


AD-A252 792



Military Review

The Professional Journal of the United States Army

JUNE 1992





Lieutenant General
Leonard A. Whitart III
Commandant, USACGSC

Major General
John E. Miller
Deputy Commandant, USACGSC

Military Review Staff
Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Rausch
Editor in Chief

Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Rhodes

Major General Thomas E. Eggers

Managing Editor

Major Bruce McVing

Editor, Latin American Editions

Patricia H. Whitten

Production Editor

Mr. D. M. Giangreco

Design Editor

Patricia L. Dunn

Books & Features Editor

Mr. Charles A. Martinson III

Art and Design

Consulting Editors

Colonel Marco A. Felicio da Silva

Brazilian Army, Brazilian Edition

Major Eduardo Aldunate

Chilean Army, Spanish Edition

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Carl E. Wingo

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

Patricia P. Hickerson

Brigadier General, United States Army

The Adjutant General

The Mission of MILITARY REVIEW is to provide a forum for the open exchange of ideas on military affairs; to focus on concepts, doctrine and warfighting at the tactical and operational levels of war; and to support the education, training, doctrine development and integration missions of the Combined Arms Command and the Command and General Staff College.

Professional Bulletin 100-80, MILITARY REVIEW, appears monthly in English, bimonthly in Spanish and quarterly in Portuguese. Second-class postage paid at Leesville, VA 22081-0001 and additional entry offices. This publication presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official US Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official US Army publications. MILITARY REVIEW reserves the right to edit material. Basis of official distribution is one per general officer and one per five field grade officers of the Active Army, and one per headquarters (battalion and higher) of the Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve. MILITARY REVIEW is available on microfilm from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI 48106, and is indexed by the PADS (Public Affairs Information Service) Bulletin. Postmaster: Send change of address information to MILITARY REVIEW, Leesville, VA 22081-0001. Telephone: (703) 244-6000 or AF 220-6042; Subscriptions: (913) 394-6130.

MILITARY REVIEW, ISSN 0095-5519

Military Review

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Prepared by

US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

VOLUME LXXI - JUNE 1991 - NO 6


Professional Bulletin 100-81-6

CONTENTS

- 2 The Strategic Employment of Special Operations Forces**
by General Carl W. Stiner, US Army
- 14 Today's Air Commandos: Air Force Special Operations Command**
by Major General Thomas E. Eggers, US Air Force
- 22 US Strategy and the Changing LIC Threat**
by Steven Metz
- 30 The Case for Separating Civic Actions From Military Operations in LIC**
by Regina Gaillard
- 42 A Time to Build: US Policy for Latin America and the Caribbean**
by Colonel P. Wayne Gosnell, Army National Guard
- 51 Emerging Doctrine for LIC**
by Lieutenant Colonel John B. Hunt, US Army, Retired
- 61 Developing a Drug War Strategy: Lessons From Operation Blast Furnace**
by Lieutenant Colonel John T. Fishel, US Army Reserve
- 70 The Army Dental Corps' Role in Nation Assistance**
by Lieutenant Colonel George L. Christensen, US Army
- 80 Insights: Observations on the Theory of LIC and Violence in Latin America**
by Major Eduardo Aldunate, Chilean Army
- 87 WW II Almanac: June 1941** by Samuel J. Lewis
Operation Barbarossa and the Initial Period of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War
by Colonel David M. Glantz, US Army
- 88 Letters**
- 92 Book Reviews** contemporary reading for the professional

DA Pamphlet 600-32 mentioned on page 1 of our May 1991 issue is scheduled for July 1991 publication as DA Pamphlet 600-32, *Leader Development for the Total Army: The Enduring Legacy*.

DISCLAIMER NOTICE



THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST
QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY
FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED
A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF
PAGES WHICH DO NOT
REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

Low-Intensity Conflict: Gearing for the Long Haul

This is the seventh issue of *Military Review* in the last three years covering low-intensity conflict (LIC), special and contingency operations or related themes. The journal has also published many separate articles related to these same subjects to emphasize the LIC component of such wide-ranging themes as division operations, AirLand Battle-Future (now AirLand Operations) and strategy.

As evidenced by the steady flow of LIC-related submissions to *Military Review*, professionals from all corners of the Army are expressing continued and, in some cases, renewed interest in the lower end of the operational continuum. This is what General Frederick F. Woerner, former US Southern Command commander in chief (CINC), called "high-probability conflict." Whether this discussion reflects the post-Cold War Army seeking its *raison d'être* or a realization that even a *Desert Storm* has its LIC component, we will leave to *Military Review's* audience. Regardless, this issue is intended to continue the debate about proper roles and missions for the Army of the 1990s.

The author of our lead article, General Carl F. Stiner, CINC, US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), concedes that LIC is the "particular province of SOF" but emphasizes that SOF "constitutes a low-cost, but exceptionally effective, force whose expertise and flexibility are applicable to both conventional and unconventional conflict." Next, Air Force Special Operations Command commander Major General Thomas E. Eggers traces the lineage of SOCOM's air arm and the Air Force's newest major command from General "Hap" Arnold's 1st Air Commando Group in World War II. He recalls the growing pains of Son Tay and Desert One and the success in Operation *Just Cause* to highlight the growing requirements for specialized airlift and fire support in future warfare.

Next, Steven Metz prescribes three imperatives for shaping LIC doctrine in the postcontainment strategic environment and concludes that the United States must "integratedly and directly act . . . when vital global balances are truly threatened by LIC." A sidebar to Metz' article and to other concerns surrounding the issue is the establishment of the Low-Intensity Conflict Proponencies Directorate in the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The new directorate will focus its doctrine-writing effort in the LIC, counterterrorism and counterdrug arenas.

While terrorist acts and counterdrug operations capture newspaper headlines and public attention, much of the real work of fostering democracy in developing countries rests in nation assistance, internal development, and humanitarian and disaster assistance. Colonel P. Wayne Gosnell suggests the basis for an integrated approach to nation assistance, and Regina Gaillard builds a thoughtful case for "delinking" civic action from counterinsurgency operations, citing the confusion that often results from too close a relationship.

The common thread that runs through several articles and especially the Insights essay by Major Eduardo Aldunate, Chilean Army, is that, over the long run, purely military, force-oriented solutions, regardless of how operationally successful, will be doomed. Ultimately, the military force will be called home and whether real progress has been made will be the result of the total range of work done from the beginning. In his white paper, *A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond*, Chief of Staff of the Army General Carl E. Vuono acknowledged: "We must not forget that the causes of low-intensity conflict generally are political and economic rather than military. Although the military aspects may be crucial, the solutions to low-intensity conflict go far beyond the military dimension."

Military Review is dedicated to providing a forum for promoting an understanding of LIC in all of its forms. Only this understanding can save the Army from a short-term strategy of "fixing things" in favor of using its resources to set the conditions in which democracy can flourish.

SFR

The Strategic Employment of SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Within the last 18 months, US forces have been called to the battlefield twice in remarkably different regions and circumstances. In both, special operations forces (SOF) played a vital role. Commander in chief, US Special Operations Command, General Carl W. Stiner discusses the mission requirements and capabilities of SOF, its contributions to Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and the world environment that will likely increase SOF use in both war and peace.



General Carl W. Stiner, US Army

We could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely, and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges.

President George Bush, 2 August 1990

SINCE December 1989, the United States has fought in two major combat operations where the world has seen special operations forces (SOF) operating in conjunction with conventional forces to bring about quick and credible victories. More than 4,000 SOF personnel were committed in Panama during Operation Just Cause, and more than 9,000 were employed during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. When used properly and when synchronized with other battlefield assets, SOF is a combat multiplier that offers commanders a capability that will extend their vision of the battlefield, increase their flexibility and enhance their initiative.

The value of SOF goes well beyond its role in combat. The strategic capabilities of our nation's SOF across the operational continuum have been demonstrated daily during the past year. During Fiscal Year (FY) 1990 alone, the SOF of the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), composed of special operations, psychological operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) forces from the Army, Navy and Air Force, deployed 485 training teams to 35 different countries around the world. The trend remains the same for this FY. Many of these deployments for training provided a significant and needed presence in areas where no permanent US military forces are stationed. For example, in Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, more than 2,000 SOF are employed, working to relieve the miserable conditions of the Kurdish refugees.

In addition to the SOF that remains employed to support Desert Storm, USSOCOM has forces employed in 32 different countries in every region of the world. These soldiers, sailors and airmen are quiet, professional instruments of US policy. They are forward employed, performing their respective missions every day of the year, from the grass-roots level—where the problems

are—to the ambassadorial level, giving advice, providing assistance and coordinating requirements, all in support of US interests.

For example, USSOCOM's special operations, PSYOP and CA forces are providing assistance and training to host nation forces and

During FY 1990 alone, the SOF of USSOCOM, composed of special operations, psychological operations and Civil Affairs forces from the Army, Navy and Air Force, deployed 485 training teams to 35 different countries around the world. . . . [Many] deployments for training provided a . . . needed presence in areas where no permanent US military forces are stationed.

officials. They help build schoolhouses, train doctors and medical officials in disease prevention and child health care, support our nation's fight to combat the scourge of drugs and assist in host nation's foreign internal defense activities through military-to-military training programs. At the same time, our counterterrorist forces are postured every day of the year to deal with any terrorist threat that may erupt.

SOF is ideally suited to support our nation's national security strategy in today's complex, interdependent, multipolar world. Leaders of every service at every level must be familiar with the roles and capabilities SOF provides.

The Geopolitical Environment

The mere absence of war is not peace.

John F. Kennedy, 1963

In concert with other elements of US strategy, SOF can, and should, be an effective instrument for achieving US objectives around the world. SOF has an essential role to play in responding to the emerging national security challenges that will confront the United States into the next century.

The warming relations between the United States and the Soviet Union should permit us to

Military Review USACGSC
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-0910

\$4.00

MILITARY REVIEW

Handwritten notes and markings on the right margin, including a large 'H' and 'J' and the word 'Codes'.

Handwritten markings, including 'A-1' and a circled '1'.

focus our attention on the complex conditions that continue to cause problems in Third World, underdeveloped countries. The euphoria induced by improved relations with the Soviet

The Third World has fragmented and should no longer be referred to as a unitary entity. There are considerable differences among the poor countries of Asia, the debt-laden nations of Latin America and the often forgotten continent of Africa. No universal solution is valid for the problems of such different countries.

Union and the accompanying reduced risk of nuclear warfare should not obscure our view of the following realities:

- There are now more significant players on the game board of international politics than ever before. New combinations of power are developing. Old international patterns have crumbled.
- There is increased global interdependence in economic, environmental, political and information issues.
- The problems of rising political and economic expectations are even more pronounced among Third World countries now that Soviet power is more diffuse.
- The Third World has fragmented and should no longer be referred to as a unitary entity. There are considerable differences among the poor countries of Asia, the debt-laden nations of Latin America and the often forgotten continent of Africa. No universal solution is valid for the problems of such different countries.

All of these factors make the issue of strategic balance far more dynamic than it has been for more than 40 years. In addition, little has been done to relieve the complex and deplorable conditions that contribute to many of the problems in the Third World. Socioeconomic decline, the spread of religious fanaticism, political instability and resource shortages are ever-present.

Narcotrafficking continues to be an international dilemma that recognizes no borders and respects no government. Increasingly, drug cartels are joining in mutual support with Third World insurgent and terrorist groups to further destabilize Third World governments. Acts of terrorism, insurgency and subversion reflect the instability created with increasing nationalism and religious fanaticism.

The proliferation of powerful weapons of mass destruction and great lethality continues. As the gulf crisis has revealed, these weapons are now in the arsenals of Third World countries and in the hands of radical factions around the world. In every region of the world, one or more states will likely attempt to establish regional hegemony. This alone will challenge us for new approaches to solutions for protecting our interests.

Without a countervailing trend to point to, it appears the internal conflict and critical socioeconomic problems in the Third World will continue, at least at their present levels. It is probable that these dilemmas will expand in coming decades, with population growth and environmental degradation adding new pressures on weak economies and unstable political systems. As a consequence, it is certain that the impact of these geopolitical circumstances upon our national interests will compel the United States to engage directly or indirectly in these struggles.

From our viewpoint, it is in the Third World countries that problems are going to challenge the United States—from an economic standpoint, from a prestige standpoint, from a resolve standpoint and in terms of our credibility as a world leader. Therefore, we must focus on the early detection of potential crises and seek peaceful solutions yet, at the same time, maintain the capability to respond if peaceful solutions fail.

The United States can best do this by being attentive to opportunities to assist. Because of the importance of the military in most Third World countries, military-to-military relations will continue to provide the United States with the best opportunities for providing assistance.



7th Special Forces Group training in Honduras

SOF constitutes a low-cost, but exceptionally effective, force whose expertise and flexibility are applicable to both conventional and unconventional conflict. . . . CA and PSYOP, as well as SOF language skills and regional familiarity, enable SOF to make unique contributions toward protecting US interests across the operational continuum.

The Department of Defense must be prepared with appropriate forces to meet a wide variety of scenarios. SOF constitutes a low-cost, but exceptionally effective, force whose expertise and flexibility are applicable to both conventional and unconventional conflict. At the same time, related areas of specialization such as CA and PSYOP, as well as SOF language skills and regional familiarity, enable SOF to make unique contributions toward protecting US interests across the operational continuum. Because of its capabilities, SOF can also foster environments that help relieve the conditions that promote instability in so many Third World countries.

USSOCOM's Role in National Strategy

As we look to the future and adjust our national strategy to compensate for this changed threat, there are two military capabilities the United States must maintain. One is to deter and counter violence that may threaten the United States and its interests, no matter the location. The second is our ability to offer nation assistance.

USSOCOM's 42,600 special operations, PSYOP and CA forces are flexible strategic assets that provide these dual capabilities. Consequently, SOF must be forward employed to meet US national objectives and to best support each regional commander in chief's (CINC's) plans and programs.

The principal implication of this strategy is that USSOCOM's assigned forces, as well as the regional CINC's forward-employed SOF, must plan, train, organize and resource themselves for commitment to, and involvement in, the environment of low-intensity conflict. As Operations *Just Cause*, *Promote Liberty*, *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* have made clear, SOF has a critical role in mid- to high-intensity conflict as well. But it is clear where the focus must lie. To counter the types of violence we are most likely to face, mission emphasis must be on counterterrorism, counternarcotics, surgical direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense and PSYOP. Concurrently, the military contribution to nation assistance must be pursued through security assistance, humanitarian assistance and civic action.

The Versatility of SOF

First, break down the wall that has more or less come between special operations forces and the other parts of our military Second, educate the rest of the military—spread a recognition and understanding of what SOF does . . . and how important that it is done. . . . Last, integrate SOF efforts into the full spectrum of our military capabilities.

Admiral William J. Crowe Jr., 1986

A valuable attribute of SOF is its ability to conduct missions in three political/military settings: peacetime engagement, crisis response and regional conflict.

Peacetime Engagement. During the period of peacetime engagement, also referred to as peacetime competition, SOF is ideally suited to counteract violence and promote nation assistance. SOF can be employed directly or indirectly to counter terrorism, narcotics

As [recent] operations . . . have made clear, SOF has a critical role in mid- to high-intensity conflict as well. But . . . to counter the types of violence we are most likely to face, mission emphasis must be on counterterrorism, counternarcotics, surgical direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense and PSYOP.

trafficking, subversion or insurgencies, and to aid resistance fighters against repressive regimes consistent with the requirements of US national security policy and objectives.

In addition, SOF is particularly adept at nation assistance tasks that require cultural familiarity, linguistic skills and a long-term commitment. Characterized by small, flexible organizations with a wide range of specialized skills and area expertise, SOF provides numerous forms of training and assistance to emerging democracies. With tumultuous events presaging change in much of the world, coordinated nation assistance programs can advance the interests of the United States while assisting Third

World countries.

In most developing countries, there are discrete economic, social and security problems that affect both the quality of life and a government's ability to function. Helping a country meet the fundamental needs of its populace is the crux of any nation assistance effort. US participation in such initiatives often works best when it remains inconspicuous—a role for which SOF is particularly well-suited.

SOF also participates in the ongoing war against narcotics trafficking. USSOCOM is a supporting CINC in the Department of Defense counternarcotics effort. As such, it provides personnel and resources to assist US law enforcement agencies, operations support to regional CINCs, and training and assistance to host nation military and law enforcement personnel.

The primary focus of USSOCOM's forces in the counternarcotics effort has been in the US Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM's) area of responsibility and the US southwest border area under the US Army Forces Command's Joint Task Force 6 (FORSCOM/JTF-6). SOUTHCOM has the highest use of SOF in counternarcotics with its involvement in the Andean ridge countries. Additionally, SOUTHCOM has the most active overt peacetime PSYOP program (OP3) directed at combating narcotrafficking. FORSCOM/JTF-6 has established an effective record for SOF use in support of law enforcement agencies.

USSOCOM's FY 1990 contribution to the counternarcotics effort, shown in operating days/percentage change over the previous year's, includes:

Type Support	Total Days
Training US law enforcement agencies	233 (+60%)
Training foreign counternarcotics forces	1,053 (+82%)
Communications support to US Coast Guard	504 (+10%)

This information does not include SOF participation in combined military training or exercises in high narcotrafficking areas.



Navy SEALs during a recent training exercise.

In Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the US Central Command employed SOF to support its campaign plan. Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs were among the first forces employed in the theater of operations and provided coalition forces training in individual and small-unit skills.

The counternarcotics training and support missions include airlift and communications support, OP3 military training, riverine and small-boat training, medical training, SIGINT (signals intelligence) support, and communications equipment loans.

Crisis Response. SOF is also capable of conducting complex crisis response contingency operations on short notice with great precision. The high state of readiness of our surgical forces permits them to respond to a variety of crises, ranging from personnel recovery missions to supporting larger operations.

Conflict. At the middle and high end of the conflict continuum, SOF supports conventional forces by providing battlefield intelligence and economy-of-force capabilities to delay, disrupt or divert enemy forces through direct action, special reconnaissance or unconventional warfare. Thus, closely integrating SOF and conventional forces in peacetime training and during conflict situations must remain an essential element of US strategy. *Just Cause, Promote Liberty, Desert Shield and Desert Storm* have significantly demonstrated that when SOF and conventional

forces are employed together, our force potential and capability are maximized.

As we look to the future, USSOCOM has two paramount priorities. The first is to ensure through every means possible, the special operations, PSYOP and CA forces readiness we have are maintained at the highest possible state. This is essential if they are to be prepared to carry out US national policy.

The second priority, in coordination with the theater CINCs, is to ensure the most effective use of SOF as an essential instrument of national policy. SOF must be forward employed in problem countries to take advantage of its capabilities—training, advising and assisting.

There is a three-step process to ensure the best use of our nation's SOF. First, in conjunction with and in support of the theater CINCs and in coordination with appropriate organizations in the interagency arena, we have to determine upon which countries we must focus.

Second, we must examine each of these countries as part of a regional plan and, in coordination with the theater CINCs, develop foreign internal defense and nation assistance programs

tailored specifically for each country. SOF is a major player in these programs. As demonstrated throughout the world just this past year, SOF provides training and assistance programs through military-to-military contacts, communications and intelligence support, civic action and disaster assistance projects, and medical and engineer support. SOF expertise in PSYOP, when coordinated with the host nation, is used to counter hostile propaganda and disinformation. Such a coordinated information campaign

Just before the beginning of the ground war, SOF was inserted deep into Iraqi territory on strategic reconnaissance missions. The intelligence the SOF provided the tactical commanders was critical to the success of the ground tactical plan. In addition, direct action missions were planned and conducted to support the campaign plan.

is also used to emphasize what the host government is doing for its people and, in a subtle way, to give credit to the United States.

After a nation assistance program is successfully implemented, every effort must be made to turn the program over to host country agencies, complete with the necessary resources, thereby enhancing the government's legitimacy in its citizens' eyes. The nation assistance effort must be "owned" by both the citizens and the institutions of the host country.

To make a nation assistance program work, there must be a coordinated, focused interagency effort that respects the priorities established by the theater CINCs. Such a program must also ensure unity of effort by including all US government programs that apply to the region and are orchestrated toward common goals and objectives that have been established for a given country.

The third and final step in this SOF forward-employment process is to determine those countries in which a shooting situation, a takeover of

a US embassy or an insurgency is likely to arise. For those countries, we need to immediately establish the appropriate operational support infrastructure so that if the United States must commit forces at some point in the future, they do not go in unaided and blind.

SOF Support of the Combined Arms Team


SOF performs its missions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to influence deep, close and rear operations. SOF can no longer be placed in its own box or operational area on the battlefield, separate and distinct from other forces. Rather, SOF must be integrated into the campaign at every stage of planning and execution. SOF is a combat multiplier that, when integrated with conventional forces, can maximize force potential and capability.

In Panama, SOF was critical in providing the eyes and ears necessary for commanders to successfully neutralize 27 essential targets during the crucial, initial hours of *Just Cause*. In addition, Army and Air Force SOF worked together to secure critical bridges, communication sites and terrain to deny the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) access to them. An excellent example of this was the Rangers' airborne assault on Tocumen-Torrijos Airport during the early minutes of *Just Cause*. By securing this airfield, the Rangers eliminated enemy resistance, provided initial "on-the-ground" intelligence and prevented the PDF from interfering with future operations. Fire support for this mission consisted of an Air Force SOF AC-130 Spectre gunship and Army SOF AH-6 attack helicopters.

Navy SOF played a vital role in *Just Cause* as well. Navy SEALs (sea-air-land teams) and special boat units secured critical waterways and shore target areas to preclude PDF use.

These joint SOF operations were essential to prevent the PDF from sending reinforcing troops, ammunition and weapons to critical areas in the theater of operations, as well as to isolate the PDF leadership. Integrated with conventional forces, the SOF prevented the PDF from mounting effective resistance and contributed to

5th Special Forces Group instructs
Qatari soldiers during MOUT training
in Saudi Arabia, 26 January 1991.



With every coalition Arab battalion that went into battle in Desert Storm, there were Special Forces units with them. These were the same Special Forces units that had lived and trained with these coalition units since the beginning of Desert Shield. . . . They assisted these units with communications support, calling for close air support and, as necessary, coordinating combat support requirements.

the overall success of the combat operations.

In Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the US Central Command employed SOF to support its campaign plan. Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs were among the first forces employed in the theater of operations and provided coalition forces training in individual and small-unit skills. This training program focused on nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) skills, integrating joint and combined arms into tactical plans, land navigation, beach surveillance and reconnaissance, and close-air- support operations. Navy SEALs actively supported maritime embargo operations, conducted area reconnaissance operations and supported countermining warfare missions. In addition, the SOF was the primary trainer in reconstituting the Kuwaiti armed forces.

With every coalition Arab battalion that went into battle in Desert Storm, there were Spe-

cial Forces units with them. These were the same Special Forces units that had lived and trained with these coalition units since the beginning of Desert Shield in early August. They assisted these units with communications support, calling for close air support and, as necessary, coordinating combat support requirements. This role was critical for the successful command and control of the coalition forces.

Just before the beginning of the ground war, SOF was inserted deep into Iraqi territory on strategic reconnaissance missions. The intelligence the SOF provided the tactical commanders was critical to the success of the ground tactical plan. In addition, direct action missions were planned and conducted to support the campaign plan.

Although not normally considered an SOF mission, Army, Navy and Air Force SOF conducted all combat search-and-rescue missions



The most important modernization concept for the 1990s is for improved SOF mobility systems. SOF must have the operational capability to infiltrate and exfiltrate forces into and out of denied areas. . . . Neither a long-range SOF air exfiltration system nor a near-term program to acquire one exists today. The lack of this capability presents a severe shortfall to SOF mobility and hinders our capabilities.

for downed pilots in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. Of the four pilots rescued during *Desert Storm*, SOF rescued three of them, with the fourth being rescued by Kuwaiti resistance forces.

There are many reasons why *Just Cause*, *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* were so successful. Command and control arrangements, time to rehearse and prepare, quality troops and leaders from all services, and a thorough understanding of AirLand Battle doctrine and joint operations are a few of the reasons. However, integrating the SOF with conventional units maximized the force potential and capability of the forces employed in each of these operations.

For *Just Cause*, *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, the operational-level leadership from all of the services had an appreciation for what SOF could contribute to the campaign plan. The leaders understood the capabilities and the limitations of SOF for preparing the battlefield and gathering intelligence before hostilities and during each phase of the battle. As a result, SOF was successfully integrated into the planning, preparation and combat phases of each operation.

Modernization

USSOCOM continues to make progress in rapidly developing and implementing some much-needed capabilities for our nation's SOF. Our research and development efforts for improving the survivability of employed SOF teams is progressing satisfactorily. We plan to provide them with the Joint Advanced Special Operations Radio System (JASORS), a communications capability offering a low probability of interception or detection. We will ensure that JASORS is interoperable with all echelons of command as well as with the theater CINC's command, control and communications system.

The Special Operations Command Research, Analysis and Threat Evaluation System (SOC-RATES) is a real success story. SOCRATES encompasses the total intelligence support needs for SOF mission activities, to include computers, communications, and map- and imagery-handling equipment. This capability now exists at all USSOCOM component commands and many subordinate commands. We have also been sharing these capabilities with US Central Command in supporting its *Desert Storm* requirements. As a result, our nation's SOF and conventional forces in Southwest Asia have unprecedented access to intelligence information.

Air and Sea Mobility Platforms. The most important modernization concern for the 1990s is for improved SOF mobility systems. SOF must have the operational capability to infiltrate and exfiltrate forces into and out of denied areas. This is a fundamental requirement.

Neither a long-range SOF air exfiltration system nor a near-term program to acquire one exists today. The lack of this capability presents a severe shortfall to SOF mobility and hinders our capabilities.

Our modernization effort in short- and medium-range air and maritime infiltration and exfiltration systems continues. This is necessary so that SOF can travel extended distances at night, employ forces in the mission area and extract them before daylight. As previously stated, these efforts are still limited by the availability of technology. Nonetheless, we are pushing the techni-

cal community hard in this regard.

The modernization of our Army special operations aviation helicopter fleet, specifically the 26 MH-47E and 23 MH-60K helicopters, will provide SOF with increased medium-range capability for low-level flight in adverse weather and precision navigation through unfamiliar, mountainous terrain. Both of these helicopter systems are equipped with extended-range fuel systems, including aerial refueling capability, forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) systems and upgraded engines.

The 24 MC-130H Combat Talon II aircraft programmed for procurement will dramatically improve our capability to employ SOF. This aircraft is capable of low-level, night, adverse-weather penetration of hostile air space to infiltrate or resupply SOF engaged in unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency operations and other directed special operations.

Improved Navy SEAL tactical insertion craft and advanced SEAL delivery systems are required to build an effective maritime infiltration and exfiltration capability. By modernizing the SEAL delivery vehicles and swimmer life support systems, the readiness of the SEAL delivery vehicle platoons will be enhanced by upgrading equipment capabilities to increase speed and capacity for short-range missions.

We are also seeking a SEAL delivery system in the long term that provides increased range and speed, and which protects our SEALs from extreme cold-water conditions. All of this equates to improved probability of mission success, as the SEALs will be more capable at the target site. In addition, such a SEAL delivery system will enhance the survivability of the delivery system's host ship.

The AC-130U gunship will greatly enhance our capability for supporting SOF committed to contingency operations. The current active AC-130H models will transfer to the Reserves when replaced by the 12 U-model gunships that are in our program. The AC-130U will be the best gunship in the world in terms of navigation, target acquisition, adverse-weather capabilities, and accuracy and lethality of fire. An additional




Closely integrating SOF and conventional forces in peacetime training and during conflict situations must remain an essential element of US strategy. [Recent operations] have significantly demonstrated that when SOF and conventional forces are employed together, our force potential and capability are maximized.

benefit of the gunship system is its greater stand-off capability and its ability to minimize collateral damage with its pinpoint firing accuracy. The gunship's performance during *Just Cause* demonstrated its utility time and time again.

Strategic Mobility. Another important aspect of SOF capability is strategic mobility. Strategic airlift is crucial to project our forces worldwide. This has been demonstrated again by *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*.

The United States does not have enough strategic airlift. This will become more apparent as forward-deployed force levels are reduced. The heart of our conventional deterrence and response capability will rest with Continental United States-based forces. For this force to be credible, a robust, strategic mobility capability is essential.



Anti-Air Force Special Operations Command HC-130 Combat Shadow refueling an MH-60 Pave Hawk.

Strategic airlift is crucial to project our forces worldwide. This has been demonstrated again by Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The United States does not have enough strategic airlift. This will become more apparent as forward-deployed force levels are reduced. The heart of our conventional deterrence and response capability will rest with Continental United States-based forces.

For our part, USSOCOM has the aircraft available to respond quickly to crisis situations. However, if a larger contingency occurs, response delays can be expected for rounding up the aircraft to move the forces necessary to successfully accomplish the mission in a timely fashion. When rapid reinforcement and timely arrival of supplies are absolutely necessary, there is no substitute for readily available aircraft support.

Force Structure. It is essential to maintain and strengthen US SOF to best support US interests in the current geopolitical environment. Successful peacetime engagement and conventional deterrence require highly trained, motivated and well-equipped mobile forces with the facilities and logistics to train and sustain operations.

To this end, the 3d Special Forces Group is

well on its way to becoming a reality, establishing the group's headquarters and activating one battalion this past year. The remaining two battalions are scheduled to be activated by FY 1993. However, recognizing world events as they are, we are working to bring them on board earlier. The addition of the 3d Special Forces Group, with its African orientation, gives SOF the capability to support fully the three most likely areas for low-intensity conflict and foreign internal defense requirements (Latin America, the Pacific region and Africa), as well as supporting Europe and Southwest Asia.

We are also building our total number of SEAL platoons to 60 by the end of FY 1992. This is necessary to meet operational support commitments to the fleet and meet our peacetime engagement responsibilities.

An area that merits concern is our requirement for in-theater logistic support. In the past, we have depended upon the services' logistic support structures to meet the bulk of SOF sustainment requirements. However, as service structures are drawn down, we can expect that forward-deployed logistic infrastructures will also be reduced. This will require SOF to deploy its own tailored support and sustainment organization with its forward-employed forces. As we validate our requirements and learn from *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, we anticipate expanding the 528th Support Battalion to meet the requirements of forward-employed SOF.

Reserve Components. Our Reserve and National Guard components' special operations, PSYOP and CA forces continue to perform exceptionally well. They are important elements in our ability to perform the roles, missions and capabilities directed by the National Command Authority. In *Just Cause*, *Promote Liberty*, *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, Reserve SOF from all services participated in all facets of the campaigns and did so magnificently.

Future Requirements

The services for the last 40 years have concentrated on deterring military conflict and the 'Big War' on the plains of Europe. That focus has worked; we have avoided both. But what we have failed to deter is low-intensity conflict—that particular province of SOF—and the strategic thinkers tell us that this is the most likely form of conflict for the rest of the century. Thus, we are well-prepared for the least likely conflicts and poorly prepared for the most likely.

