Leadership

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Military Review

CONTENTS

Leadership in ADVERSITY

From Vietnam to Victory in the Gulf

Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr.
US Army, Retired

*One of the more highly touted success st... ...e military's perform-
ance in the war with Iraq has center... ...mpetency of the
nation's civilian and military leaders a... ...tion of US war-
fighting doctrine. The author, column... ...mers, offers his
views on the development of the leaders... ...e that proved so
capable. He cites several of the military... ...ders in the post–
Vietnam era as being largely responsible... ...e foundation for
victory in the Gulf War.*

Leader Development—The Enduring Legacy

Throughout the Army's history, leadership and leader development have received continuous attention. Developing competent and confident leaders in all components of the Army (Active, Reserve, National Guard and Department of the Army [DA] civilians) is our most enduring legacy to the Army and the nation.-Developing these future leaders in light of decreasing resources and a smaller force challenges us to maximize every developmental opportunity. A trained and ready Army will always require leaders who are professionals in every sense of the word—leaders who exemplify traditional Army values.

The leaders we develop must be competent in and dedicated to the profession of arms and be experts in the art of war, they must be committed to upholding the dignity and respect of all soldiers/subordinates, they must be dedicated to the nation, they must demonstrate physical and moral courage, and they must be forthright and candid in all of their dealings. Finally, they must be willing to embrace responsibility—for their units' performance and for every soldier and DA civilian entrusted to their care.

As we shape a smaller Total Army to meet the expanding challenges of the 1990s and beyond, we also must develop leaders who understand and are able to exploit the full potential of present and future Army doctrine. Ensuring the Army's ability to fulfill its vital roles in all aspects of our national security strategy, in a world undergoing unprecedented and accelerating change, demands that we continue to develop leaders who are capable of fulfilling an evolving Army mission—a shift in posture from a large, in-place presence overseas to a focus on force projection by CONUS-based troops, poised to respond to contingency requirements.

In developing leaders for tomorrow's Army, I see the job of today's leadership as:

Developing bold, confident leaders who:

- Are technically and tactically competent.
- Know the difference between risk and gamble.
- Are willing to take risk to get inside the decision cycle of the enemy to wrest the initiative.

Developing commanders who:

- Trust their subordinates.
- Delegate authority and responsibility.
- Encourage soldiers to exercise initiative within the framework of the commander's intent.

Our chief of staff, General Carl E. Vuono, makes the record unequivocally clear: "Leader Development is our legacy to those who follow us in guiding our Army from now into the 21st Century." Our job as commanders and leaders is to translate the chief's guidance into action—to counsel our junior leaders, to develop them, to help them grow. The article, "Leader Development Direction for the Future," in this issue, provides an excellent treatment of a brand-new, one-stop look at the doctrine of how the Army intends to conduct leader development. It is important for all of us to recognize that ratifying this doctrine and publishing it in one overarching capstone document is a first for our Army.

DA Pamphlet 600-32, *Leader Development*, defines the doctrinal foundation of leader development as three pillars that progressively and sequentially lay out "where" it happens: *institutional training, operational assignments* and *self-development*. "How" this development occurs is described as a continuous, cyclic process of education, training, experience, assessment, feedback, reinforcement, evaluation and selection for the next leadership level. All Army leaders need to put this new pamphlet first on their professional "must read" list, and after a thorough reading, they should pass it on to their subordinate leaders and supervisors to do the same. Understanding this document must go from the top down, and it must go quickly—down to the last fire team leader, tank commander, crew chief and first-line supervisor in the force.

Our Army will be led in the future by those who are now squad, section and platoon leaders; by our serving company commanders; and by those just now coming into the force as DA civilian interns. The faces of young soldiers will change. New doctrine and new training techniques will evolve. The force will alter in structure to meet new missions and future threats to peace and freedom. But the requirement for competent, confident leaders will endure as long as there is a need for the Army.

LTG Leonard P. Wishart III
Commander, US Army Combined Arms Command

IF YOU would understand America's victory in the Persian Gulf War, you must first understand America's defeat in Vietnam. Combat experience in the jungles of Vietnam was the common thread that bound all of the senior US commanders in the Persian Gulf War, from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Colin Powell to General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the US commander in the field, to the senior Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps generals, to their colonels commanding the regiments and brigades.

Ironically, Saddam Hussein's misperceptions of the Vietnam War turned out to be one of America's most potent psychological warfare weapons. "America was regarded as a paper tiger in Asia," a diplomat in Beijing told the *Washington Times*' Michael Breen in words that could have been echoed by Hussein himself. "It was beaten like a wet rat in Vietnam, and because of that we tended to underestimate it."[1]

Some Americans, developing what was labeled the "Vietnam syndrome," shared those views that the United States was a loser. But the Gulf War changed all that. "It's a proud day for all Americans," President George Bush triumphantly proclaimed in the wake of America's electrifying victory over Iraq, "and, by God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all."[2]

Paradoxically, one reason for that success is that a "Vietnam syndrome" had never developed within the military. For one thing, those of us who fought there knew that on the battlefield it was not the US military but the Vietcong (VC) and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) that had been "beaten like a wet rat." NVA General Vo Nguyen Giap admitted he had lost 500,000 men killed in action from 1964 to 1969 alone.[3] And, by late 1968 (seven years before the end of the war), the VC had virtually ceased to exist as an effective fighting force.

Beginning in July 1969, responding not to enemy but to domestic political pressures, the United States began to withdraw its military forces from Vietnam. By August 1972, the last US ground troops had departed Vietnam.

When NVA tanks broke down the gates of the presidential palace in Saigon on 1 May 1975 and brought the war to a close, there

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were no US troops there for them to defeat. They had left 2½ years earlier.

"You know you never beat us on the battlefield," I told my NVA counterpart in Hanoi five days before the fall of Saigon. "That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelevant."[4]

He was right. Winning all of the battles, as General Charles Cornwallis' experiences in an earlier revolution should have alerted us, does not guarantee winning the war. And he was right in another respect as well. Losing the Vietnam War proved irrelevant to the principle of military subordination to civilian authority, one of the primary tenets of American democracy. But that was not a given. At the time, there were some misgivings, for just such a mixture of battlefield success and political failure had led to a "stab-in-the-back" syndrome in the German army after World War I that was instrumental in undermining the Weimar Republic and bringing Adolf Hitler to power. And only the strong leadership of General Charles de Gaulle prevented the same catastrophe in France after the fall of

General Westmoreland inspecting a 9th Infantry Division base camp near Long Thanh, Vietnam.

The animosity of the US officer corps was drained off, to a large extent, by General William C. Westmoreland, the US military commander in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968. In what might be his greatest contribution to his country, Westmoreland (unjustly, it must be noted) took the heat for what went wrong in Vietnam and thus helped to defuse a "stab–in–the–back" syndrome that could have been disastrous for the country.

Algeria. But it never happened in America.

By a peculiar twist of fate, the animosity of the US officer corps was drained off, to a large extent, by General William C. Westmoreland, the US military commander in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968. In what might be his greatest contribution to his country, Westmoreland (unjustly, it must be noted) took the heat for what went wrong in Vietnam and thus helped to defuse a "stab–in–the–back" syndrome that could have been disastrous for the country.

Even more important was the leadership of General Fred C. Weyand, the last US commander in Vietnam and Army chief of staff at the fall of Saigon. When he retired from active duty in 1977, the US Senate and House of Representatives both gave him credit for preventing a "stab–in–the–back" reaction in the US Army. A genuinely modest man, Weyand gave the credit to his predecessor, General Creighton W. Abrams.

"I was fortunate to have a solid foundation upon which to build," he said in a 1988 interview. "It had been laid by ... General Creighton Abrams, who turned the Army away from its Vietnam troubles and reoriented it to its vital security interests in Europe and Northeast Asia. ... Most importantly, he gave the Army a

General Weyand meeting with adviser school personnel in Vietnam, September 1970, and (*below*) Generals Westmoreland and Abrams at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, January 1966.

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sense of mission and a sense of self–worth."[6]

"A sense of mission and a sense of self–worth"—those were the key reasons why a

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"Vietnam syndrome" never developed within the US Army. To reorient the Army to its new conventional war mission, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Fort Monroe, Virginia, was formed under the initial leadership of General William E. DePuy, a distinguished combat leader in Vietnam and in World War II as well. There, an AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine began to develop that years later would bring America to victory in the Persian Gulf.

And the Army was not alone. The Air Force's Project *Warrior* (as well as its participation in ALB doctrine) and the renaissance in military strategic thought sparked by Admiral Stansfield Turner at the Naval War College in the mid–1970s (which, among other things, reintroduced the military to Carl von Clausewitz's 19th–century classic *On War*) were also part of the reaction to the frustration of Vietnam.[7]

So was the Navy's *Seaplan 2000* study that put the Navy back on the offensive and led to the power–projection strategies and the battleships and carrier battle groups that played such a major role in the Persian Gulf. The Marine Expeditionary Force in the Gulf also grew out of the Vietnam experience. "[W]e are pulling our heads out of the jungle and getting back into the amphibious business," said Marine Corps Commandant General Robert E. Cushman Jr. in

April 1972. "We are redirecting our attention seaward and reemphasizing our partnership with the Navy and our shared concern in the maritime aspects of our national strategy."[8]

Throughout the services, there was a reemphasis on fundamental doctrine. The importance of this development cannot be overstated. "[T]he influence of doctrine upon victory is profound," emphasized Navy Lieutenant Commander Dudley W. Knox on the eve of World War I. "Universal understanding and acceptance of common doctrines is necessary before concerted action by a large force engaged in hostilities is possible; it is an indispensable element in command, and an essential prelude to great success in war."[9]

Emphasizing the need to begin with a conception of war, Knox argued that "we must build from the foundation upwards and not from the roof downwards."[10] We had done precisely the opposite in the Vietnam War. Counterinsurgency doctrine, the brainchild of academic social science departments, had been forced on a reluctant Army by President John F. Kennedy.[11] Those who would not get aboard this bandwagon, such as then Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker, were forced into retirement.

Although the military gave lip service to this "doctrine" (Kennedy dropped a broad hint that future promotions of high–ranking officers would depend upon their demonstration of experience in the counterguerrilla field), the doctrine was never fully implemented in the field.[12] The result was confusion and disarray. "Almost 70 percent of Army generals who managed the war," found Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard, "were uncertain of its objectives." As he went on to say, this "mirrors a deep–seated strategic failure: the inability of policy–makers to frame tangible, obtainable goals."[13]

Almost by default, we managed to defeat the VC guerrillas. "The ultimate irony was that the people's war launched in 1959 had been defeated," former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William E. Colby pointed out in 1989, "but the soldier's war, which the United States had insisted on fighting during the 1960's,

General Vessey (center) visiting Marine positions at the Beirut International Airport, 1983.

Brigadier General John W. Vessey Jr. found that Reserve mobilization had been ignored since the close of the Korean War 20 years earlier. This deficiency had been papered over with assumptions that any future war would be over within 90 days. Vessey began asking, "What happens on the 91st day?" This was a question no one wanted to hear. Not only was his question ignored, but he was passed over for promotion.

. . . was finally won by the enemy."[14] The war was lost when we ended up abandoning our erstwhile ally to his own devices, ill-prepared to face the conventional war onslaught that ensued.

The differences in the Persian Gulf War could not have been more stark. This time we had a commander in chief, not a Vietnam-era "national command authority." Defined as "The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors," the very concept of a "national command authority" flies in the face of the principle of unity of command.[15]

This diffusion (and hence evasion) of respon-

sibility was a far cry from the presidential leadership exercised by Franklin D. Roosevelt in World War II. "I wish . . . to make it very clear," he wrote to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson on 26 February 1942, "that the Commander-in-Chief exercises his command function in relation to strategy, tactics and operations directly through the Chief of Staff."[16]

At the very beginning of the gulf crisis, Bush set clear-cut political goals and objectives upon which a coordinated military campaign plan could be constructed. Like Roosevelt, he made it perfectly clear who would make the critical strategic decisions. And like Roosevelt, with

General George C. Marshall, Bush had a military commander in the person of Powell to execute those decisions.

In the Vietnam War, the CJCS was not in the chain of command. In the theater of war, Westmoreland and his successors did not have full

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command authority. They were only the ground commanders, with naval operations outside South Vietnam's territorial waters and air operations against enemy sanctuaries and against NVA lines of communication and supply (the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail) directed from Honolulu 6,000 miles away.

Thanks to the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, this time, Powell was very much in the chain of command, and the theater commander, Schwarzkopf, was in complete command of US forces in the area. Civilian control of the military had finally been restored to its proper constitutional position. During the Vietnam War and its immediate aftermath, the conceit arose that every assistant to the assistant secretary in the Pentagon, as well as every civilian government employee above the rank of GS-15, represented "civilian control of the military." But much to their disgruntlement and dismay, during the Bush administration, those pretentions were deflated.[17]

Civilian control means that the president, the duly elected civilian head of government, commands the military through his appointed civilian secretary of defense. The Congress, the civilian representatives of the people, periodically elected, not only raises, arms and provisions the military but also makes rules to regulate and govern it, and authorizes its commitment to extended conflict. That is why, as Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger said in November 1984, "before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in the Congress."[18]

And this time, we had the support of the American people. One reason for this was Bush's clear articulation of US objectives in the gulf and his (belated) appeal to the Congress for its endorsement of his actions. Another was his courageous decision to mobilize the Reserves. In 1973, Abrams had seen the critical importance of such a mobilization and had set out to create an Army that could not be committed to sustained combat without Reserve mobilization.[19]

But, as the head of the Operations Directorate in the Army General Staff, then Brigadier General John W. Vessey Jr. found that Reserve mobilization had been ignored since the close of the Korean War 20 years earlier. This deficiency had been papered over with assumptions that any future war would be over within 90 days.

Vessey began asking, "What happens on the 91st day?" This was a question no one wanted to hear. Not only was his question ignored, but he was passed over for promotion. But Vessey had not joined the Army to get promoted; he had joined the Army to serve his country (ironically, he would later rise to become the CJCS). A former artillery first sergeant in the Minnesota Army National Guard commissioned on the battlefield at Anzio beachhead in World War II, Vessey persisted to the point where, to shut him up, the Army's mobilization plans were exhumed and found to be in a complete shambles.

Brought to the attention of the Army leadership, then Vice Chief of Staff General Walter T. Kerwin and his successor, General Frederick Kroesen, supervised a total overhaul of the Army's mobilization procedures. Thanks to

Vessey's moral courage and the hard work of Kerwin and Kroesen and many other Active and Reserve personnel over the ensuing years, when the call came during *Desert Storm*, our Reserve forces, especially those in combat support and combat service support units, were ready to go.

The war could not have been won without them, and it could not have been won without a warfighting doctrine either. Thanks to the Army's post–Vietnam leadership, we had just such a doctrine on hand, this time one developed "from the foundation upward."

First articulated in the 1982 edition of US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100–5, *Operations*, and developed and refined over the years, ALB doctrine provided the basis for Army organization, equipment and training. ALB doctrine has been discussed over the years in such great length in this FM that it needs no further elaboration here.

Suffice it to say, for over a decade, the Vietnam veterans who would lead America to victory in the gulf—then lieutenants, captains, majors and lieutenant colonels like Powell, Schwarzkopf, Ron Griffith, Barry McCaffrey and Tommy

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Franks, to name but a few—studied, trained and rehearsed that doctrine. And, when the time came to execute the doctrine, they and the forces under their command were ready.

As they would be the first to acknowledge, much credit for their successes goes to those Army leaders—the Abrams and Weyands, the Kerwins and Kroesens, the Vesseys, DePuys, and the like—in the post–Vietnam Army who refused to give in to the despair of a "Vietnam syndrome." Instead, through their hard work and by the force of their character, they pulled the Army up by its bootstraps and set it on the road to battlefield success. *MR*

NOTES

1. Michael Breen, "North Korea in Gulf Shock," *Washington Times*, 12 March 1991, A1.
2. President George Bush, quoted in *The Washington Post*, 2 March 1991, A13.
3. John Mueller, "The Search for the 'Breaking Point' in Vietnam," *International Studies Quarterly* (December 1980):497–519. See also General Vo Nguyen Giap interview with Oriana Fallaci, quoted in Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 80.
4. Harry G. Summers Jr., *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1981), 1.
5. Ibid., 7. See also Ward Just, *Military Men* (NY: Knopf, 1970), 170.
6. General Fred C Weyand, "Troops to Equal Any," *Vietnam* (Summer 1988):25.
7. For a discussion of the influence of Carl von Clausewitz on the Persian Gulf War, see Joel Achenbach, "War and the Cult of Clausewitz," *The Washington Post*, 6 December 1990, D1–D4.
8. General Robert E. Cushman quoted in Edwin H. Simmons, *The United States Marines: 1775–1975* (NY: Viking, 1976), 299. Cushman commanded the III Marine Amphibious Force in Vietnam from 1967 to 1969.
9. Lieutenant Commander Dudley W. Knox, USN, "The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* (March–April 1915), reprinted in *Art of War Colloquium*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College,1983), 56.
10. Ibid., 68.

11. Summers, 45–50. See also Chalmers Johnson, *Autopsy on People's War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973); and John Bower Bell, *The Myth of the Guerilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice* (NY: Knopf, 1971).
12. Lloyd Norman and John B. Spore, "Big Push in Guerilla War," *Army* (March 1962):33–34. See also Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
13. Douglas Kinnard, *The War Managers* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1977), 25.
14. William Colby, *Lost Victory* (NY: Contemporary Books, 1989), 365–66.
15. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 June 1987), 243.
16. Letter to Secretary of War Franklin D. Roosevelt, the White House, Washington, DC. 26 February 1942. (George C. Marshall Research Foundation, Xerox 923, GCM–COAS–CO: Relationships, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, VA.)
17. In a 1986 discussion with then Navy Secretary John F. Lehman, he said he had prepared a list of those civilians, GS–15 and above, who were interposed between the service chiefs and the president. He wanted to put it on a spread sheet, but there were too many names to fit. He put it on a scroll instead, and when it was unrolled in the Oval Office, it stretched from one side of the room to the other.
18. Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," Address to the National Press Club, 28 November 1984, (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, News Release 609–84), 6.
19. Summers, 113.

Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr., US Army, Retired, is editor of Vietnam magazine and a syndicated columnist for the Los Angeles Times. He received a B.S. from the University of Maryland and an M.M.A.S from the US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC). A combat infantry veteran of the Korean and Vietnam wars, he taught strategy at USACGSC and later held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Military Research at the US Army War College (USAWC). He was recently named a Distinguished Fellow of the USAWC.

LEADER DEVELOPMENT: DIRECTION FOR THE FUTURE

Colonel Michael A. Anastasio, US Army

The Army's renewed emphasis on leader development has been captured and formally outlined in a comprehensive program for the Total Force in Department of the Army Pamphlet 600–32, Leader Development. In this article, the director of the Center for Army Leadership highlights the key features of this overall leader development program and its importance to our Army and its future leaders.

THE INGREDIENTS of Army leadership and the critical elements in developing Army leaders are found in a variety of sources. They may come from the writings and discussions of soldiers everywhere in the practice of our profession.

Certainly, soldiers have spoken out freely—in regulations, field manuals, policy statements and professional journals; in student papers at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; and in motor pools and field training exercises—on what they think it takes to get other soldiers to follow. They have likewise tried to capture and articulate some parts of how the Army develops its leaders over time—from infancy as a lieutenant, sergeant or junior civil servant, to maturity as a colonel, sergeant

major or senior executive.

Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600–32, *Leader Development*, pulls together, for the first time in one publication, what many of us have very painstakingly learned—in bits and pieces from numerous doctrinal and experiential sources—about how to "grow" leaders. And there will even be some truth in the claim that "we already knew that" about the parts and pieces separately. But now we have it captured in one valuable document.

The Army is in the process of "building down" its structure to achieve a steady end state while it maintains its capability for expansion if needed. Absolutely critical in this time of transition is the requirement for quality leaders who:

- Anticipate, manage and exploit change.
- Exemplify the highest professional and ethical standards.
- Display technical and tactical arms proficiency while exploiting the full potential of advanced technology.
- Possess teaching, coaching and counseling skills.
- Can build cohesive teams.
- Communicate effectively while stimulating confidence, enthusiasm and trust.
- Solve problems and act decisively under pressure.
- Show initiative, plan thoughtfully and take reasoned, measured risks to exploit opportunities.
- Provide purpose, direction, motivation and vision to their subordinates.

The Process

Confident, competent leaders do not just suddenly appear; they are developed. They develop over time through a carefully designed progression of schools, job experiences and individually initiated activities. As leader development unfolds in each of the three pillars, a continuing cycle of education, training, experience, assessment, feedback and reinforcement occurs (fig. 1). As a leader progresses in his or her career and faces new challenges—promotions, positions of greater responsibility, additional duties, and so forth—he or she must be developed to meet these challenges. During this leader development process, the responsibility for a leader's overall development is shared by the leaders in the field army and the individuals themselves.

The leader development process is similar for officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), in both Active and Reserve components (AC and RC). Institutional training, operational assignment patterns and self–development programs are virtually identical for each of the components. It is, however, critical to understand that time constraints normally facing RC soldiers may require variances to the specific course programs of instruction within the institutional training pillar, as well as in op-

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erational assignments. The instruction and experience an RC leader gains is progressive and sequential and is based on time available and unit and individual needs.

To ensure that leader growth and development occur progressively, sequentially and effectively, Army leader development emphasizes totally integrating the activities that take place in the three pillars. In each of these, the emphasis is on developing leaders who, as they enter a phase of their service, possess the highest

Figure 1. The leader development process

level of experience and competency appropriate to that phase.

A phase is merely the next step up in the level of responsibility as a leader. Leaders work through the process, developing and honing their skills, and, when assessed as ready, proceed to that next level.

As an example, company–level commanders should have the appropriate developmental leader positions (platoon or section leader, unit executive officer) and education (officer advanced course) before command. Likewise, platoon sergeants should have served as team and squad leaders and already attended the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) and, preferably, Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC). RC personnel progress through the same institutional training (within certain unit type, size and location constraints). Civilians should progress to key leader positions following the proper sequencing of technical and supervisory experience.

Throughout the development of a leader, the education, training, experience, assessment, feedback and reinforcement process occurs in a logical and progressive sequence. The mission,

the unit's needs and the leader's demonstrated potential are kept sharply in focus and must be balanced at all times. Not all leaders will develop at the same rate or to the same level, so leaders must only be placed in positions of leadership for which they are prepared. Any leader will continue to develop while performing as such but should not be thrust into such a position (aside from exceptional circumstances) until he or she meets entry minimums for that leadership position.

The Pillars

Recently completed comprehensive evaluations of existing officer, NCO and civilian leader development programs clearly indicate that the Army's progressive, sequential and doctrinally based approach to leader development is sound and produces the quality leaders our nation requires. The effectiveness of this approach results directly from totally integrating the three pillars of Army leader development: institutional training (formal military and civilian schools), operational assignments and individual self–development (fig. 2).

Institutional Training. Institutional training encompasses all of the formal school training and education that leaders receive. It is within the Army's school system that leaders train to perform critical tasks by acquiring the skills, knowledge and attitudes (SKAs) that are essential to high–quality leadership.

These same SKAs, when tested, reinforced and enhanced by relevant operational or organizational assignments and self–development programs, enable leaders to ultimately attain and sustain true competency in the profession of arms. Institutional training provides the foundation for leader development, particularly in times of peace, upon which unit commanders can build, mold and shape leaders, and upon which the developing leader can base his or her self–development.

The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), through the school commandants (branch proponents), the functional area proponents and the functional chiefs are

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
*Institutional training provides the foundation for leader development, particularly
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key players in the schoolhouse phase of leader development, in addition to the individual being developed. The proponent states clearly what must be learned in the branch schools and provides the necessary training and training support materials to accomplish that end. The proponent also identifies what should be mastered through operational assignments and individual self–study or self–development. In doing all of this, the proponent defines the life–cycle model to be followed.

For RC leader development, careful planning is required to accomplish the same number of training tasks required of AC counterparts while accommodating the training time constraints unique to the RC.

Unit commanders and supervisors also contribute to effective leader development in the institutional training pillar. They must be aware of, and take advantage of, opportunities to send their leaders to all appropriate technical, developmental, skill qualification and confidence–building courses that are available through the Army school system. Commanders and supervisors also assist their subordinates in remaining knowledgeable of, and competitive for, institutional training selection by teaching, coaching

and mentoring them.

To ensure that we develop confident and competent leaders who can carry out their duties today and meet the demands of increased responsibility in the future, institutional training programs must use the best teaching and training methods. The increased use of small–group instruction within the Army school system, improved leadership assessment and development techniques, and advances in our ability to define, precisely, the SKAs expected of leaders at each level of development all contribute to leader development.

Operational Assignments. After completing a school, leaders are assigned to operational positions to gain experience and assess their ability to apply theoretical knowledge in a practical setting and their potential for further development as leaders. Officers, warrant officers and NCOs, both AC and RC, are challenged to achieve training excellence and to sustain and expand their growth as leaders during operational assignments.

Tough, realistic training at home stations and at the combat training centers (CTCs) provides battlefield realism and demands on leaders at all levels. The challenge should be equally stressful

for those assigned in nondeploying TDA (tables of distribution and allowances) units that support deploying units. At the same time, doctrinal publications provide the needed information, direction and vision, and a rich opportunity for concurrent self-development.

The commander's direct involvement in developing leaders during operational assignments is particularly critical. He or she determines

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For RC leader development, careful planning is required to accomplish the same number of training tasks required of AC counterparts while accommodating the training time constraints unique to the RC.

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leader assignments, formulates and executes unit and individual training, to include professional development programs, and acts as the unit's primary teacher, counselor and mentor. The care and manner used to train, counsel and mentor leaders will guide their future development and that of their subordinates long after today's commanders pass from the scene. For this reason, commanders must understand the leader development process, their role in its execution and that leader development activities must be an integral part of the training program in their units.

Civilian leaders generally progress in key areas such as acquisition, management, logistics, information and installation management. New programs will train generalists capable of performing in leadership positions previously held by military officers.

Thus, the substance of military leader development in the operational assignment pillar is both designed and implemented at unit level. At unit level, leader development programs must continue to be battle-focused and be tailored to support training in those leader skills demanded by both the unit's mission-essential task list (METL) and the professional development needs of junior leaders.

Self-Development. Institutional training and operational assignments alone do not ensure that leaders will gain and maintain competency in the complex tasks required by the profession of arms and those who support and sustain it. A professional leader's career requires a lifelong commitment to self-development— development that complements and builds upon the advancements and accomplishments leaders gain during their formal education and duty assignments.

The key to constructing a successful self-development program is accurate assessment. Each leader must take full advantage of all assessment opportunities, whether self-assessment, formal assessments provided by the chain of command or assessments made in Army schools. While each leader's self-development program will be unique, common elements that should be included are:
- A broad, professional reading program (one based on the foundation reading program set up by the functional proponent and pivoted around doctrinal literature from technical libraries, professional journals, and so forth).
- Duty-related correspondence course participation.
- Duty-related, off-duty, advanced civil schooling (such as offered through the Army Continuing Education System [ACES]).
- Off-duty study and research.
- Leadership roles in military and civilian community or other public service activities.

Every leader is responsible for his or her own professional development—not the commandant, not the commander, not the supervisor, but the individual leader.

Officer Leader Development

The development of an officer, whether AC or RC, is the cumulative result of his or her military schooling, operational assignments and self-development.

The officer's institutional training consists of the officer basic course, officer advanced course, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS^3), completion of a command and general

1st Cavalry Division senior commanders conferring near the Alter River, Germany, during REFORGER 87.

The commander's direct involvement in developing leaders during operational assignments is particularly critical. He or she determines leader assignments, formulates and executes unit and individual training, to include professional development programs, and acts as the unit's primary teacher, counselor and mentor. The care and manner used to train, counsel and mentor leaders will guide their future development and that of their subordinates long after today's commanders pass from the scene.

staff college and, for selected officers, completion of a senior service college course or equivalent.

The progressive and sequential process of institutional training is the same for all officers, AC and RC. RC leaders may have their institutional training needs met by a TRADOC resident school, a US Army Reserve Forces (USARF) school or a state, regional or Continental US Army (CONUSA) academy.

Officer operational assignments are designed to be progressive and sequential. Assignments are normally predicated on the officer's branch or functional area and the needs of the Army. RC officers may require variances to specific op-

erational assignments based on the nature of available operational positions within units or geographical locations.

Self-development is an essential part of every officer's leader development and is an integral part of Active and Reserve officer leader development programs. It is unique within the Army in that the Military Qualification Standards System (MQS) provides the officer with a detailed guide to his or her entire developmental pattern. An excellent guide for officer self-development, MQS does much more by providing the overarching framework for all officer leader development. MQS lists the skills and proficiencies

Self-development is perhaps the most overlooked element of leader development for warrant officers.... [They] are expected to keep abreast of the latest changes in equipment, organizations and procedures associated with their area of expertise.

an officer must master to reach expected performance levels. MQS provides officers, commanders and school commandants with the framework for common and branch-specific officer training, education and leader development, without imposing new training requirements. An article in this issue titled "Military Qualification Standards: An Officer Leader Development Tool," explains MQS in great detail.

Warrant Officer Development

Like the commissioned officer, the warrant officer's development is the cumulative result of his or her military schooling, operational assignments and self-development. Warrant officer leader development starts with the Warrant Officer Training System (WOTS) that provides for three levels of progressive and sequential institutional training and certification. These occur at entry, senior and master warrant officer levels.

At the entry level, the system is composed of a "triple-check" preappointment process. This process requires the successful completion of the following checks:

- Selecting warrant officer candidates by a centralized board (such as US Army Recruiting Command and state adjutants general).
- Successfully completing the Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS).
- Successfully completing the Technical and Tactical Certification Course conducted by the MOS (military occupational specialty) proponent.

Senior warrant officer training is designed to refresh and enhance common skills, update technical knowledge and train senior warrant officers

(CW3-CW4) to successfully perform in senior-level positions. Master warrant officer training (MWOT) is the capstone level of warrant officer training. MWOT is designed to develop selected senior warrant officers as systems integrators, managers and trainers in a senior leadership role at-various Army organizational levels.

Like institutional training, the operational assignment is another key element in warrant officer development. Except as otherwise authorized by the career management authority, operational assignments of warrant officers are made commensurate with their rank group (WO1-CW2, CW3-CW4 or MW4) and with their MOS. This process not only ensures that warrant officers are developed through progressive and sequential assignment patterns but also provides warrant officers the opportunity to perform in the full range of duties required by their MOS.

