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SHAPING THE TOTAL ARMY OF THE FUTURE:
ROLES OF THE RESERVE OFFICER ASSOCIATION,
NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

BY

Lieutenant Colonel Bernard M. Cullen
United States Army Reserve

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
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SHAPING THE TOTAL ARMY OF THE FUTURE:
ROLES OF THE RESERVE OFFICER ASSOCIATION,
NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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Project Advisor

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The author, a life member of the Reserve Officer Association and USAR AGR officer, takes a look at how outside organizations with significant influence can be of help to the Total Army. This paper lays out the roles of the Reserve Officer Association, National Guard Association of the United States, and the Association of the United States Army. The three associations have considerable influence in shaping public opinion regarding the integration of the three components of the Total Army. Recommendations are made in areas where the three associations can help deal effectively with a number of the important policy questions confronting the Total Army.

INTRODUCTION

The Total Army of the 1990's is a strong partnership. It consists of the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). It is a partnership that will be more important than ever going into the next century as America positions itself to protect its vital interests. America faces the certainty of uncertainty. There will be demands on the Total Army in the next decade that no one can now foresee.

The eyes of America and the world have been opened to the effectiveness of a strong ARNG and USAR. The Gulf war could not have been successfully prosecuted without the effective participation of the ARNG and USAR. In the words of Secretary of the Army, Michael P.W. Stone, "More than 1000 Army National Guard and Army Reserve units were activated; more than 700 deployed to the Persian Gulf. Let me state quite plainly that the war could not have been won without them. They are true professionals."¹

Soldiers in the ARNG and USAR served in the Persian Gulf primarily in the ranks of combat support and combat service support units. Their participation was critical in the Gulf. They also played a significant role during the war at stateside mobilization stations, training centers, depots and ports.² Not only did ARNG and USAR soldiers help win on the battlefield but they helped win in other ways. From now on it is clear that to win the support of the American people in a military conflict, there is no substitute

for the activation of the Reserve components. As General Edwin Burba, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Command, puts it, "When the Guard and Reserve are called up, they bring America with them, and the American people have never lost a war, and they never will."³ Now that they have been put to the test it is clear that the ARNG and USAR can and will perform in the future.

The Total Army will always work to maintain its fighting edge to protect America's vital interests. There are a number of organizations which play an important role in assisting the Total Army in its quest for excellence. Three of the more significant such organizations are the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), and the Reserve Officer Association (ROA). These organizations focus on a variety of objectives which support the Total Army's mission.

For the Total Army to prevail in a protracted conflict and achieve its objectives it must have the support of the American public. AUSA, NGAUS, and ROA are organizations which can help mobilize public support for Total Army objectives. They do not have official links with the Total Army. These three organizations work to build public support for the Total Army. One of the ways they are able to do this is by working closely with the nation's elected officials who allocate resources for the Total Army.

This paper will examine the process for shaping the Total Army of the future. It will examine how the elimination of the former Soviet threat has caused a change in the America's defensive

posture. It will also deal with the notion of a "peace dividend" which, if carried too far, will do irreparable harm to the Total Army. The challenges for determining the future force structure mix and end strength of the ARNG and USAR will be examined. The roles of AUSA, NGAUS, and ROA will be discussed. Particular emphasis will be placed on recommendations that would merge the efforts of the Total Army and the three associations to find solutions in the debate about reshaping the Total Army.

THE FORMER SOVIET THREAT - TRANSFORMED

The threat to the security of the United States and its allies has to a large extent disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Not only has the government of the Soviet Union ceased to exist but the former Soviet military establishment is in a state of disintegration.

The former Soviet Army is in throes of radical change. It is undergoing a period of tremendous introspection and reappraisal. In the present atmosphere of free expression and inquiry, the former Soviet Army is being scrutinized as never before. Great flaws are being noted in the areas of its morale, recruiting, retention, and living conditions. Today the former Soviet military is held in very low repute by the people. As a result of this, the political and military leadership is looking at the military with an eye toward reform: however, the same centrifugal forces that

caused the Soviet Union itself to dissolve are also at work within the military.

