According to Edgar H. Schein:

The most powerful primary mechanisms for culture embedding and reinforcement are (1) what leaders pay attention to, measure, and control; (2) leader reactions to critical incidents and organizational crisis; (3) deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching by leaders; (4) criteria for allocation of rewards and status; (5) criteria for recruitment, selection, promotion, retirement, and excommunication.¹⁰

The most important nugget to extract from Schein is that leaders embed and reinforce culture more by what they actually do in action, than what they say or write in formal speeches, organizational policy statements, doctrine, or memos.¹¹

Leaders of older, mature organizations, such as the Army, must understand the role culture plays in their organizations if they expect to adapt to external and internal pressures of the environment. Leaders must be aware that the current culture shapes each new generation of the organization, and creates the next "generation of leaders".¹² Effective leaders then, must manipulate or change the culture to ensure that the future organization can "adapt to changing environmental conditions."¹³ Leaders must be able to break cultural paradigms in adapting to a changed environment and must have insight "into the culture and its dysfunctional elements."¹⁴

Leaders must be able to see their own personal and organizational weaknesses, and understand and step out of their own cultural paradigms before they can change the culture of their organizations.¹⁵ To accomplish this, Schein makes it clear that leaders must listen, must "involve the group in achieving its own insights into its cultural dilemmas, and be participative in their approach to change."¹⁶

Having defined what culture is, the role it plays in an organization, and the role leaders play in embedding and changing culture, it is necessary to identify the values and beliefs that are inherent in a TQM philosophy. A discussion of the TQM philosophy is provided in the following section.

What is TQM?

A clear understanding of what a Total Quality Management (TQM) philosophy actually encompasses is necessary in order to understand the cultural changes the Army must make to inculcate it as a way of doing routine business. Perhaps the best way to define TQM is to describe what it is not. It is not another "program"; not just a passing management fad; not an organizational effectiveness, feel good program; not an abdication of leadership or management responsibility to the rank and file workers; and not a new way of doing the same old thing.

TQM has its roots in the reconstruction of Japan after World War II. Two of the most well known quality "gurus", W. Edwards Deming and J.M. Juran, have been given considerable credit for raising the Japanese economy from the ashes of World War II. There are many other published quality experts, such as Crosby, Feigenbaum, and Isikawa, to name a few, who each espouse a somewhat different slant on quality.

So what is TQM? Many long definitions of TQM exist but this short definition is the most descriptive: TQM is an organizational philosophy which focuses on customer orientation, statistical thinking, and continuous improvement of process.¹⁷ The TQM definition presented is in a large part built on the Deming philosophy. The TQM definition breaks into three major elements. "Customer orientation" is a focus on internal and external customers. Internal customers include everyone in the organization, and in the Army that includes families as well.¹⁸ External customers include those who provide or receive goods, services, or support to or from the Army. "Focus on customers" means meeting the needs and expectations of those upon whom the organization depends most, and it is the driving force of TQM philosophy. To be able to achieve a customer orientation in an organization, a quality culture must be created that defines and supports the TQM philosophy.¹⁹

"Statistical thinking" refers to the measurement of all aspects of work process to determine how these processes can be improved or what elements of a process might need improvement. "Continuous improvement of process" is a never ending journey to understand "what we do, why we do it, and how we do it."²⁰ Continuous improvement of process demands a long-term focus and perspective. As Oliver Wendell Homes put it, "The great thing in this world is not so much where we stand, as in what direction we are moving."²¹

Continuous improvement of process must be a never ending journey upon which a quality culture thrives, and it is the leadership in a TQM organization that is forever obligated to "seek out ways to improve quality."²² TQM is the vehicle through which an organization can create a culture dedicated to continuous improvement.²³ As discussed in the previous section on culture, it is the actions of senior leadership which determine the culture within an organization. It is the leadership that defines values and ensures they are cascaded throughout the organization.

The two main cultural elements of the TQM definition that I will discuss in this paper are customer orientation and continuous improvement of process. Because customer orientation and continuous improvement of process represent an operating organizational philosophy, they are part of and represent the shared values and beliefs of the culture of the organization. For these cultural elements to be realized, employees must be empowered to take risks, be innovative, and be held individually accountable for their role in achieving quality. What does "empowered" mean? Employees have to know they have the management's backing to take risks to satisfy their customer.²⁴ In an empowered organization, employees who are closest to the product and the customer are the most

knowledgeable, and take the initiative without having to check with anyone.²⁵ For the Army, empowerment is, in essence, the daily practice of trusting subordinates.

