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Confronting the Future Head-On

In writing these introductory essays, the urge always arises to search for the perfect illustration, the illuminating example, a few incisive paragraphs that place the eight or so articles of the issue into perfect harmony and context. Though the intention is honorable and worthy of pursuit, often the result is like the last-minute field goal that falls short or the two-outs-in-the-ninth, bases-loaded grounder back to the pitcher. Introducing a theme such as "The Changing Army" is even more difficult than most, given the range of topics that can be addressed and the rapidly changing environment within which the Army must evolve.

For an army standing at the crossroads, the future can offer an uncommon degree of uncertainty and puzzlement. At the same time—and more important—the years ahead also offer excitement, challenge and opportunity. Now that the Gulf War is nearing its war story phase, the talk both inside and outside officialdom is returning to "building down the Army" and to building the future force. This month, *Military Review* reenters the discussion, offering a pot-pourri of articles oriented on bringing the Army into the future.

The lead-off spot is occupied by retired Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown, a regular contributor, who underscores the importance of the Reserve components and gives a strong endorsement to the viability of the Total Force concept. At the same time, he cautions against adopting a "just like the Active Component" approach to the unique Active-Reserve relationship. Next, we offer three articles on the nuts and bolts of moving armies from the drawing board into the field. Colonel Lewis I. Jeffries proposes a bottom line philosophy and set of force design principles to nullify what he suggests has become a personality-driven system. Michael J. Mazarr outlines the requirements and the increased capability of a "middleweight force" for *Desert Shield*-type contingencies, and Captain Allen L. Tiffany goes a step further, proposing a revision in the infantry division (light) to give it more "punch" for such operations.

We round out the lineup with an article by retired Colonel James H. Allan, Canadian Army, on the allied coalition's high stakes and arguably more difficult peacekeeping role in the gulf region, followed by Major Fred V. Flynn's introspective look at a neglected subject, "Preparing 'Self' for Combat," and finally Major Frederick J. Chiaventone's historical analysis of the often acrimonious relationship between the military and the media.

Like the world, the Army must change to ensure that it progresses rather than regresses. Even treading water will put us quickly behind in our commitment to national security, and *Military Review* will continue to emphasize the wide-ranging discussion of the challenges ahead. Strong effort by all parties, examining, writing and discussing these convoluted and often redundant issues, will ensure that the Army is the agent for its own evolution rather than an institution that has change forced upon it. An even more important issue, it seems, is to prevent the astonishing success in the gulf and the uncomfortable uncertainty of the future from dampening the "fire in the belly" of an Army which rose above the shame of the Vietnam experience and the military ineptitude of the 1970s to success on the mid-intensity battlefield.

The Army must not take too seriously its own press clippings or the pot shots of its detractors, however. Like Cinderella returning to her two ugly stepsisters after the ball, the Army must return to the reality of redefining its role in national defense. The lasting lessons of the Gulf War must be learned and institutionalized. Unlike the "Hail Mary" play in the desert and the teachings of maneuver warfare, the best way for the Army to approach its future is by the head-on assault, on a broad front, hard and fast right up the middle. Stay tuned. The discussion both in and out of the Army over the next few years will be most interesting, and *Military Review* offers an opportunity for all to participate.

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Evolution of the Army

Lieutenant Colonel [Name], US Army

As the nation faces new and different threat assessments in the post-Cold War era, the debate on organizational structure and force comes to center stage. The central issue is the role of the Reserve components. The author challenges military and civilian leaders to tackle tough problems that have been avoided during periods of less dramatic change. He calls for the citizen-soldier in a modern democracy and to make advantage of the strengths of each component to meet the increasing importance of Reserve contributions to the nation's defense requirements.



AS THE majority of our mobilized land power, the Reserves are important. They appear about to become even more important as our nation surveys its military policy for the future.¹ Now operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* serve both as timely "test bed" confirmation of the wisdom or error of the Total Force policy, and certain lodestar for future Reserve Component (RC) policies and programs. Despite continuing and predictable differences between the legislative and executive branches of our government on the size of the Reserves, relative, if not actual, increased reliance appears inevitable. In fact, such reliance is the chosen path of the Atlantic Alliance, which is faced with more immediate potential ground threats.

Operations *Desert Shield*, *Desert Storm* and *Just Cause* are now being scrutinized for topical lessons learned relating to future Reserve responsibilities, policies and programs. As could be expected, evidence will reflect both very good and poor. But national security policy analysts must take care to sort the systemic from the occasional, rejecting anecdotal evidence from the extremes (the top 10 percent will excel no matter what, and the bottom 10 percent are hopeless no matter what). For what are we really looking? The answer lies in recognizing the good and bad that came as a result of the normal functioning of our systems or the problems therein. My challenge here is to propose systemic challenges and possible corrective actions to take the best advantage of the capability of the middle 80 percent. Hopefully, this will focus discussion on key leveraging issues appropriate for the serious, informed debate that is beginning.

The purpose of this article is to lay out some tough systemic issues that should be addressed as the long-term missions, policies and programs of Reserve forces are debated in both executive and legislative branches of government. To this end, it will review some myths and realities that underlie every serious discussion of Reserve forces, but which are too seldom on the table—discussants erroneously assuming that all understand, and therefore, the underlying assumptions do not have to be raised. There are also those issues


omitted through natural politeness; that is, unwillingness to raise distasteful or controversial issues that could mar completion of "actions" in question. Then, after laying out various factors influencing the Reserves, I will propose several

There has been an order of magnitude improvement in Reserve readiness during the past two decades. More competent, better-motivated personnel, provided specific mission focus and the necessary equipment, have responded to create certainly the most ready Reserve force . . . in our nation's modern military history.

long-term policy or program alternatives.² Some of these actions will require legislation; regulatory changes, while helpful, will not be sufficient. But, this is not bad. The political processes should be activated, for the issues at hand go to the fundamentals of sustaining land power in a democracy.

By its nature—looking at the problems—the focus of this effort tends to be negative. However, the bottom line is not negative. There has been an order of magnitude improvement in Reserve readiness during the past two decades. More competent, better-motivated personnel, provided specific mission focus and the necessary equipment, have responded to create certainly the most ready Reserve force our nation has possessed since World War II and probably in our nation's modern military history. While this has been a tough, but successful, team effort by many dedicated Americans, the positive impact of volunteer accessions (no more draft-induced soldiers), the resources actually provided during the Reagan years and the outstanding vision and perceptive guidance of former Secretary of the Army, John O. Marsh, combined to create this success story.


Today, some Reserve forces equal, if not exceed, the professional competence of the Active force in the 1970s. They are more capable than



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As a maritime power, the United States has found, in the Total Force, a superb combination of federal and state governance, national and local representation and professional and citizen-soldier competence. This is uniquely suited to American society—a state, nation and democracy all of which reflect the diversity of a continent.

the Active forces of many other nations. Fortunately for the nation, unfortunately for comparisons, the Active force today has improved even more rapidly than the Reserves. So a longstanding difference or "delta" of greater Active Component (AC) (or Regular Army) capability has remained and, in some areas, increased. Unable to evaluate this gap by the long view of personal experience over time, younger AC officers see, and are deeply troubled by, RC inadequacies. This becomes a source of great frustration to many deeply patriotic, extraordinarily hard working, RC citizen-soldiers. At a minimum, effective communication between components needs much improvement. The experiences of working together in operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* will help.

Total Force Policy

First and foremost, from a national, strategic perspective, the Total Force policy is a resounding success, having demonstrated that it is particularly suited for US military land power capability. As a maritime power, the United States has found, in the Total Force, a superb combination of federal and state governance, national and local representation and professional and citizen-soldier competence. This is uniquely suited to American society—a state, nation and democracy all of which reflect the diversity of a continent.


The Regular Army element of this force is highly competent, ready to project decisive military capability as a strategic force anywhere, anytime, to win—*Just Cause* and *Desert Storm* are re-

cent examples. It has also proved itself capable of holding the line against major threats as it has done for decades in Europe and Korea. It is a federal force, responsive to the president as commander in chief; yet it is nationally distributed, fully representative of region, minority and economic status and absolutely subordinated to civil direction.

This federal force is complemented by the National Guard of the various states. Commanded by the governor in peacetime, manned by citizen-soldiers who are motivated by desire to serve state as well as national interest, the Guard represents an integral and absolutely critical element of the federal republic—the pride and diversity of the various states. It is ready to support in civil disaster or to reinforce state law enforcement as we have seen recently in earthquakes and the drug war. As a state entity, the Guard responds to the governor, not the president. However, it leans heavily on the Congress of the United States, both through state representation and national associations, for political and economic support at the national level, particularly in support of preparation for federal missions.

The National Guard, a state and regional force, is well complemented by the US Army Reserve (USAR), a federal and regional force. USAR can recruit across state boundaries generally unconstrained by local politics, particularly in major multistate urban metroplexes, to access functional talent in a highly mobile work force. This capability, well-suited to attract talent in the emerging information economy, has resulted in exceptionally capable individuals and units. There are Reserve units possessing technical competence unmatched and unattainable in the Active force such as specialized engineer units, technical intelligence and psychological operation units with world-class talent.

Although the USAR is federal and is commanded by the president, it too frequently relies on Congress for political and economic support (a source of some frustration to the Active Army). For a combination of reasons to be discussed, the Active force has difficulty pro-



Guard personnel of the 35th Infantry Division training in a command post mock-up tied into the SIMNET system, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Distributed communications that link geographically spread units, allowing them to "train together" over a common war model or virtual reality such as that produced by the Simulation Network (SIMNET) system. These technologies, combined with comparable advances in leader development and team-building techniques, provide absolutely revolutionary opportunities for Reserve forces training.

viding appropriate governance. Concerned Reserve commanders, inured by extremely well-meaning, yet spotty direction, yet charged as commanders to provide ready units, seek support wherever they can find it—sometimes including Congress.

While many may view this shared command as a potential disaster, it is, in fact, absolutely consistent with the intent of our Constitution, relying as it does on division of power—the checks and balances essential for governance of our diverse peoples, regions and needs across the continent. No one in the AC or RC questions the absolute primacy of the chain of command when we go to war. In fact, we have witnessed increasing support to individual and unit mission focus mandated in the mission essential task list (METL) of current Army training programs. This has been accompanied by increasing readiness responsibilities of the "go to war" chain of command as prescribed in the CAPSTONE program and supported proactively by both Guard and Army Reserve. So in many regards,

this command arrangement may in fact be an advantage. The concern about shared command arises from genuine and understandable Active Army uneasiness about the uncertainties of divided responsibilities during peacetime.

Yet, looking to the future, if we did not have the competitive marriage of Active, Guard and Army Reserve, we would have to invent it. This is particularly true now, during a period of diminished apparent threat. Seeing itself protected by dominant sea power and perhaps air power, our democracy (traditionally uneasy about maintaining large land forces) is looking for a lower cost land power defense "insurance policy." The issue is not, "if" we will have major Reserve formations, it is "how many" and how they can best be employed.

In addition to division of peacetime authority and responsibility for land power being particularly suited for the United States, a second major advantage unique to our democracy is the availability of new technologies and applications that permit effective programs despite extraordinary

decentralization and continental distribution of units. The training revolution ongoing in the Army has brought us the task, condition and standard methodology that prepares our forces to make extraordinary use of these advancements.

During a period of diminished apparent threat [and] seeing itself protected by dominant sea power and perhaps air power, our democracy is looking for a lower cost land power defense "insurance policy." The issue is not, "if" we will have major Reserve formations, it is "how many" and how they can best be employed.

No other army has defined, with such rigor, the individual and collective task training requirements to execute its warfighting doctrine.

The soldier's manuals of the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) define training requirements in rigorous detail. Dragon gunners or Bradley crewmen know exactly what is required to be battle ready whether on Active duty in Korea, a Guardsman at Gowen Field, Idaho, or Army Reservist at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. This systems approach to training, outlined in soldier's manuals and ARTEPS, permits standardization despite remarkable peacetime dispersion of wartime chains of command.³ The systems approach is complemented by extraordinary advances in distributed communications that link geographically spread units, allowing them to "train together" over a common war model or virtual reality such as that produced by the Simulation Network (SIMNET) system. These technologies, combined with comparable advances in leader development and team-building techniques, provide absolutely revolutionary opportunities for Reserve forces training.

A third advantage is the sheer quality of the Total Force today. The Reserves are as *volunteer* as the Active force; all are Americans serving because they want to. And there is a fundamental strain of patriotism, a basic desire to serve the

country, present in all the force. There is no draft inducement. However, similar to the Active force, there are many citizen-soldiers recruited due to educational benefits. Some will have second thoughts after *Desert Storm*. Yet, despite some heart-wrenching stories of personal, family and financial sacrifice, there has been remarkably little citizen-soldier dissent about *Desert Shield* call-ups in the face of searching microphone and camera of hyperactive media. By their actions in *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, the Reserves have "reearned their spurs" in the eyes of America for a broad range of important land power tasks. Their demonstrated competence and local political power should be very persuasive in shaping the force structure of the Army in the future.

So there are good reasons for being bullish on the future Total Force. But the path is not clear; there are normal, in fact, predictable tensions and misunderstandings among, and between, all three components of Army land power and their various supporters. These will not be solved quickly, but they do need to be on the table and weighed as the tough decisions are made. Several misunderstandings or differences that must be part of the debate include:

- Routine requirements too intense for citizen-soldiers' time.
- Imperfect resource analysis in planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS).
- Inadequate full-time manning support.
- A general misunderstanding of RC by the AC, particularly forces influencing citizen-soldiers in a democracy.
- Perceptions of RC suitability for social missions.

Each of these require elaboration. The demands on Reservists' time have steadily increased. More appears to be better for the Active force that is clearly excelling in the mastery of increasingly complex doctrine and equipment. In its understandable and desirable focus on mission readiness, the AC anticipates comparable competence across the Total Force. In the absence of a fully effective screening mechanism at the Department of the Army, requirements have



The uncompromising intensity imposed by . . . readiness requirements can drive out many young leaders striving to succeed both in the Army and in the IBMs and Motorolas of competitive industry. Most do this while also "growing" a successful family, often with the spouse working . . . to support a college education for their children. When these quality young people cannot prosper in the Reserves, we have done something fundamentally wrong for the future security of our nation.

gradually, but inexorably, grown for the Reserves. National Guard Bureau (NGB) and Office, Chief Army Reserve (OCAR) both seem driven to be "holier than the Pope," that is, more professional than the Regulars.

The pressure is such that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the citizen-soldier to achieve senior positions. More and more, senior personnel are expected to attend resident courses of instruction. The yearlong course at the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, becomes virtually mandatory for line officer candidates for general officer, particularly in the Guard. Senior officers are increasingly state civil servants—school teachers or employees in one of the state departments. Key positions are occupied increasingly by full-time personnel—quasi professionals. Senior competence is genuinely increasing, although at a slow pace from the perspective of the Regular Army.

But, as a result of this fierce competition of requirements (imposed too little time) and the increased reliance on full-timers, we no longer have as many units motivated by the ethos of citizen-soldiers. The uncompromising intensity imposed by the Regular Army (with the best of intentions given genuine readiness requirements) can drive out many young leaders striving to succeed both in the Army and in the International Business Machine Corporation (IBM) and Motorolas of competitive industry. Most do this while also "growing" a successful family, often with the spouse working both from conviction and to support a college education for their children.⁴ When these quality young people cannot prosper in the Reserves, we have done something fundamentally wrong for the future security of our nation.

The imperatives of resource allocation in the Reserves are virtually a mystery to the planning,

programming, budgeting world. Comptrollers and systems analysts at all echelons relate to effectiveness and efficiency—good solid concepts of economic analysis permitting rational decisions

The training revolution ongoing in the Army has brought us the task, condition and standard methodology that prepares our forces to make extraordinary use of these advancements. No other army has defined, with such rigor, the individual and collective task training requirements to execute its warfighting doctrine.

based on the critical resources of money and people. And, in fact, the process has conditioned all of us from the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office down to regard tough policy decisions in these terms. As we have seen, there are often controversial, but generally valid, results. That said, much of this analysis is questionable for the Reserves because the vital scarce resource is neither money nor people. Rather, it is time available for unit readiness preparation.

The federal bureaucracy generally asks the right questions, but often with the wrong measures. As a general proposition, people and money can compensate for a shortage of time. For example, remarkable improvements can be made in heavy maneuver unit readiness if modern training technology or highly qualified trainers (master gunners) are available at each armory or Reserve center and are empowered to enforce performance testing. Yet, neither the training support analysis nor a training strategy optimized to provide much more time-efficient training to the Reserves has been implemented. Until there has been serious negotiation across the resource bureaucracy on this issue, significant improvements in Reserve unit readiness will be very difficult to achieve. In PPBS terms, to ensure effective analysis, the true marginal cost of time for Reservists must be incorporated in every cost-

effectiveness analysis in virtually every area of program review.

But, the problem is not solely lack of management appreciation of the criticality of time or the intensity of the Active force. Reserve force leadership particularly, but not exclusively, in the Guard is firm in desire to be "just like" the Active force. Thus, any redefined "RC friendly" requirements are regarded with suspicion. For example, RC "train to level organized" multi-echelon training becomes a major objective and takes major portions of the training calendar despite regional or local shortcomings that can seriously question, if not invalidate, this strategy. Some proficiency evaluations after Desert Shield call-ups demonstrated serious shortfalls, reflecting extensive focus at higher echelons of command when the basics clearly had not been mastered down in the squad and platoon. This is a known hazard of multiechelon training, particularly with inexperienced young leaders.

Multiechelon training assumes a chain of command competent to train at all levels. That competence is difficult to achieve in many Reserve units for understandable reasons. Additionally, AC training philosophy is biased strongly toward decentralized training to strengthen the chain of command. Inefficiencies associated with decentralization are accepted; AC units usually can find the time and resources to correct in mid-course if training is off track. Neither trained leaders nor time are as available to RC units. Frequently during annual training (AT), centralized training—often single echelon, small-unit training and evaluation—is the most effective, efficient training strategy. But few units are sufficiently confident to do it because it does not fit the multiechelon training mold and appears "nonregulation."

Motivated to being "just like" AC, there has been strong reluctance to adapt to the different training environment in the Reserves.⁵ At times, there has seemed to be almost paranoid fear of being perceived as "second class" as a result of doing anything different. This is unfortunate on its own merit, but doubly damaging because it lets the AC off the hook in its respon-



Kauai Army National Guardsmen conducting their annual training at the Pohakuloa Training Area on the island of Hawaii.

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sibility to continuously scrub AC policies and procedures. Being "just like" also provides fertile ground for compromises of integrity by RC junior leadership as statistically oriented higher headquarters, unfamiliar with small-unit "reality," measure subordinate performance against unrealistic objectives. Well-intended "just like the AC" objectives that, however laudable, are beyond the capability of the average unit to achieve are absolutely corrosive to integrity. There are certain to be examples of this revealed in the post-*Desert Shield* reviews. Impassioned appeals to be "just like" need to be viewed with suspicion.⁶

While the vast majority of the personnel in Reserve units are, and should be, part-time citizen-soldiers, the complexity of unit administration today is such that there must be a cadre of full-time personnel available to support the commander. These soldiers attend to the day-to-day administration at every echelon from company- to major general-level commands.

The expanding demands of readiness have increased requirements for this expertise to the point that both Guard and Reserve have thousands of these critical personnel in positions ranging from sergeant company administrative technicians, to full-time recruiters and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) detachment members, to colonels filling key staff positions in field commands and at OCAR and NGB. Some are former AC personnel.

