

AD-A251 824



92-15660



UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION Same		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) AWCI	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.
			WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.		
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Drugs and Terror: A Threat to U.S. National Security (U)					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) LTC Alvin D. Cantrell					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT MSP		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1992 March 23	
15. PAGE COUNT 36					
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	Narcoterrorism, Drug Trafficking, Terrorism, Insurgent Movements, Counternarcotics		
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) One of the most ominous developments in recent years is the union of drug traffickers and terrorists. This growing problem, called narcoterrorism, threatens U.S. national security. This threat causes corruption at every level of government and society. In 1989 President Bush declared that drug abuse was the gravest domestic problem facing our nation and was a national security threat. There has been little or no improvement since then. Secretary of Defense Cheney has stated that the detection and countering of the production, trafficking, and the use of illicit narcotics is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense. The social impact of the widespread drug abuse in the United States, the staggering effect on the economy, and Third World instability all have substantial national security implications. Narcoterrorism links the drug problem with the terrorist problem, and it is an international and domestic security threat.					
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Murl D. Munger			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 717-245-3911		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AWCI

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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DRUGS AND TERROR: A THREAT TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Alvin D. Cantrell, LTC, USA

TITLE: Drugs and Terror: A Threat to U.S. National Security

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 23 March 1992 PAGES: 34 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

One of the most ominous developments in recent years is the union of drug traffickers and terrorists. This growing problem, called narcoterrorism, threatens U.S. national security. This threat causes corruption at every level of government and society. In 1989 President Bush declared that drug abuse was the gravest domestic problem facing our nation and was a national security threat. There has been little or no improvement since then. Secretary of Defense Cheney has stated that the detection and countering of the production, trafficking, and the use of illicit narcotics is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense. The social impact of the widespread drug abuse in the United States, the staggering effect on the economy, and Third World instability all have substantial national security implications. Narcoterrorism links the drug problem with the terrorist problem, and it is an international and domestic security threat.

INTRODUCTION

The Cold War is over. The collapse of the Soviet Union reduces the risk to United States national security interests throughout the world. For forty years, the threat has been obvious. Now we must look beyond what was the immediate Soviet threat of general war in Europe and elsewhere to the more probable low-intensity conflict in the Third World. The flow of illicit narcotics into the United States and the demand for these drugs continues to plague our society. One of the most ominous developments in recent years is the union of drug traffickers and terrorists. This growing problem, called narcoterrorism, threatens U.S. national security. ¹

In 1989 President Bush declared that drug abuse was the gravest domestic problem facing our nation and a national security threat. The detection and countering of the production, trafficking, and the use of illicit narcotics is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense.² The manufacture and delivery of narcotics is an useful element of many terrorist and insurgent organizations. The most obvious reason for this is that narcotics are an instant source of revenue for their activities.

Drug trafficking and the consumption of illicit drugs will remain a serious threat to U.S. national security interests, and

terrorism will continue to threaten our way of life. Narcoterrorism is an alliance or marriage between two of the most ominous and devastating forces troubling our society -- drugs and terror.³

DEFINITION

The illegal traffic of drugs has furthered the interests and objectives of some governments and terrorist, insurgent and guerrilla organizations throughout the world. Although the term narcoterrorism may serve many purposes, it often implies a conspiracy with strategic and tactical objectives. Defining narcoterrorism first requires a definition of terrorism. Joint Pub 1-02 defines terrorism as:

The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.⁴

One of the most significant characteristics of terrorism is it is inimical to the basic fundamentals or values of our Western democracy.

Narcoterrorism has been defined in many ways and some are widely disputed. In the JCS Pub 1-02 definition, narcoterrorism occurs when politically motivated activities or threats, such as assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings, become connected with the drug trade. These activities involve money earned from the production and sale of drugs for violent political purposes that are usually associated with terrorism.⁵ Usually the targets are those people who are opposed to the drug trade. The attackers

range from leftist insurgents to the right-wing death squads of the drug cartels who want to maintain the status quo. These political connections are not new, but they have gained much prominence during the 1980s. The term narcoterrorism is used broadly to include the drug-insurgency connection, the "narcomilitary" state, and the terrorist-like death squads of the drug lords.⁶

Whether it applies to drug trafficking or political terror, narcoterrorism has emerged as an extremely useful weapon of these organizations. In 1984 former Secretary of State George P. Shultz said:

Drug dealers are part of a larger pattern of international lawlessness by communist nations. The complicity of communist nations in the drug trade is cause for grave concern among the nations of the free world....Money from drug smuggling supports terrorists. Terrorists provide assistance to drug traffickers. Organized crime works hand in hand with these other outlaws for their own profit. And what may be most disturbing is the mounting evidence that some governments are involved, too, for their own diverse reasons. Cuba and Nicaragua are prime examples of communist countries involved in drug trafficking to support guerrillas in Central America...The link between narcotics, terrorism and communism is not confined to Latin America, but also exists in Italy, Turkey, and Burma.⁷

In Latin America where drugs and terror work most closely together, narcoterrorism has become a factor in the economic and political power structure. Scott B. MacDonald states, "In a very basic formula, cocaine equals power, and narcoterrorism is the enforcement of that power, because it clearly threatens the intentional use of violence to create an environment of fear and

anxiety. The primary target in most cases has been the state, which has led to an increase in violence in a number of Andean nations."⁸

Narcoterrorism does suggest a linkage between terrorism and drug trafficking throughout the world. These two parallel industries form a symbiotic relationship that interact synergistically.⁹ For the terrorist, narcotics trafficking provides the money to purchase arms and finance its operations. The drug-trafficker uses terror to insure the sources of his supply and the integrity of his organization.

Regardless if motivation for narcoterrorism is for profit or ideology, social disruption occurs through violence, and each group benefits from the association. This alliance between terrorists and the well-financed drug syndicates allows both organizations to support each other while furthering their respective objectives. Professor Michael Ledeen, an American expert on terrorism and a former consultant to the National Security Council, explained:

Running drugs is one sure way to make big money in a hurry. Moreover, the directions of the flow are ideologically attractive. Drugs go to the bourgeois countries, where they corrupt and they kill, while the arms go to pro-Communist terrorist groups in the Third World.¹⁰

EVIDENCE OF INVOLVEMENT

Three principal figures exist in the world of narcoterrorism: The insurgents, the intelligence services or government officials who want to export revolution, and the drug lords.¹¹ These three types of narcoterrorist groups deal in drug-trafficking, weapons trafficking, money laundering, and mutual protection.

Insurgents-Terrorists

Many insurgent groups represent a linkage to narcoterrorism. Although the total list of insurgents involved in drug-trafficking is relatively small compared to total insurgents worldwide, it does include several major organizations, especially in South America and Southeast Asia.¹² Their activities range from providing protection to control of entire drug growing regions and drug trafficking. Generally, the connection between the insurgent-terrorist group and illicit drug trafficking is a result of the drug demand and the tendency for the two activities to be located in the same general location. In some instances, the political climate has caused the insurgent-terrorist groups to move into established cultivation and processing regions. Although each side might seek different ends in the short and long term, each group does benefit from the alliance. In any case, involvement of insurgent-terrorist groups with the drug trade further complicates governmental policies against drug traffickers.¹³

Colombia

Clear connections exist between Colombian insurgents and the production and trafficking of narcotics. These groups employ their terrorist violence against the Colombian government and the Colombian society. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is the largest of the major Colombian insurgent organizations and has some 10,000 to 15,000 active members. It operates in more than twenty guerrilla fronts throughout the country of Colombia. Over half these fronts operate in the coca or

marijuana growing areas in the rural part of the country.¹⁴ Known cases exist where the FARC operates with narcotic traffickers for money and weapons. Also, the FARC has collected protection money from the coca growers in their territory. The FARC protects many of the airfields that are vital to the narcotics trade. The coca growers gain protection while the FARC benefits are money and supplies. The FARC controls most of the areas where coca is produced.

It is certain that wherever a FARC front and drug trafficking exist, a mutual agreement between the two has taken place. In 1984 Colombian authorities raided a large cocaine processing center. A FARC camp was less than a mile away. Although this does not mean that the FARC participates in the processing of drugs, it does show that mutual agreements coexist between the two organizations. Most likely the agreement is for the protection of the processing plant. Terrorist groups continue to present a significant threat. Over 70 attacks against American interests occurred in Colombia in 1989.¹⁵ The main goal of the FARC is to overthrow the Colombian government and the ruling class. The FARC has been linked to Cuba, the former Soviet Union, and Sandinista Nicaragua.