It is estimated that troop strength will be cut in half in the former Soviet Union and that some strategic missiles will be taken off alert.⁴ The former Soviet military machine simply cannot be sustained at previous levels in the face of a crumbling economy.⁵ One of the top priorities today is the conversion of parts of the massive defense establishment into a non-defense industrial base.⁶ The diminishment of the Soviet military threat poses both opportunities and challenges for America's military leaders.

As a result of the Soviet collapse, the United States has emerged as the single world power on the scene today. As stated by Major General Robert C. Hope, (Ret.), President of the Reserve Officers Association, "The nation cannot view the world from the perspective of an uninterested observer. Rather, the United States must remain in the forefront of the world scene...and continue to promote the basic values of freedom and justice upon which our nation was founded."⁷ A key aspect of remaining a superpower has to do with having an appropriately sized Army. To that end, one of the nation's greatest challenges is to establish the right force structure and end strength for the Total Army now that the Soviet Union has ceased to exist. There are three key players in the question of re-structuring the Army - the President, Congress, and the American people. The challenge for all concerned parties is to retain a formidable and lethal Total Army while introducing appropriate cuts in the face of a reduced military threat.

According to Admiral Frank Kelso, Chief, Naval Operations, "I've tried to stop using the word 'threat' - it doesn't seem to fit anybody."⁸

Admiral Kelso's observation notwithstanding, the human race has not undergone a total transformation. There will still be some threat in the future. The quest now is to determine where and how the Total Army will be employed in the future. Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has suggested that there are at least six areas in which U.S. Military force could be used in the future:

1. Countering regional aggressors
 - a. Middle East/Southwest Asia
 - b. North Korea
2. Combatting the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
3. Fighting terrorism
4. Restricting drug trafficking
5. Keeping the peace
6. Assisting civilians

Aspin's list is interesting both in what it includes and what it excludes. The list does not reference any scenario in which U.S. Military force is brought to bear in Eastern Europe or in the territory of the former Soviet Union. He uses Operation Desert Storm as the bench mark for defining future regional aggressors. He also uses Operation Provide Comfort as a prototype for providing

humanitarian assistance.⁹

The New York Times recently published a story about future military threats to the United States which it said was based on "internal Pentagon documents."¹⁰ The story laid out seven scenarios which could involve the use of American military forces. The seven scenarios include some of Aspin's examples (Middle East and North Korea) but add several not mentioned by Aspin:

1. Conflict with Iraq and North Korea occurring at the same time.
2. Responding to a Russian invasion of Lithuania.
3. Assisting Americans threatened by a coup in the Philippines.
4. Dealing with a coup in Panama that threatens access to the canal.
5. Dealing with a new emergent superpower (Russia?)

Critics feel that the scenarios have been developed to justify extensive defense outlays. In response to the New York Times story, the Pentagon sought to downplay the importance of the suggested scenarios. Official spokesmen for the Pentagon stated that the scenarios are hypothetical in nature and were put together to develop programs and budgets for fiscal years 1994 to 1999.¹¹

THE SHRINKING U.S. DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

Today it is not a question of whether there should be cuts in the U.S. defense budget. Rather, it is a question of how deep the cuts should be. The U.S. spends about five billion dollars per week on defense.¹² Congress is determined to cut this spending. A good example of this Congressional intent is the proposal of Congressman Les Aspin. He is committed to cutting the defense budget as soon as possible because of the "irreversible changes in the Soviet Union."¹³ Both Republicans and Democrats are looking to cut defense spending and move dollars from defense to domestic needs. In the process of doing this Congress runs the risk of cutting the military too much too soon. It is possible that if the defense budget is cut too much, irreparable harm will be done to America's ability to adequately defend its vital interests during the next contingency. Not only will equipment and personnel be reduced in numbers, but the industrial base that supports the nation's military will have its defense production capacity greatly diminished.