Congressman Dan Daniel, 1985

The world will never be free of disagreements

SOF is ideally suited to counteract violence and promote nation assistance.

SOF can be employed directly or indirectly to counter terrorism, narcotics trafficking, subversion or insurgencies, and to aid resistance fighters against repressive regimes consistent with the requirements of US national security policy and objectives.

between countries. Despite reduced tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, peace and stability are not at hand in the Third World and will not come from good intentions or wishful thinking.

Today, the United States is the only country in the world that is in a position and has the resources to positively influence the geopolitical environment to foster a stable peace and economic progress, and it has an obligation to do so. This will require a visionary, prudent and patient Third World policy, with the intent of reducing the conditions that fuel insurgencies and stopping regional quarrels before they come to war. If that fails, we must then be prepared to contain wars before they spread.

SOF provides the National Command Authority and the theater CINCs with the flexibility required to execute options in pursuit of such a policy, ranging from specialized peacetime capabilities to equally specialized wartime support. SOF is a relatively small investment, and it is increasingly useful for the complex environment that lies ahead. **MR**

General Carl W. Stiner is the commander in chief of the US Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. He received a B.S. from Tennessee Polytechnic Institute and a master's degree from Shippensburg State College and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College. After serving as assistant deputy director for Politico-Military Affairs on the Joint Staff, Washington, DC, he was appointed commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He also served as chief of staff, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, MacDill Air Force Base; commander, 82d Airborne Division; commander, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg; and was designated commander, Joint Task Force South, serving as the operational commander of all forces employed in Operation Just Cause.



**Toe
Air Co**

AIR FORCE SPECIAL COMMAND

Major General Thomas E. Eggers, US Air Force

The need for special operations forces (SOF) has been highlighted by its essential contributions to Operations Urgent Fury in Grenada, Just Cause in Panama and Desert Storm in Kuwait and Iraq. The author discusses the critical role played by Air Force SOF in this complex, joint mission area. He provides historical background and the challenges facing today's "air commandos."

ON 22 MAY 1990, the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Hurlburt Field, Florida, was established as the Air Force's newest major command, with the charter of providing specialized airlift and fire support to the special operations forces (SOF) of the Army and Navy. The key to that charter is capable weapon systems and extremely innovative, "quality" people. In 1944, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, after activating the 1st Air Commando Group, noted that no matter how sophisticated and effective the weapons were, technology could not diminish the value of personal leadership. He also saw that technology increases the value of the imaginative military people who employ those weapons.¹ Arnold's conviction about the "value of people" remains the basic philosophy of this command today.

Across the continuum of conflict, each service's SOF will be involved and must coordinate with conventional forces. AFSOC aircrews use uniquely modified aircraft to penetrate hostile air space to insert, resupply or extricate Army Special Forces and Rangers or Navy SEALs (sea-air-land teams), preferably in a clandestine or undetected mode. AFSOC's performance in Grenada and Panama is a striking example that proves the Air Force SOF is ready and able to successfully complete special operations missions "anytime, anyplace."

Background

Air Force special operations initially began in 1943 when Arnold, at the direction of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, committed the US Army Air Corps to support British ground forces under Brigadier General Orde C. Wingate. By 1944, the 1st Air Commando Group was organized, trained and equipped to provide dedicated support to the British. Wingate's Chindit forces would operate 200 miles behind Japanese lines—inserted, resupplied and exfiltrated completely by air. For almost five months, the Chindits wreaked havoc in the Japanese rear, diverting elements of five divisions from the invasion of India and eventually causing the Japanese commander to abandon his planned invasion.²

Air support from the 1st Air Commandos, assisted by the tactical airlifters of Troop Carrier Command, enabled the Chindits to disrupt


AFSOC aircrews use uniquely modified aircraft to penetrate hostile air space to insert, resupply or extricate . . . [special operations forces] in a clandestine or undetected mode. AFSOC's performance in Grenada and Panama is a striking example that proves the Air Force SOF is ready and able to successfully complete special operations missions "anytime, anyplace."

the Japanese invasion of India. The successes of these courageous airmen provide the heritage for today's SOF.

General George E. Stratemeyer, commander of Eastern Air Command during World War II, felt all theater tactical air supply resources should be consolidated into a single organization.³ Although pleased with the air commandos' success, Stratemeyer was never convinced of the need for a separate, specialized air-support organization. In his opinion, the aerial transport and resupply operations in Burma were "all one big air commando action . . ."⁴ Arnold, on the other hand, recognized the symbiotic relationship between SOF and conventional tactical airlift. He saw that each has a distinct, yet complementary, role and that each acts to the mutual benefit of the other.

The rapid demobilization after World War II caused three air commando wings formed by Arnold to be deactivated. Five years later, when the need for special air operations was realized during the Korean War, the air commandos were reactivated. However, just as in 1945, they were quickly deactivated after that war.

In 1961, after almost a decade of neglect caused by the nation's reliance on the Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine of massive retaliation, the Air Force again resurrected its special air operations capability. Using a variety of vintage World War



RH-53s from the USS *Nimitz* practice formation flying over the Indian Ocean before the attempted rescue of American hostages in Iran, 5 February 1980.

[In 1970,] MC-130 Talons, HC-130 tankers, and H-3 and H-53 helicopters . . . flew undetected, at night, deep into North Vietnam and safely returned. It was the prototype of a truly joint operation. . . . The April 1980 attempt to rescue American hostages at the US Embassy in Teheran, Iran, failed mainly because of mechanical failures and command and control problems. The aborted rescue attempt focused congressional and military attention on the need to increase the services' interoperability.

If aircraft, many of them pulled from the "bone yard," the air commandos provided close air support and air mobility to Vietnamese and Laotian ground forces.

Recognizing a critical need for dedicated close air support of SOF ground forces and specialized interdiction to stop North Vietnamese night infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, innovative people within the SOF developed the gunship. Their first success was the AC-47, nicknamed "Puff the Magic Dragon." After a short experiment with the AC-119, they developed the same AC-130 "Spectre" we are familiar with today. Innovative planning once again proved to be a special operations hallmark in solving a tough problem.

In 1970, Lieutenant General Leroy Manor and Colonel Bull Simons took a specially trained task force to Son Tay prison near Hanoi. Using MC-130 Talons, HC-130 tankers, and H-3 and H-53 helicopters, they flew undetected, at night, deep into North Vietnam and safely returned. It was the prototype of a truly joint operation. Although no prisoners of war were

recovered, their actions did cause the North Vietnamese to literally purge the people in their air defense network. They never recovered!

Army and Air Force joint special operations continued throughout Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia until 1974 when the US withdrawal from Vietnam was complete. After the conflict, Air Force SOF was once again deactivated. Only a few squadrons, aircraft and personnel remained under the Tactical Air Command.

The April 1980 attempt to rescue American hostages at the US Embassy in Teheran, Iran, failed mainly because of mechanical failures and command and control problems. The aborted rescue attempt focused congressional and military attention on the need to increase the services' interoperability. This push has been particularly evident in the special operations community. In recent years, Air Force special operations have received steady enhancements in equipment, doctrine, education, organization, and command and control systems. Using less than 1 percent of the total Department of Defense budget, SOF has proved to be



An MC-130 Combat Talon
of the 1st Special Operations
Wing, Hurlburt Field, Florida

In 1983, MC-130 Combat Talons led the way into Grenada.

AFSOC combat control teams were in place early, setting up the landing zones, clearing the airdrops and controlling the air space during the initial phases of the assault. AC-130s provided effective fire support to ground forces that were in contact.

Grenada, though a valuable test of joint special operations capability, showed the services still had many differences to resolve.

a very cost-efficient investment.

In 1983, MC-130 Combat Talons led the way into Grenada. AFSOC combat control teams (CCTs) were in place early, setting up the landing zones, clearing the airdrops and controlling the air space during the initial phases of the assault. AC-130s provided effective fire support to ground forces that were in contact. Grenada, though a valuable test of joint special operations capability, showed the services still had many differences to resolve.

One of the lessons learned in Grenada was that the CCTs were so busy helping wounded and injured soldiers during the initial assault that they were distracted from their primary aircraft movement responsibilities. We have since integrated CCTs with pararescue specialists (PIs) to form special tactics squadrons. Now, PIs jump in with CCTs and are ready to conduct emergency medical treatment for injured troops until the assault zone is secured and a medical evacuation system is established. This proved to be extremely effective during Operation Just Cause in Panama.

Operation Just Cause was planned in meticu-

lous detail. The crew members and support personnel rehearsed their missions for almost six months. They knew their jobs, and when the time came, they executed them well. Operation Just Cause was one of the most complex, long-range joint air and ground operations the US military had ever tried. The plan called for 27 separate, simultaneous raids at 11 different locations—all at H-hour. What made it difficult was that the majority of the forces flew more than 1,500 miles from the Continental United States to arrive at H-hour on the morning of 20 December 1989 (see map).

Five MH-53J Pave Low helicopters and two AC-130 Spectre gunships flew to Panama a day early. Two Air Force Reserve gunships (that had been on a training mission in Panama) were already in place. During their deployment, the MH-53s were refueled in-flight by seven HC-130 Combat Shadow tankers. Four MH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters were also loaded on a C-5 and sent down a day early.

On the day of the initial assault, five more AC-130 gunships, three MC-130 Combat Talons and an armada of airlift forces carried Rangers

HC-130 Combat Shadow
refueling aircraft and MH-53
Pave Low during a training
exercise.



Just Cause was planned in meticulous detail. The crew members and support personnel rehearsed their missions for almost six months. They knew their jobs, and when the time came, they executed them well. Operation Just Cause was one of the most complex, long-range joint air and ground operations the US military had ever tried. The plan called for 27 separate, simultaneous raids at 11 different locations—all at H-hour.

and the 82d Airborne into the fight. These aircraft flew the same route flown the day before. The weather was terrible, and all aircraft required aerial refueling from KC-135 and KC-130 tankers. Aerial refueling is difficult during daylight and good weather. Successful air refueling at night and in limited visibility is a testimony to the finely honed skills of those aircrews. All refuelings were accomplished without incident.

During the first hours of *Just Cause*, there were more than 200 aircraft in the skies over Panama, with the objective area smaller than that inside the Beltway around Washington, DC. At H-hour, an AC-130 gunship neutralized the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) at Tocumen-Torrojos Airport and provided fire support as 750 Rangers parachuted in to seize the airfield.

CCTs jumped in and set up both runways for an assault by the 82d Airborne. The PIs also jumped in during the initial assault and established a joint casualty collection point to gather and treat the wounded. Two AC-130 gunships pounded the Comandancia (the PDF headquarters).

A forward refueling and rearming point was established at Rio Hato Airport, 70 miles west of Panama City. An AC-130 prepared that area by taking out the PDF's barracks and antiaircraft artillery while 800 Rangers, combat controllers and PIs airdropped onto the runway. After the Rangers landed and secured the airfield, three MC-130s and two C-130 SCOUT II (special operations low-level) aircraft landed on the darkened airfield to unload fuel and ammunition for the Rangers. One of the MC-130s stayed on the



Soldiers of the 1st Airborne Battalion preparing to be airdropped from a C-119 during Operation Just Cause II, December 20, 1989.

An AC-130 gunship neutralized the Panama Defense Forces at Tocumen-Torrijos Airport and provided fire support as 750 Rangers parachuted in to seize the airfield. . . . Throughout the early hours of the operation, Army and Air Force helicopter crews flew continuously. Whenever PDF resistance appeared, hostage situations developed or medical evacuations were needed, SOF helicopters were there. HC-130 Combat Shadow tankers completed 65 aerial refuelings and passed more than 300,000 pounds of fuel to Army and Air Force helicopters during these two weeks. These refueling crews were the unsung heroes and true force multipliers for the entire operation.

ground for 3 hours refueling and rearming Army helicopter gunships during the fighting.

Another AC-130 and an Army ground force unit also deployed to the Rio Pacora bridge. This combined arms team kept major PDF forces at Fort Cimarron from crossing the bridge to reinforce the PDF garrison at Tocumen-Torrijos and in Panama City.

Throughout the early hours of the operation, Army and Air Force helicopter crews flew continuously. Whenever PDF resistance appeared, hostage situations developed or medical evacuations were needed, SOF helicopters were there. HC-130 Combat Shadow tankers completed 65 aerial refuelings and passed more than 300,000

pounds of fuel to Army and Air Force helicopters during these two weeks. These refueling crews were the unsung heroes and true force multipliers for the entire operation.

Just as the 1st Air Commandos did during World War II and as Arnold envisioned, modern air commandos initially seized and defended an airfield.⁷ In Grenada and in Panama, once the airhead was secured, conventional airlifters conducted the large movements of personnel and equipment necessary to keep the ground forces supplied and reinforced. The Air Force SOF has come a long way since Desert One and still has a way to go, but we can be proud of the progress we have made.

[C³I] in special operations must be flawless. . . .
Mission planning and mission rehearsal are essential to evaluate the plan to determine if detection is likely and, if so, how to avoid it. To accomplish this, the SOF community must continue to focus attention on technology development. The bottom line is that technology must get special operations as close as possible to total detection avoidance.

Current Organization

AFSOC is organized into three operational wings, each with a geographical orientation (see chart). The 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW) is primarily responsible to the Central, Atlantic and Southern commands, but it also provides augmentation forces for AFSOC wings forward deployed in Europe and the Pacific. The 39th SOW is headquartered and has a squadron of MC-130s at Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany. It also has a squadron each of MH-53s and HC-130s stationed at RAF (Royal Air Force) Woodbridge in England. The 353d SOW has its headquarters and a squadron each of MC-130s and MH-53s at Clark Air Base, Republic of the Philippines, along with a squadron of HC-130s currently located at Kadena Air Base, Japan.

Additionally, AFSOC has three direct reporting units—the Special Mission Operational Test and Evaluation Center (SMOTEC), the 1720th Special Tactics Group and the US Air Force


(USAF) Special Operations School. Finally, there are two Reserve Component groups that report to AFSOC. The 193d Special Operations Group (SOG) at Harrisburg International Airport, Middletown, Pennsylvania, flies EC-130s, and the 919th SOG flies AC-130s at Duke Field, Florida, and H-3s at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona.

The Future

AFSOC's basic mission will not change as we prepare for the 21st century. Our concept of operations is simply to get in, do our business and get out before we are discovered. SOF aircrews must penetrate sophisticated enemy air defense networks unhampered by adverse weather and threatening terrain. This demands precise navigation systems, the latest in electronic countermeasures and planning highly sophisticated missions down to the smallest detail.

Command, control, communications and intelligence in special operations must be flawless. The smallest glitch in any of these areas could spell disaster for the mission. Simple detection can compromise success and cost the lives of men and destruction of machines. Thus, mission planning and mission rehearsal are essential to evaluate the plan to determine if detection is likely and, if so, how to avoid it. To accomplish this, the SOF community must continue to focus attention on technology development. The bottom line is that technology must get special operations as close as possible to total detection avoidance.

Real-time mission planning and rehearsal systems using current threat data are the first step toward getting the job done "undetected." Thorough mission planning is 90 percent of execution. If threat locations are known, missions can be planned to avoid them. Since a majority of mission planning must be done at deployed locations, a portable system is needed. Mission rehearsal is essential in this business. If time is not available to do "full up" dress rehearsals, a system is definitely needed to preview routes and "war game" execution plans. The more accurate, reliable and undetectable our navigation



systems are, the more probable mission success will become. The nature of special operations makes costly navigation errors that would allow the SOF to drift unknowingly into the range of enemy radar or miss a drop zone unacceptable.

One of the biggest problems currently facing the SOF community is keeping up with the changing threats. Avoiding, and thus not having to deal with, the threat is the preferred way to operate. But, if detected, SOF must have the capability to deceive and survive the threat to complete the mission. To that end, it is critical that our electronic warfare systems, as well as that of probable threats, be modeled accurately in the mission planning and rehearsal systems. Only then can we evaluate the probability of successful penetration of a sophisticated hostile air defense system.

Reliable, secure tactical communications are critical to the SOF mission. If our SOF is discovered because of intercepted communications or has interoperability problems that impede or cause mixed communications, the battle is probably lost. Current efforts focus on low probability of intercept and low probability of detection (LPI and LPD) and on secure communications (data burst, and so forth) technology. The bottom line is that we must make sure our SOF is talking to the right people, at the right time,

One of the biggest problems currently facing the SOF community is keeping up with the changing threats. Avoiding, and thus not having to deal with, the threat is the preferred way to operate. But, if detected, SOF must have the capability to deceive and survive the threat to complete the mission.

without fear of compromise.

Even though we are beginning to see peace and democracy break out in Europe, the crisis in the Persian Gulf shows we still live in a very dangerous world. Militarily, we are seeing a shift from the global war scenarios to regional and low-intensity conflicts such as those occurring throughout Latin and South America, the Pacific and Africa. We must not be naive and allow ourselves to be deceived by the democratic progress being made in Europe. Too many threats still exist in this world that will continue to challenge our national security and, in turn, our SOF.

By understanding our past and recognizing the demands of the future, our air commandos, the quiet professionals, are preparing to meet those special challenges "anytime, anyplace." **MR**

NOTES

1. General Henry H. H. Arnold, "The Aerial Invasion of Burma," *National Geographic*, vol. 86, no. 2 (August 1944):148.

2. Sir Robert Thompson, *Make for the Hills* (London: Leo Cooper, Ltd., 1989), 74. General Renya Mutaguchi, commander of the Imperial Army forces in Burma, noted that the failed invasion was caused by diversion of elements of five divisions to address the ground and air threat to his rear. Office, Chief of Military History, Burma Operation Record, in R. D. Van Wagner, *1st Air Commando Group, Military History Series 88-1* (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1988), 96.

3. Charles E. Miller, *Airist Doctrine* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press,

1988), 142.

4. Letter, Stratemeyer to Arnold, 25 June 1944, in Barbara P. King and Edward M. Leete, *The 1st Air Commando Group of World War II: An Historical Perspective* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1977), 166.

5. Lt Col David J. Dean, USAF, *The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1986), 98.

6. The best narrative of Desert One, Operation Eagle Claw, can be found in Daniel P. Bolger, *Americans at War, 1975-1986: An Era of Violent Peace* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), 99-168.

7. Van Wagner, 100.

Major General Thomas E. Eggers is commander, Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlbert Field, Florida. He received a B.S. from the US Air Force Academy and a master's degree from the University of Rochester and is a graduate of the Naval Command and Staff College, the Air War College and the National War College. He has served in various command and staff positions, including special assistant for special operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Research, Development and Acquisition, and deputy director of operations and, later, deputy director of plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, Washington, DC. As deputy director of plans, he was also the Air Force general officer for special operations forces.

US Strategy and the Changing **LIC THREAT**

Steven Metz

The post-Cold War environment offers many challenges to US interests. These certainly compound the tasks facing our strategic thinkers and planners. The author sees the need for a new strategy for the US role in low-intensity conflict that recognizes the dramatic changes occurring in the Third World and in the US-Soviet relationship.

THE CRUMBLING of the Soviet Empire both validates US national security strategy and makes it obsolete. For decades, the press of communist power demanded almost all of our attention. For both strategists and policy makers, the Soviet threat was preeminent. We thus did not even consider the shape of security problems after Moscow's demise. In fact, two years ago, such speculation would have seemed irrelevant. But now we have reached the mountain top and are entering a world with Soviet power purged or limited. Unfortunately, what awaits us is not a promised land where conflict is replaced by peaceful competition among nations but, instead, a confused security environment just as dangerous as the old one.

It is not hard to imagine US strategists bemoaning Moscow's decline, at least in private. The Cold War, for all of the danger and misery it generated, did bring conceptual clarity to a complex world.¹ The threat was obvious. Even when events like the Sino-Soviet split or the war between China and Vietnam indicated that communism was far from monolithic, we could be certain that the Kremlin was the ultimate enemy. And, while we disagreed over the

means and ways of national security strategy, nearly all Americans considered the demise of the Soviet Union's power the ultimate strategic objective.

Now, we must look beyond the Soviet threat. Many students of strategy assume that as the Cold War permutates into a different type of competition, low-intensity conflict (LIC) in the Third World will play an increasingly important role in US national security. Other writers contend that the United States has no vital interests in the Third World.² Even if true, this begs the point: Third World conflict will have the potential to distract us from the more central tasks of developing a post-Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union and engineering a more constructive world economic order. This means that managing LIC in what is now considered the Third World and in the parts of the Soviet Empire that will soon join the Third World is important.

The Changing Threat

For 40 years, US strategists viewed conflict in the Third World through the lens of containment. Since Moscow used discontent in Third

World nations to erode Western power and expand its own influence, our goal was to stifle the violence that contributed to Soviet aims and, more recently, to destabilize Moscow's Third World friends. Third World conflict was seen as superpower conflict in miniature. This image was never fully accurate and now is useless. Today, we simply cannot treat Third World conflict as a reflection of the Cold War but must look for endogenous causes and effects. This is a complex task that requires an understanding of the forces and trends that are changing the essential nature of the Third World conflict.

One important trend concerns LIC sponsorship. In the immediate future, the role of nonsuperpower sponsors will increase. In itself, this is nothing new. For the past decade, South Africa and Libya, for example, orchestrated violence in their regions with little linkage to the Cold War.³ Even if both superpowers had avoided involvement in southern Africa or the Sahel, violence would still have been rampant due largely to the role of regional powers. Southern Africa and the Sahel will thus form a model for the future.

There are now many regional powers that have the incentive and the ability to encourage, organize and supply terrorists or insurgents. The capability to manufacture munitions, which once was limited to the superpowers and their close allies, is widespread. Just as scientific and technological capabilities arise and then disperse, so, too, does the ability to engineer LIC. Furthermore, superpower disengagement from the Third World will remove constraints on regional powers that wish to further their interests through sponsorship of LIC.⁴ We can thus expect a multitude of terrorist campaigns, insurgencies and on-again, off-again local wars that do not need or want superpower support.

Terrorism. Other trends in LICs are also emerging. Terrorism, for example, will probably increase in destructiveness. Like any form of violence that relies on fear rather than actual force, terrorism experiences a diminishing rate of return on a given level of violence. The world has become more or less numb to airline hijackings, so terrorists must seek new techniques.

For terrorists who count the United States among their enemies, there are two options. One is to strike targets within the United States. For a variety of reasons, including elaborate counterterrorist measures enforced by government agencies, this is difficult. The other option

The Cold War, for all of the danger and misery it generated, did bring conceptual clarity to a complex world. The threat was obvious. Even when events like the Sino-Soviet split or the war between China and Vietnam indicated that communism was far from monolithic, we could be certain that the Kremlin was the ultimate enemy.

is to raise the level of destruction. Clearly chemical, biological and eventually nuclear weapons offer the greatest opportunities. The capability is there, even in the nuclear arena where terrorists can substitute technologically simple, deliberate atomic pollution for more technologically complex atomic explosions. The absence of long-range delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, which limits their utility for nonsuperpowers, is not a factor for terrorists. They would find an immobile, warehouse-size nuclear device perfectly acceptable.

Another likely trend is the emergence of new targets of terrorism. To have the desired psychological effect, terrorism must be aimed at states that are developed enough to provide numerous high-profile targets and are linked by electronic communication nets that would disseminate the impact of a terrorist strike. But to stand any chance of having the desired political effect, terrorism must also target nations with fragile or unstable governments. This second requirement explains why terrorism has had little real influence over the policies of nations like Israel, Italy or Germany. There are, however, a range of rapidly modernizing states that meet both requirements. Examples include Brazil, South Korea and Mexico.⁵

Ideological or class-based insurgencies are relatively rare today because of the inherently limited appeal of communism (or conversely, anti-communism) in traditional societies. They . . . must attach themselves to a larger force, usually nationalism. Only when this larger force is present can ideological insurgencies succeed.

Finally, terrorism will continue to undergo the same integrative trends that have characterized LIC in general. This is illustrated by phenomena such as narcoterrorism. Because they have large amounts of money, are global in scope and suffer none of the constraints that political objectives confer, narcotics traffickers can easily use terrorism. In addition, narcotics traffickers do not rely on a state sponsor as do many political terrorist groups, thus preventing any attempts to "strike at the source" by counterterrorists. This means that the distinction between political terrorism and organized crime will fade or disappear. Terrorists will continue to rely on robbery and extortion for funds, and more ominously, criminals without a political agenda will adopt the techniques of terrorism.

Insurrection. Broad-based and relatively quick blows against government will also remain an important element of the emerging security environment. Insurrection takes two forms. One is the sort of "people power" that toppled Ferdinand Marcos and Nicolae Ceausescu and challenged Deng Xiaoping. For the United States, a more dangerous form is a quasi-legitimate arrogation of the power of new or weak democracies as pioneered by Adolf Hitler and used by Maurice Bishop in Grenada and Manuel Noriega in Panama. As the number of new and weak democracies expands, this second form of insurrection will become more common.

Insurgency. Protracted rural insurgency will persist but decline in strategic importance. Despite Che Guevara's imploration to "create two, three, many Vietnams," a classical Maoist insurgency can, in reality, only threaten very weak or corrupt governments in nations with rugged terrain. Barring gross incompetence on the government's part, ideologically based rural insurgencies can continue for extended periods—witness Afghanistan, Angola, El Salvador, Peru or the Philippines—but cannot win outright. As a type of LIC, ideologically based rural insurgencies will continue to erupt but will not be a major factor in the global security environment.

Low-Intensity Conflict Proponencies Directorate

June 1991 marks the establishment of the Low-Intensity Conflict Proponencies Directorate (LIC-PD) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This new directorate is charged with managing and directing the activities of three of the specified proponencies assigned to the commander, Combined Arms Command (CAC): low-intensity conflict (LIC), combating terrorism and counterdrugs. Although operated as a CAC special staff element because it, in fact, represents the CAC commander, LIC-PD functions under the direction of the Deputy Commandant, Command and General Staff College, and derives its support from the college.

LIC-PD was established to coordinate the efforts of these three proponencies and serves to emphasize the increasing importance of these activities as the focus of the current threat to our national security

begins to shift in response to a changing world environment. While the likelihood of a direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact continues to diminish, instability in the Third World, international terrorism and illicit drugs remain vital concerns for which the Army must prepare.

Although all of the directorate's three proponency offices are responsible for developing, coordinating and documenting concepts, doctrine, organizational designs, materiel requirements and training programs as they pertain to their specific functional areas, their daily concerns and priorities are different.

The Army Proponency Office for Low-Intensity Conflict (APOLIC) is the focal point for ensuring LIC issues are considered in the Concept-Based



Narcotics traffickers do not rely on a state sponsor as do many political terrorist groups, thus preventing any attempts to "strike at the source." . . . The distinction between political terrorism and organized crime will fade or disappear. Terrorists will continue to rely on robbery and extortion for funds, and more ominously, criminals without a political agenda will adopt the techniques of terrorism.

Sectarian insurgency based on tribal, ethnic or religious antagonisms is another matter. Ideological or class-based insurgencies are relatively rare today because of the inherently limited appeal of communism (or conversely, anticommunism) in traditional societies. They

are like remora fish that must attach themselves to a larger force, usually nationalism. Only when this larger force is present can ideological insurgencies succeed. The foundation for sectarian insurgency, however, exists in every nation that is tribally, ethnically or religiously

Requirements System. APOLIC is responsible for Armywide LIC doctrine as expressed in U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*. It monitors and assists other Army proponents and units to ensure that doctrine, training, leader development, organization and materiel LIC issues are addressed.

The Combating Terrorism Proponency (CTP) serves as the focal point for the Army's antiterrorism (AT) doctrine and training programs. In coordination with the subproponent schools—military police, special warfare and intelligence—the CTP develops and integrates AT doctrine and specialized training throughout the Army. CTP also provides training support packages for officer and noncommissioned officer education and training support material to Army schools, and serves as a clearing

house of AT information for the Total Army.

The Army Counter-Drug Proponency (ACDP) serves as the Army's instructive voice in this relatively new and evolving mission area. In addition to fulfilling the responsibilities normally associated with an Army proponent, this office will educate the Army community about its roles and missions in support of the national drug strategy and determine the requirements the Army must be prepared to support.

The Army must adjust to the challenges posed by the changing world of the 1990s. LIC-TPD will look into the future to ensure that Army forces are prepared to consistently and effectively respond to all LIC, combating terrorism and counterdrug missions that may be assigned in support of our national security. ■

heterogeneous. Sectarian LIC has been most evident in Third World nations such as Sri Lanka, India, Sudan, Ethiopia and, to some degree, Peru, but it may also explode within the Soviet and Chinese empires.

Whether ideological or sectarian, insurgency will probably become more urban. Most Third World cities are surrounded by slum belts. These

We must craft strategic rules of engagement that, at a generic level, specify when, where and how US power will be used to manage LIC. . . . As the Cold War fades, it is likely that [US] attitudes will resemble those of the pre-Cold War period. Specifically, Americans will be more idealistic, rejecting the notion that the enemy of my enemy, however repulsive, is my friend. . . . Only reforming democracies will deserve our support.

have been cockpits of insurgency in the past, but revolutionaries working from urban areas often found counterinsurgency somewhat easier. The French in Algeria, for example, had much less trouble with the urban element of the insurgency there than the rural. The same holds true in El Salvador, Afghanistan and Vietnam. But, as urban slum belts grow and revolutionaries adopt modern communications techniques, the balance may shift away from counterinsurgents, and thus Third World cities will explode with revolutionary violence.

In general, the emerging security environment is one in which all types of nations face the threat of LIC. For modernized or rapidly modernizing states, the most immediate threat is terrorism. For new democracies or fragile dictatorships, the challenge is insurrection. For underdeveloped authoritarian states or nations with sectarian conflict, protracted insurgency is a real problem. Clearly, postcontainment US strategy must, in some way, respond to all of these.

US Strategy

It is often said that generals plan to fight the last war. The same holds true for military strategists and doctrine writers. After a decade of effort, US national security professionals are steadily developing an understanding of LIC. Witness emerging doctrine, such as US Army Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* and Test Publication, Joint Publication 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, that is generally sound. Unfortunately, such doctrine indicates that we are beginning to understand forms of LIC, especially Maoist-style protracted rural insurgency, that are fading in strategic importance.

Great efforts are currently under way to adapt US national security and military strategy to the changing global security environment.⁶ Since LIC, even when it occurs in regions of peripheral interest to the United States, can complicate the attainment of central national security goals, equal attention must be given to the LIC component of our strategy. Even though the fluidity of the international environment makes it impossible to fully develop a new LIC strategy at this point, work can begin. This should be based on three imperatives.

Rules of Engagement. First, we must craft strategic rules of engagement that, at a generic level, specify when, where and how US power will be used to manage LIC. Changing US attitudes toward our world role will structure this process. As the Cold War fades, it is likely that such attitudes will resemble those of the pre-Cold War period. Specifically, Americans will be more idealistic, rejecting the notion that the enemy of my enemy, however repulsive, is my friend. In other words, only reforming democracies will deserve our support. It is also likely that we will see resurgent isolationism. It will take a threat to a *clearly* democratic friend to invoke US reaction, not simply a challenge to a *potential* democracy.