Full-time manning personnel policies vary between the Guard and Army Reserves, but the basic dilemma is the same—how to develop necessary competence for them while the most important positions, including command, are reserved for part-time citizen-soldiers. Individual development programs for full-time manning are spotty at best, although the trends are positive recently as they are increasingly required to attend full-term schooling conducted by the AC. On the other hand, citizen-soldiers' concerns about competing for positions with full-time manning personnel (particularly for command positions essential for professional development and advancement) are predictable. If key command positions are allocated to full-time personnel, the part-time soldier finds it difficult to devote all those funded and unfunded days away from job and family. Why would a citizen-soldier put in significant

Comptrollers and systems analysts at all echelons relate to effectiveness and efficiency—good solid concepts of economic analysis permitting rational decisions based on the critical resources of money and people. . . . Much of this analysis [however] is questionable for the Reserves because the vital scarce resource is neither money nor people. Rather, it is time available for unit readiness preparation.

amounts of time—averaging 80 to 100 days per year in many jurisdictions—with reduced prospect of command?

The general result is continuing morale and competence problems in full-time manning personnel that can result in high turnover of less capable personnel into full-time positions, or the stagnation in those positions of less capable people who have “found their niche” and are highly resistant to change. There are clear exceptions in the Guard, largely determined by some state headquarters’ attentiveness to personnel development (and the state’s willingness to absorb key Guard leaders into the state administrative bureaucracy). The USAR does not have the luxury of a separately maintained bureaucracy, which underwrites numerous operating costs in many states.

The end result of all this is spotty, full-time manning support and understandable tension between part-time and full-time personnel competing for important professional development opportunities.⁷ Political support to technicians notwithstanding, a near-term answer to this at all echelons is to draw on the Active force to provide full-time personnel support as required. An AC back up ready source of competent, full-time personnel would give breathing space to the Reserve leadership as it sorts out a political minefield and seriously addresses full-time manning competence, and more AC personnel would understand Reserve problems.

For the long term, there is a strong case to be

made that there should be only two kinds of full-time soldiers: full-time professionals of the AC in Active units, and those assigned as required to support Reserves and part-time citizen-soldiers commanding, staffing and serving in units. Guard and Army Reserve personnel at all echelons should be part-time citizen-soldiers with specific incentives such that they will have other civilian employment. AC officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) would be available only as advisers or to fill selected staff positions in the Reserve units as specifically requested by citizen-soldiers, with AC positions renegotiated on a specified schedule.

I acknowledge the outcry such policies would provoke from the current full-time Reserve bureaucracy that includes much of the “higher headquarters” of the Reserve establishment and its congressional support base. It would also certainly not be popular with the AC, unwilling to provide such extensive personnel support to the Reserves. However, the status quo is unhealthy—citizen-soldiers being replaced by full-time manning personnel of greatly varying competence as all are trying to master an increasingly complex warfighting doctrine. Over time, it may ensure mediocre units, out of touch with local elite groups—precisely the worst situation for land power in a democracy relying on “militia” forces.

One of the greatest problems facing Reserve readiness is the paucity of AC leadership understanding of the Reserves. AC efforts to improve Reserve readiness have been herculean, providing quantities of new equipment and the time and energies of AC leaders in various training associations. It has been a major mission accepted with positive, dedicated effort. But it has been extraordinarily difficult to execute. Few current senior Army leaders have had substantive personal service with Reserves. Due to disestablishment of the readiness regions, an AC major general command, there is today no seasoning assignment for AC brigadier or major generals. There are colonel assignments in readiness groups or as senior advisers, but promotions from those positions have been rare.

Often, AC senior officers will say "they understand" because of associations under the CAPSTONE program or multiple evaluations of RC training during AT, as part of some form of training association with the unit. These are relevant, but incomplete experiences which are not fully representative of the ethos, the challenges and the satisfaction of service in the RC. As a result, the AC leadership is placed in a position of relying on unreliable "instincts" derived from incomplete personal experience or relying on the advice of the full-time Reserve personnel discussed above.⁸

The result of all this is a stream of solid, well-meaning, costly AC policies and programs, imperfectly applied to the Reserves. Cases in point are personnel and training policies formulated in an AC environment, then "translated" to the Reserves. Multiechelon training was discussed earlier. Many programs succeed "in spite of" their inherent inappropriateness because of the hard work of good people.

Unfortunately, the negative feedback has a difficult path to the leadership in Washington. The Army Staff, who may be disposed to expect the Reserves to perform at level organized (like the AC), is provided feedback screened by the full-time Reserve "experts"—OCAR and NGB—that are the only sources available to explain what it was "that the [blank] meant to say," and who are responsive (supported and resourced) up to the headquarters, not down to the field units. This is precisely the situation alluded to earlier in reviewing the problems associated with being "just like" the AC. As a result of the tensions between full-time manning and citizen-soldiers, Washington expertise in Reserve issues may lack the sensitizing influence of unit command or recent troop experience. So the AC absence of "gut experience" with the Reserves is not necessarily corrected by the Reserve advice available in Washington. Normal feedback loops are not working as they should.

At present, this is a flawed process, probably politically resistant to correction unless the administration and Congress step in with a Reserve equivalent to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, man-


dating that AC leaders serve with the Reserves to ensure their understanding of the Total Force. A short-term correction is formation of a Reserve command responsible to formulate policy and programs for the Army Reserve similar to the responsibilities of the Guard Bureau for the

Some proficiency evaluations after Desert Shield call-ups demonstrated serious shortfalls, reflecting extensive focus at higher echelons of command when the basics clearly had not been mastered down in the squad and platoon. This is a known hazard of multiechelon training, particularly with inexperienced young leaders.

National Guard of the various states. These Reserve commands could patch together sensible policies, but even this is no way to develop proactive policies and programs to optimize the great potential of citizen-soldiers during a period of severely constrained resources. The longer-term answer should address both AC leader developmental experiences with the Reserves and the nature of full-time support to the Reserves. Neither is sufficient today.

Reserve force structure and disposition is not always the result of a totally rational analysis of national defense requirements. Because size and location of Reserve units determine location of federal construction and subsidized jobs across the United States, they are subject to political pressures similar to traditional river and harbor works managed by the Corps of Engineers. The corps has handled this exceptionally well over the years with a system of division and area engineers accustomed to responding to local political pressures. It has resulted in superb control of an important resource on a continental scale. This is how our country works; it is the political process enabled by the Constitution that our Army exists to defend.

The same process governs in configuring RC forces although the AC has consciously or



Weapons training at Fort Dix, New Jersey, Oct. 6/1980. (The post is slated to be closed.)

As we see consistently with base closures . . . executive branch flexibility is severely limited. There is definitely a floor on federal support to states and localities. . . . As a result, strong resistance has developed to reductions in other federal programs. Thus, the chances of significant reductions in RC force structure are slim.

unconsciously granted the decision leverage to OCAR and NGB. As river and harbor works have moderated (running out of uncontrolled water), the pork barrel has moved to Reserve readiness, a much more effective generator of resources than even the 600-ship Navy. As we see consistently with base closures, for a combination of good and bad reasons, executive branch flexibility is severely limited. There is definitely a floor on federal support to states and localities. This is particularly so of late as many social costs have been shifted from federal to state and local jurisdictions. As a result, strong resistance has developed to reductions in other federal programs. Thus, the chances of significant reductions in RC force structure are slim.

Congressional formulations of national security strategy envisage an increased role and Re-

serve credibility, at least in combat support and combat service support units, that have been enhanced by *Desert Shield*. Rather than fret about the rationality of too many units ill-distributed to support today's operational planning (which changes almost annually), the AC might focus more on planning how to capitalize on an assured resource-generating capability. Combat support and combat service support force structure and materiel to support allies in regional coalition operations and cadre organizations are just two examples of genuine and highly salable needs appropriate for Reserves.

Nor should the AC be uneasy about Reserve acceptance of increasing social responsibilities, particularly in later deploying units that will have time to train after a call-up. Because the Total Force is now credible to average citizens, Reserves can demonstrate concern about, and willingness to, support priority social programs. Reserves' demonstration of capability to attack pressing social problems such as drug suppression can relieve some public pressure on AC support. More important such locally visible missions can be a useful stimulant to local recruiting of motivated, capable, young people—exactly the quality individual whom we need and the kind of person whom we want to serve their country. Their service can provide a base of understanding of national defense needs to be drawn upon when they advance to important economic and political positions later in life.

Lastly, a diminishing perceived threat, combined with second thoughts about Reserve service after *Desert Storm*, may mandate acceptance of more locally relevant responsibilities to attract sufficient volunteers to sustain the force. In this vein, there may be new and genuinely important opportunities for the military to expand existing training capabilities suitable for the dawning information age. The Reserves are, by definition, sensitive not only to local needs but also to the military potential available to alleviate them. There may be valuable insights here for the AC.

These are complex, but fundamental issues that now beg attention. Hopefully, it is now apparent that they offer some very broad sys-

tematic challenges of purpose that must be addressed as we ponder new policy directions for the Total Force. Against this backdrop, consider three major Reserve policy areas where substantial change may be in order: missions and appropriate force structure; optimizing unique strengths of the Active Army, the Guard and the Army Reserves; and last, modification of AC policies and programs to be more supportive of Reserve readiness.

RC Missions and Force Structure

For the purpose of analysis, three major areas for RC contributions to land power are defined. They are: RC units that fill out understructured AC formations (divisions or corps support commands [COSCOMs]); separate standing RC units that would deploy with or after AC units and fight as units; and individual soldiers to fill AC or RC units about to deploy, to fill out newly forming cadre units or to reconstitute deployed units with casualties.

In concept, there is not much new in RC filling understructured AC units—either “round-out” to fill an incomplete AC organization or “round-up” to augment an AC organization already formed with requisite AC units. The challenge of both is apparent from the *Desert Shield* Guard combat unit call-ups and subsequent training. Training evaluations associated with predeployment training dissected the three Guard combat brigades in exquisite detail. Good or bad, and there was certainly both, all should listen carefully to the unfiltered counsel of the officer and NCO leaders of those units and their trainers. After what they underwent—the unmoderated rigor of the Army combined arms training infrastructure at its zenith—they truly “know what they don’t know.” They have assimilated the tasks conditions and standards of combat readiness such that they can now assess the feasibility of RC combat units sustaining levels of proficiency necessary for rapid deployment to fight AirLand Battle.⁹

I am skeptical about the continued practicality of combat unit roundout. The level of performance required for projection or early rein-

The status quo is unhealthy—citizen-soldiers being replaced by full-time manning personnel of greatly varying competence as all are trying to master an increasingly complex warfighting doctrine. Over time, it may ensure mediocre units, out of touch with local elite groups—precisely the worst situation for land power in a democracy relying on “militia” forces.

forcing Reserve combat units is simply too high for citizen-soldiers to sustain honestly over the long term. It can be achieved with a hybrid AC-RC chain of command, extremely high levels of training support. It would require extensive AC support to enable intensive structured training during expanded AT Roundout is probably feasible at 50 percent to 70 percent full-time manning and 60 percent to 80 percent unit training days per year. There are precedents in an important Guard contribution to air defense after World War II (Nike), and some states might welcome the employment opportunities. At that price, if it can be afforded at all, one can reasonably question whether the unit is any longer RC. Whom are we deceiving?

Round-up combat units and roundout combat support and combat service support units appear more feasible, particularly for early reinforcing units. However, there may be a much higher return if they are deployed as part of RC units or as elements of a Total Force unit consisting of all components, similar to many of the combat support and combat service support units currently established under the CAPSTONE program.

There are great opportunities for RC organizations of all kinds in later deploying projection and reconstitution forces. In addition to conventional RC units “traced” to regional commanders in chief (CINCs) over the years, there are exciting new opportunities for RC units which could be structured to provide expanded support to deployed Air Force and sea services formations. There could also be new units

constituted to support contingency combined force headquarters. This would appear particularly useful to CINCs with their expanded responsibilities and authorities under Goldwater-Nichols. I suspect General H. Norman Schwarzkopf could develop a healthy list of capabilities he would have liked to have

Few current senior Army leaders have had substantive personal service with Reserves. Due to disestablishment of the readiness regions, an AC major general command, there is today no seasoning assignment for AC brigadier or major generals. There are colonel assignments in readiness groups or as senior advisers, but promotions from those positions have been rare.

had available as he thought through tactical, administrative and logistic support requirements for the hodgepodge of allies that rushed to Saudi Arabia at our call early in *Desert Shield*.

Another form of very valuable RC support for contingency operations could be provision of support for allies in those areas of combat capability where we have clear comparative advantage. At present, we structure our Total Force to execute AirLand Battle in various war plan scenarios. By and large, the underlying rationale for Army force structure is the requirement to support US forces, including the other services. Exceptionally, we have created forces explicitly to support allies such as nuclear weapons custodial units in NATO. As we have seen in *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, there are often important combat or combat service support unit augmentations required to enable our allies to conduct air-land operation alongside US forces. Improved intelligence, modern command and control communications, new highly effective fire support and expanded logistics all are general categories of capability needed to improve US allies' ability to fight coalition contingency operations.

It would seem that high-priority Guard and

Army Reserve battalions of Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) for corps communications or multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) or intelligence battalions could be valuable additions to the Total Force.

Far better to rapidly deploy fire support battalions needed quickly by our allies than roundout infantry battalions that are more difficult to keep ready and, by their battlefield mission, subject to heavy, highly localized losses in the event of hard combat. Such losses become a tragedy for the home town and a media disaster in any sensitive contingency situation.

There are other more conventional needs for RC in reconstitution units, both constituted and cadre. These kinds of units, maintained at a long-term, sustainable level of readiness (determined by time available to train prior to commitment in war plans), seem exactly what the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress have been describing as desirable variable readiness. There would appear to be a wide range of important missions suitable for Reserve units at every level of readiness.¹⁰

Once the force structure (numbers of units by type) is determined, the major challenges will be placing the units on the ground in peacetime to ease readiness preparation. For example, thoughtfully reorganizing where units are based, collocating like-type units of all components on the ground wherever possible, will encourage economies of scale in concentration of training infrastructure. Whether AC, Guard or Army Reserve, similar technical maintenance units can be concentrated in one region of the nation to further facilitate training. Alternatively, units can be colocated such that all units on a particular contingency mission plan are in close proximity to each other (for example, Northeast Asia contingency units together in one region to facilitate coordination). Thoughtful positioning is nice for the AC attempting to find the most cost-effective mix of units; it is absolutely critical for Reserves with severe time constraints.¹¹

Individual replacement requirements offer equally broad opportunities for Reserves. Individual replacements called for the Individual

Opposing force vehicles at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.



Training evaluations associated with predeployment training dissected the three Guard combat brigades in exquisite detail. . . . All should listen carefully to the unfiltered counsel of the officer and NCO leaders of those units and their trainers. . . . They have assimilated the tasks conditions and standards of combat readiness such that they can now assess the feasibility of RC combat units sustaining levels of proficiency necessary for rapid deployment to fight AirLand Battle.

Ready Reserve (IRR) were a resounding success in *Desert Shield*. There are numerous areas where the Reserves possess virtually unique skills, critical to unit readiness whether in peace or war. Language skills developed for missionary service and technical intelligence resources developed by selected industries are examples of capabilities always in short supply. As we move to an information economy, an increasingly complex AC force will require many more individual skills available only in the Reserves. Mobile, knowledge-based competence will be at a premium across industry. We may or may not be able to compete directly with industry for AC recruitment and retention. Reserve affiliation may be the best long-term source of certain skills—provided we can be sufficiently imaginative in structuring service opportunities to attract and retain them.

Particularly in the Reserves, we are limited only by our imagination. There should be great flexibility in organization or policies, counterbalanced by absolute requirements for demonstrated competence in meeting rigorous, but objective performance standards. For example, if very “high-tech” processor programmers are needed, an answer could be a carrier programmer

team of a carrier information management grouping based in Silicon Valley, California, with each soldier having mobilization orders as individual fillers to deploying units. Their annual training could be to upgrade individual skills with civilian training or to serve with their wartime gaining unit in a field exercise.

Organizations must be flexible—whatever is appropriate to attract and retain the skilled personnel we need. Frequent, hard-nosed proficiency testing of individuals including basic military skills and physical fitness would be nonnegotiable.

Optimizing Strengths of Each Component

We have already identified distinctions between the components—federal and state, national and local—and the need to take advantage of these differences. Then, I purposefully highlighted issues of comparative US advantages relative to our potential allies. For the United States, it is high-tech intelligence, fire support and command and control. We do these things exceedingly well; for many of our allies, it is their infantry that stands out. Ergo, we should leave the infantry requirements to our allies

Washington[s] expertise in Reserve issues may lack the sensitizing influence of unit command or recent troop experience. So the AC absence of "gut experience" with the Reserves is not necessarily corrected by the Reserve advice available in Washington. Normal feedback loops are not working as they should.

whenever we can—for a number of thoughtful reasons.

There are other comparative advantages within the Total Force that serve to affirm why we have the force in the first place. Therefore, within the framework of total mission capability, we really need to seek and capitalize on internal comparative advantages.

Regular Army: Soldiers and Units—the Standards of Excellence. Strengths of the AC seem evident—ready, virtually instant response limited only by political will and strategic transport. It is the Total Force's professional role model; developer of doctrine, organization, equipment and training; the mentor, instructor in schools; the repository of joint and combined lore. Beyond the demanding requirements of elite, highly "projectable" strategic units, it performs most of the Army's officer and senior NCO business.

National Guard: Proud Units. The Guard is different. It is soldiers formed with care into many cohesive units—smaller is better. It is citizen-soldiers, proud to be serving their unit, their locality and state in time of disaster or other local need. Its soldiers are deeply patriotic, proud if their unit can serve with "the Regulars," particularly overseas, but equally proud of their special state license plate, the tuition program at their state university and the special comradery and bonding of neighbors serving together. The focal point is the local unit—a "disciplined home," a mainstay in many communities—an important, respected link between the American people and their highly professional Regular force.

Army Reserve: Competent Soldiers. The Army Reserve is people; mobile people joined by patriotism to nation and by skills particularly "white and gold collar" officer and NCO skills. Its people are located regionally but capable of national training in national units. It is not an organization as much as a source of personnel talent unrestricted by state boundaries in the emerging information age.

The comparative advantage insight is this: When we view and count the three components as troop lists of such and such units, we miss a valuable perspective. Active forces are role models—the yeast that enables dramatic expansion in national need. The Guard is units—cohesive teams that embody the spirit of towns and suburbs. The Army Reserve is people—intelligent, motivated, skilled people. As we think through future policies, we need to reinforce these complementary strengths and not try to make each in the mold of the other! Optimize the AC as role models, the Guard as units, the USAR as highly skilled people. Three different sets of organizational configurations, policies and programs are highly possible, perhaps necessary.¹²

Before elaborating on differences, a word on those elements ensuring uniformity, specifically federal control. There is concern within the Reserves, particularly the Guard, about federal control (read federal dictation) in areas of clear state preeminence—at least as seen by the Guard. On the other side, there are staunch believers that the Reserves do only what the "Fed" checks; more federal presence is better, less is intrinsically bad.

Truly, neither should be concerned. Practically, this is much less an issue. The inspector general function is much more effective today. It seeks systemic problem areas and in so doing tends to be a proactive rather than reactive process. By virtue of the major automated management systems in place and building, the level, timeliness and detail of data available to higher headquarters grows consistently. Second, the rigor of the task, condition and standard to assess individual and unit performance provides un-

precedented detail for federal inspection of Reserve readiness. The system is there, and it can be tuned to any desired level of intensity. Lastly, in the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, and comparable facilities, there exist superb opportunities to train or evaluate unit performance in a quasi-combat environment. The tools, policies, procedures and trained personnel are present to ensure responsible control. The risks of startling diversity are not in maintaining control or in ensuring uniformity of practices.

