


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RESERVE COMPONENT EFFICIENCY STUDY

BY

Lieutenant Colonel James R. Carpenter  
United States Army National Guard

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RESERVE COMPONENT EFFICIENCY STUDY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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The current world's turbulent political, economic, socio-psychological and military environment is dictating that the role, missions, and force structure of the U.S. Army undergo major changes. One of the keys for the future success is more efficient utilization of both DoD personnel and its assets and wherewithal. The reality of this is forcing a major revision in our national defense strategy. No doubt the constrained resources and the expectation of a longer warning time before conflict will alter the Reserve Component roles in national security. The Army's senior leadership faces the challenge of breaking the existing paradigms and recasting a new one in this turbulent domestic and international environment. This study was designed to present ideas and provoke thought concerning the "Reserve Component Efficiency" and ultimately its potential impact on the force structure dilemma. Reasons for and roles of State Security/Defense Force are proposed, along with suggestions for implementation and training. The unique roles of RC units and their capabilities for counternarcotics, nation assistance and other civic or peacetime actions are discussed. Finally, some ideas and/or suggestions for solution to the force structure dilemma are presented along with the proposed changes and requisites needed for "victory" --the optimization of RC value added to the "Total Force." New and sometimes controversial views are presented, with the primary purpose being of assistance in determining both the type and efficiency of activities and future roles for our Reserve Components in our national defense. Hopefully, these results will open minds, cause a reassessment of position (break those old paradigms) and stimulate creative thinking by all of those in the national security/force development communities.

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## RESERVE COMPONENT EFFICIENCY STUDY

### INTRODUCTION

The bitter struggle that has divided the world for over two generations is over. We are entering a new era which not only offers great hope but one in which there will be fierce and drastic internal crises worldwide. The current world's turbulent political, economic, socio-psychological and military environment poses both threats to our national interests as well as opportunities to promote and guarantee them. The United States will be confronting dangers more ambiguous and uncertain than those previously faced. We will be facing new challenges not only to our security, but to our ways of thinking about and dealing with national/international security. Secretary of Defense Cheney, in his forward to the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment, states, "The war against Iraq presages a type of conflict we are likely to confront again in this new era -- major regional conflicts against foes well-armed with elements of advanced conventional and unconventional weaponry. We must configure our policies and our forces to effectively deter, or quickly defeat, such future regional threats."<sup>1</sup>

The drastic changes within Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, coupled with the recent coalition warfare in the Middle East, clearly suggest that the traditional roles, missions and force structure of the U.S. Army will need serious re-evaluation and possibly radical change in the near future. Geopolitical forces are in flux and are surely reshaping the bi-polar world and the roles and missions which gave meaning to the Army during the past era of containment strategy. Former Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono

outlined the complexity of the dilemma in his January, 1990, White Paper: "While some threats to U.S. security appear to be abating, other complex and dangerous challenges are emerging. These include terrorism, trafficking in illicit drugs, proliferation of sophisticated weaponry in potential hostile developing nations, and regional instability that threatens democratic regimes."<sup>2</sup> The developing world, it would appear, holds the future threat. The complexity of regional, "lesser developed" future enemies should cause great concern for both our political and military leadership.

The Army's senior leadership is clearly faced with a huge challenge in breaking the existing paradigm and recasting a new one during this turbulent and rapidly changing environment, both international and domestic. Decisions about force structure are among the most basic that need to be addressed by both groups. "America's Army plays a vital role in the execution of US national military strategy, which aims to deter conflict at all levels and, if necessary, to fight and terminate wars under favorable conditions....To meet the requirements of our strategy, the United States and its allies must understand our adversaries' intentions and be prepared to contend with the entire range of their capabilities."<sup>3</sup> The Army must be a genuine, legitimate deterrent across the continuum of very diverse threats.

Napoleon once said that "one always has enough troops if he knows how to use them."<sup>4</sup> Certainly Napoleon was suggesting that we organize by structuring the Army to best accomplish the mission. "Organizing is the process of defining the essential relationships among people, tasks, and activities in such a way that all of the organization's resources are integrated and coordinated to accomplish its objectives efficiently and effectively."<sup>5</sup> The real question is, what should the Army look like to meet the nation's needs of the future?

In November, 1991, Army Chief of Staff, Gen Gordon Sullivan wrote, "The

future Army must be a Total Force, trained and ready to fight, serving our nation at home and abroad; we must be a strategic force capable of decisive victory."<sup>6</sup> He also discussed four major challenges the Army confronts: "Maintain the warfighting edge we demonstrated in Panama and the desert. Reshape the Total Army to adapt to the new national military strategy and budget realities. Use resources efficiently. Strengthen the Total Army by improving the integration of the various components -- Active, Army Reserve, National Guard and civilian."<sup>7</sup> He feels that it is very necessary to maintain our momentum while accommodating the changes in the current rapidly changing environment.

#### So What is the Problem?

One of the major concerns of our nation is the efficiency of our government's management of national resources, particularly tax dollars. The belief by most citizens is that one of the keys for future success is more efficient utilization of both department of defense personnel and its assets or wherewithal.

"Efficiency," according to Websters' Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged), is "the power, characteristic quality, or manner of operation of an efficient cause; [and,] the capacity to produce desired results with a minimum expenditure of energy, time, money, or materials." Numerous synonyms are often associated with efficiency, and some of them are: effectiveness, capability, competence, high performance, productiveness, adequacy, resourcefulness, profitability, and proficiency. All of these words are used to evaluate and/or describe military performance both at the unit and individual levels. Senior military leaders are responsible for both leading people and managing resources, and ultimately their success is based on their "efficiency" (as defined above) at performing these two major tasks.

This paper will discuss factors impacting reserve component efficiency and will provide both information and recommendations to senior Army leadership (both the AC and RC) concerning new roles, relationships, and training and manpower considerations which could potentially improve military readiness, optimize value added of RC structure, and which should be seriously considered in determining the future AC/RC mix. First, our national interests and military strategy will be identified --along with what might be considered the Centers of Gravity or "heart" of the reserve component efficiency/force structure problem(s). Secondly, the historical perspective of RC missions and unique taskings and responsibilities --particularly the National Guard-- will be reviewed. Then the unique roles of RC units and their capabilities for counternarcotics, peacekeeping and/or humanitarian assistance/nation building will be discussed. Finally, recommended solutions to the force structure dilemma will be presented along with the proposed changes and/or requisites for "victory" --the optimization of RC value added to the "Total Force."