These rules of engagement should also reflect that the emerging international system will not simply be an old-fashioned multipolar one in




For modernized or rapidly modernizing states, the most immediate threat is terrorism. For new democracies or fragile dictatorships, the challenge is insurrection. For underdeveloped authoritarian states or nations with sectarian conflict, protracted insurgency is a real problem. Clearly, postcontainment US strategy must, in some way, respond to all of these.

which four or five great powers dominate, but it will form a complex web of interrelated regional balances. US power should be used when a regional balance is in a state of terminal disequilibrium and when this disequilibrium threatens other balances.⁷ In addition, these rules of engagement must be based on a sense of the life cycle of LIC. There are certain times when US power may prove decisive, but there are other times when a conflict is not yet ripe for resolution or when the judicious use of US power will be irrelevant. "Judicious" is the key word here since, outside of Mexico, we are unlikely to become massively involved in any given LIC.

Integration. The second imperative for US strategy is integration. Security professionals and strategists have always recognized that LIC poses an integrated threat. Military elements are intertwined with political, economic, social and psychological elements. For this reason, any response to LIC needs to be integrated and synchronized.⁸ Military thinking reflects this—Army doctrine evolved into joint Army/Air Force doctrine which, in turn, formed the foundation for all-service joint doctrine. This must continue.

The next logical step is interagency doctrine and strategy that link military activities to those

A Soviet-built SA-13 surface-to-air missile system captured at Libya's Ouadi Doum Air Base by Chadian forces in 1988. More than 70 T55 tanks and a large variety of other military equipment were captured from the Libyan forces that had entered Chad.



In the immediate future, the role of nonsuperpower sponsors will increase. In itself, this is nothing new. For the past decade, South Africa and Libya, for example, orchestrated violence in their regions with little linkage to the Cold War. . . . There are now many regional powers that have the incentive and the ability to encourage, organize and supply terrorists or insurgents. The capability to manufacture munitions, which once was limited to the superpowers and their close allies, is widespread.

of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the Agency for International Development, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the US Information Agency, Congress and any other segment of the government involved with LIC.

Indirectness. The final imperative is indirectness. The military already recognizes that armed force forms the secondary effort in LIC.⁹

When combined with the absence of public support for direct US involvement, this limits the US military to providing training, advice, intelligence and equipment. This indirect role must certainly continue. But there are avenues for greater indirectness at the strategic level, especially in pursuit of truly combined activities. A number of nations around the world have extensive experience with, and understanding of,

the processes of national development, building a Third World democracy and fighting an insurgency. Costa Rica, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Brazil and Thailand come to mind. Advisory teams that combine Americans with representatives of such states would have much more to offer nations facing an insurgency than would Americans alone.

The problems the Third World will face in the coming decades are immense. Many nations there will continue to experience economic stagnation fueled by weak world commodity prices, a shortage of investment capital, debt, ecological decay, underdeveloped infrastructure, population pressure and the absence of available and appropriate technology.¹⁰ The movement toward democracy that exploded in the 1980s will experience fits and starts as sectarian conflict, terrorism, economic stagnation, military involvement in politics and international tensions hinder political reforms. Uneven economic development and stifled political reform, combined with ever-increasing public demands, will set the stage for violent conflict.

As Third World conflicts erupt and abate in a melancholy rhythm, the United States cannot answer every call for help. We have neither the ability nor, in the post-Cold War era, the need to, in John F. Kennedy's words, "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any

Army doctrine evolved into joint Army/Air Force doctrine which, in turn, formed the foundation for all-service joint doctrine. . . . The next logical step is interagency doctrine and strategy that link military activities to those of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the Agency for International Development . . . and any other segment of the government involved with LIC.

friend. . . ." But, when we do act, we must integratedly and indirectly act. There will be instances when vital global balances are truly threatened by LIC. Then, too, we must act. But, in general, conflicts that require US attention will be rare.

By looking at the future of LIC as much as its past, we can be prepared for these rare instances when we must become involved in LIC. The past is a guide on how *not* to act, but the essential nature of LIC is changing so dramatically that it offers only a limited indication of how *to* act. Knowing not to repeat mistakes does not alone tell how to solve a problem. That is a task for imaginative and visionary strategic thinkers. Let us hope that we have them. **MR**

NOTES

1. John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," *The Atlantic* (August 1990):35.

2. On the question of whether or not the United States has vital interests in the Third World, see Stephen R. David, "Why the Third World Matters," *International Security*, vol. 14, (Summer 1989):50-85; and Michael C. Desch, "The Keys That Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the Periphery," *International Security*, vol. 14, (Summer 1989):86-121.

3. South Africa had some success in painting regional conflict as a Cold War struggle, at least during the Reagan administration. See Steven Metz, "Pretoria's Total Strategy and Low-Intensity Warfare in Southern Africa," *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 6, (1987):437-66.

4. Geoffrey Kemp, "Regional Security, Arms Control and the End of the Cold War," *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 13, (Autumn 1990):34.

5. This does not imply that these states are likely targets of increased terrorism, but rather, that they simply fit into the category of states that are often targeted. The deciding factor, of course, is the extent of the anti- and counterterror-

ism programs implemented by the modernizing states.

6. A good explanation of the changing US military strategy can be found in Lieutenant General George L. Butler's speech to the Center for Defense Journalism, National Press Club, Washington, DC, 27 September 1990.

7. Many writers encourage the United States to take a hands-off approach to regional balances. See, for example, Earl C. Ravenhill, "The Case for Adjustment," *Foreign Policy*, vol. 81, (Winter 1980-81):3-19.

8. For a more detailed explanation, see Steven Metz, "AirLand Battle and Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* (January 1990):31-37.

9. US Army Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, Final Draft (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, 7 March 1989), 2-17.

10. These are features of many Third World nations but not all. It is more accurate to at least divide the Third World into industrializing states and commodity exporters. See John Ravenhill, "The North-South Balance of Power," *International Affairs*, vol. 66, (October 1990):745-6.

Steven Metz is associate professor of low-intensity conflict, Department of Warfare Studies, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from the University of South Carolina and a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University. His article, "AirLand Battle and Counterinsurgency," appeared in the January 1990 *Military Review*.

The Case for Separating Civic Actions from Military Operations in

Regina Gaillard

Copyright 1991 by John W. DePauw and George Luz

Since its early conceptualization during the Kennedy administration, military civic action has led directly to military insurgency and low-intensity warfare doctrine and practice. The author finds this linkage to be neither for detriments nor for complementing US strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean. "Development corps" to be a distraction and a hindrance to US assistance in the future.

US military civic action (MCA) projects are a human and civic assistance strategy called "civic action" or "nation building." Soldiers, are not normally trained for these projects in their hearts and minds (see *Forced to Obey*). With "peace breaking" wars in the world and with shrinking US military budgets, MCA projects and US military civic action projects are in decline. The World Bank is increasingly unable to pay for development commercially. These opportunities are opening at a time when US military civic action projects are severely constrained by law and misunderstood by both the US and Latin American publics.

Cumulatively, the history of civic action, with its linkage to counterinsurgency and low-

This article will be published in Winning the Peace: Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action, John W. DePauw and George Luz, eds. (Praeger Publishers, New York, forthcoming). Copyright 1991 by John W. DePauw and George Luz. Reprinted with permission. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.—Editor

density doctrine, US doctrine, has tainted the realistic concept and has ultimately been unproductive to fostering a future role for the Army in Latin America (see Means). Rumsfeld, the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Panama by the year 2000 offers a similar strategy for the US Army to promote a future generation of US doctrine and strategy for Latin America, also for modern world. The presentation effort, to present civil and HCA activities from counterinsurgency and LIC.

Furthermore, the Army should take the lead in establishing a new "US development corps" that would be structured to avoid the political and doctrinal pitfalls that have marked the history of the civic action concept. After an overview of how MCA and HCA as US policy tools for Latin America acquired negative connotations, the concept of the development corps is outlined at the end of this article.

The Goals of Civic Action

Discussion surrounding the political, social, economic, developmental and military goals of MCA as a US policy tool for Latin America rose

to the forefront in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Therefore, the majority of the literature and congressional hearings on MCA is centered on that period, from which we might glean some lessons.

In their pathbreaking study on MCA published in 1966, Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning framed their discussion of US MCA policy as a search to resolve the dilemma of security versus economic and social reform in Latin America.¹ Basing his dissertation on points made in the Barber and Ronning study, Robin N. Montgomery demonstrated that decision making early in the Kennedy administration obscured any differences there might have been between MCA as a developmental tool in military

operations undertaken against an insurgency.² This differentiation of the MCA's role is extremely important in discussing the future utility of any type of civic action as a tool of US policy as we enter the 1990s.

Even before President John F. Kennedy definitively linked MCA to internal security and counterinsurgency, congressional debates showed that Congress voiced appreciation for the role civic action could play in development—as long as MCA was not linked overtly to “internal security” policies in Latin America. By 1957, the framework for future congressional debates on MCA and HCA and their negative linkage with internal security doctrine in Latin

LIC Terms

Military Civic Action (MCA). “The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.)”

—Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication (JCS Pub) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], 1 December 1989), 228-9.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA). “Operations [that] provide a mechanism through which US military personnel and assets assist Third World populations. HCA improves the quality of life through rudimentary construction, health care, and sanitation programs. These operations are defined by law and limited to—

- Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.
- Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
- Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
- Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

“The Department of State must approve most HCA operations and the US Congress funds them through appropriations specifically set aside for HCA. The United States may not provide HCA, directly or indirectly, to individuals, groups, or orga-

nizations engaged in military or paramilitary activity. HCA operations are most effective when the United States uses them within the guidelines of a coordinated interagency program developed by the Department of State, USAID, DOD, and the Unified Commands. Both active and reserve components may conduct HCA missions.

“These operations assist a host nation to attack the causes of instability. They can help prevent the need for greater assistance at a later date. HCA operations may also take place in peacekeeping operations, or in the limited circumstances of peacekeeping contingency operations.” (Emphasis added.)

—US Army Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 5 December 1990), 2-23.

Counterinsurgency. “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”

—JCS Pub 1-02, 93.

Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC). “Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.”

—JCS Pub 1-02, 212.

Removing SOUTHCOM from Panama by the year 2000 offers a splendid opportunity for the US Army to promote a joint service reorientation of US doctrine and strategy not only for Latin America but also for most of the Third World. This reorientation effort should delink civic action and HCA activities from counterinsurgency and LIC.

America was being set.³ Congressional discussion on aid to the US-supported military regime in Guatemala (in the aftermath of the 1954 overthrow of the communist Arbenz government) indicated that congressional interest in promoting developmental civic action by indigenous forces was linked to a growing concern for Latin American economic conditions and their relationship to the possibilities of communist expansion from within.⁴ Until the threat of internal subversion rose to the fore, the US rationale for military aid to Latin America was stated as the need for hemispheric defense against external aggression.⁵ The external aggression rationale was to be maintained sporadically into the Kennedy administration because it avoided criticism in Congress that US aid to Latin American militaries was being used to suppress popular opposition within Latin American countries.⁶

However, in line with Congress' more development-oriented thinking, economic aid to Bolivia was quintupled by 1956 and quickly followed by proffering military aid.⁷ Both types of aid promoted MCA programs by Bolivian troops that were deemed so successful by Senator George D. Aiken in 1960 that he likened them to the US Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and recommended that these efforts be encouraged elsewhere.⁸

Civic Action Linked to Counterinsurgency

Kennedy was responsible for organizing US foreign affairs and national security agencies to guide and assist governments he considered


threatened—most of Latin America—to resist the threat of communist-inspired insurgency. "Cuba was in the forefront of the president's attention and was a symbol of the kind of troubles that would result from successful communist guerrilla movements" throughout the Western Hemisphere.⁹ The Special Group (Counterinsurgency) established by the president in 1962 provided the organizational framework for this effort and the doctrine of MCA.

In an attempt to coordinate the economic assistance efforts of the Alliance for Progress with the military assistance efforts to counter insurgencies, the Special Group prescribed that internal defense and development plans be drawn up for each threatened country. The prescription was duly included in US counterinsurgency doctrine and, in 1981, in LIC doctrine. MCA, that "hybrid of economic and military assistance" already linked in speeches by the president to the US counterinsurgency effort, was a key concept of the prescription and thus became firmly fixed in counterinsurgency practice and doctrine.¹⁰ But, when it was developed, the emphasis in counterinsurgency doctrine and training was almost exclusively on the military aspects of unconventional warfare.¹¹

"Although he [President Kennedy] repeatedly stated his affinity for the political, economic and social aims of MCA," circumstances, particularly the worsening Vietnam situation and the Bay of Pigs failure, led him to seek advice of counselors "who advocated the primacy of military means embodied in the policy of counterinsurgency" rather than the more developmental means connoted by MCA per se.¹²

However, promoting the idea of MCA in Latin America remained an important tool of the Kennedy administration at least "as a concomitant to internal security."¹³ Moreover, MCA as part of counterinsurgency initially received a large share of resources—and even more publicity. Presumably, this was because it was considered an attractive concept with appeal to the public and thus a decorative embellishment of an Armed Forces public image.¹⁴

Uruguayan soldiers searching for Tupamaros guerrillas in Montevideo, 1970



The Latin American military and security forces, with their institutional monopoly on power within the threatened countries, had been the most effective instrument against insurgency and urban guerrillas. By the advent of the Carter administration in 1977, each of these countries except Venezuela and Colombia had come to be ruled by authoritarian military regimes that successfully eliminated the urban and rural opposition.

The Security versus Democracy and Development Dilemma

Congressional debates and hearings by the mid-1960s illustrated that Congress was sympathetic to both the developmental and counter-insurgency goals of MCA while it simultaneously expressed doubts about the wisdom of increased involvement in Latin American internal security affairs. But, ultimately, Congress supported the administration policy and resolved the involvement dilemma by decreasing Military Assistance Program (MAP) grant aid to Latin America, including MCA, while permitting increased sales of military training and equipment for Latin American internal security purposes. The result was legislative restrictions on using MCA as a policy tool and clearly

placing MCA, by both the administration and Congress, second to the necessity of maintaining the capability of the security forces of Latin American countries.¹⁵

There was no doubt, by the mid-1970s, that the Latin American military and security forces, with their institutional monopoly on power within the threatened countries, had been the most effective instrument against insurgency and urban guerrillas.¹⁶ By the advent of the Carter administration in 1977, each of these countries except Venezuela and Colombia had come to be ruled by authoritarian military regimes that successfully eliminated the urban and rural opposition.

The continuation of repressive measures by the military governments that dominated the

Latin American scene in the 1970s prompted Congress to cut off all economic and military aid to these countries after 1974. This broke the conundrum created by the clash of US interests in

Until the threat of internal subversion rose to the fore, the US rationale for military aid to Latin America was stated as the need for hemispheric defense against external aggression... Kennedy was responsible for organizing US foreign affairs and national security agencies to guide and assist governments he considered threatened—most of Latin America—to resist the threat of communist-inspired insurgency.

security versus the promotion of democracy and development in Latin America. The Human Rights Policy, presented in 1977, further assisted the United States out of the ethical bind created by the clash of these strategic objectives. Using US ideals and moral influence, the new strategy, hailed throughout the hemisphere, promoted democratic development in Latin America through a campaign to limit illegal abuses of the population by both repressive governments and guerrilla tactics.

Déjà Vu: MCA and HCA in the 1980s

By 1981, the increasing Marxism-Leninism of the Sandinistas and the threatening situation in El Salvador prompted the Reagan administration to become involved in the region, and Central America gave impetus to a rebirth of interest in counterinsurgency and civic action. At the same time, the US military introduced LIC doctrine that attempted to consider a broader view of Third World threats but continued to emphasize counterinsurgency and maintain the linkage between counterinsurgency and MCA.¹⁷

Similar to Kennedy exactly 20 years before, the Reagan administration became the organizing force that drove US policy toward involve-

ment in Central America as part of an activist ideological version of the containment policy which took a cold war view of Central American revolution. As in the 1960s, congressional support for military aid to Central American militaries was cautious. MCA as an item in the US security assistance program for Latin America had long since been halted because of the human rights violations of many Latin American militaries and persistent congressional doubts about the political, social and economic benefits to be gained by enhancing the role of Latin American forces.

However, reminiscent of the Alliance for Progress, Congress approved a "total internal security" economic and military aid package for El Salvador in which the US military attempted to promote MCA by the El Salvadoran armed forces according to traditional counterinsurgency doctrine developed in the 1960s. But opposition to administration policy on the part of the American public and Congress concerning the appropriate amount of US involvement with the El Salvadoran military, and in Central America in general, limited the number of US trainers in El Salvador to 55.

Congress also cautiously supported the administration's Nicaraguan Contra policy until it became apparent that the administration was overinvolved in implementing its anti-Sandinista agenda, using various branch agencies and departments without informing Congress. In view of recalcitrant congressional support, the Reagan administration made haste, as the Kennedy administration had done before it, to develop new venues through which to execute its Central American policy. One of these was the ad hoc development of HCA.

All of the HCA legislation that forms the backbone of present policy and doctrine was originally formulated to support the US effort to counter communist-inspired insurgency and the Nicaraguan Sandinista regime in Central America.¹⁸ One novelty of the Reagan program for Central America was appointing a Department of Defense (DOD) director for Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. The new position was



US trainer with Salvadoran soldiers, summer 1983.

As in the 1960s, congressional support for military aid to Central American militaries was cautious. . . . Opposition to administration policy on the part of the American public and Congress concerning the appropriate amount of US involvement with the El Salvadoran military, and in Central America in general, limited the number of US trainers in El Salvador to 55.

subsequently located in the Pentagon's Office for International Security Affairs which originated many of the ideas for HCA as part of an active promotion of the Reagan Doctrine in Central America. Continued efforts to extend assistance to the Contras, sometimes under the rubric of HCA, caused Congress to declare HCA to "military or paramilitary" groups illegal.¹⁹

At the same time, SOUTHCOM in Panama implemented a "security development plan designed in part to renew emphasis on humanitarian assistance initiatives."²⁰ Traditional MCA programs, emphasizing the role of the local army, were to be subordinated to operations conducted directly by US troops. This was apparently done very quickly. A General Accounting Office report created a stir in Congress when it revealed the HCA activities were conducted by SOUTHCOM in Honduras without

appropriate authority.²¹

Congress, at the behest of the administration, legalized these HCA activities performed by US troops but also severely restricted them. The Stevens Amendment, later expanded, permitted US troops to perform civic actions—but only incidental to or in conjunction with approved military exercises overseas. This legislation has led to the persistent claim that National Guard and Reserve Component troops are in Central America because "we are there to train, nothing more."²²

Yet, all of the commanders in chief of SOUTHCOM have linked the military exercises to the US counterinsurgency effort in the Latin American LIC environment. Moreover, HCA activities, described as "a mechanism by which U.S. military personnel and assets assist Third World populations" by improving their

The continuation of repressive measures by the military governments that dominated the Latin American scene in the 1970s prompted Congress to cut off all economic and military aid to these countries after 1974. . . .

The Human Rights Policy, presented in 1977, further assisted the United States out of the ethical bind created by the clash of these strategic objectives.

"quality of life," have been linked within LIC doctrine under "US Military Support to Counterinsurgency."²³

Other HCA legislation promoted by the Reagan administration was also passed by Congress, yet always with caveats against US military involvement in Central American counterinsurgency wars and warnings against covert activities. "I wouldn't prohibit military involvement [in HCA activities]," commented a Democratic congressman, "but it's appropriate for Congress to begin thinking about developing with the Defense Department some kind of mechanism to make sure it doesn't become a problem and that the military doesn't use humanitarian assistance to fulfill its own agenda."²⁴

A Latin American View of US Civic Action

Host nation politicians often share Congress' suspicion of US HCA activities. US military civic action projects in Bolivia created a nationalist uproar and considerable political opposition in 1989. First reported in Bolivia's largest circulation daily newspaper, 300 or so US troops were scheduled to extend the airport in Potosí, the capital of Bolivia's tin mining area. The Bolivian opposition to the project contended that "Washington's covert aim is to construct military bases in Bolivia—Civic Action projects, they say, are a way of winning popular support for an expanded military presence."²⁵ Moreover, they claimed that the United States is attempting the "Hondurization" of Bolivia, to make it a base for

US military operations because of Bolivia's central location in the troubled South American LIC environment.

A position to bar US troops from Bolivian soil was rejected by the Bolivian Congress; however, the Congress limited the time US troops could spend on the airport project to three months a year. The troops, mostly Reserves and National Guard engineers with a permanent contingent from SOUTHCOM in Panama, planned to bring heavy equipment and return to finish the job the next year.²⁶

The opposition to civic action activities by US troops in Bolivia was exacerbated after the US Attorney General and the US Drug Enforcement Administration director promised, during a visit to Bolivia, that "the U.S. would only send troops to Bolivia at the request of the government."²⁷ The promise was publicized by the Bolivian press, but two weeks later, "a campaigning Bolivian politician discovered U.S. soldiers handing out medicines in rural towns near the capital." Worse, "the soldiers' presence had not been publicly announced [and] the incident became an embarrassment for the [democratically elected] government when the Health Ministry acknowledged it did not know what medicines were being distributed."²⁸

With a long history of US counterinsurgency and antidrug operations in Bolivia, it is apparent that civic actions by US troops are often perceived to be part of a hidden LIC agenda. Certainly, suspicions about the linkage, harbored by many Bolivians, are counterproductive to US interests in supporting democracy in that country.

*"The problem of Military Civic Action is that the objective remains strategic—it's never just 'do goodism.'"*²⁹

The Kennedy and Reagan administrations linked MCA, counterinsurgency, HCA and LIC to internal security activities in Latin America that Congress often perceived to be antidemocratic and bordering on the covert, thus inviting severe legislative constraints. Presidential bulldozing of debatable policies through an alter-



Contra guerrillas
in Nicaragua, 1985

The Reagan administration became the organizing force that drove US policy toward involvement in Central America as part of an activist ideological version of the containment policy which took a cold war view of Central American revolution. . . . Congress also cautiously supported the administration's Nicaraguan Contra policy until it became apparent that the administration was overinvolved in implementing its anti-Sandinista agenda, using various branch agencies and departments without informing Congress.

nately compliant and fearful Congress has resulted in questionable LIC strategies, or no strategy, for Latin America and contributed to lack of clarity in military doctrine. "Current [LIC] doctrine does not do a good job of distinguishing between such diverse activities as humanitarian assistance, nationbuilding, counterinsurgency and civic action."³⁰

MCA and HCA have never been separate from the US effort to counter subversion in the Third World. Conceived as a preventative to insurgency in the 1950s, the social, developmental and humanitarian aspects of MCA were subsumed under the military aspects of US counterinsurgency doctrine and the Latin American military doctrine of internal security. Even in the 1980s, the US military continued to include

MCA and the more recent HCA in counterinsurgency doctrine under the umbrella of LIC.

In addition, DOD and the US Congress tacitly agreed in the late 1960s that US promotion of MCA programs by Latin American militaries did not serve US strategic or developmental objectives in Latin America. Instead, DOD deliberately submitted minimum requests for MCA funds as Congress relatively increased appropriations and sales of security assistance to the Latin American militaries.³¹ These actions constituted a de facto pre-Nixon Doctrine decision to minimize US active involvement in Latin America. Instead, it would render strong security assistance support to Latin American military internal defense campaigns against insurgencies and guerrilla movements. The success of the

"indigenous force/US security assistance" policy precluded an active US military role in Latin American counterinsurgency and thus in MCA which had become inextricably linked to US counterinsurgency doctrine.

The fact that the major policy decisions precluding an active US role in Latin American counterinsurgency were actually made more

Host nation politicians often share Congress' suspicion of US HCA activities. US military civic action projects in Bolivia generate nationalist uproar and considerable political opposition in 1989: . . .

With a long history of US counterinsurgency and antidrug operations in Bolivia, it is apparent that civic actions by US troops are often perceived to be part of a hidden LIC agenda.

than 20 years ago leads to the conclusion that MCA and the more recent HCA will continue to have very little application in Latin America as long as they are linked to counterinsurgency/LIC doctrine. Furthermore, if those policy decisions precluding a US military role in Latin American counterinsurgency were not substantially changed during periods of serious threats to stability, there is little likelihood that increased US involvement of the traditional counterinsurgency type will prove to be an acceptable option for US policy makers or for the majority of the Latin American governments now in the process of institutionalizing democracy and building civilian prestige.

The phenomenal spread of the knowledge of human rights values, spurred by President Jimmy Carter in Latin America, has created what I call a "second revolution of rising expectations." Whether or not democracy works in Latin America, there is widespread acceptance of democratic ideals among Latin American masses and an expectation that democracy must eventually work for them. A strong sense of na-

tionalism, even if only rhetorical, is a concomitant of this process.

Nondemocratic forms of government, or at least nonelected governments, are increasingly perceived as unacceptable. This possible climate does not bode well for US congressional or Latin American civilian receptivity to programs, even antidrug programs, that promise to enhance the stature of the military. This holds particularly true if the programs are perceived to strengthen the military's nondemocratic internal security capabilities as outlined in LIC-counterinsurgency doctrine, of which MCA and HCA are a part.

*"There is no future as of now for MCA in Security Assistance. There is no groundswell support for LIC."*³²

Including HCA in a LIC/counterinsurgency doctrine that is unlikely to become operational for US forces severely circumscribes a future substantial role for US military actions in Latin America. These conclusions lead to several specific policy recommendations on delinking HCA from LIC. Remaining are questions about the relevance of US counterinsurgency doctrine in the light of the increased ambiguity of non-communist threats to US interests in the Western Hemisphere and concern about the blanket application of the term "low-intensity conflict" to all of Latin America.

With diminishing superpower competition in the Third World, the threat on which MCA, counterinsurgency and LIC were based has receded if, as President George Bush has declared, we are "beyond Containment."³³ The Soviet Union has urged Cuba to stop exporting its brand of revolution, and the rest of the hemisphere is populated by "fragile" democracies that need economic rather than military assistance.³⁴

If the MCA concept was based on a threat that no longer exists or is changing, throughout Latin America, the Army must devise new concepts. Economic, social and criminal threats are increasingly ambiguous as to the application of military power in a democratizing Latin America. The US military should keep in mind that



Army National Guardsmen inspect the pilings for a Bailey bridge in Panama during Exercise BLAZING TRAILS, March 1985.

The Stevens Amendment, later expanded, permitted US troops to perform civic actions—but only incidental to or in conjunction with approved military exercises overseas. This legislation has led to the persistent claim that National Guard and Reserve Component troops are in Central America because “we are there to train, nothing more.”

US policy makers and the Congress have consistently found the developmental and humanitarian aspects of civic action activities to be attractive concepts that are above reproach. Moreover, the humane aspects of these programs reflect US ideals that are well-known and admired by Latin Americans and many other people in Third World countries.

Therefore, any civic action proposed by the Army for Latin America must emphasize humanitarian development and be completely divorced from “security,” counterinsurgency and LIC. How can a civic action program be set up for the future that will support the developmental ideals of the concept, use Army manpower and resources and avoid many of the political pitfalls that have plagued civic action in the past?

The following recommendations and justifications for them offer an answer.

Recommendations. *Delink HCA from LIC/counterinsurgency, and include HCA in a new, separate “peacekeeping” doctrine.*

Current LIC doctrine includes four “operational categories”: insurgency support and counterinsurgency (includes HCA), combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations (United Nations-type) and peacetime contingency operations (such as Panama). The LIC categories represent every possible operation except major war in Europe. Studies done for the Army since 1983 have urged that discrete doctrine be formulated for each of the categories. Instead, the US military should include the nonwar-fighting concept of HCA under “peacekeeping

operations" and separate it from LIC.³⁵

Broaden the new HCA/peacekeeping function, organize it as a specialty in each service and promote joint DOD projects.

The HCA/peacekeeping specialty would be dedicated to development construction and medical, managerial and conservation civic

If the MCA concept was based on a threat that no longer exists or is changing, throughout Latin America, the Army must use the new concepts. . . . Any civic action proposed by the Army for Latin America must emphasize humanitarian development and be completely divorced from "security," counterinsurgency and LIC.

assistance. Its rationale is simply humanitarian; a form of cheaper foreign aid as US foreign assistance budgets shrink. It should enhance DOD "jointness," with all services contributing to projects.³⁶

Call the new HCA/peacekeeping function "The US Development Corps," establish the development corps as a new unified military command and contract its services only to democratic civilian governments.

The US Development Corps would avoid the legal constraints that have marked the civic action concept's history by working under contract only to democratic civilian governments. It would be stationed in the United States and provide its recruits with vocational training to fulfill its mission. Morale is expected to be high, as it has been in units that have performed civic assistance in Honduras. Service in the development corps might be an attractive option for US troops coming home from Europe and Korea, providing opportunities for advancement based on excellence in civic assistance abilities.

Justifications. The development corps supports US national interests. Increasing the managerial and humanitarian competence of new democracies is an objective congruent with US

interests in support of democracy in a rapidly changing world.

The development corps is cost-effective. This mission would help retain force structure and facilities in the United States and contribute to alleviating joblessness and lack of skills both in Latin America, through training and example, and in the United States when those who have served in the development corps return to civilian life.

The development corps could prove, in terms of the US budget, that the Army and other services involved in it are "paying their way." The institutional experience of the services makes the military the most capable organization for such a mission. Development work by the military is a form of foreign aid and, therefore, would save not only dollars paid to civilian contractors but also could realize additional cost savings by combining Army pay as foreign aid. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) would negotiate the contracts in consultation with the development corps commander. The work would also be cheaper for the receiving country. As USAID and foreign assistance resources diminish, the development corps can help fill the gaps.

Development for debt? Because of crushing Latin American debt problems that endanger the viability of the new democracies, the development corps commander should urge DOD and the Department of State to develop a program for Third World democratic governments. They would exchange a portion of their international debt for "permitting" the development corps, under contract, to "train" in conducting its humanitarian development role. A "debt for development and training" program would require removing congressional banking restrictions and passing enabling legislation.

The development corps can serve as the nucleus for a new CCC. With a decaying urban and rural infrastructure within the United States, ideas for new national service, including a plan from Senator Sam Nunn, have been set forth. Most are based on the successful Army-run CCC of the 1930s which provided pride

and jobs for thousands. The future US Army Development Corps might also recruit for such a mission. Again, this mission would help retain force structure and facilities in the United States and contribute to alleviating joblessness and lack of skills both in the Third World and in the United States.