The Congressional Budget Office has concluded that, "a plan that would reduce Pentagon budget authority to 250 billion dollars by 1997 could jeopardize the ability of the United States industrial base to produce weapons in large quantities later in the 1990's or in the next decade should they be needed."¹⁴ Deputy Defense Secretary Donald J. Atwood is not alarmed by shrinkage in the industrial base. He states that free market forces should

prevail. Atwood contends that future wars will be deterred, be brief, or be preceded by enough lead time to allow for reconstitution.¹⁵ Many observers challenge Atwood's premises. His critics assert that the inventory of war material could be drawn down rapidly in an unpredictable wartime scenario. The result of this approach could leave the Total Army short of critical resources. Another major concern associated with the diminished industrial base is that defense modernization will be inhibited when industry loses government contracts which are the life blood of research. It is estimated that even now the Total Army's technological advantage is at risk by systems already on the market for nations with the money to pay for them.¹⁶

Congress is confronted with how much and what part of the defense budget to cut. One significant area of focus is the budget for ARNG and USAR. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell have criticized Congress for demanding cuts in the defense budget while resisting cuts in the budget of the Reserve components. While speaking of reducing defense spending for the Reserve components, Secretary Cheney stated, "It is absolutely vital that we be allowed to get smaller. But all too often Congress doesn't want to face up to the tough decisions."¹⁷ Congress sees a mandate to provide the best defense at the lowest cost to the taxpayers.

Many in Congress see greater reliance on Reserve forces in future years. They see the ARNG and USAR as a less expensive alternative to a large Active Army force. To "save" tax dollars

one Senator, Tom Harkin of Iowa, advocates cutting the defense budget by fifty per cent over the next ten years. The debate over the size of the defense budget will continue even after the Presidential election is over. Ultimately it will be greatly influenced by the perceived threat confronting the nation. A very powerful additional consideration will be the impact that cutting the defense budget will have on jobs.

As much as members of Congress look to plow defense dollars into the civilian sector, they are becoming very aware of the second and third order effects of downsizing the military. Not only will the downsizing of the military put tens of thousands of former military personnel into the job market, but it will have a substantial effect on civilian workers who make products for the military. It is estimated that by 1995 some 500,000 U.S. defense jobs may be eliminated.¹⁸ In the context of political considerations, it cannot be overlooked that an unemployed worker is also a potential voter.

RESHAPING THE TOTAL ARMY

The Secretary of Defense and the Army leadership are planning to have a smaller USAR and ARNG. Along with smaller numbers, the Army is revising its thoughts on how it plans to employ the ARNG and the USAR. The bottom line is that America must have a Total Army with the capability to effectively defend its interests abroad. To accomplish this the Army must make use of the ARNG and

the USAR. In his special report on the U.S. Army Reserve, MG William F. Ward (Ret.) quotes President Bush's remarks about the Reserve components:

"Reserve forces will continue to be relied upon as full partners of the Active Duty forces in time of need. A Bush administration will prioritize the manning, training and equipment modernization of the...Reserve components, not on the basis of their peacetime status as forces in reserve, but on the basis of their direct and complete integration into the operational plans and missions of the nation."¹⁹

The Secretary of the Army, Michael P. W. Stone, took the President's guidance for the Total Force and translated it into specifics for the Army:

"The reshaped Army will have four corps and 20 divisions in both the active and reserve components. It will be based largely in the continental United States. Four Army divisions will continue to be stationed overseas to demonstrate American resolve and commitment to regional stability. These divisions will be a deterrent to aggression, periodically reinforced by continental U.S. based forces."²⁰

The "reshaped Army" equates to 535,000 Active Army soldiers and 550,000 soldiers in a combined total for the ARNG and USAR by 1995.²¹ Many acknowledge that the actual numbers of Active Army soldiers may be less than the Army leadership's stated objective.