#### **NATIONAL INTERESTS, MILITARY STRATEGY AND CENTERS OF GRAVITY**

Notwithstanding the major forces of global/international change and domestic budget deficits, the broad national security interests that give focus to military objectives, strategy, and forces remain relatively constant. With the changing international security environment and the intensification of security concerns like terrorism, drug trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and a myriad of regional disputes, the United States must reassess its role in the world. "Shaping a security strategy for a new era will require an understanding of the extraordinary trends at work today --a clear picture of what has changed and what has not, an accurate sense of the opportunity that history has put before us and a sober appreciation of the

dangers that remain."<sup>8</sup> The influence a leader exerts in altering moods, evoking visions and expectations, and in establishing specific desires and outcomes determines the direction and effectiveness of a nation/military force. Leadership effectiveness will be most notable when he/she imparts vision and purpose, then provides the direction so that subordinates can achieve results. The President's broad National Security interests and objectives are outlined and described in his National Security Strategy Report of August, 1991. These interests and objectives encompass:

The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure....A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.... Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations....A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.<sup>9</sup>

As a nation we have demonstrated an enormous appetite to consume and live beyond our means. We have sold assets and borrowed heavily both domestically and abroad to finance an unprecedented expansion of domestic programs and to maintain the momentum for defense programs and the military build up of the 1980's.<sup>10</sup> The tremendous growth in the national debt has finally led to public and congressional demands for decreases in Defense spending. Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass) expressed the sentiment of many congressmen when he stated that Congress was "going to cut the hell out of the defense budget."<sup>11</sup>

It is with this attitude and Congress determination for long term reductions that the services face serious challenges in maintaining adequate resource levels to support readiness and ongoing modernization programs. The major question one might ask is, should the final word on weapons systems and military power --within a budgetary framework-- be with the Military, Congress or the President?

The need to assess and develop a comprehensive strategy that meets our national security requirements is absolutely essential. This new era of peace and national recession requires the services to review and assess their current programs, ensuring that their budgets are in line with national strategy and that efforts to reshape and restructure forces are made in a sensible, deliberate, coherent way that will serve our national interests without increasing the risks to our national security.<sup>12</sup> Our military leaders must understand the political interests and objectives of his/her nation/state and must possess a strategic vision of how those goals might be attained.

"Despite the uncertainties that remain, we see a fundamental transformation of the global strategic environment in several areas. Our policies and strategy for the decade ahead must be designed to adapt to these changes, and to shape them in ways that benefit the United States and its friends and allies."<sup>13</sup> Certainly, as world economic power begins to rival military power, the President's vision must be expressed more clearly. In addition, the American public must both understand the reasons for, and agree to the size and type of military structure it is willing to support.

The 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment outlines the role of the US Armed Forces and identifies five specific National Military Objectives: 1) Deter or defeat aggression, in concert with allies; 2) Ensure global access and influence; 3) Promote regional stability and cooperation; 4) Staunch the flow of illegal drugs; and 5) Combat terrorism.<sup>14</sup> The contribution made by military presence in furthering US interests is fundamental to the national security strategy. US military strategy is founded on the premise that America will continue to serve a unique leadership responsibility for preserving global peace and stability. Because of reductions in traditional threats and increases in allied capabilities, as well as political and fiscal factors, the

United States defense strategy must change.

The Army of the future will be smaller, US based, and resource constrained. It must still deter, and if deterrence fails, must defeat all potential adversaries. It must retain its commitment to excellence and to executing missions with uncompromising precision. It must maintain and, if possible, improve its operational readiness. Finally, the Army of the future must reposition and restructure units in response to changes in the international security environment and domestic support for the defense programs (adapted from The Army Plan, 1994-2009, Draft).<sup>15</sup>

Clausewitz, in his doctrinal work On War, notes that belligerents in any conflict will each have dominant characteristics. Further, he recommends that "... one must keep the dominant characteristics of both the belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed."<sup>16</sup>

The ultimate success of military operations rests with identifying and resolutely attacking the opposing force's center of gravity while protecting your own. Traditionally, the search for an operational center of gravity focuses on the greatest concentration of troops and/or mass of equipment and how to decisively defeat them. In attacking a nation state, one must view it and its instruments of national power as having many interdependent parts with widely diverse characteristics. These parts all contribute in varying degrees to a nation's security. Generally, attacking any part of the system degrades the system as a whole. However, there are certain key parts of the system that, if successfully attacked, will lead to certain defeat of the enemy. This is the concept known as center of gravity, and attacking this center of gravity is the surest way to success.

Although the application of force at an enemy's center of gravity may be the most decisive, it is seldom the easiest. An enemy ascertaining his opponent's center of gravity can be expected to also identify his own, and

will take stringent measures to protect it. To be effective, an organization has to be absolute in its understanding of the organization's current posture and have a clear picture of its desired end-state (vision). One might ask, what are the U.S. centers of gravity?

Certainly, our well-publicized domestic, economic and trade problems and ever-increasing national debt head the list. Secondly, the reduced security threat is causing a reduction in both AC and RC forces, with the perception that there will be an increased reliance on reserve forces.

Corresponding to that action is the question; is the Army truly an integrated "Total Army"? If the military services are to rely more heavily on the reserve components, they will have to have confidence that reserve units will be available and prepared for mobilization and deployment when needed. The issues of greatest concern are the cultural biases between the Active and Reserve Component soldiers and lack of understanding and trust between the two groups. This prevents open and truthful dialogue between one another in regards to the critical AC/RC force structure issues. Some of the future roles or missions that reserve component units will be tasked with are counter-narcotics, nation assistance, and other civic or peacetime actions. These responsibilities will not only enable them to gain realistic training but will provide a product that is critical to our nation's national interests and security. Use of RC soldiers optimizes the value added to the community and has great impact on the efficiency with which national resources are utilized.

In a narcoterrorism campaign, the Clausewitzian concept of center of gravity becomes amorphous and difficult to pinpoint. The center of gravity for each side seems to be within the same population base. The center of gravity for the United States is the population's resistance to drugs; the center of gravity for narcoterrorists is the drug market within the US population....It seems absurd that a subset of one center of gravity is also the center of gravity for the opposing force, but upon examination, it becomes clear that

these are the true 'sources of strength and balance' for each side in this unique conflict.<sup>17</sup>

Yes, our national will and the interest of our citizens to invest in other than domestic issues is the real concern. Not many people are asking, where do we want to be ten years from now and what is it going to take to get there?

#### A KEY ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD -- THE STATE MILITIA

##### A. Historical Perspective of The Army National Guard:

Historically, the National Guard has been a unique military establishment, which enjoys the distinction of being the only military force legally responsive to both federal authorities (President) and state authorities (Governor).<sup>18</sup> As volunteers with earnest desires for peace, they uphold the state and federal constitutional rights; continually prepare for war or conflict; and commit themselves to world peace. Many people today, both civilian and military, fail to recognize the difference between the National Guard and the State Guard (known as the "Militia"). The volunteer militia (similar to the early colonists and Minutemen of 1775) consists of soldiers willing to buy their own uniforms and equipment, and to undertake extra training without pay.