The development corps can serve as a multilateral development multiplier. Supporting the argument that developmental and economic assistance should not be tied to security, "the U.S. has progressively increased its contributions to the multilateral developmental banks and the United Nations system. . . ." Such aid "now ac-

counts for more than one-third of the total" US economic development aid.³⁷

A continuing trend toward multilateral development assistance combined with the new HCA/peacekeeping doctrine would provide an additional opportunity for the Army to perform those tasks. The development corps would enable the Army and the other services to participate, as in the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces, with other nations in development and humanitarian and civic assistance operations regularly without the negative connotations that have restricted these activities since the 1950s. *MF*

NOTES

1. Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power: Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1968), 4.
2. Robin N. Montgomery, "Military Civic Action and Counterinsurgency: The Birth of a Policy," (diss., University of Oklahoma, 1971), 16 and 196.
3. Michael J. Francis, "Military Aid to Latin America in the U.S. Congress," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* (July 1964):400.
4. Frank R. Pancake, *Military Assistance as an Element of U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin America, 1950-1968*, (diss., University of Virginia, 1969), 50-51.
5. Francis, 384.
6. Pancake, 61-131.
7. Harold Molinsu, *U.S. Policy Toward Latin America: From Regionalism to Globalism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 218-20; and Pancake, 340.
8. Francis, 387-88.
9. Douglas Blaufarb, *The Counter-Insurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance* (New York: Free Press, 1977), 54.
10. Francis, 403.
11. Sam C. Sarkesian, "The American Response to Low-Intensity Conflict: The Formative Period," *Arms in Low-Intensity Conflict*, eds. David Charters and Maurice Tugwell (London, UK: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1980), 68.
12. Montgomery, 196.
13. Pancake, 170.
14. Barber and Ronning, 27-8, 197-8 and 229. In addition, see Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication (JCS Pub) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], June 1987), 28-9. It considers that MCA "would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population."
15. Barber and Ronning, 239-43; Lars Schoultz, *Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 219; and Pancake, 135.
16. Military operations rather than the application of counterinsurgency theory ended guerrilla movements in Latin America in the 1960s. For example, Che Guevara's unsuccessful foco concept made him a military target. In Peru, after unsuccessfully trying to bomb the guerrillas out, the Army finally succeeded in quelling the insurgency by sealing off all access and egress around the guerrilla area of operations. Similarly, the urban terrorists of the 1970s, against whom theories of counterinsurgency bore little relevance, were suppressed by force. See Blaufarb, 284; and Pancake, 165-216.
17. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 16 January 1981).
18. Robert S. Greerberger, "Military's Return to Humanitarian Aid Business Raises Concerns About Using Food as a Weapon," *The Wall Street Journal*, 16 June 1987, 66.
19. This legal limitation on humanitarian and civic assistance is repeated in

- FM 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 5 December 1980), 2-23.
20. Major Bernard Eugene Harvey, "U.S. Military Civic Action in Honduras, 1962-1985: Tactical Success, Strategic Uncertainty," *CLIC Papers*, (Langley Air Force Base, VA: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, October 1988), 9.
21. See unpaginated report of the Third Annual DOD Humanitarian Assistance Conference, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), Office of Humanitarian Assistance, 11-12 January 1989.
22. LTG Emmett H. Walker, Jr., "National Guard Training in Central America," *National Guard* (May 1986):2.
23. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, 2-18.
24. Greerberger, 66.
25. Merrill Collett, "Leftists Challenge Airfield Project: U.S. Army Civic Action Projects Are Precursors of a Full Military Base in Bolivia, Critics Charge," *The Christian Science Monitor* (31 May 1989):3.
26. Interview with Colonel Wayman Robertson, June 1989.
27. Quoted from Merrill Collett.
28. Ibid.
29. Interview with Colonel Lyman Chandler Duryea, June 1989 (former US military attaché in El Salvador).
30. Leslie Lewis, Morlie Hammer and James Eddins, *The Army in Latin America: Leverage in a Constrained Environment*, working draft, (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, August 1988).
31. Barber and Ronning, 239-43; Schoultz, 219; and Pancake, 135.
32. Interview with Colonel C. A. McAnamey, chief, Operations Division Latin America/Africa, Defense Security Assistance Agency, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, 31 January 1989.
33. "Transcript of Bush's Remarks on Transforming Soviet-American Relations," *The New York Times*, 13 May 1989, 6.
34. *The New York Times*, 6 April 1989, 1.
35. FM 100-20, 24 June 1988, 1-10. A draft of new doctrine recently circulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff has taken a giant step in this direction by placing peacekeeping on an "operational continuum" and separating it from low-intensity conflict. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Test Publication, JCS Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, January 1990).
36. The establishment of a development or civic assistance specialty—a development corps—would not be something out of the ordinary. For example, the Army just recently established an Acquisition Corps.
37. *U.S. Foreign Assistance: Investment or Folly?*, eds. John Wilhelm and Gerry Feinstein, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 8. See also Patrick Demongest, "U.N. System Development Assistance," 360.

Regina Gaillard is a national security affairs analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. She is a graduate of Hunter College and holds a Ph.D. from the Center for Advanced International Studies of the University of Miami. She previously worked in government relations in Washington, DC, and has written on international and economic policy issues.

A Time to Build

US Policy for Latin America and the Caribbean



Colonel P. Wayne Gosnell, Army National Guard

Smoldering to the south, mostly unnoticed by an inattentive US public, is a revolution in the making. According to the author, poverty and unrelenting despair are causing an awakening of the peoples of Latin America. He offers a wake-up call to the United States, stating that we must take a moral stand now and back it up with an enlightened military humanitarian/civic assistance program.

LISTEN quietly. Peer intently beyond the flashy headlines and 30-second newsclips coming out of Latin America and the Caribbean, and you will notice something—revolution! A revolution is coming, not just in one or two countries but throughout the region. From the Rio Grande to the Strait of Magellan, it appears sometimes subtly, other times violently; it has already begun. It is a revolution that is neither restrained by national borders nor married to political ideologies. It is a revolution of desperation. Millions of poor, desperate people are awakening to their impoverished plight with an awareness that things can be changed, indeed must be changed, if not peacefully, then through revolution.

The revolution in Nicaragua, the civil war in El Salvador and the insurgencies in Guatemala, Colombia and Peru are but manifestations of the larger revolution to come. The current focus on drug trafficking, serious though it is, must be seen against the inherent instability of Latin America. There is a social and economic

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.—Editor

instability that provides a fertile medium for the growth and spread of the international narcotics trade.

The debate on what to do about, for or with Latin America ebbs and flows through the public awareness, subordinated, at times, to more pressing concerns. But it is nonetheless an ever-present and troubling ripple in the tide of national consciousness. Latin America and the Caribbean are undergoing enormous changes, changes which could fundamentally affect the future well-being of the United States.

Poverty and Injustice

The collage of peoples and cultures to the south is an incredibly complex panorama of interdependent forces. Despite the North American tendency of focusing on only one major issue at a time, Latin America can only be comprehended as the sum of its parts. Poverty; injustice; instability; liberation theology; and social, economic and political revolution are in constant and complex interaction.

To understand the complexity to the south, one must first understand its poverty. The cold statistics that dispassionately detail the desperate human condition in Latin America are readily available. The causes and effects of that poverty are perhaps not so evident. The US Congress House Committee on Appropriations stated in 1981, "... the unrest we see in the region today is due in very large measure to the inequitable development patterns of the past and, in a number of countries, the present."¹ The 1984 National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, the "Kissinger Commission," concluded that "the commanding issue in all of Latin America is the impoverishment of the people."² Former US ambassador to El Salvador, Robert E. White, citing a 1981 US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report warns:

"... it is a grave, and if we continue it, fatal error to believe that we are confronting primarily a case of Communist aggression in Central America. What we are basically confronting is an authentic revolution, born out of despair and discouragement because of a lack of economic opportunity and because of a distortion of the political process."³

Major General Evan L. Hultman agrees, saying, "internal dissatisfaction with social inequities, economic deprivation and political isolation have given rise to many indigenous insurgencies throughout the hemisphere."⁴

People struggling against starvation, ignorance and disease value political ideology only to the extent that it affects their own desperate condition. Likewise, the evils of the drug trade are relative. Peasants, struggling to put food on the table for their children, see income from coca leaf production as their salvation. *Narcotraficantes*, taking advantage of the desperation of poverty and the seemingly

The current focus on drug trafficking, serious though it is, must be seen against the inherent instability of Latin America. There is a social and economic instability that provides a fertile medium for the growth and spread of the international narcotics trade.



A Colombian farmer picking coca leaves in Caldas state, November 1986. The trees grow up to 7 feet high and can be picked every three months.

insatiable North American demand for drugs, often provide a welcome means of economic stability for those unfortunates for whom there are few alternatives. Many in Latin America, in fact, argue passionately that it is far more preferable to send cocaine north for the gringos than to allow their own children to starve. The consequences, they say with a shrug, are a North American problem.

Professor Lars Schoultz, director of the University of North Carolina Institute of Latin American Studies, affirms that there is widespread agreement that poverty underlies instability in the region. But he rhetorically questions why peasants, who have suffered in silence, poverty and political repression for centuries, have now suddenly decided to rise up in insurrection. He attributes the change to the "revolution of rising expectations" spurred on by structural changes of the Latin American societies, particularly changes in transportation and communication.⁵ Phillip Berryman, former Central American representative of the American Friends' Service Committee, agrees, stating that the expectations of the peasants have been raised by the church and by development agencies. He notes, however, that the poor have often been frustrated by their lack of progress which, in turn, has led to militancy among the peasants.⁶

The bridge between being aware of one's impoverished socioeconomic condition and initiating action to improve the situation is political mobilization. Schoultz notes that in Latin America today the poor are forming grass-roots organizations ranging from cooperative to neighborhood self-help communities and are "pushing themselves into the political system."⁷ Many of these small, community-based organizations are connected with the church and the idea of liberation theology.

Liberation Theology and the Revolution of Rising Expectations

To some, liberation theology is theology; to others, it is revolution. One cannot attempt to understand the social and political undercurrents of Latin America today without also understanding the growing influence of liberation theology upon events as they are unfolding. Considered by some to be potentially as significant as the Protestant Revolution, the theology of liberation and human emancipation is *persuasive* in its influence and promises to have a profound effect upon the entire Latin American sociopolitical equation.⁸

No less a revolutionary than Che Guevara has observed that "when Christians dare not to give full-fledged revolutionary witness, the Latin American revolution will be inevitable."⁹ What we are witnessing in Latin America today is a convergence of the rhetoric of leftist revolutionaries with the sincere beliefs of growing numbers of Latin American Christians that there is a sound biblical basis

People struggling against starvation, ignorance and disease value political ideology only to the extent that it affects their own desperate condition. Likewise, the evils of the drug trade are relative. Peasants, struggling to put food on the table for their children, see income from coca leaf production as their salvation.

for making radical changes in the existing, inequitable structures of society. A grass-roots revolution is in the making, and in many cases, political opportunities are standing in the wings ready to turn inevitable chaos to their own ultimate advantage.

Put simply, liberation theology is "an interpretation of Christian faith out of the experience of the poor."¹⁰ The focus of theology is upon the life of Jesus and his message. The poor, through scriptural study, come to understand their individual self-worth and personal dignity and their right to seek a better life, not only in the next world but also in the present. Inevitably, the outcome of such study is a critical evaluation of the present forces in society as being responsible for their economic deprivation and political injustice. "Liberation theology," Berryman explains, "is a critique of economic structures that enables some Latin Americans to jet to Miami or London to shop while most of their fellow citizens do not have safe drinking water."¹¹

Walter LaFeber, professor of history at Cornell University explains that, for centuries, the Roman Catholic Church had been one of the pillars of the status quo in Latin America. However, following the encyclicals of Pope John XXIII in 1961 and 1963, the Vatican Council II in 1963 to 1965 and the Second Latin American Bishops' Conference in Medellín, Colombia, in 1968, the church became "an engine for (religious) revolution."¹² The focus of the church in Latin America has shifted from the rich to the poor. A major historical fissure has occurred, and the tremors are now being felt.

Gustavo Gutiérrez, a Peruvian theologian and one of the advisers at the Medellín conference, has profoundly influenced the development of liberation theology. Gutiérrez sees "dehumanizing poverty as an offense against God" and urges priests to see poverty as an evil, "to protest against it" and to struggle to abolish it."¹³ It is in this struggle against poverty that liberation theology has encountered its most vigorous opposition, for the theology sees poverty as a result of the manner in which society is structured. To alleviate "dehumanizing poverty" requires changes in society's structure that require the poor to move into political action—a move often opposed by those benefiting from the status quo.

To the peasant, there is a direct connection between awakening his mind to his situation through the Gospel, organizing his village for self-help projects and joining a national peasant organization. Armies and police, Berryman states, have often been suspicious of such movements and, in many cases, have targeted them for repression. The peasants, in turn, have become increasingly militant and radicalized.¹⁴ It is in the ferment of a frustrated peasantry that leftist opportunists have implanted their message and begun their struggle "for the people."

Unfortunately, the emergence of peasant organizations and the political mobilization of the poor have often been met by elite

Narcotraficantes, taking advantage of the desperation of poverty and the seemingly insatiable North American demand for drugs, often provide a welcome means of economic stability for those unfortunates for whom there are few alternatives. Many . . . argue passionately that it is far more preferable to send cocaine north for the gringos than to allow their own children to starve.

The poor, through scriptural study, come to understand their individual self-worth and personal dignity and their right to seek a better life, not only in the next world but also in the present. . . . The present forces in society [are seen] as being responsible for their economic deprivation and political injustice.

intransigence—the governing minority's unwillingness to make changes in their societies' socioeconomic structures to satisfy the peasants' needs. The entrenched oligarchy commonly responds to the demands of the impoverished, but vocal, peasantry through brutal repression.¹⁵

As a result of the ruling elite's unwillingness to change, many peasants have become radicals and joined insurgencies. Berryman states that as governments responded with increased repression, "... many people felt they had little to lose by supporting the insurgents."¹⁶ General John R. Galvin, former commander of the US Southern Command, acknowledges that "political stress and social frustrations have fed the insurgent movements."¹⁷

There is little doubt that poverty, social injustice and political repression have fed the fires of Latin American insurgencies. To dampen these fires by alleviating the grinding poverty and social and political injustices will require vast changes in the socioeconomic and political structures of many Latin American nations. Unfortunately, the ruling elite are reluctant to make such reforms. In their intransigence, they are making President John F. Kennedy's words prophetic: "Those who make reform impossible make revolution inevitable."¹⁸

The Coming Revolution and the Moral High Ground

The revolution is coming. It is already at the door. In Latin America, leftist rhetoric is converging with the ideology of liberation theology in a historical repudiation of the existing order. Both groups clearly are seeking radical changes in the status quo—revolutionary changes. The entire US post-World War II policy in Latin America has been to seek to preserve the status quo to ensure stability in its southern flank. It is precisely this status quo that is now under attack—violently by leftist insurgents and morally by human rights and liberation theology proponents. The latter seeks to liberate man from his poverty and injustice while the former seeks to dominate him. It is indeed ironic that two groups with such widely divergent religious and moral views should converge in common cause. It is doubly ironic that the United States, a country born of revolution and founded on the idea of the equality of man, with "liberty and justice for all," should ever find itself opposing similar revolutions to the south.

Over the long term, absent a sound, moral justification for its policies, the US government cannot rely on the support of the American electorate. When the cause has a clear moral justification (World War II or *Desert Storm*), the American people will sacrifice "life, fortune and sacred honor" to defend their ideals. When the cause is ambiguous (Vietnam), public dissension will compel a vacillating and ultimately ineffective foreign policy.



Father Luis Montoya, a priest of Nicaragua's "People's Church," celebrates Mass, October 1984. The mural behind the altar depicts scenes of oppression and a gun-toting priest.

Walt Whitl Photos

The American people will not long support a foreign policy without at least an implicit moral basis. In Latin America, however, the leftists attack the unjust status quo defended by the entrenched, and often repressive, oligarchy and champion the rights of the impoverished masses. In so doing, they have staked claim to what many consider to be the moral high ground. Using social and political instability as a cover, the drug cartels are exploiting the situation to their own evil ends.

It is within the United States' power to reclaim the moral high ground in Latin America by concentrating its resources on eradicating the poverty, ignorance and disease that give rise to insurgencies. Acknowledging the necessity for a fully coordinated and integrated approach to the problems of the region, the US military is limited in its ability to effect such a policy on its own. It does have the ability, however, to lead the way toward this goal by concentrating resources in military civic action operations in support of nation assistance. Done in cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean local authorities and in coordination with the US Agency for International Development, an expanded and specifically focused military civic action program could fill in the gaps of current nation assistance efforts and contribute significantly to alleviating the people's misery.

To address the root causes of Latin American instability, the United States should adopt a strategic military humanitarian/civic assistance policy. The succinct basis for such a policy should be:

[Liberation] theology sees poverty as a result of the manner in which society is structured. To alleviate "dehumanizing poverty" requires changes in society's structure that require the poor to move into political action—a move often opposed by those benefiting from the status quo.

The entire US post-World War II policy in Latin America has been to seek to preserve the status quo to ensure stability in its southern flank. It is precisely this status quo that is now under attack—violently by leftist insurgents and morally by human rights and liberation theology proponents.

Proceeding with village-level consensus using appropriate technology, the United States will concentrate the maximum amount of military humanitarian/civic assistance possible at the most basic and local level practical to assist the rural campesino to improve his standard of living.

When in doubt as to the purpose or direction of a particular program or proposal, with such a policy, one need only answer the question, "Does this directly help the rural *campesino*?" Given the still limited resources available for US assistance to the region, the answer to this question would serve to focus US efforts on the "center of gravity" of leftist insurgencies and the rural poor.

Although such a policy might well serve to accelerate the "revolution of rising expectations" in Latin America to the ultimate detriment of the entrenched oligarchy, its morality is clear. The moral basis for a US strategic military humanitarian/civic assistance policy coincides with the liberation theologians' argument that poverty is a sin against God.

The United States is a great nation, born of revolution and founded on belief in God and the equality of men. Therefore, such a rationale and justification for a long-term military civic action program for the area is eminently practical. Such a policy would "take the moral high ground" and deny the leftist opportunists the strategically critical advantage of pretending to fight for the human rights of the common people. By championing the poor and encouraging governments in the region to do the same, the United States would align itself with the inevitable revolutionary changes that are beginning to sweep Latin America.

The American Right of Revolution

The revolution against the inequitable status quo in Latin America has begun—peacefully and democratically in some nations; violently and oppressively in others. The common denominator is a desire by diverse and often divergent groups for a change in existing unjust social, economic and political structures. Seeing the abject poverty in which many Latin Americans live, Robert F. Kennedy argued:

"These people will not accept this kind of existence for the next generation. We would not; and they will not. There will be changes . . . a revolution is coming—a revolution which will be peaceful if we are wise enough; compassionate if we care enough; successful if we are fortunate enough—but a revolution which is coming whether we want it or not. We can affect its character; we cannot affect its inevitability."¹⁹

The revolution is now at the door. The winds of change are blowing at the bulwarks of the existing status quo, cracking its foundations and sending shudders among its defenders. Leaning into the storm, the United States has too often found itself tolerating a status quo of social, economic and political injustices that would be abhor-



There is little doubt that poverty, social injustice and political repression have fed the fires of Latin American insurgencies. To dampen these fires by alleviating the grinding poverty and social and political injustices will require vast changes in the socioeconomic and political structures of many Latin American nations. Unfortunately, the ruling elite are reluctant to make such reforms.

rent within its own borders. The *real* revolution in Latin America is a revolution against this oppressive status quo. It is within this context that leftist insurgents seek to advance their own agenda in the region, and the international drug lords exploit the instability for their own profit.

For the United States, the situation is a historic contradiction of its own heritage, a heritage of struggle against oppression by the few for the many. The nation, however, is not without historical guidance in the crisis. Truths, once self-evident but now obscure, are still applicable. Once, long ago, an angry young revolutionary wrote:

"We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness—That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government

[A long-term civic action program] might well serve to accelerate the "revolution of rising expectations" in Latin America to the ultimate detriment of the entrenched oligarchy... [but would] deny the leftist opportunists the strategically critical advantage of pretending to fight for the human rights of the common people. By championing the poor and encouraging governments in the region to do the same, the United States would align itself with the inevitable revolutionary changes.

becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it."²⁰

The right of revolution against an oppressive status quo and the right to have a government "of the people, by the people and for the people" has been defended by Americans for more than 200 years. It is time we open the door and ally ourselves, through an expanded and enlightened military humanitarian/civic assistance program, with our heritage. It is time we embrace the revolution of rising expectations in Latin America and work together to secure political liberty and socioeconomic justice for all of the people of the Americas. President Kennedy's words have never been more applicable:

"Now the trumpet summons us again, not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need; not as a call to battle, though embattled we are; but a call to bear the burdens of a long twilight struggle—a struggle against the common enemies of man—tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself."²¹

To the south, the trumpet has sounded. Who will answer the call? **MR**


NOTES

1. Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 71.
2. National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, *Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, January 1984), 24.
3. Schoultz, 137, citing US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Situation in El Salvador*, 97th Congress, 1st sess., 28.
4. MG Even L. Hullman, USAF, Retired, "Central American Nation-Building Needs Military Capabilities Rather Than Force," *The Officer* (August 1986):7.
5. Schoultz, 79-81.
6. Philip Barryman, *What's Wrong in Central America and What To Do About It*, (Philadelphia, PA: American Friends Service Committee, 1983), 10.
7. Schoultz, 87.
8. Philip Barryman, *Liberation Theology: Essential Facts About the Revolutionary Movement in Latin America and Beyond* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 6-7.
9. *Ibid.*, 28.
10. *Ibid.*, 4 and 5.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1984), 219-20.
13. Barryman, *Liberation Theology*, 32 and 33.
14. *Ibid.*, 64.
15. James Chace, *Endless War: How We Got Involved in Central America and What Can Be Done* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984); Shirley Chrissan, *Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family* (New York: Random House, 1986); and Peter Davis, *Where is Nicaragua?* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); LaFeber.
16. Barryman, *Liberation Theology*, 16.
17. GEN John R. Galvin, "Challenge and Response on the Southern Flank: Three Decades Later," *Military Review* (August 1986):8.
18. Schoultz, 64.
19. LaFeber, 160.
20. United States of America Declaration of Independence, 4 July 1776.
21. John F. Kennedy, "Inaugural Address, 1 January 1961," *The Little Red, White and Blue Book: A Collection of Historical Documents*, ed. World Almanac editors, (New York: Pharos Books, 1987), 60.

Colonel P. Wayne Gosnell, Texas Army National Guard, is serving in the Title 10 Active Guard Reserve program as the US National Guard Adviser, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE). He received a B.B.A. from Texas A&M University and an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin. He is a graduate of the Inter-American Defense College. He has served with the University of Puerto Rico, the National Guard Bureau, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army and with the US Forces Caribbean. His article, "The Reserve Component Role in LIC," appeared in the February 1989 *Military Review*.

FIELD MANUAL 100-20
AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 3-20

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT



HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF
THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

LIC

Lieutenant Colonel John B. Hunt, US Army, Retired

The Gulf War notwithstanding, emphasis in recent years has increasingly focused on the military role in what has become known as low-intensity conflict, or just LIC. The author provides some background and clarity on the terminology while also describing the basic features of the joint Army and Air Force LIC doctrine.

IN A SMALL ceremony in Washington, DC, on 5 December 1989, Chief of Staff of the Army General Carl E. Vuono and Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Larry D. Welch signed the foreword of US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet (AF Pam) 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*. This culminated nearly three years of effort to produce new biservice doctrine for the complex environment that is widely recognized as the most probable threat to US interests in the near future. The ceremony constituted final approval for the publication that was distributed to the field in late spring 1990.

The basic concepts of low-intensity conflict (LIC) have been around since the early 1960s, but they have never been so thoroughly incorporated into the doctrine of the US Armed Forces.

The authors of the manual came to recognize that LIC is qualitatively different from war, has a different purpose and requires different methods. LIC conjures images of insurgent guerrillas in poor, tropical countries seeking to overthrow governments. In fact, that is only part of its meaning.

The official definition of LIC in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication (JCS Pub) 1-22, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, is:

"Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by

a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications."

Lexicographers would probably consider this an essay, not a definition. Yet, is useful and expresses some parameters omitted from earlier

LIC is qualitatively different from war, has a different purpose and requires different methods. LIC conjures images of insurgent guerrillas in poor, tropical countries seeking to overthrow governments. In fact, that is only part of its meaning.

definitions. It defines the phenomenon by establishing upper and lower limits: below war, above the routine and peaceful competition among states. War has not yet been officially defined, but like art and pornography, we generally know it when we see it. Routine, peaceful competition is easily visualized. Countries have disagreements over many things—tariffs, trade, territorial waters, immigration and many others. They can usually be resolved through the diplomatic process; they do not require large-scale killing. This is not the peace of the millenium, but it is about the best we can do in an imperfect world.

The LIC Phenomenon

There is only one universe of fact, and we must recognize that any divisions we make in it are arbitrary and made for our analytical convenience. The generalizations of peace, LIC, and war are essentially correct in their middle regions, but the distinctions become fuzzy at the edges. That is, there are no bright line borders between them. At its upper limits, LIC is very close to war and shares many of its characteristics. At its lower limits, it is distinguished from peace (or routine peaceful competition) by introducing violence into the political process.

The official definition aids understanding by what it omits. Earlier versions specifically excluded sustained combat by regularly constituted forces. That distinction is no longer present. By implication, then, some pitched battles can be fought in an environment we still describe as LIC.

To find the distinguishing element between LIC and war at the upper limit, we must look to other sources. The *National Security Strategy of the United States* (the White House, January 1987 and January 1988 editions) states that the military role in LIC is indirect and supports the political, economic and informational instruments of national power. These documents say the principal role of the military instrument is security assistance but adds that the United States may employ its own combat power when national interests are seriously threatened and other means are not sufficient. The latter idea supports the upper limit in the JCS Pub definition. It also makes clear that using US combat power is not a preferred option.

The JCS Pub definition also refers to a "combination of means," indicating an understanding that LIC is not an exclusively military show. By inference and extrapolation, we can arrive at a clearer vision of what LIC is. It is neither war nor peace. It includes violence, but the military dimension is not dominant. That is to say, we have not given up on the idea that the problem can be solved by political means supported by various economic and informational options, as well as by limited and appropriate military means.

This expanded description contains the assumption that nonviolent solutions to problems are preferable to violent ones. On its face, that would seem a truism, but if it were universally valid, there would never have been a war. Every country holds some values (even though it may be hard to define them) for which it will risk destruction in war. A serious threat to those values excludes the methods of LIC. Therefore, we can see that LIC does not constitute a threat to the survival of the state; we engage in LIC for some lesser concerns.

A Honduran teacher and US soldier distribute school supplies during *Fuertes Caminos 88*.



The solution [earning legitimacy] was to be found in balanced development—political, economic and social. Military combat forces had a defensive, supporting role. The Armed Forces . . . had great use in the development effort through medical and engineering support, among others. Combat operations had to be limited. Civilian agencies of government had to be in charge. . . . This kind of “war” stood traditional and familiar relationships on their heads. It was not (and is not) easy for people in uniform to accept these differences.

This last idea reveals another characteristic of LIC. It is a value-laden term based on perspective. What is LIC to us may be a struggle for survival for someone else. It reflects our degree of commitment and concern. LIC is important but not vital. Thus, the wags who call LIC “low-intensity conflict” have inadvertently stumbled upon a greater truth than they know. This can be understood by taking the view of a Third World country. Their internal conflict or their war with a neighbor is a vital (life-threatening) interest to them, and they reject the notion that it is LIC. On the other hand, they may view the long confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union as a distracting nuisance that would not concern them, were it not for

the possibility that they might, somehow, be dragged in.

Terminology. Using a value-laden term to describe an important phenomenon is unfortunate. We insult our friends when we describe their vital conflicts as “low intensity.” It suggests they are unworthy of serious concern. Like such terms as “backward country” that have been largely rejected, LIC implies that, if only the Third World had sophisticated, precision-guided munitions with nuclear warheads, they could have a real war. It also suggests that their lives, fortunes and honors are somehow valued less than those of the Northern Hemisphere. To the man in the trenches, his war is intense enough, thank you.

LIC also presents another problem in understanding. Remembering that it is an arbitrary division of the whole universe of human relations, we can consider it unfortunate that the term

The generalizations of peace, LIC, and war are essentially correct in their middle regions, but the distinctions become fuzzy at the edges. That is, there are no bright line borders between them. At its upper limits, LIC is very close to war. . . . At its lower limits, it is distinguished from peace (or routine peaceful competition) by introducing violence into the political process.

presents obstacles in understanding what is sought to be understood. That problem is the whole idea of a conflict continuum. A linear presentation of low-, mid- or high-intensity conflict suggests a one-dimensional relationship of quantitative variations. That is, low means less, and high means more of the same thing.

Generally, when combined with the idea of "intensity," low, mid or high indicates the number and caliber of rounds fired. This implies an inevitable and even desirable escalation from one level to the next higher. This is an example of the logical error of "begging the question." The situation is presented in such a way that the solution is implied. Without careful consideration, one is tempted to exercise his greater military power by increasing the level of violence, as we did in Vietnam. That experience, while still controversial, is widely believed to illustrate the error of such an approach.

The conflict spectrum idea is simplistic. It ignores qualitative differences that LIC specialists contend are of primary importance. A hint of the qualitative differences is revealed in the definitional references to political, economic and informational instruments of national power. Those suggest something different than bigger guns and more ammunition. The qualitative differences will be discussed later.

Origin and Meaning. It is legitimate to wonder why a term is generally accepted when its shortcomings are so many and so well-known. The answer is less than satisfactory, but it reflects the necessity to get on with a problem under less-than-perfect conditions. The following discussion is derived from long exposure to the debate on LIC from its origin.

LIC began life as a euphemism. The term reflects our failure in Vietnam and our long dislike (not entirely dissipated) of discussing it. We had used counterrevolution, counterinsurgency, stability operations, internal defense and development, and maybe other terms. Whenever their coded meaning was discovered and the government was suspected of planning for another Vietnam, the name was changed. The term "low-intensity conflict" came into vogue in the 1970s.

About that time, there was a revival of serious scholarship about the phenomenon of insurgency or revolution. Military and civilian students revisited the studies of the early 1960s and examined more recent examples of the problem that refused to go away. They rediscovered the high political content of these struggles, from Malaya through the Philippines to Vietnam and Latin America. They learned, again, the lesson that the insurgent forces and government forces are drawn from the same people. They rediscovered that the people somehow choose the side they support based on that side's proposals for dealing with issues that concern them. They understood legitimacy to mean enjoying the people's assent to be governed by one side rather than by the other.

Mobilizing popular support and buttressing legitimacy became the primary concerns. Scholars came to recognize the secondary role of violence. It could not win and could not even drive people into the arms of the enemy. The solution was to be found in balanced development—political, economic and social. Military combat forces had a defensive, supporting role. The Armed Forces, they discovered, had great use in the development effort through medical and engineering support, among others. Combat operations

had to be limited. Civilian agencies of government had to be in charge. Scholars discovered that this kind of "war" stood traditional and familiar relationships on their heads. It was not (and is not) easy for people in uniform to accept these differences.