Put another way, TQM is getting things done through people by decentralizing, tolerating experimentation, risk taking, empowering at lower echelons, and both giving and hence getting the support and trust of people. TQM is in fact a leadership and a management philosophy that effectively links people within process. The TQM philosophy recognizes that employees closest to the line are the first to know when something is broken, not efficient, or just plain dumb. It also recognizes that TQM is a way of doing business everyday; that a participative environment values risk taking and trust; and probably most importantly that Deming is right when he says that 94% of all defects and waste are caused by system failures, not people failures, and that only management can improve the system.²⁶ The TQM philosophy requires that leadership and management, act "more like coaches than like bosses" and that they foster an environment and attitude of teamwork.²⁷

The TQM philosophy has application even in the warfighter arena. Faris Kirkland has documented research both in Israel and the United States that suggests that "trust, respect, and empowerment of subordinates can assist an Army to fight outnumbered and win."²⁸

To move the Army in the direction of a more open and supportive style of leadership with a focus on continuous improvement of process, the cultural barriers to a TQM philosophy must be overcome. The next section of the paper will discuss these cultural barriers.

Cultural Barriers to TQM in the Army

This section of the paper will move from the previous theoretical definitions and discussions of culture and TQM, to the practical side of identifying in the Army the major cultural barriers to a TQM philosophy. The cultural barriers must be manipulated and changed by the senior Army leadership if TQM is to become part of the way the Army does its daily business. Because culture is primarily changed by senior leadership, the barriers presented will focus at that level of leadership.

The cultural barriers to inculcating the TQM philosophy into the Army that are described in this section should not necessarily be viewed as "bad" in and of themselves. Instead, they should be viewed as roadblocks or dysfunctional elements that pose as impediments to an even better, higher quality Army, that is continuously striving for improvement.

Any discussion of Army culture should include some brief background into how the culture was formed. Culture in the Army has been forming and maturing for over 216 years. The overarching determinant of culture in the Army is its basic mission to "protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."²⁹ Throughout the history of the Army, its basic purpose has never changed. The bedrock of the Army culture is the Army ethic which is founded upon the four professional values of duty, integrity, loyalty, and selfless service.³⁰ These values serve as a common language and bond for all members of the Army. The values of the Army ethic are further strengthened by the soldier values of commitment, competence, candor, and courage.³¹ Together, all of these basic values set the rules and standards, and are the bedrock of the culture which guides members of the Army in both their "professional and private lives."³²

The Army ethic as it has evolved over time has served as the constant, as the ideal or glue that has held the organization together through all major conflicts and world wars. The culture that has emerged reflects the shared perceptions and values that are inherent in the Army ethic. Over the last 216 years plus, the Army ethic, traditions, ceremonies, daily work rituals, leadership styles, crises, and many external and internal pressures have shaped the culture that exists in the Army today.

The Army culture can best be described as deeply rooted and embedded. The culture is a strong one due to the unchanging purpose of the Army, the relatively long life of the organization, and the strong embedding that has occurred during many conflicts, campaigns, and major world wars. In order to make the cultural changes required to incorporate the TQM leadership philosophy into everyday Army life, several cultural barriers must be overcome, so that senior leadership can make the changes required.

Leaders play the most important role in changing culture, and at the same time can be the biggest cultural barriers to a TQM leadership philosophy. Perhaps this quote from Charles B. Handy says it best, "For those in charge, continuity is comfort, and predictability ensures that they can continue in control."³³ The obsession for control may be the biggest single problem in the Army and in American organizations. As was mentioned in the culture section of this paper, leaders must be able to break their own cultural paradigms to overcome the fear of losing control in order to meet the demands of the external environment. The "Catch-22" of TQM is that the senior leaders who successfully implement TQM have the most to lose, because they have been successful leaders and role models in the old culture.³⁴ How can a senior leader step out of

his own cultural paradigm, to seek "out new ways of doing things", when it is he who may be the most dysfunctional to the TQM philosophy?³⁵

What is meant by dysfunctional behavior? It is behavior that runs counter to the TQM demands of employee empowerment, risk taking, innovation and continuous process improvement. Several dysfunctional senior leadership behaviors act as barriers. Probably the most important is an authoritarian leadership style. The predominant leadership style of command and control in the Army today is authoritarian. Senior leaders predominantly cling to this style of leadership because they feel that "obedience to command is essential for coherency."³⁶ There are still many vestiges of a "don't ask questions, just do it" style in the Army. The TQM philosophy creates the dilemma between the need or perceived need to establish strict discipline and order, and the requirement to empower people. A predominant authoritarian style flies in the face of logic because "one size won't fit all". It does not accommodate optimizing the full potential within the organization's people