Self-development is perhaps the most overlooked element of leader development for warrant officers. However, this pillar is just as important to the overall development of warrant officers as institutional training and operational assignments. Warrant officers are expected to keep abreast of the latest changes in equipment, organizations and procedures associated with their area of expertise. Also, warrant officers can and must contribute to their self-development by identifying their long-term and short-term goals, periodically evaluating their own progress, participating in off-duty civilian education courses, and seeking the advice and counsel of their commanders.

NCO Development

The development of NCOs is, as is their officer counterparts, the cumulative result of their military schooling, operational assignments and self-development. The institutional training of NCOs, both AC and RC, is accomplished through the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES). It provides progressive and sequential training for NCOs through four levels of schooling: primary, basic, advanced and senior.

The primary–level training course for NCOs, the PLDC, is a four–week non–MOS–specific, field–oriented leadership course designed to prepare soldiers for leadership responsibilities at the grade of sergeant. The basic–level NCOES course, the BNCOC, is taught at NCO academies for combat arms, whereas combat support and combat service support NCOs attend proponent resident service schools. Training at BNCOC builds upon the instruction received in PLDC.

The ANCOC is next and has a common leadership core, as well as "hands–on" and performance–oriented training to emphasize warfighting skills. It is conducted at resident service schools, and class length is based on the NCO's career management field. The Sergeants Major Course (SMC) is the capstone of enlisted training. It prepares selected soldiers for sergeant major and command sergeant major duties in both troop and staff assignments. While Active NCOs usually attend a TRADOC resident school, Reserve NCOs gain institutional training through a TRADOC resident school; a USARF school; or a state, regional or CON-USA academy.

Operational assignments for NCOs consist of table of organization and equipment (TOE) unit, TDA and special duty assignments. TOE and TDA assignments are made based on the soldier's MOS. Special duty assignments present a unique challenge and opportunity for leader development, as the NCO is often performing duties outside his or her MOS (such as drill instructor, recruiting, attaché, and so forth). Commanders and leaders use the Individual Training and Evaluation Program (ITEP) and the Noncommissioned Officer Development Program (NCODP) to enhance NCO leader development during operational assignments. (ITEP consists of a leader's assessment and common task test and formalizes the role of individual evaluation in units and organizations.)

Training soldiers follows a specific process for each MOS, unit and item of equipment. Soldiers train on individual tasks, then on collective

A professional leader's career requires a lifelong commitment to self–development—development that complements and builds upon the advancements and accomplishments leaders gain during their formal education and duty assignments.

tasks related to the unit's mission. Trainers conduct evaluations to determine training effectiveness and measure performance against soldier's manual and Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) standards.

NCODP is the commander's leader development program for NCOs. NCODP encompasses most training at the unit level and is tailored to the unique requirements of the unit and its NCOs. Commanders must continuously integrate individual training with collective training to effectively use available time to develop junior leaders and to ensure soldiers know every task required at their skill level.

NCOs use self–development to complement and enhance the knowledge and experience gained through institutional training and operational assignments. NCO self–development programs are designed to provide the individual with the additional training and experience necessary to improve, maintain, develop and sustain the appropriate SKAs for their grade and position.

NCO self–development programs can be

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individual or formal structured programs. Individual programs include professional reading and off-duty study. Formal structured programs include ACES, the Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP) and the self-development test (SDT).

The SDT is a new component of self-development. The SDT is a series of written examinations for sergeants, staff sergeants and sergeants first class. The SDT allows NCOs to measure and guide their growth in the skills and proficiencies they need as they continue to develop as leaders. NCOs are required to prepare for the SDT without dedicated unit training time. The SDT is a key factor in selecting NCOs for promotion, assignments, school attendance and retention.

Accurate assessment plays a key role in NCO self-development and assists in providing direction and focus. NCOs use a variety of management and assessment tools to formulate their self-development programs. These include performance counseling, evaluation reports, SDT results and common task test results. Jointly,

these instruments provide the feedback necessary to build a functional self-development program tailored to individual and unit needs.

Civilian Leader Development

The development of civilian leaders, like their uniformed counterparts, is also a cumulative result of their institutional training, operational assignments and self-development. The system is the same regardless of whether the civilian supports the AC or RC.

There are a variety of courses available for civilians at different grades. While these courses are not prerequisites for one another, they are tied to different levels of responsibility. Civilian leader development can begin with the Intern Leadership Development Course (ILDC) which precedes graduation to journeyman-level positions. The Leadership Education and Development Course (LEAD) is complementary to the Basic Supervision Course and is recommended for first-time supervisors. At the managerial level, Organizational Leadership for Executives (OLE) provides leadership training while Personnel Management for Executives (PME) and the New Manager's Course provide skill training. The leader development capstone, the Army Management Staff College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, is targeted at competitively selected individuals with high potential for advancement. Mandatory training for senior executive service (SES) members includes the Force Integration Course and the SES Orientation Conference.

The general organizational assignment path for civilian leaders encompasses four broad phases: presupervisory, supervisory, managerial and executive. However, civilians are not required to sequentially progress through these stages. For example, an employee may enter civil service at the supervisory or managerial level or through an internship and progress directly to a nonsupervisory managerial position without ever having supervised. For some career programs, it is logical to progress through positions of increased responsibility; that is, from the installation level to the major command level and

then to Department of the Army.

The self-development opportunities for civilian leaders are essentially the same as for the uniformed sector. Again, the key is accurately assessing leader strengths and shortcomings. Once areas of improvement are identified, an individualized program can be developed using a professional reading program, correspondence courses, off-duty advanced schooling, and so forth.

Presently, in the civilian sector, the Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS) identifies and formalizes the leader development process for the professional career program population. In the future, this will expand to cover the noncareer program population through the Civilian Integration into the Personnel Proponent System (CIPPS).

In recent years, we have seen the Army develop into the best-prepared, highest-quality force in our nation's history. To ensure we retain this capacity, we must sustain and improve upon our current high levels of readiness and quality. By following through on our uncompromising commitment to develop the very best leaders possible, we can be assured of leaving the most meaningful legacy possible to both our Army and our nation—the enduring legacy of competent and confident leaders.

Emerging constraints and rapidly changing global geopolitical situations will compel the Army to modify existing programs to some extent. We must not, however, fundamentally alter the strong leader development efforts that have brought us to our current high state of readiness. Our sound and successful three-pillared leader development concept that serves as the foundation for the future leaders of the Army must prevail. For that reason, we must remain committed to the imperatives associated with each of the three pillars.

If institutional training is to remain the strong foundation upon which future leaders anchor their development, we must retain progressive and sequential educational systems and train leaders in the critical tasks they will need as future leaders. The leader development effort must span the Total Army, providing the right mix of resident and nonresident instruction and retaining the right percentage of leaders attending resident training at each level. We must continue to select the best-qualified leaders for resident instruction and ensure that quality instructors man the training base if we are to produce quality students and instructors.

Through operational assignments, we must continue to provide leaders the critical experience they will need for the future and provide adequate training opportunities in adequately manned and resourced units. Key developmental assignment opportunities must be retained for the best leaders and every effort made to distribute leaders based on leader development priorities.

Continued emphasis on self-development must first stress each leader's personal responsibilities. It will also be essential to identify, specify and refine self-development requirements. The entire Army leadership must continue to emphasize self-development and to assist subordinate leaders in their self-development efforts.

As the Army positions itself to face the unprecedented challenges of the 1990s and beyond, our total commitment to developing competent and confident leaders will ensure that we remain the versatile, deployable and lethal combat force our nation requires. With that in mind, we must never forget that the Army of the future will be placed in the hands of tomorrow's leaders, and their development is in our hands today. **MR**

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THOMAS BECKET, OLLIE NORTH and YOU

YOU

The Importance of an Ethical Command Climate

Major John E. Shephard Jr., US Army

*Perhaps the most widely recognized measure of successful job perform-
ance is the report of "mission accomplished" or "all tasks completed."
The author sees a danger in the military's emphasis on "getting the job
done" where leaders allow overzealous subordinates too much latitude.
He analyzes three famous cases that illustrate the damage that can be
done to units, the Army and even the nation when leaders yield to the
temptation to let their subordinates just "get it done."*

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
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ABRUTAL murder in a medieval cathedral, a third–rate burglary in a posh Washington, DC, hotel–office complex and a document–shredding "party" in the bowels of the White House—what do these three otherwise unconnected events have in common? The answer is threefold: First, they were all illegal actions undertaken by "loyal" subordinates who apparently believed that what they were doing would please their supervisors. Second, in each case, the perpetrators' superiors had not taken adequate steps to prevent their followers' illegal behavior. Third, each of these crimes rocked a great nation and brought disgrace upon the country's foremost leader.

Pondering these cases is an instructive exercise for leaders in any field because the leadership problem they illustrate is not unique to high national office. Indeed, its occurrence at all levels of military, business and government organizations is far too frequent and usually preventable. It happens when pragmatic but narrowly focused subordinates, in their zeal to get a job done or please the boss, act illegally or unethically, and when their bosses have failed to take appropriate steps to discourage such behavior.

This article examines this type of leadership problem (which, for want of a more descriptive term, I shall call *ollieism*) and suggests the need for leaders to prevent it by creating and sustaining an ethical leadership environment. First, a review of these three historical cases will provide a common base of reference.

Three Scandals That Deserve Study by Leaders

Case 1. In the latter decades of the 12th century, a rancorous dispute between the Angevin king of England, Henry II, and the archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Becket, led to Becket's fatal bludgeoning in the transept of his cathedral by four faithful knights of the king. The murder outraged Europe, brought disgrace on King Henry and, at least temporarily, undermined his

most important policies and reform.[1] How did this event, terrible in both its form and its consequences, happen?

Henry II (1154–1189), a strong, resourceful monarch, restored order and unified rule over Normandy and England after a long period of civil war and feudal anarchy. He was stern, smart, stirring, constantly busy and extremely demanding of his "staff." He also, however, possessed an ungovernable temper and was prone to wild outbursts of anger.[2] Modern psychologists would probably deem him a classic "Type A" personality.

To consolidate power in England, Henry sought to expand the jurisdiction of his own courts at the expense of the church's courts which operated independently of the civil government.[3] To secure the church's cooperation in this reform, he maneuvered to have his own trusted chancellor, Becket, elected as archbishop of Canterbury, the most powerful cleric in England.

However, the brilliant, audacious and ambitious Becket proved to be no one's puppet. As archbishop, he embarrassed and enraged his former patron by launching a vehement crusade to stymie the king's designs, pronouncing himself the protector of ecclesiastical independence. Like the king, Becket was earnest, passionate and charismatic—"a leader of men whom others would follow as the weak follow the strong."[4] Since both men were as resolute and feverishly energetic as they were proud, their quarrel degenerated into a dangerous, irreconcilable feud. Becket was driven from England and schemed for six years in exile while the king ruthlessly persecuted the archbishop's followers and friends.

In 1170, when both Henry and Becket seemed at last to have tired of their various intrigues, Pope Alexander III was able to mediate the dispute. But, when Becket returned to England, he immediately proceeded to excommunicate bishops, barons and soldiers who had sided with the king to ravage his archbishopric's estate.

When news of these excommunications reached Henry in Normandy, he flew into one of his habitual violent rages and is said to have cried

out to no one in particular, "What cowards have I nourished in my house that not one of them will avenge me on this turbulent priest!"[5] This outburst spurred four knights, eager to win the king's favor, to conspire, without authority, to punish the archbishop.[6] The knights crossed the Channel, accosted Becket in the cathedral of Canterbury and smote him with their broadswords, scattering the archbishop's blood and brains before the altar.[7]

The murder instantaneously provoked widespread grief and indignation throughout England and Europe. Becket was immediately hailed as a martyr, was quickly canonized as a saint and, for centuries, became the most popular folk hero in England. Meanwhile, with his hand on the Gospels, King Henry swore an oath to his own innocence. Fearing excommunication, he was compelled to submit to the pope on several of his reforms. A year later, he accepted further humiliation by praying, prostrating himself and being whipped half-naked before Becket's tomb. Though Henry's penance allowed him to escape further punishment and reembark on his reform program, sympathy for Becket later played a substantial role in the king's troubles with civil war.[8]

Most historians of the period agree the king never intended for his minions to kill Becket despite his outburst.[9] Henry was sufficiently wise and sophisticated to know that he could ill afford to infuriate the pope, incite the populace and give excuses to his enemies, and he could gain far

more by convincing the pope to censure Becket for his impetuousness.

Yet, King Henry cannot be absolved of responsibility. Not only had he uttered the words that, however unintentionally, inspired the knights' crime, but he had also, over time, established a leadership environment that had led his misguided subordinates to believe their dastardly act would please the king. All of his ministers and soldiers knew of Henry's desire to humiliate and discredit the archbishop. In ruthlessly setting out to ruin Becket and scoffing at his claim of ecclesiastical privilege, the king acted with "scant regard for decency, legality, or justice," setting a poor example for his less clever subordinates.[10] Indeed, many of his less admirable personal qualities were reflected in the rash violence of his criminal knights:

"[King Henry] had a practical man's impatience of the obstacles thrown in the way of his reforms . . . . Without any theoretical hostility to the co-ordinate powers of the state, it seemed to him a perfectly reasonable and natural course to trample either baronage or Church under foot to gain his end of good government."[11]

Undoubtedly, then, Henry's troubles arose largely from his own failure to develop what we call today an ethical command climate. Despite all of his other qualities of leadership, this failure cost him and his inchoate nation dearly.

Case 2. The second case—the Watergate affair—carries us forward eight centuries from the murder in the cathedral. Though the nature of the crimes was quite different, the consequences of Watergate for the United States and its president were arguably as serious as Becket's affair for the Angevin Kingdom. Some stark similarities between these cases warrant our study.[12]

The bungled burglary at the Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters at the Watergate complex was organized within the Committee to Re-Elect the President (CRP). The burglars were seeking information regarding Lawrence F. O'Brien, the former DNC chairman.[13] The break-in of 17 June 1972 was the brainchild of former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent G. Gordon Liddy, a blustering

man of action, zealous conservative, devout patriot and, at the time of the burglary, general counsel of the CRP. His boss later described him as "a cocky little bantam rooster who liked to brag about his James Bond-ish exploits."[14] Liddy's allies in the effort included top CRP figures and others with close ties to the White House.[15]

Though no proof implicated President Richard M. Nixon in the original break-in, he became clearly involved in a desperate attempt to cover up the depth of his administration's involvement. He resigned in disgrace after the famous "smoking gun" tape recording revealed his order of 23 June 1972 to his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, to try to get the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to curtail the FBI's investigation into the Watergate affair.[16] He was subsequently pardoned from possible legal sanctions by his successor, President Gerald R. Ford.

But, even though a "smoking gun" may have been deemed necessary to meet rigorous legal requirements in case Nixon was tried, it is superfluous to our broader inquiry into his leadership failure. Various investigations conducted by the special prosecutor, the Congress and the media, along with several memoirs by key Watergate figures, reveal a pattern of unethical and illegal conduct that infested parts of the White House staff and the CRP.[17] "Dirty tricks" against political opponents and illegal wiretappings had become nearly routine.[18] Some of the same people who planned the Watergate break-in, including Liddy, had earlier burglarized the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.[19] And Charles Colson, Nixon's personal dirty tricks "impresario," had been vainly trying to track down proof for Nixon that O'Brien, while chairman of the DNC, was receiving kickbacks from billionaire businessman Howard Hughes.[20]

In such an environment, the Watergate break-in is not, in retrospect, surprising. The deputy chairman of the CRP, himself an admitted conspirator, put it bluntly:

"Liddy's plan was approved because of the climate of fear and suspicion [about enemies] that had grown up in the White House, an atmos-

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phere that started with the President himself and reached us through Haldeman and others, one that came to affect all our thinking, so that decisions that now seem insane seemed at the time to be rational."[21]

Likewise, in such an atmosphere, an attempted cover-up was inevitable. As Haldeman put it:

"What I thought then was a natural effort to avoid any unnecessary political damage from

Watergate I now can see was an illegal program of obstruction of justice. . . . I have to conclude that the cover–up, in some form, was inevitable. It was not planned ahead as a great conspiracy—it grew one step at a time as people, believing they were acting in the best interest of the President, took steps to meet each problem as it arose."[22]

People like Liddy and Colson, with their peculiar zeal, talents for intrigue and willingness to skirt both the law and established procedure, were ill–suited for important positions in the Office of the President or the CRP. Yet, they were there because the president, and others close to him, considered their talents valuable. One must conclude about Watergate that the president's subordinates, whether or not personally directed by the president in their actions, acted in a way they felt would please the president. They had reason to do so because he had encouraged and blessed their "dirty tricks" in the past. Nixon admits this failure of leadership in his forthcoming book:

"I should have set a higher standard for the conduct of the people who participated in my campaign and Administration. I should have established a moral tone that would have made such actions unthinkable. I did not. I played by the rules of politics as I found them. Not taking a higher road than my predecessors and my adversaries was my central mistake."[23]

The result, of course, was his own disgrace, a

burgeoning of public distrust in government and a national political catharsis that dramatically altered the "balance" of power in Washington.

Case 3. The third case, the Iran–Contra affair, is still fresh enough to arouse the passions of many people of one ideological stripe or another. Many accounts are clouded by political invective or slant (both "left" and "right") which makes it difficult to analyze the case in a reasoned and dispassionate way. Nonetheless, after nearly four years of various investigations and trials, sufficient facts have been revealed to allow us to examine the affair as a case of leadership failure.[24]

The principal legal questions surrounding the Iran–Contra affair have centered around three main topics. First was covertly selling arms to Iran to gain release of the hostages held by Iranian–influenced groups in the Middle East. Second was diverting profits from these sales and soliciting private funds by members of the Reagan administration to aid the Nicaraguan resistance. Finally was building a web of deceit to keep the US Congress in the dark about both the Iran and Contra initiatives.

With regard to the first two topics, members of the National Security Council (NSC) staff displayed a reckless disregard for legal constraints. As the president's special review board (the "Tower Commission") concluded:

"The NSC staff activities in support of the Contras were marked by the same uncertainty as to legal authority and insensitivity to legal issues as were present in the Iran initiative. The ambiguity of the law governing activities in support of the Contras presented a greater challenge than even the considerable complexity of laws governing arms transfers. Intense congressional scrutiny with respect to the NSC staff activities relating to the Contras added to the potential costs of actions that pushed the limits of the law. . . . In this context, the NSC staff should have been particularly cautious, avoiding operational activity in this area and seeking legal counsel. The Board saw no signs of such restraint."[25]

These conclusions were supported by the subsequent findings of the congressional committees investigating the affair and the findings of

the special prosecutor's investigation.[26]

Additionally, three former Reagan administration officials, including two who had been national security advisers, were convicted in court of crimes related to misleading and obstructing Congress.[27] While no "smoking gun" has implicated former President Ronald Reagan as having known about the illegal diversion of arms profits to the Contras and no evidence suggests that he ordered a cover-up, he cannot escape overall responsibility for his subordinates' crimes and the chaos that resulted. Though Reagan said he instructed his subordinates to act only "within the law," both he and his national security adviser failed to establish the clear lines of control, authority, responsibility and accountability to ensure these instructions were followed.[28]

This left room for an energetic go-getter like Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, known for his ability to "get things done" and the passionate enthusiasm with which he threw himself into his assigned tasks, to undertake his ultimately disastrous initiatives. "At no time," concluded the president's special review board, "did [the president] insist upon accountability and performance review."[29] As to the president's leadership failure, it is worth quoting the congressional committees' report at length:

"Members of the NSC staff appeared to believe that their actions were consistent with the President's desires. It was the President's policy—not an isolated decision by North or [Admiral John] Poindexter—to sell arms secretly to Iran and to maintain the Contras 'body and soul,' the Boland Amendment notwithstanding. To the NSC staff, implementation of these policies became the overriding concern. . . . The President created, or at least tolerated, an environment where those who did know of the diversion believed with certainty that they were carrying out the President's policies.

"This same environment enabled a secretary who shredded, smuggled and altered documents to tell the Committees that 'sometimes you have to go above the written law'; and it enabled Admiral Poindexter to testify that 'frankly, we were willing to take some risks with the law.' It was in

... and Colson, with their ... talents for ... skirt both the law and established procedure, ... important positions in the Office of the President or the CRP. Yet, they were there because [President Nixon], and others close to him, considered their talents valuable. . . . "I should have established a moral tone that would have made such actions unthinkable. I did not."

such an environment that former officials and their private agents could lecture the committees that a 'rightful cause' justified any means, that lying to Congress and other officials in the executive branch itself is acceptable when the ends are just, and that Congress is to blame for passing laws that run counter to Administration policy."[30]

Even accounting for the partisan tone of outrage in the committees' assessment, the facts appear to justify the conclusion that the Iran–Contra fiasco was the result of narrowly focused officials carrying out questionable and indeed illegal activities because they thought that was what the president wanted. Moreover, the president and his top staff failed to establish an ethical climate in which such shady activities would have been rejected.

Why Are Failures So Important?

These cases simply are among the most spectacular and significant examples of *ollieism*—a specific sort of leadership failure that we in the military (as well as leaders in other fields) see now and again. It is, therefore, valuable for military officers to understand the kinds of conditions that generate such failures and to think about how they can be prevented. It is worth reiterating the essential elements of *ollieism*: It occurs when pragmatic but narrowly focused subordinates, in their zeal to get a job done or to please their boss, act illegally or unethically and when their leaders, for one reason or another, have failed to take adequate steps to discourage such behavior.

By selecting one case eight centuries old, I hoped to show that *ollieism* is not unique to the modern era. Indeed, one need only read Thucydides or Tacitus to find far more ancient examples of the same phenomenon. Also, the king and presidents examined here, before their respective scandals, were each widely lauded as uniquely strong and gifted leaders which shows that *ollieism* does not afflict only incompetents. Nor is it restricted to a single personality type or leadership style. For example, Reagan, unlike King Henry, never appeared to manifest "Type A" personality traits. Unlike Nixon, he was no workaholic, and he was not known to place extraordinary pressures on his subordinates.

In wartime, this type of leadership failure in military organizations has frequently led to atrocities. Uncivilized conditions and known or rumored enemy savagery has exacerbated tend-

encies of both soldiers and their leaders to accept unconscionable, even heinous, acts as a matter of course—as part of the "hell" into which they have been thrust. For example, John Dower describes numerous atrocities committed by US forces in the Pacific in World War II, many acknowledged only years later in various memoirs. Dower cites incidents of mutilating corpses (usually for souvenirs); deliberately killing or wounding soldiers, downed pilots, sailors who had abandoned ship and civilians; and torturing and executing prisoners.[31] Here is one example:

"Some massacres of Japanese, like that of the wounded soldiers attempting to surrender on Bougainville, were ordered to take place by Allied officers, or at least received tacit support from superior officers after the event. A US submarine commander who sank a Japanese transport and then spent upwards of an hour killing the hundreds and possibly thousands of Japanese survivors with his deck guns, for example, was commended and publicly honored by his superiors even though he included an account of the slaughter in his official report. To Navy colleagues, many of whom were repulsed by this action, the fact that the officer received high praise rather than censure was interpreted as an endorsement of such practices by the submarine high command."[32]

This type of incident was less rare than popularly understood. Charles A. Lindbergh, who flew in 1944 as a civilian observer with US forces in New Guinea, recorded in his journal:

"It was freely admitted that some of our soldiers tortured Jap prisoners and were as cruel and barbaric at times as the Japs themselves. Our men think nothing of shooting a Japanese prisoner or a soldier attempting to surrender. They treat the Japs with less respect than they would give to an animal, and these acts are condoned by almost everyone."[33]

Such crimes, of course, were prompted by more than simply a desire to get a job done or please superiors. A fervid hatred of the enemy and a desire for retribution were strong motivations. Nonetheless, it is clear that, in many of these cases, soldiers had little reason to believe

Former White House aide, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, being sworn in before the Senate's Iran-Contra Committee, 7 July 1987.

Even accounting for the partisan tone of outrage in the [Iran–Contra] committees' assessment, the facts appear to justify the conclusion that the Iran–Contra fiasco was the result of narrowly focused officials carrying out questionable and indeed illegal activities because they thought that was what the president wanted. . . . The president and his top staff failed to establish an ethical climate in which such shady activities would have been rejected.

they would be held accountable for such crimes. Often, leaders themselves either provoked, approved of or silently condoned war crimes.

But atrocities are an extreme manifestation of this type of leadership failure. More often, during both war and peace, less serious crimes or unethical practices are condoned or go unnoticed due to faulty leadership. These are no less tolerable, however, especially because they can have an insidious effect that rots a unit's "soul" by fostering distrust and dishonesty, inures unit members to improper methods, hides serious defects that warrant attention and leads inexorably to yet more serious infractions. Behind many scandals involving organizations, one can usually find a long history of unethical practices that, having

festered unseen from the outside, fostered arrogance and contempt for the law, custom and morality on the inside.

What forms does *ollieism* take in military organizations in peacetime? Think of the commander who knowingly allows his supply and maintenance people to hoard excess equipment and spare parts. This practice is often rationalized as protecting the unit from unforeseen contingencies and keeping its readiness rate up. Meanwhile, though, other units that need the items go without. What about the platoon leader, frustrated with a nonperforming soldier, who nods his head unquestioningly when a squad leader winks and says, "Don't worry, sir, the squad knows how to deal with guys like him." Peer

"pressure" can take various forms, and I know of one incident in which a soldier died as a result of injuries inflicted during a "blanket party."

What about the commander who pressures his subordinates to report high readiness rates but fails to provide the resources to achieve them or does not ensure the reports reflect the actual situation? Such "make it happen" leadership often fosters unethical gamesmanship among subordinates. Retired Major General Perry M. Smith tells of an Air Force wing that had routinely sent forward false reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff "to make the wing look good." As the newly assigned chief of maintenance, Smith discovered the practice and nipped it in the bud. How had that situation developed and why had his predecessor not stopped it?[34]

Other documented examples abound, but I can offer a parable from my own experience.[35] As a recently arrived platoon leader in a mechanized infantry battalion overseas, I soon became aware that there was a widespread problem with "midnight requisitions" in the motor pool.[36] One day, my driver came to me, clearly frustrated. He was troubled because several parts had been stolen from his vehicle, and he was planning to "steal them back" that night from the company whose people he suspected had done it. Surprised that he would suggest this to me, I told him to cancel his "raid" because stealing was wrong and unacceptable. Meanwhile, we would try to nab the perpetrators through a proper investigation.

I felt, though, that my moralistic arguments were unpersuasive because this man clearly felt that "everyone was doing it" and that he would be a "sucker" if he let himself, and our unit, be "ripped off" without immediate retaliation. So, I instructed him to properly order new parts that afternoon and warned that anyone, including him, suspected of stealing would be investigated and held accountable. I later checked to see that he ordered the parts, following up as they came in, and I discussed with the company commander the possibility of placing company guards in the motor pool.

It soon became evident that part-stealing was only a portion of the problem. The battalion's maintenance program was a mess. Other shaky practices abounded. Vehicle licenses were being issued without required training, "hangar queens" (vehicles needing major repair) were cannibalized and hidden from inspectors, some units were hoarding parts that were needed by others, endless promises of days off for over-worked mechanics were continually rescinded, and so on.

Meanwhile, entire companies of soldiers were being sent en masse to the motor pool to "do maintenance" without any clear instructions or supervision. While soldiers hauled clean equipment out of vehicles to clean it again, many officers and sergeants gathered in motor sergeants' offices to drink coffee. Around the middle of the month, the battalion executive officer rousted company motor officers, motor sergeants and mechanics for all-night wrench-turning sessions to ensure the battalion's "snapshot" equipment status report would show a high level of readiness. Any vehicle that could be jerry-rigged to roll forward on its own power was typically considered "ready."

Luckily, before long, a new battalion commander and executive officer arrived in the unit. Appalled at what they found in the motor pool, they set out deliberately and systematically to fix the problems. Training programs for drivers, mechanics, maintenance clerks and supervisors were established. Hangar queens were hauled out of their hiding places and gradually rebuilt as

parts were ordered and received. Company commanders who had rarely appeared in the motor pool started to show up. Part-stealing largely disappeared, and equipment status reports began to reflect the unit's actual state of readiness.

However, shortly after the new battalion commander arrived, so did the division inspector general's team. Though great progress had been made, three companies failed the vehicle maintenance category of inspection.[37] Rigorous efforts were made in the next few weeks to improve the maintenance program, though no relief was given in the battalion's operational tempo (also, the battalion was required to move—lock, stock and barrel—to a new camp shortly before the reinspection). Despite some marked improvements, two of the three companies failed the reinspection, whereupon the battalion commander, executive officer, motor officer, maintenance technician and two company commanders were immediately relieved for cause. The division commander (also new to his job) replaced them with a first-rate team that completed the reforms already begun, ultimately establishing a fine maintenance program.

What can be said about this case? A virtual cesspool of unethical practices had been allowed to fester under several leaders who were either too incompetent or too weak to deal with the pressures from above to keep readiness rates high. They passed these pressures along to overworked, poorly trained soldiers and looked the other way when many of these men resorted to shortcuts, petty crimes and falsehoods to give their bosses the readiness reports they sought. This bought sufficient time to allow some of these leaders to escape the consequences through normal transfers.

However, the new division commander could not countenance a mechanized battalion that had failed its vehicle maintenance inspection, so he took decisive and corrective action. Being inclined to amputate rather than to incise, he unfairly punished a new battalion commander and executive officer who had earnestly and honestly tried to fix the mess they inherited. The other officers relieved, however, deserved to go.

Why do cases like this, and the others previously described, occur? Answering this question will help us to determine how to prevent similar types of problems when we are in leadership positions.

Understanding the Problem

This type of leadership failure is generated by several factors, any of which may be present singularly or in combination. First, there are lots of temptations. Temptations to allow atrocities to go unpunished in war may include virulent hatred and contempt for the enemy, the desire for vengeance, fear of scandal, and so on. As for the more mundane manifestations of *ollieism*, temptations may include competition with other organizations, desire to win acclaim for a difficult task, desire to relieve pressure from above, fear of failure, or a belief that one's situation is so unique that extraordinary means are required.

This latter temptation is quite common when leaders are under any kind of stress. Admiral James B. Stockdale who, as a prisoner of war (PW) in Vietnam, led others in refusing to submit to the manipulations of their captors, gained keen insight into this temptation. He says:

". . . a properly educated leader, especially when harassed and under pressure, . . . will avoid the self-indulgent error of seeing himself in a predicament so unprecedented, so unique as to justify his making exception to law, custom, or morality in favor of himself. . . . [Too many leaders are gamesmen who] make exceptions to law and custom in favor of themselves because they choose to view ordinary dilemmas

as unprecedented crises."[38]

Stockdale himself refused to compromise his principles even in a most extreme and stark "crucible of pressure."[39] Despite the tortures and indignities inflicted on him during his several years of captivity, he cut no deals to better his own position and stealthily worked, at great personal risk, to build communications and cohesion among his fellow prisoners. Nor would he accept compromises among those he led under those dire circumstances.