The name "National Guard" was first applied to the Militia in 1824 but not until shortly after 1893 was the term universally accepted.<sup>19</sup> "The Constitution provides that militia may be called into federal service for three purposes: to enforce the laws of the United States, to suppress insurrection, and to repel invasion."<sup>20</sup> The National Guard also has several State missions in addition to supporting the National Military Strategy: to function efficiently under State authority to preserve life, protect property, maintain law and order, and provide public safety during natural disasters

and periods of local disturbance.<sup>21</sup> More specific mission statements for the National Guard are given in the approved War Department Policies of 13 October 1945, for both Federal and State service.<sup>22</sup> In addition, specific objectives of the National Guard have been identified by The Department of the Army in Title 10 USC 3062(a) and AR 10-5.<sup>23</sup>

From the time the earliest settlers landed on the shores of the New World, they banded themselves into military organizations. "American military history began with the establishment of the several colonial militias in the first half of the seventeenth century, but developments during this early period generally have been overshadowed by the imperial and revolutionary struggles of the eighteenth century."<sup>24</sup> The militia gradually evolved over the first half-century of settlement since there was constant interplay between culture and heritage on the one hand, and environment and necessity on the other. The militia was used regularly during the many battles which occurred while this Country grew and developed. The Constitution explicitly granted the Federal government authority to raise and maintain land and sea forces, in peacetime as well as in war-time, and the power was vested in them to employ the militia for common purposes of internal and external security. The second Amendment to the Constitution, part of the "Bill of Rights," guaranteed the "right to keep and bear arms." It was intended to prevent the Federal government from disarming the militia.

As these Militia forces evolved, "they graduated from strictly home town defense roles into larger organizations with broader missions; missions of protecting the frontiers in the French and Indian Wars; of holding together the fledgling Nation in the War of the Revolution and the War of 1812"<sup>25</sup> After the war of 1812, support of the militia decreased, and for the first half of the 19th century there was an explosion in the growth of the voluntary militia. Between 1792 and 1903, the militia received very little

support, financial or otherwise, from the Federal government, and none whatever from the War Department; but this situation changed considerably under the Dick Act of 1903 and its revision in 1908, whereby Federal aid was increased significantly.<sup>26</sup> The Dick Act of 1903 made the militia more responsible to the national government in time of peace, as well as in time of war. The National Defense Act of 1916 was one of the most important pieces of military legislation in U.S. History. "The Act guaranteed the state militias' status as the Army's primary reserve force, and it mandated the term "National Guard" for that force."

"In spite of the word National, the Guard units were primarily instrumentalities of the states. Governors summoned their troops 481 times from the Civil War to 1906."<sup>27</sup> Traditional reliance on the Guard as a state militia-constabulary has not changed, and through the years they have proved their devotion and patriotism in responding to the Nation's call during the various wars and conflicts, including the most recent, the Desert Shield / Desert Storm Conflict. During the early years call-ups were primarily for labor troubles, while more recently it has been for civil disturbance or disaster relief missions. In retrospect, the National Guard has played a vital role in the success of both the war efforts and various state needs. National Guard troops have been called for assistance in various activities: racial tensions, holiday traffic control, riot control, political disputes, state law enforcement, and assistance during and after fires or natural disasters. Over the years the National Guard has tended to lose its exclusive state status, and become more and more "federalized."

Today's National Security, or Defense Posture, depends greatly on the healthy relationship of the regular Army with the National Guard and Reserves and their readiness for war. "In 1972, with the drawdown of US forces in Vietnam, then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird coined the term 'Total

Force,' declaring that National Guard and Reserve forces will have a key role to play....They will be the initial and primary source of augmentation of the Active Forces during a contingency."<sup>28</sup> The total force policy was promulgated in 1973 by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and as a result, the National Guard, together with the other reserves and the regular services, has become a major part of the total force.

The total-force policy brought to the fore several implicit features of the nation's defense posture. The most important of these was that the United States cannot successfully mount and sustain a significant military operation without the Guard and Reserve. It also acknowledged that constraints on military budgets require that an increasingly large portion of our military strength reside in the Guard and Reserve forces that have proven exceptionally cost-effective when compared to active-component alternatives. And it recognized that members of the Guard and Reserve possess professional military skills comparable to those of their active-force counterparts....The total-force policy brought the National Guard and the other Reserve components into full partnership with active components for the purpose of deterring war, providing defense, and waging war. Full partnership meant a concerted effort to organize, train, equip, and employ both Reserve and active military assets in the most effective overall manner. Full partnership meant general equivalency for active and Reserve forces in training methods, performance standards, and readiness. For Guardsmen and Reservists, the total-force policy provided unprecedented opportunities for contributing to the national defense, particularly during peacetime.<sup>29</sup>

The urgency for the implementation of the Total-Force policy became apparent in 1974 when the "affiliation" program between the Army's active and reserve combat units began, followed by the initiation of the "round out" program in 1976.<sup>30</sup> The change in policy and the implementation of these new programs caused radical changes in the attitudes towards, and actions within the National Guard during the late 70's and early 80's. The immediate impact of this total-force policy was: the realization that the nation would never support enough professionals in peacetime to wage war unassisted; the recognition that the National Guard and Army Reserve were going to constitute the primary augmentation for the active component; the understanding that these

backup forces, therefore, must be available and sufficiently ready for deployment; and the comprehension that all forces must be able to enter combat anywhere in the world shortly after M-day, which would most likely, be days not months. Since most National Guard units are now a significant component of the Army's "Total-Force" concept, greater emphasis is being placed on their rapid mobilization and deployment. As a result of this force integration, greater efforts have been made by Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, and military commanders at all echelons to include the Reserve Components in their force structuring, mobilization planning, and operational training and evaluation.

Clear responsibilities are now assigned to National Guard units, and proportionally, considerably more money is available for manning, equipping and training them. The accomplishment of Army Guard's future plans will require well-equipped, mission-trained, flexible and responsive forces. These units must have well educated and trained leaders who not only understand "AirLand Battle Doctrine" but can effectively train units so they are capable of mobilizing, deploying and conducting sustained joint and combined operations.

**B. Potential Need For State Constabulary or Security/Defense Force:**

As a result of the Guard's greater focus on its federal mission, there is a potential problem in the states' ability to meet their various defense force obligations if mobilization occurs. Through the years it has become obvious that future wars would move at an accelerated rate and that National Guard and Reserve units would be rapidly mobilized and deployed. Therefore, Governors will have insufficient time to prepare for disaster relief or civil disturbances if they mobilize and train their state defense forces after the Army and/or Air National Guard is federalized. State AG's are generally

assigned responsibility for planning and directing the employment of any military support that may be provided to civil authorities in case of some large scale disaster such as nuclear attack or natural calamities. National Guard Bureau has clearly indicated that "long-range plans developed by each State Adjutant General should focus on an ideal structure that can be raised, trained, supervised and maintained in the respective state to support Army missions, and compatible state missions, in the National Military Strategy."<sup>31</sup> The question still remains, have the states prepared their State Defense Force (SDF)?