With the end strength figures proposed by the Administration, the next question is how the Total Army of the future should be structured. Of particular concern is how the Total Army can best

use its Reserve component assets. Regarding ARNG combat brigades, many see them serving as "roundout" units. Some feel that there is an "absolute commitment" within the Army to make full use of the National Guard and Reserve units in any future crisis.²² Other observers feel that Desert Shield/Desert Storm showed that the Active Army was not completely sincere in using Reserve units according to their predetermined CAPSTONE alignments. In some instances Reserve units with CAPSTONE missions were not activated, but were used to provide fillers, or were sent to perform in an area for which they had not trained.²³

The use of ARNG and USAR units in America's military contingencies represents the visionary views of General Creighton Abrams. When Abrams was Chief of Staff of the Army, he instituted a "Total Force Policy" in the late 70's. Simply put, Abrams designed a Total Army to ensure that the next time America went to war it would use Reserve forces.²⁴

There is no question that Reserve units will continue to be involved in America's future wars. A central question, however, is when and how they should be used. The President's fiscal year 1992 budget submission called for a larger Active Army contingency force and a "small Reserve Force for reinforcement of an extremely large emergency, with little in between."²⁵ In the future if there is too much reliance on the Active Army to fight America's wars, the risk will be incurred of not having wide-spread popular American support. In the words of LTG Lavern Weber (Ret.), Executive Director NGAUS, the use of Reserve Forces contributed

significantly to public support for the Gulf War:

"Much of the grass roots political support that the Persian Gulf War still enjoys stems from the fact that so many Guard and Reserve units from grass roots America were mobilized and deployed. As can be seen from hometown to hometown, the deployment and now the return of these citizen-soldiers has a galvanizing effect."²⁶

The use of Reserve forces in the Gulf War very clearly demonstrated the capability of the ARNG and USAR. Namely, the ARNG and USAR were used to support the Active Army - not replace it. In bearing arms in the defense of the nation, Reserve forces are fulfilling their constitutional prerogative.

SIZE OF ARNG AND USAR END STRENGTH AND FORCE STRUCTURE

The central debate regarding the future use of ARNG and USAR has to do with the extent to which their end strength and force structure should be cut in the face of a reduced threat. The Institute of Land Warfare of AUSA puts it this way, "If the AC and RC are not fitted into the overall structure in some logical and coordinated fashion, the Army is headed for an unbalanced force."²⁷

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney has consistently sought to reduce the size of the ARNG and USAR in numbers proportionate to cuts taking place in the Active Army:

"Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, repeatedly have argued that as active-duty units are dismantled during the drawdown, the reserve units designed to support those active units should be cut, too. Without the cuts, Cheney and Powell said, there will be reserve units with no missions."²⁸

Powerful voices in Congress and the Reserve community challenge the premise that cuts to the Reserve components should equal those slated for the Active Army. Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii), Chairman of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, told representatives at the 1991 NGAUS General Conference in Honolulu that he will oppose in law any reduction in Army National Guard Force Structure.²⁹

MG Evan L. Hultman, (Ret.), Executive Director of the Reserve Officers Association, summarizes the view of many in the Reserve community who support Congressional efforts to resist making cuts in the Reserve proportionate to cuts in the active force:

"Attaining the maximum military capability at the lowest cost by enhancing the role of the Reserve Forces has seldom been the goal of Pentagon planners. The budget request currently before Congress which proposes a 'fair-share' reduction of the Reserve Forces and little or no funds for Reserve modernization is but the most recent example. Unfortunately, 'fair-share' is nothing more than jargon for across-the-board cuts based on over-all budget constraints rather than objective force structure realignments. ...Most members of Congress are not fighting to maintain current Reserve levels. Both the House and Senate have agreed to reduce Reserve strength by nearly 40,000 next year. ROA also has been advocating reducing the Reserve in those areas that are tied directly to planned Active Force unit disestablishments. What

both Congress and ROA are objecting to are the senseless "fair-share" cuts that have been proposed by the Administration."³⁰