A temptation closely related to what Stockdale describes is expediency or "gaming the system." Leaders will often choose, or resign themselves, to accept the "rules of the game" as they exist or seem to exist. Because "everybody is doing it" outside the formal system, there is no alternative but to play along. Nixon was guilty of doing this in allowing "dirty tricks" to be played on his opponents.[40] The military commander who sends readiness reports forward that he knows or suspects are inaccurate because he believes everyone else is doing it is also guilty.

It happens at all levels. People who engage in this practice often consider themselves pragmatic "realists." Smith tells how he saw this problem in the Pentagon as the services prepared their budget requests. Services would knowingly submit inflated estimates of program requirements, knowing other services would do the same and that the Department of Defense and Congress would ultimately hack at them. Of course, this type of gamesmanship inevitably becomes self-defeating and engenders distrust. Smith goes on to describe how former Air Force Chief of Staff Lew Allen refused to descend to such dishonesty and forced his staff to redo an inflated Air Force program request.[41]

Frustration is another of the factors that often promotes *ollieism*. Henry II was certainly frustrated by the obstacles Becket erected to stem the king's attempt to extend his authority over ecclesiastical courts. Nixon was frustrated by information leaks and perceived political "enemies" whom he felt were trying to undermine him. Members of Reagan's NSC staff were frustrated by congressional strictures that interfered with the policies they sought to pursue.

Today, large organizations like the military services are characterized by bureaucracy which is inherently frustrating. Bureaucratic procedures are often cumbersome, leading action-oriented or impatient leaders (and hence their subordinates) to seek expedient ways around the system. Thus, the subordinate who can "get things done" or "beat the system" gains favor regardless of the methods he uses to accomplish the mission. As long as the mission gets done, leaders may be inclined to look the other way.

For example, I once overheard a company commander say, "My supply sergeant takes good care of me. He has great connections. I don't have to worry about coming up short of anything." On its face, this could be a perfectly innocent accolade for a good supply sergeant, but I like neither the phrase "takes good care of me" nor the bit about "great connections." Was the sergeant's duty to "take care of" the company commander or to properly account for and maintain unit property? Were his "connections" legitimate? Yet, it is not uncommon for supply sergeants who are adept at going outside the system to be admired for their resourcefulness.

The epitome of this type of soldier is the character played by Jackie Gleason in the old movie, "Soldier in the Rain." A senior supply sergeant, he has raised bartering to such a fine art that he has become a powerful broker of government—

A returnee and escort walk proudly past a North Vietnamese soldier at Hanoi Airport, February 1973.

Despite the tortures and indignities inflicted on him during his several years of captivity, [Admiral Stockdale] cut no deals to better his own position and stealthily worked, at great personal risk, to build communications and cohesion among his fellow prisoners. Nor would he accept compromises among those he led under those dire circumstances.

owned items. He can come up with anything on demand, from "drawers, cotton, with elastic tops," to trucks, to platoons of soldiers! His office, filled with unauthorized luxuries, is far more plush than the base commander's, reflecting his importance to the informal workings of the organization. We are meant to admire him, as does his young acolyte (played by Steve McQueen), an enthusiastic young company supply sergeant.

Though the movie carries the situation to an absurd extreme, it should give us pause to think about how our organizations are really running. When subordinates are allowed to make end runs around established procedures, either because their leaders are inattentive or actually sanction such activities, the organization and its leaders are on a slippery slope. Their contempt for legal, regulatory or customary procedures may

spread to other areas of their work. The unit's operations can slide insidiously out of their control. This is especially true if the subordinates allowed such great latitude are particularly zealous or hyperambitious.

Other relevant factors are narrow focus, misguided loyalties and inattentiveness. Narrowly focused subordinates—and leaders for that matter—sometimes fail to see the broader implications of their actions. For example, hoarding an extra engine may help a battalion in a contingency, but how does it help the division that has vehicles awaiting new engines?

Misguided loyalties are similarly dysfunctional. To whom or what was North being loyal when he lied to Congress—the president, national laws or his own ideas of the public good?[42] Was it loyalty to his country, his subordinates or

himself that led Nixon to collude in a cover-up of Watergate?

Finally, inattentiveness can lead to disaster as well. Leaders, especially busy ones, need to be able to delegate authority to subordinates who can use their initiative, skills and experience to get things done. This is good for both the leader and the organization. But avoiding micromanagement and developing initiative are not excuses for inattentiveness. The leader bears the responsibility to ensure his subordinates are operating within accepted parameters of law, custom and morality.

What Can We Do?

Ollieism—the problem of subordinates acting unethically or illegally to get a job done or please the boss and their leaders failing to take steps to discourage such behavior—occurs far too frequently. Ollieism can occur in any large organization whether it operates in government, business, academia, religion or some other field. In the military, it happens during war and in peacetime. It is not restricted to certain personality types or leadership styles. And it can happen, as it did with Henry II and presidents Nixon and Reagan, with leaders who have otherwise shown extraordinary leadership skills.

The cases examined here also suggest that this type of leadership failure can have dire conse-

quences for subordinates, leaders, organizations and sometimes nations. It, therefore, behooves leaders to understand the nature of ollieism to ensure it does not occurr in their organizations. This article has attempted to help by factoring out, from various cases, several conditions that tend to underlie the development of unethical or illegal practices in organizations. These conditions include frustration, gamesmanship, self-interest, hyperambition, narrow focus, misguided loyalties, inattentiveness and several other kinds of temptation.

The only way military leaders can eliminate or mitigate the effects of these conditions is to work deliberately and proactively to establish and maintain an ethical command environment. This is important at all levels, especially for senior leaders since they set the moral tone for their subordinate organizations and have a high degree of "ethical visibility."[43]

The short chapter on "Professional Ethics" in US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, provides a good start for determining how to go about establishing such an environment. Armed with a knowledge of the conditions that foster ollieism and a determination to discharge their ethical obligations as laid out in FM 22-103, leaders can go a long way toward eliminating the potential for such a failure in their organizations.

As Stockdale, who won the Medal of Honor for his extraordinary courage in leading American PWs in Vietnam, wisely suggests, the best leaders are "transforming" leaders who devote much time to these concerns:

"Transforming leaders instruct and inspire their followers to recognize worthy needs, and they make those needs their wants. They have a way of raising their followers out of their everyday selves and into their better selves, of making them conscious of the high-minded goals that lie unconscious beneath their self-centered desires. In summary, the transforming leader has the wisdom to read the minds of his flock, to understand what they want, and he has the persuasive power to implant the latter into their hearts."[44]

Being a role model is not easy. Demonstrating

uncompromising integrity, inculcating values and standards, developing appropriate ethical norms and building moral discipline in an organization takes wisdom, patience, deliberate attention, careful supervision, persistence and lots of precious time. It also takes a high degree of moral courage since it is often more convenient to allow shortcuts and bending of established rules if, by so doing, "things get done." Rewards, after all, accrue to those who accomplish the mission, not to self-righteous failures.

But accomplishing the mission involves more than just "getting things done." Over time, it must also involve building a healthy, efficient and accountable organization that engenders and deserves lasting trust and confidence from those it serves. The leader who does not actively develop an ethical climate throughout his organization or who simply allows day-to-day pressures to distract him from this most fundamental of leadership tasks cheats his country, his organization, his subordinates and himself. **MR**

NOTES

1. W. L. Warren, *Henry II* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973), 447–517; John Richard Green, *A Short History of the English People* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1889), 105–12; and Edward P. Cheyney, *A Short History of England* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1918), 161–65. T. S. Eliot's brilliant quasi-historical drama, "Murder in the Cathedral," in T. S. Eliot: *The Complete Poems and Plays* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1971), 173–221.
2. Green, 105.
3. "The church" refers to the Catholic Church. The reforms cited are known as the Constitutions of Clarendon (1164). See Warren, 448–60; and Green, 106–7.
4. Warren, 449.
5. Cheyney, 165. King Henry apparently made similar outbursts before, for no intended effect but to vent his spleen. See Warren, 509.
6. Warren, 509.
7. Green, 108–9; and Cheyney, 165.
8. Warren, 531; and Cheyney, 165.
9. For example, see Warren, 508 and 520; Cheyney, 165; and Green, 108–10.
10. Warren, 484–92.
11. Green, 105.
12. *The Watergate Hearings: Break-in and Cover-up; Proceedings*, ed. *The New York Times*, (New York: Viking Press, 1975); Richard Nixon, *Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], 1974); *Report of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1975); Edward W. Knappman, *Watergate and the White House* (New York: Facts on File, 1973); Leon Jaworski, *The Right and the Power: The Prosecution of Watergate* (New York: Reader's Digest, 1976); Theodore H. White, *Breach of Faith: The Fall of Richard Nixon* (New York: Atheneum, 1975); Sam J. Ervin Jr., *The Whole Truth: The Watergate Conspiracy by Sam Ervin* (New York: Random House, 1980); Jeb Stuart Magruder, *An American Life: One Man's Road to Watergate* (New York: Antheneum, 1974); and H. R. Haldeman, *The Ends of Power* (New York: Times Books, 1978).
13. On the break-in, see Knappman, 11–20; *The Watergate Hearings*, 70–129; Haldeman, 3–42 and 317; and Magruder, 196–212.
14. Magruder, 173.
15. Including, for example, Charles Colson, a former special counsel to the president; E. Howard Hunt, a former White House consultant; John Mitchell, a former US Attorney General and director of the Committee to Re-Elect the President (CRP) at the time of the break-in, and Jeb Stuart Magruder, Mitchell's deputy at the CRP.
16. Haldeman, 32–35.
17. See note 13.
18. Jaworski, 31–44; Knappman, 33, 53, 71–77, 102 and 228; Magruder, 178–80; *The Watergate Hearings*, 70 and 309–57; and White, 100, 121, 153–59, 195, 197, 229 and 231–32.
19. White, 115, 147, 149–51, 155, 198 and 254.
20. Haldeman, 5 and 18–22.
21. Magruder, 196–97.
22. Haldeman, 322.
23. Richard Nixon, "Excerpts From Forthcoming Book *In the Arena*," *Time* (2 April 1990):38.
24. John Tower, Edmund Muskie and Brent Scowcroft, *The Tower Commission Report* (New York: Bantam Books, 1987); US House of Representatives

and US Senate, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair With Supplemental, Minority and Additional Views* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987); David Johnston, "North Guilty on 3 of 12 Counts; Vows to Fight Till Vindicated," *The New York Times*, 5 May 1989, 1 and 19; David E. Rosenbaum, "Jurors See North as a Scapegoat for His Superiors," *The New York Times*, 6 May 1989, 1 and 9 ; "Excerpts From Reagan's Videotaped Testimony," *The Washington Post*, 23 February 1990, A10–11; Stanley Meisler and Robert L. Jackson, "Poindexter Found Guilty," *The Kansas City Star*, 8 April 1990, A1 and 16; and Ed Magnuson, "The Ultimate Fall Guy: Once Again, Poindexter Takes the Hit for Iran-Contra," *Time* (16 April 1990):23.
25. Tower et al, 78–79. See also 71 and 75–78.
26. *Report of the Congressional Committees*, 4–5, 13 and 21–22.
27. Robert McFarlane pleaded guilty to four charges of withholding information from Congress; Poindexter was convicted on five charges of obstructing Congress, conspiring to destroy documents and making false statements; Oliver North was convicted on three charges of obstructing Congress, destroying documents and receiving an illegal gratuity. One of North's convictions has since been reversed on appeal and the others remanded to District Court for review to examine whether any of North's immunized testimony before Congress was used to convict him. See Magnuson, 23; and Meisler and Jackson, A16.
28. "Excerpts From Reagan's Videotaped Testimony," A10.
29. Tower, 79. See also 56, 62, 69, 80–81, 88 and 92.
30. *Report of the Congressional Committees*, 21–22.
31. John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 61–71 and 141–42.
32. Clay Blair Jr., *Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan* (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1975), 384–6, cited in Dower, 66–67. The submarine commander was awarded a Navy Cross following this mission.
33. Dower, 70.
34. Perry Smith, "Leadership and Ethics: A Practitioner's View, *Moral Obligation and the Military* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988), 130.
35. For example, see Smith, 129–40; Charles W. Hudlin, "Morality and the Military Profession, *Military Ethics* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987), 86; and Phillip A. Johnson, "Why Don't We Follow the Rules?" *Military Ethics*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987), 131–35.
36. "Midnight requisitioning" refers to the practice of stealing parts after hours from equipment belonging to other units.
37. Luckily, my company's clean-up crusade started early and we passed inspection.
38. James B. Stockdale, "Machiavelli, Management, and Moral Leadership," *Military Ethics* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987), 36; and Michael Maccoby, *The Gamesman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976), passim.
39. Stockdale, 36.
40. See note 24.
41. Smith, 133–34.
42. John E. Shephard Jr., "Where a Soldier's Loyalty Lies," *The Wall Street Journal*, 26 March 1987, 36.
43. US Department of the Army Field Manual 22–103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987), 18 and 25.
44. Stockdale, 43–44.

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MILITARY QUALIFICATION STANDARDS

An Officer Leader Development Tool

Lieutenant Colonel William A. Knowlton Jr., US Army

The expected drawdown of the Army has already been compared to the one that occurred between World War I and World War II. One critical feature of the Army of the interwar years was a consistent emphasis on educating and developing leaders. The author describes an important element of the current leader development program, the Military Qualification Standards System (MQS). He discusses the main features of the system and how it will serve our future officer leaders.

LEADER development is the focus of increasing attention within the Army. General Carl E. Vuono, chief of staff of the Army, has made leader development one of the six fundamental imperatives to follow in reshaping the Army of the future. He frequently emphasizes that the officer, noncommissioned officer (NCO) and civilian leaders we develop are the legacy we will leave the Army. He also tells prospective battalion and brigade commanders at their precommand course that nothing they do will have a more lasting impact on the Army than the way they develop their junior leaders.

An emphasis on leader development, however, is longstanding in the Army. During the period between World War I and World War II, an era to which the 1990s is being compared, the Army greatly decreased in size but retained as its highest priority, training, educating and developing its leaders. General Douglas MacArthur, in a 1929 letter to the minority leader of the House of Representatives, said:

"Skilled officers, like all other professional men, are products of continuous and laborious study, training and experience. . . . Trained officers constitute the most vitally essential element in modern war, and the only one that under no circumstances can be improvised or extemporized. . . . [An army] in action is doomed to destruction without the trained and adequate leadership of officers."

The Army's contemporary leader development programs rest on three pillars: institutional training, operational assignments and self-development. Institutional training encompasses all of the military "schoolhouse" training and education a leader receives. For officers, this includes such courses as the officer basic and advanced branch courses as well as the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³); for warrant officers, schooling such as the senior and master warrant officer training courses; for NCOs, each part of the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (such as the Primary Leadership Development Course or the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course); and for civilians, a variety of technical training opportunities, as well as the training offered by the Center for Army Leadership, US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC).

Operational assignments include developing the leader. This occurs as part of unit training as the leader progresses through sequential developmental assignments. In operational assignments, the leader applies what was learned in the schoolhouse, gets feedback on whether he has attained the standards and develops a sense of practical reality about the profession. Self-development includes those activities the leader undertakes on his own to increase his knowledge of the profession of arms—professional reading and writing, off-duty study, and education and correspondence courses for example.

For commissioned officers, one program directly related to each of the three leader development pillars currently receiving great emphasis is the Military Qualification Standards System (MQS). MQS is not new; in fact, it first was implemented in 1984. Today, however, reactions to MQS vary throughout the Army. One often hears comments such as, "Isn't that an SQT (skill qualification test) for officers?" or "That's the program that requires commanders to devote already limited training time to training their officers on tasks unrelated to the unit missions!" or "MQS puts an unreasonable burden on the individual officer—it requires a lieutenant, who has little enough free time as it is, to spend his or her evenings poring over telephone book–size manuals!" One also hears frequent cries that MQS has never worked and never will because the manuals are never available and are too unwieldy anyway. And, occasionally, one finds that

> *The revised MQS . . . is not an SQT for officers. It does not require the commander to devote training time to nonmission–related tasks, it does not put an unreasonable burden on the individual officer, and it does not consist of voluminous texts. Rather, it is a developmental tool—a means . . . to ensure that all commissioned officer leader development efforts are integrated, progressive and sequential.*

knowledge of MQS has not spread throughout the Army and the reaction to MQS is, "What on earth is that? I never heard of it!"

Those who have not yet heard of MQS will encounter it in the future, and although some of the comments just noted may have been true of earlier versions of MQS, they are not true now. The revised MQS that is now being fielded is not an SQT for officers. It does not require the commander to devote training time to nonmission–related tasks, it does not put an unreasonable burden on the individual officer, and it does not consist of voluminous texts. Rather, it is a developmental tool—a means of tying together the three leader development pillars to ensure that all commissioned officer leader development efforts are integrated, progressive and sequential. Let me describe MQS in some detail from the perspective of the individual officer.

An officer's first contact with MQS occurs in precommissioning training. Regardless of the type of precommissioning program—Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), US Military Academy (USMA) or Officer Candidate School (OCS)—the cadet or officer candidate is issued an MQS manual when he or she starts precommissioning training. This manual

outlines those critical tasks the cadet must master before being commissioned. The manual contains a summary page with the conditions, standards and performance measures for each task. When a cadet picks up the MQS manual, he will find tasks in the following areas:

- Drills and ceremonies.
- Inspection.
- Written and oral communication.
- Operations and tactics.
- Land navigation.
- First aid.
- Physical fitness.
- Weapons.
- Nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defense training.
- Army training.
- Radio and wire communication.

Some of the information the cadet or officer candidate must know is not directly observable and cannot be demonstrated through direct task performance. This information is presented in MQS as professional knowledge subject areas (PKs). Summary pages also are included in the MQS I manual for PKs in the following areas:

- AirLand Battle doctrine.
- Combat service support.
- Command and control.
- Intelligence.
- Leadership.
- Low–intensity conflict.
- Military history.
- Mobility and survivability.
- Soldier support systems.

- The Total Army concept.
- Training.

As you can see, the MQS I tasks and PKs cover all of the basic soldier and leader skills. The summary pages in the manual are not intended to serve as the primary training materials, however. The cadet's military instructors are provided with training support packages that include lesson plans, practical exercises, student handouts, and extensive references to use in preparing their classes. The MQS manual is intended to be a resource for the cadet and to serve as an aid in preparing for and reviewing instruction received in the classroom or during field training.

The cadets also will find the professional military education requirements for precommissioning in the MQS I manual. Professional military education provides the cadet with the academic foundation necessary to support intellectual growth. Every cadet and officer candidate must take at least one course in written communications, human behavior and military history. Courses in management and national security studies are recommended but not required. Cadets are told which specific courses are approved at their respective academic institutions for the required fields of study. Cadets generally are expected to obtain a baccalaureate degree before being commissioned and must obtain a baccalaureate degree if they want to be competitive in the selection for promotion to major.

Armed with the MQS I manual and having been trained in a precommissioning program on the critical tasks and PKs addressed in the manual, our cadet is commissioned, pins on the gold bar of a second lieutenant and heads off to the officer basic course. At this point, the officer transitions into MQS II, the next level of MQS, which encompasses all the training an officer receives as a lieutenant and captain. MQS II should prepare the officer to perform wartime tasks, to be promoted to major and to attend USACGSC–level schooling.

The entire MQS, of course, is intended to be progressive and sequential, so the training an officer receives in MQS II builds on and reinforces the training received in MQS I. Upon arrival at

Task summary pages for branch tasks are included. . . [The] MQS II Armor Branch Manual, for example, will have the most critical tasks for armor lieutenants relating to "moving and shooting." In areas such as intelligence or defense, the only tasks listed would be those that are critical for company grade armor officers.

the officer basic course, a diagnostic test will be administered to determine if the officer is proficient in MQS I tasks. A lieutenant who does not meet the standard on MQS will begin a personal remedial program of training supported by the school. Therefore, officers need to retain the MQS I manual!

While all cadets are expected to master the same critical tasks in MQS I, MQS II incorporates two developmental areas—common and branch. The common tasks and PKs are those in which all lieutenants and captains, regardless of branch, are expected to be proficient. Branch tasks do not apply to all officers but, rather, are specific to the officers of a particular branch.

To illustrate, let us suppose a Lieutenant (LT) Patton has been commissioned into the armor branch. Upon arrival at the Armor Officer Basic Course, he will receive two MQS manuals: the MQS II Common Manual and the MQS II Armor Branch Manual. The MQS II Common Manual is similar to the MQS I manual. It lists and includes summary pages for all critical common lieutenant tasks and PKs. These tasks and

PKs are organized into the following areas: the seven battlefield operating systems (intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability, combat service support, and command and control), AirLand Battle doctrine, leadership, training, history and soldier support systems.

In addition, the common manual includes appendixes covering the school commandant's and unit commander's responsibilities for MQS and an appendix outlining the MQS II reading program. This program is built around a foundation reading list of 19 books in general history, sustainment, technology, training management, command and leadership, the nature of war, tactics and warfighting, and low-intensity conflict. Every company grade officer is expected to read 10 of these books by the time he is eligible for promotion to major. The MQS II Common Manual thus structures, to some extent, the lieutenant's self-development program.

The MQS II branch manual covers those branch-specific tasks in which the officer is expected to be proficient. In most cases, the

branch manuals will have their tasks grouped under the battlefield operating systems. Task summary pages for branch tasks are included in the branch manuals. LT Patton's MQS II Armor Branch Manual, for example, will have the most

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MQS II incorporates two developmental areas—common and branch. The common tasks and PKs are those in which all lieutenants and captains, regardless of branch, are expected to be proficient. Branch tasks do not apply to all officers but, rather, are specific to the officers of a particular branch.

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critical tasks for armor lieutenants relating to "moving and shooting." In areas such as intelligence or defense, the only tasks listed would be those that are critical for company grade armor officers.

Now that LT Patton has his MQS II common and branch manuals, what does he do with them? First, he should use the manuals as references during the Armor Officer Basic Course. Most of the instruction he receives during the course will be the critical common and branch lieutenant tasks identified in the manuals. The task summary pages in the manuals should assist him in determining not only what the critical tasks for an armor lieutenant are but also what the performance standards are. Second, when he graduates from the basic course, he should take these manuals with him to his first assignment! They become even more important to him once he is out of the schoolhouse.

After completing the basic course, LT Patton is assigned to a tank battalion at Fort Hood, Texas, and his first assignment is as a tank platoon leader. At this point, the MQS II manuals become a valuable source for both LT Patton and his commander. For the commander, the manuals serve a couple of purposes. They identify for him the critical common and branch tasks in which LT Patton is expected to be proficient and indicate in which of those he has received train-

ing in the Armor Officer Basic Course. They further identify the Armywide standard LT Patton must achieve. In this manner, the commander can determine where to put his emphasis on individual officer training to build on what the officer received in the schoolhouse.

This is not to say, however, that the commander is responsible for training LT Patton on every critical lieutenant task not covered in the basic course. The commander can tailor his training to support his mission-essential task list (METL). He should use the MQS manuals as a "menu" from which to choose important METL-related tasks and to provide an Armywide standard for those tasks. LT Patton can review the manuals for the training he received in the basic course and also to define the task standards for him. Finally, the manuals can be used by the commander in designing and the officer in completing a unit officer certification program.

As LT Patton gains experience and demonstrates his competence, he will be assessed and subsequently developed through assignment to different duty positions. As he goes through his three to four years in the battalion, he may serve as a support platoon leader, company executive officer or battalion staff officer. These developmental assignments will provide the opportunity to broaden his experiences and should increase LT Patton's overall proficiency.

Periodically, he should pull out his MQS II manuals and review the critical common and branch lieutenant tasks. There may be some tasks that are not being trained in the unit because they are not related to the unit METL. In this case, LT Patton must master these as part of his self-development program. The task summary pages in the manuals should provide the information on tasks, conditions and standards, and the references necessary to become proficient in the tasks.

The MQS thus ties together the three pillars of leader development for LT Patton, his school commandant and his commander. Institutional training in the Armor Officer Basic Course, operational assignments in the tank battalion and LT Patton's own self-development program

USACGSC students during their resident course.

To ensure he is ready to move through this passage point, CPT Patton again will take a diagnostic test when he enters the Command and General Staff Officer Course (whether resident or nonresident). This test will assess his proficiency on critical captain tasks.

should complement each other and be based on the critical common and branch lieutenant tasks identified in the MQS II manuals.

Continuing this example, LT Patton goes to the Armor Officer Advanced Course and is promoted to captain (CPT) after he completes his tour of duty at Fort Hood. Once again, CPT Patton will face a diagnostic examination when he enters the advanced course. This diagnostic examination will assess CPT Patton's proficiency on selected lieutenant tasks to determine if he has reached the appropriate level of development for this point in his career. If he is not up to standard, CPT Patton will find he has some remedial work to do during the advanced course. The armor school may assist him, but the responsibility for gaining proficiency is the officer's, and his MQS II manuals should serve as his guide.

The MQS II manuals include critical captain tasks in addition to common and branch lieutenant tasks. The critical common captain tasks in the MQS II Common Manual are organized into the same task areas as the lieutenant tasks with the addition of low-intensity conflict and force integration. Similarly, the critical branch captain tasks in the MQS II Armor Branch Manual will be organized around the battlefield

operating systems. The MQS manuals thus serve the same purpose for CPT Patton in the advanced course as they did in the basic course—defining the critical tasks expected to be mastered at this level of development. He will not be trained on all critical captain tasks in the advanced course, and for those not covered, the task summary pages in the manual again establish Armywide performance standards.

When CPT Patton completes the advanced course, he will automatically be enrolled in the nonresident phase (Phase I) of CAS³. He must then complete Phase I within two years. Following the advanced course, CPT Patton is assigned to Germany, initially to an armored brigade's operations section. During this assignment, CPT Patton will find that more of the burden of his development falls on his shoulders.

The brigade operations officer and executive officer will contribute to the development of the brigade staff officers by training them on METL-related tasks, but some critical captain tasks may not be trained. The MQS II manuals should prove particularly useful here in identifying for CPT Patton the critical captain common and branch tasks for which he is now responsible and in establishing the required standard. Building on the instruction he received in the advanced

course, CPT Patton can prepare himself for company command by ensuring he is competent in critical captain tasks. He should also complete Phase I of CAS³ as soon as possible.

When he has completed Phase I, the brigade commander, in conjunction with CPT Patton's branch manager, must ensure he attends the resident phase (Phase II) of CAS³. CPT Patton must ensure he successfully completes it. Timely completion of CAS³ should improve CPT Patton's staff skills and assist him in performing his duties as a staff officer.

After a year in the brigade operations section, CPT Patton is reassigned to a tank battalion, where he takes command of a tank company. Again, the MQS II manuals should prove useful for CPT Patton's battalion commander in identifying those critical tasks in which he has been trained in the advanced course and in helping the commander structure his individual leader development programs in the unit. For CPT Patton, now a commander himself and responsible for developing his own officers, the MQS II manuals also can assist him in structuring a leader development program for his lieutenants.

After two years of command, CPT Patton returns from overseas, completes an ROTC Cadet Command instructor training course and is assigned to an ROTC instructor position. He must assume the major responsibility for his own development while in this assignment, and his MQS II common and armor branch manuals should be useful resources in maintaining branch proficiency.

At this point, CPT Patton will be approaching the zone of consideration for promotion to major. He will have been through functional area designation (in his case, operations, plans and training) at about his fifth year of service and, upon completion of his ROTC tour, is assigned to a functional area position in the Combined Arms Command at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Having completed the required schools (the Armor Officer Advanced Course and both phases of CAS³), completed his key armor captain-level developmental assignment (company command), attained proficiency in all common

and branch-critical captain tasks, and completed the required foundation reading for company field grade officers, CPT Patton is ready to move through the "passage point" from MQS II to MQS III (field grade).

CPT Patton is now prepared to be promoted to major and for CGSC-level schooling. To ensure he is ready to move through this passage point, CPT Patton again will take a diagnostic test when he enters the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) (whether resident or nonresident). This test will assess his proficiency on critical captain tasks.

MQS I and MQS II as just described are in the process of being fielded. MQS I (precommissioning) has been in use since 1984, and an MQS I revision to update the tasks and their associated training support packages was completed in May 1990. MQS II (company grade) currently is being fielded. Distribution of the MQS II common manuals began in January 1991 and the first of the MQS II branch manuals in March 1991.

MQS III for field grade officers is still under development. Continuing MQS at this level is extremely complex because field grade officers are developed in five areas: common, branch, functional area, joint and acquisition. For the newly promoted MAJ Patton, for example, development may include institutional training in the common area (completing CGSOC), operational assignments in both his branch and in his functional area (such as battalion executive officer and assignment to a division or corps operations staff section), and institutional training and assignment in the joint arena (completion of the joint operations course at the Armed Forces Staff College, followed by assignment to a joint or combined staff).

As you can see, continuing to progressively and sequentially develop the field grade officer simultaneously in three or more areas is extremely difficult. To further illustrate this point, developmental requirements in the acquisition area are extensive. The creation of the Army Acquisition Corps requires primacy in an acquisition functional area. Beyond the eight- to 10-year

mark, the focus of an officer's career is exclusively acquisition related. Other modifications to the Army's officer management system may be necessary in the future to facilitate leader development.

Efforts in field grade leader development are focusing on three areas. The first of these is functional area development. Functional area manuals are being written to assist the officer in attaining proficiency in his functional area and should be fielded early in 1992. When available, the appropriate functional area manual will be provided to the officer on designation of his functional area.

The second area of focus for field grade leader development is a revision of Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization.* This pamphlet will be useful in developing and managing careers for all officers, but it will be particularly relevant for field grade officers for whom career paths can become very complex.

The final area of focus is an MQS III leader development manual. Unlike the MQS I and II manuals, the MQS III manual will include short descriptions of the broad areas of knowledge with which field grade officers should be familiar rather than specific tasks. The MQS III manual will be oriented toward self-development and will highlight foundation reading, correspondence courses and assessment.

Senior service college (SSC) is the last institutional training course of any length an officer will attend, and development beyond this point is not as structured as at the junior grades. One of the goals of MQS III is to prepare an officer for SSC-level schooling. The other goals are to prepare officers to serve in positions of greater re-

sponsibility and, specifically to command and serve on higher level joint service staffs. The

The MQS II reading program is built around a foundation reading list of 19 books in general history, sustainment, technology, training management, command and leadership, the nature of war, tactics and warfighting, and low-intensity conflict. Every company grade officer is expected to read 10 of these books by the time he is eligible for promotion to major.

Army must also ensure that officers promoted to colonel have completed MQS III and have or will complete SSC-level schooling. There is significant career management for senior officers, such as the five-year career plan for general officers prepared by the General Officer Management Office, but development at the grade of colonel and beyond primarily focuses on self-development and self-study.

