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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CREATING A RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TO SUPPORT
THE COLOMBIAN ARMY IN A NEW ENVIRONMENT

BY

Colonel Henry Medina Uribe
Colombian Army

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**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CREATING A RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
TO SUPPORT THE COLOMBIAN ARMY IN A NEW ENVIRONMENT**

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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The indiscriminate violence that has plagued Colombia for the last 50 years, together with other secondary factors have committed the Colombian Army to a continuous war of attrition inhibiting its ability to modernize and be ready for the challenges brought about by the new world order. One of the arguments that support this thesis is the inadequate resource management system that is manifested by its inability to blend operational and logistical systems, and the disjointedness of the planning, programming, and budgeting process.

This study sustains that now is the opportune time for the Colombian Military to lead their own change process by instituting a new resource management system. The suggested mechanism should facilitate the translation of national objectives and strategy, strategy and military operations planning, military force types and levels into specific defense programs, and the development of defense programs into a budget request. This process could be evolved using as a model the U.S. Department of Defense Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Further, this study presents a diagnosis of the current Colombian resource management system and also portrays some models that could be useable in initiating this evolutionary process.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. Basic System Model	Page. 13
Figure 2. Biennial PPBS Logic	Page. 16
Figure 3. PPBS Process proposal for the Colombian Army	Page. 17
Figure 4. Functional Life Cycle	Page. 24
Figure 5. Force Planning Model	Page. 25
Figure 6. Army Force Integration	Page. 31

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CREATING A RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
TO SUPPORT THE COLOMBIAN ARMY IN A NEW ENVIRONMENT**

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Colombian Army resource management system, draw conclusions, and make recommendations that would improve its efficiency and effectiveness. This analysis is motivated by the new political constitution, the national strategy, the decentralized government policy, and an awareness that the Colombian Army needs a better basis for making rational budget decisions.

This paper asserts that the current Colombian Army resource management system should be modified to meet the challenges and environment of a New World Order. In general, the system used now by the Colombian military forces has similarities with the characteristics of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in the Fifties.¹ A similar therapy to the one initiated by Secretary of Defense McNamara in the early 1960's may be applicable to the Colombian Armed Forces. Accordingly, it is important to touch up on the general concepts of the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) in order to create an expectation, and use it as a model for a new resource

management system that considers the characteristics, size, organization, and operational continuum of the Colombian Armed Forces.

If the recommendations are accepted by the Colombian military leadership, a select military team of subject matter experts from Colombia and the United States could be formed to design and develop a PPBS for the Colombian Armed Forces. Although this paper refers mainly to the Colombian Army, the proposed resource management system has applicability to all Services.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The study includes: (1) an analysis of the characteristics of today's system; (2) an analysis of the new Colombian constitution; (3) a review of the "National Strategy for Combatting Violence" issued in 1991; (4) personal and telephonic interviews of selected senior officers and experts from the U.S. and Colombian Armies to gain their perceptions of the current system and reactions to actual changes; and (5) an analysis of resource management systems used by both the U.S. and Colombian Armies. This study could serve as a basis for determining those resource management and force integration activities that may be incorporated into the Colombian Army's resource management system. Furthermore, it may serve as a basis for additional studies and analyses.

In general, the deductive method will be applied. The constitutional and national strategy analyses are useful as a framework to establish the parameters for the proposed system and recommended operational models. Since the Army is dependent on higher levels of command for administrative management and oversight, frequently the analysis presented refers to decisions that must be taken at a higher level of command.

CHARACTERISTIC OF TODAY'S SYSTEM

Even though Colombia has been categorized as one of the most successful democracies in Latin America, the violence that has plagued the nation for nearly a half century has forced the country to continue to be underdeveloped, hindering its people from realizing a brighter future. The political violence, ideologic confrontation with communism, and narcotraffic activities are events that have occurred in an environment characterized by economic imbalance, high unemployment, illiteracy, and political instability.²

During the same period, the armed forces have been involved in wars of attrition with the guerrillas and drug traffickers while simultaneously serving as the country's policemen against strikes, smuggling operations, student riots and other civil military affairs. These events have created a complacency among the soldiers, even to the point where these confrontations give the impression of a permanent war where the

ends, ways, and means are blurred. This creates the sensation that the road to victory is almost impossible to achieve.