The division of opinion over the relative end strength and structure of the Active Army and the ARNG and USAR is pivotal to America's ability to successfully prosecute future land wars. Intelligent compromise should and must be reached on this issue. It is highly possible that the size of the Active Army may be reduced beyond the levels cited by Secretary Stone. There are two factors that could cause Congress to support smaller Active Army numbers and increased Reserve component numbers:

First, the inability to swiftly move a CONUS based army rapidly to future trouble spots in the world poses a question. If transportation assets cannot be obtained in sufficient quantity to rapidly deploy significant numbers of Active Army soldiers, more structure can be put into the Reserve components. This is because some Reserve forces will need increased time to complete their required validations and post-mobilization training; with the phased completion of their training, Reserve component soldiers can be deployed on a graduated basis in accordance with available lift capability. The lack of transportation assets ultimately suggests the need for a smaller Active Army.

Second, Congress's previously referenced desire to gain a "peace dividend" may cause the political leadership of the nation to cut Active Army end strength below the levels set forth by Secretary Stone. In this connection, the demonstrated lower cost

of the Reserve components might serve as an irresistible inducement to the Congress when they are looking to get the most milage out of Defense dollars. Congress might accordingly put more structure and end strength in the Reserve components.

RESERVE COMPONENT ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ACTIVE ARMY

In spite of the recent successes noted in the use of the ARNG and USAR, more can be done to ensure that relations between Reserve components and the Active Army are sound. The Active Army's viewpoint on end strength and structure must conform to that of the Defense Department. There are those who suggest that members of the Total Army Family (Active Army, ARNG, and USAR) would be able to reconcile their differences on the questions of end strength and force structure adjustments without negative input from certain Defense Department officials. One State Adjutant General blames the civilian leadership in the Defense Department for the problems associated with the use of ARNG maneuver elements :

"It is our belief that the problems with calling up Army Guard infantry and armored units stem from misperceptions at the highest levels of civilian leadership at DoD, not with the uniformed leadership of the Army."³¹

By comparison, the climate within the Total Army itself seems right for solving important strength-structure issues. MG Robert F. Ensslin Jr., President of NGAUS, says of the Chief of Staff of

the Army, General Gordon Sullivan:

"For the first time in a long time, the senior uniformed leader of the Army seems dedicated to being the Chief of Staff of the Total Army, including the Guard and Reserve."³²

General Sullivan earned tremendous respect within the Reserve Community with his substantive remarks at the 1991 NGAUS General Conference in Honolulu concerning the contributions made in the Gulf War by the ARNG and the USAR. Of particular note were his positive remarks on the three ARNG roundout brigades. He indicated that they had done very well in post mobilization training and had suffered undeserved criticism for their performance at the National Training Center.

Nevertheless, much work still needs to be done to build a relationship of trust between Active Army soldiers and ARNG/USAR soldiers. Colonel David Shaver, who serves as a member of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, has made extensive inquiry into the question of prevailing attitudes between Active Army officers and their Reserve counterparts. He feels that there must be a change of attitude within both the Active Army and USAR/ARNG ranks:

"I've personally seen, time and again, officers exude not confidence in, but flagrant disdain for RC unit leadership. The elimination of the perception of AC arrogance, more than anything save lack of knowledge is vital to the harmonization of the components. To an AC officer, the RC officer appears to be political, incompetent or untrained, and independent of AC absolute control, which frustrates the AC officer."³³

Colonel Shaver also asserts that the Reserve leadership should objectively evaluate its own ability to perform combat missions and admit that the Reserve maneuver elements do not have enough training time to function effectively in combined operations at brigade and higher levels. While many will challenge Shaver's views, they cannot be ignored.

ROLES OF ROA, NGAUS, AND AUSA

In the quest to solve the pressing questions concerning the shape of the Total Army, many organizations are providing input. Three of the most prominent of these organizations are the Reserve Officers Association (ROA), The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA). All three associations push for the establishment of legislation. Elected leaders know and appreciate the work done by these associations.