Now, it will prove useful to emphasize those differences that should be encouraged to optimize inherent strengths of the Active, Guard and Reserve forces.

Regular Army. The need for a force projection capability remains. Skilled, tough, proud ready units prepared to fight anywhere, anytime in conjunction with our other services and our allies will still be required. The size of the AC must be determined by the aggregation of regional threats and a national decision as to how big the United States wants the land power "insurance policy" to be.

Deployable units would be complemented by a relative and absolute increase in nondeployable support TDA (tables of distribution and allowances) units, strengthened to provide quality institutional and distributed training for senior leaders (officers and NCOs of the Total Force), as well as for the leadership of likely allies. Improved training would be matched by enhanced capability to develop and implement doctrine, organizations, materiel and improved unit training. This is essential if the various combinations of Reserves, services and allies are to be able to fight together to fulfill our overall post-Cold War military strategy. Certainly, this is a formidable task.

Last, there would have to be expanded numbers of senior officers and NCOs to support cadre units, as well as established joint and combined organizations—potentially United Nations as well as regional organizations. The overall allocation of more senior personnel would be considerably above that justified solely by the relatively small number required in Regular Army

units. Due to the unique requirements of sustaining land power in a democracy (capable of expanding rapidly), Army manning requirements may be different than those appropriate

Units can be collocated such that all units on a particular contingency mission plan are in close proximity to each other. . . . Thoughtful positioning is nice for the AC attempting to find the most cost-effective mix of units; it is absolutely critical for Reserves with severe time constraints.

for the Navy and Air Force. Modification of existing statute and regulation would probably be required.

National Guard. In contrast to AC forces of smaller size, but with extraordinary excellence, the National Guard could sustain units—as many as are geographically sustainable across the United States. The Guard would draw on the sinews of industrial and rural America as it has with distinction over the years. It is not just an issue of "flags" of greatly varying readiness, which could be rapidly enhanced in mobilization, but also of maximum sustainable presence of proud patriotic organizations, available to provide a positive military experience and to be available to reinforce local authority in disasters.

They could also support the nation by addressing appropriate local and regional problems as authorized by federal or state authority. Some Guard units would have to be maintained at high-readiness levels to reinforce joint or allied formations as discussed earlier. Others could be virtual "skeletons"—but performing vitally important state or local missions as highly competent organizations, able to respond to needs and "make things happen."

Army Reserve. Accessing and retaining quality personnel wherever they may be in an evolving information economy would be the purpose of the Army Reserves. To achieve this, they could maintain close, almost symbiotic,

relationships with professional and vocational associations, our national industrial base and perhaps with multinational industry associated with our allies. Examples could be media specialists, transportation or intelligence processing or several other specific industries with skills applicable to military needs. The size of units would be determined by mobilization needs. Relations very similar to this exist in some strategic intelligence units today.

It would seem entirely possible that progression in industry could be matched by promotion in the Army Reserves. The Reserve unit leaders could be the same people providing that functional capability in industry and supporting the Army during war, analogous to some industries in World War II—such as the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T) association with the Army Signal Corps. Of course, there would have to be baseline military socialization, as well as military applications training combined with regular validation of military skills and physical conditioning for deploying forces. But, these should not be significant problems. Practical ties between the civilian airline industry, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and the Regular Air Force may provide timely examples. Current USAR responsibilities for the IRR individual mobilization augmentation and post-mobilization institutional training would be largely unchanged.

There you have three rather different ways of looking at sustainment, if not improvement, of the current Total Force in the future. Obviously, it is not all that easy. But we must strive to do what is right from a national military perspective, not simply what is salable to the myriad of interest groups that would be involved in change.

Modification of Total Force Policies and Programs

It seems evident from the preceding discussion that the AC really needs to scrub some longstanding AC policies and programs that have been more or less taken for granted by the Reserves. The most pervasive problems are those associated with the differences in relative

importance of various resources across components—dollars and people most important for AC, while time is most critical for RC.

The Regular Army has had severe challenges to both manpower and funds for several years. The resource competition became particularly intense as the Active force expanded from 16 to 18 divisions—the expansion of light forces in the mid-1980s. The mechanism for squeezing was the organizational design called Army of Excellence (AOE). The Reserves were swept along in the management enthusiasm to conserve personnel and, where possible, to garner funds as new, higher technology, “more productive” organizations were introduced. Maintenance personnel in organizations were cut. Assumed advantages of high-tech diagnostic equipment and better-trained senior mechanics permitted substantial reductions in the numbers of mechanics. Such was the planning, much of it exceedingly well done, as new technologies were introduced. Execution has been less benign as has been discussed most recently in the context of the Apache attack helicopter. More is coming out in post-*Desert Storm* discussions.

The bottom line is that some of the robustness essential to reliable performance in adversity has been “managed” out of the Army. The really unfortunate part of this is that the RC did not initially have a problem of dollars or people.

Both have been in ample supply—often from Congress though rather than DOD. But the Reserves did, and do, have a problem in availability of time which is now exacerbated by lean organizations. In retrospect, when AOE was laid out, the RC should have been given more rather than fewer personnel to compensate for agreed unique challenges. New organizational documentation procedures and data processing could have made such RC variations feasible. Now, if robustness is restored, it may be possible to better accommodate Reserve requirements.

In addition to the Total Force Study, there are now other major actions underway within the DOD that may bring these kinds of issues to the fore. The Defense Management Review is conducting an important and searching scrub. It

RESERVE CHALLENGES

would seem appropriate to review the allocation of responsibilities between the various components of the DOD force as it reviews service practices. Clearly, there will be new responsibilities associated with the post-Cold War Total Force. Several examples come to mind that could serve to reinforce new responsibilities. The Regular Army may need disproportionate personnel authorizations to permit expanded training and other intensified support of Reserves and regional allies. The Guard would probably need recognition of their support of locally important federal programs—comparable to the counterdrug effort—and of mentoring support to the various state “backup” militias so they are credible. The Army Reserve could need special authorities and resources to ensure cross-industry coordination of “gold collar” support in selected areas, including overseas coordination with multinationals.

These are merely hypothetical examples. The point is that these are truly serious national Total Force issues that should be addressed by the Army's first-line leadership to ensure not only policy direction but also program resource consistency.

This is written neither in the frustration of un-

willingness to change nor uneasiness about complex political decision processes that have to be pursued to stimulate change in the Total Force. Rather, it is written with respect for the Total Force's perseverance in attempting to bring about significant improvements. And it is written with great respect for the complex diversity of nation, state, people and continent thankfully involved in decisions involving American land power. That diversity is what will ensure our grandchildren and their offspring having the benefits and protection of the competent land power we have had. That diversity is also what will suggest innovative new ways to draw on the talents and energies of the citizen-soldier, one of our strongest national assets.

But diversity is really tough to acknowledge or to stimulate, especially if we disagree about the presence of problems amid the obvious general success of the Total Force. Hopefully, this discussion has illustrated that there can be no persuasive case for “business as usual.” There are serious systemic challenges and few easy salable solutions. All the more reason to bring deeper systemic issues of the Total Force to the national “front burner.” **MR**

NOTES

1. The Department of Defense Total Force Policy Study submitted to Congress January 1991, appears to be a timely initial effort to orchestrate Reserve Forces into the emerging post-Cold War national security strategy.

2. The points raised here are not speculation. They are the result of personal observation and command experience in a succession of command and staff positions directly relating to the Reserves over 13 years, including Readiness Group and CONUSA command. I may, of course, be biased by that experience.

3. Unfortunately, similar rigor does not yet exist for many important staff tasks such as coordinating fire support and intelligence in support of the commander's intent—battle command/staff training—but it will come.

4. This is an insidious process. As a colonel commander, I was directly involved with improving the readiness of two National Guard combat battalions for over six years—as the branch mentor at a home state major training site (an AC divisional post); they were round out to the brigade I commanded and then they were under my jurisdiction as a Readiness Group commander. The end result of a great deal of personal effort was a major recruiting problem. Too much had been asked for too many years. Fortunately—unfortunately for the units—I was there long enough to realize the damage inflicted on the units by the intensity of my unmoderated professional requirements and act accordingly in other positions—not to modify the standards, but to reduce the number of tasks.

5. In all fairness, this is as much an AC problem as it is RC. All too often, hard-charging AC senior commanders unfamiliar with the total RC training environment, descend on RC units during AT armed with the latest AC training doctrine and determined to implement without deviation all that “works” in their AC units. This is particularly galling when these AC commanders by their words and actions unfamiliar with the RC, have a charter to evaluate the RC unit in a manner that the AC would permit reluctantly in the AC chain of command.

6. The AC “has been there” on this by attempting to maintain high, unre-

sourced standards in Europe during Vietnam. It was terribly corrosive. It took almost 10 years, firm leadership and very well-resourced units to fully reestablished integrity.

7. As the Regular Army draws down, there certain to be competent personnel eager to join the Reserves as full-time manning. This could alleviate the quality problem temporarily but not the more important systemic issue.

8. Over the years I probably worked Reserve issues with 30 or 40 generals or lieutenant generals. I can recall only a handful who felt comfortable dealing with these problems. Regrettable, but not surprising in an Army deployed for 40 years, required to develop officer nonline specialty proficiency and become joint.

9. The assessment is so important for future force structure that any oral or written survey effort should be conducted to permit absolute anonymity, by DOD or DA IGs. Surveys should extend tot AC personnel who have been involved in the training/evaluation—Readiness Group, OIC, OPFOR in the CTC, and so on.


10. Various combinations of AC and RC deployment capability are also discussed in “The Uncertain Path,” *Military Review*, June 1990, and “AirLand Battle Future: The Other Side of the Coin,” *Military Review*, February 1991.

11. This would appear to be self-evident. It hasn't been. Frequently, units are constituted seemingly with absolute disregard for peacetime location. I commanded one transportation battalion composed for war with five companies—AC, USAR and National Guard—located in five states. It was virtually impossible to train together in peacetime.

12. This is a different view of desirable Regular Army—Militia sharing of responsibilities than that formulated in disagreement by Calhoun/Upton or Palmer. Modern technology applied to war suggest a new rationale. This is one direction such a new rationale could take.

Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown, US Army, Retired, a former chief of armor, resides in McLean, Virginia. In addition to commanding an armored brigade in the 2d Armored Division, he served in Vietnam, the Continental United States and Europe. His article, “The Uncertain Path,” appeared in the June 1990 issue of Military Review.

A Blueprint for Force Design



Colonel Lewis I. Jeffries, US Army

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The Army is in the midst of a major force design effort. The author calls for the development of a clear set of design principles, a doctrine, to guide this process. He cites past reorganizations of Army forces to warn against the shortcomings that are invited by a personality-vic doctrine-driven design process.

It is . . . flexibility both in the minds of the armed forces and in the organization that needs above all to be developed in peacetime.

Michael Howard

The Army's fundamental strategic role is to generate land power in military operations across the operational continuum. While military operations are readily seen as the institutional mission, force design must also produce organizations that can operate across that continuum. The Army requires a mix of forces that can achieve maximum effectiveness with the given manpower authorization level imposed by Congress. Likewise, the Army should be as utilitarian as possible.

Army forces must be properly designed to fully implement the Army's employment doctrines. If the Army as a whole is not designed organizationally to achieve as much synergism

as possible, its forces will not be able to return the "biggest bang for the buck" and, more ominously, may not be able to fulfill its strategic role. The most irrevocable result will be the added cost in lives.

Force design determines a unit's proper internal composition so that it can best accomplish its intended battlefield purpose. Tables of organization and equipment (TOE) are the products of force design and provide detailed lists of the precise levels of manning and equipment needed to perform specific battlefield missions. The design of our forces, therefore, is a critical element of building and preparing our forces for combat. A flawed organizational structure with an inadequate TOE places the unit at a disadvantage even before the first shot is fired. Because the force design process is so important to the ultimate success of our units, it follows that the de-

sign process itself is key; it must assure that the products of the design process—Army units—can perform on the battlefield.

Force design doctrine, on the other hand, guides the process for designing those forces. Just as our AirLand Battle doctrine provided the blueprint for success in the Gulf War and AirLand Operations doctrine will guide our training and education for future employments, a force design doctrine must be the bedrock of our design efforts in this time of change and restructuring. That doctrine should establish a set of theoretical principles used as a foundation for conducting force design just like the principles of war provide the foundation for conducting military operations. Without these principles, the whole process evolves into a personality-driven system.

Unfortunately, the Army's force design process is not based on fundamental principles, or self-evident truths, but rather by a management system relying heavily on personalities. As a result, the organizational structure for corps and below has remained essentially unchanged for almost 20 years. Our current capstone employment doctrine, AirLand Battle, first published in 1982, and its successor, AirLand Operations (to be published this year), are being implemented by existing organizations. To make matters worse, this is being done without having first decided what the roles, missions and functions are for each echelon above corps, much less which echelons are actually needed.

There is a better way of designing our forces. What the Army needs is a clear and coherent force design doctrine—a set of principles to guide the design process to an end product that will be not only more capable and effective but more in line with the needs of the Army and the nation. To create that doctrine, the Army should first look to its past to ascertain how forces were designed during a highly effective time in our Army's history. Then it is instructive to see how force design evolved over time to what it is today. Finally, the Army must analyze successful force design actions to formulate theoretical principles of force design that can

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serve as the foundation for organizational doctrine. This article proposes what these principles and that doctrine should be.

Background and the Problem

In 1936, Major E. S. Johnston published an article in the *Review of Military Literature* titled "Field Service Regulations of the Future."¹ He clearly presented the importance of the need to link operational and organizational doctrines. Johnston defined the problem when he wrote, "An officer of our army cannot go to Field Service Regulations—the basic book on our doctrine for war—and find a statement of the fundamentals of military organization."² He could be speaking today about the lack of organizational doctrine in the current capstone manuals.

Johnston was certainly one of the foremost theoreticians to emerge from the US Army in the 1930s. In arguing the importance of organizational doctrine, he stated that the organizational doctrine should be derived from two principles of war: unity of effort and economy of force. To Johnston, unity of effort meant more than unity of command; it also included cooperation and control.³ Economy of force was achieving maximum results with minimum expenditure of force.⁴ These two principles are key to the development of an organizational doctrine.

The economy-of-force definition used by Johnston differs from that in US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*. The current definition embraces *input* theory to "allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts."⁵ Johnston espoused *output* theory, "to

achieve maximum results with the minimum expenditure of force." This theory proves to be much more suitable as a fundamental force design principle.

In outlining the basis for tactical organization, Johnston advocated:

- Unity of effort to accomplish the organization's object (or aim).
- Organization's determination by the object of the unit.
- A tabular organization from which to further task organize.
- A flexible basic organization to allow modification for worldwide employment and adaptability to a particular situation.
- Each unit having the maximum number of subdivisions possible for training and control.
- Close combat units being supported either organically or by direct support or attachment. This support would be determined for each particular unit by: frequency of need;

Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, Commander, Army Ground Forces . . . developed our World War II organizational doctrine and applied it on an unprecedented scale to a greatly expanding Army. His organizational concept was based on . . . the principle of economy of force—the economic expenditure of combat power. McNair advocated, in particular, "streamlining" and "pooling."

availability due to limited quantities; how effectively it could be employed by the lower echelon as compared to the higher.⁶ The movement to organize along Johnston's concept began in the late 1930s with the reorganization of the Regular Army "square" divisions into "triangle" divisions.

But, it was Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, Commander, Army Ground Forces, who developed our World War II organizational doctrine and applied it on an unprecedented

scale to a greatly expanding Army.⁷ His organizational concept was based on J. F. C. Fuller's and Johnston's application of the principle of economy of force—the economic expenditure of combat power. McNair advocated, in particular, "streamlining" and "pooling." About tactical organization, the US Army's official history of World War II states:


"The twin aspects of economy were streamlining and pooling. They were phases of the same organizational process. To streamline a unit meant to limit it organically to what it needed always, placing in pools what it needed only occasionally. A pool, in the sense here meant, was a mass of units of similar type kept under control of a higher headquarters for the reinforcement or servicing of lower commands, but not assigned to lower commands permanently and organically. Pooling occurred at all levels from the GHQ [general headquarters] reserve pools which reinforced armies down through army pools, corps pools and division pools to the company pool, which, in the infantry, provided mortars and machine guns to reinforce rifle platoons."⁸

The streamlining and pooling were affected by three criteria:

- Including organically only that needed for all operations, not what is needed to meet peak loads or conditions and extreme situations.
- Range of weapons and the ability to mass fires beyond the area of responsibility of a particular size unit.
- Differences in tactical mobility.⁹

This structuring, or methodology, was used in application throughout the Army to create units. It was assumed that the field army would be the smallest self-sufficient unit and that smaller units would be made sufficient through attachment—the concept of pooling. Service units that did not have the tactical mobility of the division were assigned to the field army.¹⁰

McNair's model generated much opposition, with most disagreement focused on two major points. One was that higher commanders could not always provide routinely needed support units to the lower tactical commanders. The other was that the temporary attachments made



An M4A3 Sherman from the 5th Regimental Combat Team, 24th Infantry Division, rolls past a destroyed T-34 tank near Kumchon, North Korea, 6 October 1950.

In 1946, Devers, as commander, Army Ground Forces, fully triangularized and assigned more organically to the divisions to facilitate task organizing regimental combat teams and battalion task forces for specific combat missions. These "fixes" proved correct in time. In the Korean conflict, the "RCTs often controlled as many as five or six battalions of armor or infantry and were fought with the flexibility of combat command organizations."

it very difficult to create cohesive tactical groupings. One of McNair's opponents was Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers who, as chief of the armored force and later an army group commander, felt that combined arms and services integration suffered in both training and teamwork.¹¹

During World War II, many of the concerns about the organizational concept were validated. In both Europe and the Pacific, divisions overcame these weaknesses through long-term attachment. Commanders who strictly followed doctrine achieved maximum use of units at a cost of confusion and inefficiency. In essence, larger units never had enough tank, antitank, antiaircraft and engineer units to satisfy divisional demands.

In 1946, Devers, as commander, Army Ground Forces, fully triangularized and assigned more organically to the divisions to facilitate task organizing regimental combat teams (RCTs) and battalion task forces for specific combat missions.¹² These "fixes" proved correct in time. In

the Korean conflict, the "RCTs often controlled as many as five or six battalions of armor or infantry and were fought with the flexibility of combat command organizations."¹³

In 1956, the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, conducted a study for the Army in 1956 to compare the merits of small and large divisions.¹⁴ The proposed small (Pentomic) division had its basic maneuver elements directly subordinate to the division, while the large (existing) division had a regiment, or combat command, echelon between the basic maneuver elements and the division headquarters.

This study found the large division as responsive as the small one, a better span of control in the large division and that tactical and strategic mobility were the same. Very significantly, it also found that the organizational structure, not the size of the unit, adds flexibility. The recommendation was to retain the large division. Despite this study, the Army adopted the Pentomic division in 1957.

The shortcomings of the Pentomic concept were soon evident and the Reorganization Objectives Army Division (ROAD) was adopted in 1963. The ROAD division resembled the design

The shortcomings of the Pentomic concept were soon evident and the Reorganization Objectives Army Division was adopted in 1963. The ROAD division . . . allowed maximum flexibility; division commanders were encouraged to promote habitual associations. So, the Army went through yet another major force design change with no guiding set of principles.

recommended by the 1956 CGSC study and allowed maximum flexibility; division commanders were encouraged to promote habitual associations.¹⁵ So, the Army went through yet another major force design change with no guiding set of principles.