The most notorious of Colombia's insurgent groups was the leftist organization called the 19th of April Movement (M-19). It obtained weapons and supplies through drug traffickers dealing with Cuba. Documented allegations exist that linked Noriega in Panama, Castro in Cuba, the M-19, and Colombia's Medellin drug cartel. These allegations involved money laundering, gun sales, and

narcotics trafficking.¹⁶

The M-19 cooperated with drug trafficker Jaime Guillot-Lara. He supplied the M-19 with weapons during the early 1980s in return for assistance in his drug trafficking enterprise from high-ranking Cuban officials. By 1985 close ties existed between M-19 and Carlos Lehder, one of Colombia's leading drug traffickers. In November 1985, about sixty members of the M-19 guerrilla organization seized the Palace of Justice in Bogota. They were funded by the Medellin cartel. The M-19 took more than 300 hostages, including many judges from Colombia's highest court. Their mission was to destroy the records of nearly 200 drug offenders threatened with extradition to the United States. The Colombian military stormed the Palace after a 28 hour siege. M-19 killed many people, including eleven of the Court Justices.¹⁷ Only a few members of the M-19 force managed to escape. Most were killed. On 2 November 1989, the Colombian government and the M-19 signed an agreement to disband the M-19 as a guerrilla force.¹⁸ The agreement granted amnesty to the members of M-19 and allowed them to form a legal political party.

Since the 1985 attack, narcoterrorism has appeared in most Andean countries. Active Colombian communist insurgents continue to use profits from narcotics trafficking to arm and equip their guerrilla forces against the Colombian democratic government.

Peru

Peru ranks as the primary region of coca cultivation in the world. Peruvian insurgents follow the examples of those operating

Colombia. Drug-related violence has steadily increased since the early 1980s. Many violent attacks on the police and workers have taken place. Much information suggests that narcotics traffickers and narcoterrorists were behind the killings. In Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, a mutually beneficial alliance exists between narcotics traffickers and the infamous Sendero Luminoso, a Maoist insurgent group. This is probably the strongest narcoterrorist alliance in Latin America. Sendero Luminoso, also known as the Shinning Path, ranks among the most elusive, secretive, and brutal terrorist-like insurgent organizations in the world. A major objective of Sendero Luminoso is to interrupt Peruvian-U.S. anti-drug efforts. More than 400 government workers have resigned since 1987 because of Sendero Luminoso terror. Since 1980 the Sendero Luminoso organization has killed more than 23,000 people and cost the Peruvians some \$18 billion. Although not all these incidents have been drug related, many resulted from the linkage between the insurgent Sendero Luminoso and the trafficking of narcotics.¹⁹

The Sendero Luminoso not only trade protection for drug money, but they also exploit the Peruvian government's U.S.-funded crop eradication program. This exploitation works as propaganda toward the peasants who lose their income because their coca fields are government targets for destruction. Drug-related violence supports a state of anarchy in Peru that the government finds hard to stop. Narcoterrorism by the Sendero Luminoso and the drug syndicate allows both groups to support one another while furthering their respective objectives. Although these two groups do have different

ideologies, they do share a mutual enemy, the Peruvian government. Sendero Luminoso justifies its participation in the drug trade by explaining that drugs contribute to the corruption and demoralization of Western democracy. Their involvement in the drug trade increases the threat to Peru's democratic government and regional U.S. interests.²⁰

Bolivia

The cultivation of the coca plant is an ancient practice in Bolivia. The production and trade of this coca plant dominates the Bolivian economy accounting for about one half of the nation's GNP. Approximately 20 percent of the working population (300,000 to 500,000 people) depend on coca for their livelihood. The farmers can make up to four times the amount of money growing coca than they could make growing other crops. United States support, especially with military forces, undermine the popularity and nationalist characteristics of the Bolivian president. Coca growers are a national political force. Five times they have joined forces with the worker-peasants to blockade the nation's third largest city, Cochabamba to protest U.S.-Bolivian anti-drug policies. There have been other anti-government demonstrations as well.²¹

Although Bolivia has not been free of guerrilla violence in the past, it has avoided the terrorist problems that have plagued other Andean countries. During the first half of the 1980s, it has even seen a decline in such activity. Even if not threatened by well-organized and elaborate insurgencies, some terrorist groups

have now joined in these activities.