ROA was founded on October 2, 1922 by several hundred Army officers. General of the Armies, John J. Pershing, was the keynote speaker at the founding of the ROA. ROA had the special distinction of being chartered by the United States Congress in 1950.³⁴ As an organization incorporated by Congress, it has a special relationship with that body. Like other such organizations, ROA testifies before Congress on a number of issues of concern to the Total Army. ROA has a nationwide network of chapters which maintain close contact with their elected

representatives in Congress. It has a commissioned officer membership which encompasses all services.

ROA's declaration of principles proclaims a strong commitment to creating a lethal and effective Total Army. Specifically, ROA supports:

"A highly trained and well-equipped Regular Army and Reserve Component, maintained in an advanced state of readiness.

The Association believes that the armed services should be deployed as a Total Force in response to a clear and present threat to our national security and only after the military objectives have been established: that citizen soldier participation will help to preclude open-ended and wasteful military commitments in which the objective has not been clearly defined.

The Association further believes that it is the duty and obligation of all Americans to urge Congress to make national security a reality, to adopt legislation that will ensure the Reserve Component can perform its share of the Total Force mission, and to appropriate funds for the foregoing."³⁵

A primary method used by ROA to educate its membership is through its monthly magazine, The Officer. The Officer serves as a vehicle for keeping ROA members informed on issues for which they might want to contact their congressman or senator. Indeed, Congressmen, Senators, and Presidents have addressed ROA meetings and received ROA awards. President George Bush was presented with the ROA Minute Man award at the ROA mid-winter meeting in January, 1991. At the January 1992 ROA mid-winter meeting, Congressman John P. Murtha, Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, received the same award.

NGAUS was founded in 1878. It is an organization which exists

to uphold the 350 year old National Guard tradition of defending America's interests at home and abroad. Its membership consists of commissioned officers of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard. It has members in all states and territories. NGAUS has among its goals one in particular which contributes to making the Total Army a lethal fighting force:

"Our goal is to maintain the freedom and security of this nation by guaranteeing a strong national defense through the provision of a vital and dynamic National Guard as a part of the Total Force. To achieve this goal we will...strive to educate and inform the American public, the Congress and defense community on the purpose and capabilities of the National Guard."³⁶

NGAUS has a long tradition of working very effectively with Congress to achieve its legislative agenda. NGAUS attains its legislative goals by following a legislative action plan:

"Almost daily, members of the NGAUS senior staff walk the halls of Congress, telephone, write letters, meet with other Washington-based groups, and seek support from Guard members in every State, for or against bills that concern the Guard. Some of the NGAUS staff effort also is reserved for keeping Guard officers in the States informed on Guard issues and on where specific legislation stands. Such tools of communication as the NATIONAL GUARD magazine, the WASHINGTON LETTER, the LEGISLATIVE ACTION PLAN, ACTIONGRAMS and their faster cousins, electronic mail and FAX, telephones and ordinary letters are used to keep a flow of information between State Adjutants General, State National Guard Associations, commanders and members."³⁷

The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) was founded in 1950. Its members come from the ranks of the Active Army, ARNG, and the USAR. Members are in both active and retired status. The aims and objectives of AUSA include:

"To contribute its full resources and capabilities to advancing the security of the United States; to support a national military policy that will promote stability and peace throughout the world, to cultivate cordial relations and mutual understanding and support among the several military forces within the Department of Defense."³⁸

Like ROA and NGAUS, AUSA has a nationwide membership. It is organized into regional, state, and local chapters. To accomplish its goals of advancing the cause of the Total Army, it publishes many in depth studies on matters of concern to the Total Army. AUSA reaches its membership through its magazine, Army and its monthly newspaper, AUSA News. These publications go a long way toward keeping AUSA membership informed of significant Army issues. AUSA encourages its members to contact their elected representatives on significant issues.³⁹ AUSA also regularly submits testimony to Congress on measures to support the Total Army.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is time to break out of the disagreement phase over the future structure and strength of the ARNG and USAR. There are two contending forces in this debate, namely the Department of Defense

(DoD) leadership and the U.S. Congress. As pointed out previously in this paper, both DoD and Congress support a strong Total Army. They differ on how best to resource the ARNG and the USAR.