From the late 1960s on, the Army hierarchy seems to have continued to use periodic studies to determine new design. After the 1970 Echelons Above Division Study, the corps was changed from a tactical echelon to a separate structure with its own logistic system.

The series of Army 1986 studies took a radically different approach—that operational concepts should drive force design. Specifically, this meant that the infantry division mission should be determined by its capability, not vice versa. This also meant that pooling was not acceptable for designing divisions' capabilities. Additionally, it followed that the division had to be strategically tailored at the deployment decision time, not using the force design process.¹⁶

End-strength constraints replaced operational considerations in the force design process with the development of the Army of Excellence structures that followed Division 86. The result is that the AirLand Battle tenets are very difficult to achieve with this organizational methodology.¹⁷

The past has had a major effect on force design today. Unfortunately, in the past, force design was dominated by frequent studies, each chartered with its own set of criteria, largely reflecting the personalities of the current Army leadership, and not a set of enduring design principles.


A Doctrine for Force Design

A coherent and well-thought-out force design doctrine is needed to establish an enduring process that generates the force design products—the TOE. This doctrine should consist of three elements that guide the design of Army forces. Specifically, these elements are:

- Force design must proceed from the top echelon down.
- Units must be designed based upon the well-defined role, anticipated missions and functions required that are unique to the specific organization.
- The design doctrine must provide a set of theoretical force design principles to guide the application of the process.

Top-Down Perspective. Force design doctrine should have a top-down perspective. A bottom-up perspective will not work because the designer will not know what requirements are to be placed on the unit nor what external resources will be available to the lower commander. Our national military strategy drives, from the top down, the use of Army forces in peace, conflict and war. The employment, or operational, doctrines are also developed from the top down; therefore, the design of those Army forces must be driven from the top down in a like manner. It is essential that the determination of what type and how many units are needed, what these Army forces will be required to do and what their desired capabilities will be must be based on our national military strategy and our operational doctrine. The optimum design can only be produced through a top-down perspective.

Army forces, it now seems apparent, will always operate in the joint arena. A top-down design process is needed to ensure congruence with the strategic vision of the Joint Chiefs of



Battalion-level communications sections were deleted under AOE cuts; as with other reductions, the many communications equipment setup and maintenance tasks remained.

End-strength constraints replaced operational considerations in the force design process with the development of the Army of Excellence structures that followed Division 86. The result is that the AirLand Battle tenets are very difficult to achieve with this organizational methodology.

Staff. If the force design process is not driven top down, it is nearly impossible to synchronize and interface Army forces with US sister services. Such combined considerations will result in greater utility across the operational continuum. Also, it provides the vision of how various units will fit together and be tailored into task groupings. Otherwise, task groupings are much harder to achieve. Driven from above, the entire defense design process becomes more coherent and efficient in building the Total Force structure.

The current force design of units lacks the vision and coherence of the top-down perspective. This has often caused forces to be designed from small-unit building blocks upward, until end strength halts the process at an incomplete conclusion. This is especially dangerous in that it can leave national-level planners without the forces needed at the higher levels, seriously jeopardizing the outcome of operations. In the end, this makes it more difficult to design the

force with the greatest possible synergism for a given end strength.

Establish Roles, Missions and Functions.

The capabilities needed in units to actually conduct operations are first derived from employment doctrines. Each level of command performs a unique role in military operations. Likewise, each level of command has anticipated missions it will be expected to execute. Then, the functions necessary to execute its missions and thus fulfill its role will evolve. The force design, the actual "bean counting" that produces the TOEs, is the result of identifying and providing to the unit the capabilities required by the roles, missions and functions.

The following five steps are necessary and integral in determining the roles, missions and functions to implement the employment doctrines:

- Determine *all* of the echelons of command that will be needed in the employment of our national military forces, both in war and

operations short of war.

- Establish for each echelon of command its role in the conduct of operations.
- Ascertain what operational missions each echelon of command will be able to perform.
- Derive the functions each level of command must do to perform its role and missions.
- Design each organization so it can perform its role, mission and functions.

Digesting the information derived from these five steps is fundamental to the proposed force design doctrine. While these steps are presented

Forces, regardless of size, can be readily employed if the officer corps is educated in using the largest possible structure. This does not work in reverse, and our options would be severely constrained if our employment doctrine and education have been limited to lower-echelon employment. [Before] World War II. . . the military leadership was educated in the theory . . . although the interwar years saw an Army organized only with smaller units.

in a very simple, straightforward manner, the actual process would not be that simple. Working from the simple to the more complex, an explanation follows.

Echelons of Command. It is necessary at the onset of a design process to establish what echelons of command this nation will need to employ the largest possible amount of land forces on the world's largest land masses. This should include all possible land echelons of command that could be required.

Why is it important to consider the maximum size structure rather than the smaller, and more probable, structure for limited conflicts using smaller forces? Our history has shown that forces, regardless of size, can be readily employed if the officer corps is educated in using the largest possible structure. This does not work in reverse, and our options would be severely constrained if

our employment doctrine and education have been limited to lower-echelon employment only. World War II vividly illustrates this when the military leadership was educated in the theory and anticipated practice of fighting large units although the interwar years saw an Army organized only with smaller units.

Roles. Each level of command should have a role on the battlefield and in the theater of operations. Each echelon has a distinct role to perform in the hierarchy of military activities. Today, the roles of our units are ill-defined or nonexistent. The last time that the roles of all of the echelons of maneuver forces were explicitly defined was in the 1954 version of the Field Service Regulations (FSR).¹⁸ The FSR of the 1950s not only prescribed how to employ divisions and larger units, it clearly stated the role that each level of command played in military operations.

There are two roles that must be determined before the others are completed. First, what echelon will fill the role of ground unit of maneuver (in today's parlance, the operational instrument or unit of operational maneuver) for executing strategic and tactical ground operations. The second role that must be determined is that of the basic tactical unit of combined arms and services, used as the building block of larger units. Today, this has not been done.

After these two roles are identified and assigned to specific levels of command, the roles of all other echelons begin to take form. It is very important that the roles relate to each other, particularly with the role of the echelon above and below a given level. Roles cannot be determined in isolation.

Before the disestablishment of the field army in 1973, the roles of all echelons had remained fairly consistent for more than 60 years. After the passing of the field army, the roles of all echelons of command were not reestablished.

Missions. There are four basic operational missions for units to execute. The term "operational," here does not mean to imply operational art, but rather means a mission to be executed in combat operations, per se. So, missions

Engineer elements of the 2d Armored Division's Tiger Brigade moving to the Kuwaiti border, February 1991. The brigade was initially attached to the 1st Cavalry Division and received significant augmentation to operate as part of the 2d Marine Division during the liberation of Kuwait.



The division, as a large, fixed TOE organization, appears not to be flexible. Yet, flexibility is built into its structure because the brigades are task-organized into combat teams. In this way, combat, combat support and combat service support elements can be reallocated to other committed maneuver elements when their habitually supported maneuver unit is not committed.

means specific combat operations assigned to a military unit. Some maneuver commands can do all four, while at the higher and lower levels, they usually do three—but not normally the same three.

The missions that units are expected to perform must be validated. The basic missions are to attack, defend, retrograde/delay and move. There are more specific missions such as a hasty attack, deliberate defense, movement to contact, withdrawal and many others, but they are all a further refinement of the four basic missions. In the design process, expected missions are critical because they will affect the capabilities required of the unit.

Units that habitually have support missions, likewise, must have their support missions validated. Tactical support missions for units engaged in combat support and combat service support roles are to be treated the same way as the maneuver commands are in the overall

design process.

Functions. From the roles and missions of each echelon, a determination must be made as to what functions each echelon must be able to perform. Functions are an outgrowth of the expected activities based on the unit's role and the missions it executes in the conduct of military operations.

Of course, it has been necessary to formulate many organizational concepts that directly influence functions of maneuver echelons and assist not only the practitioner that employs units but also the designer that must build the unit structure and capabilities. An example of needed organizational concepts, in this context, is the various battlefield operating systems. These concepts have a major effect on how to best lash up the combined arms structure to foster flexibility in execution of the doctrine. From a force design standpoint, these types of concepts have to be laid out before the maneuver echelon func-

tions are derived in total. While little is being said about other units aside from the maneuver forces, all units are to be designed in the same manner with this process.

Guided By a Set of Principles

What is needed to carry the whole process from the theoretical or conceptual stage to the implementation stage of TOEs is a set of guiding principles of force design. These proposed principles will almost appear to be self-evident truths. In reality, they must be simple rules that guide the force designer in building organizations for the employment of military forces to conduct war and military operations.

Nine principles are proposed to guide the force design process of the US Army's organizational doctrine.¹⁹ Two of the principles are fundamental to governing tactical organization—they are economy of force and unity of effort. From these two fundamental principles, one can

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postulate seven subordinate principles: implementation of doctrine, flexibility, standardization, span of control, resiliency, mobility and continuity.

Economy of Force. Economy of force refers to the expenditure of combat power in order to achieve the maximum results with a minimum of force. It is the fundamental principle from which other principles of force design are derived, and it is the standard by which one should judge all tactical organizations.

The force design application is output-oriented and focuses on economical employment by generating the maximum combat power with a given set of limited resources through

effective force design. It is the same output-oriented approach to this principle of war advanced by Fuller and Johnston previously mentioned in detail. This is a fundamental shift from the input-oriented approach espoused in our doctrine today.

Unity of Effort. The purpose of any tactical organization is to provide a flexible, agile and responsive command and control structure that facilitates unity of the total effort. It results in the economic expenditure of the total effort. It results in the economic expenditure of combat power in the pursuit of a common objective.

The principle of unity of effort provides for the synchronization of combat power in time and space. Unity of effort can be obtained through either unity of command or through the use of cooperation and coordination. The determination of what units are organic, attached or in direct support to each echelon will dictate the application of this principle.

Implementation of Doctrine. To provide unity of effort and achieve economy of force, operational and employment requirements must drive organizational and force structure. This means units must be organized to fulfill the intended roles, missions and functions which implement the employment doctrines.

In application, the operational requirement for synchronization dictates that tactical organizations be flexible and capable of rapid task organization, while the requirement for agility dictates that tactical organizations be responsive, balanced, self-contained combined arms formations. These organizational capabilities are not easily combined within a single command. Nevertheless, the organizational design must support the employment, or operational, doctrines.

Flexibility. The principle of flexibility is the ability of an organization to adapt to a particular situation. It is also the degree to which a TOE facilitates task organization in combat. This principle favors giving each command echelon the combat and service support means to reinforce its lower echelons, thus providing economy of force and the flexibility to concentrate its combat power at the decisive point.



Traffic jam of supply vehicles following in the 82d Airborne Division's wake during the ground phase of *Desert Storm*, February 1991.

The resources and assets are simply not available to provide all units with the same movement capability. An organization's mobility requirement is dependent upon the functions to be performed and the time-distance factor inherent to accomplish these functions. Organizations in direct support . . . or attached to a force must have the mobility of the supported unit or at least that of the parent unit.

Tactical organizations should contain the minimum essential combat power to perform their battlefield functions under normal conditions. Since combat conditions are rarely normal, organizations should anticipate entering combat as task-organized teams, reinforced with attachments provided by higher echelons. Organizations can then perform many combinations of tasks and functions to meet practically any situation.

The division, as a large, fixed TOE organization, appears not to be flexible. Yet, flexibility is built into its structure because the brigades are task-organized into combat teams. In this way, combat, combat support and combat service support elements can be reallocated to other committed maneuver elements when their habitually supported maneuver unit is not committed.

Standardization. Standardization is a principle that seems to be in conflict with flexibility; but without a standard force design, task orga-

nization becomes a complicated and time-consuming process. This principle supports the organizational concept of clearly identifying the roles of "the ground unit of maneuver," which is the basis for executing strategic and tactical ground operations, and "the basic tactical unit of combined arms and services" being used as building blocks for larger units.

Combat, along with service support, formations must be considered in relation to the whole force, as well as the concept of pooling combat units. Some units will have standardized, fixed organizations, yet these must be flexible enough to be tasked-organized. The criteria to determine what capabilities ought to be organic, attached or direct support—which is discussed in unity of effort—must be standardized throughout the force design.

Span of Control. Commanders and leaders can control only so many units and activities. This must normally be less than the saturation

point, or we run the risk of overloading commanders and their staffs.

When considering the maximum number of units and activities in the span of control, reinforcing elements must be included. This principle is continually violated today with big units

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being created, having too wide a span of control. Commanders in wartime are usually less experienced, and this further limits the number of elements that can be controlled effectively. A good rule of thumb is that four subunits are the maximum span of control for an average combat commander, while three is desirable.

Resiliency. Resiliency is the ability of a unit to undertake continuous operations, absorb combat losses and still remain combat-effective. It requires robustness and redundancy in an organization.

Designing staying power into an organization costs assets that could be used to activate other units. The lack of resiliency in heavy combat requires more units to allow for unit rotation and rehabilitation.²⁰ The planner will have to find a compromise—somewhere between fewer robust, fully manned units and more numerous leaner units with inherently less staying power. The national leaders must make this call based on their assessment of defense requirements.

Mobility. Each unit or level of organization must have the capability to move commensurate with its intended role, missions and functions.

Mobility is integral to all military organizations regardless if the unit has a move mission or not. But the resources and assets are simply not

available to provide all units with the same movement capability. An organization's mobility requirement is dependent upon the functions to be performed and the time-distance factor inherent to accomplish these functions. Organizations in direct support of organic or attached to a force must have the mobility of the supported unit or at least that of the parent unit. General support units can be less mobile.

Continuity. An army should make organizational changes only if the benefits clearly outweigh the costs.

The TOEs of different types of units are interdependent because units are designed to support each other. Therefore, a change in one TOE usually leads to changes in several others. Necessary changes should be evolutionary and should anticipate the introduction of new technologies, so that units can integrate the reorganization process into its training and other activities.

The Army has a good employment doctrine framework from which to proceed. The success of *Desert Storm* has validated AirLand Battle doctrine. What is needed now, especially as the Army embarks on a significant transition to a smaller force, is a force design doctrine that guarantees an orderly and commonsense methodology to the change. It must be a doctrine in the same sense as our employment doctrine in that it uses a set of accepted theoretical principles of force design as a guide. The doctrine proposed here provides a clear determination of the roles, missions and functions across all echelons of command and offers principles of force design that apply to the building of units that will have the needed capabilities to fulfill their wartime requirements.

If the doctrine is written sufficiently well, and if the roles of each echelon are clearly defined, then the organization of these echelons becomes a much simpler task. If this or a similar sequence is not followed—which is now the case—then our employment doctrine must be executed by existing or by slightly modified formations that have not been designed or validated to perform the missions and functions they will surely face on the battlefield. This leaves formations that ei-

ther cannot fully implement the doctrine or are improperly organized and equipped at the various echelons to harmonize roles, missions and functions between units and levels of command.

These organizational incongruences further hamper the use of mission-type orders, a methodology espoused by our doctrine, across all levels of command; whereas commanders with mission-capable units, organized and equipped in accord with accepted roles and functions, can act more freely, confident that design shortfalls will not add to the "fog of war." The efficient organization and standardization of units can reduce the requirement of necessary information essential to decision making, allowing all commanders to use mission orders with a minimum of directives and to encourage the initiative that is vital to successful execution of our employment doctrine.

The bottom line is that force design directly influences how well the different echelons can actually work together on the ground. Force design can either enhance or inhibit the synergism that is another key tenet of our warfighting doctrine. If the roles, missions and functions are not determined first, then the force design efforts

When considering the maximum number of units and activities in the span of control, reinforcing elements must be included. This principle is continually violated today with big units being created, having too wide a span of control. . . . Four subunits are the maximum span of control for an average combat commander, while three is desirable.

that are now building our Army of the future will surely result in a less capable force. If the different echelons do not complement each other in role, mission and function, neither unity of effort nor economy of force will be achieved. These two principles are as fundamental to force design doctrine as they are to force employment doctrine. **MR**

The author gives special recognition to Lieutenant Colonel Glenn M. Harned for his personal time to ensure historical and content accuracy. His research on the background of force design from the 1930s to the present, and the formulation of seven of the nine principles offered in this article were his thoughts from his own research of the topic.

NOTES

1. MAJ E. S. Johnston, "Field Service Regulations of the Future," *Review of Military Literature* (June 1936), 5-44, and (September 1936), 13-49.
2. *Ibid.*, (June 1936), 31.
3. *Ibid.*, 25-30.
4. MAJ E. S. Johnston, "A Science of War," *Review of Military Literature* (June 1934), 117.
5. US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (5 May 1986), 174.
6. Johnston, (September 1936), 29-36.
7. Kent Roberts Greensfield, Robert R. Palmer and Bell I. Wiley, *United States Army in World War II series, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 271-276 (hereafter Palmer).
8. *Ibid.*, 291.
9. *Ibid.*, 291-92.
10. MAJ Glenn M. Harned, monograph "The Principles of Tactical Organization and Their Impact on Force Design in the US Army" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), School of Advanced Military Studies, 1985), 7-8.
11. Palmer, 295-97.
12. CPT Jonathan M. House, *Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey*

- of 20th Century Tactics, *Doctrine and Organization* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, August 1984), 146-49.
13. LTC Kenneth T. Sawyer, "A Universal Division" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 25 January 1960), 34.
14. USACGSC Study 56-10, 2-4.
15. House, 159-60.
16. House, 18-22.
17. MAJ Raymond D. Barrett Jr., MIMAS thesis, "Coherence Between AirLand Battle and Contemporary Force Structure at Corps, Division and Brigade Level" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, 1985), 62-63.
18. The *Field Service Regulations* of 1954 included three FMs: FM 100-5, *Operations* (27 September 1954), FM 100-10, *Administration* (31 October 1954), and FM 100-15, *Larger Units* (28 June 1950 with Change 1).
19. Harned, 27-33. He originally presented seven such principles. After further research and study, the author added two more—span of control and mobility. The title of one of the original seven was changed to implementation of doctrine, while the original concept and content of that principle are unchanged.
20. "Rehabilitation" is used instead of the commonly used term "reconstitution." Rehabilitation is the Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (1 December 1989) approved term and definition for the US armed services and in international agreements.

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MIDDLEWEIGHT FORCES

for Contingency Operations

Many lessons have already been born of the Gulf War and many more will follow as the analyses continue. The author points out one lesson that he says was recognized more than a decade ago and has been validated by Operation Desert Storm. He argues that Army force structure should include "middleweight forces" that have significant antiarmor capabilities along with both strategic and tactical mobility.

Operation Desert Storm has been an overwhelming military success. Coalition forces inflicted a defeat on Iraq unequalled in recent history, perhaps in any history. While the military lessons of the war are already being drawn, it would seem that few would counsel a change in the US military's way of doing business, which has worked so well. Yet the character of the war in fact strengthens the case for a modest reform in US Army force structure—the creation of a "middleweight" corps.