In August 1988, there was a bombing attempt on Secretary of State George P. Shultz's motorcade. In December 1988, the Bolivian Congress was dynamited. Also, in May 1989, two Mormon missionaries were murdered. These attacks and murders are linked to the U.S.-sponsored crop eradication effort. A group called Zarate Willca Armed Forces of Liberation has been linked to these attacks.²²

The Zarate Willca could become similar to Peru's Sendero Luminoso if the government goes too far against the cocaine economy.²³ The large and poor Indian population has largely remained outside of the Bolivian economy. Crop reduction programs continue to disturb coca growers and their workers. These crop reduction programs coupled with the impoverished population could start the type of narcoterrorism that is currently seen in Colombia and Peru. Already, there is evidence that suggests a link between the Sendero Luminoso and insurgent movements in Bolivia.²⁴

Golden Triangle

Much of the world's illicit opium and refined heroin is produced in an area of Southeast Asia known as the Golden Triangle. This area is nearly 150,000 square miles in size. It extends from the Chin Hills in western Myanmar (Burma) to China's Yunnan province to the northwestern provinces of Laos and Thailand, and into the Kayah State of southern Burma. Presently, there are major concentrations of opium cultivation in Burma, Thailand, Laos, and China and estimates show that these concentrations are steadily increasing.²⁵

The insurgents range from ideological revolutionaries to ethnic separatists and profit oriented drug warlords. Whatever their objectives, these groups are very much involved in the production, transport, and sale of heroin. The relationship between insurgents and drug traffickers is extremely close in Burma. Most of the primary insurgent groups rely on the trafficking of heroin to finance their activities. A wide range of ideology exists among these insurgent groups. Burma is the single largest producer of opium. More than half the opium harvested in Burma is in the areas controlled by the leftist and ethnic separatist insurgents. Although they exist, insurgent-terrorist links to the narcotics trade are weaker in other areas of northern Thailand, Laos, and southern China.²⁶

The largest of these groups was the Burmese Communist Party (BCP). The BCP, as with the other groups, involved themselves in the production, delivery, and sale of heroin. In 1983 the BCP even began to establish refineries to convert opium into heroin. Also, the BCP engaged in direct drug sales to middlemen. In the Kachin State, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) supports the Kachin Independence Organization. This insurgent organization has increased its support throughout the area since the collapse of the BCP in the late eighties. The KIA continues to depend on its drug revenues to support its operations. The KIA controls significant producing areas.²⁷

Since the 1960s and 1970s, the Shan United Army (SUA), the Burmese counterpart of the FARC in Colombia, has been an active

insurgent group in Burma.²⁸ The SUA ,also known as the Mong Tai Army, is a well-armed insurgent group that controls a substantial portion of the narcotic smuggling operation in the area, and it has used its profits to finance its insurgent activities.²⁹

The SUA is headed by Khun Sa, the most powerful of all the warlords in the Golden Triangle.³⁰ Khun Sa has been fighting the Burmese government for more than 25 years in order to establish an independent homeland for the Shan ethnic minority. Khun Sa controls the primary transit routes to the Thai-Burma border where the SUA controlled refineries and others process most of the heroin produced in Burma. ³¹

State-Sponsored

There are some nations that have supported narcoterrorist organizations. These include the former Soviet Union, Cuba, and Bulgaria which espouse Marxist-Leninist ideals plus some other countries such as Syria that often regard the United States or Western democracies as a threat to their goals or ideology.

Soviet Connection

For many years U.S. officials have had substantial evidence implicating Cuba and other communist nations in international drug trafficking. These countries have been mere surrogates of the former Soviet Union. The former Soviet Union had nothing against terrorism especially if it serves their useful purpose of furthering global class struggle.³²

Marxist-Leninists teach that no methods are immoral if they

advance the interest of the state. James Sherr explains that Marxist-Leninist think differently and hold a different view on politics and ethics:

For bourgeois thinkers, the relation between means and ends is largely an ethical issue. For Marxist-Leninist, it is a practical issue. The character of war, 'Lenin stated,' is not determined by who the aggressor was, or whose territory the enemy has occupied; it is determined by the class that is waging the war.' Marxist-Leninists find themselves firmly within the 'just war' tradition. In the judgment of the USSR's international lawyers, the violence of the oppressed can never be termed 'aggression.' In the service of 'national and social liberation,' war is always rightful, if not always prudent: so, for that matter, is espionage, subversion and terror.³³