Facing this multiple threat is the Colombian Army organization consisting of 142,500 soldiers. In Colombia there are 4 soldiers for every 1,000 inhabitants versus 10.3 for Chile, 6.5 for Peru, and, in general, 9.8 for developed countries.³ In budgetary terms, Colombian defense outlays represent 1.4 percent of GNP versus 6.1 for Europe, 5.9 for the United States, and 4.2 for Africa (figures of military expenditures, 1988).⁴ The result is insufficient resources for modernization, training, and motivation. But the problem is not only in the Army; during 1990, the operational readiness(OR) rate for aircraft was 33 percent versus a minimum acceptable level of 70 percent. Similarly, the Navy had an OR rate of only 40 percent.

The current resource management system is not fully integrated, placing the armed forces at the mercy of the Minister of Finance who is not versed in military operations. For instance, during the force planning phase, the Minister of Defense submits the defense manpower estimate to the Minister of Finance who in turn determines if projected revenues are adequate to support this estimate. If not, the defense manpower estimate is adjusted without considering the implications that this action may have on the armed forces. The result, so far, has been units filled at less than 70 percent of required levels.

In the Colombian Army, planning and financial management are two almost unrelated activities. The former activity is

basically under the jurisdiction of the Army Operation Staff Department (E3), which submits its plan to the Armed Forces General Command. The latter which is under the dual jurisdiction of the "Intendencia General" and the Logistics Planning Department (E4) which submit their plan directly to the Ministry of Defense, bypassing the Armed Forces General Command. Five-year military plans are prepared with little regard to cost affordability implications and investment effectiveness. Budget decisions, however, are largely independent of plans. For instance, when the Ministry of Defense prepares the budget, which is based on the approved plans, costs are at least 300 percent higher than the budget guidance. As always the budget guidance prevails. This leads to or has the potential for the development of a "hollow Army."

Resources are allocated by law on an annual basis, and are divided internally into five programs (Office of the Ministry of Defense, Armed Forces General Staff, and the three Services). The Army further subdivides its portion of the budget into three separate categories:

- Personnel Services: Which contain all the expenditures related to wages and subsistence.

- General Expenditures: Refers mainly to operations and maintenance expenditures.

- Investment: Procurement of weapons/systems, physical infrastructure, construction, and technological development.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW POLITICAL CONSTITUTION

The end of the Cold War creates a New Order with important implications for Latin America. The change from a bipolar to a multipolar world creates an environment that gives less importance to military power but puts greater emphasis on the economic blocks created by groups of nations. The free trade agreement with Canada and Mexico (NAFTA) and the "Enterprise for the Americas Initiative" indicate that the U.S. is developing a new strategy in Latin America.⁵ It is possible that as a result of this new order, a new Latin American Army Model could emerge, focusing less on the external threat and ideological confrontation, and more on the domestic issues.

The Colombian Army is not only affected by the factors stated above, but also by many aspects such as a new constitution,⁶ a new National Strategy for Combatting Violence,⁷ and a new civilian Minister of Defense (after 45 years of military control). All these factors create a new environment that guides the military sector through a transition period, allowing greater influence in future policies, strategies, organization, doctrine, and procedures. It is in this environment that the military has the opportunity to lead their own change process, rather than merely reacting to externally mandated changes that are based on little or no military input.