To trust and empower subordinates and encourage innovators requires a great tolerance for risk taking, which is probably the second biggest barrier to TQM at the senior leadership level. As stated by Kenneth Rose, "In a system characterized by brief assignments and unforgiving retribution for even the perception of a misstep, there is great temptation to avoid improvement actions that may be time consuming or risky."³⁷ Risk taking and innovation are both encouraged in the Army leadership doctrine, but there is a large gap between the doctrine and the execution. The basic systems within the Army such as evaluation, promotion, and recognition do not reinforce and mutually support this doctrine. We don't practice what we preach.

There is also a gap between what leaders say and what they do. This gap is also a barrier to the TQM philosophy. Mike McGee, in a recent *Army* magazine article, articulates this very well. He discusses making cosmetic name changes, to training doctrine for example, but not really changing the program or the way we do business, and refers to this syndrome as "do as I say, not as I do."³⁸ Some examples of "do as I say, not as I do" messages, include; the leader who orders everyone to leave work on time or take half days off during the holiday period, but continues to work late hours or full days; the leader who demands punctuality, but who is never on time for a meeting himself; and the leader who wants your candor, but cannot accept it when he gets it, or to quote Mike McGee again, "total candor is not a virtue."³⁹ All of these subtle and not so subtle messages are very powerful and embed themselves in a culture which is at odds with the espoused culture, far more effectively than all the memos, policies, and hollow words designed to support the ideal.

Another cultural barrier to TQM is senior leadership's response to crises. A "can do", fast action orientation in the Army traditionally occupies a large amount of daily time and often results in the unholy search for the quick-fix. The priority of the quick-fix over the long-term solution or improvement of process is one of TQM's biggest enemies. Will leaders have the courage in a TQM Army to consistently seek the improvement of the process over the quick-fix? The success of TQM will in a large part, be based on reinforcement of the TQM philosophy every day, even in time of crisis.⁴⁰ Even in crises we must never forget that "this too shall pass", and we must be prepared to continue to live with what in large measure we create on the other side of the crisis.

Long term commitment to TQM is probably one of the best known "rules" or requirements for it to work successfully.⁴¹ Like any belief system or philosophy, it

should be forever until shown to be incorrect or dysfunctional. Given the volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous environment in which the Army's senior leaders must work, can they overcome their own cultural barriers and commit to TQM in the long term? Are they willing to accept the risk for the long haul in a very rapidly shrinking Army, and uncertain domestic, political, and world situation? Can they emphasize TQM with the same missionary zeal that they do for the new Airland Operations doctrine? Can the leadership shift its cultural paradigm, and place the same importance on its TQM leadership and management doctrine as it does for more concrete warfighter concerns of doctrine and training?

The overabundance of regulatory guidance, policies, and procedures in the Army is driven by the bureaucracy and is another major cultural barrier to TQM. The plethora of regulations within the Army stifles the risk taking, paradigm shifting, and innovation that are necessary for TQM to work on a long term basis. The current systems in place to recommend regulatory changes are cumbersome, slow, and very frequently unresponsive.⁴² Another side of the regulatory issue is the influence of other governmental agencies that set the "rules" for the Army. The Office of Personnel Management, for example, exerts a great deal of influence on the way the Army manages its civilian workforce. Whether regulatory requirements are set internally or externally, the senior leadership of the Army must plan for loosening their grip, to give maximum flexibility to implement a TQM philosophy.

The hierarchical nature of the Army can also be a cultural barrier to TQM. Each layer of command or management filters out ideas and communication which could be useful to senior leadership. Each layer of management, especially middle management, wants to put its "mark" on the organization, but may not add value. The mark often results in additional, unnecessary workload, or an emphasis

on solving the wrong problems and making quick-fixes. LTG (Ret.) Walter F. Ulmer, President of the Center for Creative Leadership, points out that in highly hierarchical organizations "organizational values, policies, and directives are routinely distorted or otherwise modified as they get communicated down through the successive rungs."⁴³

The action oriented, numerical goals culture of the Army is a significant barrier to the TQM philosophy. The entire nature of the way the Army does business is action oriented. The phrase "just do something, but don't make a mistake" is learned early in the Army. Within reasonable legal, regulatory, and common sense parameters, no one cares how you accomplish your goals or what the long-term ramifications are for the organization. For example, improving turn-around-time for payment of travel vouchers could be achieved by working costly overtime, or by becoming delinquent in payment of bills to commercial vendors. There is very little concern for the continuous improvement of processes for the long term. The Army's evaluation, promotion, recognition, and assignment systems all reflect the action oriented culture.