MQS is intended to take the officer from precommissioning training to SSC and to help the officer, his commanders and his school commandants structure an integrated leader development program. In identifying the critical tasks and other developmental requirements at each stage of an officer's career, MQS will provide the tools through which institutional training, operational assignments and self-development will contribute in an integrated, progressive and sequential manner to create leaders who can execute the Army's missions. It will be up to each of us to ensure that the tool is used properly. **MR**

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COMPETENCY-BASED LEADERSHIP

Major Joseph R. Palmer, US Army

As the euphoria of the victory in the gulf subsides, the drawdown of the US Armed Forces appears to be regaining momentum in Congress and elsewhere. The author correctly surmises that leader development will be even more critical to the capability and readiness of a reduced force. He describes the components of the Leadership Assessment and Development Program and the necessity to press ahead with its full implementation.

"**S**IR, I've been assessing leaders for almost 30 years," said the sergeant major.

"Yes, I'm sure you have Sergeant Major, and I'm sure you're good at doing it," replied Lieutenant Colonel Smith, the battalion commander, as he looked up from the document he had been reading.

"So why is this new Leadership Assessment and Development Program [LADP] being implemented in the TRADOC [US Army Training and Doctrine Command] school system?" continued the sergeant major. "Why do we need a new way to look at leaders?"

"Well," said Smith, pausing briefly to organize his thoughts, "let me try to answer that by asking you a couple of questions." He motioned for the sergeant major to have a seat.

"Now," Smith said, then asked, "what is your assessment of First Sergeant Jones in Charlie Company?"

"He is topnotch, sir, one of the best noncommissioned officers [NCOs] in the brigade," came the quick response.

"Would you be a little more specific? Just what is it about Jones that brings you to the conclusion that he is topnotch, one of the best?"

"Well, sir, he doesn't just react to fires, he acts.

He is first to get the job done and has higher standards than others. He never accepts defeat or even mediocrity. In fact, he always seems to be a step ahead of the other first sergeants."

"Okay, Sergeant Major, that makes sense. Now, look at *how* he acts rather than reacts to situations and give me a couple of specific examples," Smith continued.

After a pause, the sergeant major said, "He has done more in three months than the other first sergeants have in a year. For example, he completely renovated the recreation room in the billets—even got his NCOs to help repair the furniture. He recognized boredom in the motor pool, instituted a new crew maintenance procedure, which encourages healthy competition among crews, and recognized those who performed well." The sergeant major continued, "He corrected several supply shortcomings by suggesting to the supply sergeant a new method of accounting for field gear and equipment. Also. . . ."

"Okay, super!" interrupted Smith with a big grin on his face. He picked up a piece of paper from his desk and handed it to the sergeant major. "Now, take a look at this list of the nine leadership categories of behavior, called competencies, currently found in US Army Field Manual

[FM] 22–100, *Military Leadership*. If I asked you to place each example of Jones' behavior into one of these categories, tell me where you would categorize them."

The sergeant major pondered the list for a moment. "Well, sir," he said, "it looks like *soldier team development* is the category or competency for renovating the day room, and perhaps *technical and tactical proficiency* would be the competency for the new maintenance and supply procedures. But it seems like the competency *decision making* also applies to both examples because Jones decided to initiate these actions."

"You're right on target, Sergeant Major," the battalion commander replied. "Now, let me ask you another question. Do you see the possibility of using these competencies, Armywide, to provide developmental feedback to our leaders?"

After some thought, the sergeant major responded, "Yes, sir, I do. It would force us to reorganize our thoughts and allow us to speak the same language when talking about Army leaders. However," he continued, "I don't see how we can classify all leader behaviors into these competencies. Some behaviors can probably be classified into more than one competency. And, when using these competencies, how would we evaluate the leader's performance in each area to give him some idea of how he is doing?"

"Yes, Sergeant Major," replied Smith, "the same question occurred to me. My original impression was similar to yours; I thought I had been assessing leaders for 20 years, but this new leadership assessment process looks like a better way to organize our leadership feedback."

"This could be a useful counseling and feedback method for our leaders."

"I agree. Take another look at this LADP memorandum, Sergeant Major, and we'll discuss it again later," said Smith as he got up to leave.

CONVERSATIONS such as this may be taking place within many TRADOC organizations as a result of the new LADP. TRADOC recently issued guidance for implementing LADP in resident leader training courses. The goal of LADP is to contribute to

Army leaders' self–development. Leadership assessment provides student leaders with accurate, uninflated leadership evaluations and nonthreatening developmental feedback. This feedback contributes to their professional self–development. LADP is being implemented in

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A leader prepares his self–development plan by compiling assessment results into a summary and identifying areas needing improvement. He creates a developmental action plan using goal–setting criteria that is achievable, measurable, specific and, most important, realistic.

TRADOC resident leader training courses that are longer than five weeks.

Self–development is considered one of the three "pillars" of leader development. The other two are institutional training (the Army school system) and operational assignments. Together, these three pillars provide the supporting structure for leader development in the Army. LADP complements all three pillars and facilitates a sequential and progressive system of leader development. During institutional training, student leaders are assessed by trained assessors, and self–development feedback is provided. Student leaders then move on to operational assignments where they apply their self–development plans.

A leader prepares his self–development plan by compiling assessment results into a summary and identifying areas needing improvement. He creates a developmental action plan using goal–setting criteria that is achievable, measurable, specific and, most important, realistic.

Labeling LADP "new" is actually a misnomer since neither the assessment process nor using assessment for leadership evaluation is new to the Army. The US military actually initiated the assessment process to help select candidates for intelligence operations during World War II. Since World War II, using assessment for both selection and development has taken place in

many civilian and government organizations. The US Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) Cadet Command has been using leadership assessment successfully during precommissioning training since 1982. Thousands of government and civilian organizations (including IBM, AT&T, the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] and the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]) are now experiencing great success with assessment methods. These organizations use assessment to select applicants for positions and then develop them once selection decisions are made. In fact, the applicants' assessment results are often used to diagnose training needs such as communications, time management and supervision.

The Army issued instructions for implementing LADP in October 1989. According to TRADOC Deputy Commander for Combined Arms Lieutenant General Leonard P. Wishart III, LADP will "grow into a comprehensive program over time." Although there is widespread agreement with the concept of "developing Army leaders," the reality of implementing this concept using assessment methods is characterized by less optimism. This is a natural reaction to the program due to constrained resources (a tighter budget, fewer personnel and lack of trained personnel) envisioned for the next several years. This view will change with continued success in training and education about LADP.

Implementing leadership assessment for developing, as opposed to selecting, Army leaders represents a novel application. It is important that Army leaders understand the difference between leadership assessment for development and standardized performance evaluations such as noncommissioned officer evaluation reports (NCOERs) and officer evaluation reports (OERs). A common misconception about the leadership assessment process is that it must be nonevaluative. Nothing could be further from the truth. Assessment is, in fact, one of the most sophisticated formal, objective evaluative processes in existence today (fig. 1).

The confusion lies in using the results. Assessment results are commonly used for one of two purposes: to select for a particular position or to provide developmental feedback to the individual. The Cadet Command's Leadership Assessment Program (LAP) is currently using assessment for selection so it may be seen as evaluative to the casual observer, whereas TRADOC's LADP is using assessment solely for development. Yet, both are evaluative systems.

Assessments are Evaluations *But*

INDIVIDUAL ASSESSMENTS	PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
Evaluate student behaviors.	Evaluate performance on the job.
Predict future abilities.	Usually measure past results.
Are nonthreatening; therefore, UNINFLATED.	May be threatening; however, INFLATION is common.
Require "trained" assessors.	
Measurement tools are quantifiable, standardized, usually validated.	Require senior–subordinate relationship.
Assessor "bias" not likely because judgment calls are minimized.	Measurement tools may not apply to anyone other than the person being evaluated.
	Require judgments and may be biased.

Figure 1.

The ROTC Cadet Command has been using leadership assessment successfully during precommissioning training since 1982. Thousands of government and civilian organizations (including IBM, AT&T, the FBI and the CIA) are now experiencing great success with assessment methods. These organizations use assessment to select applicants for positions and then develop them once selection decisions are made.

Individual leadership assessment for development uses the assessment process to identify student leaders' strengths and weaknesses. A faculty counselor then gives nonthreatening developmental feedback. Leadership performance evaluations, such as NCOERs, use a subjective evaluation process to identify leader strengths and weaknesses in the field. Promotions, eliminations and other selection decisions are then based on these results. Both assessments and evaluations require judgments on individual behaviors. However, the performance evaluation is more threatening because it deals with on-the-job success that translates to job security, promotions, money, and so on. The realism of "duty first" inherent to field assignments does not compare to the more relaxed "learning" environment associated with TRADOC schools.

LADP requires assessors who are well-trained. This training ensures cadre and faculty members'

competence to perform leadership assessment objectives. Normal performance evaluations require a senior-to-subordinate relationship that may be characterized by a myriad of biases. LADP minimizes such biases because assessors are trained to objectively record and classify student behaviors—not intentions, potential or overall ability.

TRADOC resident leader training courses provide a positive training environment for Army leaders that supports leadership assessment for development. This environment supports uninflated leadership assessment results and very little assessor bias for two reasons. First, assessors often evaluate the student leader during only one event, and they are not direct-line superiors within the "rating chain." Second, the results from all assessed events are not as threatening since final assessment reports are not tied to the student leader's Academic Evaluation Reports.

Before getting too involved in describing LADP further, a brief history of leadership theory may illustrate why we use assessment. Pre-1900 researchers believed that leaders were born (na-

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ture), not made (nurture). This "great–man" theory postulated that great leaders emerge by virtue of possessing qualities or traits of greatness. These theorists unsuccessfully attempted to support their theory with empirical research data.

The next phase of leadership theories also focused on leaders' situational behavior. Patterns of appropriate leader behavior seem to match with given organizational settings, specific jobs and the maturity level or experience of subordinates. Results were then compared to subordinates' satisfaction and job performance.

Leadership assessment methods appeared in the late 1940s and gained popularity rather quickly in part because they were not wedded to any of the theories then in vogue. Instead, they offered a practical method of evaluating leadership based on the prospective leaders' behavior.

The US government soon tested the viability of individual assessment techniques due to undeniable successes in the civilian sector. The Veterans Administration, FBI, Federal Aviation Administration, Social Security Administration and others joined in using assessment methods. Beginning in 1973, the Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia, field–tested assessment methods to determine their applicability in selecting and developing officers. The most successful application of assessment methods is taking place in the ROTC Cadet Command. Since 1982, Cadet Command has used

assessments taken during advanced camp to select cadets for commissioning.

The Army is increasing its emphasis on leader development. The study by then Major General Gordon R. Sullivan, published in spring 1988, specified more than 50 leader development initiatives and established the Leader Development Office as an overwatch agency to ensure those initiatives are implemented. One of the Sullivan study initiatives directed TRADOC to build on the success of Cadet Command's LAP and, in effect, created LADP. Unlike LAP, however, the Army is using nine competencies, rather than 16 dimensions, to measure leader development. Why nine competencies?

In 1976, the US Army Administration Center published Research Monograph Number 8, *A Matrix of Organizational Leadership Dimensions*. This report was the result of a study of civilian and military organizations and was conducted by the Army Research Institute. It identified nine functions and activities organizations must perform to operate effectively. In 1983, these functions, termed dimensions, were published in the Army's operational concept for leadership, and they became known as competencies. Today, these competencies are in FM 22–100 and are the organizational leadership behavior categories that provide the framework for LADP:
- Communications.
- Supervision.
- Teaching and counseling.
- Soldier team development.
- Technical and tactical proficiency.
- Decision making.
- Planning.
- Use of available systems.
- Professional ethics.

By adopting these competencies, the US Army now has a better opportunity to use an interactive leadership approach. By integrating individual *leader* behaviors with organizational *leadership* behaviors, an equation for success is created. We can now answer the questions, "What is necessary to make an individual an effective leader?" and "What is necessary to make an organization effective?" These two actually

According to FM 25–100, **Training the Force**, *we train the way we intend
to fight because history shows a direct correlation between realistic training and battle-
field success. The assessment process fits logically into TRADOC schools where
realistic training takes place. In fact, research supports the predictive validity of
simulations that parallel "on–the–job conditions."*

interact to yield the following equation:

$$\begin{array}{lll}
 & & \text{Successful} \\
\text{Individual} & \text{Organizational} & \text{organizations} \\
\text{leader} & + \text{leadership} & = \text{led by} \\
\text{behaviors} & \text{behaviors} & \text{successful} \\
 & & \text{leaders}
\end{array}$$

Applying this equation using the competency, *decision making*, we can see that integrating organizational with individual needs sharpens our leadership view. Since leaders at all levels make important decisions, we assume that a squad leader's decision to lay down suppressive fire for Bravo Team would be similar (organizationally) to a battalion commander's decision to move Charlie Company to another area based on the tactical situation. Both decisions may affect the lives of subordinates, although the battalion commander's decision is more far-reaching. Both leaders made their decisions by analyzing the situation, weighing the alternatives and deciding on the best course of action. The squad

leader gathered input directly. The battalion commander gathered input from his staff and subordinate commanders. Both leaders exhibited the organizational competency, *decision making*, but did so uniquely and individually.

How can we evaluate both leaders' decisions adequately, given the variation in method and impact? Can we use a similar tool to analyze the decision–making skills of these two leaders?

Organizational leadership competencies are well–suited to do just this; however, they are too broad to identify specific leader behaviors within all Army organizations. Therefore, we must use another tool to help identify specific actions of leaders at multilevel positions, ranks, training events and tasks. By continuing to categorize, each competency can be further divided into specific leader performance indicators (LPIs). These are specific leader actions peculiar to each organizational level and training event that enable assessors to provide accurate student

leader assessments. These LPIs are based on the required leader skills, knowledge and attitudes at each stage of development. These LPIs are not a checklist of leader behaviors serving as a crutch for lazy assessors.

Master assessors (persons trained to implement LADP and conduct assessor training at TRADOC schools) identify these LPIs when analyzing training events within school programs of instruction. Currently, the Center for Army Leadership, TRADOC's executive agent for developing LADP, conducts this master assessor training. The role of master assessor at each TRADOC school is to train assessors and implement assessment opportunities within each school program. As LADP subject matter

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The [Sullivan study] published in spring 1988, specified more than 50 leader development initiatives and established the Leader Development Office as an overwatch agency to ensure those initiatives are implemented. One of [these] initiatives directed TRADOC to build on the success of Cadet Command's LAP and, in effect, created LADP.

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experts, they must implement assessment opportunities at the most appropriate training times and locations. The LPIs enable them to do so.

Can leadership assessment reliably evaluate a leader's ability in a training environment and provide feedback that will help him develop his skills in operational assignments? According to FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, we train the way we intend to fight because history shows a direct correlation between realistic training and battlefield success. The assessment process fits logically into TRADOC schools where realistic training takes place. In fact, research supports the predictive validity of simulations (training events simulating battlefield conditions) that parallel "on-the-job conditions." If realistic training in the TRADOC schools parallels operational assignment conditions, then realistic

leadership assessments should take place during this training as a predictor of success.

We must ensure that our junior leaders possess the needed skills, knowledge and attitude they will need for increased responsibilities. Leaders must possess the appropriate skills based on experience, knowledge based on learning and attitudes based on frame of reference to make the transition and perform well at the next step up in the organizational level. Providing accurate leadership assessments, followed by nonthreatening developmental feedback, can help develop senior leaders within the training environment.

The feedback mechanism used in LADP is the standardized after-action review (AAR) process. Group and individual AARs offer trainers the opportunity to standardize feedback for student leaders in all TRADOC courses. Just as the seven battlefield operating systems form the basis of operational AARs, the nine competencies form the basis of leadership AARs. Periodically, during the course, senior assessors (trained to integrate assessment data and perform developmental counseling) combine all AARs to conduct counseling sessions with student leaders.

How many sources of feedback are necessary to ensure student leaders are accurately assessed? In his book, *Taking Charge*, Perry Smith says leaders are three people: who they think they are, who others think they are and who they actually are. Currently, LADP has three types of assessment, each yielding different feedback. These three types of leadership assessment are known as "eyes" because each provides a unique "look" at leaders. The first "eye" is self-assessment, and it provides the leader a look at himself based on his own perception. An example of self-assessment feedback is the competency-based leadership assessment form (LAF) "self."

The second "eye" is associate (peer) assessment that lets the leader look at himself based on the input of his fellow student leaders. An example of associate assessment feedback is the competency-based LAF "other."

The third "eye" is cadre or faculty assessment that lets the leader look at himself through the eyes of experienced faculty members who are

Figure 2. Progressive Program Design

trained to assess his performance in a leadership situation. An example of cadre or faculty assessment feedback is the completed Student Assessment Report (SAR). Assessors obtain this by observing leader performance during training events. Together, these three "eyes" of assessment make up the total leader view that gives the student leader accurate and comprehensive developmental feedback at the end of a course.*

A blending of the three types of assessment takes place when integrating LADP into leader training courses. This blending results in a progressive program designed to include the right balance of assessment feedback. For example, as officer leaders progress through the school system, their individual leader assessments vary according to their needs(fig. 2). At lower levels of leadership, where more inexperienced leaders are faced with the challenge of leading subordinates face-to-face, LADP calls for predomi-

nantly cadre or faculty assessments. Because assessors need to be more knowledgeable than the student leaders and more familiar with the training events, TRADOC school staff and faculty members serve as assessors. Senior–level student leaders, naturally more skilled and knowledgeable based on years of experience, are served better by predominantly self–assessment methods. These are usually psychometric instruments such as the Myers–Briggs Type Indicator, the Kirton Adaptation Inventory and Leadership Behavior Analysis, to name a few.

LADP requires at least four assessments or snapshots of each student leader; additionally, the program recommends these come from different assessors. This requirement for providing additional snapshots from different viewers adds detail and clarity to the total leader picture and validity to the leadership assessment process. A key ingredient to producing successful photos is accurately recording information in the SARs— the LADP film. Trained faculty members using the assessment process are able to produce accurate SARs for student feedback. Using all "eyes," incorporating the nine basic competencies or "colors" in varying combinations and angles, the

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* Subordinate feedback is a potential fourth eye of leadership assessment. Gathering input from subordinates to elicit their perceptions of the student leader's effectiveness is very popular in many civilian programs. Some Army organizations currently pilot this form of feedback. Research indicates that subordinate assessment results have as much, or more, predictive validity than peer assessment feedback. This is a very promising application for the future.

LADP film is then developed. These standardized program components all combine to create a common view of leadership.

When assessment ratings are conducted properly, leaders rarely disagree with the resulting feedback. The fact that different photographers (assessors) took four different photos, independent of each other, validates the findings. Therefore, LADP is a powerful tool for measuring leadership effectiveness and providing accurate individual feedback. We must never lose sight of the fact that LADP is designed solely for developing Army leaders!

What does LADP cost? It is cheap in terms of dollars but rather costly in terms of training time. All personnel involved with LADP at resident leader training courses need training as assessors. This training takes a minimum of two days for those with no experience in the leadership assessment process. Taking the time to train trainers is the most important commitment because trained assessors are the backbone of any viable assessment program. Poorly trained assessors will generate poor-quality assessments and ultimately poor developmental feedback.

Can we afford the cost of LADP? In reality, we cannot afford to pass up the opportunity to offer the student leaders the most beneficial leadership evaluation tool available today. Assessment is the state-of-the-art technology in leader development. To ignore it would be to ignore developing quality leaders for the future. In developing successful Army leaders for tomorrow, we must act today to implement a program paralleling those used successfully in ROTC and civilian industry worldwide.

The streamlined force of the 90s will be faced with unique operational and tactical situations requiring specialized combat operations for any

theater. The new genre military leader will find himself equipped with the most technologically sophisticated weaponry imaginable. However, the ultimate mission will remain essentially the same—to destroy the enemy's will to fight.

The post-Gulf War Army will be characterized by confidence and optimism, but it will also be challenged to meet our nation's security commitments with a significantly reduced force. Accompanying this reduction in force will be an even greater need to evaluate leadership skills, ensuring quality control in leader development. Leadership assessment technology offers this quality control and affords the Army the opportunity to select and develop our best.

The leadership assessment methodology offers a prudent move toward this better-quality force. LADP is tailored to meet changing environmental demands and incorporates the use of a widely accepted process to develop leaders in the training environment. Institutional training is tailored to meet the needs of Army leaders at each developmental level. As training changes, so too will LADP because it uses selected training events to serve as leader assessment opportunities. In this way, LADP will adapt to the changing environmental demands. By adopting school training to meet the tactical challenges, leadership assessment adapts using selected training events within TRADOC schools.

Tomorrow's Army leaders will face innumerable challenges given the ever-increasing complexity and uncertainty of warfare. To meet these challenges, the Army must pay special attention to developing quality leaders for this future specialized force. The best means to effectively select and develop our future leaders is to implement leadership assessment into TRADOC leader training courses. **MR**

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xpert Warfighter
With Battlefield Vision

Major Jose A. Picart, US Army

US Army Field Manual 22–103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, *characterizes battlefield vision as the ability to intuitively sense the significance of battlefield events for future actions. The author points out that the essence of battlefield vision is intuition. He cites the scientific findings that suggest that intuition and thus battlefield vision are derived from the expert knowledge warfighters can develop and that our Army as an institution can foster. He offers several recommendations that would direct officer professional development efforts and policy to that end.*

THROUGHOUT history, the ability of great battlefield captains to intuitively foresee the flow of battle has been shrouded in mystery. Many historians consider this ability an inexplicable personal gift, available only to a few exceptional people. Recently, however, scientists have begun to uncover the essence of intuition. Their research findings suggest that battlefield vision is an explainable ability that leaders can develop.[1]

Success in future wars will require combat leaders who possess effective battlefield intuition. Modern wars will be characterized by nonlinear operations, increased lethality and a high degree of uncertainty. The mobility of forces and the fluidity of battle will require leaders at every level with the vision to anticipate the course of events and the determination to act quickly to influence the outcome. To expect less is to invite defeat.

AirLand Battle doctrine is designed to meet the challenges of the modern battlefield. Only leaders with initiative and audacity, however, will be able to successfully execute AirLand Battle doctrine. Intuition allows leaders to sense how current battlefield events will affect future operations. This is critical in reducing the fog of battle and promoting initiative and audacity. As

During battle, warfighters confront a complex and constantly changing array of information. Terrain and weather, threat capabilities, enemy activity, the disposition of forces, and the status of supplies and equipment are just some of the data the leader must process. The successful commander quickly integrates this information into meaningful patterns.

the leader perceives uncertainty decreasing, determined and decisive action becomes possible. Leaders with *intuition* who can operate independently within the commander's intent will fulfill the tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine.

If intuition and battlefield vision are essential combat leadership skills, how can we develop leaders with these abilities? Scientists have found that intuitive people share one characteristic: *They are experts in a particular field of knowledge.* Their findings suggest that warfighting expertise, or mastering warfighting knowledge, is what makes intuition and battlefield vision possible. The implication of these research findings is clear regarding how we develop battlefield vision. Combat leaders will have the same amount of battlefield vision as they have warfighting expertise. Unfortunately, the Army's current leader development program develops "competent and confident" leaders, not warfighting experts.

This article will present findings that scientists have uncovered about intuition and their impli-

cations for how our Army develops combat leaders for AirLand Battle. The discussion will focus first on four characteristics of expert performance, describing how they account for battlefield intuition. Then, several recommendations will be offered outlining what the Army can do to develop a corps of expert warfighters with battlefield intuition.

Warfighting Expertise and Battlefield Intuition

The research on expert knowledge provides a rational explanation for the apparently inexplicable nature of intuition. As warfighting knowledge grows, there is a gradual change in how the battlefield commander thinks and reasons. Understanding the way experts think will help us understand how warfighting expertise makes battlefield vision possible.

Much research in cognitive psychology seeks to understand highly competent expert performance. This research has established that experts possess a broad but detailed knowledge base that is organized into rapidly accessible categories. Nobel laureate Herbert A. Simon, professor of psychology and computer science at Carnegie Mellon University, is one of a group of researchers who believe it is this organization that accounts for intuitive thought.[2]

Four robust and generalizable characteristics of expert performance have been directly linked to the organization of expert knowledge:

● Experts are able to quickly impose meaning on a complex pattern of information.

● Experts exhibit extraordinary speed in performing mental tasks and solve problems quickly.

● Experts rapidly interpret and give meaning to information.

● Experts have superior attention and memory capacities.

Psychologists believe these characteristics are the essential ingredients of intuitive thought.[3]

Recognizing Patterns in the Flow of Battle. Presented with a complex array of information about events in their domain, experts are able to quickly perceive meaningful patterns

in the data. This ability to "see" meaningful patterns does not reflect a superior perceptual ability; rather, it reflects efficient use of a detailed body of knowledge.[4]

During battle, warfighters confront a complex and constantly changing array of information. Terrain and weather, threat capabilities, enemy activity, the disposition of forces, and the status of supplies and equipment are just some of the data the leader must process. The successful commander quickly integrates this information into meaningful patterns. This ability, referred to as pattern recognition, is a central ingredient of battlefield vision.

After extensive research involving grand-master chess players, psychologists W. G. Chase and H. A. Simon concluded that pattern recognition involves matching available information with what already exists in memory.[5] In combat, commanders with a large, well-organized body of warfighting knowledge will perform this matching process quickly. Instead of consciously reasoning through several analytical steps, the expert warfighter quickly "recognizes" the pattern of events unfolding on the battlefield as familiar. Rapid pattern recognition is the first step toward intuitive thought.

Drawing from a vast store of expert knowledge, a warfighter quickly matches the current tactical situation with a similar historical or experiential event in memory. Based on the matching information in memory, the expert warfighter then forms expectations about future events and directs the application of superior combat power at the critical time and place on the battlefield. In this manner, expert knowledge becomes the source of intuitive sensing referred to as battlefield vision.

Battlefield Problem Solving. Psychologists explain the speed of expert problem solving in a manner that contributes directly to our understanding of battlefield vision. Researchers have found that experts can derive possible solutions to problems without extensive mental effort.

As described earlier, expert warfighters are able to perceive meaningful patterns in the seemingly chaotic flow of battle. In a study of

highly experienced cab drivers, Chase discovered that familiar patterns in traffic flow immediately suggested to the drivers reasonable responses to potential road hazards.[6] Through

> *The organized structure of expert knowledge is also crucial to releasing the warfighter's attention and memory capacity.... Given the rate and density of information flow on the modern battlefield and the limited capacity of the human memory, this apparent increase in working memory is essential to effective battlefield vision.*

extensive study and acquired experience, experts store many problem–solving facts and rules in memory. For many of these rules, a specific pattern of events automatically elicits expectations and a sequence of problem–solving responses.

This same process is formalized in the commander's use of the decision support template. The decision support template is a product of the staff estimate process taught to students at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The template relates projected patterns of battlefield events to a required command decision. Presumably, when enemy activity on the battlefield corresponds to the pattern of events projected on the template, the commander is alerted to initiate a predetermined response. The performance of many experts engaged in problem solving indicates there are many decision support templates present in the memory that are immediately available for use. The resulting ability to quickly generate responses to evolving tactical problems is the second important ingredient of battlefield vision.

But what happens when the combat situation is not familiar? The friction of battle and free will of the enemy will inevitably result in unexpected and unfamiliar battlefield conditions. On these occasions, experts use their organized knowledge to identify constraints in the situation. In a series

of studies involving expert and novice physicists, researchers discovered that experts used their extensive knowledge of physics to more precisely define a problem.[7] In other words, their expert

> *Our Army's ultimate responsibility is to fight and win the AirLand Battle. Therefore, a commitment to developing a corps of expert warfighters is essential. . . . If identifying and certifying expert warfighters is to be accomplished within the framework of the current leader development program, some changes to the process must be made.*

knowledge enabled them to quickly rule out options and decide what was not possible. In this manner, the number of possible responses is limited, and the potential for making a correct decision is increased.

Interpreting Battlefield Information. An organized knowledge base enables the expert warfighter to make rapid interpretations of battlefield events based on general principles of warfighting. Expert knowledge is organized into broad, general categories of information, much like the chapters of an encyclopedia. Rapid access to general principles of warfighting knowledge is an important ingredient of battlefield vision because combat leaders often do not retrieve exact information. Instead, battlefield commanders must be able to infer and make predictions about future events. Consequently, an expert is not likely to be distracted or misled by conspicuous details that may be irrelevant to the appropriate action.[8] Drawing on general principles of battle acquired through study and experience, an expert warfighter is more likely to recognize the implications of less obvious information for future courses of action.[9]

Marshal Jean–Baptiste Bessières demonstrated this ability at the Battle of Austerlitz. At one point in the battle, Bessières, of the French Imperial Guard, saw a mass of routed French infantry coming over the crest of a nearby hill.

Bessières calmly turned to his aide and informed him that an engagement with the Russian cavalry was imminent. He alerted the guard cavalry and managed to delay the Russian cavalry that appeared on the horizon shortly thereafter.

Later, when asked by his aide how he knew the cavalry was approaching, Bessières explained that, when men simply run without looking back, they are running from infantry. When they run and look back, they are running from cavalry. Undoubtedly, a less experienced commander might not have been prepared for the Russian cavalry attack.[10]

Attention and Memory in Battle. The organized structure of expert knowledge is also crucial to releasing the warfighter's attention and memory capacity. Researchers have shown that an expert's recall of recently presented information appears to exceed the limits of human short–term memory.[11] In fact, expert warfighters do not have a larger memory; instead, the speed or automaticity of their mental skills frees up attention and memory capacity. Given the rate and density of information flow on the modern battlefield and the limited capacity of the human memory, this apparent increase in working memory is essential to effective battlefield vision.

Psychologists attribute the speed of these mental skills to the organized structure of expert knowledge. As described earlier, experts possess many problem–solving facts and rules, organized into rapidly accessible blocks or chunks of knowledge. Information stored in large meaningful chunks, instead of small fragmented details, is accessed more rapidly and requires very little attention or memory capacity.[12] An expert warfighter can attend to more information and retain more information in working memory. This increased capacity expands battlefield vision and speeds the problem–solving process.

Conclusions From Research on Expert Performance. The origins of intuition are no longer a mystery. Intuition is not a product of genetics or some mysterious unexplainable mental ability. Intuition is the product of a well–organized body of expert knowledge. From

Studying historical or technical accounts of how weather and terrain affect tactical operations is insufficient. Leaders acquire more knowledge when they experience firsthand the difficulty of crossing a rain–swollen creek or how a muddy field brings an armor company's advance to a halt.

expert knowledge springs the mental capabilities collectively referred to as intuition. What is also clear is that intuition and battlefield vision can be developed through warfighting expertise. If the four characteristics of expert performance are capabilities combat leaders need to effect AirLand Battle doctrine, how can we develop battlefield commanders with the required level of expertise?