Specifically, the new constitution, signed on 6 July 1991, implements significant changes in the way the different

levels of government develop, justify, and resource their programs. For example, the Minister of Defense, a key player in national security, must develop a mechanism that takes into consideration the precise mandates specified below:

The establishment of a National Development Plan (NDP) (Article 339) consisting of a general section and an investment plan covering national public entities. The general section shall include a description of long-term national proposals and objectives; midterm goals and priorities for state action; and the general strategies and guidelines to be adopted by the government in connection with its economic, social, and environmental policy. The public investment plan shall contain the multi-year budgets and specify the fiscal resources required for carrying them out. Further, there shall be a National Planning Council made up of representatives from the different government departments as a forum for discussing the NDP.

These requirements mandate the restructuring of the national planning and programming system. Further, the Minister of Defense is afforded greater participation in the formulation of the national security strategy and the gathering of information for the development of the national military strategy.

Under the former constitution, the population was accustomed to the idea that public order was exclusively the responsibility of the armed forces. Now, the new constitution, article 303, directs that regional councils, from departments and

municipalities play bigger roles in combating domestic violence. Henceforth, governors and regional authorities are compelled to recommend and comment on regional security plans and to periodically evaluate the positioning of military and law enforcement forces within their jurisdiction. This modification is very important because it forces greater interaction between the military and the civil authorities, and compels a greater delegation of authority for decision making to division and brigade command levels. Consequently, greater participation must be allowed at these levels to facilitate the allocation and administration of resources.

Of greater interest in the resource allocation process is the restructuring of the comptroller's office to place greater resource responsibility at the department level. To accomplish this, the Defense Ministry must create its own resource management capability and be responsible for its own program. This is significantly different from the previous system where the Defense Ministry needed many approvals in order to execute the programs. Furthermore, brigade and higher level commanders must play bigger roles in the planning and budgeting process, something that was not previously required.

The growth of domestic programs is also a key issue for the Ministry of Defense. Implementing these programs requires large expenditures of scarce national resources. Accordingly, the Minister of Defense needs a system that clearly articulates and defends the resource requirements for national security when

presented to the Superior Council for National Defense (SCND), the National Planning Council, the Superior Council for Economical and Social Policy (CONPES), the President, and the Congress.

Further, to implement the mandate of the new constitution, the National Planning Department has begun development of planning guidance that the President will issue to the Ministry of Defense. This planning guidance includes:

- Creating an interagency group (Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Finances) to follow the activities of programming and execution of the Defense Ministry budget.

- Reducing bureaucratic procedures in the administration of contracts. This requires a relook of the entire acquisition process to include a review of the 2337/1973 National Decree which regulates the acquisition process.

- Restructuring the different enterprises that belong to the Defense Ministry, and transferring to the private sector or other non defense establishments those functions not directly related to national security.

- Integrating the military retirement system with the newly developed national social security system.

The recommendations of the National Planning Department to the President imply that something is wrong with the armed forces management system.

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING VIOLENCE

The National Command Authority has determined that the biggest threat to national security is domestic violence. The "NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING VIOLENCE" was issued in May 1991 to contend with this threat. The government believes that by implementing the new constitution and subsequent measures, such as this strategy, along with other social, political, and economical measures, there will no longer be a pretext for insurgency and armed conflict against the citizens of Colombia. The most significant aspects of this strategy are:

- (1) Strengthens the roles of regional and local authorities for maintaining public order.
- (2) Promotes a peace policy with the guerrillas and centralizes the negotiation process at the executive level.
- (3) Provides that the only legal authority for directing and controlling law enforcement activities is vested in the national authorities.
- (4) Reinforces and modernizes the Judicial Branch of government to ensure compliance with national laws.
- (5) Fortifies the state's authority to confront guerrillas, narcotraffic, delinquency, kidnapping, and terrorism.
- (6) Protects and promotes human rights.

Implementing these measures, primarily the first two, together with a decentralized system of government, will significantly impact on how the military develops the national

military strategy and how the forces are structured.

The integration of the civil authorities in the maintenance of the public order adds a new dimension in the process of threat determination, selection of means, and allocation of resources. In other words, the new "National Strategy for Combating Violence" demands change in the way force requirements are developed.