Since the 1970s, proponents of a more flexible Army force structure have called for a unit that would straddle the distinction between light infantry and heavy armor. Commonly called a middleweight force, this hybrid structure would employ light armored and light mechanized or motorized units—equipped with light tanks and armored personnel carriers, armored cars, light

self-propelled artillery, trucks, jeeps and other vehicles—to achieve tactical mobility and firepower. Middleweight forces are primarily designed for defensive operations against heavy armor, counteroffensive and maneuver warfare operations, and attacks against infantry.¹ Former Army Chief of Staff Edward C. Meyer popularized an idea much like the middleweight concept in the early 1980s. His *White Paper* of 1980 called for lighter forces to meet "the most demanding challenge confronting the US military in the decade of the 1980s," which was "to develop and demonstrate the capability to successfully meet threats to vital US interests outside of Europe, without compromising the decisive theater in Central Europe." Meyer advocated a better balance of light and heavy forces—a more flexible "spectrum of force" including "medium force packages for rapid deployment missions."²

Meyer foresaw that advances in technology would allow forces to defeat heavy armor without the need of their own. Antitank missiles, laser-guided bombs and artillery shells, tank-killing missiles, and high-velocity cannon of small caliber could be carried on light tanks even though they called into question long-standing assumptions about the requirements for tank units. Meyer's chief legacy was the Light Technology Test Bed, which united the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, with new technologies and operational concepts for light forces.

Within the Army, there were a number of reasons for the shift in emphasis. Chief of Staff General H. M. Shultz placed emphasis on developing the light infantry divisions (LIDs) rather than light armored or mechanized forces. The strong infantry and armor constituencies within the Army both perceived a threat to their traditional roles and were skeptical of middleweight forces. The Army could never settle on a single light armored gun system, the core of any middleweight force, and the 9th Infantry thus could not validate many middleweight operational concepts. The light motorized brigade is made up largely of dune buggies, jeeps and trucks, and is not a middleweight unit as such.

The case for middleweight forces, however, is as strong as ever, and has now been given a notable boost by the results of Operation Desert Storm. Reduced to its essentials, the case for middleweight forces depends on four arguments: that light infantry is too light for the modern battlefield; that strategic lift shortfalls require a light armored force; that the modern battlefield calls for something between infantry and heavy armor; and that technology and combined arms operations allow lighter units to fight armor. Desert Storm has validated these points.

The Need for Heavier Light Forces

The war in the Middle East has borne out Meyer's basic contention: that non-European threats to US interests were significant and might require a sizable US military response. It

It is only in smaller, more discrete LIC contingencies that light infantry finds a persuasive role. In fact, "mid-intensity" wars in the Middle East and Korea are more likely than either a "high-intensity" clash in Europe or a major "low-intensity" conflict in the Third World. . . . and US planners need something heavier than the LIDs.


is the nature of those non-European threats that has been the subject of debate. LIDs are optimized for low-intensity conflict (LIC), not winning tank battles. While LIC has been an important military mission in recent years, including such operations as the interventions in Grenada and Panama, it is unlikely that the United States will fight another Vietnam-style counterinsurgency war. It is only in smaller, more discrete LIC contingencies that light infantry finds a persuasive role.

In fact, "mid-intensity" wars in the Middle East and Korea are more likely than either a "high-intensity" clash in Europe or a major "low-intensity" conflict in the Third World. "With the decline of the Soviet military threat to Europe," a 1990 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report argued:

"... conflicts that might be termed 'mid-intensity' will dominate U.S. planning concerns. The potential for U.S. involvement in mid-intensity conflict—wars with or between powerful regional states—will provide a key justification for military budgets during the 1990s and will establish most of the threats against which U.S. forces are sized, trained, and equipped." Critics of the LIDs have thus argued for years that they were designed for the wrong sort of war. Nations such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya and others deploy hundreds or thousands of modern tanks, and US planners need something heavier than the LIDs.⁴

Desert Storm, of course, confirmed these fears. LIDs played no role in US operations there, despite their highly touted mission as a worldwide "interventionary" force. Several of the LIDs—

A HIMAG (high mobility and agility) light armored gun system prototype at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, circa 1988.




[Chief of Staff Edward C.] Meyer foresaw that advances in technology would allow lighter forces to defeat heavy armor without heavy tanks of their own . . . [and] called into question longstanding Army assumptions about the requirements for taking on tank units. . . . [Meyer's successor,] General John Wickham, placed emphasis on developing the light infantry divisions rather than light armored or mechanized forces. The strong infantry and armor constituencies within the Army both perceived a threat to their traditional roles and were skeptical of middleweight forces. The Army could never settle on a single light armored gun system.

the 2nd in Korea, the 6th in Africa, even the 1st in Vietnam. They may be obligated to Asian-Pacific missions and hence may have been left out of Desert Storm so they could be ready to do other jobs. Still, it is apparent that the US military has been successful in the war, and that the forces doubt that they are appropriate for any modern warfare other than the one they fought. The US military will have to find a way to use the LID.

To keep the mobility, however, those forces must also be lighter than heavy armored units. A primary concern of middleweight forces has been the US should fall in line with the rest of the world's forces.

Desert Storm have universally complained that the handful of fast sealift ships, roughly 75 C-5 and 240 C-141 aircraft and other lift assets would not allow the US military to fulfill its global responsibilities. The United States has for some time been in no position to meet its "10 divisions in 10 days" commitment to NATO, or to project sufficient power in a timely manner into the Middle East or Northeast Asia.

Desert Storm would seem to challenge these assumptions. The US buildup in the Middle East was impressively accomplished—at one point, according to some estimates, it equaled an entire REFORGER operation every day. US forces responsible for lift, including many Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units, performed admirably under very difficult conditions.



VII Corps Bradleys on their way to Saudi Arabia from Germany, December 1990.

A primary concern of middleweight proponents has been the US shortfall in strategic lift. . . . The handful of . . . lift assets [will] not allow the US military to fulfill its global responsibilities. The United States has for some time been in no position to meet its "10 divisions in 10 days" commitment to NATO, or to project sufficient power in a timely manner into the Middle East or Northeast Asia.

Yet, this buildup: It took the US to get sufficient to conduct offensive operations and to deploy even a division. The exact schedule of the buildup has not been released, but it is apparent that there were not enough US armor units and heavy forces in place to defend against a surprise attack for some weeks. Segal quotes one Marine officer as admitting that "if the attack came in August or September, we would be in a clock." He also notes that the US would have had the ground force options besides the "trip wire." In short, the success of the Desert Shield operation continues for

to procure more strategic lift assets. The US military has been constructing a new generation of more, mechanized and armored units capable of being airlifted in. The US military has been constructing a new generation of more, mechanized and armored units capable of being airlifted in. The US military has been constructing a new generation of more, mechanized and armored units capable of being airlifted in.

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The crew of Sheridan armored reconnaissance assault vehicle
waits its turn to depart for Saudi Arabia, 17 August 1990.



It took the United States seven months to get sufficient forces into the theater to conduct offensive operation, and many weeks to deploy even a credible defensive capability. . . . It is apparent that there were not enough US armored or mechanized forces in place to defeat an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia for some weeks.

and the effectiveness of superior Western technologies in battle. The nature of this war suggests that middleweight forces would be a valuable complement to existing US force structures.

Obviously, desert combat is maneuver warfare, often compared to combat at sea. If US and allied forces were fighting in mountains or urban terrain, their tactics would undoubtedly be different. Nevertheless, the war has reaffirmed notions that modern warfare is fast-moving, mechanized combat, fought by mobile armies over thousands of square miles. The US military actually takes advantage of this fact; the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine is designed to use mobile armor, light and medium mobile units, parachute troops and special forces to fight a battle well into the enemy's rear. Such warfare begins to approximate what many have begun to call "nonlinear" combat, in which the rigid lines of a World War I-type battle give way to moving, shifting areas of contact.

This sort of warfare obviously requires tactically mobile, hard-hitting, well-protected com-

bat units. Heavy armored forces are in many cases ideal, but middleweight units could also make an important contribution; indeed, the main battle tanks of a middleweight division are likely to be at least as well protected as a Bradley Fighting Vehicle or a Marine Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), both of which played large roles in Desert Storm. Light vehicles are acquiring more and more hitting power, and the technology of small antitank weapons is advancing rapidly. Light infantry moving around the battlefield in trucks or, worse yet, lacking tactical mobility, could play some role but would clearly not be as useful as middleweight units.

Robust and advanced command and control systems are the essential context for these sorts of complex, combined arms maneuver battles. US and allied command and control systems are unrivaled, and apparently were highly successful in Desert Storm. This again would contribute disproportionately to the effectiveness of middleweight forces, which must exercise particular care in engaging enemy heavy forces. If a light



Unexploded ordnance lying among the debris from a destroyed Iraqi T-62 tank, February 1991.

The majority of Iraqi tanks destroyed by coalition forces did not fall to direct fire by tank guns; rather, coalition forces used air-to-surface missiles such as the Hellfire, TOWs fired from helicopters, Copperhead 155mm cannon shells, cluster munitions, laser-guided bombs and a whole assortment of other weapons to do the job. . . . Light forces, while retaining a capability for direct-fire antiarmor engagements, can profitably employ long-range fire from artillery and air power.

tank battalion stumbled upon an opposing heavy tank brigade. For example, the results would not be pleasant for the middleweight unit. But tight command and control, combined with such battlefield management technologies as the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft, will help middleweight forces make the enemy fight on our terms.⁹

Perhaps the most important lesson of Desert Storm in terms of middleweight forces has to do with the effectiveness of US antiarmor technology. The majority of Iraqi tanks destroyed by coalition forces did not fall to direct fire by tank guns; rather, coalition forces used air-to-surface missiles such as the Hellfire, TOWs fired from helicopters, Copperhead 155mm cannon shells, cluster munitions, laser-guided bombs and a whole assortment of other weapons to do the job. This is not to suggest that heavy tanks are obsolete or unnecessary—only that light forces, while retaining a capability for direct-fire antiarmor

engagements, can profitably employ long-range fire from artillery and air power to do what tank guns have done in the past. General Meyer's vision of modern technology's effect on the modern battlefield has been validated.

The impact of this technology is magnified by US combined arms operations, which further reduce the need to rely on main battle tanks for battlefield firepower. By all accounts, the combined effect of US tactical air strikes (by F-16s, F-15Es, Tornados and other attack aircraft), A-10 ground support aircraft and Army missile and cannon-firing helicopters was decisive in the war. Combined with evolving "smart" artillery weapons, including the variety of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and Army tactical missile systems (ATACMS) warheads and more traditional cannon and howitzers, US air power will allow lighter forces to take on opposing heavy armor. In mid-intensity warfare in the Third World, the United States and its allies can

One way of answering this need [for improved strategic mobility] . . . is to procure more strategic lift assets. Another option, however, and the one now proposed by middleweight advocates, is to lighten the load—constructing a middleweight corps of light armored, mechanized and motorized units capable of being airlifted in roughly as many C-141 equivalent sorties as a single heavy armored division.

count on air supremacy, due to both numerical and technological dominance.

Middleweight Forces and Desert Storm

What would middleweight forces have done in *Desert Storm*? First, it is important to note what middleweight-type units actually did. According to coalition military briefings, French light armored units provided a screening force on the left flank of the coalition attack around the Iraqi flank and cleared a corridor for 18th Airborne Corps operations. US Marine LAVs participated in the advance north through Kuwait and into Kuwait City. Bradley Fighting Vehicles, not middleweight equipment per se but somewhat comparable in armor and mobility (though not in firepower) to what light armored units might have, provided protected mobility for thousands of US mechanized infantrymen.

Had the United States possessed an actual middleweight corps on 2 August—say a light armored division and a light mechanized or motorized division supported by an armored cavalry regiment and an airmobile brigade—how might it have been employed? First, such a corps would have provided an early reinforcement capability. It is impossible to know if Saddam Hussein harbored any intentions of invading Saudi Arabia but if he had, the United States almost certainly could not have placed enough forces of the right kind in his way to have stopped him in August. A middleweight corps, designed to be flown into Saudi Arabia within a week or so, could have

combined with the Saudi army and expanding US tactical air assets (on land and at sea) to put up a very stiff fight.

Middleweight units could also have played a major role in the vast coalition sweep around the Iraqi flank. Such forces would have difficulty conducting an offensive across open ground against an opposing heavy force, and so at least one heavy armored division would have been required to lead the assault. But middleweight units could provide flank protection, push the advance into less well defended areas, and move near an enemy heavy force and dig in, using air power and artillery to attack an enemy armored counterthrust. Middleweight units could also have participated in the US/Saudi push north through Kuwait, using light armored personnel carriers, tanks and armored cars in attacks against dug-in infantry without organic antitank firepower; the vehicles would protect infantry from artillery fragments, small-arms and machinegun fire, and (if properly insulated) from chemical attacks as well. In short, middleweight forces did some important things during Operation *Desert Storm* and could have done much more.

An Army for a New Age

Even before Operation *Desert Storm*, the US military had quite properly begun to discard its traditional obsession with the European contingency. The Gulf War has accelerated and deepened this shift, and US military strategy will never be the same. No longer will the United States base its military strategy on the notion of "one and a half wars," the one being in Europe and the half being somewhere else. Rather, the United States may move toward some variant of a "two contingencies" strategy that "places emphasis on the US ability to respond rapidly to one or more conflicts in widely dispersed regions of the globe." The list of possible contingencies would include Europe, but primary emphasis would be elsewhere—in the Middle East, the Korean peninsula and other hot spots.¹⁰

Middleweight forces would be extraordinarily useful in such a strategy. They would provide an unprecedented combination of strategic mobil-

ity and tactical capability. A primary lesson of Operation Desert Storm continues to be that US air supremacy, modern command and control systems and precision-guided munitions can all compensate for the absence of middleweight forces. A light force is relatively less antitank-capable than a heavy force.

Middleweight units could play this role in places other than the Korean peninsula. Korea, for example, the rapid army of a middleweight corps could provide a rapid response to South Korean and US requests for support. Such forces could ably complement the US Marine Corps in Europe, providing a rapid response to Soviet power. In this sense, moreover, they are a perfect force for the present situation, in which the United States must look more and more to threats beyond its borders. Keeping one eye firmly on the danger of renewed Soviet hostility, Middleweight units would allow the United States to maintain a reinforcement capability for Europe while expanding power-projection capabilities for other regions.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this

The combined effect of US tactical air strikes, A-10 ground support aircraft and Army missile- and cannon-firing helicopters was decisive in the war. Combined with evolving "smart" artillery weapons, including the variety of MLRS and ATACMS warheads and more traditional cannon and howitzers, US air power will allow lighter forces to take on opposing heavy armor.

analysis does not argue for an abandonment of heavy armored units. Armor will have a crucial role to play in US force structure for the foreseeable future. The question for Army force structure designers is not "either/or"; obviously, the Army needs light infantry for some jobs, and heavy armor for others. But Operation Desert Storm supports the notion that the creation of a middleweight corps would provide the Army with greater flexibility—or, as General "Shy" Meyer put it a decade ago, a better "spectrum of force." **MR**


NOTES

1. For an in-depth study of the US Army's force structure, see Michael Mazzy, *The US Army's Force Structure: A Study in the 1990s* (Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute, 1990). The subject is COL Peter F. Herlihy, "Middleweight Corps: The Army's Deployability Dilemma," *Parameters* (September 1990).
2. Edward C. Meyer, *White Paper: A Framework for Modeling the Army of the 1990s* (Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute, 1990), 1-3, and "A Conversation with General E. C. Meyer" (Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute, 1991), 8 and 14.
3. CSIS Conventional Arms Control 1990 Project, *Conventional Arms Control: An Approach for the New Strategic Era* (Washington, DC: CSIS, May 1990), 23.
4. See David Segal, "Army Light Infantry Divisions: Are They Fit to Fight?" *Armed Forces Journal International* (October 1990); Edwin Beach, "Are Our Light Divisions Too Light?" *Army* 35 (February 1990); and William Caldwell, "Not Light Enough to Get There, Not Heavy Enough to Win: The Case of US Light Infantry," (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1987).
5. Some would argue that the US Army's force structure is already light enough, the 101st Airborne Division is a light enough unit, there will always be a need for some light infantry in any war. The question is whether US Army force structure ought to include five UDAs—the 82d and four others—and no middleweight forces.

6. Indeed, during his February 27 press briefing on the conflict in the war, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf stated that he had appreciated the media's exaggeration of US troop strength in the area during the last phase of Operation Desert Shield, when the United States had "very little" actually in place.
7. David Segal, "Whatever Happened to Rapid Deployment," *Armed Forces Journal International* (March 1991): 38. Segal himself concludes that US successes "may lead observers to conclude that America has all the right stuff to fight and win wars in distant areas like the Persian Gulf region. But that conclusion would be a hasty one."
8. See Francis Tusa, "Increased firepower weighs heavily on light armor," Glenn W. Goodman Jr., "Smart Antitank Submunitions Will Be Ready for Next War," and Tusa, "Europeans Figure There's More Than One Way to Skin a Tank," all in *Armed Forces Journal International*, (March 1991).
9. Designers of the 9th Infantry Division recognized the importance of command and control. An Army conceptual agency reported on the division in 1985 that it "orients on the enemy force, maneuvering its firepower through sophisticated command and control and intelligence gathering to attack the enemy by air," see "Ideas to Products," Army Development and Employment Agency, Report to the Army, February 1985. A 9th Division briefing noted that command and control "allows us to structure the battlefield in our favor."
10. The CSIS Conventional Arms Control project, *A New Military Strategy for the 1990s: Implications for Capabilities and Acquisition* (Washington, DC: CSIS, January 1991), 16.

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“A LIGHT” Infantry L M FIGHT



Captain Allen L. Tiffany,
US Army Reserve

As the Army transitions rapidly to a smaller, more efficient force structure, existing organizational designs will come under close scrutiny. The author argues that this is especially needed for the infantry divisions (light) that currently constitute a significant portion of the Active force. He identifies several shortcomings that limit the effectiveness and utility of these divisions and offers a proposal for a new “light infantry division” that will be both rapidly deployable and ready to fight upon arrival.

“When the [North Koreans] hear who we are, they’ll quit and go home.” A Task Force Smith corporal’s appraisal of the effect Task Force Smith would have on the attacking enemy shortly before the Task Force was destroyed, in Korea, June 1950¹ . . .

“Smith’s choices were not enviable [approximately 4 hours after first contact with the enemy]. His unit was achieving very little where it stood. But if he chose to withdraw immediately from the position, put his men into their surviving trucks, and head south, sooner or later the column was likely to meet the Communist tanks that had gone before them. He would gain little, with his small force, by abandoning the high ground to launch a counterattack against the [newly arrived and advancing] enemy infantry. Yet, if they remained in place, they could expect neither reinforcement nor relief. Here was an extraordinary situation. This was the year 1950, when vast economic wealth, possession of the atomic bomb, and the legacy of victory in the Second World War caused America to be perceived as the greatest power the world had ever seen, mightier than the Roman Empire at its zenith or the British a century before. Here, on a hill in Korea, the first representatives of United States military power to meet Communist aggression on the battlefield were the men of a mere understrength infantry battalion which now faced annihilation as a military unit. Not all the B-29s on the airfields of the United States, nor the army divisions in

Europe, the fleets at sea from the Taiwan Strait to the Mediterranean, could mitigate the absolute loneliness and vulnerability of Task Force Smith. Those in Tokyo or Washington who supposed that the mere symbolic commitment of this token of American military might would suffice to frighten the North Koreans into retreat were confounded.”²

THE PRECEDING quote forms a sad commentary of the diminished capability and readiness of the US military just four years after World War II. This embarrassing weakness was especially evident in our inability to project a credible force quickly into Korea. Such a precedent bodes ill of the current rush to restructure and drawdown the force that was so successful in our nation’s most recent use of its military power.