The evaluation systems for officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians all concentrate on actions completed within the rating period. The emphasis is on "actions" and numbers of things achieved. The emphasis is on what was accomplished within the rating period that can be documented with hard figures and end dates. Some examples are improved unit readiness rates, budget obligation rates achieved, projects completed, and reduced travel voucher payment turn-around-time. The philosophy is that actions completed and numbers of goals achieved, defines success. The focus is on the "short-term fixes" and accomplishments. The focus on completion of short term "actions" manifests itself in many other ways.

Cleaning up findings on inspections are a good example. Maximum short term effort normally is directed toward the "clean up" of deficiencies. A year or six months later, the same deficiencies will probably reoccur. Why, because no attempt was made to analyze and fix the process which caused the deficiencies in the first place. For example, failure to process travel vouchers within three days could be solved with a quick fix by beefing up the travel section, when the real reasons for late travel vouchers could be due to a myriad of process related problems such as incomplete preparation instructions, poor work distribution, and failure to process on a first-in, first-out basis.

The awards and recognition programs of the Army also tend to reward action oriented accomplishments and are a barrier to TQM. The example in the above paragraph concerning "cleaning up the deficiencies" could easily have resulted in the award of an impact Army Achievement Medal or Commendation Medal for superior effort. Such a reward focuses on the action oriented and short-term results. Most awards, to include those presented at the end of a tour, also focus on a compilation of action oriented, quick-fix accomplishments.

The Army assignment policy is also action oriented. Two-year command tours, assignment musical chairs for general officers, and Army assignment policies in general, all contribute to a short term, action oriented focus and are also barriers to a continuous improvement of process philosophy. Given the Army evaluation and recognition systems, discussed previously, the measure of one's worth on any assignment is how many actions and successes he can chalk up. Each new commander, staff office chief, or division chief all determine what actions they need to accomplish on their "own watch". The system creates the need to make your own mark during the current tour, "a new broom sweeps clean" cycle that is repeated over and over. The "fundamental changes in

leadership concepts and methods" that occur over time when senior leadership is constantly changed, leaves a lasting imprint on Army culture according to LTG (Ret.) Walter F. Ulmer.⁴⁴ Without a long term focus on improving the processes already in place, and a plan for continued process improvement by a successor, the TQM philosophy will not become a reality in the Army. The "constancy of purpose for improvement of product and service" that Deming suggests is so essential is impossible to achieve, given the short term focus of the evaluation, recognition, and assignment systems.⁴⁵

The focus on short-term results and fixes also creates other cultural barriers to risk taking and innovation. As previously discussed, the evaluation systems, awards and recognition systems and assignment policies of the Army are all action oriented and are based on fixing things. They all foster or create an environment for familiar sayings, such as "if it ain't broke, don't fix it," "conform to the norm", and "row harder". The extremely competitive nature of the Army, which will become even more so in the builddown, does not reward risk takers or innovative thinkers because risk taking and innovation could squander precious few resources. The competitiveness of the selection systems, coupled with the short-term focus, all but stifle a true paradigm shifter. The Army systems are not structured nor do they encourage risk takers. The true innovative personnel are normally weeded out of the Army at an early age as misfits for failing to "conform to the norm". Risk taking and innovation must be developed, encouraged, and rewarded for the TQM philosophy to be effective. An interesting note is that Army leadership doctrine does encourage risk taking and innovation, the real problem is that the Army does not "walk its talk".

The emphasis on results and quick fixes in the Army's evaluation, reward, and assignment policies are in large part due to the fixation on achieving

standards against fixed performance goals and numbers. The statistics driven Army is another major cultural barrier to TQM. Virtually every facet and function of the Army has a specified performance factor and goal. The measurement, record keeping, and fixation on the "numbers" drives a majority of everyday activities in the Army. Unfortunately, meeting the "numbers" can be confused with achieving quality.⁴⁶ The focus must be moved from measuring achievement of "numbers" and the "bottom line", to achieving measurement which enhances real process improvement each and every day in the Army.⁴⁷