To accomplish the objectives specified in the national strategy, the defense and state security organizations are assigned the following missions:

-Consolidate and transfer to the Army overall responsibility for combating insurgency. The guerrilla has lost support because of the implementation of the new constitution and the end of the cold war, which weakened his ideological arguments. However, underdevelopment and narcotraffic support continues to provide the guerrilla a perceived legitimate base for his existence. This being the case, the role of the Army will not diminish regardless of any constitutional or political change.

-Directs the Navy to establish a Coast Guard organization to prevent the exit of narcotics ships, and to deny the entrance of drug chemicals and precursors.

-Directs the Air Force to serve in a supporting role against insurgency and narcotraffic.

-Consolidates and transfers to the National Police the responsibility for combating narcotraffic. The Navy and Air

Force will serve in supporting roles.

- The Department of Administrative Security is assigned the mission of controlling economic crimes against the state, illegal enrichment, and the funding of guerrillas.

The reallocation of functions within the government mandates a realignment of resources and the development of a management system to accomplish the mission.

IDEAS FOR A NEW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

AND

FORCE INTEGRATION SYSTEM

Based on the appraisal of the national security needs and the military strategy, the Colombian Army must develop models that provide the structure to support the Internal Defense and Development (IDD) strategy, and permit the linking of the variables: objectives (ends); concepts (ways); forces (means); and risk. The ultimate goal is to create a system that integrates the efforts of operational and logistical systems, maximizing benefits from both resources and military capability. Subsequently, the system would facilitate development of operational programs and achieve strategic military objectives within specified fiscal ceilings/constraints.

Analysis to date reveals that corrective measures are needed. Measures which, according to deductive reasoning, must take into consideration a broad approach that responds to the

needs identified above. Since the Colombian Army follows the doctrinal and organizational patterns of the U.S. Army, and given the success of the resourcing models in the U.S., there should be a great benefit for the Colombian Armed Forces to examine or implement the DOD Resource Management System and the U.S. Army Force Integration System Models.

BASIC SYSTEM MODEL




FIGURE 1

The first step should be development of a conceptual framework for the total system. For example, the U.S. Army organization is an open system that transforms money, manpower, and material into military capability required by the U.S. to implement its national security and national military strategies.⁸

This basic systems model of INPUT-PROCESS-OUTPUT, could have application in the Colombian Army, (Fig 1). In practice, the danger exists, that Colombian Armed Forces may consume too much energy in the PROCESS phase and not see enough emerge in the form

of readiness.⁹ This is a risk that the Colombian Army may be confronted with. However, internal and external feedback could be useful in monitoring resource utilization and output effectiveness. Internally, there are the operational results, the timed reaction in the counterinsurgency struggle, statistical indexes, and training evaluations. Externally, there are, among others, public opinion campaigns about security and operational success, political advocates of military budget cuts, and congressional discontent. These are factors that the Colombian Army must be aware of, both as preventive and reactive measures.

PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING MODEL

An examination of the resource management system employed by the U.S. Department of Defense (Figure 2) could be useful in establishing planning, programming, and budgeting priorities in the Colombian Army.

The purpose of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is to develop a long-range plan, a mid-term program, and a near-term budget with the ultimate objective of providing the best mixture of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints.¹⁰ The PPBS is a collection of cycles that begin every other year, thus creating an overlap of cycles and instilling a measure of flexibility, since what happens in one cycle would impact on the others (Figure 3).


The PPBS could be a subordinate system of the National Development Plan (NDP) created by the new Constitution, and would compose the best tool to support the Ministry of Defense in presenting and defending resource requirements before the National Planning Council (Article 340 of the new Constitution).

The following discussion addresses the parameters and purpose of a Colombian resource management system model. This system will be divided into the three steps of the process: Planning(5 years), Programming (3 years), and Budgeting (1 year).