As our troops return from the gulf and units begin to deactivate and redeploy from Europe, it appears likely that an ever greater percentage of our active duty Army forces will be based in the Continental United States (CONUS). Therefore, our ability to rapidly deploy a credible force from CONUS grows ever more important. That is, CONUS-based forces must be able to conduct offensive military operations against any potential opponent in any potential environment and must be able to deploy rapidly. This is the mission for which we were ill-prepared in 1950

and are today not as well prepared as we could be.

We are in an especially dangerous position because we have heaped great expectations on our infantry divisions (light) (ID(L)). Unfortunately, our ID(L)s are dangerously flawed in a variety of ways that greatly reduce their value for any potential conflict. We are stuck with a rapidly deployable force that is of little value on arrival. This article will detail some of the more obvious and dangerous design flaws of the ID(L), and propose a new "light infantry division (LID)." Hopefully, this and other discussions will provide the impetus for the Army to take steps to turn the ID(L)s into LIDs.

In short, the flaws of the ID(L) stem from the fact that it is a slimmed down infantry division. When the ID(L) was designed, the hard choices of what attributes it would have were avoided in deference to a solution that offered all observers a little bit of what they thought most important. The final product, a cut-up version of a "real" infantry division, lacks the components required to create the synergistic effect needed to win battles on the modern battlefield.

The number of ID(L)s in the inventory (to the exclusion of other types of forces) only make their flaws more dangerous because they absorbed resources that could have been used to create a truly light infantry force and a rapidly deployable, tactically mobile force. Our ID(L)s cannot fight a mobile enemy, and we still cannot get an adequate amount of armor where we need it in a reasonable amount of time. Our inability to rapidly move armor to Saudi Arabia in August is instructive.

The world may or may not be a safer place these days. For instance, one informed observer feels that:

"Contrary to the tide of official and public opinion at the present time . . . there is more peril than promise in the contemporary course of Soviet-American relations. Mikhail Gorbachev is but the latest in a long succession of reforming czars. It is all but inconceivable that he could direct and oversee the transformation of the brutal, continental multinational empire that is the USSR into something so much kinder

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and gentler that a truly objective basis for a structural improvement in political-security relations would be the consequence."³

While the Soviet threat remains unstable, we must recognize that the Soviets are no longer the only source of potential threats in the world, as recent events in the Persian Gulf clearly demonstrate. If we feel that there may someday be a need for an army—as history and current realities seem to dictate—then it is only prudent that this army must be designed and resourced in such a way that it can achieve success in battle. And, equally as important, we must be able to get it to where it needs to be in a timely manner.

"One or the Other" or "Both": Deterrence and Combat Power

If an attacker can be deterred simply by involvement of US forces, early arrival and placement of virtually any US forces to oppose him will suffice. If an attacker will be deterred, the size or strength of the force is less critical from a combat power perspective. However, if the introduction of US forces fails to dissuade an aggressor, a fight will be imminent, and combat power becomes immediately critical. Since we have little way of knowing beforehand whether deterrence will succeed, its probability of success becomes only a calculated guess (as it was in Korea in 1950). Thus, the combat power introduced in a given amount of time could be decisive, and in most instances, the more combat power we can introduce quickly, the better. When looking at the ID(L)s in such a rapid deployment scenario,

the question that must be answered is, "Is the way our ID(L)s are currently organized, equipped, resourced and augmented the best possible design

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to achieve a rapid buildup of combat power against any enemy in any environment?"

The answer to this question is not so clear-cut. It is clear that there is still a requirement for US forces to be called upon to intervene quickly and effectively in a variety of scenarios. In addition to the Persian Gulf, Korea, Central America and Europe remain locations that may require rapid introduction of US ground forces. Unlike the recent operation in Panama, it may take much more than three or four lightly armed brigades to decide the issue. A division or two may not be enough combat power to get the job done—or even to hold the line until the heavy forces arrive. This is especially true if we are unable to deploy rapidly or if surprise at the strategic level has been lost. It would have been necessary to consider all these points had Iraq's war plans of early August included marching on Saudi Arabia.

A unit that has been optimized to deploy rapidly and show the flag in the hope of deterring an aggressor is, by its definition, not optimized to fight. Though the importance of having rapidly deployable units cannot be overstated, rapid deployability must take a back seat to the intelligent and reasonable design of combat units. To develop forces that are both rapidly deployable and intelligently designed, the first step is to design the combat formations that will do the fighting. These forces must first be "optimized" to fight in a given situation. In this way, we are

taking the initiative in matching our strengths against an enemy's weakness and vulnerabilities.

Our ability to rapidly deploy forces is currently hamstrung by our limited variety of forces from which to choose and the limited number of transport aircraft available. These two interactive factors currently determine which units we deploy and, as a result, how we conduct combat operations once on the ground. In the doctrinal terminology, we have thrown the "T" for "troops available" of the commander's "mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available" (METT-T) analysis out the window at the national level. Using the existing ID(L) design as a starting point, we can do better. We owe it to the men of the next Task Force Smith to do better.

The Army must diversify its force structure inventory so that it can fight successfully in a variety of situations. One component of such a diversified inventory would be a light infantry division. The Army can easily make this change, even with the impending reduction of forces that deficit reduction measures foreshadow. Indeed, this time of change provides the Army a window of opportunity to break out of the inertia of the status quo and to implement needed internal change.

The "Light" Forces

Currently, there are two basic types of forces in the active duty inventory: "heavy" and "light." The heavy forces are the mechanized and armored divisions in the inventory such as the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Armor Division, and so on. These divisions are similarly equipped with tanks (either M60s or M1s) and armored personnel carriers (M113s) or mechanized infantry fighting vehicles (M2/3 Bradleys). The heavy forces are so heavy that they are incapable of being rapidly deployed by air in significant numbers.

For example, the C-5A/B can carry two M1s or four M2/3s. A C-17 can carry one M1 and one M2/3.⁴ For the purposes of illustration, consider how long and how many C-5s or C-17s would be tied up moving just one M1 and M2/3 battalion task force. Such a task force would have 14

M1s, 47 M2/3s, approximately 56 vehicles from the M113 family, 43 2.5-ton trucks, nine 5-ton trucks, 22 heavy, expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs), 27 high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and approximately 64 vehicle trailers.⁵ It would take approximately 25 C-17s or 19 C-5s just to fly the M-1s and M2/3s! That still leaves 157 vehicles and 64 trailers to be moved. Obviously, the light forces will have to go it alone until the heavy forces can arrive by sea, as we saw in the early days of the Persian Gulf deployment.

The current ID(L) structure will be discussed in detail. First, however, a brief review of the specific characteristics of the 82d Airborne and the 101st Airmobile divisions is instructive.

The 82d and the 101st. The 82d is the only airborne division in the inventory. As such, it is in the interesting position of being analogous to a "trump card," which can only be played on occasion. The deterrent value we gain from having an airborne division that has not yet been committed serves us well by forcing a potential enemy to be prepared for the possible employment of the 82d. The greatest value of the 82d and its subordinate units lies in their ability to conduct "forced entry" operations and in catching an enemy unprepared at a place and time of our choosing. We are less interested in seeing the 82d involved in protracted ground operations than we are in seeing it used to conduct airborne assaults to facilitate the introduction of other forces. The division accomplishes its second stated mission, keeping the enemy guessing, simply by its existence and potential deployment. Though specific changes to the 82d may be appropriate, the division provides the Army a needed capability.

Similarly, the 101st is essentially a traditional infantry division with one notable difference.⁶ Its unique asset is the large number of helicopters it possesses. Organizationally, the primary difference between the 82d and the 101st is that the 82d has a battalion of light tanks whereas the 101st has many more helicopters. As such, the tactical employment of the infantry battalions of the 101st in ground combat is not dramatically



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different than that envisioned of the battalions of the 82d (or, for that matter, the battalions of the ID(L)).

The Infantry Division (Light). The third type of the light force is the ID(L). The ID(L) is a relatively new design that is essentially an "austere" infantry division of old. The intent was to create a capable infantry division that could be deployed rapidly. Though "rapidly" is a relative term, the ID(L)s can be deployed by air much easier than any other division formation in the inventory.

The current table of organization and equipment (TOE) of the ID(L) gives the impression that the designers were pulled in at least four different directions during the design process. They were compelled to respond to the 500-sortie requirement (to keep the division rapidly deployable); to fight in "low-intensity conflict" situations (which, correctly or incorrectly, seem

to be synonymous with fighting an enemy who has very limited armor assets in restrictive terrain); the need for a "leg" infantry force to complement existing heavy forces in tactical operations; and in response to an informal, though very real, pressure from many in the infantry

Our ability to rapidly deploy forces is currently hamstrung by our limited variety of forces from which to choose and the limited number of transport aircraft available. These two interactive factors currently determine which units we deploy and . . . how we conduct combat operations on the ground.

to "get back to being 'real' infantrymen" after the advent of the "armored infantry" as typified by the M2-clad infantrymen.

The result is an infantry division that is so light it can be deployed into situations, regardless of whether it is the right force for the mission, simply because it is the only divisional unit in the inventory that can be deployed rapidly. It is a division that, as a division or a part thereof, may not be properly equipped (without extensive amounts of corps augmentation) for fighting in a given situation. It is a division that is not optimized to fight in restrictive terrain and one that is too "heavy" and lacking in aviation assets to make a significant portion of it sufficiently mobile on a restrictive battlefield.

The 7th ID(L)'s Capabilities Book of 27 May 1986 states:

"The availability of sufficient airlift and sealift is a chronic constraint on the strategic flexibility of land forces. Even with programmed improvements through FY 89, the shortage will continue. However, the army can increase the utility of available lift through force redesign. Therefore . . . the complex, global nature of the threat, the increasing requirement for strategic flexibility, and the continuing constraints on resources (money, manpower, lift) lead to the requirement for . . . Infantry Divisions, Light."⁷

As one senior officer put it, the "principal design feature" of the ID(L) was:

" . . . it could be squeezed into 500 C-141 sorties. Why 500 was the key number, or what capability the division would have upon arrival in an operational theater, were issues that were dealt with only *after* the total load requirement of the division was squeezed into the preordained box."⁸

As such, the design of the ID(L) is flawed. Incredibly, 40 years after the abject tragedy of the Smith debacle, the potential for a similarly shattering defeat and failure exists. The similarities between our current ID(L)s, their lack of combat power and our inability to rapidly deploy units with more combat power are strikingly similar to the situation that existed in 1950.

Often, the arguments about the ID(L) design focus on how much firepower (in the guise of "combat power") the ID(L) has or is lacking. An important aspect of this argument is to understand the effect of adding firepower. Adding "more" can become an endless spiral that changes the tactical style of the unit. The experiences of the Rangers in World War II are illuminating.

The Ranger force was initially conceived as a "commando-like strike force." Initially, its operations emphasized two principles of war, surprise and security. But the force grew heavier to meet perceived needs. First, the Rangers traded their sole source of organic indirect fire support, 60mm mortars, for 81mm mortars, then came 4.2-inch mortars and finally half-track mounted 75mm howitzers. As the Ranger force grew ever more "capable," it was assigned more and more conventional missions that emphasized the need for firepower rather than surprise and security. When Rangers became more "qualified" for conventional operations, they were given more missions and kept in the line longer. As they lost their ability to use surprise and security to their advantage, they tried to compensate for the lost skills by adding more firepower, which meant they were capable of conducting, and were therefore given, more and more conventional missions.⁹

An M1 Abrams tank deplaning a C-5A Galaxy.



Consider how long and how many C-5s or C-17s would be tied up moving just one M1 and M2/3 battalion task force. . . . It would take approximately 25 C-17s or 19 C-5s just to fly the M-1s and M2/3s! That still leaves 157 vehicles and 64 trailers to be moved. Obviously, the light forces will have to go it alone until the heavy forces can arrive by sea

Additional impetus was given to the advent of the ID(L)s in the early 1980s by the realization that, other than the 82d and the 101st, the Army no longer had any infantry divisions capable of fighting in restrictive terrain. Contrary to popular belief, the ID(L) did not solve the problem. The infantry battalions of an ID(L) have a vehicle density of one vehicle for every 16 men, clearly too many vehicles—or too few soldiers—to close with an enemy operating in highly restrictive terrain. Though the companies of the ID(L) are reasonably capable of operating in restrictive terrain, the ID(L)'s battalions, brigades, or the ID(L)s in total, are not. More than 20 years after Vietnam, we do not have division- or even brigade-size units ready and capable of fighting in even moderately restrictive terrain against an even moderately capable enemy.

The temptation to make the ID(L)s heavier to make them more capable betrays a fundamental lack of understanding of what a light infantry force can do. These divisions do not currently consist of nine "commando-like strike force"

battalions under one division headquarters.

There has always been a desire to design multimission organizations and equipment to save limited institutional resources. This is driven by desires to enhance standardization to simplify training, manning and arming units. Unfortunately, this multimission goal for the ID(L) has left it vulnerable in almost all situations.

We must also be careful about the abilities we attribute to these divisions. For instance, a myth has been born that "light fighters" are elite, unique soldiers capable of superhuman feats. The supporters of this position have occasionally referred to famous incidents, such as the 101st's dramatic stand at Bastogne in late 1944, as an example of what the US infantryman, especially the light fighters, can do. However, such examples of extraordinary feats of light fighter prowess should be viewed with caution. Consider that in the case of the 101st's stand at Bastogne, the division task force included 12,000 men from the 101st, and was supported by 40 tanks, a tank destroyer battalion and more than six artillery

battalions. This division task force was not comparable to an ID(L).

Additionally, Hollywood renditions excepted, the German efforts to take Bastogne with the men and equipment they had can hardly be called impressive.¹⁰ The experiences

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of the 101st are not used here to take away from the gallant efforts of the brave men who were there. However, it is important to understand that overestimating the abilities of ID(L)s by heaping extraordinary expectations on their overloaded soldiers is a sure way to create an atmosphere and belief that they can do anything anywhere to any enemy. Such a belief is dangerous and foolhardy, at the least.

The Fallacy of the 500-Sortie Cap

The requirement for the ID(L)s to fit into 500 C-141 sorties had a top-down effect on the design of the division.¹¹ That is to say, the fighting formations of infantry squads, platoons, companies, battalions and brigades were responsive to the size restriction placed on the division. The ID(L) design could have been optimized to fight, rather than fitting into 500 sorties. This would have been designing from the bottom up. Arguably, designing from the bottom up would have created a much larger division that, therefore, required more than 500 sorties to deploy as a division. The 500-sortie limit is presently viewed as sacrosanct.

The designers of the ID(L) clearly recognized the potential requirement for additional assets in some situations. In the words of the 7th ID(L)'s

Capabilities Book:

"... the division can be supported with additional combat or support units from corps level when required by a particular type of mission or threat. The units providing this type of support are referred to as augmentations and the determination of the type and quality of augmentation is dependent on the specific mission."¹²


There are four reasons why the augmentation theory is flawed. First, the combined number of sorties the ID(L) and its augmentees require will exceed the 500 C-141 sortie limit. Thus, the 500-sortie limit is artificial. It would be better to design the division for a specific type of combat (counterguerrilla or conventional operations in jungle, urban or mountainous terrain, for instance) rather than just "shrinking" a traditional infantry division and giving it a new *light* label.

Second, if the division is going to be augmented anyway, rebuild the division with its potential augmentees now to take advantage of the increased combat power that will occur as a function of the time the units will spend training together before they go into battle.

Third, as currently designed, the ID(L) may very well require a substantial amount of the corps commander's assets just to survive on some potential battlefields. This degrades his ability to weight his main effort and thereby decreases the entire effectiveness of allied forces in a given theater.

Fourth, some components of the ID(L) are simply poorly designed. The personnel cap on the division (a function of the 500-sortie limit) means that any addition to the division must be "paid for" by taking from some other organization in the division. For instance, there are only two air defense artillery (ADA) batteries, and the engineer companies assigned to each brigade have only two platoons. Though it would be wrong to categorically oppose any decrease in manpower in some units of the ID(L), these examples and others clearly decrease the ability of the ID(L) to fight by "robbing Peter to pay Paul."

Since the ID(L)s are designed to do well in all situations, they may, in fact, do well in only a very few situations. Indeed, there is the danger



of the annihilation and loss of the unit as a fighting force. A review of the trials and tribulations of infantry battalions from ID(L)s at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, would substantiate this view.¹³

ID(L)s are designed, "to be capable of rapidly deploying worldwide." To do so:

"... the division is task organized for training and deployment into three brigade task forces. An infantry brigade of three infantry battalions serves as the base for each task force and is complemented with appropriate combat, combat support and combat service units."¹⁴

Theoretically, there is some flexibility in how the brigade task force is tailored for a specific mission. In reality, this flexibility is limited by time since the lead elements of a deploying task force are required to be "wheels up" in as little as 18 hours. Therefore, "to facilitate planning and reaction time, a standard mission package for the," brigade task force on the highest alert status is used (see figure).¹⁵ Thus, it would appear that the brigade of an ID(L) (the first unit likely to go into a conflict as a self-contained, relatively self-sustaining organization) is relatively "locked" into a preordained task force configuration before a specific mission is identified.

Unfortunately, the only task organizing deploying units really have time to carry out is the deletion of units that are not needed or are lowest on the priority list when there is a shortage of available aircraft. For instance, the 82d and the

7th divisions both left their heavy antiarmor weapon systems (TOW [tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile] HMMWVs) home when they deployed to Panama for Operation *Just Cause*. An important point to keep in mind is that units tailor themselves by deleting what they do not need so they can use the limited number of aircraft at their disposal to get that which they perceive they "really" need for a particular situation to the target area as fast as possible.

Significantly, the combat power of the ID(L) can be increased by habitually attaching that which will inevitably be attached in a crisis, without increasing the total number of sorties to lift the subordinate units of the current ID(L) and augmentees. Once this is realized, it is easier to begin the task of designing divisions to fight rather than to deploy. If the ID(L) will not deploy as a division without augmentation, it is reasonable to insist that those assets that will be used to augment the ID(L) in a crisis should become part of the organic division structure prior to such a crisis.

Obviously, there is the unanswerable question of exactly which assets should be made part of the organic ID(L). No one can claim to know exactly where (in what kind of terrain and climate) and exactly whom we will next face in combat. Therefore, no one can claim to know which assets should be made part of the organic ID(L). But if the ID(L)s are to deal with just one

scenario that the Army may be required to respond to, the task becomes manageable. Combat ability MUST drive the design of combat units. A specific combat unit must be built from the bottom up, based on a clearly defined, specific contingency situation.

Though it is reasonable to assume that few units were ever perfectly organized when they entered combat, it is hard to imagine a more confining and limiting design restriction than how many aircraft sorties are required to move it. The 1st Cavalry Division went to Vietnam in 1965 designed as a "lean and light" division.¹⁶ This sounds remarkably similar to the ID(L)'s mandate to "have a greater tooth to tail ratio than any of our other army divisions."¹⁷

Notably, the 1st Cavalry Division, while in Vietnam, had an organization very similar to the current organization of the ID(L), with nine infantry battalions in three infantry brigades of three battalions each, a 105mm artillery battalion, habitually assigned to each infantry brigade, one divisional 155mm battalion, an engineer battalion and only very limited "armor" assets (in the reconnaissance troop). The 1st Cavalry did have substantially more aviation assets than the ID(L)s now have.¹⁸ Though designed to be

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"lean and mean," wartime demands forced the division to grow from "a normal . . . airmobile division" authorization of "15,818 personnel (as of 31 December 1968)" to as much as 20,271 personnel assigned, a 28-percent increase over initial authorizations.¹⁹ This leads to the conclusion that in times of peace, resource constraints may entice planners to underestimate the personnel required to keep units operating under

the stresses of protracted combat operations. To do so is a misguided effort to stretch the force further than it can go. The ID(L) is symptomatic of this problem.