Blind obedience could serve as another cultural barrier to TQM. Military personnel become part of a culture that demands and holds dear the basic Army ethic of loyalty and duty, often at the expense of such soldier values as candor and commitment. Can the leadership of the Army foster an environment where disagreement is not disrespect?⁴⁸ Or is the real culture one where "total candor is not a virtue"?⁴⁹ The open discussions that a TQM leadership philosophy hopes to encourage will initially give rise to more disagreement and will surely require a culture change. This point is further supported by a recent *Parameters* article by George B. Forsythe, in which he states, "few officers like to have their opinions challenged and their logic criticized."⁵⁰

The last cultural barrier to be discussed deals with Army programs. As long as there has been an Army, there have been programs. The fact that there are always going to be Army programs is as reliable as death and taxes. Programs cover virtually every facet of Army life and almost always result in unresourced new requirements. Some of these programs are or were called "Zero Defects", Army Internal Control Program, Army Communities of Excellence, Army Suggestion Program, Organizational Effectiveness, and the Management Improvement Program. Programs that have been unsuccessful did not receive

the support of the senior leadership and were not properly resourced. Employees who are exposed to many ill-conceived programs over time will probably resist new programs.⁵¹ To overcome this cultural barrier, the Army leadership must be sensitive to this fact and ensure TQM is not marketed or perceived as "just another" program which requires another increase in workload with no resources.⁵²

In summary then, there are many cultural barriers to the implementation of TQM in the Army. First and foremost, is the senior leadership of the Army who may have to change themselves the most, if they are to become the culture change agents required to make TQM a reality. The other barriers discussed were an overabundance of regulatory guidance, the hierarchical nature of the Army, focus on action oriented, short term results, the Army evaluation, recognition, and assignment systems, blind obedience to authority, and Army programs. The senior leadership must identify and recognize the cultural barriers in themselves, in those they lead, and those that are inherent in the Army system, and they must anticipate the resistance to change.⁵³ With that knowledge, the senior leadership can develop a strategy that will remove the cultural barriers to inculcating a TQM philosophy in the Army. The next section of this paper presents a culture change methodology and fourteen recommendations to achieve that end.

Recommendations

The Army over time has developed a very strong culture due to its unchanging mission of defending the constitution and providing for the common defense. The strong mission focus and a bedrock of basic values have contributed to embedding

traditions and a way of doing business shaped over many campaigns and conflicts. To change that culture and remove barriers to change will require more than just directives, good intentions, and a lot of energy. It will require a great deal of commitment and risk taking on the part of the senior Army leadership. The recommendations proposed to change the culture and to embed a new culture can be categorized into four major areas. These categories are: changing senior leadership behavior to match the new culture, changing systems such as evaluation and assignment policies, modifying procedural mechanisms, such as Army regulations, and lastly, changing attitudes and behaviors of the people in the Army.⁵⁴ By focusing on, embedding, and reinforcing cultural changes in the Army, the senior Army leadership can remove the cultural barriers to TQM that have been identified. The end result is a better, more productive, even higher quality Army than we know today. The recommendations that follow, if implemented by the senior Army leadership, will remove those cultural barriers to TQM.

1. Articulate a new vision

Perhaps the best way to move the Army towards a TQM philosophy and to begin to overcome cultural barriers is for the Army leadership to clearly articulate "a desirable and understandable vision which gives purpose and meaning" to the entire Army family.⁵⁵ The vision must include "strategic planning objectives to everyone at all levels" of the Army.⁵⁶ The most important part of the vision must be a description or a road map that explains how the organization is going to move from its current state to a desired future state. The vision must explain why the current culture in the Army must change given the recent successes of the Army and its current high state of readiness.

The vision must be a "shared vision" for the entire Army family. It must link the changes in the external environment, such as diminished resources and a diminished security threat, to a new social reality that is compelling, plausible, and attractive.⁵⁷ The vision must sell the very positive social reality of an empowered workforce creating a quality work environment.

2. Emphasize and mandate strategic and senior level TQM training and education

Education and training are key to overcoming cultural barriers that exist within the senior Army leadership and in the Army as a whole. The senior Army leadership and management from colonel to general should see firsthand how industry and various DOD organizations have implemented TQM. Senior leadership must have and take the opportunity to talk to industry's chief executive officers who can share their TQM experiences and their insights into the cultural change process. Senior leadership should also see successful DOD TQM applications as well, especially those in the other services.