The membership of the ARNG and USAR has immense influence with the American public. This stems from the fact that ARNG and USAR soldiers are "twice the citizen." They serve as both working men and women in the civilian sector and as soldiers. ARNG and USAR soldiers collectively have considerable influence within their communities. The men and women of the ARNG and USAR affect public sentiment toward the Army in a way that the Active Army cannot. This is because Active Army soldiers are too transient to sink community roots in the same way as Reserve component soldiers.

In order to resolve the issue of the future force structure and end strength of the ARNG and USAR, the author recommends that the ROA, NGAUS, and AUSA set up a panel that will come up with proposals for the Army to resolve these matters. The panel would work actively with members of the Army staff to reach the figures that reflect an end strength and force structure that all can support before Congress. The final outcome would be channeled through DoD on its way to Congress. The political clout of the ROA, NGAUS, and AUSA would serve to bolster the legitimacy of the panel's recommendations before Congress.

It is understood that such a panel is unprecedented; however, it can work. If the Army does not sort out its own answers, it will find that Congress will come up with its own solution to the question of ARNG and USAR force structure and end strength. Now is

the time to reach agreement within the Total Army on the crucial question of ARNG and USAR end strength and force structure.

Specific agenda items that should be taken up by the panel include:

- A critical analysis of how to divide up the combat power of the Army among the Active Army, ARNG and USAR. Such an analysis should factor in the speed that can be brought to bear in moving combat power from the United States to given regional conflicts. If there is considerable lead time required to move units from CONUS, it can be argued that more combat power can be put in the Reserve components because they will have time to train up to deployment standards before lift is available to move them to the combat zone.

- Outlining the ways that will result in a better integration and exchange of personnel within all the components of the Total Army. An exchange program that will move soldiers between components will pay dividends by familiarizing them with the specific challenges presented by serving throughout the Total Army structure.

- Exploration of ways the Active Army can cooperate with the ARNG and USAR to assume more peacetime missions within the United States to support local and state governments. By finding domestic missions for the Active Army, its end strength can be maintained at higher levels. Legislative changes would have to be examined to allow this development to take place.

- Distribution of new equipment to the ARNG and USAR.

The faster Reserve component units receive modern equipment, the faster they can attain full combat capability.

- Establishment of a Guard or Reserve officer position to provide direct advice to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such a position would ensure that the interests of the Reserve components are consistently represented in the office of the Chairman.

- Provision of adequate full time support (FTS) personnel for the ARNG and USAR. Studies of the ARNG and USAR have indicated that much of their readiness can be attributed to work done by their FTS personnel. FTS personnel relieve drilling reservists of much of the administrative burden that cuts into training time.

In his stimulating paper, "Closing Ranks: The Secret of Active Army and Reserve Component Harmony," Colonel Shaver suggests a number of "fixes" that can contribute to giving truth to the phrase "Total Army":

- Add more M-Day/Troop Program Unit (TPU) instructors at TRADOC service schools.
- Insert mandatory Reserve component courses at Senior Service Schools and Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC).
- Increase the number of seats for Reserve officers at the U.S. Army War College and at CGSOC.
- Let the Active Army assume more responsibility for the readiness of Reserve units by setting realistic standards

and taking a sincere interest in helping Reserve units attain them.

- Integrate Active Army generals and colonels into Reserve units at echelons above corps.
- Change existing law to allow service within a Reserve unit by Active Army officers to be equivalent to a joint assignment.⁴⁰

The time is now at hand for a degree of unprecedented cooperation within the Total Army family to solve the critical questions relating to the future of the Army. If the Active Army ignores the input of its Reserve component leaders and their association leaders, it will run the risk of not having its voice heard where it counts - in Congress.

ENDNOTES

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