It has also been suggested that difficulties which have beset the National Guard for a long time "stem from lack of knowledge of the laws pertaining to it on the part of those charged with the responsibility of promulgating regulations and policies affecting it and of administering its affairs."<sup>32</sup> The Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8, quite clearly states that:

The Congress shall have power...To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;...To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;..."<sup>33</sup>

The National Guard has to continually meet the requirement for having an armed force with sufficient strength to cope with civil disturbances and disorders within the United states such as the racial conflicts and political demonstrations that have occurred since the 1950's. "Throughout United States history, the National Guard's role in civil disturbances has hurt the efficiency of more than a few state units, including the Ohio Guard at Kent State in 1970. Something happens when local troops, representing force, compel

obedience from other state residents."<sup>34</sup> Consciousness of the possibility that domestic emergencies can occur as a side-effect of mobilization and war, as they did during the World Wars and Vietnam, seems to be on the increase. "That a militia must accordingly be on hand, however, is largely ignored."<sup>35</sup> In fact it might be possible that some governors are totally unaware of the possible side-effects on their states if the National Guard were federalized and mobilized rapidly.

One thing is certain, lack of action during peacetime will result in failure of SDF after National Guard mobilization. In 1981 the Governor's organization raised the issue concerning the state operated internal security forces for militia or constabulary service in the event of National Guard mobilization.<sup>36</sup> Jacobs indicated that "nothing stands in the way of the states' planning for such forces and even organizing them. However, several states need to alter their own laws to permit such organizations to be created in time of peace; and on the federal level, most of the laws have lapsed which permitted the federal government to provide support to the states."<sup>37</sup> Jacobs also feels very strongly that this is a state matter and the issue is highly unlikely to get off the ground unless "the Feds" provide the rules of engagement, and some funding or, at least, logistical support. The same issue was raised in 1979 by the House Armed Services Committee's military personnel and compensation subcommittee.<sup>38</sup> Historically, intervention by the federal government during WW I may have set a precedence:

With the entire National Guard in federal service, only the adjutants general and their headquarters staffs remained in the states. They were never considered a part of the Guard that could be taken into federal service. Since the states needed some sort of force available at home, State or Home Guards came into being. Because some states were slow to constitute these, the War Department took the lead, creating the United States Guard by General Orders 162 dated December 22, 1917.<sup>39</sup>

From 1943-45 the SDF's were called up 32 times for civil disturbances,

104 times for natural disasters and 33 times for other miscellaneous missions.<sup>40</sup> State security/defense forces were on duty for the above incidences a total of 1144 days. In contrast, during the Korean War and Vietnam conflict, there was only partial mobilization of the National Guard; therefore, SDF's were not authorized to be officially established by the states, but some did respond and complete their planning.<sup>41</sup> Actually, 13 of the states and Puerto Rico currently have authorized organizations, while during WWI there were 40 and during WW, II 34 state forces.<sup>42</sup> The mission(s) are certainly there but the issue which needs to be addressed at depth is, how can each state be better prepared for National Guard mobilization?

Key issues which must be addressed at the state level are manning, equipping, training and facilities usage. Not only must the size of unit be determined, but also the identification of key leaders. Good officers, both commissioned and noncommissioned, may be recruited from retired personnel, nondeployable troops, and those soldiers who left the service because of job conflicts or other personal reasons. The advantage of recruiting these past members would be their technical expertise, previous military training, and familiarity of training sites, armories and rules and regulations. Equipping might not be as difficult as one would expect. As the Army downsizes and the Regular Army and National Guard modernize, weapons, uniforms, and displaced equipment could be made available for issue to SDF's. A specific concern is the availability of engineer-type equipment that might be needed for disaster relief or public safety missions. When National Guard units are activated, the armories should also be available for SDF training and equipment and weapons storage.

Training for SDF personnel could be accomplished by coordinating training days with Guard units when they conduct civil disturbance or communications training, weapons qualification and leader development courses. In

some instances individuals might be sent to Army schools if changes in laws and/or regulations were made. The major constraint for all options is sufficient resourcing. To be effective, SDF funding must be provided from both federal and state budgets. Certainly, a decentralized system should be developed under Department of Defense sponsorship which would enable the states to create these Constabulary or Security/Defense Forces.

Execution of such action should be delegated through NGB. Both DOD and NGB should be working on two key elements which might assist with this transition. First, the laws need to be changed to authorize limited federal support of the SDF and, secondly, Army Regulations must be adopted to provide general policies and guidance for the states. It seems equally clear that the National Guard's state mission, to provide public protection and safety within each state, will not disappear in time of national crisis but may in fact be exacerbated by these circumstances. To ignore this potential problem would place the governors at great risk. Thus SDF forces should be planned for now by the Adjutants General of each state, with guidance and direction from the Governors, in order to be ready when needed, instead of being created after National Guard mobilization. In addition, NGB should be providing general policies and guidance for the states and working with DoD and Congress for federal funding and establishment of appropriate legislation.

#### **ROLE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES IN COUNTERNARCOTICS**

The widespread problem of drug abuse plaguing the United States is both diverse and pervasive, undermining the moral fabric of American society. It is a multifaceted problem that has reached epidemic proportions across the United States. It has legal, social, economic, medical and national security ramifications, possibly even undermining our foreign interests. We have become, by some accounts, the most drug-ridden society in the industrial

world. The White House Drug Abuse Policy Office in its 1984 National Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking presents statistics to validate this national problem.<sup>43</sup>

Notwithstanding the considerable negative consequences of drug trafficking on the domestic homefront, it was principally because of international impact that drug trafficking was deemed a threat to our national security. On April 8, 1986, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 221, a document noting that "criminal drug trafficking organizations can corrupt political and economic institutions and weaken the ability of foreign governments to control key areas of their own territory and populace."<sup>44</sup> The directive further noted that "some insurgent and terrorist groups cooperate closely with drug traffickers and use this as a major source of funds."<sup>45</sup>

A detailed threat assessment, to include recent drug abuse trends and the extent of the supply of illicit drugs, was contained in the Executive Summary of the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board's National and International Drug Law Enforcement Strategy, published in January, 1987.<sup>46</sup> The threat is also validated in more recent summaries of the drug problem which are outlined in the President's 1989, 1990 and 1991 National Drug Control Strategies. To fight drugs successfully we must, as a nation, exert pressure on all facets of the drug problem simultaneously.