Developing Expert Warfighters

Future wars will demand leaders who possess intuition and battlefield vision. Our challenge is to develop expert warfighters. Senior battlefield commanders must possess an extensive well-organized body of warfighting knowledge. After many years of research involving experts in various fields, Michael I. Posner, a research scientist in cognitive processes at the University of Oregon, concluded that "producing an expert may be not so much in selecting someone who has special capabilities, but to create and maintain the motivation needed for long-continued training."[13]

If our Army is to take advantage of this process, what is required is a systematic, fully integrated and carefully managed program dedicated to developing a corps of expert warfighters. This is not a new idea. In his 1985 report to the officer corps on the professional development of officers, then Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham Jr. stated, "The development opportunities should be weighted toward those officers demonstrating the greatest potential: . . . some officers should be experts in the art and science of war."[14]

An example of this strategy is the program recently implemented to develop a corps of expert materiel acquisition managers. This intensively managed and fully integrated program identifies future program executive officers early, provides them with extensive institutional training, and ensures continued and progressive operational experience in materiel acquisition assignments. A similar program can and must be implemented to fully develop senior-level combat leaders.

Our Army's ultimate responsibility is to fight and win the AirLand Battle. Therefore, a com-

mitment to developing a corps of expert war-
fighters is essential. The objective of such a corps
is to provide a pool of highly qualified combat
leaders capable of effectively executing AirLand
Battle doctrine. If identifying and certifying
expert warfighters is to be accomplished within

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*Personal experience is the
most effective way to develop skill–
based expertise [because] knowledge
derived from experience is much more
memorable than knowledge gained
from study. For example, you are more
likely to recall how you or your
commander successfully solved a tactical
problem at the NTC than how . . .
a similar problem [was solved in an]
account you once studied.*

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the framework of the current leader develop-
ment program, some changes to the process must
be made.

The Army's leader development program
consists of three components: operational ex-
perience, institutional learning and self–
development. A program designed to develop a
corps of expert warfighters must maximize each
component's contribution as officers acquire
warfighting knowledge. First, personnel man-
agement policies must identify warfighters early,
and these officers must be continually assigned
to positions that allow them to acquire warfight-
ing knowledge. Second, attendance and gradu-
ation requirements for CGSC must emphasize
and demand mastery of warfighting knowledge.
Third, the leader development program must
encourage, reinforce and reward officers who are
dedicated to independently studying warfare.
The current leader development program does
not accomplish these objectives. The next
three sections identify shortfalls in the current
system and recommend needed changes if our
Army is going to develop expert warfighters.

**Expertise Through Operational Experi-
ence.** In peacetime, an officer acquires opera-

tional warfighting experience through assign-
ments to warfighting duty: leadership or staff
positions in combat, combat support or combat
service support units with warfighting missions.
Officers develop warfighting skills and acquire
invaluable warfighting knowledge in these as-
signments through realistic combat training and
by participating in the combat training center
(CTC) program. The time officers now spend
in warfighting positions before assuming battal-
ion command is not optimal. Both Army doc-
trine and personnel management practices con-
tribute to this shortfall.

US Department of the Army Field Manual
(FM) 22–103, *Leadership and Command at Senior
Levels*, presents our Army's doctrinal framework
for developing effective battlefield vision. To de-
velop effective battlefield vision, the manual pre-
scribes that a senior leader possess three perspec-
tives: historical, operational and organizational.
The manual also describes the roles these per-
spectives play in formulating battlefield vision:
-- "Perspectives ensure that senior leaders pos-
sess the timing needed to anticipate and form the
situation. When correctly mastered, perspective
skills foster an ability to determine quickly the
context and relevance of an event."[15]

These perspectives are founded on knowledge
developed from extensive study and lead directly
to acquiring warfighting expertise. However, ex-
tensive study is only one way humans acquire ex-
pertise in a skill–based domain. Conspicuously
absent from the list of required perspectives is the
experiential perspective.

It is generally acknowledged that personal ex-
perience is the most effective way to develop
skill–based expertise. One reason for this is that
knowledge derived from experience is much
more memorable than knowledge gained from
study. For example, you are more likely to recall
how you or your commander successfully solved
a tactical problem at the National Training Cen-
ter, Fort Irwin, California, than how General
Omar N. Bradley solved a similar problem in a
World War II account you once studied. Fur-
thermore, much warfighting knowledge cannot
be adequately acquired through study and is

A battery of M109 howitzers and support vehicles moving cross-country during a *REFORGER* exercise.

A dedicated effort must be made to identify warfighters early, preferably following company or battery command. Officers would be selected based on duty and service school performance, personal preference and demonstrated warfighting knowledge.

more effectively acquired through personal experience. An example is knowledge pertaining to the implications of terrain and weather on combat operations.

In 1983, an Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) study group conducted a historical review of successful and unsuccessful battlefield commanders. The study concluded that success in combat results primarily from the leader's intuitive judgment of terrain. The study group also concluded that this essential leader attribute improved primarily through experience.[16] Studying historical or technical accounts of how weather and terrain affect tactical operations is insufficient. Leaders acquire more knowledge when they experience firsthand the difficulty of crossing a rain-swollen creek or how a muddy field brings an armor company's advance to a halt.

The perspective derived from personal experience is unique and should be included in FM 22-103 as a separate requirement for developing effective battlefield vision. Either by design or oversight, the absence of the experiential perspective from our doctrinal manual for senior-level leadership undermines its importance in developing combat leaders. Furthermore, if doctrine prescribes the fundamental principles that

guide Army policies, the absence of an experiential perspective fosters a personnel management system that fails to fully develop warfighting expertise.

Current personnel management practices fail to provide combat leaders the extensive experiential perspective required to fully develop battlefield vision. Before assuming battalion command at 16 or 17 years of service, an officer may spend as many as six or seven years in duty assignments that contribute little or nothing to acquiring warfighting knowledge.

Usually, an officer is removed from warfighting units immediately following company or battery command and assigned to tables of distribution and allowance (TDA) units or nominative duty such as Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) or West Point instructor. If graduate schooling is required, an officer will not have the opportunity to acquire warfighting knowledge for the next four to six years. Some of these assignments such as service school instructor and doctrine or combat developer offer opportunities to acquire warfighting knowledge; however, most do not. As a major, an Army officer is almost certain to spend only one tour in a warfighting assignment. The remaining two or three years will be spent on the Department of

> *Usually, an officer is removed from warfighting units immediately following company or battery command and assigned to TDA units or nominative duty. . . . An officer [may] not have the opportunity to acquire warfighting knowledge for [up to] six years. . . . These personnel management practices result in an officer corps of "competent and determined leaders" but very few officers with the warfighting expertise to fight and win employing AirLand Battle doctrine.*

the Army staff or in some other nonwarfighting assignment.

These personnel management practices result in an officer corps of "competent and determined leaders" but very few officers with the warfighting expertise to fight and win employing AirLand Battle doctrine. We must establish personnel management strategies that ensure officers get the extensive operational experience required to develop battlefield intuition.

First, a dedicated effort must be made to identify warfighters early, preferably following company or battery command. Officers would be selected based on duty and service school performance, personal preference and demonstrated warfighting knowledge. A similar screening would be made immediately following CGSC attendance. Officers excelling in duty performance and warfighting knowledge would once again be assigned only to duty that affords them the opportunity to develop warfighting expertise.

Officers selected for certification as senior combat leaders should serve continuously in assignments affording them the greatest opportunity to acquire warfighting knowledge. To develop expert warfighters, we must recognize the difficulty of pursuing qualification for senior combat leadership and, at the same time, achieving expertise and experience in an alternate specialty. Officers seeking battlefield commands

must be solely dedicated to pursuing qualification as expert warfighters. The ultimate objective is to certify a group of highly competent officers at the lieutenant colonel and colonel rank as expert warfighters. It is from this pool of certified expert warfighters that the Army then selects its battalion and brigade commanders.

In summary, personnel management policies must identify potential senior combat leaders early and ensure their assignment only to duty contributing to warfighting expertise. By intensively managing the assignments of officers with the intellect, warrior temperament and motivation to lead in battle, we increase the possibility of developing warfighting experts. This process certifies officers for senior-level command only after extensive operational experience in positions that contribute to developing warfighting expertise.

Expertise Through Institutional Learning. Shortfalls in the development of expertise resulting from the lack of operational experience can be partially overcome through study. The Army's commitment to provide its officers with a professional education in formal institutional settings is outstanding. Before assuming battalion command, an officer will spend the equivalent of three academic years in military institutions acquiring warfighting knowledge.

Reforms to the officer basic and advance courses, the addition of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS^3) and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and improvements to the staff and war colleges have greatly enhanced the warfighting focus of officer institutional training. Recently, however, CGSC was criticized for a lack of academic rigor, and several recommendations for improvement were offered.[17] The recommendation that rigorous examinations be administered merits serious consideration.

Officers selected to attend CGSC and seeking certification as expert warfighters should achieve minimum standards on a comprehensive examination designed to measure warfighting expertise. The examination would measure the officer's knowledge of branch tactics, weapon

capabilities, threat forces, terrain and weather analysis, military history and the human element of war. An examination similar to the diagnostic comprehensive examinations presently administered to students after their arrival at the college would be appropriate. The primary purpose of the examination would be to identify officers with outstanding warfighting intellect for certification as expert warfighters, but it would also reinforce and reward self-study.

An examination linked to certification as a warfighter would result in several positive outcomes. Officers seeking battalion and brigade command will be compelled to acquire a base-level warfighting knowledge that will serve as a foundation for developing warfighting expertise. Officers attending the staff college would not only have demonstrated outstanding performance in the field Army but also would enter the college with an increased level of warfighting expertise. This is sure to greatly enhance the classroom learning experience at the staff college. Furthermore, examinations administered during the course must ensure students master the course material. Students who fail to achieve minimum standards should not be allowed to graduate.

Another very effective way to acquire warfighting knowledge is being assigned to the military faculty to teach warfighting topics. These assignments should be considered second in importance only to duty in warfighting units. This is because faculty members are forced to acquire extensive knowledge in a subject area to be able to teach effectively.

The biographies of successful World War II division commanders testify to the importance of combining theory, technical knowledge and troop experience. Most of the successful World War II division commanders spent between 49 and 108 months on school faculties and staffs and became experts on the subject of warfare.[18] The level of expertise required to teach warfighting contributes greatly in developing future battlefield commanders. These assignments should be competitive and reserved for warfighters.

Expertise Through Self-Development. More must also be done to encourage officers to independently acquire warfighting knowledge through self-study. Recently, the Marine Corps initiated a reading program requiring Marine Corps officers to read at least three books—ideally six books—each year from lists assigned to each commissioned grade through colonel.

> *Reforms to the officer basic and advance courses ... and improvements to the staff and war colleges have greatly enhanced the warfighting focus of officer institutional training. Recently, however, CGSC was criticized for a lack of academic rigor. ... The recommendation that rigorous examinations be administered merits serious consideration.*

The lists include books related to military history, fiction, tactics, leadership, strategy, theory and biographies. A similar program for Army officers is needed.

The Army has increased the emphasis on reading in the Noncommissioned Officer Development Program. However, there is no systematic program for instilling in officers a full-time commitment to studying war, its history, doctrine, the threat and the capabilities of soldiers and machines.

In addition to a required reading list, perhaps the Army should consider administering a branch-specific examination similar to the enlisted soldiers' skill qualification test to officers in the field. If an officer's technical and tactical proficiency is an essential leadership competency, then it should be measured periodically and officers held accountable to an acceptable standard. The results of these examinations should be reviewed for promotion and school selection. Recognition of excellence through appropriate performance badges should also be considered.

Finally, officer efficiency reports should require raters serving in warfighting units to assess

and report the warfighting expertise of the officers they supervise. If our Army hopes to execute AirLand Battle doctrine effectively, it must

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The biographies of successful World War II division commanders testify to the importance of combining theory, technical knowledge and troop experience. Most of [these] commanders spent between 49 and 108 months on school faculties and staffs and became experts on the subject of warfare.

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implement a program that encourages, reinforces, recognizes and rewards those officers who commit themselves to becoming warfighting experts.

The Leader Development System. The present leader development program is appropriate for producing "competent and confident" leaders, but it falls short of developing leaders with the warfighting expertise needed to effectively execute AirLand Battle doctrine. The research on expert knowledge suggests that war-

fighters with battlefield intuition capable of executing AirLand Battle doctrine can be developed.

As the Army moves toward specialization and single–tracking officers in functional areas to achieve expertise, a similar effort must be made for warfighters. Several recommendations have been presented outlining methods to increase the amount of operational experience warfighters receive and to emphasize warfighting expertise in institutional training. Several recommendations have also been offered to encourage officers to study the art of war independently. These recommendations for improvements in our leader development process must be considered by the Army leadership.

Developing a corps of warfighting experts is consistent with current OPMS policy which allows officers to single–track in their basic branch. The important difference is the emphasis on developing expertise as a criteria for participation. It is essential that our Army develop leaders with warfighting expertise and battlefield vision. AirLand Battle doctrine demands it, professionalism requires it and our nation expects it. **MR**

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Major Daniel P. Bolger,
US Army

US 12th Army Group leaders during the major World War II campaigns in Central Europe have been collectively elevated to the lofty status of the revered "Great Captains" of military history. The author finds, however, that "Eisenhower's lieutenants," as some have called them, were really "Marshall's boys" and that the inner circle of Bradley, Hodges and Collins was more conspicuous in its "unimaginative caution" and predilection to relieve subordinate commanders. Marshall's Fort Benning tutelage and an overreliance on "minor tactics and the ax" are found to be the common thread in the First Army's disturbing number of botched and bloody battles.

Collins and Bradley are too prone to cut off heads. This will make division commanders lose their confidence. A man should not be damned for an initial failure with a new division. Had I done this with Eddy of the 9th Division in Africa, the army would have lost a potential corps commander.

Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr., 7 July 1944[1]

TODAY, many US soldiers revere the campaign in northwest Europe as the apotheosis of ground combat and thus have elevated its architects to the demigod status previously reserved for a few Civil War standouts.[2] Dwight D. Eisenhower and his band of brothers—Omar N. Bradley, Courtney H. Hodges, George S. Patton Jr., William H. Simpson, J. Lawton Collins and Matthew B. Ridgway—stand etched in black-and-white group photographs, forever together and smiling, the able generals who led the final storming of Adolf Hitler's Third Reich. Or so goes the image.

Such hero worship is perfectly understandable, but it misses an obvious point. Eisenhower's lieutenants were men, not gods. Consequently, his subordinate army groups and their several armies varied in operating style. Some generals displayed much more effectiveness than others. The passage of years has blurred these important distinctions.[3]

It is worthwhile to pass the mythology and glimpse the reality of the US command structure in Europe during the final year of the war. In the process, some interesting truths seem to emerge from the comforting mists of legend.

Command in the 12th Army Group

Bradley's 12th Army Group, activated on 1 August 1944, grew into the largest US ground combat force ever created. It contained four field armies, 12 corps and 47 divisions by war's end. For most of its nine months of war, 12th Army Group directed three formations: Hodges' First Army, Patton's Third Army and Simpson's Ninth Army.[4]

> 12th Army Group comprised the main effort by US soldiers.
> It fought the big battles—Normandy, the drive across France, the Ardennes and the Rhine crossings. . . . [It] was an effective combat force—make no mistake about that. Yet, any serious examination of its operations reveals some marked shortcomings, particularly regarding generalship in one of its armies. . . . Most First Army generals showed themselves "competent but addicted to playing it safe." By comparison, Patton's Third and Simpson's Ninth risked more and accomplished more, with significantly fewer losses.

Though three other army groups fought in Europe—the British-led 21st in the Low Countries, the US/French 6th in southern France and the Allied 15th in Italy—the all-American 12th Army Group comprised the main effort by US soldiers. It fought the big battles—Normandy, the drive across France, the Ardennes and the Rhine crossings. Patton, Bradley, Collins, Ridgway, Walton H. Walker and James M. Gavin served in this army group and made it famous.

The 12th passed its heritage directly to the modern US Army. In so many ways, from strategic focus to tactical doctrine and from officer ethics to training methods, today's Army represents the living legacy of an idealized memory of the 12th Army Group.

The real 12th Army Group was an effective combat force—make no mistake about that. Yet, any serious examination of its operations reveals some marked shortcomings, particularly regarding generalship in one of its armies. Not everything went well.

Certainly, Bradley and his subordinates had their share of victories, culminating in German surrender. They did fine work on the Normandy beaches, in the *Cobra* breakout, in the pursuit across France, in defending of the Ardennes and in seizing and exploiting multiple Rhine crossings. The weakened state of the German forces was a factor, but US capability mattered more in these battles.

Yet, against the roll of successes, one must weigh a disturbing number of botched battles and, especially, missed chances. The hellish butchery in the Normandy bocage, the incomplete Falaise encirclement, the costly confusion before the West Wall in the autumn, the bloody

fumbling about in the Huertgen Forest, the shocking initial surprise in the Ardennes and the eventual unwillingness to pinch off the forces in that German salient, the backing and filling in the face of the Remagen bridgehead opportunity—together form a distressing litany that spans the entire length of the campaign.

All of these failures become even more alarming when one notes that the First Army occupied center stage in each. That formation's key senior leadership remained largely intact during the campaign. Therefore, these reverses represent more than the usual teething problems common to new units. Something bigger, more endemic, was hobbling First Army, and it did not get better over time.

The premier analyst of US command in northwest Europe, Russell F. Weigley, identified the underlying tactical weaknesses that precipitated the major crises in the First Army. He marked "unimaginative caution" as the overriding trait of these US commanders. Most First Army generals showed themselves "competent but addicted to playing it safe." By comparison, Patton's Third and Simpson's Ninth risked more and accomplished more, with significantly fewer losses.[5]

Careful US officers in First Army avoided bold measures such as biting off the Ardennes salient at its base or plunging beyond the fortuitous Remagen bridgehead, even though these gambles might have paid off handsomely in wrecked German armies. No less an authority than Napoleon warned that, in war, the safest options "are almost uniformly the worst that can be adopted."[6] One avoids losing, but one can also avoid winning by playing it safe.

> As a paratroop general, [Gavin] . . . had the opportunity to work with several armies, including British forces. Readily acknowledging the want of dash in the First Army, he proposed that it arose from a disturbing tendency to resort too quickly to unfair, ill-considered firings of division and corps commanders.

Three of the 10 First Army corps and division commanders relieved by General Courtney H. Hodges: (*left to right*) Generals Charles H. Corlett, XIX Corps; John Millikin, III Corps; and Donald A. Stroh, 8th Infantry Division.

Why did First Army play it safe? Weigley believed that doctrinal flaws caused the trouble, a reasonable supposition by a diligent scholar. He zeroed in on an unwillingness to concentrate combat power and an inability to combine armor, infantry and air power as readily as the more familiar infantry–artillery team.[7]

Surely, US doctrine had its shortcomings, if one is willing to grant that armies really read, let alone follow, their written doctrine. This argument is appealing because there are possible remedies to the problem. Today's obsession with doctrinal matters indicates that Weigley's diagnosis has many adherents in uniform.

But what about the fact that Third and Ninth armies had the same doctrine, yet experienced at least equal successes and suffered no similar failures? Another explanation, less often heard but more suggestive, is in order.

This theory came from Gavin, commander of the 82d Airborne Division. As a paratroop general, he found himself shunted all over the battlefield. Thus, he had the opportunity to work with several armies, including British forces.

Readily acknowledging the want of dash in the First Army, he proposed that it arose from a disturbing tendency to resort too quickly to un-

fair, ill-considered firings of division and corps commanders. "Summarily relieving senior officers," he said, "seems to me, makes others pusillanimous and indeed discourages other potential combat leaders from seeking high command." He went on to say, "Summarily relieving those who do not appear to measure up in the first shock of battle is not only a luxury we cannot afford—it is very damaging to the [US] Army as a whole."[8]

This airborne commander, noted for audacity and innovation, realized that subordinates must be trained and guided in combat, not axed at the first mistake. Otherwise, initiative would necessarily give way to diffidence and rote obedience. This could produce Weigley's "unimaginative caution" as readily as faulty doctrine, and probably more so. One can ignore "the book" under fire, but one cannot play fast and loose with a senior commander consistently threatening relief.

It appears that both Weigley and Gavin have hit upon major reasons for the hesitation that occasionally paralyzed the First Army. Taken together, their contentions explain much, especially when considered as background to the list of those cashiered. Eleven division and two corps commanders, three from Third Army and

One would suppose that tough, blustering Patton might have taken the most scalps. Though Patton raged and fumed, he proved amazingly tolerant. Two of the men he removed basically requested the action. The third . . . went only after the corps commander demanded that Patton do something.

Patton visiting a divisional headquarters in central France.

10 from the unhappy First, paid for perceived tactical mistakes. Simpson's Ninth sacked none.

To some, the distribution between First and Third armies may appear odd. One would suppose that tough, blustering Patton might have taken the most scalps. Though Patton raged and fumed, he proved amazingly tolerant. Two of the men he removed (Charles S. Kilburn and Alan W. Jones) basically requested the action. The third, his old friend John S. Wood, had become a nervous wreck, unable to sleep more than a few minutes at a stretch. But, Wood went only after the corps commander demanded that Patton do something. "One should not act too fast" in such matters, thought Patton.[9] This reflected his experience in 1918, North Africa and Sicily.

The bulk of the sackings, including both corps reliefs, originated in First Army and showed the hands of Bradley, Hodges and Collins. This was no accident, and it helps explain that Army's uneven performance. Those who trusted in inadequate doctrine enforced their faith by readily dumping generals who failed to make such tactics work.

In this, they only reflected their mentor, General George C. Marshall. Although Marshall had also approved Patton and Simpson, they had not served directly under the chief of staff in previous assignments and were not his original selections to command armies on the Continent.[10] By contrast, the First Army brain trust— Bradley, Hodges and Collins—represented Marshall's inner circle. They were truly his men.

Marshall's Example:
Minor Tactics and the Ax

Marshall's chosen elite ran the European war, and they held particularly prominent roles in the 12th Army Group's First Army. Of the many men on the Army chief of staff's famous list of promising officers, he reposed special trust in those he had met while serving as assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. These included Eisenhower, Bradley, Hodges, Collins and Ridgway. They and almost 200 other Fort Benning instructors and students rose to wear stars under Marshall's patronage.[11]

Although an intelligent, innovative commander in the interwar years, Marshall's special claim to prowess involved his staff work in World War I. He greatly regretted his lack of combat command experience. In 1936, he wrote to his young protégé Collins that, "if a war comes along or is in the offing, don't let them stick you in a staff job like they did me. You insist on getting out in the field and getting with troops."[12]

It has been said that those who cannot do, teach. Nobody will ever know what sort of field soldier Marshall might have become because he never got the chance. But even so, and probably in spite of his lack of wartime experience, Marshall is reputed to be the greatest teacher of the interwar US Army. In Bradley's words, Marshall's Fort Benning served as "nursery school" for generals.[13] Marshall was their role model.

One must be careful to note that, other than providing an example, Marshall did not really teach as much as examine and select. The frosty,

Reliefs for Poor Performance from Corps and Division Command
US Army 12th Army Group, June 1944 to May 1945

Date Relieved	Unit	Commander Relieved	Months in Command	Months in Combat	Relieved by
Jun 44	90th ID	MacKelvie	6	1*	Collins (VII Corps)** Bradley (First Army)
		Reason: *disorganization during Cherbourg operations*			
Jul 44	8th ID	MacMahon	18	1	Middleton (VIII Corps) Bradley (First Army)**
		Reason: *requested relief; poor progress in bocage*			
Jul 44	90th ID	Landrum	1	1	Middleton (VIII Corps) Bradley (First Army)**
		Reason: *poor progress in bocage fighting*			
Jul 44	28th ID	Brown	19	1*	Corlett (XIX Corps) Bradley (First Army)**
		Reason: *poor progress in bocage breakout operations*			
Aug 44	3d AD	Watson	24	1	Collins (VII Corps)** Hodges (First Army)
		Reason: *poor progress in bocage breakout operations*			
Oct 44	XIX Corps	Corlett	7	4	Hodges (First Army)** Bradley (12th Army Gp)
		Reason: *"tired" at Aachen*			
Nov 44	7th AD	Silvester	32	3	Collins (VII Corps) Hodges (First Army)**
		Reason: *poor performance at West Wall fighting*			
Dec 44	4th AD	Wood	31	5	Eddy (XII Corps)** Patton (Third Army)
		Reason: *physically and mentally exhausted*			
Dec 44	8th ID	Stroh	5	5	Gerow (V Corps) Hodges (First Army)**
		Reason: *poor progress in Huertgen Forest*			
Dec 44	106th ID	Jones	21	1	Middleton (VIII Corps)* Patton (Third Army)
		Reason: *division destroyed in Ardennes*			
Jan 45	75th ID	Prickett	16	1*	Ridgway (XVIII Corps) Hodges (First Army)**
		Reason: *poor performance in Ardennes counterattack*			
Mar 45	11th AD	Kilburn	12	3	Eddy (XII Corps) Patton (Third Army)**
		Reason: *requested relief*			
Mar 45	III Corps	Millikin	17	4	Hodges (First Army)** Bradley (12th Army Gp)
		Reason: *"bad leadership" after taking Remagen bridgehead*			

* Less than one month   ** Major proponent for relief from command

SOURCES: GEN Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1951), appendix, "Order of Battle"; GEN Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 262, 269–70, 287, 337; Shelby L. Stanton, *Order of Battle: World War II* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984), 46–188; Russell F. Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), 418, 602–3; Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers, 1940–1945,* vol. 2, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974), 653; Dr. Robert H. Berlin, *US Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1989, 17–20; and Dr. Christopher Gabel, *The 4th Armored Division in the Encirclement of Nancy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1986), 25–26.

reserved Marshall served as an impartial judge, not a helpful coach. It was up to the evaluated man to learn what he needed to know.

Already, the assistant commandant looked toward bigger things. Like a Broadway talent director, he sized people up on first impressions, and subordinates knew it. Bradley's memoirs make it clear that he caught Marshall's eye with a meticulously choreographed display of weapons firing. Walter Bedell Smith gained Marshall's esteem when the latter overheard a scintillating snatch of Smith's classroom presentation.[14]

Most of those lucky enough to pass their audition had similar stories. Invariably, demonstrated skills at teaching or learning infantry

> In World War I, companies and battalions fought "pure." This would not happen in the next war, and generals would have to make many hard choices about how to allocate tanks, air power, engineers and other support. Bradley later called the narrow concern with infantry a "regrettable lapse."

42d Division soldiers outside Hazavant, France, 14 September 1918.

tactics offered the best way to impress Marshall. Mistakes in the same ensured relief.

Marshall breathed small–unit infantry tactics. During his tenure at Fort Benning, he revamped the curriculum and substituted more realistic, less structured map exercises and field problems for the previous rote drills. For this, he has received due credit.

Marshall advocated imagination, and he claimed to have little luck with "school solutions." Many make much of the opening statement of the first chapter of his distillation of World War I combat, titled "Infantry in Battle." Here, editor Marshall states, "Combat situations cannot be solved by rule."[15] Such pithy comments typified him in his Fort Benning years.

And yet these maxims only went so far. All of the good intentions meant very little in the aggregate because the meat of Marshall's teaching referred to companies and battalions in World War I situations. Many of his thoughts did not translate directly to the higher tactical and operational levels in the World War II environment. Two examples directly bore on the doc-

trinal troubles later experienced in Europe.

First, Marshall envisioned continuous pressure against the enemy, with reserves employed to capitalize on weaknesses found or created. A main effort might not be designated, particularly if terrain proved difficult or the enemy situation vague.[16] Perfectly reasonable for a battalion in an attack, this advice hardly applied to an army group with limits on its resources, finite transportation and hundreds of miles to cover. Larger formations needed clearly designated main efforts to orchestrate assembling combat and supporting power.

Second, Marshall paid no attention to tanks or aircraft or, for that matter, to any supporting arm except artillery. Again, in World War I, companies and battalions fought "pure." This would not happen in the next war, and generals would have to make many hard choices about how to allocate tanks, air power, engineers and other support. Bradley later called the narrow concern with infantry a "regrettable lapse."[17]

More troubling were Marshall's ideas on how to make his infantry tactics work. Stripped of the

> Marshall's chosen elite ran the European war. . . . He reposed special trust in those he had met while serving as assistant commandant of the Infantry School. . . . The frosty, reserved Marshall served as an impartial judge, not a helpful coach. It was up to the evaluated man to learn what he needed to know.

Marshall inspecting General Edward M. Almond's 92d Infantry Division in Reggio, Italy. Almond had attended the Infantry School during Marshall's tenure.

exhortations to initiative, Marshall's tactical doctrine reflects a strong emphasis on rules and procedures to overcome friction. The human element is notoriously absent, not surprising for someone whose war experience consisted of moving things, not people.

"Control," he wrote, "presupposes that the leader knows the location of all elements of his command at all times and can communicate with any element at any time." Lest one be misled, Marshall made it clear that "the requirement is absolute."[18] Again, one must note that this might happen in a long–service Regular Army company. It will not happen in a mobile field army of draftees.

Marshall also had a blunt solution when a unit lost control. In *Infantry in Battle*, one vignette described a "partly trained" unit that could not resolve contradictory patrol reports. In this case, "It would be desirable to relieve all unreliable junior officers."[19] Since there were no rules, there were no bad tactics—only bad tacticians. Failure demanded removal.

Here, then, was the result when Marshall combined his snap evaluations with his infantry tactics. As a tester rather than a teacher, Marshall judged and moved on. One officer recalled that "he expected his subordinates to be right all the time; the subordinate might be right many times and then err; he was then 'finished.' "[20] Once a man failed, Marshall rarely granted a second chance.[21]

A great man worthy of respect, Marshall

gained the permanent adulation of his loyal coterie, especially the Fort Benning infantrymen. They stood in awe of his towering intellect, his undoubting decisiveness and his rock–ribbed integrity. His charges tried to emulate him in every way, especially in his detailed understanding of minor tactics.[22] Well they should. One slip and Marshall might swing the ax. Nobody knew that better than his old Infantry School subordinates.

Bradley's Example:
Hard Times in the Bocage

Bradley looked like a school teacher, and the appearance did not altogether deceive. He had instructed in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), at the US Military Academy and at Fort Benning. Though in service, he missed overseas duty in World War I, and he had little experience with troops before 1941. Intelligent, if unimaginative, Bradley possessed a genial nature. While not quite the "nice guy" and "GI general" portrayed by Karl Malden in the motion picture *Patton*, Bradley certainly knew how to get along with most people, superior or subordinate.[23]

But of all that instructing surely made an impression. Bradley thought he knew his profession "thoroughly" and referred to his grasp of tactics and the military evaluation of terrain as his "specialties." A reporter observed that, "almost alone among eminent commanders his career shows no change of concepts, no development.