The following sections will highlight some specific shortcomings of the ID(L), leading to a new design proposal. The goal is a "light infantry division" design that does not have the flaws that have curtailed the usefulness of the current ID(L).

The 6.75-Man, Nine-Man Squad


Like all units, the ID(L) has a specific TOE. But, the ID(L) was designed first and foremost to fit into 500 C-141 sorties. The TOE of the ID(L) calls for rifle squads of nine men. Whether this is enough in the first place is debatable. Admittedly, the leader-to-led ratio is better in a nine-man squad, but the number of infantrymen in the division is decreased by two men per squad when compared with the 11-man squad of years past. This is a huge, cumulative loss of 486 infantrymen to an ID(L)!

All the assets of the ID(L)'s infantry battalions are austere. For instance, each company has a six-man, 60mm mortar section. The men of this section are overloaded by the equipment they have to carry. Consequently, they can carry only a few mortar rounds. Because of the way infantry companies operate, they do not have ready access to the rounds the infantrymen carry for them (as if the infantrymen do not have enough to carry already).²⁰

The TOW squad, originally four men, was chopped to three in an attempt to save manpower slots for use elsewhere. The loss of the extra man has seriously degraded the operational effectiveness of the TOW HMMWV squad. The loss of one man is not simply the loss of 25 percent of the squad's manpower; it is much worse than that. Like a ship with a hole in its hull, once the integrity of the design is destroyed, the system cannot operate in the manner and to the efficiency level for which it was designed.

An issue even more important than the mortar section and the TOW squad is the status of the rifle squads themselves. The infantry squads

Members of the 82d Airborne Division conducting an air jump in Honduras, March 1988. The paratroopers and the 7th Infantry Division (Light) were sent to discourage Nicaraguan forces from continuing to make incursions into Honduras.



The greatest value of the 82d and its subordinate units lies in their ability to conduct "forced entry" operations and in catching an enemy unprepared at a place and time of our choosing. We are less interested in seeing the 82d involved in protracted ground operations than we are in seeing it used to conduct airborne assaults to facilitate the introduction of other forces.

are the sharp end of the ID(L) and, in fact, the entire Army. However, a survey of the 81 rifle squads of one of the ID(L)s revealed that the average strength for each squad was 6.75 men, well below the authorized nine.²¹ At the time of the survey, most of the rifle companies were also understrength, but every headquarters company in the brigade was overstrength.

The staffs of the various headquarters of the ID(L) were designed as austere as the rest of the division. However, there are two factors that have caused them to "grow" informally and unofficially: The staffs truly need more help, and the staffs have the power to get it.

Staffs are tasked heavily in peacetime to produce tangible, quantifiable products—unlike infantry squads. The staffs and their commanders have come to realize that they cannot meet the workload with only their authorized strength.

Further, special staffs for schools or other projects (such as ad hoc sniper sections) are created locally to fill real and perceived needs of the parent division. As a result, and because the staffs have the influence to get commanders to agree, they add personnel to their rolls so they can meet the demands placed on them.

In the final analysis, in a "steady-state" environment such as that created by capping end strength, each and every soldier who is pulled up to a staff is a soldier ultimately pulled out of a rifle squad. Since crew-served weapons are always manned first, and "special" platoons such as the battalion scout, antitank and mortar platoons are habitually kept at 100 percent, the only place left to find troops are the rifle squads of the rifle platoons. The results are rifle squads and platoons that are habitually understrength.

The situation is worse than just saying every

squad is at about 75 percent strength. The more insidious result is the effect such loss of manpower has on the manning of weapons and the distribution of equipment in the rifle platoons. Consider that each rifle platoon is assigned two M60 machineguns (with two assistant gunners), six

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squad automatic weapons and six M203 grenade launchers. Each platoon must have one platoon leader, one platoon sergeant, one radio telephone operator, three squad leaders and six team leaders. These positions will be manned from whatever manpower is available in the platoon. Obviously the padding, not to mention its robust versatility, is gone before the unit even goes to battle. The agile, "light" infantryman, on which the ID(L) claims to depend for so much, vanishes under his overloaded rucksack before the unit ever gets to its destination. All of the platoon's equipment such as field phone, reels of wire, tripods, antitank weapons, mortar rounds (for the company mortars), spare batteries, and the like must be spread across fewer backs. Worse still, if the strength of the platoons falls below a certain point, the degrading effects of grossly overloaded rucksacks accumulate logarithmically.²²

Inevitably, because the ID(L)s were poorly designed, the soldiers and young lieutenants down in the rifle squads and platoons will have to make tough decisions when confronted with unexpected situations that leaders at higher levels may not even know exist. It is imaginable that to solve the problem, overloaded soldiers whose

lives are endangered by their lack of mobility will choose to leave equipment rather than carry it. They will throw away ammunition and "lose" equipment in an attempt to make their loads manageable. Their decisions, in the context of the dilemma they have been forced into, will be justified. However, for the commander of the force that has just arrived in country, such actions literally throw away his combat power.

Two Does Not Equal Three


Three divisional organizations in the ID(L), according to the 7th ID(L) Capabilities Book, have only two subordinate organizations for attachment to the maneuver brigades. This is an unhealthy situation creating a variety of problems that have a tendency to be addressed with "jury-rigged" solutions.

The ADA battalion has only two Stinger batteries.²³ This means, unless augmented (augmentation, yet again) or task organized into three "makeshift" batteries, one brigade will not have any dedicated ADA assets. One of the responses to this has been an attempt to assign specific members of the infantry battalion in the ID(L) a secondary mission of being a Stinger gunner. There are obvious pitfalls to this.

The division's general support artillery battery cannot be divided to support three brigades simultaneously either. It has two platoons of four 155mm guns.²⁴ As general support, these weapons will, more often than not, work for the division or just one of the brigades. But should these weapons be needed to support three widely dispersed brigades simultaneously (such as brigade fire bases similar to those used extensively in Vietnam), one of the brigades will be without the important variety of fire support the 155mm family of munitions offers; that is, unless the division is augmented.

The problem with dedicated engineer units is similar, though at a different level. The division engineer battalion does have three companies, one being habitually assigned to each brigade. But, there are only two platoons in each of the companies.²⁵ This inevitably means that one of the three infantry battalions in each brigade will

An M4 Sherman taking another tank in tow. Roughly 40 Shermans from the 9th and 10th Armored divisions along with nearly three dozen M18 Hellcats of the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion (mounting a more lethal high-velocity gun) played a critical role in the defense of Bastogne, 20-26 December 1944.



[The] 101st's dramatic stand at Bastogne in late 1944 [is often given] as an example of what the US infantryman, especially the light fighters, can do. However, such examples of extraordinary feats of light-fighter prowess should be viewed with caution. . . . In the case of the 101st's stand at Bastogne, the division task force included 12,000 men from the 101st, and was supported by 40 tanks, a tank destroyer battalion and more than six artillery battalions. This division task force was not comparable to an ID(L).

lack dedicated engineer assets. Again, various haphazard organizations may solve short-term problems or allow a unit to get through a given exercise. Does this make sense? Denying brigades ADA, artillery and engineer assets because they do not fit in 500 sorties is beyond ridiculous. It undermines the efforts of professional soldiers to learn from history, exercises and models to design forces to fight in our next war.

Three Should Be Four

A quick comparison of the battalions of an ID(L) and a heavy unit reveals that the battalions of the heavy unit have five maneuver companies (including the antiarmor company) while the battalions of the ID(L) have only three companies.²⁶ This translates into 15 maneuver companies in a heavy brigade and nine maneuver companies in a light brigade. Though there is probably no "perfect" number of companies in a battalion, be it a heavy or light unit, only three maneuver companies in a battalion

are arguably too few.²⁷

Interestingly, 1st Cavalry Division had four infantry companies per battalion while in Vietnam.²⁸ Adding a fourth company to the battalions of the ID(L) would be especially valuable when the rifle companies of the battalion are assigned missions such as guarding static facilities of significant value (bridges, fresh water wells, and the like), guarding detainees and prisoners of war or guarding the brigade trains. All of these instances are readily conceivable in limited or total war scenarios. Compounding the problem further, as fewer and fewer units are left to engage the enemy, there may be more and more incidents of enemy forces conducting raids on brigades and battalion assets such as artillery batteries, mortar platoons, tactical operation centers, combat trains and other vulnerable assets. As a result, we may imagine that even more infantrymen, in the form of fire teams, squads and platoons, will be dispatched to protect such assets.²⁹

These types of missions, coupled with battal-

ions that have only three companies, further reduce the combat power of the ID(L). Designing support forces that are so austere that they need infantrymen to protect them is a recipe for disaster. Especially when the companies left to do the

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fighting have only 6.75 men per squad, are short or engineers and ADA assets and have only limited antiarmor weapons.

One of the most common scenarios in which light units are expected to participate is the limited war or restrictive terrain variety, much in line with the 7th ID(L)'s and the 82d Airborne Division's participation in *GOLDEN PHEASANT* in Honduras in 1988 and, more recently, *Just Cause* in Panama in December 1989. A primary characteristic of these operations is they will be dominated by small-unit actions that require large numbers of infantrymen. But, unfortunately, the ID(L) lacks infantrymen. Though relative to heavy units and to the tooth-to-tail ratio Armywide, the ID(L) is rich in infantrymen, we must in good conscience ask: Are there really enough? Arguably not.

Light Fighter Antiarmor Weapons

Perhaps the most dangerous threats to the forces currently capable of deploying rapidly are enemy aviation assets, chemical munitions and armor assets. Of these, enemy armor may be the most probable and, therefore, the most dangerous. It has become evident recently that there are many nations that have relatively large inventories of modern tanks. US forces need to be

prepared to fight armor in any potential conflict. Solving this problem has become even more difficult with the advent of "reactive armor."³⁰

No discussion of the destruction of Task Force Smith is complete without commenting on its antiarmor weapon system. It used the same rocket launcher, bazooka, that was deemed ineffective five years earlier in World War II. To say that the bazooka proved ineffective in the hands of the men of Smith is a gross understatement. One young officer fired 22 rounds at close range in a desperate attempt to slow the North Korean tanks. For his efforts, one tank threw a track, and he received a Silver Star. However, the North Korean tanks continued to roll south.³¹

Headquarters company of each of the ID(L)s' infantry battalions has a platoon of four HMMWV-mounted TOWs. Each company of the battalion has a 13-man antiarmor weapon section of six "Dragon", M47, antiarmor rocket launchers.³² The individual infantrymen are issued the light antiarmor weapon (LAW, a Vietnam era 66mm rocket).³³ As a general statement, the weapon most capable of killing enemy armor is the TOW, followed in order by the Dragon, the AT4 and the LAW.

The ID(L)'s brigades have no other organic antiarmor systems that can readily be used in an offensive way. The next source of offensive armor killers organic to the division would be attack helicopter assets. The remaining antiarmor assets available to the ID(L) come from external sources.

Thus, the first brigade deployed and in contact is potentially unprepared to counter an armor threat. This is doubly so since not only are its weapon systems questionable against an armored opponent but also because the ID(L) is decidedly short of any combat systems that can maneuver on the battlefield faster than a walking infantryman. This is a significant disadvantage if the enemy has mobile combat systems and inaneuver space. If a situation does occur, such as confronted Smith, or as could have confronted the 82d and 101st in Saudi Arabia had Iraq chosen to continue south, the deployed US forces may find themselves forever responding to the



1st Cavalry Division troopers manhandling a 105mm howitzer out the bay of a CH-47A Chinook during the Vietnam War.

Though designed to be "lean and mean," wartime demands forced the division to grow from "a normal . . . airmobile division" authorization of "15,818 personnel" to as much as 20,271 personnel assigned, a 28-percent increase over initial authorizations. This leads to the conclusion that in times of peace, resource constraints may entice planners to underestimate the personnel required to keep units operating under the stresses of protracted combat operations.

mobile combat power of the enemy. In effect, we will grant the enemy the tactical initiative because we will have deployed the wrong force. It is hard to imagine how we intend to achieve a stated policy goal if we abdicate the first several days (or weeks) to the enemy because it takes us that long just to get there and then deploy forces that can only react at the tactical level.

The Real Aircraft Constraint

Aircraft do play a role in constraining how a force is designed. But it is not the erroneous argument of numbers of aircraft per unit countered above. Rather, it is a question of how much will fit in an aircraft as defined by the aircraft's internal physical dimensions and its weight-carrying ability. This will be a function of the physical characteristics of the given weapon system considered—the size and weight of the weapon system as compared to the capabilities of those strategic and tactical aircraft that will move it between theaters (strategic lift, such as C-141s,

C-5s and C-17s). Care must also be taken to evaluate a given weapon system against the aircraft that will move it about within the theater (tactical lift such as C-130s), on the battlefield (CH-47 and UH-60 helicopters), and the weapon systems' ability for self-deployment (mobility).

Consider, if a C-141 is used to move a given combat force from one point to another, what the C-141 can move is constrained by what will physically fit in the aircraft's cargo bay and what it can lift, expressed in a unit of weight. Since some strategic aircraft are capable of refueling in flight, they could be loaded, theoretically, to their maximum payload figures. The optimum goal would be to fill an aircraft with as much combat power as possible, until the weight and physical limits of the aircraft are reached at the exact same time. To do otherwise is to waste airlift capacity. That is, we will be getting less combat power in each aircraft than potentially available.³⁴

The vast majority of the H(D)'s 500 sorties,

especially the first 135 sorties filled with the men of the battalions and brigades, "cube out" before they "weigh out" (that is, they fill up all available space in the C-141 before they reach its weight limit).³⁵ This represents capacity wasted that could be used to move more combat power in every aircraft. If the early delivery of combat power is critical, indeed essential, this could be disastrous. But there is another factor in play here. Before it can be said that every C-141 should be packed with the maximum amount of combat power, like pouring a definable amount of sand in a bucket of a given size, one must review the definition of combat power as stated in FM 100-5, *Operations*. It states that "combat power is the ability to fight. It measures the effect created by combining maneuver, firepower, protection and leadership in combat actions against an enemy of war."³⁶

Firepower and protection would seem to be absolute, quantifiable amounts for different types of weapon systems. Maneuver is a bit more tricky. Again, to quote from FM 100-5, "Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage."³⁷ Maneuver is the absolute mobility of a given type of system in a specific type of terrain and weather as measured in time. It is also a function of the enemy's potential ability to maneuver in response to our movements (should he be able and willing to do so). In short, our weapon systems' absolute mobility, terrain and the enemy's ability to maneuver affect our ability to maneuver. This dictates our ability to bring firepower to bear on the enemy at a place and time of our choosing.

This is rather obvious when viewed in less ethereal ways. Tanks prefer open spaces in which to maneuver because they are not restricted by terrain. Tanks do not like to operate in enemy-infested cities or jungles because their freedom to maneuver is denied. Conversely, infantrymen prefer restrictive terrain, so much so that open areas are considered "danger areas." The 7th ID(L) Capabilities Book makes this point when it says that one of the characteristics of the 7th ID(L) is to "operate in close [restrictive] ter-

rain."³⁸ It furthers the point a bit later, "In its preferred environment, [the 7th ID(L)] is the maneuver unit of choice."³⁹ Implicit in this is that there are environments where ID (L)s will not be the unit of choice, unless augmented. Since the pitfalls of augmentation are onerous, we must find a better solution.

It is clear, then, that different forces stack up against each other differently in different situations. Many variables impact upon the "our combat power versus their combat power" equation. In the final analysis, it is in our best interests to have several types of rapidly deployable forces from which to choose in facing a specific enemy in a specific environment.

In the case of the ID(L), it is clear that it needs to be redesigned. It is dangerously flawed for any mission in its present form. The existing perception that it can do anything makes it a prime candidate to be destroyed on a future battlefield, thereby failing to accomplish the mission it was sent to achieve.

A New ID(L): The Light Infantry Division

The proposed new type of division would have three brigade task forces assigned. It is a light infantry division and is rich in that most precious of all weapons—the infantryman. It is not designed to fight anywhere against any enemy. It is designed to fight in restrictive terrain, and it is rapidly deployable.

There are many aspects of this proposal that could be discussed at length. Hopefully, this exposure will generate a continuing debate, and those of you who are knowledgeable about infantry missions and who understand the difference between light infantry and light units will contribute to the effort of finding the best design. Whether this proposal is 100 percent perfect in the final analysis is less important than the realization that we do not now have, but certainly need, a rapidly deployable light infantry division.

Also implicit in this discussion is the recognition that we also lack a middleweight force in our inventory. Although it is not addressed here, it is a very real deficiency. As we saw in the gulf,

we do have a need for a rapidly deployable, tactically mobile force that can effectively engage heavy armor forces. Such a force would inevitably be less capable in the components of firepower and protection of combat power than our heavy forces. However, vehicles now exist that are available "off the shelf" to serve as the base vehicle from which we can build very capable, mobile and deployable forces. Many options exist that would allow us to create such a force.