The Soviet Union had a hand in the growth of international drug trafficking. In the fall of 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev called a secret meeting in Moscow with the top Warsaw Pact leaders. Major General Jan Sejna attended the meeting as a member of the Czech delegation. Sejna was later Secretary of the Czechoslovak Defense Council and Chief of Staff at the Ministry of Defense prior to defecting to the West in 1968. According to Sejna, Khrushchev addressed the subject of drugs during the meeting.³⁴

Khrushchev explained how the drug business would cripple and destabilize Western societies and at the same time would generate much needed capital revenue in exchange for intelligence operations. Also, he stated that the drug business would undermine the health and morale of U.S. soldiers and weaken the human factor in the defense situation. The education system would also be a

target. Sejna clearly remembers Khrushchev's closing remarks, "When we discuss this strategy, there were some who were concerned that this might be immoral. But we must state categorically that anything that speeds the destruction of capitalism is moral."³⁵

Many of the Soviet Union's closest allies and client states clearly have been involved in the drug business. Bulgaria, Cuba, and Nicaragua could not have been involved in narcoterrorism without Moscow's knowledge or tacit approval. There has been evidence of U.S. naivete about Soviet involvement in terrorism, but many believe that the Soviets were partly responsible for the infrastructure of international narcoterrorism.³⁶

Cuban Connection

During this decade, substantial evidence has connected Cuban officials and Colombian drug lords. Cuba uses drug organizations to funnel weapons and money to terrorists groups who want to destroy various Latin American governments. The clearest link of Cuba's narcoterrorism connection surfaced in November 1982 during the Jaime Guillot-Lara case in Miami's Federal District Court. Fourteen people received indictments including several Cuban high officials. During the case, testimony documented Cuban Government involvement in both protection of drug vessels enroute to the United States and shipment of arms to the M-19 insurgents in Colombia.³⁷

Since 1982, law enforcement agencies have found real evidence that implicates Cuba and other communist nations in the trafficking of narcotics. Cuban officials encouraged and aided the Sandinista

government of Nicaragua to enter the narcotics business. Former Nicaraguan officials have said that the narcotics business under Ortega was an official government run operation with Cuban and Soviet advisors.³⁸ In 1983 in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida, a former member of the DGI (Cuban Intelligence Service) testified that there was indeed Cuban involvement in narco-trafficking. His testimony said that this trafficking was aimed clearly at the United States:

One of the reasons for this drug traffic with the United States is to throw the United States off in Central America, and this big operation of drugs coming up to Miami is part of that. They are trying to create an atmosphere of crisis in the southern United States, and then throw you off and work up in the northern areas, bringing equipment and medical equipment and supplies and other stuff through Panama....In all of this, the Soviet Union is involved. Since Fidel Castro took over the chairmanship of the nonaligned countries, they have tried, through the Soviet Union, to undermine the United States in the eyes of the world, just like the Soviets did in Vietnam, where they undermined the prestige of the United States, and another one of their operations there was the heroin for the U.S. forces.³⁹

The goal of these operations is to use drugs as a political weapon against the United States. U.S. officials have evidence that Cuban MIGs and patrol boats have escorted and protected Colombian drug shipments in Cuban airspace and territorial waters.⁴⁰ These shipments were enroute to the United States. At least three of Colombia's six terrorist groups have ties to Cuba.⁴¹

The most recent evidence of involvement came between October 1987 and March 1988. Three indictments in Miami involved narcotic

traffickers and Cuban officials connected in the transshipment of Colombian cocaine headed for the United States. These indictments involved Noriega, Castro, Ortega, and the Medellin cartel. It cannot be a coincidence of the links that involve Cuba with the international narcotics trade and international terrorist organizations.⁴²

Bulgarian Connection

Bulgaria was foremost among the Soviet client states in narcoterrorism. It is a likely suspect for two main reasons. First, its geographical location gives it the ideal place for movement between Europe and Asia. Secondly, it has been one of the Soviets most faithful allies. The Bulgarians actually like the Russians.⁴³