He never had to develop; the ideas that led to the destruction of the German armies were there from the beginning."[24] In short, Bradley knew his job—or thought he did.

He had the greatest respect for others with similar learning, especially his old Infantry School cronies from Fort Benning, Hodges and Collins. Like him, they had learned the tactical writ from the foot of the master, the aloof and uncompromising Marshall. Bradley showed little patience with those who had not gained similar expertise.

For Bradley, success in combat meant applying doctrine and picking the right subordinates, defined as those who knew their tactics. In Patton's sarcastic opinion, Bradley thought "that all human virtue depends on knowing infantry tactics."[25] The "GI general" elevated or demoted officers accordingly.

Despite his pedagogic background, Bradley did not emphasize training his officers. As far as he was concerned, war on the Continent equaled the final examination, to be passed or failed. In this, he saw eye to eye with Marshall.

He also agreed with another Marshall man, his theater commander, Eisenhower. Ike warned him that "you must be tough with your immediate commanders and they must be equally tough with their respective subordinates." Eisenhower meant business. "We have passed the time," warned Eisenhower, for excuses. Once "you have made careful plans and preparations and estimated that the task can be accomplished," the objectives must be taken, or else.[26] Steeled in Tunisia and Sicily, Bradley proved very tough indeed. He explained his policy on reliefs this way:

". . . there were instances in Europe where I relieved commanders for their failure to move fast enough. And it is possible that some were the victims of circumstance. For how can the blame for failure be laid fairly on a single man when there are in reality so many factors that can affect the outcome of any battle? Yet each commander must always assume total responsibility for every individual in his command. If his battalion or regimental commanders fail him in the attack, then he must relieve them *or be relieved himself*. Many a division commander has failed not because he lacked the capacity for command but only because he declined to be hard enough on his subordinate commanders."[27] (Emphasis added.)

As First Army commander, Bradley carried his faith in his Fort Benning tactics into the confusing hedgerows of the Normandy bocage. Legitimately, some might have thought to fire the Army commander responsible for the endless, indecisive grinding. Had Bradley never looked at a map of what lay past Omaha and Utah beaches?

Bradley acted first. He canned four division commanders, relieved three brigadiers and, in the words of an aide, "countless regimental commanders." Although Bradley knew his tactics and bounced those who lacked the capacity to translate those tactics into victories, things did not improve much.[28] As Patton explained, "No general officer and practically no colonel needs to know any tactics. The tactics belong to battalion commanders. If generals knew less tactics, they would interfere less."[29]

For seven weeks, Bradley did what he knew

> Collins . . . turned out to be an aggressive, brilliant infantry officer who could exert the [prescribed] "control." Collins placed battalions and maneuvered regiments [and] weeded out subordinates in good Marshall fashion. "Lightning Joe" could pull it off, and he micromanaged his corps to victory. Bradley had enough sense to ride this good horse.
>
> General J. Lawton Collins

best. He interfered and fired. He launched a "massive frontal assault" with all four corps about a month after D-day, but this broad push did not work. Things looked bleak; Bradley feared a "World War I-type stalemate."[30] How long would he last if the slugging continued unabated? Bradley eventually ended his dilemma in a way Marshall would approve. He found the right men to solve it for him.

Collins, his VII Corps commander, turned out to be an aggressive, brilliant infantry officer who could exert the "control" Marshall prescribed. Collins placed battalions and maneuvered regiments. He also weeded out subordinates in good Marshall fashion. "Lightning Joe" could pull it off, and he micromanaged his corps to victory. Bradley had enough sense to ride this good horse.[31]

Bradley's tactical air chief, Major General Elwood R. "Pete" Quesada, figured out the best way to mass air power and, in the process, suggested the gist of the Cobra breakout plan. During a meeting to allocate resources, Quesada argued passionately against continued dissipation of tanks and guns among the corps. Make one corps "overwhelmingly strong," Quesada recommended, and he guaranteed continuous close air support over every column.

The infantrymen present—Bradley, Hodges, Collins, Charles H. Corlett, Troy H. Middleton and Leonard T. Gerow—looked surprised. Previously, First Army simply divided up the pie equally. Now this pilot, who obviously knew nothing of fundamental Fort Benning-style infantry tactics, had broken in with his unprecedented suggestion. Bradley, who was not stupid,

saw an opportunity. Collins was clearly the best corps general. Why not give him the bulk of the Army's combat power? So Operation Cobra was concocted. It worked.[32]

Bradley's success in Cobra allowed him to activate the 12th Army Group and turn First Army over to Hodges, a Marshall man who had been Bradley's deputy and understudy since early 1944.[33] He had watched and learned, all right.

Hodges' First Army: Grim Intensity

Hodges took over his post with the highest accolades from Marshall. "Hodges is exactly the same class of man as Bradley in practically every respect," effused the chief of staff in a letter to Eisenhower. He listed the infantry officer's good points: "Wonderful shot, great hunter, quiet, self-effacing, thorough understanding of ground fighting, DSC [Distinguished Service Cross], etc., etc."[34]

Commissioned from the ranks in 1909, winner of the DSC as a battalion commander in the Meuse–Argonne and noted by Marshall as a solid Fort Benning instructor. Hodges looked like a sure winner. Bradley praised him as "a military technician whose faultless techniques and tactical knowledge made him one of the most skilled draftsmen of my entire command."[35]

Most of Bradley's First Army subordinates would have wondered about whom their former Army commander was talking. True, Hodges shared Bradley's belief in the importance of sound infantry tactics and willingness to relieve problem officers.[36] However, he lacked Bradley's intelligence, communicative skills and energy.

> The inability to pluck meaning from Hodges' spare verbiage
> could result in accusations of disobedience, one of Hodges' real pet peeves.
> He believed that a subordinate's failure to carry out First Army's will, however
> poorly expressed that will might be, represented a lack of loyalty.
> The General . . . had almost no tolerance for concerns, complaints, bad news,
> extra questions or anything he considered excessive in terms of
> requests for support and supplies.

Hodges did not display any noteworthy degree of intelligence, a marked contrast to Marshall, Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton, Collins and most of the rest. His dogged adherence to book–learned tactics said little for his imagination. Patton wrote that "even the tent maker [Bradley] admits that Courtney is dumb."[37]

Yet, there he was, an Army commander. Obviously, he knew the right people, if not the best ways to think. Hodges, who failed out of West Point as a youth, appears to have been extremely sensitive about that, which may account for his few utterances and well–known reticence.

This shyness and, indeed, inarticulateness made it hard for Hodges to communicate his intent to his subordinates. He abdicated much day–to–day authority to his acerb chief of staff, Major General William B. Kean Jr., who badgered subordinates incessantly in Hodges' name.[38] Since Hodges said very little himself, subordinates could never be quite sure which were the Army commander's directives and which were Kean's personal opinions. If they guessed wrong, they paid for it.

When Hodges did give personal instructions, he preferred to use vague oral orders. Even so, he usually included some very explicit, concrete directive among his paucity of words. This is not to say that Hodges communicated his intent in his terse remarks; he seldom explained why any operation was happening. Rather, the general would salt an absolute requirement or two, usually expressed in terms of some defined terrain objectives, into his verbal messages.[39] It took quite a bit of experience to become comfortable with these types of "orders." Those who did not adapt quickly enough lost their positions.

The inability to pluck meaning from Hodges' spare verbiage could result in accusations of disobedience, one of Hodges' real pet peeves. He believed that a subordinate's failure to carry out First Army's will, however poorly expressed that will might be, represented a lack of loyalty. The general expected his officers to adhere strictly to orders and procedures and to carry out their missions. He had almost no tolerance for concerns, complaints, bad news, extra questions or anything he considered excessive in terms of requests for support and supplies.[40] Given Hodges' sensitivity about his own intelligence and his lack of speaking skills, it is hardly surprising that this general refused to discuss orders, let alone argue about them. Orders were to be followed, period.

Finally, Hodges proved to be much less energetic than Bradley. He rarely traveled forward from his various command posts. From 1 August to 16 October, during the fighting around Mortain, the drive across France and the initial attacks into Germany near Aachen, Hodges visited his XIX Corps exactly 13 times and went to one of that corps' divisions once.[41] This did not stop him from firing Corlett, the XIX Corps commander, at the end of that period.

The First Army commander preferred to recall his subordinates for lengthy conferences in the rear and even set up an extra command post to facilitate these councils of war. Naturally, this put a premium on reports from the fighting corps; woe to the fast–moving corps that lost contact with the swollen Army headquarters sites! John Millikin of III Corps lost his command for poor reporting, among other sins.[42] Hodges spent most of his time simply hanging

> **Despite Hodges' persistence in the usual ineffectual broad–front pushes, fears of relief apparently quashed any dissent. Hodges ordered his corps into the deathtraps of the Huertgen Forest, yet he did not make it clear that he wanted the Rur River dams beyond the woods that could have been seized by other routes. Nobody dared ask "why."**
>
> General Courtney H. Hodges

around his headquarters "doing nothing."[43]

Old Fort Benning friend, Collins, his "fair-haired boy," became Hodges' premier fighter, just as he had carried the ball for Bradley. He relished the opportunity. If Hodges wanted victories sure to appease his chain of command and benefactors, the ambitious Collins would deliver. He and his VII Corps starred in every key First Army operation.

Hodges' usual rules did not apply to Collins who worked as almost a coequal on many occasions. Some felt Collins should have received First Army when Bradley left for the 12th Army Group. For his part, Collins shrewdly backed the insecure Hodges, giving what First Army Air Chief Quesada called "boundless loyalty."[44] Collins made Hodges look good, and the Army commander chose not to interfere with Collins.

Other corps commanders, who resented Collins' special status and personal relationship with the unapproachable Hodges, had to tread carefully. One division commander groused that Hodges "did little without the advice and support of Collins."[45] The eager VII Corps commander obviously made recommendations about his peers, as well as his own subordinates. Since Collins also believed in quick firings, it is unclear who influenced whom when he and Hodges got together to discuss relief issues in First Army.

Hodges relieved four division and two corps commanders. In the first three cases, including that of the XIX Corps commander, Collins played an important role. Bradley, up at 12th Army Group, showed personal interest in sacking Lindsay M. Silvester of the 7th Armored Division who had been given a second chance by Patton after some earlier trouble.[46] Hodges, of course, agreed with his two old Fort Benning colleagues.

These reliefs, especially that of Corlett in XIX Corps after his successful fight near Aachen, poisoned the command climate in the First Army, with predictable effects in the field. Times were already hard enough, with stiffened German resistance, foul autumn weather and serious logistics troubles. First Army needed to pull together in the face of adversity.

But Hodges did not invite suggestions for resolving the quandaries. Instead, he named terrain objectives: "Schmidt," "Huertgen Forest." His dispirited generals "trudged" ahead "with a serious and grim intensity," in Bradley's words. Armored division General Ernest N. Harmon summarized the First Army effort differently: "slow, cautious, and without much zip."[47] He might have added "costly."

Despite Hodges' persistence in the usual ineffectual broad–front pushes, fears of relief apparently quashed any dissent. Hodges ordered his corps into the deathtraps of the Huertgen Forest, yet he did not make it clear that he wanted the Rur River dams beyond the woods that could have been seized by other routes. Nobody dared ask "why" in the Huertgen Forest.

With Collins' corps leading, division after division plunged into the evil forest and backed out mangled. No generals objected. General Donald A. Stroh of the 8th Infantry Division finally took the town of Huertgen and asked for a brief leave—his son had just died in action. Hodges rewarded him with a leave and relieved

him from command. The fighting sputtered on from October until February, bleeding units dry.[48]

While the Huertgen purgatory persisted, Middleton of VIII Corps and Colonel Benjamin A. "Monk" Dickson of the First Army staff worried about a German counterattack through the Ardennes, but both tread carefully around Hodges who could have cared less. Eisenhower and Bradley told Hodges not to worry, so he did not.[49] His men paid for his lack of concern.

When the Germans attacked in force in mid-December, Hodges nearly broke down. Eisenhower intervened, giving Ridgway and his XVIII Airborne Corps to Hodges. He also ordered a major counterattack by Patton's Third Army and a supporting attack by the British to the north. All of this, plus good fighting by US soldiers of all ranks, saved First Army.

Hodges did not lose his job, although the thought crossed both Eisenhower's and Bradley's minds. Shaken by the attack, Hodges became even more pessimistic and cautious than usual and directed the most conservative possible counterblows once the German offensive ran down.[50] He still showed no qualms about removing a new division commander who bungled his first attack.[51] Perhaps, like Bradley had said, Hodges figured that if heads had to roll, he would prefer to cut rather than be cut.

Hodges did not distinguish himself in the operations after the Ardennes fighting. In his February offensive toward the perennial objectives, the Rur River dams, he launched another broad-front effort through the outskirts of the Huertgen Forest. This proceeded so indifferently that even Bradley thought his old First Army "fell down on the job," although he blamed the staff, not Hodges. More threats of relief in the lead division finally brought the dams into First Army hands.[52]

When Millikin's III Corps jumped the Rhine at Remagen ahead of all other Allied forces, Hodges worried rather than rejoiced. He fretted about the narrowness of the thrust and criticized Millikin, saying "there has not been sufficient control" over the opportunistic operation. First

Army dithered in exploiting the bridgehead, Hodges smoldered and Millikin lost his corps.[53]

To a great extent, most of the delays could be attributed to Hodges' uncertainty about continuing across the Rhine. Eisenhower preferred crossing in the north, in the British sector. For his part, Bradley worried as much about defending Remagen from possible German counterattacks as about getting across in force. Bradley and Hodges hemmed and hawed and tried to talk Eisenhower into accepting reality instead of sticking with the plan. Meanwhile, poor Millikin paid the price for his boldness. He distinguished himself as the 13th Armored Division commander in the remaining weeks of the war, indicating that the fault probably lay elsewhere.[54]

Price of 10 Reliefs:
The Reckoning

Under Bradley and Hodges, First Army claimed to have gained efficiency from its hard command policy. It was first ashore in Normandy, first into Germany, first across the Rhine and first to reach the Elbe River. Bradley recalled with pride that his old First "had borne the brunt of the really tough fighting."[55]

Unstated in Bradley's tribute are two salient points worth remembering. The First Army fought tough battles, all right, but it too often made things tough on itself. The Normandy bocage, the Huertgen Forest and the Ardennes did not occur spontaneously. But there was more, even worse.

The First gained another distinction. "It also," Bradley admitted, "buried more American dead" than his other armies.[56] Here was one price of being "hard enough" on commanders.

Interestingly, thanks to the victories they did win and their certainty in naming and dumping culprits for their setbacks, none of the principals paid for their mistakes. Bradley, who had believed and tried Marshall's ways, went on to be US Army chief of staff, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to wear five stars. Collins, who had been able to make the Marshall system work in battle, rose to four stars and also served

as chief of staff. And Hodges, the least able of the three by far, sustained by his faith alone, very nearly took his First Army into the invasion of Japan on Marshall's enthusiastic recommendation. Only the Japanese surrender and Hodges' retirement, shortly thereafter, prevented his further advancement.[57]

Patton, whose name and image are invoked far more readily in today's Army than his actual fighting and leading techniques, saw the dangers of lionizing these Marshall men. "Sometimes I get desperate over the future. Bradley and Hodges are such nothings."[58] He understood, but he did not like it. Their type, not his, survived to place an indelible stamp on the US Army. **MR**

NOTES

1. The epigraph comes from Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers, 1940–1945*, vol. 2, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974), 479. For a reference to Manton S. Eddy's superb 9th Infantry Division in Normandy, see MAJ William Sylvan, *War Diary*, Record #N16898.44, US Army Combined Arms Research Library Archives, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23. Sylvan served as aide-de-camp to General Courtney H. Hodges.
2. Among the memorializations are standing awards at US Army schools and on buildings and weapons (Bradley fighting vehicle and Patton tank). Lee, Jackson, Sherman, Grant and Sheridan received similar treatment.
3. The US Army's official history series, although dated a bit and not prone to make personal assessments, offers the most comprehensive secondary source on operational and tactical command in northwest Europe. The only thorough independent study of the subject remains Russell F. Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981). David Irving's gossipy compendium, *The War Between the Generals*, does not merit serious examination.
4. GEN Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1951), 558–61. The Fifteenth Army, which dealt with the bypassed German-held ports in France, served on the line briefly in 1945. Ninth and First armies occasionally fell under command of the British 21st Army Group.
5. Weigley, 729; and D. Clayton James. *A Time for Giants* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1987), 205–6 and 234.
6. Napoleon, "Maxims," in BG Thomas R. Phillips, *Roots of Strategy* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985), 427.
7. Weigley, 2–28 and 729.
8. Ibid., 602.
9. Blumenson, 479, 586 and 627; and Dr. Christopher R. Gabel, *The 4th Armored Division in the Encirclement of Nancy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1986), 25–26.
10. James, 145.
11. GEN Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 73.
12. Edgar F. Puryear Jr., *Nineteen Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981), 48 and 71.
13. Bradley and Blair, 73.
14. Ibid., 68–69.
15. *Infantry in Battle*, ed. COL George C. Marshall, (Washington, DC: The Infantry Journal, Inc., 1939), 1. This book was compiled by Marshall's men in 1934 and reworked a bit in 1939. He personally wrote the foreword and guided the work. The same officer, Edwin Harding, designed the first edition and ensured continuity in the second. Harding rose to become a general and was relieved at Buna, New Guinea, by MG Robert L. Eichelberger.
16. Ibid., 55–56 and 307–23; and Dr. Samuel J. Lewis, "Interview With LTG Elwood R. 'Pete' Quesada, USAF (ret.)." Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 April 1988. Quesada mentions the deep-seated tendency to broad-front pushes.
17. Bradley and Blair, 56. Tanks and aircraft are not mentioned in *Infantry in Battle*.
18. *Infantry in Battle*, 169 and 177
19. Ibid., 199.
20. Puryear, 81.
21. Bradley and Blair, 263. The classic case of a second chance by Marshall involved James Van Fleet, whom Marshall mixed up with an alcoholic with a similar name. Van Fleet received his due promotions once Bradley convinced Marshall of the mistake.
22. Ibid., 231 and 449; and Merle Miller, *Ike the Soldier* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1987), 340. Generals Collins and Ridgway also paid tribute to Marshall in their memoirs.
23. Lewis; and MG Charles H. Corlett, USA, Ret., *Cowboy Pete* (Santa Fe,

NM: Sleeping Fox Enterprises, 1974), 97.
24. Bradley and Blair, 56 and 79; and Fletcher Pratt, *Eleven Generals* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1949), 355.
25. Blumenson, 486.
26. Bradley, 100; and Bradley and Blair, 154.
27. Bradley, 65.
28. Ibid., 229; Sylvan, 28; and CPT Michael D. Doubler, *Busting the Bocage: American Combined Arms Operations in France, 6 June to 31 July 1944* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 63.
29. Blumenson, 486.
30. Bradley and Blair, 286 and 272.
31. Ibid., 281; Blumenson, 478; Lewis; and GEN J. Lawton Collins, *Lightning Joe* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana University Press, 1979), 303.
32. Lewis; Bradley and Blair, 272; and Weigley, 162.
33. Miller, 576.
34. Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945* (New York: The Viking Press, 1973), 647.
35. Bradley and Blair, 95; and Bradley, 226.
36. Blumenson, 486.
37. Ibid., 625.
38. Bradley and Blair, 111–12; Sylvan, 77; Weigley, 602; and COL Robert S. Allen, *Lucky Forward* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947), 13. Allen notes that, during a statesside command in 1943, Hodges also permitted his chief of staff to be "in effect, the actual commanding general of the army."
39. Corlett, 97; and Lewis.
40. Sylvan, 46, 95 and 208.
41. Ibid., 49–95. Hodges rarely visited any of his corps or divisions.
42. Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater, "Command and Staff Procedures—Army," Record #R11403, US Army Combined Arms Research Library Archives, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3; and Sylvan, 64.
43. Blumenson, 482 and 576. See Sylvan for further confirmation of Hodges' habits.
44. Collins, 303; Lewis; and Corlett, 92. Weigley, 676, at one point, refers to Collins dealing directly with Ninth Army headquarters rather than making liaison directly with the adjacent corps or going through his own First Army.
45. Collins, 316; and MG Ernest N. Harmon, USA, Ret., with Milton MacKaye and William Ross MacKaye, *Combat Commander* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970), 208. Collins worked to block Harmon's bid to command the 3d Armored Division in 1945.
46. Collins, 277; Corlett, 102–5; and Bradley and Blair, 337. Bradley, Collins and Hodges all decided that Corlett was "not well" physically. Corlett admits to being "tired and run down" but blames that on Kean's, and sometimes Hodges', steady needling and second-guessing during the successful fight for Aachen.
47. Bradley, 226; and Harmon, et al, 208.
48. Weigley, 365–66, 416–18 and 601–3. Bradley and Blair, 341–43; and Sylvan, 121. In Miller, 705, there is a description of Hodges weeping as he watched the Huertgen wounded go by in trucks.
49. Weigley, 461; Bradley and Blair, 352–53; and Charles B. MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets* (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1985), 73–76.
50. Collins, 292; Bradley and Blair, 369; and Miller, 731
51. Sylvan, 171.
52. Weigley, 601–3; and Bradley and Blair, 393.
53. Sylvan, 208–9 and 214; and Weigley, 632.
54. Weigley, 632 and 679; and Bradley and Blair, 405.
55. Bradley and Blair, 405; and Bradley, 226.
56. Bradley, 226.
57. "Bradley and Blair, 435; and James, 242.
58. Blumenson, 482.

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Making the Combined Arms Training Strategy Work

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Rozman, US Army

One of the most welcome outcomes of Operation Desert Storm is the acknowledged success of Army training. The author outlines ongoing plans and strategies to carry Army training into a period of reduced funding and resources. He sees the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS), which has already made significant progress, as the over-arching concept and system that can focus Army training strategies, resource requirements and acquisition efforts into a more efficient and effective program.

RECENT EVENTS in the Persian Gulf and around the world clearly indicate the Army must come to grips with a much more complex set of operational requirements. The political developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union make the massive, high-intensity ground war in Europe seem less possible. Yet, as the Iraq and Panama actions show, the prospects for rapid deployment to contingency theaters are increasingly likely. It is now apparent that whatever deployment option surfaces, the Army must be prepared to respond with adequate forces anywhere on the operational continuum.

Unfortunately, this realization comes at a time when it appears certain there will be less forces available (with less budgetary support) to respond to this range of possibilities. In such circumstances, the *readiness* challenge begins to assume even greater stature as a potential major problem that must be addressed by Army planning and a comprehensive training strategy.

In addition to budget constraints, broader mission possibilities and a smaller ground force, the Army will probably be more disparate in its specialized elements (heavy, light, special operations, aviation, and so on), and its future equipment will be more capable. Greater ranges and lethality for weapon systems, among other things, will make existing range and maneuver facilities inadequate. To be useful for training, these facilities will require upgrading or replacement. In fact, for maneuver and aviation units, alternative training formats, such as simulation and simulators, will become an increasingly important method of training soldiers, crews and units to standard in the future.

All of these developments underscore a vital Army requirement. To ensure the Army can train to a battle-ready standard for any mission now and in the future, the Army must be successful in its training system planning and planning management. Failure in this area will yield disaster—an Army that cannot train to required standards and will needlessly lose lives and battles in some future war. Fortunately, Army planners have already made significant progress in developing a force training development planning and management approach that may forestall such a possibility—the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS). This article proposes the next step in the evolving strategy—the ways and means of implementing CATS in the current resource-constrained environment.

Background

Until recently, support for Army programs and operations has been relatively substantial. The Army's soldier strength has been stable at just over three–quarters of a million. Generally, resources for training the Army in US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools and in units have been sufficient to the task. True, Gramm–Rudman–Hollings (GRH) legislation has had an impact on funding, but the constraints of previous post– and interwar periods have not been evident in Army training during the 1980s. If anything, significant enhancement of training capability has been added to the training system by fielding increasingly more capable simulations and simulators, and developing and activating the combat training centers (CTCs).

The CTCs (the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany) have introduced the most sophisticated capability to replicate "real battle" that the Army has yet experienced short of war. The CTCs accomplish this by melding traditional maneuver exercises on terrain with a dedicated opposing force (OPFOR) and advanced technology in the form of force–on–force weapons simulation using lasers and sensors. This lash–up provides casualty assessment and feedback data through instrumentation, a sophisticated computer model and dedicated observers/controllers who, based on great tactical experience and using the instrumentation system, are able to present units with comprehensive analyses of their performance.

That is the good news. However, it also leads us to the bad news. Because money has been plentiful, careful long–range planning and management to ensure the best possible resourcing of Army training from the funds available have been less than focused. Solutions to training challenges tended to follow traditional thought; that is, more maneuver, more gunnery, more flying hours, more field time. But, of course, that

also meant more gas, more spare parts, more bullets and more money.

Because the force training concept, as a "mark on the wall," has not been adequately designed, a clear picture of what "things" would be required to execute that force training concept never

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Greater ranges and lethality for weapon systems . . . will make existing range and maneuver facilities inadequate. To be useful for training, these facilities will require upgrading or replacement. In fact, for maneuver and aviation units, alternative training formats, such as simulation and simulators, will become an increasingly important method of training soldiers.

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emerged as a comprehensive system. The result has been a proliferation of "widgets" and "gizmos" that may or may not meet a legitimate requirement to train a critical battle skill within an overarching concept. In fact, in the maneuver arms, increasingly expensive "gizmos" have been asked for but rather as augmentation to tried and true maneuvering on terrain and live gunnery.

The result has been expending a great deal of resources on procuring a great array of items that, when examined, fail to meet a clearly stated requirement. During recent reviews of programs, duplication was apparent. In some cases, valid training requirements—things with a direct impact on combat readiness that could not be trained without a device—were not supported for long periods of time.

This situation has come into sharper focus in the last few years. It surfaced as the GRH deficit–reduction legislation began to reduce fiscal flexibility and continued as technology began to extend new systems capabilities. For weapons, that invariably means overmatching ranges and doubling or quadrupling per–unit munitions costs in the next generation of hardware. Most recently, budget decreases (exclusive of GRH)

Figure 1.
Combined Arms
Training Strategy

and attendant developments in force reduction have also heightened the need for a clearer picture. As we get our 35mm camera lens focused on a sharpening image, the existing situation looks something like this:

● The years of plenty allowed the expansion of the development organization with each subset devising its own development process. In the training area, it further subdivided into system and nonsystem segments. Though theoretically tied to a concept–based philosophy, the system had become so extended that it was difficult to understand where everything fit and which concept requirements were being supported.

● Sometimes field commands have exerted enough influence to obtain an item, causing an unforecast procurement. The result may have been losing something more valuable to the Army as a whole. Because an overarching concept did not exist, the greater Army value of what had been compromised was also not as clear.

● There has been a lot of duplication, and there are a number of areas that have not been supported.

● New weapons and vehicle capabilities and the anticipated cost of using petroleum products and bullets in a constrained budget environment have dictated a need to determine what might otherwise be available in training key skills.

Consideration of this image produced an intelligent reassessment that has matured into the Armywide training plan, CATS. From this work, an emerging concept of how the total force will train all of its arms through time has developed. The training system has to produce a battle–ready Army that can integrate any of its elements into effective battle teams for deployment. It has to do this with the training resources that can reasonably be expected to be available in a deliberate and careful plan.

CATS, as the emerging plan, provides an architecture that progressively expands on the "how to" of today's force training doctrine (Field

Manual [FM] 25–100, *Training the Force*, and FM 25–101, *Battle Focused Training*) that complements the Army's warfighting doctrine. Additionally, it addresses the near-term future by developing a force training strategy/concept that complements tomorrow's warfighting concept, AirLand Operations. From these doctrine and concept definitions of how we will train, disciplined requirement definitions are being developed. These are the training enablers (resources) we need to execute the concept.

Of course, this all brings us to the real challenge. How do we successfully manage something that is gigantic? Training resources for the entire force cover a wide area. Everything from class III (petroleum products) and class IX (spare parts), eked out in operating tempo (OPTEMPO) miles and flying hours; ammunition; ranges; maneuver areas; Military Construction, Army, (MCA) projects; devices; simulations; and simulators, to people are resources that support training. Somehow the architecture of CATS has to encompass a management system that makes all of this workable.

Implementing a CATS Management System

The rest of this article proposes a management system for CATS. Implementing the system is also discussed. To appreciate the following discussion, CATS is outlined in abbreviated form:

● CATS is the Army's strategy for training integration of the heavy, light and special operations forces (SOF) of the Active and Reserve Components, both in the institution and unit. It is the Army's all-arms training strategy.

● CATS provides the overarching Army concept for training the force—now and in the future.

● CATS considers the entire force training system, both institution and unit.

● CATS establishes the context for strategy/concept-driven training requirement development and management.

● From the CATS requirement definition, the Army develops and refines its training resource acquisition strategies.

Significant enhancement of training capability has been added to the training system by fielding increasingly more capable simulations and simulators, and developing and activating the combat training centers (CTCs). The CTCs have introduced the most sophisticated capability to replicate "real battle" that the Army has yet experienced short of war.

● CATS thoroughly integrates training development with the Concept–Based Requirements System (CBRS) and allied developmental processes such as the Life–Cycle System Management Model.

To visualize the structure of CATS implementation, the schematic at figure 1 is provided. The "goose egg" indicates that the basic training concept for the force (all of its parts) trains in two places—institution and unit. These will exist no matter what the warfighting doctrine is. The specifics of what skills and capabilities must be trained, and to what standard, develops from the changes in warfighting doctrine or future warfighting concepts.

The top box in the goose egg, *warfighting doctrine*, is what was defined by the preceding bullets. The participants in this strategy/concept definition process are TRADOC, the integration center (ICs) and the schools. Other Army organizations will participate in their areas of

expertise. The US Army Materiel Command (AMC) will serve as a primary information source on technology and hardware capabilities, software and program information. Analysis and test agencies will assist in clarifying the alternatives and validate the basis for alternative design. Major Army commands (MACOMs) will provide input throughout the concept design process through the schools, ICs and TRADOC headquarters (HQ)–level interface.

The key result of the top box is that the TRADOC level of the strategy/concept definition

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Because the force training concept, as a "mark on the wall," has not been adequately designed, a clear picture of what "things" would be required to execute that force training concept never emerged as a comprehensive system. The result has been a proliferation of "widgets" and "gizmos" that may or may not meet a legitimate requirement to train a critical battle skill within an overarching concept.

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process establishes the guidance for the more detailed proponent strategy/concept definition. The entire process is interactive so that, once the detailed training concept has been developed, its identification of "overages and shortfalls" becomes feedback during regular reviews. The result is that all players better understand the context within which they operate, as well as what the *whole* concept picture looks like.