1. PLANNING. The National Strategy Appraisal(NSA) initiates the strategic planning cycle. The NSA is a process for threat identification, gathering information about the future global security environment, raising issues, and facilitating the integration of the strategy, operational planning, and program assessments.¹¹ During this process, a series of input (intermediate products) are developed by the Joint staff of the military forces command, service commanders, and division commanders. The intelligence assessment provides the base line intelligence threat analysis for developing the subsequent NSA.

The NSA should include as annexes, concise papers summarizing division commanders' input pertaining to readiness, missions, capabilities, shortfalls, and prioritized requirements. Another important component of the NSA should be the risk evaluation force structure. This is the force which would be necessary to achieve national military objectives with a reasonable assurance of success.

BIENNIAL PPBS LOGIC



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FIGURE 2

PPBS PROCESS PROPOSAL FOR THE COLOMBIAN ARMY




FIGURE 3

Responsibility for the NSA process rests with the General Commander of the military forces. The NSA process serves as a framework for building the National Military Strategy Document (NMSD). At the same time, the NSA is structured to provide information to the Minister of Defense in his preparation of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) which provides top-down direction for preparation of Service recommendations pertaining to military strategy and forces. The NSA would consider many areas of the American Joint Strategic Planning System known as the Joint Strategy Review (JSR), Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA), and Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA).

The NMSD is prepared by the General Commander of the military forces with input from the Service Chiefs. This document takes into consideration the National Military Strategy proposal and the fiscally-constrained force structure that is required to support this strategy.

The Minister of Defense uses the NMSD and the planning and resource requirement documents of the National Police and the Administrative Department of National Security to formalize the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS conveys to the President, the Superior Council for National Defense (SCND), the Superior Council for Economical and Social Policy (SCESP), and the National Planning Council a fully integrated National Security Strategy proposal. Once approved by the President, this strategy serves as the basis for the Minister of Defense planning guidance.

The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) furnishes the Minister of Defense's planning guidance and fiscal constraints to the General Commander of the military forces and to the Services to begin development of their programs. The DPG includes strategy and policy, the Minister of Defense's program planning objectives, fiscal and manpower constraints, and the illustrative planning scenario to accomplish the NMS. The DPG could be considered the link between Planning and Programming. It provides planning and programming guidance to the military departments for developing their planning documents (The Army Plan [TAP] and Program Objective Memorandum [POM]).

2. PROGRAMMING. This phase should translate Army planning as presented in The Army Plan into a comprehensive and detailed allocation of forces, manpower, material, and money for a three-year period. The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the Fiscal and Monetary Forecast (FMF), and the Strategic Capabilities Plan (SCP) would provide the foundation for the Army programming cycle. Other key documents related to and significantly affecting the programming process would be the Program and Budget Guidance (PBG) and Force Integration Analysis (FIA).

Currently, each year in June, the Ministry of Finances approves and sends to the Ministry of Defense the Fiscal and Monetary Forecast (FMF) pertaining to the resources available and the expected inflationary indices, so that Services know how much they can procure. This phase of the process needs to be modified

and integrated into the Minister of Defense's DPG.

The Strategic Capabilities Plan (SCP) would provide strategic guidance to the Services, including the apportionment of forces, to accomplish assigned strategic tasks based on military capabilities existing at the beginning of the planning period.¹² The SCP would be the principal vehicle by which the Army would be tasked to develop national and regional operational plans. The SCP would provide:¹³

- (1) A summary of the current national military strategy.
- (2) Planning guidance and strategic tasking to the Services.

- (3) A listing of major combat forces expected to be available.

- (4) An intelligence estimate for planning.

- (5) A group of the following annexes:

- Intelligence
- Command, Control, Communications, and Computer
- Mobility
- Logistics (Both material and facilities planning guidance)
- Psychological Operations
- Mobilization
- Electronic Warfare
- Civil Affairs

The Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which is part of a prioritization process, is the Army's proposal for a balanced

allocation of resources within specified constraints. The POM is forwarded to the General Commander of the military forces with proposed programs to achieve assigned missions and objectives. Program decision and fiscal guidance provided by the General Commander, after having reviewed Service programs, serve as a basis for the Army Budget.