The Army should develop a standard senior level TQM course which would be mandatory for all those in key positions to attend. An individual self-study program should also be developed which would be a continuation of the formal training. To supplement the formal training, selected senior leaders should receive training from either external or internal culture and TQM consultants to help the leaders identify their own cultural paradigms that must be shifted. A further step to provide insight to senior leaders would be to administer standard psychometric tests to measure their personal leadership tendencies.⁵⁸ The results of the tests could be used to assess the degree individual senior leaders might have to modify their

leadership tendencies to be more in line with the TQM philosophy. Personal development programs could be individually developed from the assessment.

3. Institute TQM leadership training from cradle to grave

The Army should coordinate with all the officer producing institutions to integrate the TQM philosophy in their curriculums. Specific targets should include the United States Military Academy, all of the state supported military schools such as The Citadel, Virginia Military Institute, Texas A&M, Norwich, and others, and all Reserve Officer Training Corps participating schools.

The TQM leadership training philosophy should be a part of all entry level officer courses, advanced courses, mid-level and senior service schools. TQM training or refresher training should be required before assumption of all commands starting at the company level. All precommand courses should administer psychometric tests and provide detailed feedback and consultation on the results to the command selectees. The test results will help identify those authoritative leadership tendencies that are incompatible with the TQM philosophy. The same training and testing should also be required for equivalent level NCO and civilian schools for those assuming equivalent levels of responsibility. The biggest benefit of education is that it will enable everyone to "see the need for change."⁵⁹ With TQM we are capitalizing on a strong suit already available to us, but not accentuated.

4. Define and sell TQM to the Total Army

For the uninitiated, TQM can be a difficult concept to grasp. Already, there is a great deal of confusion in the Army rank and file on what the "TQM thing" really is. The Army must define TQM in layman's terms, give good clear examples of what it is and isn't, and develop a standard language and dictionary of TQM terms that apply to warfighters, as well as to all functional areas of the Army.

Upon completion of that task, the Army must then market TQM. Each officer, soldier, and civilian should get an information packet no more than five-pages long, which gives enough information to plant the seeds of interest and to dispel confusion. Specific examples of Army and other organizations' successes should be presented. The Army must "sell" TQM and must tell its constituency what benefits TQM will bring to them such as, more say in the operation, better communications, and the potential for improved morale. The release of this document to the Army family should coincide with the official announcement to implement TQM. The Army should also work its Public Affairs machine to get the word out in every format possible. The Army should also consider a chain teaching technique similar to the one currently underway for the builddown. The internal "customers" of the Army must get familiar and comfortable with a new culture, to break down resistance.

5. Rewrite, consolidate Army leadership and management doctrine

The entire inventory of Army leadership and management field manuals, training circulars, pamphlets, and regulations should be rewritten to fully incorporate the TQM philosophy. Much of what is currently documented in the leadership and management doctrine such as leadership vision, ethics, values, competencies, and characteristics is still current, enduring, and will always be

applicable. This recommendation suggests that all of the doctrine be linked together in one manual using the TQM philosophy as the common thread and frame of reference.

The single manual applicable to the entire Army could be divided so that each section or chapter could be peeled off a layer at a time and used at the appropriate leadership level from squad to strategic. Incorporating the TQM philosophy theme throughout the manual, would help institutionalize TQM leadership to make it a part of the way the Army does its everyday business. The finished product should be used as the basic TQM training reference and be required reading for all TQM training in the Army. This training should encompass all aspects of leadership and management under a common TQM philosophy. The Army would then have one complete document which would bridge all levels of leadership and management and connect the military and civilian cultures.

6. Streamline management layers

This recommendation specifically addresses the Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) Army, but there are probably some Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) applications as well. The TQM philosophy stresses teams and teamwork. The old span of control constructs should be reevaluated and where it makes sense, organizations should have their management structures flattened to reduce hierarchy and unnecessary layers of management that do not add value and actually impede process improvement. A complete review of Army manpower staffing guides, Manpower Staffing Standard System (MS³) requirements, and other staffing standards should be made, giving commanders maximum flexibility.

7. Change the performance evaluation system for officers, enlisted soldiers, and civilians.

Changes to the officer, enlisted, and civilian performance evaluation systems would not only be a paradigm shift, but would encourage paradigm pliancy, "which is the purposeful seeking out of new ways of doing things."⁶⁰ The evaluation system must be changed to encourage and reward risk takers and emphasize continuous improvement of process and not quick fixes or short term solutions. It must also recognize employee empowerment accomplishments, and recognize those who support the TQM philosophy. The evaluation system should require specific achievement bullets which provide actual accomplishments that support the TQM leadership philosophy, both from the rated individual and the rater.