The process, therefore, develops the force's training system as a total system. This process is directly aligned with warfighting doctrine and future warfighting concepts that develop from CBRS. It ensures this alignment by aggressive interface with combat, materiel and force developers. It uses a review mechanism that updates the concepts and requirements, assuring the best prioritization possible in the various acquisition strategies. The objective is an accurate reflection of Army training priorities in the budget and the

Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

The next box down in figure 1, *proponent training strategies*, would involve several actions.

Within the CATS concept provided by TRADOC HQ, the Combined Arms Command—Training (CAC-T) develops the combat, combat support and combat service support training strategy/concepts. These concepts will be provided to the proponent schools and will initiate development of their arm–specific training concepts. The ICs will integrate the school strategy/concepts into the combat, combat support or combat service support concepts as appropriate.

From these concepts, specific requirement definition will occur. At the IC level, it will focus on integrating the force such as specific training concepts and training requirements for the battlefield operating system of command and control.

At the IC level and at some other agencies (such as the Army Training Support Center [ATSC] for training, devices, simulators and simulations [TADSS]), the integrated training resources will be developed into unconstrained training resource area master plans such as the CTC master plan and Family of Simulations (FAMSIM) master plan. Constraint will then be applied, based on budget guidance, producing modernization plans. Each plan will state its concept definition for that resource's use within the defined force and proponent training strategies.

These integrated packages will provide the conceptual underpinning (outlining what is to be done) for the requirements (describing how it will be done) which, in turn, will provide the basis for the acquisition strategy (where it will come from and when).

The ICs and other integrating agencies such as ATSC, in developing the plans, will identify and integrate all required training resources such as system and nonsystem TADSS, maneuver areas, ranges, targetry, instrumentation, OPTEMPO, ammunition, and so on. TRADOC HQ will provide final concept, policy and prioritization recommendations to HQ, Department of the Army (DA).

The ICs and agencies will develop from these

BATTLE CENTER

How do we successfully manage something that is gigantic?
Training resources for the entire force cover a wide area. Everything from class III
(petroleum products) and class IX (spare parts), eked out in OPTEMPO miles and
flying hours; ammunition; ranges; maneuver areas; Military Construction, Army,
(MCA) projects; devices; simulations; and simulators, to people are resources that
support training. Somehow the architecture of CATS has to encompass a
management system that makes all of this workable.

plans, prioritized lists in each resource area, and the ICs will integrate proponent lists into the master and modernization plans.

The preceding outline anticipates that these actions will generate two major force training substrategies—one for the institution and one for the unit. Current functional alignment within TRADOC assumes that CAC–T will be the lead integrating developer for institutional strategies/concepts and requirement definition. Unit strategy definition will be derived according to the outline described above. Both strategies are essential to the success of the force training system. It is essential to produce an effective balance of both strategies over time if a combat-ready force is to be reliably achieved today, tomorrow or in the future.

Also important to the integrating level of concept and requirement definition is the role of the MACOMs. MACOM review of concept and requirement definitions, particularly from the present out to four years into the future, ensures that MACOM–unique perspectives and needs are properly considered in the definition process. This review requires that projected strategies and concepts must be developed.

Projected strategies/concepts guarantee we know where we want to go over time, particularly with the master and modernization plans, and we know what we want to buy. Projections might be aligned with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and the extended planning program (EPP). This

would appear as shown in figure 2 where the resource structures to support the strategy might look like the bullets under the plan boxes.

Once the ICs and other integrating "role" agencies have completed their work, the schools will become involved. Actually, the schools will

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These actions will generate two major force training substrategies—one for the institution and one for the unit. . . . Both strategies are essential to the success of the force training system. It is essential to produce an effective balance of both strategies over time if a combat–ready force is to be reliably achieved today, tomorrow or in the future.

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be involved as early as possible throughout this dynamic and ongoing process. Specifically, the schools will develop their arm–specific training concepts and identify the resources they will need to execute these strategies/concepts. The arm–specific strategies/concepts will be built within the context of the Army (TRADOC) and IC strategies/concepts. Arm–specific concepts and requirements will be integrated into the various plans and the supporting acquisition strategies. For example, infantry requirements for Bradley gunnery TADSS will be integrated by CAC–T and ATSC into the TADSS plan and the supporting TADSS acquisition strategy.

From the preceding effort, as figure 2 illustrates, a comprehensive and integrated definition of Army force training requirements will result. These are the critical training resources that, at various points in the future, will allow the Army to train as it said it planned to train in its future training strategy/concept definition.

Specifically, training resource requirements are all of the resources the various training concepts must have. Training resource requirements address nonsystem and system, institution and unit, soldier to Army corps, and Active and Reserve. Once requirements are defined and incorporated into a training resource area plan, they

are integrated into the appropriate acquisition strategy. Concept and requirement definition may occur at DA, MACOMs, TRADOC HQ and the ICs or the schools. They will be finalized and consolidated by the ICs and other appropriate agencies, such as ATSC, into the training resource area plans and the supporting acquisition strategies.

Continuous refinement of force training strategy/concept and supporting requirement definition will result in identifying the major sub-areas of the overarching concept. Today, these may best be thought of as the institution and unit, each with its distinct concept of how training is to be conducted. The two areas combine to reach the objective force training goal of a force trained to standard to execute wartime missions.

Supporting these two major divisions are other major subsets that describe, as previously mentioned, the concept of application for the primary training resources required to execute the concept. Examples of these areas have been mentioned earlier. These subconcepts will be developed into unconstrained master plans that describe how the particular resource concerned applies to training the force over time. Following is an outline of what these training resource plans would look like:

● Training resource area plans respond to the force training concept articulated by DA, TRADOC HQ, the ICs and the schools.

● For the particular resource area, the plan states the integrated concepts for that resource area within the defined force and proponent (institutional and unit) training strategies/concepts and outlines what is necessary to execute the concept over time.

● The executive agents for the plans are primarily the ICs and/or designated agencies.

● The plans include, but are not limited to, these training resource areas: CTCs, FAMSIM, TADSS, ammunition, OPTEMPO and ranges.

● The plans provide the basis for supporting acquisition strategies.

● The plans will be updated on a cycle that is responsive to the PPBES.

Figure 2. Army Training Strategy Through Time

The plans, over time, may subdivide into separate plans as a particular component achieves more prominence as a training resource category such as the simulation portion of TADSS becoming a separate area under the FAMSIM master plan. Another possibility would be coalescing separate areas into a single plan such as all facilities oriented on nonhome station fire and maneuver training coming under a single plan. A final possibility, of course, is the disappearance of a plan as a resource area becomes unnecessary, based on the overarching force training concept.

Constraint, as earlier noted, will be applied based on budget guidance, transforming the plans into modernization plans. These constrained plans will become the basis for the acquisition strategy, an important result of the plans. These packages will establish the timetable for specific resource development, supporting funding, programmatic time lines and priorities. This information will directly link with the PPBES input currently under combat develop-

ments proponency. The strategies would ultimately be incorporated into the Army Modernization Memorandum by TRADOC and then integrated into the Long–Range Army Materiel Requirements Plan (LRAMRP) and the POM at DA level.

An outline of acquisition strategy development would show that training resource area acquisition strategies are the consolidation of a resource area's requirements into an acquisition plan. This plan would prioritize requirements, translate requirements into the PPBES and clearly state milestones for resources to be acquired. It would also identify all sources of resources and funding that support them; for example, budget categories such as Operation and Maintenance, Army, MCA, and so on.

Acquisition strategies show a direct relationship of acquisitions to requirements that derive from training strategies/concepts—a clear picture of why the Army needs the resource and what the Army will do with it.

> *Constraint... will be applied based on budget guidance. ... These constrained plans will become the basis for the acquisition strategy, an important result of the plans. These packages will establish the timetable for specific resource development, supporting funding, programmatic time lines and priorities.*

Toward a Comprehensive Strategy

The preceding discussion, at first glance, may give the impression that much work has to be done. In fact, many pieces of what is recommended already exist in part or in a fairly complete form. The overarching strategy articulation has been developing in the TRADOC CATS initiative and predecessor efforts of several DA special task forces. Considerable work has been ongoing in defining institutional and unit training doctrine and future concepts through several documents. These include FM 25-100, FM 25-101, Student Text 17-12-7, *Armor Training Strategy*, and US Army, Europe, (USA-REUR) Regulation 350-1, *USAREUR Training Directive*, and, most recently, initial work on CATS proponent baseline training strategies. Resources area plans have already been evolving in the CTC master plan, CATS-TADSS effort, training management area master plan and Standards in Training Commission (STRAC).

The question immediately arises, why bother, then, to coalesce all of these correct initiatives under one roof? The answer is simple. The number of affordable plans and programs under a fairly generous budget are less so when funds get tight. More efficient means must be applied to ensure the best training resource is bought and that critical holes in training the force do not develop. That takes a system that, as clearly as possible, states "how" the Army is to train (concept), identifies "what" resources are needed to train (requirements) and "where" these requirements will come from (acquisition strategy) in the emerging funding environment. The Army must articulate its training system as a force training system—a companion to its warfighting system. If the Army can state its warfighting concept and the necessary requirements to execute that concept (CBRS), it should also be able to state the companion force training strategy/concept to support the warfighting concept and the resources needed to execute that training strategy/concept.

Finally, it behooves the Army to define such a force training development approach in such a way that it institutionalizes the guidance. This is necessary to ensure that all participants understand the concepts, their roles and the objectives. The codification should be in a regulation. Such a document would be dynamic and constantly in a state of review—the proverbial living document. It would provide a means to focus what currently are somewhat dispersed efforts to ensure the desired results—a trainable Army in all of its parts. If we do not achieve such focus, we may have an untrainable force later.

CATS implementation is doable. Many of the key ingredients are already in place. There is much work remaining to be done. But the measure of success is a trained force over time—light, heavy, SOF, both Active and Reserve, in the institution and in the unit—a force that is versatile, deployable, lethal and combat-ready. **MR**

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REVIEW ESSAY

FM 22–103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*: Good Draft, Go Final!

By Colonel Terry A. Girdon, US Army

The publication of US Army Field Manual (FM) 22–103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, in June 1987, heralded a new era of leadership doctrine for the Army.[1] It formally recognized what good leaders already knew: Leadership competencies and behaviors required at the brigade level and higher are different from those needed at the battalion level and lower. Then Chief of Staff of the Army General John A. Wickham wrote in the preface, "This manual recognizes the complexity of leadership and command at senior levels and the separate need to address indirect leadership concepts and fundamentals critical to building organizational teams."[2] It is not that you can forget what you have already learned but, rather, that you need to add additional leadership competencies and behaviors to your repertoire to remain successful as you move up the chain. So far, so good.

FM 22–103 says it is "a statement of principles, illustrated by examples, providing a framework for action wherein a senior leader can fit his own leadership style."[3] Unfortunately, it never fully delivers on this promise. Its use as a primary text for the resident and nonresident classes of the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, has demonstrated there are some serious problems with its organization, thoroughness of content and intellectual rigor. What was a most welcome addition almost four years ago is now a manual badly in need of revision. What form could a new version of FM 22–103 take to assuage these problems?

Organization. The manual's organizational problems are the easiest to describe. The chapter titles—"The Challenge," "Leadership Vision," "Professional Ethics," "Professional Skills," "Command Processes," "The Organization" and "Senior Leaders in Action"—tell us much more about the contents than was intended. If you begin to sense a certain "apples and oranges" flavor to this list, you are not alone. One primary difficulty with FM 22–103 is that it gives every indication of being written by a committee. Something is wrong when you have difficulty identifying and outlining the "principles, illustrated with examples," the preface promises. A brief chapter-by-chapter examination will illustrate the point.

Chapter 1 introduces the subject matter very well. It might be considered prophetic with its title, "The Challenge." Chapters 2 and 3 are also well focused on their topics of vision and ethics, each one discussing, in some detail, a single senior-leader competency or behavior. Chapter 4, "Professional Skills," is where things begin to go awry. First, the title is misleading to the extent that all of the senior-leadership competencies and behaviors discussed in this FM could fall under it. Second, it has gone from addressing a single principle to an entire cluster. In addition, this chapter sets forth a large variety of behaviors further categorized as being concept-, competency- or communications-based.

But, in Chapters 5 and 6, "Command Processes" and "The Organization," FM 22–103 really loses its focus. Chapter 5 swerves away from senior-level leadership to talk about command, while Chapter 6 addresses senior leadership from a whole new direction. Shortly after FM 22–103 was published, Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer Jr. wrote, "It fails to distinguish between 'leadership' and 'command' at senior levels. The difference between 'leadership' [the art and process of influencing and motivating] and 'command' [a responsible officer exercising authority] is one of several points needing greater clarification."[4] The information presented in these two chapters is interesting and important, but it does not fit with the material preceding it. The final chapter, Chapter 7, presents excellent historical examples of senior leaders in action that illustrate the leadership principles discussed earlier.

The manual's failure to maintain a coherent, logical approach in presenting senior-level leadership doctrine is a serious distraction. It needlessly complicates a subject at the very heart of the military profession. If this was the only problem, the manual would not warrant our attention, but unfortunately, the difficulties go deeper.

Thoroughness of Content. These organizational inconsistencies may mask the answer to a more important, fundamental question. Does FM 22–103 thoroughly discuss and present a complete list of the key competencies and behaviors a senior leader needs? The answer is yes and no. They are

all discussed, but all are not given the attention they deserve. A comparison of the Army doctrine in FM 22–103 with what recognized civilian experts in the higher level leadership field are saying illustrates the problem.[5]

FM 22–103 states, "The model of leadership and command presented looks much like a wheel. It is founded on the practical realization that all action starts with a vision of what is required."[6] Vision, then, is the hub or core of the wheel, and there are five spokes radiating from it—challenge, ethics, skills, processes and organization. There is a chapter on each, including vision, in the manual. Carefully reading these chapters, a list of recommended senior–level leadership competencies and behaviors can be drawn. Unfortunately, this is a needlessly difficult and complicated exercise because of FM 22–103's organizational confusion.

There is another reason it is so hard—the degree of thoroughness with which FM 22–103 presents the various senior–leader doctrine elements. To illustrate, let us begin by identifying the eight competencies and behaviors forming the basis of senior–leader doctrine included in the current FM 22–103:

Vision—The senior leader should have a concept of where the organization is going.

Ethics—The senior leader must be a role model, promote subordinates' ethical development, and develop and sustain the ethical climate.

Conceptual skills—The senior leader should be able to make decisions and forecasts using creativity and intuition.

Competency skills—The senior leader must possess the required aptitudes, knowledge and abilities.

Communication skills—The senior leader must develop interpersonal, listening, language, teaching and persuasive skills.

Management—The senior leader focuses on planning, organizing and budgeting behaviors.

Team building—The senior leader provides the command climate to develop a shared vision and understanding of the commander's intent.

Motivation—The senior leader ensures there is a will to win and it is nurtured by the command climate.

Is this a complete listing? Is each competency and behavior explored thoroughly? One might anticipate that all eight would receive equal coverage in the manual. Even a brief examination, however, reveals this is not the case. Vision and ethics each have their own chapter; conceptual, competency and communication skills each have about a third of a chapter; management and team building each have about a fourth of a chapter; and motivation has less than half a page. Perhaps the assumption of equal weighting is wrong. Comparisons with what civilian experts say about senior–level leadership should clarify whether the doctrine presented in FM 22–103 is complete and thorough.

John Gardner, a former cabinet officer and prolific writer on leadership, has one of the more exhaustive lists of essential senior–leader competencies and behaviors.[7] There is a direct content match between his list and the one drawn from FM 22–103(see figure). While the relative importance of each task may vary over time and situation, it is clear Gardner considers each to be of equal importance. This equality is not reflected in FM 22–103.

James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner published an excellent book, *The Leadership Challenge*, the same year as FM 22–103.[8] In it, they sought to provide for leaders what Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman Jr. provided for business professionals in their 1982 best seller, *In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best Run Companies*, such as learning from the success of others.[9] Kouzes and Posner looked at highly successful senior lead-

Correspondence of Senior–Leader Competencies/Behaviors

FM 22–103	Gardner	Kouzes/Posner	Bennis
Vision	Envisioning Goals	Inspiring a Shared Vision	Managing Attention
Ethics	Affirming Our Values	N/A	Managing Trust
Conceptual Skills	Renewing	Challenging the Process	N/A
Competency Skills	Serving as a Symbol	Modeling the Way	Managing Self
Communication Skills	Explaining	N/A	Managing Meaning
Management	Managing	N/A	N/A
Team Building	Achieving Workable Unity	Enabling Others to Act	N/A
Motivation	Motivating	Encouraging the Heart	N/A

ers to see what made them successful. They found five leadership practices common to all (see figure).[10] FM 22-103 addresses all five, but the equal emphasis Kouzes and Posner place on their five is not evident in FM 22-103.

Warren Bennis used an approach much like Kouzes and Posner's during his five-year study of "90 of the most effective, successful leaders in the nation; 60 from corporations and 30 from the public sector."[11] From his effort, Bennis coined the often-quoted phrase, "Leaders are people who do the right things; managers are people who do things right."[12] Bennis' study produces the expected diversity, but it also identifies four competencies shared by all of the successful leaders(see figure).[13] Once again, Bennis' study has a high degree of content correlation with FM 22-103 but disagrees with the manual on the relative importance of individual competencies and behaviors.

This quick look at what four civilian experts say about senior-level leadership reassures us about the completeness of current Army senior-leadership doctrine as presented in FM 22-103. However, it raises some disturbing questions about its thoroughness.

Intellectual Rigor. There is no other way to say it. FM 22-103 lacks the intellectual rigor one expects in a doctrinal manual for senior leaders. Comparing it with any good leadership text would certainly make this point, but comparing it to a much more closely related document proves even more convincing.[14] Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-80, *Executive Leadership*, has plenty of rigor.[15] In fact, it may have too much which would explain why it is so seldom read.

Published the same year and month as FM 22-103, DA Pam 600-80 should really be viewed as a complementary document. It contains the US Army Research Institute study results of what the Army's most senior leaders (serving three- and four-star officers) have to say about their own leadership. It is the Army's equivalent to the research, discussed earlier, conducted by Kouzes and Posner about successful business and industry leaders. DA Pam 600-80 provides some very valuable insights into senior-level leadership and deftly combines the theory with the practice. What does the pamphlet provide that the FM is missing?

DA Pam 600-80 recognizes three leadership levels instead of two, as cited in FM 22-103. The FM differentiates between direct leadership at the junior level (battalion and lower) and indirect leadership at the senior level (brigade and higher).[16] The pamphlet agrees with the direct level of senior leadership but further divides indirect senior leadership into

two separate and distinct levels—organizational leadership (corps, division and lower) and executive leadership (unified commands and the like).[17]

Carl von Clausewitz acknowledged this break in indirect leadership many years ago: "A major gulf exists between a commander-in-chief—a general who leads the army as a whole or commands in a theater of operations—and the senior generals immediately subordinate to him."[18] The US Army War College has incorporated this executive- or strategic-level leadership into its curriculum as part of a retitled core course called "Strategic Leadership," first offered to its 1991 resident class. The Center for Army Leadership, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has been working for some time on an additional chapter of FM 22-103 to recognize this distinction. The best approach now, however, would be to incorporate it into a completely new FM 22-103 edition.

The pamphlet goes beyond the FM's treatment of leadership vision to talk about "frame of reference" which it defines as "understanding cause and effect in complex situations."[19] It describes what the Army's senior leadership says is critical in developing this vital competency. It cites the importance of systems understanding, an understanding of second-order effects, a future focus and vision, and proactive reasoning. Each of these components of vision at the senior level needs to be discussed in the new FM 22-103 edition.

The conceptual skills associated with decision making are discussed in both DA Pam 600-80 and FM 22-103.[20] The pamphlet, however, also discusses the important notion of value added in the following terms: "Leaders at all levels have unique, critical tasks that cannot be performed by subordinates, most commonly because they are so complex that lower echelon leaders lack the frame of reference to make the required decisions. Tasks that cannot be delegated are critical and the leader who does them makes a unique contribution [adds value]."[21] This key decision-making aspect needs to be included in the manual.

DA Pam 600-80 has an excellent chapter on organizational culture, values and climate.[22] It describes one aspect of the interaction of culture and values as the "cascading translation process"—a high-sounding name for a very important concept.[23] A key responsibility of executive leaders, or strategic leaders as the Army War College calls them, is to ensure their policies are in consonance with the organizational culture and values. If they are, they will be more readily accepted as they "cascade" down the chain and are further "translated" and explained at each intermediate level of

command. If the strategic leader is truly in sync with the organization's culture and values, then one should expect the actions and orders at the bottom to agree with the policies issued from the top. That is the cascading translation process in action. The FM's limited treatment of command climate does not do justice to these important concepts all senior leaders must understand for the good of their organizations and themselves.

These four examples illustrate the intellectual rigor an Army doctrinal publication can have but that FM 22-103 does not have. The goal must be to incorporate into the manual the substance but not the confusing academic language. The objective is to add depth and breadth to a senior/strategic leader's understanding of one of the central military professional tenets—leadership. That is FM 22-103's purpose—one that is achievable with a new edition of the manual. What, then, should the new version look like?

A New Version of FM 22-103

The new FM 22-103 should be well-organized, thorough and intellectually rigorous. The unifying element for presenting the doctrine should be the eight senior-leader competencies and behaviors already present in the manual. They are a good starting point. Gary A. Yukl writes in his excellent second edition of *Leadership in Organizations* that "there is no absolute set of 'correct' behavior categories."[4] He indicates that differences will occur in such lists for three primary reasons: the list's purpose, the list's abstraction level and the method used to develop the list.[25] The eight competencies and behaviors in the current manual are well-suited to their purpose and are substantially consistent with the civilian examples cited and the research in general.[26] The Army would be well-served by using them again as a doctrinal base.

How should the revised FM 22-103 be organized? The new manual should dedicate an entire chapter to each of the identified competencies and behaviors. This would solve many organizational problems and the thoroughness question of the current FM. The complete answer will come with the application of more intellectual rigor.

Chapter 1 should introduce the subject and identify and give a brief discussion of the three leadership levels. The primary thrust should continue to be senior-level leadership, although a later chapter should be dedicated to discussing the third and highest level—strategic leadership. Chapters 2 through "whatever" should each be dedicated to a single senior-leader competency or behavior and include a substantive discussion of each in the manner of DA Pam 600-80. The chapters should not be long, but discussion of their topic should be rigorous and insightful. A concluding chapter, much like the current "Senior Leaders in Action," would be a fitting finale, particularly if it provides a historical illustration of each competency or behavior discussed in the earlier chapters.

Senior leaders are intelligent; let us write their leadership doctrine accordingly. The manual should avoid what one early critic of the current manual describes as "a style that from the start repeats all the cliches of officership" and another describes as "endless alliterative lists of traits."[27]

When it was published, FM 22-103 represented a significant addition to US Army leadership doctrine. It filled a recognized void with valuable advice and counsel for senior leaders. Since that time, however, continued research has brought new insight and understanding into this critical military professional element. Just filling a gap in leadership doctrine is no longer enough. As resources become scarce and the Army shrinks in size, senior- and strategic-level leadership quality and effectiveness will be all the more critical to future success. The current FM 22-103 is a good draft, but it is time to go final! *MR*

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NOTES

1. US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], 21 June 1987).
2. Ibid., ii.
3. Ibid. i.
4. Walter F. Ulmer Jr., "The Army's New Senior Leadership Doctrine," *Parameters*, vol. 17, (December 1987):13.
5. There is a remarkable degree of convergence between the demands of leading high-level military organizations and those of directing large business, industrial and other civilian institutions. See Donn A. Starry, "Running Things," *Parameters*, vol. 17, (September 1987):13. In generic leadership research, military officers are routinely included with business and industrial leaders as subjects. See, for example, Bernard M. Bass, *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations* (New York: The Free Press, 1985); and James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner, *The Leadership Challenge: How to Get Extraordinary Things Done in Organizations* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987). Both of

these books report on large-scale leadership research that included military officers in their study samples.
6. FM 22-103, 5.
7. In particular, see John W. Gardner's series of 12 monographs published under the auspices of the Independent Sector in Washington, DC. Its titles and dates of publication are "The Nature of Leadership" (January 1986), "The Tasks of Leadership" (March 1986), "The Heart of the Matter: Leader-Constituent Interaction" (June 1986), "Leadership and Power" (October 1986), "The Moral Aspect of Leadership" (January 1987), "Attributes and Context" (April 1987), "Leadership Development" (June 1987), "Constituents and Followers" (November 1987), "The Task of Motivating" (February 1988), "Renewing" (March 1988), "The Changing Nature of Leadership" (July 1988) and "Leadership: An Overview" (August 1988). Gardner's latest book is *On Leadership* (New York: The Free Press, 1989). See also John W. Gardner, "The Tasks of Leadership," *New Management*, vol. 4, (Spring 1987):9-14.
8. Kouzes and Posner.

9. Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman Jr., *In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies* (New York: Warner Books, 1982).
10. Kouzes and Posner, 3–14.
11. Warren Bennis, "The Four Competencies of Leadership," *Training and Development Journal*, vol. 38, (August 1984):14.
12. Ibid, 16.
13. Ibid. 14–19.
14. See, for example, Gary A. Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 2d ed., (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989).
15. Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600–80, *Executive Leadership*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 19 June 1987).
16. FM 22–103, 3.
17. DA Pam 600–80, 2–8.
18. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 111.
19. FM 22–103, 7–16; and DA Pam 600–80, 3.
20. DA Pam 600–80, 33–40; and FM 22–103, 26–31.
21. DA Pam 600–80, 7.

22. Ibid., 17–23.
23. Ibid., 18–19.
24. Yukl, 92.
25. Ibid.
26. See, for example, Yukl and Bernard M. Bass, *Bass and Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*, 3d ed., (New York: The Free Press, 1990). It is also interesting to look at Richard E. Byrd, "Corporate Leadership Skills: A New Synthesis," *Organizational Dynamics*, vol. 16, (Summer 1987):34–43. He writes (page 36) that he will "address the needs of the 1980's with a new, more encompassing frame of reference . . . creating this new framework will allow us to bring together the key ideas of major investigators and corporate leaders and demonstrate their underlying commonality." The results of these efforts are five key categories of leadership skills: anticipatory skills, visioning skills, value-congruence skills, empowerment skills and self-understanding skills. Despite the name changes and the promise of something new and better, each of these skills is encompassed by one or more of the current FM 22–103 competencies/behaviors.
27. Ulmer, 13; and John M. Vermillion, "The Pillars of Generalship," *Parameters*, vol. 17, (Summer 1987):3.

INSIGHTS

The Tools to Select Leaders Are Available—Why Not Use Them?

By Captain Thomas A. Kolditz, US Army

Selecting and developing leaders versus managers is not a new issue. Every officer in the US Army, at one time or another, has endured some tired viewgraph transparency describing leaders as "bold, decisive, risk-taking" and managers as "careful, meticulous, bureaucratic." But actually selecting and developing true leaders is a problem considered and endured in the same manner as the weather—with resignation smacking of helplessness. This should not be the case. The leader development community is *not* helpless. The tools are in place to objectively select leaders having the qualities doctrine and common sense demand of professional leaders. Why not use them?

Structured Assessment Tools. Structured assessment techniques (the tools) could augment current Army procedures used to select and develop leaders. Structured assessment means using multiple observations and written instruments to develop objective, quantitatively valid behavior evaluations.

Assessment forms differ fundamentally from traditional evaluation approaches that use tasks related to some concept, with success or failure at the tasks presumably denoting mastery or deficiency in the concept. Structured assessment also uses tasks, but success or failure at the tasks is considered irrelevant. Instead, behaviors surfacing during task completion are rated with respect to a concept, and the ratings are combined quantitatively to give an estimate of ability—in the case at hand, leadership ability.

There are two forms of assessment—assessment programs and assessment centers. The Army is currently using structured assessment programs. In these programs, assessors are trained to observe

leaders following an existing training plan. Any concept or doctrine can form the assessment basis such as the leader dimensions of decisiveness and risk-taking listed in US Army Field Manual (FM) 22–100, *Military Leadership*. Applied psychologists have measured these variables for years. Insofar as the differences between leaders and managers can be described, those differences can be assessed and the assessments used to aid selection decisions.

For example, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) Cadet Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, uses the Leadership Assessment Program (LAP). It is a structured assessment program designed to select cadets for active duty and uses 16 dimensions of leadership as its yardstick. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Fort Monroe, Virginia, uses the Leadership Assessment and Development Program (LADP) to develop leaders. This program uses the nine leadership competencies from FM 22–100 as criteria. The LADP is implemented in all resident leader training courses lasting five weeks or longer.

Structured assessment can also take place in assessment centers that are essentially resident workshops where leaders perform tasks designed to elicit the behaviors meaningful to assessors. General officers are offered the opportunity to attend such a workshop at the Center for Creative Leadership in Greensboro, North Carolina. Using assessment centers is the better method, but it is more expensive than most assessment programs.

Recurring Call for Assessment Tools. Senior Army study groups have repeatedly recommended the Army establish assessment centers to

augment current selection and evaluation efforts. As early as 1978, the Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) study recommended to the Army chief of staff that all commissioning program applicants be processed through an assessment center as a gate in the selection process. A similar recommendation resurfaced in the report generated through the Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS), directed in 1984. The Leader Development Action Plan, currently in the execution phase, calls for the leader development community to capitalize on Cadet Command's LAP success and to continue efforts to use structured assessment to help leaders develop their skills. Modifying assessment programs is emerging in the Army as an inexpensive alternative to establishing assessment centers that are more expensive.

If a single theme runs concurrently with these recommendations, it is objectivity. For example, the RETO study specifically investigated officers' perceptions of inequity in the selection processes among the three commissioning sources—Officer Candidate School, the US Military Academy and the ROTC. If study group participants had known the Army would subsequently face a large-scale drawdown, it is possible the theme would have been even more pronounced. Our aging retention and selection system faces great challenges in the wake of Operation Desert Storm. The objectivity inherent to quality assessment could reinforce both the perceived and actual fairness of necessary force reductions. Ironically, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission used structured assessment to fill senior executive positions created during a reorganization in the late 1970s.

Practical Application. Assessment techniques enjoy considerable success in the private sector where validity issues are related to hiring and, therefore, are tested in court. Many large cities use assessment centers to make promotion decisions in their police and fire departments. Numerous government agencies such as the Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service and Department of Housing and Urban Development use a broad range of formal assess-ment techniques. Put simply, assessment techniques work well for them.