The FIA is the basis for the POM, and would analyze and verify that the Force is both affordable, given the resource constraints, and capable of accomplishing the mission when taking into consideration risk factors. Key questions in this analysis are: (1) Can the force be equipped, manned, and trained?; (2) Can the force be sustained and maintained?; and (3) Can the force be successfully employed against the threat?¹⁴

The General Commander of the military forces would review the Services' POM and produce the Joint Program Assessment (JPA) as a base for the Minister of Defense's Program Decision Memorandum (PDM).

The JPA, like the American Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA), would present the views of the General Commander of the military forces on the balance and capabilities of the POM force and the support level to attain the national security objectives within the DPG, and submit to the Minister of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals in order to achieve greater conformance between the Army program recommendations and Minister of Defense priorities.

The Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) is the consequence

of the JPA and constitutes acceptance or modification of the Services POM. The PDM could be considered the link between the Programming and Budgeting cycles. It is the baseline for the Services' Budget Estimate Submission.¹⁵

3. BUDGETING. The budget phase expresses the resources requirements for one specific year of the programming process. This phase permits the allocation of funds to carry out the approved plans and programs, and promotes efficient program management and effective financial control.

The budgeting process should include budget formulation, justification, and execution. The formulation would include the Budget Estimate Submission (BES) and the General Commander of the military forces and Minister of Defense revision and approval. The justification would be before the Ministry of Finances, the National Planning Department, and the National Planning Council. Additionally, this phase includes the translation of the program into the Ministry of Finances' terminology and codes, and the Ministry of Finances' and congressional review and approval into appropriation law. The third stage, budget execution, is the adjustment of budgets to the approved congressional funding level, and the development of instructions to the field for the execution of approved programs. It also includes the Administrative Order for Execution of Fixed Fiscal Expenditures, which is issued by the Army Commander every December.

Under PPBS the Logistical Planning Department (E4) must become a key player in logistical planning and prioritization,

program integration, and budget formulation. Currently the E4 is only concerned with the accounting activities of the budget process.

By accepting these recommendations the Colombian Army should understand that the budget process is not only bureaucratic necessity but also a means for efficiently allocating resources, decision making, and evaluation of performance indicators.

FORCE INTEGRATION AND THE FUNCTIONAL LIFE-CYCLE MODEL

The second step of the basic model, PROCESS, can be analyzed by use of the functional life cycle. This model provides a solid basis for viewing the Colombian Army as a total system. It is very close to the "Functional Life-Cycle Model of the U.S. Army" and permits the evaluation of the Army from an operating and management perspective."¹⁶

The philosophical concept that supports the model is that each individual resource required by the U.S. Army is somewhere on a life continuum which stretches from the establishment of a need/requirement and entry into the Army to ultimate separation.¹⁷ Resources move on a clockwise direction throughout the model. The Army leadership must monitor, make decisions, and ensure top-down involvement to make the process work.

FUNCTIONAL LIFE CYCLE¹⁸




Figure 4

The following is a brief discussion of the major Force Integration activities in the Colombian Army:

FORCE DEVELOPMENT. Is the first phase of the life-cycle model and is the foundation for all other functional areas. It is defined as "the process of determining Army material, organization, and doctrinal requirements and translating them into time-phased programs and structures within allocated resources to accomplish assigned missions and functions."¹⁹ It permits the transition from theory to operational reality. It is the transition from threat analysis to manpower requirements,

weapon systems, and force structures manifested in tables of organization and equipment (TOE).

As previously stated, the National Security Strategy of Colombia has identified violence as the main threat to national interests and goals. The violence is manifested by the guerrilla, narcotraffic, terrorism, organized delinquency, kidnapping and extortion. As we saw before, the NAC ordered the Army to confront the guerrilla. To do that, the Army must revolutionize the process of building forces capable of defeating this threat. In Force Planning, I suggest the "Top-Down Approach".²⁰ It permits concentration on Ends and defines useful strategy among alternative force choices. This approach can be condensed into the next model (Figure 5).