The National Drug Control Strategy recognizes that the international drug trade is a threat to our national security and the security and stability of other nations. The 1989 Strategy focused on the major coca producing countries --Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia-- through a regional approach. The 1990 Strategy elaborated on the Andean Initiative and directed interagency reviews of plans and programs for Mexico, the surrounding transit countries in the Americas, and the heroin production and transit areas....The 1991 Strategy aims first to strengthen the political commitment of drug producer and transit countries to strengthen their laws, legal institutions, and programs to prosecute, punish, and where appropriate, extradite drug traffickers and drug money launderers.<sup>47</sup>

The threat to the United States is twofold; first, the impact that drugs are having on us domestically, and secondly, the national security implications that result from destabilization of friendly foreign governments, particularly in Latin America. Michael Dziejic points out four characteristics of the drug threat that are especially pertinent when considering its challenge to national security: 1) It is the product of a supply-and-demand relationship between drug-producing and drug-consuming countries; 2) The drug trade is a transnational phenomenon with complete disdain for boundaries; 3) Concern for national sovereignty is a considerable impediment to anti-drug programs; and 4) The drug threat, in spite of its severe national security implications, is not inherently a military threat.<sup>48</sup> President Bush's

National Security Strategy states:

No threat does more damage to our national values and institutions, and the domestic violence generated by the trade in drugs is all too familiar. Trafficking organizations undermine the sovereign governments of our friends and weaken and distort national economies with a vast, debilitating black market and large funding requirements for enforcement, criminal justice, prevention and treatment systems.<sup>49</sup>

A "war" against narcoterrorism may necessitate many drastic changes in both international and national law. Experts now suggest that the international drug trade has expanded exponentially to an estimated \$US 500 billion annually, and that this is bigger than the world trade in arms or oil.<sup>50</sup>

Both the domestic and international consequences of drug trafficking were recognized when the NSDD 221 elevated drug trafficking to an issue of national security. The March, 1990 National Security Strategy of the United States states:

Traffic in illicit drugs imposes exceptional costs on the economy of the United States, undermines our national values and institutions, and is directly responsible for the destruction and loss of many American lives. The international traffic in illicit drugs constitutes a major threat to our national security and the security of other nations.<sup>51</sup>

The fight against terrorism and narcotics has captured the attention of both the American public and the Congress, and legitimate questions are being raised about what the real security concerns are. It is known that damage to political institutions, proliferation of sophisticated weaponry among non-governmental actors, and the link between traditional insurgents and drug traffickers are all features of the drug problem in South and Southeast Asia, but it is in Latin America that all these factors are most often combined.<sup>52</sup>

Indicative of the corrupting influence they wield was when they offered to help pay off Colombia's foreign debt if they would not be prosecuted for their crimes.<sup>53</sup> Drug dealers have also been able to provide services which the formal government has not. Bruce Bagley notes that drug traffickers:

...have also donated lavishly to local causes, built schools and low income houses, clinics, churches and soccer stadiums. The cartel leaders have thereby cultivated grateful and loyal followings -- sometimes entire city neighborhoods or rural communities.<sup>54</sup>

Recognizing again the complex interrelationships existing among the economic, social and political aspects of the drug trade in South America, simply stated, it is not in the best interests of the United States to permit drug traffickers to have such destabilizing influence on fledgling democracies in our sphere of influence. "The scourge of illegal drugs saps our vitality as a free people, diverts our energies from more positive pursuits and threatens friendly democratic governments now plagued by drug traffickers."<sup>55</sup> Countries and regions like the United States and Europe that provide a demand for illicit drugs thus create conditions that can lead to a serious deterioration in the security environment of producer countries. In the process, their own broader security interests may be endangered.<sup>56</sup> In 1988, many Americans felt that the elimination of illicit drug use was the single most important national security goal of the United States, and favored

the use of military force to intercept incoming illegal drugs at our borders.<sup>57</sup> Apparently, we have the national resolve to eliminate the supply of drugs and to dramatically reduce the demand for them. The question now becomes, what are the proper roles of military forces, and how can they best be used to support our nation's strategy to control illicit drugs?

#### **A. Legal Considerations and Legislation:**

As the quantity of illicit drugs into the United States continued to expand in the 1970's, law enforcement agencies at the federal, state and local levels were unable to stem the flow. The reason they could not was because of the large expanses of unsecured border areas and the drug traffickers use of sophisticated electronic equipment to avoid detection.<sup>58</sup> This enabled smugglers undetected entry by land, sea and air.

As a result, Congress determined that military assistance was needed, as it was the only organization with the necessary equipment and personnel capable of effectively offsetting the drug traffickers' high powered boats, improved aircraft and high-tech weapons. However, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 in most cases prohibited the military from assisting civilian law enforcement agencies. To overcome this, in 1981 Congress clarified the role of the military in support of law enforcement by adding Chapter 18, "Military Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Officials," to Title 10 of the United States Code. Chapter 18 authorized the Department of Defense to:

- \* Provide to law enforcement officials information collected during the normal course of military operations concerning violation of State or Federal laws.
- \* Make available to law enforcement officials any equipment, base facility or research facility for law enforcement purposes.
- \* Train and advise civilian law enforcement officials in the operation and maintenance of military equipment made available to them.

- \* Assign personnel of DOD to various agencies to operate and maintain equipment.<sup>59</sup>

In 1982 Congress added two very important caveats to the assistance the Department of Defense could provide by:

- \* Restricting direct participation by military personnel in interdiction, search and seizure, arrest or similar activity.
- \* Assuring that rendered assistance would not adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States.<sup>60</sup>

Since the amendment of Title 10 United States Code, the Department of Defense has provided a great deal of assistance to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies in combatting the drug threat. In order to deal with all aspects of the threat, the Administration has promulgated a set of goals -- a strategy to combat the threat -- outlined in the National Drug Control Strategy issued in September, 1989, January, 1990 and February, 1991. In doing so, the government has brought to bear its economic, diplomatic, socio-psychological and military instruments of power to carry out these national strategies for a drug-free society.

**B. National Policies and Strategies:**

Combatting the drug threat is a two-fold problem. To be successful, both the demand for, and the supply of, drugs must be attacked. The current Federal policy established in 1986 has been clear and straightforward with respect to support provided to law enforcement agencies:

It is the Department of Defense policy to cooperate with civilian law enforcement officials to the extent practical. The implementation of this policy shall be consistent with the needs of national security and military preparedness, the historic tradition of limiting direct military involvement in civilian law enforcement activities and the requirements of applicable law.<sup>61</sup>

The 1989 National Defense Authorization Act considerably expands the role of the Department of Defense in the areas of command, control, communications and intelligence in the war on drugs. Clearly, the Department of

Defense policy anticipates higher military priorities than supporting domestic law enforcement efforts, but few Americans would argue against that position.

The Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy has identified three means of attacking the flow of illegal drugs: 1) at the source, 2) in transit and 3) in the United States.<sup>62</sup> This will be done through a multi-agency and multi-national approach with the Department of Defense complementing the other U.S. agencies and cooperating foreign countries. Of late, a major issue is whether or not the military should get involved in the counternarcotic effort. Without question, yes. The military is an instrument of government. Therefore, any threat to our national security or national interests is justification for military response.

#### C. Various Roles for Military Support:

Representative samples of the kinds of military operations uniquely designed to support DOD's attack on drugs at the source, in transit and in the United States are presented in the following discussion. These examples will also show the magnitude of the effort that has been made by the armed forces (Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard) to support the law enforcement agencies and make the counternarcotic program work.