The performance evaluation could also include a subordinate evaluation of the rated individual on the key TQM areas of empowerment, continuous improvement of process and rewards and recognition. The subordinate evaluation could be used as part of the total evaluation, be used as a counseling, coaching tool by the rater/senior rater, or it could be used for both purposes. Subordinate appraisals have been used in other organizations and have been found to provide more information on leadership abilities because of the wider assessment base.⁶¹ They are also valuable because they reinforce "employee commitment and involvement."⁶² The corporate experience has been that subordinate appraisals actually help change the culture.⁶³ Subordinate appraisals have also been suggested by LTG (Ret.) Walter F. Ulmer to assist in leadership development.⁶⁴ The recommended changes to the evaluation system would help build commitment to the TQM philosophy and would facilitate paradigm shifting.

8. Relook, modify, change assignment policies.

TQM demands constancy of purpose. The current policy of two-year command tours builds in short-term, quick fix results, that can drive units to their culminating points at the two-year point. An alternate solution would be to program command selectees into the executive officer position for at least a year before assuming command. Lengthening command tours beyond two years for line units and three years for other TDA type commands is another alternative. The Army should totally relook its assignment policy rationale and career progression philosophy in light of TQM, shrinking resources, and forces. The above recommendations would build in more ownership, constancy of purpose, and would result in more attention to long term improvement of process.

The current policy of moving various categories of people such as general officers every 18 months or so, is non-productive in its own right and does not contribute to constancy of purpose or continuous improvement of process. Below the general officer level, the entire spectrum of tour stabilization should be reviewed and modified. Some examples include, lengthening the time on station requirements before attendance at schools such as Command and General Staff College, Senior Service School, and The Sergeant's Major Academy; and modifying reenlistment incentives that encourage minimum time on station.

9. Modify award criteria to recognize long-term improvement of process

The criteria for awards such as the Army Commendation Medal and Meritorious Service Medal should be modified. The emphasis should be placed on contributions to continuous improvement of process, not short term

accomplishments or "quick fixes". The Army Achievement Medal could be used for the sometimes needed quick fix actions. A specific award for quality should not be created because it would distract from the goal of making quality a way of life in the Army. The civilian award criteria should similarly be changed to recognize process improvement. Senior leaders should also recognize adherence to the TQM philosophy in the every day process of patting people on the back for making process improvements.

10. Use the Army Inspector General (IG) Network as "quality facilitators" and "process assistants"

Changes to an organization, especially major ones such as TQM, require a specific feedback mechanism to ensure senior leadership is informed and can make changes to systems as required. The Army already has an in-place Army-wide IG network which could provide the leadership with feedback on TQM implementation, along with the full range of cultural dimensions. In addition, the IG could serve as quality facilitators after some additional training. The IG network could focus on continuous process improvement aspects at the Army's post, camps, and stations. The IG network is ideally suited for this role because of its dispersion throughout the Army, its linkage to the general officer command structure, and its experience in reviewing processes and systems.⁶⁵ The network could serve as the commander's quality culture advisor and could genuinely assist units in the proper application of the TQM philosophy. The emphasis would be on process, not compliance. Follow-up visits should also zero in on the viability of the processes of the organization. Army Secretariat IG personnel could assess quality on an Army-wide basis and could serve as the Army's eyes and ears for quality.

The Inspector General could serve as the Secretary of the Army's principal advisor on TQM issues.

The Army IG school could be renamed the Army Quality Institute to better describe its mission. The curriculum would need to be broadened to include TQM subjects, especially statistical process control.

11. Create an Army "Quality Corps"

A modification of the previous recommendation is to combine the Inspector General and Internal Review functions into a "Quality Corps". The Quality Corps would be a total force of uniformed and civilian personnel which would provide the dual capability of audit measurement and process review. In addition, programs such as Army Communities of Excellence, Internal Management Control, the Army Suggestion Program, and many others should be rolled up, eliminated, or revised to ensure they fit within the TQM philosophy and that scarce resources devoted to those programs are being put to the best use. By doing the up-front analysis and taking the appropriate action for each program, the Army can reinforce TQM as a philosophy and gain some instant credibility. The Army would be able to focus its energy on continuous improvement of process instead of piecemeal, disjointed programs that require gambling with scarce resources and detract from mission performance.

All of the Army quality assurance and audit functions should be reviewed to determine how they all fit in a TQM driven Army. The in-process review of functions should identify redundancies, barriers to TQM, and contributions each program makes to TQM. Changes or elimination of the programs should be made accordingly. The benefit of executing this recommendation is that it could result in

the elimination of many programs which come and go with no value added and substitute a permanent TQM philosophy which, hopefully, becomes ingrained in the culture.