The scholarship of the 1970s was not new, but it added sophistication and increased the depth of knowledge. It had a practical turn from which specific programs could be developed that stood a reasonable chance of success. A strategy for counterinsurgency, not unlike that of a decade earlier, was developed. Initiatives were made to implement it in the Armed Forces.

By 1980, the momentum had died down again. Proponents of what Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. calls "the concept" (the traditional, quantitative approach to conflict) in his book, *The Army and Vietnam*, were in the ascendancy. The Army, which had led the rediscoveries, decided again that LIC was not its job. A struggle, which continues, has seen both advances and setbacks for the advocates of the qualitative approach to LIC.

The world continues to intrude, however, and the wolf at the door cannot be ignored. The struggles in Central America jolted the Army and the country back to reality. The study of LIC resumed its advance, and it continues to experience ups and downs. Proponents of LIC continue to seek understanding and solutions to the problems.

From Counterinsurgency to LIC

The increasingly sophisticated understanding of counterinsurgency led to an important discovery that could be applied with success to other forms of conflict. The political dominance of internal wars is also to be found in some international conflicts. The evidence for this is empirical, and no satisfactory general theory has yet been formulated. It is difficult to put a date on this insight, but some of the examples of recent history are illustrative. The US bombing of Libya on 14 April 1986 is one. That mission was conducted for political and psychological purposes. It was not a simple military operation. It



Marines moving through the twisted wreckage of the Sasan oil tanker 18 April 1986.

To the gun crews on the US destroyers, [attacks on Iranian oil platforms] were direct military actions. From the broader perspective, however, the oil rigs represent a strange choice of target. . . . The attacks on the oil rigs were, in some sense, acts of communication. They were psychological actions. The message they delivered was that the United States would not tolerate Iranian interference with neutral shipping.

delivered a loud message that state-sponsored terrorism would not go unpunished. Military targets were hit, but their destruction was not the driving purpose. Rules of engagement were strict; there were to be no attacks on "targets of opportunity." (In spite of precautions, unintentional damage to other than selected targets occurred.)

Likewise, the attacks by US Navy forces on Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf had an unusual dimension. To the gun crews on the US destroyers, these were direct military actions. From the broader perspective, however, the oil rigs represent a strange choice of target. If the purpose was to change Iranian behavior by military means, in the traditional war sense, destroying those targets would not have done the job. Something was added to the decision-making

[LIC] is a value-laden term based on perspective. What is LIC to us may be a struggle for survival for someone else. It reflects our degree of commitment and concern. LIC is important but not vital. Thus, the wags who call LIC "low-intensity conflict" have inadvertently stumbled upon a greater truth than they know.

process. That something was the political dimension. The attacks on the oil rigs were, in some sense, acts of communication. They were psychological actions. The message they delivered was that the United States would not tolerate Iranian interference with neutral shipping in the international waterways of the Persian Gulf. The attacks demonstrated a greater military capability and a warning. They told Teheran to change its behavior, or else. It was not necessary to spell out in detail, "or else what?"

Many conflicts in the world are something short of war. Forty years of confrontation between Israel and the Arab states have been punctuated by wars, but most of the time, they have constituted something else. India and Pakistan have engaged in some form of LIC since 1947. Theirs is a different conflict from that in the Middle East, since the interwar periods have been generally free of violence.

There are other examples around the world. Some people have included the stand-off of mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union under the rubric of LIC. It can

be made to fit within the parameters of the JCS Pub definition, but that is probably to the discredit of the definition. Somehow the values at stake are too high to call that situation LIC. That is an American perspective, of course. Maybe someone else would call it LIC, but that is just too big a pill for an American to swallow. Thus, the scholarly discoveries of the 1970s and 1980s show that LIC is bigger than insurgency and counterinsurgency, but they are not yet able to determine accurately what its upper limit is.

It may be that definitional limits are useful only to philosophers. We can agree that the US-Soviet stand-off is not LIC without offering detailed reasons why. It is our scholarship and our perspective, and we know that is not what we mean by LIC. Other countries can write their own studies. If I were to attempt a new definition of LIC, I would start with something like the JCS Pub version and add words to the effect that it is a situation in which US survival values are not at risk except perhaps in the long-term cumulative effect but that important interests are threatened.

However, I do not want to attempt a new definition. That brings us back to accepting a term that is generally considered unsatisfactory. Hundreds of attempts have been made to put a name on the phenomenon of "less than war, not peace." None proved any more useful than LIC. Pages of military journals were filled with debate by advocates of one term after another. Eventually, the debate proved to be a distraction. We really do not care how many angels can dance on the head of a pin if our purpose is to close up a rip in our pants. The rip was growing wider, and the time had come to decide how to deal with the phenomenon, whatever it might be called. Enough was known about LIC to do that practically.

LIC is a term of convenience. It is embodied in law by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 that established the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and mandated a LIC board on the National Security Council. People in government know what it means even though it is



LIC, with its elements of violence, requires that the military instrument of power be engaged. Yet, as we have seen, the prospect of politically resolving the conflict has not been abandoned. The aim is to avoid escalating to war and to solve the problem in the political domain. . . . We can "win" in LIC.

not a perfect term. It is sufficient and an end to the definitional debate would permit prosecution of the task.

Army and Air Force Doctrine

The Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, set out to develop a doctrine. The result was FM 100-20/AF Pam 3-20. The book is not perfect, but it is the most comprehensive military document ever written on the subject.

The authors changed the original working title by adding the words, "Military Operations in . . ." That accurately describes their approach. They came to recognize LIC as an environment in which certain types of military operations can make a positive contribution. If LIC is a less than perfect name and the phenomenon is less than perfectly understood, that is no bar to getting on with the job. Enough is known to form a practical doctrine.

The LIC Imperatives. The manual recognizes several characteristics that tie the diverse forms of LIC together. The authors labeled

these imperatives and used them as guides for operational doctrine. The most important of these is "political dominance." Any casual reader of Carl von Clausewitz knows the famous dictum that "war is a continuation of politics by other means." Certainly, wars are fought to achieve some political aim. In war, the military instrument of national power is used to create the conditions in which that aim can be realized. Diplomacy, propaganda and economic policies are all subordinated to military necessity. Military action pursues the aim directly. The other instruments of national power have a supporting role.

In peacetime (routine peaceful competition), the military instrument is not actively engaged. It is in reserve. It uses this opportunity to prepare for war. The threat of its use creates deterrence.

LIC, with its elements of violence, requires that the military instrument of power be engaged. Yet, as we have seen, the prospect of politically resolving the conflict has not been abandoned. The aim is to avoid escalating to war and to solve the problem in the political domain. (Note that this constitutes a definition of success. We can "win" in LIC.)

The political instrument is dominant in LIC. The military instrument, along with information and economic policy, is secondary or supportive. That is the meaning of the words in the *National Security Strategy*. The logic grows out of

A government conducting operations in LIC must look to the legitimacy of the entity it is supporting and to its own legitimacy. . . . Whether a government, an organization or an action is legitimate is a matter for the private and cumulative judgments of the whole world. Every act of a military force or its individual members can make positive or negative impacts on legitimacy.

the assumption that peace (or LIC) is better than war and that the purpose is to drive the situation down to routine peaceful competition and prevent its escalation to war. Political dominance reinforces that the military role in LIC is indirect. That is inherent in the nature of the environment and has great implications as to how military organizations are effectively employed. It also means that military personnel, down to the lowest organizational level, must be aware of and concerned with the political character of LIC. These lessons are clearly derived from insurgency/counterinsurgency and are applicable to other forms of violence short of war.

The next imperative, unity of effort, is closely related. If the political purpose is to be achieved by combining all of the instruments of power, it is important that their actions be synchronized. This has major implications for command and control, especially when the Armed Forces are trying to synchronize their efforts with civilian agencies in which the concept of "command" is unknown.

Adaptability follows in logical order. It will not suffice to do things ordinarily. This requires more than tailoring forces; it includes changing methods and attitudes.

Legitimacy is the key to success. A government conducting operations in LIC must look to the legitimacy of the entity it is supporting and to its own legitimacy. The concept is a subjective one. Whether a government, an organization or an action is legitimate is a matter for the private and cumulative judgments of the whole world. Every act of a military force or its individual members can make positive or negative impacts on legitimacy.

Perseverance is the final imperative. It seeks to disabuse us of the notion that we can "get the boys home by Christmas." A combined politico-military action cannot succeed unless we are ready to stay for the long haul. Even those peacetime contingency operations (Libya, etc.) in which the military action is swiftly ended require long-term preparation and follow-up. The authors of FM 100-20/AF Pam 3-20 had originally called this imperative "patience." Their intent was to emphasize that dogged prosecution of a set policy may not be the proper course. The Armed Forces and the country must have sufficient flexibility over the long term to change their course of action if it is not working. Sometimes, the best thing to do is nothing. That means, in particular, that apparent short-term benefits might sometimes better be sacrificed in the interest of long-term goals.

These imperatives are the common features of the various conflicts, domestic or international, that we call LIC. We cannot identify all such conflicts with certainty, but we can identify enough of them to form a doctrine.

Operational Categories. The Army and Air Force doctrine divides military operations in LIC into four categories. The first is insurgency/counterinsurgency, from which the ideas grew. The doctrine treats them as a single subject because they are two sides of the same coin. The *National Security Strategy* says we might, under proper circumstances, support either side. Recent history proves the point (Angola, Afghanistan, Nicaragua).

The second category is combating terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic that can be employed in either LIC or war. In LIC, its political content is

Infrared photograph from an A-10 Thunderbolt II
showing the destruction of the center of the
bridge at the intersection of the main road
at the intersection of the main road was
partially destroyed. The bridge was
partially destroyed.

***Terrorism is a tactic that can be employed in either LIC or war.
In LIC, its political content is readily apparent. . . . Terrorism is conducted for
political and psychological purposes, to intimidate or coerce. Our response must
include actions in the same dimensions. That requires the unified effort
of many agencies over extended periods.***

readily apparent. Applying the other imperatives is not difficult to see. Terrorism is conducted for political and psychological purposes, to intimidate or coerce. Our response must include actions in the same dimensions. That requires the unified effort of many agencies over extended periods.

The third category of military operations is peacekeeping. This is interposing a neutral military force between belligerent parties with their consent to aid in negotiating a lasting peace. Without applying the political instrument, it has no chance for success. Scrupulous impartiality is necessary to protect the legitimacy of the peacekeeping force. It must be patient and appreciate the concerns of both sides. Peacekeeping is quite different from fighting, and a military force in this role must adapt it-

self to the environment.

The final category is peacetime contingency operations. This is a large category that includes many actions by the Armed Forces that are useful to the government. Some are warlike (strikes and raids), others are quite peaceful (disaster relief) and still others lie in-between (drug interdiction). All have a dominant political purpose, require an integrated effort with civilian agencies, demand a departure from the ordinary military way of doing things, test the legitimacy of our purpose and methods, and take time.

Relation to AirLand Battle Doctrine. The capabilities, skills, organizations and equipment that the Army and Air Force have developed to use in war are the very things that make the Armed Forces useful to the government in LIC.

Contingency operations . . .
[include] many actions by the Armed Forces that are useful to the government. Some are warlike (strikes and raids), others are quite peaceful (disaster relief) and still others lie in-between (drug interdiction). All have a dominant political purpose, require an integrated effort with civilian agencies, demand a departure from the ordinary military way of doing things, test the legitimacy of our purpose and methods, and take time.

AirLand Battle doctrine applies in LIC, with suitable modification to fit the situation. The LIC imperatives provide guidance for that modification. Thus, the relationship between LIC doctrine and AirLand Battle doctrine is complementary.

Where We Are and Where We Are Going

The doctrine approved by the Army and Air Force provides only the basic framework for executing military missions in the LIC environment. Both services understood and intended from the beginning that implementing doctrine would be required to translate general requirements to specific tasks. The Army Combined Arms Command (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is planning to integrate LIC in combined arms and branch doctrinal publications. Some additional publications will be produced to address the operational categories and other specific missions in greater detail. The Air Force will develop its own procedure for implementing the basic doctrinal guidance.

The Army is also integrating LIC requirements into the Concept-Based Requirements

System, the Army's method for managing change. A study authorized by Army Regulation 5-5, *Army Studies and Analyses*, is under way at Fort Leavenworth to identify requirements, ascertain present Army capabilities, determine efficiencies and deficiencies, and recommend solution sets. The solutions will include all of the domains of combat development: doctrine, training, leadership development, force development and materiel solutions. These solutions will be integrated into the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) for the future development of the Army.

LIC is like an object seen vaguely through a fog. Enough detail is visible that one can discern its inherent danger. Its exact form at the outer limits cannot be discerned. With what we know, we are able to take the appropriate action. This is especially true of counterinsurgency, for which we have a well-developed theory. We know less about support to insurgencies. We also have experience in peacekeeping and some types of peacetime contingency operations such as strikes, raids and shows of force.

There is less information on other peacetime contingency operations such as drug interdiction and combating terrorism. However, there is sufficient understanding to act with prudence and confidence, and the threat is such that we must act. The four operational categories are reasonably well-understood. The doctrine for coping with them appears in FM 100-20/AF Pam 3-20.

There is room for improvement in our understanding of the operational environment of LIC. While we go forward to implement what we know now, we must also continue to pursue further understanding of the phenomenon of conflict short of war. The effort to do that is well under way. **MR**

Lieutenant Colonel John B. Hunt, US Army, Retired, is with the Army Propensity for Low-Intensity Conflict, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a B.A. and J.D. from the University of Kansas. During his military career, he served as a military intelligence officer and a foreign area officer for South Asia.

Developing a Drug War Strategy

LESSONS FROM OPERATION BLAST FURNACE

Lieutenant Colonel John T. Fishel, US Army Reserve

Operation Blast Furnace was a very visible and highly criticized effort by the United States to curb the flow of cocaine into the country. Many have claimed that its meager results were not worth the political fallout. The author finds that Blast Furnace may indeed be a valuable experience for the lessons that should be learned from its successful identification of key "centers of gravity" in the drug industry. He discusses how these can be put to good use in future drug interdiction and eradication efforts.

OPERATION Blast Furnace, the first ever combined interagency US-host nation drug interdiction experiment was requested by the Bolivian government during late summer and fall 1986. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was the lead US agency for the operation. It was tasked by US Commander in Chief, Southern Command (USCINCSO) General John R. Galvin to the commander of the 193d Infantry Brigade, Major General James R. Taylor, whose subordinate commander, Colonel "Steve" Stephens of Task Force Bayonet, was the chief planner and ground commander for most of the operation.¹

Planning began in early summer 1986, and the operation commenced in July. It continued until November when the US troops returned to Panama. Blast Furnace was followed by limited US military assistance to the embassy, DEA and the host nation.

In retrospect, Blast Furnace appears to have been considered a failure. Some examples of this assessment include Donald J. Mabry's comment that Operation Blast Furnace "... nearly toppled

the Paz Estenssoro government."² Similarly, Rensselaer W. Lee states that, "... the use of the US Army to raid cocaine laboratories in Bolivia ... aroused intense nationalistic reactions. ..." while Kevin Healy says that "... Operation Blast Furnace reinforced 'anti-imperialism' and pro-labor political alignment patterns and sentiments in the [Bolivian] coca-cocaine debates."³

The operation, however, really was merely a raid analogous to the 1942 Dieppe mission against the coast of France.⁴ Like the Dieppe raid, Blast Furnace provides a wealth of material for lessons learned. Unfortunately, most of the lessons have been neither captured nor learned. This article seeks to remedy that failing by analyzing the operation and its results. It further attempts to address the lessons of the operation and its aftermath in a way that will suggest strategic alternative approaches to coca.

Analysis of the Operation

Blast Furnace was a combined, interagency operation—combined because it involved US and Bolivian elements; interagency in that it involved the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Justice (specifically the DEA). The operation is best addressed in two specific areas: intelligence and operations.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.—Editor

Effective intelligence was recognized early in the planning stage as key to accomplishing the mission. The mission of DOD forces in *Blast Furnace* was to provide helicopter lift and communications support to Bolivian and DEA forces in antidrug operations. The intelligence portion of

Blast Furnace was a combined, interagency operation—combined because it involved US and Bolivian elements; interagency in that it involved the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Justice (specifically the DEA). . . . Effective intelligence was recognized early in the planning stage as key to accomplishing the mission.

this operation was accomplished by adapting the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process.

IPB is an analysis process that uses all sources to produce a graphic representation of the intelligence estimate. It is a systematic and detailed effort to collect all relevant data about the area of operations, the environment, and enemy doctrine and adaptations. It is integrated to produce a relatively complete picture of the probable courses of action open to the enemy.

In the case of *Blast Furnace*, the process was handicapped by the fact that the senior intelligence officer (and nearly his entire staff) spoke no Spanish and, therefore, it failed to consider overt human intelligence (HUMINT). This failure left a major gap in both the IPB and the ongoing intelligence analysis. In spite of this, they did conduct an effective analysis of the cocaine industry and identified the coca base/cocaine hydrochloric acid (HCl) laboratory as the critical attack node. In strategic terms, this made the lab the center of gravity.

This conclusion flew in the face of some of the conventional wisdom of drug enforcement that said either eradicating the coca crop or eliminating the narcotraffickers (through arrest and judg-

ment) was key. IPB showed that if one eliminated the point at which chemicals, coca, personnel and transport all came together—the lab—there would be a direct and immediate negative impact on the industry.

The IPB process then developed a profile and signature for the drug lab that allowed a specific targeting procedure to be developed. Out of this procedure, target lists were elaborated and targets selected for attack. These targets were assigned at the mission briefing held at 1600 each day before the operational strikes that lifted off at 0600 the next morning. Because the US military controlled the lift assets, it controlled the missions.

The Bolivian Police's Mobile Units for Rural Areas (UMOPAR) discovered the target only after lift-off. DEA went along except when its own version of HUMINT developed leads that diverted DEA assets into usually futile efforts to make arrests. This would also divert some Bolivian-UMOPAR assets and cause postponement of some missions. In general, control of targeting through intelligence and lift assets provided operational control.

The operations undertaken during *Blast Furnace* attacked a significant number of labs. Although there was very little law enforcement success in terms of arrests (only a few low-level individuals), partly resulting from inadequate operations security (OPSEC) at all levels, all of the labs attacked were put out of business, and other labs were not established in Bolivia. The narcotraffickers made a conscious decision to wait for the US effort to end. According to Stephens, all official sources, including the ambassador, told him the operation had succeeded in reducing the flow of coca products from Bolivia to about 10 percent of the previous level.

Late in the operation, it became clear that the narcotraffickers had shut down their Bolivian labs and had chosen to produce more cocaine from other sources of coca such as Peru. DEA then asserted its authority and targeted a peasant village that was known to have a concentration of traffickers. The purpose of this raid was to capture the narcotraffickers and any stores of coca or



US DEA and Bolivian soldiers performing coca paste sackings during Operation Blast Furnace, 1986.

At the time, [the peasant farmer's] break-even point for 100 pounds of coca leaves was \$40. Because of, and during, Blast Furnace, the price of 100 pounds of leaf dropped 37.5 percent to \$25.

Blast Furnace reduced the commerce to and within Trinidad. . . . No mitigating civic action was designed to offset the negative impact of the military operations although rudimentary engineering projects and medical support to the civil population in the poorer areas could have made a positive impact. Thus, Blast Furnace was blamed for the recession it partly caused.

coca products that might be there. The plan called for moving the UMOPAR and DEA raiders in US Army helicopters, exactly as on lab raids. The only significant difference between this raid and the others conducted by *Blast Furnace* was that the target was a populated village rather than an isolated lab.

As in all of the lab raids, OPSEC was not sufficient to preclude some warning. The little warning time was enough, and the raiders were met by a thoroughly aroused and angry village. A near riot ensued, and the raiders departed ignominiously. The fact that the raiders were surprised by this turn of events can be attributed to the lack of HUMINT in the IPB and inadequate HUMINT to support ongoing operations. While DEA HUMINT identified the target, the lack of sociopolitical HUMINT produced failure

to anticipate the popular uprising that occurred.

The fact that civic action operations and psychological operations (PSYOP) had not been included bore a bitter fruit in the village raid. No HUMINT had been generated by civic action, and the fact that the villagers were totally opposed to the raid can be attributed to the lack of any positive PSYOP by the Bolivian and US forces, as well as the rudimentary, but effective, hostile PSYOP used by the narcotraffickers.

In a similar vein, the operational base for *Blast Furnace* was located at the airport of the city of Trinidad in the heart of Beni Department, the center of the clandestine base and HCL labs. While the US troops were housed at the airport, the dozen or so DEA personnel stayed at the Hotel Ganadero in town. The hotel is a fairly luxurious establishment that, in normal times,

Although there was very little law enforcement success in terms of arrests, partly resulting from inadequate operations security at all levels, all of the labs attacked were put out of business, and other labs were not established in Bolivia. The narcotraffickers made a conscious decision to wait for the US effort to end.

caters to cattlemen and narcotraffickers. As a result, there is usually lively commerce from the airport to town and in town.

The presence of the US military and DEA forces of Operation *Blast Furnace* reduced the commerce to and within Trinidad. Also, the isolation of the US troops through their general self-sufficiency eliminated any serious HUMINT efforts in town. No mitigating civic action was designed to offset the negative impact of the military operations although rudimentary engineering projects and medical support to the civil population in the poorer areas could have made a positive impact.⁵ Thus, *Blast Furnace* was blamed for the recession it partly caused.

Results

The results of *Blast Furnace* were relatively modest, yet still significant. Labs were clearly the center of gravity of narco activity in Bolivia in 1986, and the combined attacks on them forced the narcotraffickers to temporarily close down lab operations in that country and simply wait the gringos out. Hence, during the period of *Blast Furnace* from the late dry season through the rainy season, approximately 90 percent of the flow of coca products from Bolivia was interdicted. This was due to the direct effect of the strikes and the indirect effects resulting when the narcotraffickers temporarily halted their processing. Consequently, while the narcotraffickers lost some revenue and equipment, this was not significant.

A far more interesting and significant result was the impact on the peasant coca grower—the

demand for his product simply dried up. At the time, his break-even point for 100 pounds of coca leaves was \$40. Because of, and during, *Blast Furnace*, the price of 100 pounds of leaf dropped 37.5 percent to \$25. In general, the peasants placed no blame—the price drop was an act of God. Indeed, the peasants from five coca-growing villages along the Chaparé River sought assistance from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in developing alternative crops.

Note that this was a direct result of the lab raids. When, late in the operation, emphasis was shifted to law enforcement raids, the peasants were mobilized by the narcotraffickers to violently oppose the raiders. This activity was easy to spot as armed troops, transported by US helicopters, were conducting highly visible operations in peasant villages without any PSYOP preparation, mitigating civic action or adequate HUMINT so they would know what to expect. A further result was the recession induced in Trinidad's economy because it was the site of the rear operating base. Despite the large number of US and UMOPAR troops at the airport, they did not significantly use the services and diversions of the city, and they had disrupted the normal air travel of the narcotraffickers who did use the city. This, plus the lack of PSYOP and mitigating civic action, produced both resentment and the lack of any significant HUMINT to support the operation.

Lessons Learned

The most important lesson from *Blast Furnace* is that the center of gravity on the supply side of the equation is that point at which chemicals, coca products and transportation come together. In Bolivia, in 1986, that point was the coca base/cocaine HCl lab. Although the particular point of concentration may have changed or may change in the future, the fact remains that the point of concentration of resources and product is a center of gravity.

The second part of this lesson is that to attack the center of gravity effectively does not require a law enforcement approach. The law enforce-



Eradication alone is a counterproductive effort. First, it merely alienates the peasant farmer and turns him into a potential insurgent. Second, it is a wasted effort because for every hectare of coca that is eradicated, two to three more are produced.

The base/HCI lab/transport complex, the wholesale distribution center and the money-laundering complex focused on commercial banks. Successfully attack these three centers, and a huge dent is made in the cocaine industry that might be sufficient to buy time to reduce the number of users to a manageable proportion.

ment aspect of *Blast Furnace* was an abject failure. However, the attack on the drug labs successfully reduced the supply of coca products from Bolivia by about 90 percent. The corollary to this lesson is that this center of gravity does not exist in only one country, and if attacked in one place, it will pop up elsewhere. This corollary is one of the few lessons actually learned and has been incorporated into USCINCSO briefings to visitors and as part of his counternarcotics strategy.

A second lesson learned is the primacy of intelligence. The well-learned part of the lesson is that the IPB process can be used to identify the center of gravity and critical nodes for targeting. The part of the lesson that should have been learned was that overt HUMINT is the single best approach in collecting relevant intelligence. Properly used, overt HUMINT would have given far superior information for the IPB

process and would have precluded the disastrous village raid previously described. Overt and clandestine HUMINT would have produced intelligence that permitted a picture of the concentration of precursor chemicals and the organization of the narcotics industry. Finally, a unified intelligence operation would have concentrated rather than dispersed DEA and military efforts.

A third lesson is in the operations area. Mitigating civic action would provide access to overt HUMINT and develop the conditions to conduct strike operations in populated areas. Moreover, Civil Affairs training of the UMOPAR would have reduced the effect their post-*Blast Furnace* operations had in alienating the peasantry.

A fourth lesson, also in the operations area, is that PSYOP is essential to the success of counternarcotics operations. PSYOP, in conjunction

with mitigating civic action, would predispose peasant villages not to interfere with strikes against narcotraffickers. PSYOP, in conjunction with the rear operating base at Trinidad, would

[The intelligence staff] identified the coca base/cocaine hydrochloric acid laboratory as the critical attack node. In strategic terms, this made the lab the center of gravity. . . . IPB showed that if one eliminated the point at which chemicals, coca, personnel and transport all came together—the lab—there would be a direct and immediate negative impact on the industry.

have reduced the negative perception of the base presence at Trinidad. Moreover, strategic PSYOP can be used to effectively target the entire population of the host nation, as well as specific target audiences.

The next lesson is that corruption, although it interferes with OPSEC, can be neutralized so effective operations can be conducted. Corruption tends to preclude effective criminal prosecution, but if the objective of the exercise is to interdict and disrupt narcotrafficking operations, then neutralizing the effects of corruption can be temporary. As a result, the costs to the corrupted person are less for doing what he is supposed to do than for not doing his job because he has been bribed.


The final lesson has to do with the coca eradication program. Eradication alone is a counter-productive effort. First, it merely alienates the peasant farmer and turns him into a potential insurgent. Second, it is a wasted effort because for every hectare of coca that is eradicated, two to three more are produced. This is simply a function of the law of supply and demand. What *Blast Furnace* demonstrated was that targeting the center of gravity, the labs, had the salutary effect of producing steps in voluntarily abandoning coca growing in favor of alternate crops. What happened during the operation was that

demand for leaf and coca paste was reduced to nothing. Peasants who could not make money from growing coca sought alternative crops. As the director of USAID Bolivia later put it, "Eradication depends on effective interdiction." His argument was based on the five villages seeking alternative crop aid as a result of *Blast Furnace*.

Cocaine Industry Centers of Gravity

We have learned much about the cocaine industry since *Blast Furnace*. We now know the dimensions of production among the primary producers—Peru, Bolivia and Colombia—as well as among the secondary producers. We have learned that Peruvian and Bolivian peasants respond to similar stimuli and are in similar circumstances. And we know that the dimensions of the industry between Peru and Bolivia diverge with the production of base and cocaine HCl. But, as late as 1988, a normally astute observer could write that "of course, some Peruvians have sought entry into the more lucrative stages of the agro-industry. Peruvians operate the labs that refine coca leaves into paste . . ."⁶ In this passage, the author gives the impression that paste labs represent a lucrative target. That is precisely the opposite of what was discovered in the IPB analysis for *Blast Furnace*.

The figure shows a graphic flow of the main ingredients of the cocaine industry—chemicals,



coca and money. It also identifies three potential centers of gravity; transportation nodes; and command, control and communications (C³). As shown, the industry is somewhat artificially divided between supply and demand. Moving counterclockwise from the top, straddling the two sides, is the chemical node divided between the kerosene required to turn leaf into paste and the ether and acetone required to turn paste into base and HCl.

The second node is the start of the supply chain—the farmer, pastemaker and transporter. The first two are now, more often than not, the same while the transporter moves leaf directly from the grower or from the stomper to further refinement. The only chemical required for processing at this stage is cheap, readily available kerosene, and the only equipment is a plastic sheet. Along the Chaparé River of Bolivia and the upper Huallaga River of Peru, there are thousands upon thousands of these rudimentary labs that are nothing more than maturation pits. Since *Blast Furnace*, these one- or two-man operations have become a principal target of DEA and its host nation allies, the UMOPAR.

The third node is the base lab/HCl lab/transport center. Here, chemicals, leaf, paste and transport to and from, all come together. Generally, these lab sites are significantly larger than mere maturation pits, requiring several fairly large buildings, storage areas and easy access to both ground and air transport. While they are not large factories, they do give off telltale signatures to relatively unsophisticated (and the most sophisticated) intelligence-collection mechanisms. The signature makes finding the lab complex comparable to finding a fairly large guerrilla base camp (although easier) in counterinsurgency operations. This node, particularly the lab itself, was the one identified by *Blast Furnace*'s IPB process as the center of gravity.

The next node is money. Here, we find money laundries on both sides of the supply/demand line and banks straddling it. This node was identified after *Blast Furnace*.

The fifth node is found on the demand side of the equation. This is wholesale distribution. It

LA POLICIA NACIONAL LOS BUSCA



JEFE DEL CARTEL DE MEDELLIN
ASESINÓ A UNO DE LOS MIEMBROS DEL CARTEL DE MEDELLIN



¡DENUNCIELOS!

—AYUDE... ¡NO SEA LA PROXIMA VICTIMA!

A Colombian wanted poster identifying the Medellín Cartel hierarchy: "Turn them in! Help us—Don't be the next victim!"

It is erroneous to assume that putting the cartel out of business and not allowing anything to replace it will solve anything. Since August 1989, Colombia has mounted a direct attack on the Medellín Cartel, with some apparent success. The price of this strategy, however, has been extremely high in terms of societal violence. . . . and the overall value of all of these actions remains very much in doubt.

is the last site of significant concentration of resources, but only refined cocaine, transportation and money come together. Thus, we are talking about a target that is a warehouse in the midst of many other warehouses, making it a very tough nut to crack indeed. The problem here is comparable to finding good urban guerrillas and requires very high-quality HUMINT to attack.

The last three nodes indicate increasing dis-

person of resources—transport, retail distribution and the user. Attacking any of the three with law enforcement resources is, at best, a delaying action and, at worst, a losing game. Only

[One] target was a populated village rather than an isolated lab. . . .

A near riot ensued, and the raiders departed ignominiously. The fact that the raiders were surprised by this turn of events can be attributed to the lack of HUMINT in the IPB. . . .

While DEA . . . identified the target, the lack of sociopolitical HUMINT produced failure to anticipate the popular uprising that occurred.

addressing the user to reduce demand, and then in a non-law enforcement node, offers much hope of success in the drug war.