At the source of drug production in foreign countries, the Active Component has taken the lead, and should continue to do so. They assist with nation assistance (security assistance and law enforcement), operational support to host-country forces, and cooperate with host-country forces to prevent drug exports. Types of assistance are training, command and control, reconnaissance, planning, logistical and medical support and civic actions. Cutting off drug sources in foreign countries is a mission well-suited to

military ground action. Operation "Blast Furnace," conducted in Bolivia in 1986, was our government's first attempt at conducting military operations designed to curtail drug processing and export from a foreign country.<sup>63</sup> Operationally *Blast Furnace* was moderately successful, but strategically and politically it might be considered a failure.

Some examples of this assessment include Donald J. Mabry's comment that Operation *Blast Furnace* '...nearly toppled the Paz Estenssoro government.' Similarly, Rensselaer W. Lee states, '...the use of the US Army to raid cocaine laboratories in Bolivia ...aroused intense nationalistic reactions...' while Kevin Healy writes that '...Operation *Blast Furnace* reinforced 'anti-imperialism' and pro-labor political alignment patterns and sentiments in the [Bolivian] coca-cocaine debates.'<sup>64</sup>

There were two main lessons learned. "The attack on the drug labs successfully reduced the supply of coca products from Bolivia by about 90 percent. The corollary to this lesson is that this center of gravity does not exist in only one country; and if attacked in one place, it will pop up elsewhere. ...A second lesson learned is the primacy of intelligence."<sup>65</sup>

Concerning the drug pipeline to the U.S., the Coast Guard, Air Force, and the Navy have been the frontline force in interdiction. Main efforts are detection and monitoring by aerial and maritime surveillance. For example, the Air Force AWACS provide extended radar coverage, the Navy provides air and sea patrols, and the Coast Guard conducts search and patrol operations in conjunction with the Navy. The Navy and Coast Guard forces have been jointly operating in the Caribbean since 1981.<sup>66</sup> A couple of the multi-agency operations that were very successful are Operation Blue Lightning, April, 1985, in the Bahamas, and Operation Hat Trick II, November 1985 to January 1986, in Latin America.<sup>67</sup>

There are some restrictions placed on the support provided by the military to the law enforcement community. Participating military personnel must derive similar training or operational benefits that they would receive from

normal duty. It provides very challenging and realistic individual and unit training in a stressful environment. Successful tactical interdiction is dependent upon the capability to both detect and intercept "targets," and this poses a great challenge. Even under these constraints, however, the use of military personnel and equipment in support of the counternarcotics efforts does pay dividends. Regarding drug supply lines in the U.S., the military --the National Guard specifically-- has been very active. In some respects the National Guard is being singled out as the Department of Defense's "internal" military contributor to the drug effort based on restrictions of *Posse Comitatus*.

The traditional role of the National Guard has been the States' first line of support in natural disaster and civil disturbance. The National Guard in the past has been very dependent on the support of the Active Component, which provided state-of-the-art equipment for their use. It is this traditional mission that propelled the National Guard to the forefront in the 'war on drugs.'<sup>68</sup> Who are better suited to support Drug Law Enforcement Agencies than citizen soldiers helping their over three thousand communities across the country to combat illegal drugs?

By establishing a very modest quantifiable objective of a 50% reduction in current drug use over a 10 year period, the National Drug Control Strategy recognizes that the drug war will be a contest of wills.<sup>69</sup> Statistics reflect a considerable reduction in drug use in cocaine, marijuana, and heroin, but evidence of trafficking continues to grow. As noted by the President, however, in his cover transmittal to Congress of the February, 1991, Drug Control Strategy, "...although much remains to be done and serious problems still confront us, numerous indicators show that we are beginning to see significant declines in drug use throughout the nation."<sup>70</sup>

Based on my analysis I believe there is strong argument for continued

military support in the law enforcement effort to reduce the supply of illicit drugs into the United States. The Department of Defense should continue to employ military forces in their counternarcotics efforts. They should continue to include the National Guard in supporting law enforcement agencies with the drug interdiction and eradication effort and equipment loan to Federal Law enforcement. Maximizing effects of missions like border observation, clandestine airstrip observations, commercial port of entry inspection, sea port inspections, radar and sea vessel surveillance may require a mobilized force instead of volunteers.

Deploying the military to support the counternarcotics effort will not provide a panacea for the illicit drug problem. If the counternarcotics efforts reduce the supply of illicit drugs and provide America with a drug-free society, and at the same time make our soldiers better prepared for their "wartime" responsibilities, then we have maximized the efficiency of expenditure. Congress has shown a willingness to interpret or modify legislation to allow greater military involvement, but military involvement does not mean changing *Posse Comitatus* or other laws limiting military authority over American citizens. Certainly, the military's role in drug interdiction and eradication efforts should be clearly defined and understood by those involved. This may require the support of DoD, Congress and the Supreme Court.

The US Armed Forces --the National Guard in particular-- should be heavily involved in the ongoing and growing counternarcotics effort in the future. Our plan must be creative and aggressive, using all possible means. We must develop a successful attack on illegal drugs at all three phases of the flow: at the source, in transit, and during distribution and use here in the United States. Our nation must address demand reduction. This will require an emphasize on education, a willingness to show compassion and care

for their fellow man, a solid stand against drug sales and use, and a sincere commitment by individual citizens and groups to community action.

#### RESERVE COMPONENTS IN PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The role of the Reserve Components will most likely be changing considerably over the next few years. New missions may be transferred from the Active Component to the Guard and/or Reserve, and new requirements may be added to meet the challenges posed by the rapidly changing world situation. President Bush, in his historic 'Aspen Speech,' said, "What we require now is defense policy that adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy - a policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War."<sup>71</sup> The 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment stated:

The importance of peacetime measures in deterring aggression and defusing crises will inevitably grow as military resources continue to shrink. As America builds upon a continuing presence in diplomatic, economic, and military realms on a daily basis, the foundation is laid for the sympathetic infrastructure so vital to tomorrow's strategic environment. Visible participation in peacetime serves the purpose of detection, nation-building, influence-building, deterrence, and promoting stability, which can obviate the need for military response and complement its effectiveness should deterrence fail."<sup>72</sup>

Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger acknowledged the value of military-civic action and the historic role of the "militia," stating, "Civic action [is] the construction and restoration of infrastructures, the assisting of others in the improvement of their own lives, whether by restoring land, building roads, digging wells or helping provide medical and educational services. In the past such work was not thought to be the work of the military."<sup>73</sup> What better way is there to use the medical, combat engineer,

civil affairs, psychological operation, linguistic, communications and logistics units than employing them in roles which appear to be both logical and necessary to avoid precisely the situation in which US combat forces might have to be used to protect national security interests.

The most prudent course to achieve internal security, and the one that at least initially seems to be working, is the strategy that makes use of military capabilities instead of military force.... Not only do the Reserve Components have a force structure uniquely suited to military-civic action, the citizen-soldiers of the National Guard and Reserves possess skills and capabilities that differ significantly from those of their Active Component counterparts, skills that make them particularly well suited for civic action operations in foreign lands. They are not only soldiers, they also are "citizens" in the civilian sense of the word.<sup>74</sup>

Peacetime Engagement is founded upon the idea that in order for the United States to continue as a leader in shaping the course of world democratization and change, it must be able to focus and coordinate the application of all its elements of national power toward a common goal. This presupposes that a clearly defined goal exists, and that agencies and bureaucrats are able to overcome their "territorial instincts" and work toward it. To compel the seemingly intractable agencies and institutions of government to look beyond their petty self-interests will require immense political courage and leadership.

