Arms Control Verification Is No Longer a Stumbling Block to True Disarmament

Abstract

Verification is generally recognized as a necessary element of any significant agreement on arms limitations and reductions. Verification matters, for a long time, have been a stumbling block in the way of disarmament between the Soviet Union and the United States. However, the mid-1980s marked a fundamental change in the Soviet attitude towards verification. This paper addresses both the Soviet and U.S. approaches to verification with an emphasis on the international legal aspects of verification. The United Nations also is discussed in terms of its attempts to strike an agreement between the two superpowers. The author argues that the breakup and democratization of the Soviet Union affords the perfect opportunity for true nuclear disarmament. The United States must take the lead in pursuing this goal, yet to date, it is in no hurry to ratify the START treaty. The United States also is on a course towards the abandonment of the ABM Treaty. Will the United States be the cause of future stumbling blocks in true nuclear disarmament? Also, the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) needs to become a growth industry. OSIA can play an important role in the conversion of the Soviet military industrial complex and the downsizing of the Soviet military.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 01, 1992
Accession Number
ADA252289

Entities

People

  • Mark C. Easton

Tags

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  • Biomedical
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Space

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Arms Control
  • Arms Control Treaties
  • Intergovernmental Organizations
  • International Law
  • International Organizations
  • International Relations
  • National Politics
  • National Security
  • Negotiations
  • New York
  • Nuclear Energy
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Political Systems
  • Second World War
  • Treaties
  • Ussr

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