In the early 1970s, Bulgaria's involvement in the drug business became relatively clear to U.S. officials. In 1971 Stefan Sverdlev, a colonel in the KDS, the Bulgarian Committee for State Security (KGB equivalent), defected to Greece. He brought with him some 500 documents. One of these was KDS directive M-120/00-0050 dated July 16, 1970. The directive subject was "the destabilization of western society through, among other tools, the narcotic trade."⁴⁴

KINTEX, a Bulgarian state trading organization, was used to execute this strategy, and it has been used to smuggle drugs and weapons throughout the world. KINTEX was nothing more than an umbrella organization that was used to move different types of contraband through Bulgaria. However, Bulgaria has adopted a low

profile in recent years largely because of strong public condemnation by the United States.⁴⁵ It has yet to be seen what effect the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact will have on this drug connection.

Syrian Connection

Syria, like Cuba, has become increasingly involved in narcoterrorism. Syrian involvement is more classic in its form of terrorism because it uses narcotics trading to continue its war with Israel, conservative Arab nations, and the West. Syria became a major player in the Lebanese drug trade in 1975, when Syrian military forces seized control of Lebanon's fertile Bekaa Valley. Since this occupation, hashish has been the major drug produced and by 1986 approximately 75 percent of hashish world consumption was harvested in the Bekaa Valley.⁴⁶

Since the early 1980s, opium has competed for the land in the Bekaa Valley and in 1990 at least five tons of pure heroin were processed. This heroin is some of the highest-grade in the world. About 25 percent of this heroin goes to the United States. Western Europe receives the rest.⁴⁷ Recently, Syrian and Lebanese factions have become involved in the profitable cocaine trade. Although the coca plant is not grown in the valley, coca paste is received from South America for refinement.

Linkage exists between the Colombian Medellin cartel and the Syrian military intelligence in a drugs for terrorist training deal. The essence of the deal was that Syria would supply the cartel with terrorist expertise and equipment in exchange for

cartel help to Syria in its Lebanon-based cocaine activities.

The Syrian military has about 30,000 soldiers in the Bekaa Valley. These forces have continued to provide protection and at times transit for the illicit drugs.⁴⁸ Nothing moves in or out of the valley without passing a Syrian checkpoint.

Drug revenues for Syria's drug involvement contribute an estimated \$1 billion to the Syrian Treasury. Syria's involvement in the drug trade has increased the supply of drugs available for consumption, and has increased the threat of terrorism in the Western Hemisphere especially since its involvement with the cartels. This involvement poses a threat to the United States.⁴⁹

Cartels-Drug Lords

The drug lord element of narcoterrorism's trinity has escalated in recent years. What used to be mafia type crimes have grown to narcoterrorist political actions. In Colombia, two cartels, the Medellin and Cali, have controlled the majority of the drug trade and have earned billions of dollars each year by bringing corruption and violence throughout the world.

During the 1980s, these two cartels controlled over eighty percent of the exported cocaine and over sixty percent of the cocaine sold in the United States. The rest of the trade has been controlled by guerrillas, insurgents, and other smaller processors.⁵⁰ The Medellin cartel had the largest share of the market until the early 1990s, but recently their drug power has been reduced because of its long and vicious battle with the Colombian government. The Cali cartel is now the largest and now

produces seventy percent of the cocaine going to the U.S. today and ninety percent of the drug sold in Europe. In July 1991, Robert Bonner, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, said: "The Cali cartel is the most powerful criminal organization in the world. No drug organization rivals them today or perhaps any time in history."⁵¹ Drug lords are a powerful force throughout the Colombian society. With billions of dollars and high tech weapons, these narcotics traffickers have attempted to disrupt the democratic government of Colombia. The Cali and Medellin cartels are probably more dangerous than any of the Latin American terrorist and guerrilla groups.⁵²

It is not uncommon for the drug lords to murder or kidnap those who oppose them politically or economically. More than 20,000 people were murdered in Colombia in 1988. Approximately, ten percent of this staggering number were killed for political purposes. A partial chronology of prominent Colombian drug killings indicates the drug trafficker's prime targets:

- 10 Apr 1984-Minister of Justice Dr. Rodrigo Lara Bonilla
- 23 Jul 1984-Judge Tulio Manuel Castro Gil
- 31 Jul 1986-Supreme Court Judge Hernando Baquero Borda
- 17 Aug 1986-Colonel Jaime Ramirez Gomez, former Director of the Anti-Narcotics Force of the Police
- 17 Dec 1986-Don Guillermo Cano Isaza, Director of El Espectador, a leading daily newspaper
- 13 Jan 1987-Budapest, Hungary: former Minister of Justice, then Ambassador of