Professor Steven Metz from the Air War College, points out that in assessing risk, one must not only concentrate on the enemy strengths and our weaknesses but they must also consider both the psychological and political factors such as morale, national will, political leadership, alliance cohesion and training level.<sup>75</sup> He also states:

Risk originating in the political system is especially problematic, particularly for democracies. Because of the openness of the American political system, national will is vital for the application of military power but is fragile and often transitory. This means that the skill with which the political leadership cultivates national will --which is beyond the control of military planners-- directly influences

risk level....Extensive involvement by civilian decision makers in military planning can also amplify risk.<sup>76</sup>

For peacetime engagement to succeed, our leaders must recognize the value of all instruments of national power, have the desire to employ these instruments with clear goals, acknowledge the fact that they might be playing on a team rather than representing one nation state, and ensure that appropriate lines of communication and interagency relationships have been established, knowing that doing so obviates the use of lethal military force.

The Reserve Components are uniquely qualified to assist with dealing with most of these types of threats because of their proven technical capabilities and their experiences under dual federal and state status. Guard and Reserve units can continue to enhance the image of the United States by rendering assistance to foreign nations with their specialized skills and knowledge. Furthermore, by training with host nation personnel, particularly in the Third World, US citizen-soldiers contribute to world stability. Thus the nation must ensure that the Reserve Components are properly resourced and trained at levels consistent with their assigned mission(s). Therefore, all RC senior leaders must optimize the efficiency with which they use personnel, equipment and other training resources to prepare their units for the various assigned contingencies. Most critical is their understanding that identified units must be capable of deployment for the various assigned missions in a very timely manner when called upon.

#### CONCLUSIONS

Why is it so difficult for the U.S. Army, an organization which prides itself on its abilities to plan and execute, to perform this mission of downsizing/force realignment? A perception that has emerged in recent months is the notion that there will be an increase in warning time, which would make

it possible to adopt fundamentally new approaches to fielding conventional forces.<sup>77</sup> With greater warning time and the need to preserve as much combat capability as possible during this period of budgetary austerity, a large majority of the Congress and the American people believe that the DoD should place greater dependence on the reserve forces as they develop long range plans and force structure requirements.

Effective change in force structure and strategy implementation will depend on the extent and effectiveness in which existing leadership --with years of set institutional training and organizational structure-- is able to stimulate sincere desire for change. National strategy sets a course from the present state of affairs to the envisioned endstate. The Army's strategy is derived from and supportive of our national strategy and the subordinate national military strategy. Army strategy is implemented through its current force structure and concomitant resource acquisition and allocation policies. Drawing down the force structure must not also draw down readiness.

The United States should respond to regional crises with any and all elements of national power. When the military option is selected, the military force must be able to respond properly. This response can only be made by properly structured forces tailored for regionally specific missions. Sizing forces for regional contingencies is an operational problem. The regional contingency corps needs a mix of "type units," from which to quickly tailor capabilities to project power into the region for which they are organized. Les Aspin states, "The forces must be large enough and ready enough --and well equipped and trained-- to deal with these real-world threats, but they must also be shaped right to win as quickly and safely as possible in the conditions of the new era."<sup>78</sup>

The combat structure should be able to execute deep, close, and rear operations in any environment posed by the regional METT-T (Mission, Enemy,

Terrain, Troops available and Time). However, "even the best structured, most ready, and most modernized forces cannot be employed or sustained without adequate strategic lift. The United States cannot afford to risk the effectiveness and credibility of its overall defense strategy by failing to develop and field adequate worldwide lift assets."<sup>79</sup>

Current decision trends show the Defense Department's tendency to take the path of least resistance and spread the budget cuts equally across the services. The Army in turn is also demonstrating a similar tendency by trying to save division flags as opposed to looking at restructuring the Army to meet the missions and requirements of the future. The uncertainty of the end state evidently has not caused an envisioned change by our leadership, therefore, no strategy seems to have been followed in making recent budget and force structure decisions. In fact, it appears that we are making no more than a reduction in kind and are maintaining the same mix and ratio of forces from the past. For example, we're reducing forces but not changing AC/RC ratios or critically evaluating the importance of the Heavy Mech forces developed to fight the former Soviet Union. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said "If you don't have a strategy...and try to make deep cuts you can wind up with nothing and still spend as much money."<sup>80</sup> A clear path to the future force structure of the U.S. Army is not available. We need a totally fresh, bottom-up strategic basis for defining our forces. We should not simply cut our forces proportionally to fit a declining budget.

We know that downsizing is going to be a painful experience. With all this turmoil, several key questions for defense planners still remain: What is the best mix (balance) of active and reserve component forces? How well trained and ready must the reserve component be? What risk are we willing to accept? How can reserve efficiency be measured and are they as ready as we advertise? What types of capabilities are best placed in the reserve compo-

ment? and, Are the current roles realistic and achievable?

Recognizing that past problems plagued these components, Secretary of Defense Laird stated his expectations of the Reserves, and what was to be done for them in the future: "Increase the readiness, reliability and timely responsiveness of the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserve and individuals of the Reserve."<sup>81</sup> However, in the early/mid 1970's there was little need perceived for "rapidly deploying" RC forces.

Based on General Sullivan's presentation here at the Army War College and his recent articles in Military Review and other periodicals, it appears that there is wide consensus within the reserve component community --both National Guard and Army Reserve-- that the Chief of Staff is sincere in his efforts to integrate the Army. Particularly troublesome for the new Chief of Staff is the attitude that prevails among active and reserve component leaders and soldiers concerning the roles played, or not played, by Reserve Components during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The National Guard in particular has been vocal in its criticism of the senior Army leadership over the issue of Round-out Brigades.<sup>82</sup>

The article "Reserve Forces Army Challenge of the 1990's" by LTG Brown --published in Military Review in August 1991-- discussed the problems and opportunities associated with integrating the total force. Although there is tremendous AC/RC controversy, he states, "looking to the future, if we did not have the competitive marriage of Active, Guard and Army Reserve, we would have to invent it. This is particularly true now, during a period of diminished apparent threat. ...The issue is not 'if' we will have major Reserve formations, it is 'how many' and how they can best be employed."<sup>83</sup> Certainly, whatever tensions have occurred between AC/RC soldiers, the downsizing and budget constraints along with the poor communication or mis-communication will only exacerbate the problem. COL Heller reviews the relationship between

the Army's Components in historical context and comments on the "roots of the antagonism between Regulars and the citizen-soldiers."<sup>84</sup> This section of his manuscript discusses some of the factors which cause animosity between AC and RC soldiers, particularly the AC officer's perception of reserve officer capabilities, the economic competition among components and the political lobbying.