FORCE PLANNING MODEL




Figure 5

ACQUISITION. Currently, equipment acquisition is based on availability of resources and not on need. All logistical support is acquired and managed via the "Intendencia General" comprised of a directorate staff of seven divisions that deal with transportation, health, procurement, communications, ordnance, personal equipment, and accounting. Within the Intendencia General there is a logistical support brigade with five battalions dedicated to the Army clothing industry, storage, transportation, distribution and maintenance. In addition, there is a battalion for health services.

The Intendencia General is a very complex organization that has acquired a great deal of autonomy in the prioritization of needs, contract management, and resource allocation for all battalion-size units. This concentration of power is not convenient because the lack of new "check and balance" within the system. The new resource management system must provide for greater interface between the Intendencia General and the Directorate of Instruction and Training.

TRAINING. For this activity, the Colombian Army has an office named "Directorate of Instruction and Training" reporting directly to the Army Commander. Although this office reports directly to the Army Commander, its role in doctrine and equipment acquisition is minimal. Basic and advanced training for soldiers is done by the battalion. After six months, the soldier is considered ready for combat operations. Normally a soldier is assigned to the same unit for his military obligation.

In training, it is necessary to strengthen the Directorate of Instruction and Training. It should be restructured to resemble the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command with responsibilities for doctrine, training, organization, leadership development, and weapons systems and equipment modernization. In the new environment, this office must establish additional interface with division and brigade commanders to determine battlefield requirements and to develop acquisition strategies concurrently with the Intendencia General.

DISTRIBUTION. Equipment distribution directives are the responsibility of the Intendencia General, while execution is exercised by the logistical brigade. Combat service support (CSS) battalions of the correspondent brigades are responsible for the receipt and distribution of supplies among the battalions.

Material distribution plans are made based on the number of soldiers assigned to a battalion and on budgetary limitations, with little consideration given to the mission or the priority assigned to the unit and with minor input by brigade and division commanders. In order to maximize cost effectiveness, the Directorate of Instruction and Training must play a bigger role in the determination of material requirements and prioritization. The Intendencia General needs to provide greater emphasis on the activities of programming and procurement, and delegate the execution of the distribution plans to the Logistics Brigade.

EMPLOYMENT. The commitment of troops is based on the

day-to-day situation in the country (theater of operation). The decision to engage a battalion is made by the Army Commander while the employment of company-sized units is made by the brigade commander.

Based on the new constitution and the new strategy for combating violence, plans for employment of forces require greater coordination with the civil authorities. This implies greater delegation and decentralization in the deployment, employment, and commitment of forces.

SUSTAINMENT. This function is accomplished by the Intendencia General based on the logistics brigade capabilities and budgetary constraints. Since the allocated resources are never sufficient, commanders at all levels must rely on donations from other agencies and the private sector, especially for fuels and maintenance materials. To combat this situation, it is necessary to implement a mechanism so that the high command can successfully support and defend military requirements at the national command level. A small, well-organized, and adequately resourced Army is better than a big hollow Army.

DEVELOPMENT. Officer education programs range from individual self-development and the military academy to senior Services and military institutions such as the Superior War College. Additionally, the Army seeks officer developmental programs within military institutions in the country and abroad, mainly in the U.S. Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) training covers special technical skills only.

Although Colombian Army soldiers are professionally and technically competent, according to the realities of the country, the Army needs more capable soldiers in the personnel management arena. Furthermore, there is a need to develop educational programs that prepare and qualify personnel for future assignments, rather than rewarding past meritorious acts.

SEPARATION. Traditionally the Army has not viewed this situation as a normal consequence that should worry the institution. When officers or NCOs retire they are no longer a concern of the institution, except for retired pay. Upon completion of military service, soldiers are assigned to the reserve. In theory this is a good philosophy; however, because of budget shortfalls, they are never called to participate in military operations. Consequently, with each progressing year that they are out of the Army, they become less of an asset.