Colombia in Hungary, Dr. Enrique Parejo Gonzalez

- 11 Oct 1887-Presidential Aspirant Jaime Pardo Leal, leader of the Patriotic Union Party (UP)
- 25 Jan 1988-Attorney General Carlos Hayos
- 4 May 1989-Former governor Alvaro Gonzales Santana
- 16 Aug 1989-Carlos Ernesto Valencia, Superior Tribunal Magistrate
- 18 Aug 1989-Luis Carlos Galan, a Liberal Party Senator and presidential candidate
- 27 Oct 1989-Gabriel Santamaria, a UP Congressman⁵³

During the last decade, over 350 employees of Colombia's judicial system, including 50 judges, were murdered in drug-related violence. With their tremendous financial resources, the cartels can provide modern weapons and revenue to the ideologically driven insurgents. Clearly, the cartels have the power to rival the Colombian government.⁵⁴ Rensselaer W. Lee III states:

Drug barons today are major political forces in countries as Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, carving out states within states in coca-producing regions, sometimes forming alliances of convenience with local leftist guerrillas, undermining authorities with bribery and assassinations, and amassing enough armed might to keep governments at bay. Drug traffickers have also sought to play by the local political rules, banding together to lobby politicians to nominate candidates for public office and occasionally to negotiate with national leaders as quasi-equals.⁵⁵

IMPLICATIONS ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Former President Reagan stated in a National Security Decision

Directive (NSDD) entitled "Narcotics and National Security" that "Illicit narcotic trafficking is a greater threat to national security, economic well-being and social order than the threat posed by international terrorist or any armed conflict short of war with a major power."⁵⁶ Some of the major points of this NSDD are:

- Critical drug trafficking organizations can corrupt political and economic institutions and weaken the ability of foreign governments to control key areas of their own territory and populace.
- Some insurgent and terrorist groups cooperate closely with drug traffickers and use this as a major source of funds.
- It is the policy of the United States, working in cooperation with other nations, to halt the production and flow of illicit narcotics, reduce the ability of insurgent and terrorist groups to use drug trafficking to support their activities, and strengthen the ability of individual governments to confront and defeat this threat.⁵⁷

Trafficking and consumption of drugs can cause national security problems for the United States both at home and abroad. The four basic U.S. national interests of President Bush's August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States include:

1. The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
3. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
4. A stable and secure world, where

political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.⁵⁸

Narcoterrorism threatens these national interests. The National Military Strategy has been structured to support these interests and two national military objectives address narcotics and terrorism:

- Stem the Flow of Illegal Drugs
 - Stem the production and transit of illegal drugs and their entry into the United States.
- Combat Terrorism
 - Participate in the national programs to thwart and respond to actions of terrorist organizations.⁵⁹

Narcoterrorism does not threaten the United States like a direct military attack. It is more subtle. It affects our national values. Both internal and external elements face endangerment. Drug trafficking is an ideal weapon that threatens the social fabric of the United States. American values continue to erode, in part, because of this. Americans consume about 60 percent of the world's illicit drugs. Drug use in the United States has reached some staggering heights: 62 million Americans admit having used marijuana, 22 million report cocaine use with 6 million regular users, and 500,000 heroin addicts.⁶⁰ The use of drugs and addiction affects people at all levels of our society and has caused dramatic increases in crime. AIDS is relative to drug use. Close to 25 percent of all American AIDS victims are infected through illicit drug use.⁶¹

Global drug trade has been estimated up to \$500 billion a year

which is more than twice the value of all U.S. currency in circulation. The U.S. share of this is estimated at over \$100 billion which is twice what U.S. consumers spend on oil a year.⁶² Additionally, the U.S. economy loses more than \$200 billion in accidents, absenteeism, rehabilitation and medical treatment, insurance claims, increased law enforcement requirements, and other related costs.⁶³

In 1988 murders in Washington D.C. increased by seventy percent due to the result of cocaine use and trafficking.⁶⁴ Other cities have the same type of problems. This increase in crime has caused a crisis in the American judicial system. During the 1980s, there was over a 250 percent increase in drug related cases filed in federal district courts. Drug related offenses represent over one-third of all federal prison incarcerations.⁶⁵