Finally, in the very center of the graphic is the C³ node identified as the cartel. It is erroneous to assume that putting the cartel out of business and not allowing anything to replace it will solve anything. Since August 1989, Colombia has mounted a direct attack on the Medellín Cartel, with some apparent success. The price of this strategy, however, has been extremely high in terms of societal violence. Little or no action has been taken against the Cali Cartel, and the overall value of all of these actions remains very much in doubt.

Based on this description of the cocaine industry, three nodes have been identified as probable centers of gravity—the base/HCl lab/transport complex, the wholesale distribution center and the money-laundering complex focused on commercial banks. Successfully attack these three centers, and a huge dent is made in the cocaine industry that might be sufficient to buy time to reduce the number of users to a manageable proportion. Such action would signal victory in the drug war, but only if the identified centers of gravity have been attacked effectively.

Of the three centers of gravity identified in the

narcotrafficking industry, *Blast Furnace* successfully identified the first, the lab complex. Since *Blast Furnace*, however, much of the collective efforts of DEA, the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics Matters (BINM) and the host nation have been focused on far less lucrative targets such as growers and maturation pit paste labs. This violates the cardinal rule of strategy—to attack the enemy's center of gravity and not waste one's time on the trivial.

Toward Strategic Alternatives to Coca: Additional Lessons

The lessons of Operation *Blast Furnace*, combined with the analysis presented of the cocaine industry, provide some direction in seeking strategic alternatives to coca. The principal fact of the cocaine industry is that it is an economic activity driven by supply and demand. Although we identify both a supply and demand side of the equation, there is a demand aspect throughout the supply side.

We, including the strategists of the US Southern Command, have identified the center of gravity as demand, and *Blast Furnace* proved the point. When demand for leaf and coca paste ceased, the price of leaf dropped 37.5 percent, and the peasants lost money cultivating coca. As a result, they sought assistance in producing alternative crops. Hence, the first critical step in developing economic alternatives to coca cultivation is reducing demand at any point in the chain. On the production side of the equation, this means attacking the center of gravity that *Blast Furnace* identified as the labs. It also means not attacking the peasant grower directly and supporting all operations with effective mitigating civic action and PSYOP. The latter does need to be directed at the peasantry because failure to do so will turn coca growers into potential guerrillas. This has happened all too often in Peru, through their progressive alienation from the national government which has never helped them anyway.

If the drug war is at any time successful in reducing demand, then we must be ready to offer alternative crop assistance. Many of the current

areas of coca production will grow almost any crop, so there often is no significant technical problem for substitutes. What is required is that crop substitutes be economically viable; a market must exist. Substitute crops without a market tend toward the same outcome (alienated peasants becoming antigovernment guerrillas) as is produced by operations targeted at the coca growers.

One feature of the cocaine industry that would inhibit introducing alternative crops is that the coca-marketing system comes to the grower or paste producer. The industry buys leaf directly from the peasant or paste from the stomper and provides transport directly from the farmer or the maturation pit. All the primary producer does is prepare his product for shipment and collect his money. For any agricultural alternative to succeed, the marketing and distribution process of the coca industry at the grower's level must be replicated accordingly.

A final consideration in approaching alternatives to coca production is that costs and benefits need not always be calculated in simple economic terms. There are social costs and benefits as well. Reducing the price paid for coca leaf to the peasant below the break-even point may not be necessary if the social cost of growing coca can be raised sufficiently. This would be a very risky and sophisticated supplement to strategy, requiring a major investment in both mitigating and

The attack on the drug labs successfully reduced the supply of coca products from Bolivia by about 90 percent. The corollary to this lesson is that this center of gravity does not exist in only one country, and if attacked in one place, it will pop up elsewhere.

developmental civic action and PSYOP for it to be successful. Moreover, both must support an effective rural development program.

Ultimately, no economic alternative to coca production is viable unless demand is reduced and the costs of growing are raised so that a change is attractive. At that point, any economically viable alternative crop will work, and all other actions will merely help institutionalize the transition to the alternative. The transition to alternatives may be all important. If it only means a return to subsistence agriculture, then the peasant has been placed in a situation of acute relative deprivation that most theorists agree is a recipe for insurrection. The strategic bottom line is that the cocaine industry problem is both political and economic. Success achieved on the economic front will, if not handled with political skill, serve merely to enhance the probability of a serious insurgency such as we now find in Peru. **MR**

NOTES

1. The methodology applied in writing this paper is that of participant observation. The author drafted an initial assessment of *Blast Furnace* based on an observation visit in September 1986 and followed that with a draft strategic assessment of Bolivia. He was also deeply involved in the US Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM's) civic action program in Bolivia from 1986 through 1988. This included a staff visit to the US counternarcotics operations along the Chaparé in 1988. Finally, he was a major contributor to SOUTHCOM's counternarcotics campaign plan in 1989.

2. Donald J. Mabry, "The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in Latin America," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, (Summer/Fall 1988): 69.

3. Rensselaer W. Lee III, "Dimensions of the South American Cocaine Industry," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* (Summer/Fall

1988): 101; and Kevin Healy, "Coca, the State, and the Peasantry in Bolivia, 1982-1988," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* (Summer/Fall 1988): 118.

4. The Dieppe mission was a commando raid that, in military terms, was an absolute disaster but provided an incredible number of valuable lessons for D-day two years later. Like all analogies, this one is flawed since *Blast Furnace* was not the unmitigated disaster Dieppe was.

5. The concepts of mitigating and developmental civic action are developed in LTC John T. Fishel and MAJ Edmund S. Cowan, "Civil-Military Operations and the War for Moral Legitimacy in Latin America," *Military Review* (January 1989): 48.

6. Cynthia McClintock, "The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* (Summer/Fall 1988): 128.

Lieutenant Colonel John T. Fishel, US Army Reserve, is an individual mobilization augmentee, Special Operations Command, South, Panama. He received a Ph.D. from Indiana University and has taught political science and Latin American studies at the University of Wisconsin-LaCrosse. He served four years on the staff of the US Southern Command J5 where he was involved in counternarcotics matters at the theater strategic level. He is an independent defense consultant.



The Army Dental Corps' Role in Nation Assistance

Lieutenant Colonel George L. Christensen, US Army

Nation assistance has emerged as an important factor in the low-intensity conflict arena. The author cites several successful training exercises in which Army dental teams, from both Active and Reserve components, have made significant contributions to host nation dental health care while also providing excellent training for US dental units.

LOW-INTENSITY conflict (LIC) and the Army's role in that controversial arena have captured a great deal of recent attention. Certainly, the ongoing nature of LIC cannot be ignored. Yesterday, today and tomorrow, the United States will find its interests jeopardized by what the former commander in chief (CINC) of the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), General Fred F. Woerner, chose to call, not low-intensity, but high-probability warfare.¹ The controversy surrounding LIC, however, is not regarding its probability. It centers on the appropriate US strategy and the role, if any, of our military forces.

Certainly, LIC transcends purely military considerations. It involves the politics, culture, history, economics and religion, as well as many other aspects, of the subject country.² Regardless

of what LIC strategy the United States chooses, the focus, or objective, of that strategy should be directed toward legitimizing and stabilizing a government that is friendly to the United States and its interests. The legitimacy of a government is largely determined by its ability to meet the needs of its people; therefore, nation assistance, in an effort to enhance that ability, has emerged as an appropriate strategy in US doctrine.³

Civic action programs play an important role in nation assistance. Woerner talks in terms of what he calls a "combined arms team for LIC."⁴

This team is made up of engineers, Civil Affairs specialists, psychological operations (PSYOP) experts, public affairs specialists, medics, a security assistance staff, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), foreign military sales (FMS) programs and, of course, the host

country infrastructure. Often included in the medical element of the team are members of the Army Dental Care System. Based on past and present successes and the unique service it provides, the Army Dental Corps can play a vital role in nation assistance, civic action programs.

Dental care involvement in civic action is certainly not a new concept. The Dental Corps' most visible involvement came during the Vietnam War. It is probably safe to assume, however, that some form of dental civic action programs has been conducted since the first Army dentist was appointed in 1872.⁵ What is important about Vietnam is that it seems to mark the establishment of civic action as a legitimate Dental Corps mission.

The arrival of the 36th Medical Detachment (Dental Services) (Med Det [DS]) in 1962 marked the placement of the first dental unit in Vietnam.⁶ The detachment's mission was, of course, to tend to the needs of US forces, but they also participated in informal civic action operations. The first formal dental civic action role came with the introduction of the 5th Special Forces Group, including its organic dental officer. Due to the nature of the Special Forces' mission, the dental officer found himself heavily involved in supporting the Civil Affairs and psychological officers assigned to the group's "A" teams. The demand for dental services in the civic action programs soon outstripped the capabilities of a single dentist. The group was subsequently augmented by two additional dental officer slots to assist in this emerging mission.⁷

What later came to be known as DENTCAPs (Dental Civic Action Programs) were a formal part of the MEDCAP (medical civic action program), one of a number of programs developed as a result of a secretary of defense directive to aid the civilian health effort in Vietnam.⁸ These programs, though aimed toward providing very basic emergency dental care, were highly effective and were often employed as a part of a combined arms task force sent into a targeted area. In the later stages of the war, the formal role of DENTCAPs deteriorated as the war effort itself seemed to lose its focus. Additionally, the increased number

of US troops placed greater demand on the dental care system; however, US dental personnel still spent many hours of volunteer time treating and teaching the civilian population.

The immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War saw a general "never again" denunciation of limited warfare and a reorientation on the "Big War." SOUTHCOM, however, found itself

The legitimacy of a government is largely determined by its ability to meet the needs of its people. . . . Regardless of what LIC strategy the United States chooses, the focus, or objective, of that strategy should be directed toward legitimizing and stabilizing a government that is friendly to the United States and its interests.

faced with LIC as a primary threat in the 1980s and a realization that civic action would be an important weapon. SOUTHCOM also found itself with very few medical and dental assets with which to prosecute an effective civic action program. Initial dental efforts, generally a small part of a nondental exercise, were primarily ad hoc affairs using the limited dental resources available in the theater. These resources included personnel from the Panama Dental Activity, as well as personnel and equipment from the 7th Special Forces Group and the 142d Medical Battalion assigned to US Army, South.

In time, the SOUTHCOM civic action program grew in prominence and urgency. The role of the Army Dental Care System grew correspondingly, primarily as a result of great success in the early programs. What had started as something of an afterthought in these early operations grew into a major consideration in civic action planning.

SOUTHCOM became the "test-bed for LIC doctrine," and Honduras was the main laboratory.⁹ Army Reserve and National Guard dental units, as well as the Army's only Continental United States (CONUS)-based active duty,




Figure 1. Relative Effect of Medical Programs on Host Nation

TOE (table of organization and equipment) dental detachment, went to Honduras on many and varied deployments. These ranged from small personnel augmentations to support dental readiness and training exercises (DENRETEs), conducted by the dental element in Palmerola (now Soto Cano Air Base) and the 7th Special Forces Group, to large, stand-alone dental exercises. These early efforts, though attending to the needs of countless impoverished Hondurans,

SOUTHCOM was faced with the common dilemma of having few forces with which to prosecute its nation assistance efforts. FORSCOM, on the other hand, had the forces but precious few realistic field training opportunities, particularly for those medical and dental units suited for nation assistance. The DFT concept was born to meet both of those demands.

focused on dental extractions and offered little in terms of long-term benefit other than relieving pain.

In their article appearing in the February 1989 *Military Review*, Colonel Edwin H. J. Carns and Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Huebner offer an excellent review of the SOUTHCOM Regional Medical Strategy which, they claim, is the first such document for a unified command. Among the principles of this formal strategy document is the appropriateness of using military medical assets to achieve US objectives in a LIC environment and the validity of humanitarian and civic assistance as a mission for US military medical units. They also point out that the programs that evolve must be directed toward the host country requirements and its national plan and must be executed in concert with the host country infrastructure, the US country team, USAID and the US Military Security Assistance Office.¹⁰

It is safe to say that the degree of effort and the resources committed to a medical civic action program for any given country directly affect the




Figure 2. Relative Effect of Dental Programs on Host Nation

degree of benefit to that country. If the objective is to assist the host country in its development and its ability to see the health needs of its people, it is obvious that the more sophisticated and resource-intensive medical activities, particularly those directed toward improving the host country health care infrastructure, can better accomplish that objective.


Figure 1 shows a chart appearing in the Carns and Heubner article. It displays the movement of the effect on the host country health care program from "Quick Fix" to "Long Term" in relationship to the level of effort and the resources required for various indicated medical civic action programs.¹¹ The nonlinear nature of the slope depicted is noteworthy as it suggests the relatively disproportionate benefit of medical operations on the low end of the curve. It could be said that there is great benefit in just getting started, in establishing a presence. Nevertheless, the greatest benefit to the host country and its people comes from the activities on the high end of the spectrum. Consequently, an effective na-

Large, stand-alone unit deployments covering multiple sites offer maximum unit training benefits. . . [They] offer a far greater range of services beyond the dental extractions usually associated with the smaller DFTs, thus providing a longer-term benefit in the nation assistance effort. These mutual benefits are evident in the DFT and nation assistance efforts of one particular dental unit.

tion assistance program should drive its medical and dental effort toward that end.

A second look at figure 1 reveals two uniquely dental services on the curve. There are, in fact, many more dental services that could appear. Figure 2 represents a dental overlay of the Huebner curve related to the same axes. Note again that the services aimed at host country dental care systems and associated government infrastructure are the ones with the greatest

PEOPLE AND MILITARY OF THỦ-ĐỨC WELCOME THE DENTAL TEAM



Vietnam [marks] the establishment of civic action as a legitimate Dental Corps mission. . . . The first formal dental civic action role came with the introduction of the 5th Special Forces Group, including its organic dental officer. . . . the dental officer found himself heavily involved in supporting the Civil Affairs and psychological officers assigned to the group's "A" teams.

long-term benefit. There are significant differences between medical and dental services that do not appear on the two graphs. These differences are the factors which make dental civic action activities unique and such a valuable part of any nation assistance program.

First and foremost, dental services, particularly on the low end of the curve such as extractions and dental cleanings, usually afford immediate payback, a near instantaneous good will effect. Furthermore, a large number of people can be treated in a relatively short time with equally effective results. Contrast the native who comes to the DENRETE team in pain and is given immediate relief in the form of an extraction, a cleaning or some other service with the patient who reports with a common chronic medical illness that requires treatment over an extended period for relief, if any, of his symptoms. A dental

team can come into an area for as little as a few hours and have a lasting impact.

Another difference is the level of effort and the resources required to gain an equal benefit in the long term. The short amount of time required to produce a result on the lower end of the dental service spectrum has already been mentioned. It must also be noted that these services do not require a great amount of personnel and materiel resources. Mid-spectrum dental services such as definitive restorations and prosthodontic appliances—roughly equivalent to minor surgical procedures or perhaps short-term medical care—also require relatively little in terms of time, personnel, equipment and materials. Those programs on the high end of the spectrum are also easily managed.

The 257th Med Det (DS), the Army's only CONUS-based, active duty, TOE dental unit,

as well as other dental units from the Reserve Component, has demonstrated the unique value of dental participation in nation assistance efforts, particularly over the last four years. The effectiveness of dental civic action programs has been well noted by the recent SOUTHCOM CINCs and is perhaps best demonstrated by the demand for dental civic programs from many of the countries in the SOUTHCOM area of operations.

Before looking at specific efforts, a basic understanding of the deployment for training (DFT) program is necessary. SOUTHCOM was faced with the common dilemma of having few forces with which to prosecute its nation assistance efforts. The US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), on the other hand, had the forces but precious few realistic field training opportunities, particularly for those medical and dental units suited for nation assistance. The DFT concept was born to meet both of those demands, as well as to satisfy the requirements of the law governing such activities.¹² More specifically, the draft revision of US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, describes the DFT as an exercise conducted outside of CONUS due to the unique training value accrued to the exercising unit, usually resulting in collateral benefits to the host nation.¹³

Though this discussion focuses primarily on nation assistance (the SOUTHCOM interest), the obvious training benefits to the participating units need to be mentioned. The benefits are many, including individual soldier MOS (military occupational specialty) training, enhancing unit esprit and morale, developing individual self-confidence and satisfaction, education, and quite simply, they are fun. The most important benefit, however, is the opportunity to train the unit's mission-essential task list (METL) in a realistic environment.

The degree of benefit in this regard depends on the type and quality of the DFT experience. Figure 3 relates the six basic types of dental DFTs in terms of degree of difficulty and unit training value. Small personnel augmentations such as those sent out to support the medical element at

Oral health education is an important part of any dental treatment plan. Unit oral hygienists, as a part of the DFT, traveled to schools in the area of operation. There, along with their Costa Rican Public Health counterparts, they conducted oral hygiene classes for the schoolchildren and, more important, their teachers.

Soto Cano Air Base, though of great benefit to the individual dental officer and his assistant and to the Honduran people treated, offer little in terms of unit training value. On the other hand, large, stand-alone unit deployments covering multiple sites offer maximum unit training benefits. More important, the large deployments offer a far greater range of services beyond the dental extractions usually associated with the smaller DFTs, thus providing a longer-term benefit in the nation assistance effort. These mutual benefits are evident in the DFT and nation assistance efforts of one particular dental unit.

The 257th Med Det (DS) started participating in nation assistance activities in a round-about manner in 1986. Early operations were locally generated in ad hoc fashion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to support the 7th Special Forces and their training activities in Honduras. Dental teams consisting of a dental officer and his assistant, their vehicle and equipment were




Figure 3. DFT Impact on Unit Training



Dental services, particularly on the low end of the curve such as extractions and dental cleanings, usually afford immediate payback, a near instantaneous good will effect. Furthermore, a large number of people can be treated in a relatively short time with equally effective results.

attached to deploying Special Forces A teams, primarily to assist the group dental officer in training the Special Forces medical specialists in emergency dental treatment. These operations also provided valuable training for the dental team as it operated in an austere environment with its field equipment.

As a side benefit, a great amount of dental care, including restorative treatment, was provided to the Honduran people in the A team area of operation. This greatly enhanced the A team commander's influence and his ability to fulfill his primary mission. Support for dental participation with special operations forces was formalized to support the Special Operations Forces Humanitarian Assistance Team (SOFHAT) series of civic action deployments conducted by the 4th PSYOP Battalion in 1984. The success of these operations, as well as concurrent DENRFTES generated through the medical element of Task Force Bravo (USMC), led to the development of a new Air Force

Honduras, to coordinate and provide logistic support for nation assistance operations in Honduras), soon created a big dental and for combined medical and dental, as well as stand-alone dental DFTs, to other countries in the SCA. THCOM area of operation.

The first stand-alone dental DFT, using deployed unit equipment, was conducted by the 257th Med Det in Costa Rica in 1988, at the request of the Costa Rican government through the US Embassy country team. The request from the Costa Ricans specifically emphasized restorative care and envisioned multiple treatment sites throughout the target area of operation. The collective training opportunity afforded the unit is a result of the large scope of the situation, including the independent deployment of oral care resources, vehicles and equipment, and the attendant command and control challenges, was invaluable. Aside from the obvious benefit to the Costa Rican people, the most important accomplishments were established to protect



US and host
nation dental
personnel

The great success of the Costa Rican dental DFT program can be attributed to many factors. The most important is that it was part of an overall dental care strategy with specific objectives, designed and executed in concert with the host country health care infrastructure, SOUTHCOM and the country team.

and successfully demonstrating that dental operations are a valuable contribution to nation assistance strategy and promoting US policy objectives.

The initial Costa Rican mission and two subsequent missions have seen the 257th, in concert with SOUTHCOM, the country team, and the Costa Rican Ministries of Public Health and Security, work across the entire spectrum of the dental curve shown in figure 2. Multiple mobile dental teams, paired with counterpart Costa Rican dental teams, provided a full range of dental services to isolated populations in dire need of care. Recent deployments have seen the addition of a removable prosthodontic capability, to include a mobile field laboratory to fabricate complete and partial removable dentures.

Oral health education is an important part of any dental treatment plan. Unit oral hygienists, as a part of the DFT, traveled to schools in the area of operation. There, along with their Costa Rican Public Health counterparts, they con-

ducted oral hygiene classes for the schoolchildren and, more important, their teachers. In the meantime, senior dental officers of the unit worked with public dental health officials on problems of a broader nature such as strategies and the equipment requirements needed to establish effective outreach programs.

At this point, the Office of Defense Cooperation from the country team—the primary orchestrator thus far—became involved in possible assistance through the FMS program and USAID to procure necessary dental equipment systems. The Costa Rican DFT program also included a predeployment exchange of visits with Costa Rican and 257th Med Der officials to discuss overall strategy and objectives. As part of their visit to Fort Bragg, the Costa Rican officials were briefed on US field dental capabilities and doctrine, and were taken to visit the University of North Carolina Dental School where they received a briefing on the school's highly successful, state-sponsored dental outreach

program.¹⁵ The great success of the Costa Rican dental DFT program can be attributed to many factors. The most important is that it was part of an overall dental care strategy with specific objectives, designed and executed in concert with the host country health care infrastructure, SOUTHCOM and the country team.

Costa Rica is not the only success story, and the 257th Med Det (DS) is certainly not the only player. A large number of Army dental

A formal doctrine should be developed and included in future field manuals, and it should be taught in appropriate courses at the Academy of Health Sciences. Civic action operations should be included in field dental units' METL. Current field dental sets, kits and outfits should be reconfigured to meet civic action requirements. And, perhaps most important, the Dental Corps must collectively educate the key [LIC] players and planners.

officers and ancillary personnel, most from Army Reserve and National Guard units, have deployed on countless civic action exercises throughout the world. Whether part of a large, stand-alone dental DFT or a small team supporting a major exercise, the Army Dental Care System has been able to make a valuable contribution to nation assistance programs. Many lessons have been learned in the process, both good and bad. To ensure continued success, certain basic requirements must be adhered to, and obvious pitfalls must be avoided.

Foremost, the dental effort, as well as other components of a nation assistance program, must be part of an overall strategy formulated in concert with the host country objectives. "Shuck and run" tactics, a euphemism for DENTETEs that are limited to extractions, should be avoided whenever possible. The number of extractions performed should not be allowed to become a major measure of success. The dental ef-

fort should be directed toward the services that provide a longer-lasting benefit to the country and its people.

And, finally, members of the entire team must avoid the "Ugly American" syndrome, a frequent undoer of good things in the past.¹⁶ The entire dental team, down to the lowest-ranking enlisted person, must function as ambassadors without portfolio, reflecting the United States and that for which it stands in the best possible light. At the same time, this will enhance the host country government's image, particularly in regions of dissatisfaction and unrest.

The dental team can be an effective force multiplier through performing civic action programs, particularly in LIC. Contributions in this area are not limited to LIC. Applications throughout the operational continuum are conceivable, particularly in consolidation phases of operations and in pacifying hostile indigenous populations in the rear area of operation.

Currently, dental civic action doctrine is largely ad hoc and locally formulated. The present dental field service manual, FM 8-26, *Dental Service*, barely mentions civic action.¹⁷ However, things are changing as the demand for dental participation in nation assistance efforts and the success of these operations increase. As more and more units become involved, a consensus, yet still informal doctrine, is evolving. The draft document for dental support of Medical Force 2000 addresses dental civic action involvement and sees it as a legitimate mission.¹⁸ FM 8-42, *Medical Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, addresses, in detail, the dental role.¹⁹ Still, more needs to be done.

Foremost, civic action in support of nation assistance programs and combat operations should be formalized as a secondary mission of the Army Dental Care System. A formal doctrine should be developed and included in future field manuals, and it should be taught in appropriate courses at the Academy of Health Sciences. Civic action operations should be included in field dental units' METL. Current field dental sets, kits and outfits should be reconfigured to meet civic action requirements. And, perhaps most impor-

tant, the Dental Corps must collectively educate the key players and planners in LIC operations to ensure the dental team is integrated into nation assistance strategy.

The Dental Corps can play a unique and valuable part in nation assistance programs as past successes have demonstrated. In Costa Rica, the dental team was the "point man" for the medical effort and an important part of the overall strategy for that nation. Given the high-probability nature of LIC, nation assistance will be a growing mission for the Army and its specially suited elements like the Army Dental Care System for some time to come.

Despite the need and past success, there are those who argue against civic action involvement. A study commissioned by the Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center concludes that civic action programs, in general, are a failure and are ill-advised.²⁰ The study group, among others, criticizes the programs as a "drop in the bucket." Well-known LIC experts such as Mao Tse-tung might argue that many drops will, in time, fill the bucket. Some question the legality; however, the Department of Defense

The entire dental team, down to the lowest-ranking enlisted person, must function as ambassadors without portfolio, reflecting the United States and that for which it stands in the best possible light. At the same time, this will enhance the host country government's image, particularly in regions of dissatisfaction and unrest.

Task Force on Humanitarian Assistance of 1984, the Stevens Amendment and the subsequent revision of Title 10 of the US Code, recognize humanitarian and civic assistance as a valid military mission.²¹

Finally, there are many who decry siphoning professional assets from the Army Dental Care System's primary mission of caring for soldiers. If through their efforts in nation assistance the Dental Care System can help preclude introducing combat forces and the casualties involved, it will have contributed greatly to accomplishing that primary mission. **MR**

NOTES

1. GEN Fred F. Woerner, "The Strategic Imperatives for the United States in Latin America," *Military Review* (February 1989).
2. US Department of the Army Field Manual 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict*. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], 1981).
3. Ed. Comment, "Perspectives on Nationbuilding in Low-Intensity/High-Probability Conflicts," *Military Review* (February 1989): 29.
4. Woerner.
5. COL Harley M. Ellinger, "Highlights in the History of the Army Dental Corps," a handout as part of a presentation at the World-Wide Dental Commander's Conference, West Point, NY, May 1980.
6. Ibid.
7. COL Richard McConnell, "History of the Dental Services in the Southeast Asian War," unpublished.
8. MG Spurgeon Neel, *Vietnam Studies: Medical Support of the US Army in Vietnam, 1965-1970* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973).
9. Woerner.
10. COL Edwin H. J. Cams, Retired, and LTC Michael F. Huebner, "Medical Strategy," *Military Review* (February 1989).
11. Ibid., 40.
12. Title 10, US Code.

13. FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, Final Draft. (Washington, DC: GPO, March 1990).
14. Personal experiences while assigned to the 257th Medical Detachment (Dental Services) from 1986 through 1989.
15. Ibid.
16. Tom Barry, "Low Intensity Conflict: The New Battlefield in Central America," Inter-Hemisphere Education Resource Center, 1986.
17. US Department of the Army FM 8-26, *Dental Service* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1980).
18. US Army Academy of Health Sciences, chap. 7, "Dental Services," in *Health Services Support Futures*, Final Draft (Fort Sam Houston, TX, March 1989), 7-11.
19. US Department of the Army FM 8-42, *Medical Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, Appendix E, "Dental Support in Low Intensity Conflict." (Washington, DC: GPO, 4 December 1990).
20. Personal Experiences.
21. Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger, "DOD Task Force Report on Humanitarian Assistance," June 1984; and Stevens Amendment, 1985 Revision of Title 10, US Code.

Lieutenant Colonel George L. Christensen is the deputy director and dental staff officer, Directorate of Combat Developments, Academy of Health Sciences, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, as well as the field dental support coordinator for the US Army Dental Corps. He received a D.D.S. from Loyola University School of Dentistry and is a graduate of the US Military Academy, the Armed Forces Staff College and the US Army War College. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the United States, Vietnam and Korea, including staff dentist, Fort Carson, Colorado; chief of Fixed Prosthodontics, 10th Medical Detachment, Korea; and commander, 257th Medical Detachment (DS), Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

MR⁺INSIGHTS

Observations on the Theory of LIC and Violence in Latin America

By MAJ Eduardo Aldunate, Chilean Army

Despite all of the times I have sought enlightenment from the classic theorists, it would be a vain attempt on my part to even pretend to understand this war that is, yet is not, the one known to the US Army as low-intensity conflict. Even more difficult to understand is the American approach to dealing with these conflicts. It is gratifying to see the great interest the United States now has in Latin America, evidenced in numerous speeches and papers. However, I note with a certain degree of apprehension the way in which a North American perceives activities in the region, particularly military professionals and faithful readers of US Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*. This has prompted me to pose some questions about the violence in the region that underlies the conflict currently labeled "low intensity" by the US Army.

My objective is to present another point of view to contribute toward a better understanding of the problem. To that end, I will show that the problem of violence in Latin America has emerged from a variety of very complex causes and that "quick fixes," such as using force alone, treat the symptom but do not cure the disease. In fact, these quick fixes often serve only to perpetuate it. The continuing scourge of violence in Latin American countries must be addressed by profound reforms in all areas—political, economic, social, judicial and military. Furthermore, the international community must show a willingness to strengthen a sense of solidarity with these countries.

Many US observers, especially military professionals, believe that the problems of subversion and drug trafficking in Latin America have military solutions or that using force should be the primary means of dealing with these problems. Also, it seems that the leaders of more developed countries think they can "advise" the military of developing countries within the framework of an established doctrine of low-intensity conflict. This idea apparently is based on the conviction that the military institutions of these countries are not doing their job well and that "a little advice" could help solve the region's enormous problems.

This, in turn, is normally followed by "advisers" who believe that the "correct use of force" is the

panacea for the problem of subversion. Some of the more outspoken advocates of this tactic even go so far as to speak of a great "multinational offensive." Others, both in the United States and in Latin America, think that by simply throwing money at those governments plagued by the problems of violence and subversion, the situation can be neutralized and finally resolved.

Violence and Terrorism

Perhaps it would be wiser to analyze the complex problem of violence in Latin America in greater depth, actually considering the role the political, economic and social structures of the affected countries have played in its development. One would likely find that the legal structures often favor those who practice violence. Such an understanding is not commonly held, leading certain sectors of international opinion to sympathize with the supposedly weaker groups who suffer constant persecution from the "corrupt and inhumane" military. Finally, the cultural traits and education of the peoples involved provide fertile ground for a predisposition toward violent behavior.

Added to this simmering pot, admittedly, is a political society that has been unable to act in unison against a common foe. Although emotionally and intellectually opposed to violence, the political society cannot gather its forces to face the problem that affects it as a whole. Partisan differences and personal jealousies among the groups have to date been insurmountable obstacles to achieving the *national unity* that is absolutely necessary for a country to deal with violence, in whatever form it assumes.

A thorough knowledge and understanding of the countries of the region—not collectively but, rather, individually—are absolute prerequisites for any attempts to "assist" or intervene in this situation. The reasons the countries themselves do not put an end to this scourge must also be considered. If there is a military solution (which is most often not the case), one should ask why the armed forces of those countries cannot find it.

Terrorism in Latin America is basically rooted in economic and social inequality that can only be improved by providing a broader and more equita-

ble access to economic resources and the benefits they imply (health, education, housing, stability, security, and so on). Because the political establishments have traditionally been inefficient and unsuccessful in providing a more equitable system, violent solutions are often seen as the only recourse. This tactic has been used by groups predisposed to employ totalitarian doctrines, a phenomenon that has been common in this region and one that, in the 1960s and 1970s, manifested itself in forming guerrilla and terrorist groups that destabilized political societies of that period. This finally led to many military governments taking power, especially in the southern cone.