12. Establish a TQM lessons learned organization

The quality successes of the Army should be documented, published, and disseminated throughout the Army. The emphasis should be on the resulting benefits of the quality effort, such as improved morale, communications, empowerment, and improvement of process. Of particular importance is identifying specific TOE applications that were successful. The warfighters must be convinced that TQM applies to them, that it works, and how it works. Publicizing success will reinforce the benefits of TQM. It is also recommended that the lessons learned organization be part of the IG Network or Quality Corps, since it will be in the best position to capture successes if recommendation number 10 or 11 is instituted.

13. Reevaluate the dependence on performance data

The Army's dependence on bottom line performance factors as a measure of effectiveness, such as dollars obligated, customers serviced, and documents processed, should be completely reevaluated. The "bottom line" quite frequently is not the true bottom and may not even be meaningful. Using the statistical measurement techniques promoted under a TQM philosophy, it is often revealed that the functions being measured are the least responsible for "good" or "bad" performance. The senior leadership should mandate the use of statistical process control as the true measure of effectiveness. This is a priority because the "bottom

line" drives so many other systems of the Army and requires significant resources to be used needlessly. Statistical process control when applied across the Army will not only save scarce resources, it will also ensure that the focus is on facts and not fiction and emotions.

14. Deregulate the Army

When the Army as a whole begins to assimilate the TQM philosophy, it can be anticipated that existing Army Regulations, policies, and procedures could serve as roadblocks to TQM. There must be a mechanism established that provides maximum flexibility to eliminate, change, or exempt commanders from Army regulations. The mechanism should be more streamlined and responsive than the former Management Improvement Program. Perhaps, more importantly, the Army should take a hard look at its current policy on what it needs to regulate looking through TQM glasses. After this analysis, the Army could decide that it may not be necessary to regulate every process. Whenever possible, commanders must be given the flexibility to pursue continuous improvement of process without being hampered by overly restrictive regulations.

The Army must go even further and target other regulatory road blocks from outside agencies, such as the Office of Personnel Management. For example, to fully implement TQM, greater flexibility will be needed to manage the civilian workforce. The Army must establish an open dialogue with the other agencies and begin to work legislative issues that impact on its daily business and establish working groups designed to peel away oppressive regulatory restrictions.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed the importance of culture in the Army and has inextricably linked the management of culture by the senior Army leadership to the success or failure of TQM. There are many cultural barriers to TQM in the Army just as there are in any organization. But, the strong, mature culture that has developed in the Army over the past 216 years will require many changes by the senior leadership, changes to Army systems and procedures, and changes within the Total Army family. The changes are necessary to make a great Army an even better one, that is constantly improving and striving for "quality."

A diverse menu of recommendations has been presented to change the Army culture. The recommendations are not all inclusive by any means, but are intended to provide a range of options or ideas for senior Army leadership to consider. A final word of caution is that the strategy selected for Army TQM implementation not underestimate the importance of culture, nor the level of commitment required to make TQM a reality.

Endnotes

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⁴Dan Hellbriegel, John W. Slocum, and Richard W. Woodman, *Organizational Behavior*, 4th ed., (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1986), 340.

⁵ Schein, 46.

⁶*Ibid.*, 6.

⁷Warren Bennis, "Leaders and Visions: Orchestrating the Corporate Culture", *Corporate Culture and Change*, Conference Board Report, no. 888 (The Conference Board Inc., 1986) : 63-64.

⁸Schein, 50.

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¹⁰*Ibid.*, 225.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 232.

¹²*Ibid.*, 313.

¹³*Ibid.*, 317.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 322.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 322.

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²³*Total Quality Management Guide, Volume II*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 15 February 1990), 1-1.

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²⁹U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 100-1*, forward.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 15.

³¹*Ibid.*, 17.

³²*Ibid.*, 16.

³³Charles B. Handy, *The Age of Unreason*, (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1989), 10.

³⁴G.M. Harrington, "The Catch-22 of Total Quality Management", *Across the Board* (September 1991), 54.

³⁵Barker, 74.

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³⁹*Ibid.*, 13.

⁴⁰Brad Stratton. "What Makes It Take, What Makes It Break", *Quality Progress* (April 1990): 17.

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⁴²Hal A. Rumsey, PE, Ph.D. and Philip E. Miller, Ph.D., "Barriers to Total Quality Management in the Department of Defense," *Logistics Spectrum* 24, issue 4 (Winter 1990): 5.

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