The allied armies of the United Kingdom, Canada and Israel also use these techniques to select their combat leaders. The British Regular Commissions Board is a superb example of the assessment center method applied to military leadership skills. Those who wish to become British army officers (except physicians, dentists and other nontactical leaders) must first be assessed for 3 1/2 days at an assessment center. This rigorous, structured assessment course includes written tests and instruments, briefings, obstacle courses and physical challenges, interviews and planning projects. Within 48 hours after assessment completion, prospective officer candidates receive assessment results by mail. Approximately 50 percent pass and are recommended for officer training. The assessment center cost is minimal compared to the cost of discovering unsuitable candidates during more expensive, developmentally focused training.

To illustrate the practical significance of assessment centers in our Active Army, consider the very successful assessment center for company command selectees at Fort Carson, Colorado. In 1979, the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) commander, then Major General Louis Menetrey, established an assessment center as part of the precommand course to give developmental feedback to company commanders before they assumed command. Information about the prospective commander's performance formed the basis of a developmental counseling session at the end of the two-day assessment but was never shared with the officer's command chain.

During the six-year period the center operated, the administrators kept confidential assessment records. They discovered that approximately 80 percent of the company commanders unsuccessful in command (defined as either relief for cause or receipt of a referred officer evaluation report) were previously assessed as having significant deficiencies in leadership abilities. (The potential practical benefit of structured assessment as one component of the command selection process is eliminating the practical costs associated with unsuccessful command.) Reluctantly, in 1984, Fort Carson closed the assessment center portion of the precommand course because of funding constraints.

The expanded use of structured assessment in the Army mirrors, in some ways, the expansion path taken in the private sector. For example, those familiar with the LADP know the results are potentially of high quality, but the time and resource requirements are a burden. Private sector assessment experts addressed this same concern by developing batteries of written assessment instruments that computers score and integrate into feedback. The Army's Organizational Leadership for Executives Course is already piloting such an instrument. It seems likely the Army will design computer-scored instruments for leader development, given the need to provide quality feedback to large numbers of students in TRADOC schools (the original purpose of the LADP).

Implementing Structured Assessment.
Unfounded skepticism aside, all assessment systems warrant cautious implementation. Partial assessments or assessments accomplished by poorly trained personnel do more damage than good because they appear to be valid when they are not. Informally derived instruments hold these same characteristics. Assessment officers in both the Center for Army Leadership (CAL), US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Cadet Command occasionally receive recommendations to change elements of their respective assessment programs. These suggestions intuitively seem reasonable but are reckless in a technical sense. An assessment program's validity is a measurable, objectively derived standard. If the program is changed without measuring the impact of the change, the quality of the feedback becomes an uncertainty.

As with any leap-ahead technology—and formal assessment is *the* leap-ahead technology in leader selection and development—implementation is a pitched battle. Assessment systems and assessment instruments not expertly crafted and professionally executed usually provide meaningless results, regardless of face validity and nifty packaging. Expertly applying a leap-ahead technology is, by definition, a bold and deliberate action that is usually expensive. Can we afford to do the job right? The answer to that question seems obvious when one considers the Army's tremendous investment in selecting and developing leaders. In the Army, the hidden costs associated with marginal leadership at any level can be tragic.

The only legitimate reason for leaders to develop an appreciation for assessment technology is it can help them do their jobs better than if they choose to work without it. Were the Army to design a selection system complemented by assessment techniques, it would look like the system we have now. From an assessment point of view, our present system is primarily subjective and normative. It is subjective because it depends upon considered judgment at multiple levels—for example, efficiency reporting and the promotion board process. It is also normative in that it compares leaders to each other, as opposed to some common standard. In contrast, assessment centers and assessment programs are objective and criterion-referenced. Put simply, assessments use unbiased data-collection techniques to rate leaders against specified criteria. Such criteria may exist only as assessment tools or may emerge from other training and doctrinal efforts such as the Military Qualification Standards System. Clearly, structured assessment strengths are complementary to the systemic weaknesses of the procedures now

used for promotion and command selections.

If one considers the realities of a limited resource base, the investment strategy (see figure) for assessment techniques seems to make sense. It proposes an intense developmental assessment experience for midcareer leaders attending resident courses at Fort Leavenworth. The large body of basic and advanced course students could receive a host of relatively affordable self-assessment instruments directed toward planning their development during later operational assignments. As with junior leaders, the assessment strategy for senior leaders would primarily focus on self assessment but for a different reason. A growing body of research suggests the experience and maturity of senior leaders make self assessment particularly suitable for their development. This assessment investment strategy ensures leaders receive assessments throughout their careers but that the resourcing targets are career soldiers who, it is hoped, will develop into senior leaders. The same principle may be applied to noncommissioned officer (NCO) and civilian career patterns as well.

It is important to view assessment technology as a potential commanders' tool. In the Army, troop assignments are the focus for selecting and developing leaders. In executing their responsibility to select and develop leaders, commanders weigh a mass of information about performance and potential and then make the tough calls. Because commanders are not always with their subordinates, commanders compare behavior samples and render subjective judgments about performance and potential. Structured assessment would not displace this process but would enhance it by adding objectively derived information—a qualitative gain. There would also be a quantitative gain in information which is certainly important when making decisions about junior leaders whose performance files

Leadership Assessment Investment Strategy

may be thin. Military leaders tend to be practical and focus necessarily on the quality of information these behavioral technologies provide.

If assessment methods exist to support commanders' decisions, then it follows that assessments should occur during activities in which both the commanders and subordinates take part. As design criteria, realistic situations are the most desirable assessment opportunities. Thus, the combat training centers are probably the best locations to assess officers and NCOs in key leadership positions. In conjunction with the Army Research Institute, CAL is investigating assessment technologies' applicability in the near–combat training environment at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. Early reports of successful assessments made during field training are encouraging and come from assessment contact points at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Fort Benning, Georgia; and Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Let's Do It. Most worthwhile efforts require the confidence of the participants to succeed. Quantitative assessment represents a venture into the unknown for many who view leadership as an art. In addition, the field wrestles with traditional suspicions, skepticism and doubts about structured assessment capabilities. Assessment analysts refer to this as the "I've been assessing soldiers for 20 years" dilemma.

Of course, these same concerns surfaced among senior executives in the private sector but ceased to be an issue when assessment–based personnel decisions prevailed in the courts. Unlike personnel decisions in the private sector, most selection decisions in the Army can be challenged and, if necessary, resolved in administrative appeal channels designed to enhance fairness. Thus, the Army is somewhat insu-

lated from the need for objectivity as an immediate response to civil liability. An appreciation for assessment technology, then, will develop slowly and for different reasons than those of the private sector.

Given that structured assessment delivers accurate information about abilities and given that the Army needs such information to select and develop its leadership, why is the use of assessment techniques not more widespread? The answer is that structured assessment is burgeoning as a tool for the Army, as well as other Department of Defense services and agencies. Several US Navy and US Air Force agencies are in close contact with CAL and view the Army as something of a team leader in assessment as it relates to military leadership. The US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, has a leadership assessment elective in place. All services' flag officers are offered the opportunity to attend an assessment center run by the Center for Creative Leadership, a well–respected agency dedicated to leader development.

The systems in place for selecting and developing leaders are effective. But this is clearly not a case of "perfection is the enemy of good enough." Selecting and developing future leaders are enormous responsibilities for commanders and trainers, worthy of our very best efforts. Let us put away the viewgraph transparency that bemoans the proliferation of managers in a leaders' profession. Find the leaders, and put them to work. **MR**

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BOOK REVIEWS

The first six reviews in this month's Book Review section are by members of the Center for Army Leadership, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Although the books were not originally published within the last two years, they are considered excellent reading choices in the area of leadership.—Editor.

DEFEAT INTO VICTORY by Field Marshal Viscount Slim. 576 pages. Papermac, London. (Distributed by Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York.) 1987. $9.95. **SLIM: The Standardbearer** by Ronald Lewin. 368 pages. A. A. Johnston, United Kingdom. (Distributed

by State Mutual Book & Periodical Service, Ltd., New York.) 1988. $40.00 paperback.

The US Army's leadership doctrine (US Army Field Manual [FM] 22–103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*) defines senior–level leadership as "the art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the conditions for sustained organizational success to achieve the desired result." In the person of Field Marshal Sir William J. Slim of the British army, we have a superb soldier who exemplifies leadership and command at senior levels.

Although not as well known as his contemporary, Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, Slim was at the least Montgomery's equal in exercising senior leadership and command. While Montgomery made his name defeating German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and went on to command center stage in Western Europe in 1943 to 1945, Slim made his mark in the China–Burma–India (CBI) Theater, a relative side show in World War II. The conditions under which Slim directed the 14th Army in defeat of the Japanese in Burma, however, were far more arduous than any Montgomery faced.

Two accounts of Slim's leadership provide perspectives on what made him so successful: *Slim* is a biography covering Slim's entire life; *Defeat Into Victory* is Slim's own account of the Burma Campaign from 1942 to 1945. *Slim* covers Slim's career and his development as a leader up to the point where *Defeat Into Victory* begins with his arrival in India in 1942 and his involvement in the near disastrous retreat of the British army from Burma. In its discussion of Slim's leadership in the CBI Theater, however, *Slim* draws heavily on *Defeat Into Victory* which is the more useful in examining Slim during the critical 1942 to 1945 period in Burma.

What can we learn from examining Slim's leadership? FM 22–103 states that successful senior leaders and commanders must establish a clear vision, communicate it and be tough enough to implement it. In the Burma Campaign, Slim provides a case study on successful senior leadership. In 1942, the British army had been pushed out of Burma and was demoralized, ill–equipped, understrength, disease–ridden and defeated. By 1945, it had retaken all of Burma, defeated the Japanese army and was one of the best fighting forces in the world. The transformation that occurred was largely due to Slim's leadership, and he did exactly what the doctrine says a senior leader must do.

First, Slim had a *clear vision* of what needed to be accomplished. His objective was clear: to defeat the Japanese army in Burma. Slim notes in *Defeat Into Victory* that when he took over 14th Army in October 1943, he had problems—supply, health and morale. Slim went about improving all three as he rebuilt the 14th Army. In his analysis of the foundations of morale, Slim articulates his vision as threefold—spiritual, intellectual and material.

Second, Slim was a master at *communicating* his vision to his soldiers. His method was very simple: direct communication with the soldiers themselves through informal talks and contacts. Slim says only two things are necessary—to know what you are talking about and to believe in yourself. The chapter in *Defeat Into Victory* where Slim discusses lay-

ing foundations for improving morale is practically a text on how it should be done.

Third, Slim certainly was *tough enough to implement* his vision and achieve the desired result. His training methods, as well as the manner in which he rebuilt his army logistically, were particularly effective in revitalizing a defeated force. In executing his plans, Slim also proved himself tough enough to adopt innovative plans with some risk involved. His description of the final battles against the Japanese in Burma is a veritable cliff–hanger, with the final outcome in some doubt until the end.

No better example of an outstanding senior leader can be found than Slim. *Defeat Into Victory* details his leadership. *Slim* provides another perspective and puts his command of the 14th Army in the context of his achievements. Both books would make significant additions to the military professional's library.

LTC William A. Knowlton Jr., *USA,*
Center for Army Leadership, USACGSC

WHY LEADERS CAN'T LEAD: The Unconscious Conspiracy Continues by Warren Bennis. 160 pages. Jossey–Bass Pubs., Inc., San Francisco, CA. 1989. $19.95.

In an earlier work, *The Unconscious Conspiracy,* Warren Bennis describes the obstacles to leadership in modern organizations and our society. Unfortunately, these obstacles are now worse.

In his latest, very readable work, Bennis documents and links societal changes to the problems facing anyone who seeks to be in charge of an organization. He paints a bleak picture of our society's slide toward a "bottom–line obsession." The quest for power, status and profits has resulted in a greedy and self–centered nation.

There is good news. Considering the obstacles with which aspiring leaders must contend, Bennis has sound recommendations to overcome both the individual and organizational barriers to better leadership. Although Bennis does not deal specifically with military leadership, there is sufficient detail for the military leader to link the implications of his findings to the military culture as a subset of our society. This book belongs on the shelf of every American as an accurate assessment of what our society has become.

MAJ Mark J. Lavin, *USA,*
Center for Army Leadership, USACGSC

THE LAST HERO: Wild Bill Donovan by Anthony Cave Brown. 836 pages. Times Books, Inc., New York. 1982. $24.95.

This biography of Major General William J. Donovan—superb combat leader, presidential emis-

sary and spy master—briefly covers his early life and emergence from World War I as one of the United States' most decorated heroes. Donovan experienced the fighting and dying of the trenches as both battalion and regimental commander of the 69th Infantry, 42d Infantry Division.

As significant and exemplary as Donovan's early exploits were, they are not the major theme of this book. The focus is on World War II which, at the outset, found the United States facing a fight for survival with no coordinated system for intelligence operations. President Franklin D. Roosevelt realized that waging modern war involved using all means—political, economic, communications and propaganda—in addition to the battlefront war. This war demanded a central organization to gather and analyze information and conduct secret activities to further national aims.

Roosevelt tasked Donovan to establish the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the first US agency responsible for coordinating intelligence activities. This monumental undertaking was guided by a vision shared by Donovan and Roosevelt (though sometimes lukewarmly by Roosevelt), but it was an undertaking fought against and resisted by the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the military and others. As a senior leader, Donovan's lasting contribution is apparent. By force of personality and will power, he overcame national reluctance and persistent opposition to create the organization to meet this need.

The OSS' contribution to securing war objectives is detailed in interesting and exciting chapters. Each operation is revealed through behind-the-scenes information meticulously researched from Donovan's personal files and official records. The accounts of the problems encountered are fascinating, yet illustrative of how unprepared the United States was to deal with international intrigue, hidden agendas, uncertain measures of success and, all too often, unstable allies.

To form the OSS, Donovan gathered a disparate crew of businessmen, writers, educators and military. They were neither alike nor compatible, but they shared Donovan's enthusiasm and developed his intense patriotism and belief in the mission. This dynamism was forged by Donovan's treatment of his people. He cared for them, supported them and shared their hardships. As a result, they mirrored his commitment, loyalty and desire for action. This intense identification with Donovan's values and goals enabled his novice spys to produce glorious successes and weather spectacular failures.

Donovan clearly left his mark on the US intelligence and military communities. This influence is still felt in the OSS successor, the Central Intelli-

gence Agency; in New York's 42d Infantry Division; and in the Special Forces and other US units. Today's officers, facing new missions and a new century, have an outstanding model in Wild Bill Donovan.

MAJ Daniel V. Wright, USA,
Center for Army Leadership, USACGSC

THIS KIND OF WAR: A Study of Unpreparedness by T. R. Fehrenbach. 768 pages. Bantam Books, Inc., New York. 1991. $5.95.

The subtitle of this book issues a warning to all military professionals who may have to fight in future "limited wars." T. R. Fehrenbach's seminal work on the Korean conflict is worthy to be reread by all soldiers to obtain the lessons learned that were paid for in American blood.

This authoritative work is based on the personal narratives of those who fought in Korea, supplemented by media sources, official records and operations reports. The book is very easy to read. Written shortly after the end of the Korean War when memories were fresh and emotions strong, it begins in prewar Seoul and runs through the interminable negotiations at Panmunjom.

As US Army Field Manual 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, states, "The key to maintaining leadership perspective is sustaining the ability to look beyond peacetime concerns. This is the essence of being a warrior." Today, commanders and staffs often find they have more demands to cope with than they have the time or resources to deal with the demands. It is easy to be consumed with peacetime bureaucratic concerns and forget the organization exists to fight in war. Everyone has heard repeatedly that you are "to train as you will fight" and that "you will go to war with what you have." Fehrenbach's book provides historical examples of what happens when the commander is not permitted to focus on training for war.

Take the case of Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Mott, commanding the 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry, on 25 July 1950. He was promised six weeks of training in Japan; instead, he found himself and his battalion on the front line at Chinju. "In their ranks were four hundred brand-new recruits. Their newly issued rifles were not zeroed; their mortars were yet untest-fired; their new machine guns oozed cosmoline." The next day, Mott's battalion was routed by large enveloping forces, leaving more than 300 dead and 100 prisoners.

One of the superb aspects of the book is the author's ability to take the reader through the savage fighting experienced by the soldiers and, within a few pages, explain the big "strategic" picture. This allows the reader to understand what has happened

without becoming enmeshed in operational minutia. The book also has numerous maps and pictures to enhance the reader's comprehension. Throughout the book, Fehrenbach remains candid. He objectively reports leadership mistakes, as well as successes. This is the strength of his writing.

Only our profession requires us to kill what we have to accomplish the mission. We should learn from the mistakes of those who went before us so that we might minimize the number of our soldiers who may die in the next "police action."

LTC Terry Morrison, *USA*,
Center for Army Leadership, USACGSC

THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE: How to Get Extraordinary Things Done in Organizations by James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner. 362 pages. Jossey–Bass Pubs., Inc., San Francisco, CA. 1987. $18.70.

Few books by nonmilitary authors deal with the topic of leadership in a manner similar to that espoused in US Army doctrine. Some are too academic; others have a focus too narrow to be useful. Refreshingly, this is not true of *The Leadership Challenge*.

Pooling their expertise, James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner have produced a book that is full of examples of leadership and specific recommendations for action. They examine the experiences of more than 500 managers at various levels. Their analyses of the combined successes of these executives yield sets of practices and behaviors that any leader could use. Using a particularly upbeat tone, Kouzes and Posner detail the executives' various successes in testimony to the specific leadership trait they are discussing at the moment.

Deeply steeped in human resources development backgrounds, Kouzes and Posner focus on dynamic behavioral skills and techniques used by successful leaders. They theorize that all successful leaders employ five fundamental practices: challenge the process, inspire a shared vision, enable others to act, model the way and encourage the heart.

The authors give specific details of the five fundamental practices. Their format is especially helpful in portraying these practices. Each section begins with a short summary of the particular principle and is followed by a two–chapter presentation of the ideas that elaborate and support the principle. The section concludes with recommendations for putting each practice and specific behavior into use.

The discerning military reader will see the similarity of these practices to the tenets of our current leadership theories. It is refreshing to see that contemporary Army leadership principles which have been proven to work in a variety of situations are also accepted in the business world.

Because *The Leadership Challenge* is written for a broad business audience, not as a military primer, it presents two relatively minor distractions to the military reader. First, since the examples presented throughout the book are from the personal best of the managers involved in the study, there is a certain repetitive cheerleading in the narrative. After a few chapters, this becomes monotonous. Second, it is necessary to translate the civilian "verbiage" to that of the military to relate the two ideas. As an example, "model the way" certainly seems to be the equivalent of the Army's "lead by example."

I enjoyed *The Leadership Challenge*. It is an excellent leadership summation work with specific ideas for a leader at any level and should be added to one's leadership library.

LTC Stephen O. Whitworth, *USA*,
Center for Army Leadership, USACGSC

THE CHALLENGE OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP. Edited by Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown. 167 pages. Pergamon–Brassey's (US), Inc., McLean, VA. 1989. $32.00 clothbound. $14.95 paperback.

As a credible examination of the various aspects of senior–level leadership, this book provides the reader with a compilation of comments and ideas from a myriad of educators and senior–level leaders. At a time when leadership under current military doctrine is making the difference on the battlefield in the Middle East, it is refreshing to read a book that reflects the need for our current military leadership doctrine.

There is a wide range of offerings. Retired Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer Jr. gives introductory comments on the necessity of senior leaders adjusting "their leadership styles to the demands of a high–tech battlefield and the legitimate expectations of today's generation of soldiers." The final reading contains Donald Bletz' suggestions on what the "Modern Major General" should look like.

The book reinforces what is preached at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, concerning the requirements of senior leadership on the AirLand battlefield of tomorrow. If we are to succeed in such confrontations where technology will devastate and destroy to degrees that far exceed those of past battlefields, then leaders must control such technological use. They must also prepare the junior leadership to confront the dynamics of these proposed battlefields.

The guidance in US Army Field Manual 22–103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, is to push for initiative and risk–taking by our younger leaders. But are we merely paying lip service to such suggestions? Ulmer states that such ideas "may be more dif-

ficult to put into place than the operational doctrine itself." General Omar N. Bradley in "On Leadership" states that "a leader should encourage the members of his staff to speak up if they think the commander is wrong. He should invite constructive criticism." Doctrine supports this view. But, again, are we practicing what we preach?

In discussing the World War II decentralization concept of the Germans' *Auftragstaktik*, John Nelsen states that "the strongest psychological impediment to Auftragstaktik in the U.S. Army is fear on the part of the commander that his subordinates' mistakes resulting from their loosened rein would make the command look bad and thus jeopardize the commander's own success. Over control . . . is the reflex of the commander's own career insecurity."

To operate at the senior level requires certain skills not previously required for junior-leader positions. Quoting Carl von Clausewitz, Mitchell Zais writes, "Every level of command has its own intellectual standard; its own prerequisites for fame and honor. . . . There are commanders-in-chief who could not have led a cavalry regiment with distinction, and cavalry commanders who could not have led armies."

Appropriately, the book includes two case studies that reflect senior leadership as it should be—doctrine-oriented and proven effective. Thomas Stone describes the successful leadership of General William Hood Simpson and the US Ninth Army during World War II: "General Simpson's genius lay in his charismatic manner, his command presence, his ability to listen, his unfailing use of his staff to check things out before making decisions, and his way of making all hands feel that they were important to him and the Army. . . ."

In "Napoleon on the Art of Command," Jay Luvaas cites Napoleon's theme on leadership: "[We] should read and meditate about the wars of the Great Captains; that is the only way to study war." For young leaders who seek a successful military career in peace and in war, *The Challenge of Military Leadership* is an excellent source for study.

LTC Dave Smith, USA,
Center for Army Leadership, USACGSC

BY WAY OF DECEPTION: The Making and Unmaking of a MOSSAD Officer by Victor Ostrovsky and Claire Hoy. 371 pages. St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York. 1990. $22.95.

There is no wonder that the Israeli government did not want this book to be published. Unless this book is a fabulous piece of disinformation, it is an indictment of a government that is supposed to be "friends" with the United States. While the reali-

ties of politics are that every nation looks after its own national interests, the Israelis are accused of doing so at the expense of their friends. What is so interesting is that the accusations come from a former Israeli Mossad agent which lends an air of credibility that cannot be easily ignored.

Victor Ostrovsky and Claire Hoy give a detailed account of Ostrovsky's experiences inside an organization that has been as big a mystery to Israelis as it has been to foreigners. The name "Mossad" conjures notions of superspies and slick operations. Ostrovsky gives a new view of an organization that, in turn, gives meaning to the saying that "power corrupts." His view of the organization with which he dealt for four years shows the seamy side of a powerful clique not responsible to the state it serves and in which the ends always justify the means.

Ostrovsky purportedly was recruited and served for a brief period of time within the Mossad. His experiences in training and as a "case officer" (operative) are cited in relatively detailed accounts. His purpose in writing this book is to uncover the licensed corruption that he saw and fell victim to during his service with the Mossad. Power struggles, personal gain and botched operations combined to disillusion Ostrovsky who is a self-admitted Zionist.

Many of the anecdotes (such as the Jonathan J. Pollard spy case) are easy to cross reference from press accounts since dates, times and even people are named, but many are left to speculation. If his purpose is to bring attention to the alleged misconduct of the Israeli intelligence service, he has done so in the only way possible. The controversy surrounding this book and the information it contains will have far-reaching consequences not only for the Mossad but also for the state of Israel and countries with which it does business.

This is an extremely interesting book which, if true, holds cautions for dealing with Israel, a country that has had close ties to the United States for years. By *Way of Deception* provides an interesting insight into how the Israelis perceive the world and the threats to their national interests at the lowest levels. For those interested in the Middle East, this book is excellent.

MAJ Edwin L. Kennedy Jr., USA,
Center for Army Tactics, USACGSC

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   c. DOD Civilian

   d. Retired military

   e. Other (explain)_____

2. If Active/Reserve, what is your rank?

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3. Fill in appropriate blanks.

Branch____ Alternate specialty____

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4. What is your current military assignment level?

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b. Line

c. Staff

d. Student

e. School staff/faculty

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NCOs	a	b	c
Retired military	a	b	c
Federal employees	a	b	c
Civilians	a	b	c

6. How many issues of *Military Review* have you read in the past year?

a. None   b. 1–3   c. 4–6

d. 7–9   e. 10–12

If you answered "None," you can stop here. Thank you for your time. Please fold and staple this entire survey in accordance with the editor's instructions above. If you answered other than "None," please continue the survey.

7. Are you a *Military Review* paid subscriber?

   a. yes (go to question 9)   b. no

8. How do you usually receive a copy of *Military Review?* Circle only one.

   a. Mailed directly to my office

   b. Through office distribution

   c. From friends

   d. Read it in the library

   e. Read it in the day room

   f. Other (specify)_____

9. How soon after publication do you read *Military Review?* ____

   a. The same month

b. One month later

c. Two months later

d. Three or more months later

10. How much of each issue do you read?

   a. All of it

   b. Most of it

   c. Some of it

11. After reading *Military Review*, what do you do with it?

   a. Route it through distribution

   b. Pass it on to someone else

   c. Keep parts or all of it for reference

   d. Leave it in the day room/library

   e. Throw it away

   f. Other (specify)_____

12. How often, within the past year, have you used *Military Review* for reference?

   a. Frequently

   b. Sometimes

   c. Seldom

   d. Never

13. How often do you read the following sections in *Military Review?* (a. frequently; b. sometimes; c. never)

Articles	a	b	c
Letters	a	b	c
Book Reviews	a	b	c
From the Editor	a	b	c
Insights	a	b	c
Inside back cover	a	b	c
Summaries	a	b	c

14. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (a. strongly agree; b. agree; c. undecided; d. disagree; e. strongly disagree)

Military Review:

is interesting	a	b	c	d	e
is informative	a	b	c	d	e
has a pleasing appearance	a	b	c	d	e

increases my professional knowl-
edge   a b c d e

is stimulating   a b c d e

authors are experts in their fields
                a b c d e

is easy to read   a b c d e

15. Overall, how do you rate *Military Review's* art, illustrations and photography?

    a. They add a great deal

    b. They make it somewhat better

    c. They should be used less

    d. They should not be used

    e. No opinion

16. The length of the articles is:

    a. About right

    b. Too long

    c. Too short

17. The following topics have been discussed in *Military Review*. For each, would you like to see **a.** more coverage; **b.** about the same amount of coverage; **c.** less coverage?

Staff operations	a b c
Leadership	a b c
AirLand Battle	a b c
Operational art	a b c
Low–intensity conflict/ terrorism/SOF	a b c
Heavy/light forces/operations	a b c
Psychological operations	a b c

Civil–military operations	a b c
Professional military values	a b c
Training developments	a b c
Personnel administration	a b c
Professional ethics	a b c
Reserve role in Total Force	a b c
Electronic warfare/intel/deception	a b c
NBC operations	a b c
Command and control	a b c
Resource management	a b c
Human element of war	a b c
Force development	a b c
Strategic planning and mobility	a b c
Combat service support	a b c
Tactics of US forces	a b c
Tactics of Soviet forces	a b c
Weapon systems	a b c
Technological developments	a b c
Joint and combined operations	a b c
NATO planning and operations	a b c
Soviet threat and US security	a b c
US military posture and regional assessment	a b c
Foreign military affairs	a b c
Military history	a b c
Simulations/simulators/training development	a b c
Command	a b c

Education	a b c
Doctrine development	a b c

18. What other subjects would you like to see discussed in *Military Review*?

_____

_____

19. What other professional military journals do you read?

    a. *Army*

    b. *Airpower Journal*

    c. *Center for Army Lessons Learned Bulletin*

    d. *Army Trainer*

    e. *Marine Corps Gazette*

    f. *Foreign Affairs*

    g. *Naval Institute Proceedings*

    h. *Armed Forces Journal Intl*

    i. *Air Force*

    j. Branch journals or other publications (specify)_____ .

    k. Other (specify)_____

_____

20. If you do not subscribe to *Military Review*, what would cause you to?

_____

_____

**THANK YOU
FOR YOUR TIME
AND INPUT**

FOLD TWICE AND TAPE CLOSED   FOLD TWICE AND TAPE CLOSED

RETURN
THROUGH
POST MAIL
ROOM
OR PLACE
STAMP HERE

**Commandant
US Army Command and General Staff College
Military Review, Funston Hall
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027–6910**

New Hall of Fame
HONOREES

One of the many functions of the US Army's history program is to commemorate the achievements of units and individuals from the past. Doing so develops loyalty and esprit de corps within the US Army. Likewise, memorializing individuals reveals the ideals they personify and inspires us to emulate their actions.

The Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has been instrumental in developing Army leadership since its establishment. Many CGSC graduates have played significant roles in the nation's history. In 1970, CGSC instituted a program to commemorate such leaders through the Memorial Hall of Fame Association. The Hall of Fame currently has members, including Robert E. Lee, William T. Sherman, Matthew B. Ridgway, Dwight D. Eisenhower and Mark W. Clark. This year's inductees are General Creighton W. Abrams and Lieutenant General Clarence R. Huebner.

Abrams, a 1936 graduate of the US Military Academy, is noted for a long and distinguished career that included service during World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. By 1942, he was a lieutenant colonel commanding the 37th Tank Battalion as it dashed across France and relieved the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne. After World War II, Abrams held key command and staff positions in the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3d Armored Division and V Corps. He attended CGSC in 1949. He may be best known as commander of the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, from 1968 to 1972, and as the chief of staff of the Army from 1972 until his death in 1974. His skillful command of forces in Vietnam during the tumultuous years of the US withdrawal and his successful leadership of an Army faced with racial problems and an identity crisis are indicative of the leadership qualities he demonstrated throughout his career.

Huebner is probably best known as the commander of the 1st Infantry Division—the "Big Red One"—during World War II. He enlisted in the Regular Army in 1910 and served as a private, corporal, sergeant, quartermaster sergeant and regimental supply sergeant before being commissioned as a second lieutenant in November 1916. Huebner's service in World War I is studded with success and bravery. He commanded an infantry company in the 1st Division at Beaumont, Cantigny, Aisne-Marne, Saint-Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne. He was twice wounded in action. Later, in 1924, he attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth and served on its faculty in 1929. In 1943, he assumed command of the 1st Infantry Division in North Africa. He led the "Big Red One" in the invasion at Normandy, the breakout at Saint-Lô, the repulsion of the German counteroffensive at Mortain, and the Allied offensives at Aachen and the Huertgen Forest. He ended the war as commander of V Corps. His final assignment before retirement was as commander, US Army, Europe.

This year's ceremony is scheduled for 7 May 1991 at CGSC. In selecting Abrams and Huebner, the Hall of Fame Board continues to maintain its high standards in honoring great leaders whose exemplary service has benefited the Army and reflected favorably on Fort Leavenworth.

General Creighton W. Abrams

Lieutenant General Clarence R. Huebner