Economic Reality

A similar economic reality exists in some areas today, coupled with the consistently misguided distribution and application of foreign aid—a topic I will later address in greater detail. Because the same weak socioeconomic structures persist, most of these countries still suffer varying degrees of violence.

Clearly, then, one of the primary factors in this situation is the economy. It is strongly centralized in these countries, and almost all economic resources are managed by the state in a patronage system or are in the hands of a few powerful economic groups. Plans for the economy tend to be short term, and the rules for its operation are always unstable. Printed money generally has little or no value, and the state uses its own resources and businesses to disguise unemployment, thus the lack of distinction between the terms "government" and "state."

Hence, with very little private investment—whether internal or foreign—to stimulate development, state ownership of many industries, economic groups that put strong pressure on the governments, entrepreneurs who have little or no social conscience and constant nationalization of international businesses have all caused inflation rates to skyrocket and standards of living to plummet. Political parties that tend toward "statism" or, at best, semi-statism (that is, the theory that resources should be controlled by the state) often control the unions. The fact that the economy is poorly managed serves their immediate electoral purposes.

In the meantime, the poorest classes are living in subhuman conditions, teetering on the brink of disaster. While their needs have increased, their low standard of living has remained at the same level since time immemorial.

These classes fall easy prey to guerrillas or drug lords who promise them a steady income and enough food for themselves and their families. After all, it is extremely difficult to talk to a young

person about the benefits of democracy if its effects on him are abysmal, if his chances of getting an education depend on how much money he has, and if access to individual and family health care is practically nonexistent. His vision of the future will be one in which he is condemned to scratch a living out of the ground, as did his father and grandfather before him.

The worker who lives in a rural area finds there are no adequate roads to transport his goods. He suffers under the crushing burden of need in time of inflation. He lives in the 20th century—or at the threshold of the 21st as some love to say—yet, his children have to walk miles to go to school. He sees having drinking water and electric lights as something extraordinary and indeed something that gives some people status over others. For all practical purposes, he still lives in 19th-century conditions.

Add to that the frustration he must feel when he glimpses the unattainable fantasies that play themselves out on the television screen. Not only is it unrealistic to expect him to espouse democratic values as firmly as would a Kansas farmer, it is also absurd to suppose he should reject the chance to better his lot by whatever means become available to him.

In some countries, the political society has sustained the constant political swing of those who use violence as a means of struggle against the system. The society allows many of them (such as ex-guerrilla leaders) to attain high political positions. Then they reap for themselves the benefits of the very system they attempted to overthrow by force of arms as they try to shroud their recent past in a mantle of forgotten deeds. Furthermore, it is quite common in the intelligence community to know who, among prominent public figures, maintains ties with groups that advocate violence. This situation only makes it more difficult to solve the problem because of the lack of mutual trust among those in positions of authority. In any case, it is always preferable that these former subversives participate in the normal political process rather than continue their armed struggle. While some may complain about that choice, it is one of the costs of keeping democracy alive in some countries.

As an aside, consider presidential elections. Normally, the two main parties vie for political prominence in aggressive campaigns (themselves not exempt from violence), proposing socioeconomic systems that are not only vastly different but indeed are often antagonistic. So, in some Latin American countries, people desiring change often simply vote for change, causing the "ship of state" to radically change course every six or eight years.

This does not provide long-term investments and projects the stability they need to come to fruition; only a few projects manage to survive elections. Hence, what you see periodically in the region is playing the political game of all or nothing. Cases in point from recent history are El Salvador, Brazil, Argentina, Panama and Nicaragua.

The Judiciary

The judicial problem is even more complex. As a result of the aforementioned political instability, there is an absence of adequate legislation that could break up the chain of violence efficiently. Consequently, the only ones who face tough sanctions are the low-level activists who actually confront the law by taking up weapons or get caught hiding bombs. Because they are not the architects of this chain of violence, punishing them does not eradicate the overall problem.

If we consider this together with a desperate economic situation in which groups that advocate violence control enormous sums of money, we can see corruption as a natural consequence. This promotes a situation that mitigates in favor of those pro-violence organizations that use delinquents (ranging from habitual thieves to members of organized crime mobs) to protect their illegal activities and to intimidate those who would try to enforce the law. As a result, the situation becomes very complex.

Consider, for example, a scenario that has played itself out repeatedly in violence-torn countries. A flunky working for a terrorist group gets caught by the security force and goes before the court. He ends up serving very little time and is released so that, in a mockery of justice, he can again parade in front of military headquarters or civilian targets throwing stones or hiding bombs. In sum, he can act with absolute impunity.

Justice, in general, because it is slow and bureaucratic and because it affects the average man of these countries, is urgently in need of modernization. With respect to this, the otherwise praiseworthy and necessary activities of human rights organizations become indirect but highly effective tools that the terrorists use. Some of these organizations have supported terrorists in the face of excesses by the military. While it is certain that the militaries have committed some abuses, the types and quantities attributed to them are exaggerated. Yet, a whole range of delinquents are protected from supposed political persecution.

However, these protected delinquents do not fight with words, as did Demosthenes, but, rather, with modern assault rifles. Then, when arrested,

they very quickly cry out for the same democratic benefits they seek to destroy, completely ignoring the responsibilities that accompany their rights.

Normally, private human rights organizations have a one-sided perception of the facts, in that they are concerned only for the supposed victims of military or governmental excesses while paying mere lip service to the many civilian and military victims injured or killed by their defendants. No one takes effective action or makes public denunciations of this same violence on behalf of the original victims.

It is also necessary to recognize the political affiliation of some of the members of most of these "humanitarian" groups to appreciate how Marxism basically uses any organization to obtain its objectives. And when the military occasionally falls to the temptation to use violence as a response, a vicious cycle of violence is perpetuated. This act terrorist groups and their publicity organizations certainly use to their advantage.

Another factor in this equation is the activity of certain sectors of the Catholic Church that has played an important political role throughout Latin America's history. The appearance of liberation theology, which distorts Catholic doctrine to conform to Marxist ideologies, has had a profoundly negative impact despite Catholic authorities, including Pope John Paul II, having categorically rejected it as contrary to the spirit of Catholic doctrine. Similarly, the seemingly Marxist interpretations of scripture approved at the Latin American Bishops' Conferences at Puebla, Mexico, and Medellín, Colombia, have had some very harsh effects despite the Pope's efforts to clarify their significance.

Many members of these positive religious organizations have ties, in one way or another, with pro-violence activists. They go beyond what ecclesiastical authorities have taught by providing support to those who supposedly suffer unjust persecution. Obviously, they go completely against the activities of some governments and especially against the military.

This is not an attempt to cover up the fact that the military itself is responsible, in some cases, for human rights violations. No responsible soldier would disagree that such actions must be stopped and that mechanisms must be designed and implemented to prevent further abuses on the part of the military. This must be done, however, without the military losing its authority and efficiency in legitimately defending the people against violent sectors. However, prudence, in this case, would cause one to wonder if the military is not simply part of

the same general landscape, as opposed to being one of the main causes of the problem.

It is perhaps more appropriate to wonder what would happen in these same countries if the military did not act in the face of violence. Furthermore, one should ask if the military is not justified in taking a strong stance in defending the national community against imminent or latent aggression. I think we are looking at a case of the "thief" criticizing the "judge" and suggest that we analyze the subversives' actions. Consider for a moment their strategies that speak of armed insurrection, popular struggle, armed mobilization and other forms of extreme violence to reach their objectives. These obviously do not follow the path of democracy.

Evidently, the armed forces are an integral component of the problem, along with the rest of the society of which they are a part. However, their actions have normally constituted a response—right or wrong—to an action initiated by pro-violence civilians in this circle of violence. Although there are no "recipes" in politics, I believe the solution to the problem of violence should be sought in a thorough, coherent strategy—with broad criteria and a spirit of open-mindedness, prudence and, above all, political realism.

Toward a Coherent Strategy

Certainly, the first step will be to find a consensus among society as a whole, within each country, in diagnosing this disease. Failure to do so or to do so incorrectly will extend hatreds and passions that divide the country and, more seriously, continue to submerge the society in a violent struggle.

First, there must be a firm resolve among the citizens of each country to reject the use of violence, whatever its source. Second, Latin American countries need to enact deep reforms in their political and economic structures that will transform the benefits of democracy for the most deprived from mere electoral slogans to reality. One of the ways to bring this about in the economic sphere is to reduce the enormous participation and control of the state in the region. Without ignoring its responsibility in some areas of the economy, the governing institutions must take a subsidiary role in economic matters with respect to the rest of the society.

Third, each country must have the political will to face the violence problem in terms of a global approach, without accepting politicians or officials of any kind who speak out against violence in public and support it under the table. Then, the judicial system must support the established authorities by acting as firmly as possible within an accepted legal framework to obtain the fairest results. The

rights of those citizens who feel unjustly punished or persecuted should be properly defended; however, one of the fundamental roles of the law in this regard should be to protect the average citizen from the scourge of violence. In other words, the legal system must respect the rights of the majority as well as the rights of those who turn to violent actions.

There should be professional armed forces working to defeat the pro-violence groups. They must follow judicial procedures that are consonant with the threat but must have the resources (a centralized intelligence system and modern technology) to attack all levels of the terrorist organizations. The armed forces should be able to provide sustained economic support in threatened areas, and when these military forces withdraw, this support should not cease. Certainly, there should be a clear procedure for effectively punishing the excesses of those who are part of this force; however, at the same time, fear of punishment should not prevent the military from acting to legitimately defend the people.

Nor should private citizens fear reprisal for taking a stand against those groups or individuals who would destroy existing social order by violent means. The concept of a "nation at arms" is appropriate, with citizens now prepared to use moral, cultural and material weapons against violence.

The press, and especially Latin American journalists, should also act in accordance with this objective. They should cooperate with the educational system in cultivating a national sentiment that helps the government combat violence rather than exacerbate it by misusing the idea of freedom of the press. Clearly, the ideal of freedom of the press presents a dilemma. While I strongly advocate the need for this fundamental freedom, I also believe the media needs to impose some degree of self-censorship against information that represents a clear threat to democratic order, to innocent individuals or to the population at large. Judicial mechanisms should be established to prevent the media from becoming the involuntary ally of terrorists.

All of this discussion is nothing less than a commitment made by each country and its internal institutions to the values of democracy. This commitment is based not only on the rights but also on the obligations that democracy implies for governments and citizens alike.

Finally, it must be noted that the international community has continually meddled with internal politics in Latin America, often impeding development rather than promoting it. A far more prudent and welcome approach would be for developed countries—especially those that share

common objectives or cultural ties with Latin America—to make a greater effort to understand Latin American people. The developed countries should give the people and their governments the support they need without compromising their sovereignty or their traditions. They should stop providing a source of direct and indirect support to violence, either by their actions or failure to act. In fact, responsible countries should seek out and penalize, by way of all available economic and legal sanctions, those countries or organizations that lend themselves as a base for violence.

Fortunately, the end of the Cold War and the economic troubles of former Eastern bloc countries have greatly alleviated the problem of Communist-backed insurgency, at least in the short term. This is not the case with the problem of narcotrafficking in those countries in which insurgents have joined forces with drug lords.

An aspect of this broad "politico-strategic maneuver" (that is, the coordinated action of the many fields of national action) should be the coordination of the various internal institutions of each nation with the whole of that nation's strategy. Hence, the correct military action—should it be necessary and justified—would be taken at the same time as appropriate economic and diplomatic measures. This would prevent a repeat of what happened in Panama where the economic aid came almost six months after the military action.

The example of Panama illustrates how not to conduct a politico-strategic maneuver. The diplomatic result of the US action in Panama was negative for the United States in terms of its regional context, despite the fact that many countries agreed with the United States' judgment of General Manuel Noriega. This also led to a situation of near crisis with the Vatican, endangering the supposed successes that had been gained in this operation.

In retrospect, one must ask whether there is anyone who seriously believes the situation in Panama was resolved with Operation *Just Cause*. My impression is that the answer must be "no" and that, clearly, the problem in Panama and in other countries of the area goes far beyond a Noriega. In fact, the most probable future will be that another Noriega will emerge as soon as US forces withdraw. If the structure is not completely overhauled to deal with the problem in a joint and coherent manner, it is only a matter of time before such symptoms re-emerge.

Also critical to a coherent national approach must be formal, legal channels through which the military of each country may be heard in matters of national security that are decided at the political

level. Where decisions affecting the diplomatic, economic and military spheres are made, this function of political interface is invaluable. The military should be able to work jointly with the other fields to lay out a coherent strategy that does not become isolated in one or another of these spheres. Furthermore, it is unwise to waste the armed forces' immense potential—especially the manpower—in an undertaking of this nature. Thus, military efficiency is lost if not coordinated with other activities.

For example, a military adviser performing at the strategic level must present the political perspective to his superior who will make the final decision on using force or, alternatively, the commitment of military forces in noncombat operations where appropriate. Similarly, a military adviser should remind the political authority that in a given area, should the socioeconomic problems not be solved, subversion will persist despite all of the military pressure brought to bear against it. In situations such as those described here, using force by itself may not be the most appropriate response, as has been proven in many historical examples.

Another point that merits consideration is the fragile state of some of the democracies in the region that are currently confronted by violent internal threats. These struggling, immature democracies have not demonstrated to date the resolve necessary to show they are capable of facing and solving the problem of political violence. Many ask what type of governmental system is best suited to face this crisis situation. While it may fall to political scientists to answer such questions, they nonetheless present valid concerns to anyone interested in the region's problems.

In my view, the issue of the crushing external debt of many of the countries in the region should be included in this context. Governments of the region are faced with having to look (from the outside) like good debt payers while they suffer domestic problems that require a large share of their scarce national resources to be allocated for internal development. These problems will go unattended as long as available funds must be used to pay the foreign debt. In many cases, these nations are forced to take what little remains after the foreign debt is serviced and opt for short-term populist measures that lack any direction. While these governments may retain a certain level of respect in the international community, inside their own countries, they are merely inefficient governors and mediocre administrators of an ever-increasing poverty.

The developed countries may be assured that part of the debt will be paid—and certainly Latin American nations want to pay their debts—but at

the high cost of these countries not being able to use their own resources to diminish poverty and thus reduce the level of violence. Hence, we can be certain that violence will continue for a long time. This could have a boomerang effect against those countries that try to increase their profits by charging excessively high interest rates. Thus, the foreign debt is not merely an economic but a political problem, and it must be addressed and understood from that perspective. In this regard, a more reasoned approach by developed countries would look for ways to ease rather than exacerbate the economic problems of Latin American countries.

Latin American countries should be allowed to determine the solutions to their problems. They should be reasonably encouraged to do so, aided with technology and helped to overcome economic crises, especially those related to the external debt. No one should exacerbate their already difficult situation by imposing excessive tariffs on their products. Rather, they should strengthen the levels of exchange and eliminate the unfair system of protectionism, encouraging these countries to export their products. Latin American countries stand ready to make the progressive transition from their current status as exporters of raw materials to become exporters of finished products, incorporating the added value of new exports to benefit both the world market and their own economies.

This is not a plea for "free money." It is a bid to open to the world a serious place in which to do business fairly and equitably rather than permitting a few to take "the lion's share" and obliging the less fortunate to make do with "the mouse's share." These are measures that would aid the countries in the region economically and in shoring up the weaknesses of their democratic systems. Last and most important, developed countries must truly attempt to understand the Latin American countries. All must realize that they are the most interested in solving their problems; moreover, they are responsible in the eyes of their own people to do so.

Prospects for the Future

The experiences of the 1970s and world events at the end of the 1980s proved the failure of "statism" and "centralism." They also demonstrated the excesses of extremist ideologies in South America and obligated all political parties in the region to reexamine themselves and their positions from a pragmatic perspective. Many groups in this region accept the concept of private property, along with the benefits of a market economy and nonviolence as a political recourse. Also, they appear to be a little farther away from the totalitarian ideologies of

this century. Now is the time all should cooperate and work diligently toward consolidating this process rather than looking to the past and blaming one another for failures in an effort to attach responsibility for a country's problems.

Certainly, there are still some orthodox sectors that do not understand what has occurred in the world recently and maintain their extremist positions, some of them still using violence to achieve their goals. As for the political right, it adopted more social and humanist positions. Curiously enough, being center or "moderate" today receives the broadest appeal in elections, with moderate political policies becoming more popular in every aspect of politics in Latin America.

There are countries in the area, such as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Bolivia, that are on this path despite the fact that they are experiencing many of the problems previously outlined. But, in general, Latin America will have to wait a bit longer to see if political figures and society as a whole have really learned the lessons of recent history or if their apparent change is nothing more than election year "make-up."

I can offer examples of what I have discussed by examining my own country's situation. Chile, due to the political process of 1973-1990, has shown clear indications of being on the road to solving these problems. An objective evaluation of its triumphs and failures of that period would seem to bear that out. The sound economic situation left by the military government to its successor, the modern constitutional government currently in power, and the decentralization of state control are only a few factors indicating that, despite the little foreign aid Chile received during these years, the country has followed an effective course. Admittedly, certain activities and fields still require some improvement, but the progress is unmistakable.

All of this was guaranteed by the professionalism of the Chilean armed forces which brought about the peaceful transition from military government to civilian leadership. This transition stands as clear evidence of the political stability achieved in the country, in sharp contrast to the gloomy predictions made by those who know nothing about Chile and its armed forces, or of the civic maturity of its people.

However, isolated violent factions still exist in Chile. In that regard, it is essential to recognize that the process is a long one, and much time is required for successive governments to adopt the measures necessary to finally rid the country of extremist violence. A moral commitment to democracy must reach the heart of every citizen. Fortunately, in Chile, changes in the world situation in

the last few years and in Chile's political sphere (with the end of the military government) have led most political and social figures to reject violence.

A region that has been walking an economic tightrope for almost a century, facing the ever-present risk of falling into the abyss of Marxist totalitarianism (today apparently a more distant and changing threat), cannot be asked to suddenly change its entire structure, especially if it has not had an adequate level of commercial exchange, foreign investment and international understanding of its difficulties. It is even more unreasonable to demand this of the area that has always been the most affected by various world economic crises, a fact that often seems to be forgotten.

Consequently, returning to the central idea, it would seem that using military forces under these conditions is not the solution to the problem. Rather, it is only one part of those measures that together form a coherent whole, within a long-term national strategy, in which using force alone is not always the best approach. As long as conditions of economic deterioration, an inadequate legal system and the sociopolitical situation mired in poverty persist, and as long as the developed countries do not show real solidarity with developing countries on the terms previously described, nothing will be gained by using force. This is true of force rendered by the militaries of the countries involved or by foreign military advisers who seldom understand the social, economic and cultural realities of other countries.

A final warning on the matter is that the transition through this long, slow and deep reform process will probably face internal resistance in these countries. The traditions of centralism, subsidies and statism have created a "culture of conformism" with the status quo among the workers because they at least have security. Hence, the governments will confront difficult moments in effecting such radical changes. Only strong political will, determined leadership, business and political conscience, and a great social commitment will allow them to go forward.

I would like to conclude by emphasizing the difficulties and obstacles toward understanding these problems that will confront those who consider Latin America as a unified whole—a common error in even enlightened sectors of the most developed countries. I would also like to debunk the myth that the most beleaguered countries in the area are facing a mere "low-intensity conflict." Even the name is euphemistic from the Latin American point of view. It disguises the serious internal war these countries are really fighting and reflects a lack

of understanding of the profound reasons for the endless violence.

From the US perspective, and based on its strategic reality, the situation in certain countries of the area requires only part of the potential US aid available which, in turn, leads to the classification as low-, mid- or high-intensity conflict. In other words, the magnitude of the US effort expended determines the classification of any given conflict. The countries involved have a very different viewpoint; for them it is painful, bloody war, not conflict. The fact that those who seek to help them in some way cannot understand this will no doubt have increasingly negative results, as has already been shown in similar situations in post-World War II history.

More than anything, Latin America needs for world powers to understand the region's individual and collective realities. Such an understanding would make possible a true cooperation in various areas, to be achieved according to the reality of each country. But it will certainly never be attained through a so-called "carrot and stick" approach or by calling some countries "banana republics" or using similar insulting appellations.

This level of understanding can only be gained through seriously and dispassionately studying Latin America's present and past, its economic potential and its cultural riches—all of which should be grounded in the respect that is due to all countries as sovereign entities composed of human beings. This is the only way to realize the old dream of forming a true continental brotherhood. Such cooperation cannot be achieved by invoking the ideal only when the region or individual countries are needed in the councils of international organizations or in situations of international crisis, as has been the tendency in the past. Europe and Japan have already had their moments when economic reform and development were nurtured. Now, we must ask if it is not time for Latin America to be afforded the same opportunity.

Without a doubt, a broader application of universally accepted concepts of humanity, solidarity and equality in relations between countries (as Pope John Paul II urges in his international outlook) would be a benefit to Latin America and the world community as a whole. *MRF*

Major Eduardo Aldunate is the Chilean liaison officer to the US Army Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and consulting editor for the Spanish edition of *Military Review*.

MRWWII ALMANAC

June 1941 by Samuel J. Lewis

The United States was at peace in June 1941 and would remain so for another six months, when the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor would finally awaken the somnambulant giant. The war, however, was already assuming global proportions. In Asia, the conflict had already been raging for some 10 years in the form of Japanese aggression in Manchuria and China. With the retreat of the European colonial powers following the fall of France the previous summer, the Japanese Empire prepared to expand south.

In Europe, Germany's armed forces had overrun France, Belgium, Norway, Yugoslavia and Greece. The Nazi propaganda machine hailed the German dictator, Adolf Hitler, as the greatest military genius of all time, and as May 1941 concluded, few could argue. The seeds for Hitler's destruction, however, had already been sown. Like other continental empire builders before him, the former Bavarian corporal could not escape the Continent to win a final decisive victory. As long as England remained secure across the Channel and prepared to fight on the periphery of Europe, his previous victories remained temporal.

The first hint of German weakness was demonstrated the previous month, when the Battle of Britain concluded with the final German air raid on the night of 10-11 May. Great Britain had survived and was still full of fight. In early June, Convoy HX-129, the first to receive continuous escort across the Atlantic, arrived in England. At the same time, the British army seized Baghdad after driving out the pro-Axis Iraqi leader, Rashid Ali. On 8 June, Commonwealth and Free French forces invaded Lebanon and Syria. And on 15 June, Field Marshal Archibald Wavell launched an unsuccessful counteroffensive in North Africa in an attempt to relieve General Erwin Rommel's siege of Tobruk.

For Hitler, however, the Mediterranean held little interest. He had earlier rejected a Mediterranean strategy proposed by his military advisers, and German forces were sent to the area only to prevent the ruination of his Italian ally.

Hitler's real desire was to invade the Soviet Union, his ideological nemesis. He had often spoken of the need for securing "living space" in the East and even mentioned drawing up plans for the invasion the summer of 1940, but he did not instruct his military to make preparations until December 1940. The German military devoted most of its efforts to preparing for that invasion, which jumped off on 22 June 1941, beginning the most extensive land campaign in history.

By 30 June, the German army closed the first of its great double encirclements, trapping some 290,000 Soviet troops in the Bialystok pocket. It and subsequent German victories throughout the remainder of the year, however, would avail Hitler little. Russia would swallow up the German military like it had swallowed up other famed invading armies before. Millions of soldiers and civilians would fight and die in an enormous geographical funnel, some 400 miles wide at the narrows between East Prussia and the Carpathian Mountains, and some 2,000 miles between the Arctic Circle and the Black Sea. After thousands of battles and engagements, most forgotten or unknown, this struggle ended in late April 1945 with the Red Army's assault on Berlin and Hitler's suicide. **MR**

Samuel J. Lewis is an instructor with the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He previously wrote for Military Review while a research fellow with CSI.

Operation *Barbarossa* and the Initial Period of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War by Colonel David M. Glantz, US Army

On 22 June 1941, Nazi Germany unleashed the most powerful military host the world had yet seen in an attack against a nation with which it had cynically signed a nonaggression pact less than two years before. Along a front of more than 4,000 kilometers extending from the Kola Peninsula to the Black Sea, three German army groups organized

into 122 infantry, 19 panzer and 15 motorized divisions struck the partially prepared Red Army a devastating blow. The more than 3 million men, 3,350 tanks, 7,184 artillery pieces, 600,000 vehicles and 2,770 aircraft that took part in this surprise offensive represented fully 75 percent of the German *Wehrmacht*.

The massive German blow, supported initially by more than 500,000 Rumanian and Finnish troops, caught the Soviet government and Red Army by surprise. Despite years of growing political crisis, intense Soviet study of the nature of initial periods of war and adequate intelligence information regarding the impending German attack, the Soviet Union was not fully prepared to resist the invasion. The "riddle" of June 1941 as to just why this was the case has since remained unresolved. A satisfactory answer to this riddle will probably not emerge until the system that produced Joseph V. Stalin has itself perished.

Within a matter of days after the invasion had begun, German armored spearheads had pierced Soviet border defenses, plunged deep into Soviet territory, paralyzed Soviet command and control, demolished numerically superior Red Army forces in the border military districts and threatened defending Soviet forces with utter annihilation. The momentum of the multiple German armored thrusts carried the *Wehrmacht* through Soviet strategic reserves hastily deployed along the Dnieper River and produced a cascading series of successive encirclements of large Soviet forces. Three Soviet armies were swallowed up in the forests east of Bialystok, and another three were smashed around Smolensk. In September 1941, a gigantic German

pincer entrapped and destroyed a full Soviet front of more than 650,000 men around Kiev, and soon other large encirclements at Viaz'ma and Bryansk vividly marked the *Wehrmacht's* final fall drive to seize Moscow and end the war.

In early December 1941, while German forces were poised at the gates of Leningrad, Rostov, and Moscow itself, by herculean efforts, the Soviet High Command marshaled and committed to combat sufficient strategic reserves not only to halt the German offensive but also to launch a major counteroffensive of their own. By year's end, it was clear to most perceptive observers that Operation *Barbarossa* had failed.

The fact that the Soviet Union was able to survive this series of unprecedented military disasters and the loss of the bulk of its peacetime army (about 3 million men) and still emerge victorious remains one of the most fascinating, but as yet relatively unstudied, cases in modern military history. *MF*

Colonel David M. Glantz is the director, Foreign Military Studies Office, US Army Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and founder and editor of the *Journal of Soviet Military Studies*. He has been a frequent contributor to *Military Review* since 1983.

M LETTERS

Squads/Platoons—Key to Success

In their January 1991 *Military Review* article, "Centralized Battalion Evaluations," Colonel Robert H. Sulzen and Lieutenant Colonel Stephen C. Rasmussen claim *BOLD THRUST* is a dramatically innovative training strategy recently developed at the 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, California. The *BOLD THRUST* strategy is to replicate the combat training center (CTC) environment complete with MILES (multiple integrated engagement system), a fire-marker system and observer-controllers. A permanent *BOLD THRUST* staff and controller team evaluate battalions against Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) standards. This permanent controller team and general officer commitment apparently guarantee the effectiveness of this training strategy. However, except for the permanent *BOLD THRUST* staff, this training strategy is not new.

I have served with units that have trained bat-

talions this way for several years and have always been frustrated. Too often, training emphasis is not given to squads and platoons. Ironically, a battalion's success is ultimately dependent upon the successful execution of these smaller units. After-action reviews (AARs) from the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Little Rock Air Force Base and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, corroborate the fact that execution by tank commanders, squads and platoons is ultimately the key to battalion mission success.

RAIDER FOCUS is a training strategy of the 1st Brigade, 6th Infantry Division (Light), that places emphasis on small units. This strategy, while not necessarily new, prepares small light infantry units and battalion staffs for CTCs and war. This strategy does not resource a centralized team to standardize the evaluations; rather, the brigade commander emphasizes that all leaders will understand and use

published ARTEP standards. **RAIDER FOCUS** integrates normal combat service and combat service support slices into the training. **MILES**, **AARs** from observer-controllers and live-fire scoring systems aid soldiers' learning by providing quick and measurable feedback. The net result is better-trained small units at a relatively low cost.

RAIDER FOCUS begins with battalion, company and platoon assessments of their respective mission-essential task list proficiency. All units establish training priorities and prepare and coordinate training schedules. Leaders prepare instruction, the staff resources supplies and equipment, and the battalion deploys to the field. Company-size units establish assembly areas and execute training in accordance with the published schedule.

So? So, training is at squad and platoon level. For three solid weeks, these small units execute battle drills and mission-essential tasks until they perform to published standards. Precious learning time is not wasted because soldiers are waiting for maneuver instructions from higher headquarters. Soldiers concentrate on improving those tasks identified during the planning phase as areas needing improvement.

The staff simultaneously trains on its mission-essential tasks. Simply by executing obvious training support requirements, the staff exercises planning and coordinating processes. Battalion commander and support units' comments are the feedback. The staff schedules command post and similar exercises during the three-week period to train specific mission-essential tasks. Brigade staff members conduct **AARs**, and the battalion staff retrain those tasks not conducted to standard. Because these staff training exercises do not require all of the battalion's soldiers, squads and platoons are free to train tasks they and their company commanders prioritize.

Training focused primarily on winning at **NTC** or **JRTC**, as the **BOLD THRUST** strategy does, risks establishing a false sense of security by soldiers at all levels. Indeed, short of war, the **CTCs** are the best the Army has to offer for training resources. However, because **CTCs** are not war, leaders must exercise extreme caution in training just for the centers.

Specifically, leaders and soldiers have developed techniques to win with **MILES**. For example, a soldier at **JRTC** will position behind small trees while receiving direct fire from an opposing force soldier's **MILES** system. The result is the **MILES** sensors are not activated, and the soldier is not a casualty. Yet, the foliage from the trees that prevented the laser impact would not disrupt penetration from actual bullets. While this initiative is great, it requires scrutiny.

The two **CTC** controllers and, I suspect, the two **BOLD THRUST** controllers dedicated to a platoon

attempt to discourage this bad field discipline, but often they cannot observe all unsafe field craft actions. Also, they cannot demand that the soldier or small unit immediately retrain in the tasks performed poorly, thereby reinforcing the training principle addressed.

RAIDER FOCUS provides several controllers at platoon level to observe training. These controllers demand that soldiers who, although successful with **MILES**, practiced a battlefield survival skill poorly retrain that skill as soon as feasible before beginning another task. This retraining of a task that was successful under **MILES** conditions reminds the soldier that **MILES** is not war but only replicates it. A false sense of security is reduced in this strategy. Training is for war—not for **MILES**.

According to Field Marshall Rommel, "The best form of troop welfare is first class training." I have been to the **NTC** and **JRTC** as a rifle platoon leader, support platoon leader and company commander. I agree with Sulzen and Rasmussen that realistic and demanding training to **CTC** standards will prepare battalions for war. However, each of my units' successes or failures at **NTC** or **JRTC** was directly related to small-unit and individual proficiency.