The Army has an organization called "Direction of Recruitment and Mobilization" which is dependent on the Army command and that is basically dedicated to the activity of recruitment. More emphasis must be placed in the area of mobilization. To do this it is necessary to establish an efficient statistical control process to track former soldiers. A system should also be developed to provide a minimum of two weeks of annual training for prior service soldiers up to the age of 45.


In the new environment, the Colombian Army will face permanent changes that will affect its performance. The Force Integration Model, based on the U.S. Army War College model, is useful to understand the different support systems that the Colombian Army should implement and the interrelations of the subsystems and how they must be coordinated. Additionally, this model could be a key factor in reorganizing the Army structure leading to enhanced resource integration and force capability. The model at figure 6 depicts a potential force integration process that may have applicability in the Colombian Army.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

During the last 50 years, the ideological confrontation with communism, narcotraffic, smuggling operations, student riots, and police activities are events that are a drag to the Colombian Army making difficult the modernization of its forces and hindering the successful execution of the National Military Strategy.

The new world order implies a new role for Latin American Armies. The new Constitution and the new National Strategy against violence constitute ingredients that will guide the military sector through a transition period where the military leadership must lead their own changing process, rather than merely reacting to external mandated changes that are based on

ARMY FORCE INTEGRATION



little or no military experience.

This new environment creates the best opportunity to modify the current Army resource management system as a key factor that gives light to the process of modernizing the force and suits the requirements of the emerging circumstances. To accomplish this, it would be very useful to analyze the process that Secretary of Defense McNamara initiated in the U.S. in the early 1960's; develop models to support the internal defense and development strategy; create a system to integrate the efforts of operational and logistical systems; and maximize the benefits from both resources and military capabilities within specified fiscal ceilings/constraints.

The first step should be the development of a conceptual framework for the total system. The basic system model of the U.S. Army could be applicable and useful for determining the INPUT-PROCESS-OUTPUT relationship and environmental influence on the Army.

In order to analyze the current Colombian Army PROCESS step of the Basic System Model, it could be useful to do it throughout the Functional Life-Cycle Model of the U.S. Army. To do this, the following recommendations appear applicable:

- The use of the "Top-down Approach" to plan the force and evaluate the variables (end, ways, means, and risk) in order to determine the force needed to accomplish the mission.

- More interaction between civil and military authorities.

-Decentralize the operational decision process and the resource management system to fit the government policy of decentralization and the new National Strategy for Combating Violence. To do this, it is necessary to delegate more authority to division and brigade commanders making them more responsible for input to the planning, programming, and budgeting process.

-Strengthen the Directorate of Instruction and Training and restructure it to resemble a scaled-down version of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

-Establish a more efficient information system to assist the Army leadership in the decision making process and facilitate the risk identification and force analysis.

-Develop educational programs that prepare and qualify personnel for future assignments, rather than rewarding past meritorious acts.

Because the operational and logistical systems run separately, the Colombian Army must establish a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). An examination of the resource management system employed by the U.S. Department of Defense could be useful in establishing a long-range, midterm, and near-term vision to provide the best possible mixture of forces, equipment, and support. Currently the Colombian resource management system is only concentrated on the near-term.

Additionally, for the development of a PPBS, it will be necessary to implement a model that permits the reorganization of the Army structure leading to enhanced resource integration and

force capability. For this purpose, the Army Force Integration Model developed by the U.S. Army War College can be useful.

By incorporating the ideas presented, the Colombian Army can better implement the National Military Strategy, design its force structure, and organize, train, and equip the force to achieve a higher combat effectiveness. Although this paper is not conclusive and further analysis is required, the study identifies some models that are considered very useful to initiate the next step in the system development process. Because of the complexity of the subject, a team of selective subject matter experts from both the Colombian and the U.S. Military establishments could be formed to design and field a new Resource Management System to support the Colombian Army in the new environment.

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