With the increased reliance on the Total Force Policy, there has been concern expressed over the reduction in Active Component (AC) advisors in the Army reserve components in recent years. One possible solution should be the infusion of high quality, trained manpower from the active force into the Reserve components. This would provide active force personnel during the build-down of the Army with opportunities to serve as part of the full-time force in the Reserve components; however, there are also concerns that utilizing AC personnel in full-time support positions would erode and probably destroy the organizational culture and community support base presently existing in the reserve components, particularly ARNG units. Certainly, one must recognize that expertise required to function effectively in the unique RC organizational environment is not commonly found in the active Army.

The AC soldier on a tour rotation does not make a lifetime investment in the community as does a guardperson who is planning for an entire career that will span many years. Given the hometown nature of most ARNG units, local identification of full-time personnel enhances their effectiveness. Utilizing AC soldiers in these community-oriented units may erode the community support base that ultimately sustains National Will. Neither General Carl E. Vuono, former Chief of Staff, or General Gordon R. Sullivan, current Army Chief of Staff, favors moving active Army personnel, removed from active duty because of the current force reduction in the Army, to the Army National Guard in place of the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel already on duty.<sup>85</sup>

In the context of force structure a paradigm should be understood to mean an underlying cognition of organizational structure with knowledge, capabilities and strategy rather than an organization chart or specific force. In a recent survey of the USAWC Class of 1990 regarding their "opinions" about the AC/RC missions, capabilities and structure, it was "found that a majority of the respondents believed that we should build a stronger, more capable, albeit smaller AC force to respond rapidly to worldwide contingencies and rely on the RC to provide 'back-up' units for a prolonged (longer than 90 days) conflict."<sup>86</sup> In fact "the students' responses showed that they strongly believed that the Army needs a new force structure 'philosophy' to create a smaller, more balanced, more capable total force among the three components (Active, Guard and Reserve) and various type units (combat, combat support, and combat service support)."<sup>87</sup>

Since the inception of the All Volunteer Force and the One Army Concept, there has been an ever-increasing reliance on the abilities of our RC forces to shoulder a greater portion of the defense burden. "The role of the RC clearly has been expanded from one of wartime augmentation only to now being an integral part of the deterrent force. Today's Army can meet no major contingency without the Reserve Components. The Total Army is no longer just a concept; it is a guiding principle."<sup>88</sup>

Interestingly, it was during the critical Pentagon and Congress debates of the mid/late 1970's over the All Volunteer Force (AVF) and the One Army Concept that then Secretary of Defense, Mr. Schlesinger, made the following statement: "Such heavy reliance on the Guard and Reserve divisions for the initial defense missions would be imprudent ...If we are to act responsibly toward the National Guard and Reserve, we should stop pretending that we can use all of them as full substitutes for active duty ground forces."<sup>89</sup>

Another explanation for the nation's rush to increase our reliance on the RC

might have been the belief that we must never again become involved in a Vietnam-like situation in which a protracted war is allowed to proceed without calling up the reserves. This was certainly very apparent during Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm and was very effective at generating National Will.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army has played a significant role in helping maintain world order and peace, but Army leaders and planners can no longer hang their hats on the paradigms of the past. In order for the Army to accommodate evolving and radical budget decisions, it must be willing to make changes in its traditional way of thinking. However, this means that everyone must be willing to forget about the old paradigms and be more open and visionary in considering nontraditional ideas and a more innovative and integrated approach.

The National Guard as a state militia has to continually meet the requirement of having a strong armed force to cope with the civil disturbances and disorders within the United States. Consciousness of the possibility that domestic emergencies can occur as a side-effect of mobilization and war, as they did during the World Wars and Vietnam, seems to be on the increase. There is one thing for sure, lack of action during peace-time will result in inefficiency and probably failure of SDF after National Guard mobilization. Certainly, nothing stands in the way of the states' planning for such forces and even organizing them. Both DoD and NGB should be working on two key elements which might assist with this transition. First, the laws need to be changed to authorize limited federal support of the SDF and, secondly, Army Regulations must be adopted to provide general policies and guidance for the states. Key issues that must be addressed at the state level are manning, equipping, training and facilities usage.

The Department of Defense should continue to employ military forces in their counternarcotics efforts. They should continue to include the National Guard, in supporting law enforcement agencies with the drug interdiction and eradication effort and equipment loan to Federal Law enforcement. Involvement in missions like border observation, clandestine airstrip observations, commercial port of entry inspection, sea port inspections, radar and sea vessel surveillance may require a mobilized force instead of volunteers. Great emphasis must be placed on the coordination of programs among Federal, State and local drug agencies. Efforts must be made to prevent jealousy and bickering; instead, all agencies must orient their efforts and coordinate and manage resources for optimum efficiency and effectiveness. Our nation must also emphasize education, show concern and compassion for their fellow man, and commit themselves to community action against the enormous drug problem.

The future has new forms of deterrent operations in store for US Armed Forces --peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. Forces most adaptable to these and nation-building missions, reside not in the Active Force, but in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Military civic actions can provide the deployment training necessary to maintain or enhance operational readiness.

The Army "game plan" for the Total Force policy appears to be unrealistic. An adequate and affordable Total Force can be attained only with increases in reliance on the less costly Reserve Components. The Roles and missions of Guard and Reserve units will change dramatically so that forces are capable of assuming additional responsibilities. We must, at a minimum, state more explicitly and honestly the true capabilities of our reserve components, the necessary balance between the three components, and the resulting capabilities that the Congress and the people of our nation can reasonably expect from this "Total Force."

We have ignored the struggles between components, therefore, as manpower

resources shrink it behooves the Active and Reserve Components to develop respect for one another and train more closely together. The military has grown a generation of senior military officers that are parochial. Reserve component leadership has tended to claim readiness levels slightly higher than reality. They must accept the fact that combat arms units are not as ready as AC counterparts, therefore will require greater train-up time, particularly the mechanized units. This does not mean that RC soldiers or units are inferior but that the differences in ability are a matter of time, opportunity and training.

Other actions that could have great impact on the RC efficiency are; getting rid of "dead-wood and using good soldiers coming off active duty, giving the RC units needed access to training at NTC and JRTC, increasing the AGR and military technicians to maximize system strengths and minimize weaknesses (reduce administrative requirements on RC leadership and minimize training detractors), providing more joint training exercises or AT deployment with AC units, providing much more formal training at all military schools to improve the soldiers understanding of the various military components, and optimizing the RC role in both local state and federal counter-drug operations and the provision of assistance during natural disasters, civil disorder or environmental clean-up.

Yes, success is within reach, but it will not come automatically. No matter how it "really" will be, the threats will probably be regional, and the contingency corps may still be the heart of any U.S. response to a crisis. Because of pure economic reasons a greater percentage of the total force is going to have to come from the reserve components, the National Guard and Army Reserves. The military force must be able to respond properly to the global challenges. A proper response can only be made by properly structured forces tailored for specific missions and/or strategies.

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