— **RAIDER FOCUS** is a cost-effective alternative to the **BOLD THRUST** strategy. It maximizes brigade training resources for small units while simultaneously preparing battalion-level battle staffs.

CPT Todd J. Ebel, USA, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, USACGSC

General Brown Right On Target

Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown's superb article, "AirLand Battle Future: The Other Side of the Coin," (February 1991 *Military Review*) is right on target. Brown has once again asked us to look beyond our In box and examine where we want to be as a US Army in 10, 20 or 30 years. Changes in the strategic environment, most notably in the Soviet Union, Europe, and now, Southwest Asia, will have a profound impact on our future doctrine, force structure and modernization. All of us must be concerned with the future—that is where we will be spending the rest of our lives. Thanks for reminding us.

COL Alan G. Vitters, USA, Columbus, Georgia

The New Guard

The Gulf War's end brings back into focus an action already under way: significant US military cuts in US Army ground forces—Active and Re-

serve. Three questions must be asked about the coming "new guard." First, are the cuts justified based on the events of the war and the present chaos in the Soviet Union? Second, are policy and decision makers drawing the wrong conclusions from the war in deciding to cut the force, and what effects will these reductions have on Reserve Component (RC) capabilities and force structuring? Third, assuming reductions are justified, how will they be managed? I offer the following observations for consideration by policy and decision makers when they are answering these questions.

The RC leadership often speaks in glowing terms about the citizen soldier's capabilities. For the most part, I agree wholeheartedly. Today's RC is vastly more combat ready than the RC of even 10 years ago. Much of this increased capability stems directly from equipment modernization, qualitative improvements in personnel and increased financial resourcing. The RC has been transformed into a more equal partner in the Total Force structure. It was not accomplished overnight, nor accidentally—decisions were made and implemented years ago.

Officers' and noncommissioned officers' dedication is impressive, particularly when balancing civilian and military careers. Recruit quality in the RC is on par with the Active Component (AC). Having spent nine plus years as a Regular Army officer, I would favorably compare the average enlisted soldier in the RC with any found in my former AC units. People will always remain the most important resource in any organization, and personnel issues must be addressed as part of the overall solution to what the makeup of the new Guard will be.

I disagree with those who state RC units are as combat ready as their AC counterparts. Given that leadership and training programs are equal in quality to the AC's, this is still statistically impossible. RC units have 38 or 39 available training days per year. Other requirements detract from the actual time available for training including maintenance and administrative actions (physicals, HIV [Human Immunodeficiency Virus] testing, physical fitness testing and inspections). AC units have 200 available training days per year. Comparing 39 days to 200 days, it becomes apparent that it is impossible to begin at the baseline used for evaluation and produce RC units equal in combat readiness on "day one" to their AC counterparts. Does this mean RC units are inferior? No, it means that the difference in ability is a matter of time, opportunity and training.

I will not argue the points of whether the three combat brigades mobilized for Operation Desert Storm were given an unfair shake, whether leadership was lacking or whether training was not up to

par. I will say that, after being in the first RC combat unit used at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, for opposing forces augmentation to command and control subordinate units, the 48th Infantry Brigade (Georgia Army National Guard) rotation proved a combat-ready unit could be produced in time. But to expect an RC unit to maintain the same readiness level as an AC unit would be an impossible task.

Historically, RC units have been afforded the opportunity to prepare for combat. A study done by the RAND Corporation (from an Association of the United States Army Special Report, "The Active and Reserve Components: Partners in the Total Army") states, "the minimum time to prepare a National Guard division after mobilization for the Korean War was about 32 weeks." Increased equipment and technology levels, regardless of the quality level of RC leadership, will require even more time.

This is basically a matter of "mind-set." The RC will not degrade itself by admitting time is needed to bring units up to speed. The RC leadership is wrong to claim an impossible level of initial performance, and the AC cannot expect Reserve forces to assume a mission they cannot fulfill. It will not lessen the RC's importance to admit additional time is required.

Will this affect RC CAPSTONE alignment? The Gulf War does not allow analysis of what would have happened if the three RC combat brigades had deployed with their roundout unit because this did not happen, and combat did not occur. Arguably, if those units had deployed and experienced the same train-up level as the AC units, RC combat missions would have been performed at the same level as the AC. However, what if combat had occurred shortly after arrival in theater? The concept of rapid RC deployment and AC training and mission readiness levels could have been validated.

In the final analysis, if this reorientation of the mind requires the RC to reconfigure, then so be it. The nation needs a strong Reserve force that can, with the allotted time, reinforce the AC. This includes combat forces, as well as combat service support forces. For many years, a "come as you are war" was assumed. It did not happen that way. US and coalition forces had the luxury of a long preparation period. But what of the future?

What must be done? First, it is time for the Qualitative Management Program (QMP) to be implemented in the RC but with the flexibility to retain quality personnel who cannot be promoted because of a lack of unit vacancies. However, the system must weed out those individuals who not

only fail to be promoted but also lack the initiative to perform in their present grade.

Second, retention boards for service continuation after 20 years are an ideal way to remove below-average performers. As RC units return from the gulf, the words, "getting rid of the dead wood," keep appearing in their "war stories." It seems units have retained personnel for reasons other than combat readiness. Mobilization and deployment are not the times to rid units of those who are not capable. There are systems in place allowing commanders to take the necessary actions. They should be more stringently enforced. If properly conducted, the message will soon get out that continuation in the RC is not a given but must be earned.

Third, an increased overall attempt should be made to reduce the administrative requirements on RC leadership and personnel. Every effort should be made to abolish internal detractors. If this occurs, there will be a corresponding rise in training opportunities.

Fourth, the peacetime/wartime process must be refined, and the AC must support these efforts.

Fifth, the equipment fielding and modernization process should be continued. Automation should be a key factor in future purchases. The RC artillery with the battery computer system and light tactical fire direction system should be fielded. Training simulators should be available for all ground combat systems. Increased use of these devices will not only save training time but also reduce overall equipment costs.

Sixth, for RC units, increase the use of the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center, Little Rock Air Force Base, and Fort Chaffee, Little Rock, Arkansas. One deployment for an RC unit pays dividends for years.

Seventh, there is a need to establish a cadre system. Personnel, equipment fielding and authorizations should follow a system similar to the Soviet military. Staff and man units only at a certain percentage. In some cases, only a cadre would be present. This allows the unit leadership to train in those skills and tasks needed after mobilization. For example, in an artillery unit, each battery would field a complete fire direction center, a gun chief and, perhaps, assistant in each section, along with the commander, first sergeant, executive officer, firing battery chief and gunnery sergeant. Upon mobilization, the remaining personnel positions would be filled at the mobilization station where these fill-in personnel would undergo extensive training and be incorporated into the unit.

The AC and RC can be true partners in the Total Army. The inherent limitations of the RC need to be accepted and everything possible done to

maximize the system's strengths, as well as balance its known weaknesses.

CPT Richard D. Koethe III, ARNG,
Tennessee Army National Guard, Memphis, Tennessee

"Up-Gunning" MPs for Contingencies

"Force Protection: Military Police Experience in Panama," by Captain (P) Anthony M. Schilling in the March 1991 *Military Review*, was an excellent review of the series of events leading up to Operation *Just Cause* and the role of the military police (MP) in those events. I must disagree, however, with Schilling's comment that "the MPs require a system with an antiarmor capability and better protection than a high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV)."

In his article, "Military Police in Contingency Operations: Often the Force of Choice," in the September 1990 *Parameters*, Major General Charles A. Hines states the "unique capabilities of the military police, coupled with their domestic and international acceptability as a security force, frequently make them the most appropriate force for contingencies . . . [but] as the lethality of a situation intensifies and combat operations become more certain, the suitability of military police declines while that of the combat arms rises."

The MPs are uniquely trained and equipped. Their organization and training to deal with hostile civilians with tremendous professional constraint and minimum use of force make them a potent force in politically sensitive situations. They are an excellent resource for antiterrorism and, I would argue, counterterrorism operations where the environment demands those constraints. However, as Hines correctly notes, the time comes when the "gloves must come off." At that point, when heavy weapons such as the Panama Defense Force's V-300 armored cars are deployed, the game has evolved from low-intensity conflict to purely combat operations.

Just as the infantry, armor and artillery are inappropriate in low-visibility, politically sensitive operations, MPs are an inappropriate choice when full combat operations begin. To attempt to "up-gun" the MPs to handle every possible contingency would be as wasteful as sending in 8-inch self-propelled howitzers to handle a civil demonstration. We each have our role; there is no need to try to do the other guy's job.

LTC John M. Hammell, USA, Headquarters,
89th Military Police Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas

MR BOOK REVIEWS

THE NEW INSURGENCIES: Anticomunist Guerrillas in the Third World by Michael Radu, with contributions by Anthony Arnold, Paul Henze, Justus van der Kroef and Jack Wheeler. 306 pages. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ. 1990. \$32.95.

Is the Reagan Doctrine dead? Did it ever exist? Is support to anticommunist guerrillas ideological bedrock or geopolitical marriages of convenience? Interesting questions as the bipolar threat of conventional war recedes and light is applied to the conflict spectrum's lower end. In this book for policy makers and soldiers alike, the authors examine Western support of insurgencies, in general, and six current insurgent movements, in particular.

In a lengthy introduction, the principal author, Michael Radu, rips off the "bumper sticker" labeling of anticommunist guerrillas as freedom fighters and describes in detail the very different (from our own) reality in which these groups operate. He argues that to try to understand their objectives, motivations and tactics from a Western cultural and political perspective is to quite often misjudge their essential character; hence, policy "houses" can be built on sand, leading to far different outcomes than expected. (Did we really imagine that the *mujahidin* would establish a liberal democracy if they succeeded in toppling the Kabul government?) The common thread among these diverse groups is the desire to rid their countries or homelands of "foreign domination, foreign forms of political organization, and alien political and cultural values."

Radu saves his strongest stuff for the ideological blinders of the Ronald Reagan administration with its illusionary "Reagan Doctrine." A media creation, the term defines a statement of principle that US policy is to support local forces opposing existing Marxist-Leninist regimes. While Secretary of State George P. Shultz reasoned that morality, the national interest and cost effectiveness dictated such support, the threat was never pinned to the wall: "Will it be communism or the Soviet 'evil empire?'" Illustrative of incoherent and conflicting goals was support to UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and, simultaneously, to FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front), Mozambique's Marxist-Leninist ruling party. Alternatively, never able to believably articulate the threat, the administration suffered slings and ar-

rows for years in its support of the Contras, until it and they were overcome by events.

While developments have or are quickly eclipsing the scenarios cited, the case studies are excellent background material on the motivations and methods of operation of the movements against Marxist-Leninist regimes in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Nicaragua. All in all, this book is an excellent treatise on the requirement to go into a situation with our eyes open, seeing the last step, as Carl von Clausewitz said, before we take the first.

MAJ Robert C. Leicht, USA, US Army Research Fellow, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare by Bard E. O'Neill. 171 pages. Brassey's (US), Inc., McLean, VA. 1990. \$19.00.

This slim book contains only 164 pages of text and footnotes. Therefore, it cannot be and does not try to be a comprehensive survey of any, let alone all, low-intensity conflicts since World War II. The author, who teaches at the National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, wisely delegates that task to other monographs by area experts on the Middle East, Southwest Asia, South Africa and the numerous other places undergoing terrorism and insurgency, the most prevalent form of armed conflict in the world. The author, instead, offers his readers a framework for analyzing the ends, ways and means of low-intensity conflicts; that is, their adversaries and external allies, their resources, methods, strategies and their goals. When he deals with specific conflicts and contestants, it is not done to tell their history in any meaningful detail. It is done, instead, to demonstrate the utility of his analytical categories.

For example, one category of analysis concerns organizational structure. The author discusses a spectrum of structures, running from decentralized urban terrorists who disdain mass political organizations to centralized political insurgents who follow the Maoist model of protracted war. Despite the bewildering number of so-called revolutionary war-

riors, at least one fact emerges from this survey—organizational structure is a very useful concept for analyzing and categorizing groups engaging in low-intensity conflicts.

Like all other books, this one has some shortcomings. In pursuing generalizations that are valid for a wide variety of groups, the author sometimes states the obvious: "The smaller the disadvantaged groups, the smaller also the potential, since they can be more easily dealt with by encapsulating them The more government responses are informed, prudent, relevant, determined, and disciplined, the greater the burden on the insurgents."

Despite these few blinding insights into the obvious, this book is the place to start for people like me who are seeking analytical categories to analyze the insurgent and terrorist groups that seem to be growing more diverse, partly because the Soviet Union is fragmenting. When the Kremlin was running its international communist empire, it provided at least some direction and control over many subversive groups in the West. It simultaneously eliminated subversive groups among its subjects in the East. Now that the Soviet Union itself is decaying from within, one can only expect more terrorist and insurgent activities from independent groups from Armenia to Northern Ireland, each with its own structure, agenda and ideology. We will need Bard O'Neill's *Insurgency and Terrorism* to help us sort through this mess.

Michael D. Pearlman,
Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz by Martin van Creveld. 254 pages. The Free Press, New York. 1991. \$22.95.

Martin van Creveld has given us excellent analytical books on the subject of war. This is not one of them. What he offers, instead, is an extended essay on his vision of how the essential elements of war are changing. His chapter subtitles indicate his organizational construct for understanding war: "By Whom War Is Fought," "What War Is All About," "How War Is Fought," "What War Is Fought For" and "Why War Is Fought." He concludes with a vision of future war that reviews all of his foregoing chapters, each heavily sprinkled with historical and theoretical vignettes, and extrapolates his assertions of recent trends into the future.

Van Creveld's premise is that the Clausewitzian concept of war no longer applies. Carl von Clausewitz, the author states, was focused on "trinitarian

war," the idea that the three critical factors in war are the government, the army (military force) and the people. He maintains such a view is accurate only if war is an instrument of the state. However, he continues, since the state no longer is the sole or even the primary factor in warfare (other factors such as religion, justice and existence prevail), trinitarian war can only be one type of war among many different types. Hence, van Creveld asserts, war cannot be just an extension of politics because politics is synonymous with the state, and the state has not existed for much of human history and will probably diminish in importance in the future. Even where the state does exist, he adds, politics does not circumscribe all of its activities.

This is a very narrow definition of politics. As widely read as van Creveld is (as indicated by his exhaustive bibliography), he omits the broader view that politics can be found in all human interaction, that it is the essential determination of who gets what, when and how. Taken in that context, the view that war is an extension of policy would fit even the examples van Creveld cites. *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*, Lewis F. Richardson's classical study on warfare concluded decades ago, but not cited in the author's bibliography, already makes a strong case that what van Creveld dismisses as nonpolitical war may, in fact, be just that.

Had van Creveld stuck with his central critique of the Clausewitzian theory of war, he might have produced a solid—if debatable—work. Unfortunately, he clutters his argument with a number of digressions on a multitude of subjects: the literature on war, war as the great game, war as theater, women in war, the sexual undertones of war, and so on. Some take off on tangents requiring great leaps of faith to lend support to his underlying premise that we are in the midst of a significant transformation in the nature of war.

The book's jacket describes the work as an audacious searching examination of the nature of war. Other adjectives might be substituted for audacious such as preposterous, incredulous and ludicrous, to name a few. While much of what van Creveld says is thought-provoking, his arguments often are jumbled by bold and sometimes unsupportable assertions. Sadly, we seem to have less a serious study than an extended essay that attempts to display the author's mastery of understanding the state of war in the modern age while dismissing far too many others as unenlightened. It is poorly edited by its publishers (such as "Carslyle" Barracks, "Bohling" Air Force Base, and so on), with some overlap, redundancy and disjointedness in how van Creveld treats the subject.

A reviewer, prominently cited on the book's

back, admonishes us, "for professional soldiers to neglect this book is to neglect our duty." That may be so but only insofar as a reputed author ought to be read to see if he has anything of significance to add to the literature on his subject and, in this case, if only to entertain the provocativeness of thought van Creveld must have intended. But to cite this book as a serious study of war and rate it as a vision on the transformation of war is to place too much trust in what seems to be a loose rendition of a master's disparate thoughts.

**COL. James R. McDonough, USA, Director,
School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC**

ALTERNATIVE TO INTERVENTION: A New U.S.-Latin American Security Relationship. Edited by Richard J. Bloomfield and Gregory F. Treverton. 159 pages. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, CO. 1990. \$39.50.

Alternative to Intervention is an exceptionally important book on inter-American relations because it presents a "mainstream" interpretation of recent relations and advocates policy that may well be implemented by the next US Democratic administration.

The authors of the book are "mainstream" Latin Americanists from the US and Latin American academic and policy communities. As such, there is little "knee jerk" anti-Yankeeism. On the other hand, there is also little or no acceptance that the security assumptions of US administrations to the right of President Jimmy Carter might have been correct. In short, the positions articulated here represent US liberals and the Latin American center and "democratic left."

The book's overall thesis is stated by one of the contributing authors, James Kurth: "The inter-American collective security system has never been based upon an identity of interests between the United States and Latin America. It has always been based upon a great bargain in which the very different vital interests of each were served, usually at the cost of the peripheral interests of the other." The logic of the thesis argues that the great bargain has fallen apart over time and that the threat to hemispheric security has increasingly become US unilateral interventionism. This is merely the conventional wisdom, well stated.

At this point, the thesis shifts to the need for a new collective security system in the hemisphere. Such a system, all the authors argue, must secure the vital interests of both Latin America and the United States. It would depend on Latin Americans' taking responsibility for actions to enforce

collective security, and argue the authors, the Contadora process that sought to negotiate an end to the Central American conflict may provide a useful model.

While there is little to dispute in terms of the central thesis, there are some interesting and significant omissions in the discussion. First, in a book that focuses on the inter-American security system and its institutions, it is surprising that the oldest of those institutions, the Inter-American Defense Board, is not even mentioned. No matter that it is moribund (but hardly more so than the Organization of American States [OAS]); it is still in existence and is loosely connected with the OAS.

A second, critical omission is that the positions of the Latin American armed forces on this subject of vital institutional and national interest are not considered. This is significant because the positions of the military institutions may be very different.

Despite these failings and omissions, *Alternative to Intervention* is a "must read" for anyone interested in the US Southern Command arena. It addresses a very probable future policy context within which the US military will be required to act.

LTC John T. Fishel, USAR, Augusta, Georgia

THEODORE ROOSEVELT'S CARIBBEAN: The Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Latin American Context by Richard H. Collin. 598 pages. Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, LA. 1990. \$45.00.

Admirers and critics of Theodore Roosevelt regard him as the first modern chief executive, wielding US power for large purposes abroad and dominating American domestic political life. In this fresh and provocative reevaluation of one of the most controversial aspects of Roosevelt's presidency, Richard H. Collin argues persuasively that both groups have misunderstood Roosevelt and his time. In Collin's view, Roosevelt was a transitional figure, caught between the inward-looking America of the 19th century and the global power of the 20th century. Rather than wielding the "big stick" with gusto, Roosevelt was a reluctant interventionist.

Roosevelt did not intervene in Latin American affairs to create a US empire in the Western Hemisphere; instead, his purpose was to forestall European intervention. Collin illustrates his thesis through a series of case studies of Roosevelt's diplomacy: the 1902 Venezuelan crisis, the 1903 Panamanian revolution, the US receivership of Dominican customs receipts, US efforts to stop the 1906 war in Central America and the second US

intervention in Cuba that same year.

Collin's work has many strengths. Exhaustively researched and gracefully written, it deflates some conventional myths: that Roosevelt was a social Darwinist and a racist, that he orchestrated the Panamanian revolution and that US policy had its roots in economics (the "open door," dollar diplomacy or the current rage, "corporatism"). It even deprives us of Roosevelt's famous boast, "I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate," by showing that this familiar textbook quote rests on a journalist's mangling of Roosevelt's actual words.

Collin ably puts events in context, tracing the enormous technological, economic and cultural changes affecting the Western Hemisphere at the turn of the century. He has an equally deft grasp of personality and chance, and how they shape history. He is particularly effective in depicting the domestic constraints on the president: partisan political considerations, imperious senators with their own agendas and ambitions, and the public's indifference to foreign affairs. He also carefully traces the domestic factors influencing other countries' policies, in particular, offering a devastating indictment of Colombia's mishandling of the Panamanian issue.

In short, this is a model diplomatic history. It deserves a wider audience than diplomatic specialists though. Anyone interested in US foreign policy, "Teddy" Roosevelt, Latin America or how the United States interacts with the "Third World" can learn much from this book.

Daniel F. Harrington, *History Office,
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico*

THE PHOENIX PROGRAM by Douglas Valentine. 479 pages. William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York. 1990. \$24.95.

One of the most thought-provoking books about the Vietnam War, *The Phoenix Program* gives an entirely different perspective to this war. In the face of an undeclared war status, no national policy and thus no long-range goals, and few enforced rules of engagement, Douglas Valentine attempts to determine whether the Phoenix Program was a legal and moral program that occasionally abused its authority or a program that far exceeded its charter. It is clear the author believes the program was, in fact, an assassination program.

The Phoenix Program, Nelson Brickham's brainchild, was founded in November 1967 as a covert effort to destroy the Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI).

Founded out of the confusion, turf battles and failure of all former organizations designed to conduct covert operations, it focused on coordinating intelligence data and then exploiting that data. It proved a herculean task, molding all US civilian programs into a team-oriented organization while also addressing the US military role and the Vietnamese civilian and military structure.

The US civilians involved with defeating the VCI viewed military operations as secondary to their own efforts and saw the military as a shield behind which to work. Initially headed by Robert Komer and future Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Colby, the program closely paralleled the US military situation in that American patience waned early toward Vietnamese efforts to defeat the communists. America moved progressively from a support role to the principal role with only token Vietnamese support.

Opponents, like General Loan, chief of the Vietnamese national policy, felt the Phoenix Program infringed on Vietnamese sovereignty. One of several Americans working in the CIA, Tully Acanypora went so far as to blame the Phoenix Program for the success of the Tet offensive by the VCI in the Saigon area. Nevertheless, the Phoenix Program moved to the forefront in countering the VCI. However, the monumental tasks of simultaneously destroying the VCI while winning the population over to the Vietnam government's side proved impossible for the Phoenix Program.

With President Richard M. Nixon's early 1969 Vietnamization policy, the CIA (the money source) began to disassociate itself directly from the program and, by June 1969, passed the Phoenix Program to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). MACV caused further breakdown in relations with their US civilian counterparts and the Vietnamese by placing unqualified military personnel in the field and bringing Vietnamese back into key positions. Also by then, South Vietnam was so corrupt and deceptive and so infiltrated by the VCI that attempts to right the program proved futile.

This same year, the Phoenix Program ran afoul of legal and moral issues. Brought to the American public's attention, Colby was forced to defend the program before a Senate hearing in early 1970. He succeeded in buying time, but by then, the Phoenix Program was in shambles. Key US players were anxious to transfer responsibility to the Vietnamese side under the guise of the Vietnamization policy.

In 1973, MACV was replaced as the Phoenix Program's overseer by the US Embassy's Defense Attaché Office. In April 1975, Saigon fell, and yet

the Phoenix refused to die. Similar programs have reappeared in such places as El Salvador, Iran and Nicaragua. Are such programs now an accepted model of covert operations?

COL C. E. Hatch, USMC,
Marine Corps Liaison Officer, USACGSC

LEADERSHIP: Quotations From the Military Tradition. Edited by Robert A. Fitton. 382 pages. Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, CO. 1990. \$19.95.

THE MILITARY QUOTATION BOOK: More Than 600 of the Best Quotations About War, Courage, Combat, Victory, and Defeat. Edited by James Charlton. 152 pages. St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York. 1990. \$12.95.

A DICTIONARY OF MILITARY QUOTATIONS. Edited by Trevor Royle. 210 pages. Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York, NY. 1989. \$35.00.

Just when it appears the market is saturated with quotation books, along come three books of special interest to military professionals. Each book is readable, and each demonstrates there are still niches to be filled in the military professional literature.

Military professionals require a working knowledge and ready reference to war literature across the spectrum of human activity. The art and science of war produce human effort and emotion at the epitome and the nadir. Successful war requires the ultimate exercise of leadership, command and management functions. Perhaps as important as practicing these functions is the ability to articulate what is involved in preparing and waging war. No other profession requires the knowledge, understanding and application of the mental, physical and moral traits essential to and associated with successful human endeavor.

Soldiers will find Robert A. Fitton's book to be an extremely useful tool, solely on leadership. It has an up-to-date collection of usable quotes, frag-

ments and readings on leadership. Some are well known. Some should be better known. Two examples of the latter are "The Will of Marshall de Belle Isle" and "Know Your Men, Know Your Business, Know Yourself." The book is usefully arranged by presenting leadership functions and facets alphabetically, from "Ability" to "War," and has a good index. The principal fault with the book is that the quotes are listed only by author, title and date. Exact page numbers are missing, and since some quotes are fragments, it would be more helpful if a complete reference had been used.

James Charlton's book contains more than "600 of the Best Quotations About War, Courage, Combat, Victory and Defeat." This book is not limited solely to leadership functions but encompasses the military endeavors spectrum. There are many useful and familiar quotes for any student of war in this small book. There are others not so familiar but apropos. The principal fault with this book is that the quotes are not separated by function or chapter but, rather, are in a continuous stream. There is an author index, but if you do not know the author, you will have to start reading. Additionally, the exact documentation for each quote is not provided.


Trevor Royle's book is the best arranged of the three, with an alphabetical authors' listing and an alphabetical listing for these categories: "Battles and Wars," "Armies and Soldiers," "War and Peace" and "Last Port." The quotes, again, are not exactly documented in all cases, but this book is more definitive than the others. The quotes are very extensive and encompassing. There are more than 3,500 quotations in this book.


If you are a teacher or a speaker—and all true professional soldiers are both—these books will be of immeasurable help to you. Ideally, it would be convenient to have all three on the bookshelf for ready reference or for an evening of casual reading.

LTG Richard G. Trefry, USA, Retired, Clifton, Virginia

Senior Officer Logistics Management Course (SOLMC)

SOLMC is designed to update battalion- and brigade-level commanders and their primary staffs in the logistics arena. The course covers maintenance, supply and transportation procedures, as well as hands on experience with vehicles, weapons and ammunition, to include medical, communications, NBC [nuclear, biological and chemical] and quartermaster equipment. The course is open to majors and above in the Active and Reserve Army and the US Marine Corps; military from allied nations; and Department of Defense and all services civilians in the grades of GS-11 and above. The one-week course is conducted 10 times each year at the US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky. For more information contact CPT Lisa L. Hammerle, AUTOVON 464-7133/3411 or (502) 624-7133/3411.





Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps: 75 Years of Providing Leadership



Seventy-five years ago this month, President Woodrow Wilson signed the National Defense Act of 1916, inaugurating the largest commissioning program within the US military community—the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC).

ROTC has commissioned more than 5 million men and women to serve their country as Army officers since the gold bars of leadership were pinned on 133 second lieutenants in 1920. ROTC traditionally provides the Active Army, the Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve with more than 70 percent of their junior officers. ROTC graduates have provided battlefield leadership in every conflict from World War II to Operation Desert Storm.

ROTC is a unique blend of America's academic community and the Army. Students at more than 1,000 colleges and universities in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and Guam combine their classroom instruction with demanding military training. ROTC thus provides the Army with a rich diversity of officers from all sections of the country, from all ethnic backgrounds and from campuses large and small, private and public. Commissionees with backgrounds as diverse as accounting to zoology bring needed skills to the Army.

Women have been an integral part of the program since 1972-73, and they currently constitute some 20 percent of the total enrollment. The first 150 female commissionees earned their gold bars of leadership in 1976.

Two programs in ROTC have received renewed emphasis—commissioning men and women to serve with the Army Nurse Corps and providing the opportunity to earn commissions through the "Green to Gold" program to separating enlisted soldiers who are enrolling in college. Currently, approximately 10 percent of the ROTC cadets are prior-service personnel who will be rejoining the Army with college degrees as well as commissions.

Army ROTC has had its own command structure since 1986 when the US Army ROTC Cadet Command was established at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Before that time, the ROTC was a staff element of Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, at Fort Monroe.

A Junior ROTC program is available at more than 850 high schools across the country. The program emphasizes the values of good citizenship and the importance of staying in school and earning a diploma to the more than 130,000 students enrolled.

General George C. Marshall, World War II chief of staff of the Army and later secretary of state and secretary of defense, was commissioned at Virginia Military Institute, one of the 28 charter ROTC schools established in 1916. Each spring, the nation's top cadets gather in Lexington, Virginia, to discuss military strategy and international affairs at the ROTC seminar that bears his name.

ROTC has served the country with distinction for three-quarters of a century, providing officer leadership to help preserve American freedom, both in time of conflict and as peacekeepers in all corners of the globe. Among its alumni are Generals George H. Decker and Fred C. Weyand, who both served as chief of staff of the Army, and General Colin L. Powell, the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



Articles to Watch for:

The Challenge of Peace:

Brigadier General James R. Harding, US Army,
and John A. Pitts



Toward a European Security and Defense Policy

Werner J. Feld



Building a NATO Corps

Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks Jr., US Army
and Major Alan T. Carver, US Army

\$4.00

2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 2680, 2681, 2682, 2683, 2684, 26

[illegible]

Copyright © 2004 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

with $\beta = 1$ and $\beta = 0.5$, while $\beta = 0.5$ conditions are not all generally representative.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

2. $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$ is a root of $\chi_{\mathbb{R}}(T)$ if and only if $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$ is a root of $\chi_{\mathbb{C}}(T)$.

doi:10.1017/S0022292412001912

| Case no. | From | To | Age | Sex | Occupation | Time of day | Time of year | Time of day | Time of year |
|----------|------|------|-----|-----|------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|
| 1 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 2 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 3 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 4 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 5 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 6 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 7 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 8 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 9 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 10 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 11 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 12 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 13 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 14 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 15 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 16 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 17 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 18 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 19 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 20 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 21 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 22 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 23 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 24 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 25 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 26 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 27 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 28 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 29 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 30 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 31 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 32 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 33 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 34 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 35 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 36 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 37 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 38 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 39 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| 40 | 1980 | 1981 | 20 | M | Student | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 | 10:00 |
| | | | | | | | | | |

1000

© 2000 Blackwell Science Ltd *Journal of Internal Medicine* 247: 161–168

© 2006 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

2024年12月10日 星期二 10:10:10

© 2004 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, *Journal of Internal Medicine* 255: 111–118

[illegible]

$\mathcal{H} = \mathcal{H}_1 \oplus \mathcal{H}_2$ and $\mathcal{H}_1 = \mathcal{H}_2 = \mathcal{H}$ if and only if $\mathcal{H} = \mathcal{H}_1 = \mathcal{H}_2$.

© 2000 Blackwell Science Ltd, *Journal of Internal Medicine* 247: 105–112

RECEIVED

Headquarters, Department of the Army

FINE 00330 000

Any cost for the release of information is minimal.