Americans continue to die or lose their personal potential. The degradation of social and moral values because of the drug problem continues to threaten our younger generations. Narcoterrorism prolongs our fight against the supply of illicit drugs entering the United States. Global Outlook 2000, a United Nations publication states:

Drug trafficking has become very sophisticated and complex, involving organized crime in a variety of illegal activities, including conspiracy, bribery, intimidation and corruption of public servants, tax evasion, banking law violations, racketeering, illegal money transfers, import/export violations, smuggling of weapons, crimes of violence and terrorism. Drug-related problems thus directly affect social stability and public safety and are associated with social disintegration.⁶⁶

United States national security depends upon its domestic strength and international stability. A chief threat to U.S. interests in Latin America is the social, economic, and political instability caused by narcoterrorism. Latin America suffers from economic underdevelopment. The large revenues generated from the drug trade constitute a serious economic weapon. Money buys arms, and these arms prolong the insurgent's causes. The economic power of the drug traffickers threaten the political and legal institutions in Latin America.

Traffickers provide immediate channels for the movement of explosives, arms, and terrorists across international borders. Narcoterrorism helps erode the security establishments in the target countries. Easy access to money increases the intelligence gathering sources of the insurgents. Also, it is an irresistible corruptive influence on government officials at all levels. This hinders U.S. efforts to fight the trafficking of illicit drugs because this activity disrupts the fragile Latin American democracies. Instability causes further unrest.

Drug money has freed insurgent groups in Latin America from relying on Soviet financial aid and have made them self-supporting. The Cold War may be over, but narcoterrorist objectives still exist to destroy the American society. This is done by drug dependency and the overthrow of the democratic governments in Latin America with revenues from the drugs exported to the United States. Narcoterrorism is the ultimate abuse of human rights. It aims at the very heart of civilization and erodes the national will of many

democratic Latin American countries. Many of these countries are vital to our national interest in combating the supply of drugs.

SUMMARY

Narcotics trafficking is a key element in global lawlessness that includes terrorism, insurgency, violence, and a disregard for basic human rights. Narcoterrorism links terrorism with drug trafficking and political insurgency.

Political insurgents frequently use terrorist tactics and have become directly or indirectly involved with narcotics production and trafficking. This link is most substantial in drug source countries such as Colombia, Peru, Burma and Thailand. In Colombia alone, there are four insurgent organizations that work in collaboration with the drug traffickers. There has been a connection between drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and terrorist organizations. Frequently, these groups are located together.

There are some indications of state-sponsored narcotics trafficking. In a few instances further indications exist that certain communist countries have in the past facilitated narcotics trafficking. However, in most cases, this state-sponsored narcotics trafficking has been overcome by the recent collapse of the Soviet Union.

In most cases narcotics trafficking is dominated by the drug cartels who are governed only by their greed. Their ideology is for the pursuit of profit. Most of these organizations cannot be called terrorists in the classical sense, but they use terrorist-type tactics, such as assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings, to

further their goals. Whether narcoterrorism applies to narcotics trafficking or political terror, it has become a serious threat with domestic and international implications.

Both President's Reagan and Bush declared illicit narcotics trafficking a threat to U.S. national security. Narcoterrorism is detrimental to U.S. interests and promotes the further trafficking of drugs. No nation in the Western Hemisphere is untouched by the production, use, or trafficking of illegal drugs. Throughout Latin America, U.S. interests and regional security are threatened by drugs and terror. Friendly democratic governments are being politically undermined and destabilized by the linkage of the drug trafficker with terrorists and insurgents. Drug trafficking constitutes a clear danger to the very survival of democracy in some countries who have been long friends and allies of the United States. When these governments are friendly to the United States, our security interests become threatened.

Economic, social, and health problems are also increased within the United States and Latin America because of illicit narcotics. Whenever a force, such as narcoterrorism, can cause social, economic, and political unrest and disruptions throughout the world, U.S. national security interests are in danger.

The social impact of widespread drug abuse in the United States, the staggering effect on the economy, and Third World instability all have substantial national security implications. Narcoterrorism links the drug problem with the terrorist problem, and is an domestic and international security threat.

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