Finally, we must recognize and accept that the future of the Army is as a CONUS-based force. Therefore, we must modify the ID(L) into a usable design. When called upon to deploy, it will inevitably be under emergency conditions. How much combat power can we deploy per aircraft is not just critical—it is the paramount concern. Failure to take advantage of this time of change may set the stage for yet another Task Force Smith. **MR**

NOTES

1. Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 17.
2. *Ibid.*, 19.
3. Colin S. Gray, "The Soviet Threat in the 1990s," *Global Affairs*, vol. 5, no. 2, (Spring 1990): 25.
4. Numbers are based on information provided on 4 May 1990 during a telephone conversation with Senior Master Sergeant Scott Ellestead of the Military Airlift Command.
5. United States Army Infantry School, *Infantry Reference Data* (Fort Benning, GA: 1989), 5-2.
6. *Ibid.*, 1-1.
7. Headquarters, 7th Infantry Division and Fort Ord, *7th Infantry Division (Light) ID (L) Capabilities Book* (Fort Ord, CA: 1986), 1-2.
8. John C. Bahnen Jr., "Mr. President, We Can't Go," *Armed Forces Journal International*, (October 1987): 114.
9. Michael J. King, *Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II*, Leavenworth Papers, No. 11, (Combat Studies Institute [CSI], Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1985), 22.
10. Ralph M. Mitchell, *The 101st Airborne Division's Defense of Bastogne* (CSI, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1986).
11. *7th ID (L) Capabilities Book*, 1-5.
12. *Ibid.*, 1-6.
13. For an excellent discussion of how to use light forces in conjunction with heavy forces, read, "Complementary Force Operations," by MG Peter J. Boylan, in the June 1990 issue of *Military Review*. One of the most notable aspects of the article is the articulated realization that the way we employ light forces at the combat training centers is dangerously flawed due to the nature of rotations and the dynamics of sequential set-piece battles. I highly recommend anyone wishing to join the debate on the role of light forces read this article.
14. *7th ID, L Capabilities Book*, 2-1.
15. *Ibid.*, 2-1 and 2-3.
16. Shelby L. Stanton, *Anatomy of a Division* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1987), 195.
17. GEN John A. Wickham Jr., *White Paper 1984 Light Infantry Divisions* (US Department of the Army, 16 April 1984).
18. Stanton, 197-205.
19. *Ibid.*, 211.
20. CPT John M. Spitzer, "The 60mm Mortar: How Good Is It?," *Infantry*, (May-June 1990): 19.
21. Headquarters, Third Brigade, 7th Infantry Division, Light, "Third Brigade Bayonet Training Brief: 2nd Quarter FY 1989" (Fort Ord, CA, December 1988).
22. These comments are based on personal experience. I am aware of one rifle platoon that went on an exercise—the ID (L) "certification" exercise in 1986 no less—with only 13 of the 34 men authorized. An extreme example certainly, but one that makes the point. Over a 6-month period of time, my own rifle platoon usually could only muster 26 or 27 men. We generally had about 30 assigned and inevitably had three or four in school, on leave, sick and so forth.
23. *7th ID, (L) Capabilities Book*, 8-2.
24. *Ibid.*, 5-5.
25. *Ibid.*, 7-2.
26. *Ibid.*, 3-3.
27. For this argument, I have counted the antiaircraft company in the heavy units. I have not counted the antiaircraft platoon in the light units. The antiaircraft

- company in heavy battalion is often task organized with the "line" companies to create five companies of relatively equal combat power, particularly in potentially maneuver, firepower and protection values. The antiaircraft platoon of an ID (L) battalion differs from the line companies in its battalion so significantly that it is more the source of heavy antiaircraft firepower than is a "maneuver" unit. And since it is, after all, only a platoon, I have not counted it here.
28. Stanton, 197.
 29. Personal experience. For instance, on brigade (at least) habitually kept one of its nine rifle companies guarding the brigade trains during the 1986 7th ID (L) certification exercise.
 30. Reactive armor dramatically improves a vehicle's ability to survive direct hits from "shaped charge" antiarmor weapons. Reactive armor is cheap and easy to design, manufacture and install. Thus, it is a defensive system we could see anywhere in the world. It is not impossible to defeat. Our next generation tube-launched optically tracked, wire-guided missile (TOW) is designed to fly over targets and "shoot down" as they pass over the top of a vehicle to take advantage of the thinner armor on top of vehicles. But there is no reason why reactive armor can not be put on the top of a vehicle, and reports of precisely that are already surfacing.
 31. Hastings, 18 and 22.
 32. The Dragon is similar in design to the TOW, but is technically considered "man portable." It is actually very heavy, especially with its night sight, and is very responsive to errors by the gunner. The weight of the system limits the number of rounds a unit will actually carry. Though there are claims it can be an effective weapon if the gunners are well-trained, the fact of the matter is that most Dragon gunners in the Army are not well-trained. As a result of these, though the Dragon possesses a warhead roughly equivalent to that of the early TOW, and a range of 1,000 meters, it is not an effective weapon system.
 33. The light antitank weapon (LAW) and AT4 are comparable in design but the AT4 is significantly more powerful. Both are issued as a round of ammunition, ready to fire on receipt. They need no additional equipment to be fired. Both these weapons are man-portable. The LAW weighs 5 pounds, the AT4, 15 pounds. Both can also be defeated by reactive armor. There is no specific count for these weapons in a battalion since they are issued to individual soldiers based on mission requirements and availability. Speaking very broadly, the men of the infantry squads may normally carry three or four of either per squad. Obviously, due to the weight, more LAWs can be carried than AT4s.
 34. It is interesting to note that the Army, in 1983, according to a GAO report ("Anti-tank Weapons: Current and Future Capabilities", GAO/PEMD-87-22, pages 13 and 14), changed a policy such that the LAW and AT4 would no longer be classified as anti-tank weapons.
 35. The maximum load and range for a transport aircraft in the strategic deployment role is dependent upon the availability of aircraft to refuel it in flight, length and altitude of departure and arrival airfields, temperature, crew endurance and availability, and so on. The permutations of these calculations are endless, and as such, highly responsive to the specifics of a given scenario.
 36. Personal experience and discussions with a trained "airload planner" responsible for airload planning and infantry battalion in the 7th ID (L).
 37. US Department of the Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), 11.
 38. *Ibid.*, 12.
 39. *7th ID, (L) Capabilities Book*, 1-5.
 40. *Ibid.*, 1-8.

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Now that combat in the gulf has ended, the demanding job of peacekeeping remains a daunting challenge. The author argues that the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping apparatus is in need of significant reform. He cites bureaucratic and leadership problems in previous peacekeeping missions and calls for strong US and coalition participation in current operations. Although the pace of withdrawals and the Iraqi intransigence toward UN verification teams present new challenges, his proposals offer useful guidelines for peacekeeping efforts that may be required for some time to come.

THE UNITED STATES has led the allied coalition superbly to a famous victory in the Gulf War. Now the United States and the coalition must face the equally demanding rigors of peace. Conquering the megalomania of Saddam Hussein may come to seem like child's play in comparison to winning the bureaucratic battles for the peace. In seeking to ensure that the victory in war is consolidated into lasting peace, US officials will be facing a host of obstacles: coalition partners who split away now that the war is won to pursue their independent national interests; vengeful Iraqis and other former supporters of Hussein who will seek, in peace, the prize that eluded them in war; and, perhaps surprisingly to some, the United Nations (UN) organization itself, particularly its entrenched bureaucracy

responsible for managing peacekeeping.

An effective peacekeeping operation will be an essential condition before the diplomats and politicians can move toward long-term stability and security in the gulf region. Peacekeeping is by definition a form of conflict control that restores and maintains peace pending long-term resolution of the conflict by diplomacy and other means. The United States will be required to pay much greater attention to peacekeeping than it has in most past UN peacekeeping operations, if the fruits of its victory are not to be squandered in a pusillanimous pursuit of the peace.

Some may argue that the United States has paid more than its fair share of peacekeeping dues in the past. It has financed a major part of UN peacekeeping efforts throughout the globe;

The United States cannot simply entrust the peacekeeping portion of its postwar policy to its traditional allies with peacekeeping expertise and to the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. To protect the coalition investment of blood and treasure, the United States must get involved with peacekeeping to a much greater degree than ever before at both the strategic and operational levels.

US diplomacy has been instrumental in paving the way for such operations as the UN force on the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria; and in the UN Security Council, the United States has played a key leadership role in world crises from Cyprus to Iran-Iraq. Where necessary the United States has fielded its own peacekeeping initiatives such as the Multinational Force of Observers in the Sinai.

However, after the Gulf War, the US government is faced with a radically different situation than those it faced in past peacekeeping operations. In the gulf case, the United States was one of the combatants, and the peacekeeping operation will be dealing with the United States and its coalition partners as one party to the conflict and with Iraq as the other. This will present the unique problem of making peacekeeping work when one side of the conflict is led by a dominant superpower that has chosen not to impose a "Pax Americana" but rather to rely on the shaky mechanism of UN peacekeeping.

To make peacekeeping work under these conditions the United States cannot simply entrust the peacekeeping portion of its postwar policy to its traditional allies with peacekeeping expertise and to the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. To protect the coalition investment of blood and treasure, the United States must get involved with peacekeeping to a much greater degree than ever before at both the strategic and operational levels. Matters such as the composition of the peacekeeping force, its mission and tasks, command and control, the role to be played by the secretary-general and his peacekeeping staff, the role of the Security Council itself (since three of its members with veto powers are in the allied coalition) and the criteria for termination of the operation must be subjected to the same rigorous analysis as were the plans for war.

Should the United States choose not to take a positive role, there will be great danger of a typically frustrating pattern emerging in which the peacekeeping force quickly becomes ineffective; the Iraqis and their supporters use the UN force as a facade behind which they delay all real efforts to a lasting peace; and the UN apparatus becomes more concerned with its own bureaucratic battles than with the original purpose of the peacekeeping. It will be difficult for the United States to prevent this from happening, but national and coalition interests must be protected and fostered. The United States has no choice but to expend every energy in making the peacekeeping successful. To begin with, it should look realistically at the peacekeeping record of the United Nations.

A Spotty UN Performance

A US strategic analysis of past UN peacekeeping will reveal a general pattern of frustration, disillusionment and failure, with success the occasional exception. UN peacekeeping efforts have more often been part of the problem than of the solution. Experienced peacekeepers such as Canada have too often seen peacekeeping mask the violence between the parties to a conflict, while the root causes of the conflict remain unresolved or are never even on the agenda. For more than 27 years, the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), for example, has provided a convenient pretext for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to prolong their ancient disputes and avoid political compromise and accommodation.

Canada has also seen years of effort to improve UN management of peacekeeping come to naught. Frustrated by the whole performance, Canadian governments began in the 1970s to seek ways of avoiding future open-ended, fruitless commitments. Criteria were established to

Blame for the lackluster UN performance in peacekeeping can be attributed to many factors such as the Cold War, Security Council vetoes and inadequate funding. But the lack of leadership of the secretary-general and the bumbling performance of his peacekeeping assistants cannot be ignored. Look, for example, at the almost indecent haste with which the UN hierarchy embraced the pathetic, last-gasp efforts of the Soviets to delay the start of the ground war.

aid the government in deciding whether to take on a new assignment. Two of these criteria indicate the frank approach that the United States must take to the gulf peacekeeping proposals. Canada has insisted that it will not get involved unless the UN peacekeeping mission, or mandate, is clear to all parties and has a good chance of being fulfilled. A second Canadian condition is that there must be a reasonable expectation of a political settlement. The majority the coalition holds in the Security Council should be used to the fullest extent to win the most effective ground rules for the gulf force, but at the end of the day, the United States and its coalition partners may have to accept a less than ideal proposal from the UN peacekeeping coterie.

Once the United States accepts the peacekeeping proposal, it must then deal with the UN bureaucracy under the secretary-general that is responsible for peacekeeping matters. During the war, this bureaucracy could be ignored and was largely irrelevant. But during the peace, it presents a major obstacle. Like most bureaucracies, the United Nations fits Honoré de Balzac's model of a "giant mechanism operated by pygmies." William F. Buckley Jr. was quite brutal in his assessment after working with the US delegation to the United Nations. He found that "for every good reason in the world, the doings of the United Nations are not widely reported. For one thing they are mostly meaningless. But mostly there is an inherent offensiveness in hypocrisy . . ."

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
not be ignored. Look, for example, at the almost indecent haste with which the UN hierarchy embraced the pathetic, last-gasp efforts of the Soviets to delay the start of the ground war. Dag Hammarskjöld, secretary-general from 1953 to 1961, was an effective leader and peacemaker, but most of his successors and their senior advisers have emerged from the ranks of dysfunctional, international civil servants or second-rate national politicians.

The United States cannot reinvigorate the leadership of the secretary-general nor reform his peacekeeping bureaucrats single-handedly, certainly not before an effective peacekeeping force must be on the ground in the gulf. The best that may be able to be done is to treat all products of the bureaucracy with determined and healthy skepticism and to bring concerted pressure to bear from major coalition partners, including the threat of reducing funds made available to the United Nations. In the longer term, the United States must get the Security Council to re-examine the idea of a military staff, responsible to the Security Council, being in charge of peacekeeping rather than the undersecretary-general, who now reports to the secretary-general. The option of creating a peacekeeping force outside of the United Nations, under the auspices of The League of Arab States or some other rational body, should not be forgotten if the UN system founders. After all, nothing in the historical UN *modus operandi* and *modus vivendi* should be treated as sacrosanct.

A Gulf Observer Group

Historically, the peacekeeping art has been carried out mainly by two types of organizations: peacekeeping forces and observer groups. A peacekeeping force is lightly armed, usually in-

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British lancers patrolling in their Saladin armored car near the demolished Cypriot village of Ayios Efstathios, 1988.

fantry or armored cavalry, uses wheeled commercial vehicles or tracks for mobility and may have some aviation support. The force is authorized to use its weapons in self-defense only. Normally, a peacekeeping force will deploy along a cease-fire line and by patrolling, shows of force, investigations, static observation and regular meetings with both sides attempts to maintain the peace while the diplomats talk. The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights is an active peacekeeping force. It was created in 1974 to monitor the cease-fire between Israel and Syria following the 1973 war. Today, UNDOF has approximately 1,300 peacekeepers, primarily from Austria, Canada, Finland and Poland.

The other major UN organizational solution for peacekeeping has been the military observer group that consists of unarmed military personnel, usually officers, from a mix of nations. They patrol, observe, investigate and negotiate much like a peacekeeping force, but lack the formed military units to make a show of force. The UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) is an active group, created in August 1988, to oversee the cease-fire after the eight-year Iran/Iraq War. At its height, it comprised 350 military officers from 25 nations plus an equal number of civilian administrative employees. It manned more than 1,200 kilometers of cease-fire line between the two countries. Despite the preliminary peace steps taken by

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Hussein during the war, UNIIMOG still exists in reduced numbers to fulfill the remaining parts of its mission.

The requirement in the gulf appears to be for an observer group as opposed to a peacekeeping force. Observers should be on the scene after the cease-fire to monitor withdrawals and prisoner exchanges until they are complete and to establish the patrol of the final cease-fire lines. The observer group should be composed largely of combat arms officers, a small naval detachment to patrol the gulf waters and some aviation resources. Strong US forces will be remaining in the gulf and the Mediterranean as part of national postwar deployments, and these forces will be available if the Iraqis make any attempts to reopen hostilities. In such a case, the US or coalition forces, acting to enforce the peace, would not be part of the UN operation but would need to coordinate with the UN peacekeepers.

There would be considerable merit to creating a largely Arab observer group as opposed to calling on the traditional UN peacekeepers (the Canadians, Danes, Dutch, Norwegians, Swedes, Australians, Indians, and so on). Not only would this approach avoid the criticism already launched by the Iraqis and others against having members of the hated coalition coming back as peacekeepers, but it would also take advantage of the advance planning that has been done by Egypt, Syria and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain). They have examined the option of an Arab peacekeeping operation based on the Egyptian and Syrian forces already in the gulf, supplemented by technical and specialist support from other UN members and from the UN Field Service administrative resources. The 38,000 Egyp-

tian troops and the 19,000 Syrians are more than adequate to provide the approximately 300 officers needed for an observer group, or if circumstances change and a peacekeeping force is needed, they have the resources for that.

An Arab-dominated peacekeeping observer group or force has much to recommend it. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait agreed in a February 1991 meeting to finance much of the operation, as well as to provide economic aid to Egypt and Syria, thus fostering the overall Middle East peace hopes. Arab peacekeepers could approach the art from a new vantage point and avoid the jaded, ineffectual techniques of past UN efforts. Certainly they would be more acceptable to the Iraqis, Saudis and Kuwaitis than would white-skinned Christians such as Scandinavians or Canadians. An Egyptian-Syrian observer group, speaking Arabic with old friends and old foes and operating in familiar terrain, climate and culture, has many advantages over a typical UN Tower of Babel such as UNIIMOG (which at one time had 350 officers from 25 different nations trying to make things work with English as the one operational language).

The relative lack of peacekeeping experience among the Egyptians and Syrians need not be an obstacle; indeed, it may be an advantage. Any well-trained professional combat arms officer can pick up the essentials of peacekeeping very quickly. If he is already familiar with the language and culture of the former combatants, he is well on his way to being effective.

A final reason for preferring the Arab observer group is that much planning has been done on this option by the Arab members of the coalition. So the frenetic, last-minute improvisation that has marked peacekeeping efforts planned in New York can be avoided.

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Peacekeeping Tasks in the Gulf

The classic mission for an observer group or peacekeeping force, alluded to earlier, is to restore or maintain peace between the combatants while the diplomats pursue long-term stability and security arrangements. The mission statement for a gulf observer group would make the required references to the UN resolutions that approved the cease-fire and the creation of a peacekeeping operation, and it should also include a general concept of operations. Specific tasks falling out of the mission could include the following:

- Monitoring the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait to Iraq (if any remain in Kuwait by the time the peacekeepers are deployed).

- Monitoring return of coalition forces to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This task would vary depending on where the final cease-fire line is placed, but it is assumed the cease-fire lines will be the prewar Iraq-Kuwait and Iraq-Saudi Arabia borders.

- Collecting and controlling any serviceable weapons left on the field of battle by the Iraqis.

- Supervising marking and removal of mines in Kuwait and destruction of unexploded munitions.

- Supervising prisoner-of-war exchanges until the International Red Cross/Red Crescent arrives and thereafter assisting Red Cross as necessary.

- Assisting the Kuwaiti government in

[A small staff] would include political and legal advisers, public information officers, liaison officers and translation and interpretation experts. It is essential to effective functioning of the group that all civilian members be fully subordinate to the commander. This is particularly true of the senior civilian, the political adviser who, in many past UN missions, has built his own empire and has gone to his cronies in the UN bureaucracy, behind the back of the military commander.



United Nations photo

humanitarian and reconstruction efforts such as extinguishing oil fires.

- Performing the primary task of supervising a cease-fire until permanent agreements can be reached by the diplomats.

No tasks are foreseen for the observer group inside the aggressor state of Iraq once prisoners have been exchanged. The reconstruction of Iraq will not be within the mission of the peace-keeping operation nor will control of Iraqi rearmament. It will be necessary to maintain a liaison detachment with the Iraqi government in either Basra or Baghdad, or both.

Organization of the Observer Group

The components of the gulf observer group would be a small headquarters in Kuwait City, perhaps with detachments in Basra and Bag-

dad, and liaison officers in Riyadh; observer teams on both sides of the cease-fire lines; small naval patrol and aviation units; and a labor and administrative force from local Arab sources and from the UN Field Service, which would provide clerks, drivers, mechanics, communicators, storemen and finance clerks. Some technical assistance such as categoric services and satellite imagery could be provided to the headquarters from US resources.

The commander of the observer group will report to the Security Council through the secretary-general. This is where problems arise. Historically, the secretary-general has relied on the undersecretary-general for special political affairs and his small staff to manage peace-keeping—with the bumbling results that have been noted. The United States should look closely at removing this reporting filter and at

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having the peacekeepers report to an effective military staff working directly for the Security Council. If this is not possible, the United States must pin its hopes on getting an effective commander who will deal sternly with interference from UN bureaucrats and will not hesitate to go over their heads to the secretary-general himself.

In the gulf scenario, with an Arab-dominated observer group, the commander could be an Egyptian general with a Syrian chief of staff. A small multinational military and civilian staff serving the commander would include political and legal advisers, public information officers, liaison officers and translation and interpretation experts. It is essential to effective functioning of the group that all civilian members be fully subordinate to the commander. This is particularly true of the senior civilian, the political adviser who, in many past UN missions, has built his own empire and has gone to his cronies in the UN bureaucracy, behind the back of the military commander. The practice of selecting a political adviser from among UN officials should be discontinued and a well-respected national diplomat should be selected. As UN commanders such as General Carl C. von Horn have noted, too many UN peacekeeping operations have floundered on the shoals of civilian status, privileges and incompetence. In peacekeeping, the priority must be peace—not bureaucratic power struggles.

The specter of corruption has also haunted past UN peacekeeping missions. Commanders usually have no difficulty in dealing with military

offenders, regardless of nationality. But, because of their mutual protective society approach, it has been difficult, if not impossible, to deal properly with UN civilian offenders. To solve this, all civilians must be clearly under the authority of the commander, who should be able to dismiss offenders on the spot.

Several of the organizational and functional factors influencing the performance of the United Nations as a peacekeeper have been discussed relative to a possible gulf observer group. It is evident that the dysfunctional UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, in its present form, is incapable of taking on the management of this new peacekeeping venture. Substantial changes are necessary, and the United States must get involved and stay involved with the strategic and operational aspects of the gulf force to ensure that the United Nations gets it right.

If the necessary reforms cannot gain the approval of the Security Council, then the United States and its coalition partners must seek a regional peacekeeping option outside the United Nations. Perhaps such a drastic action would force the United Nations to make itself relevant again to the pursuit of world peace. As a triumphant leader of a winning coalition, the United States now has a unique opportunity to begin the reform of UN peacekeeping with the support of its coalition partners. In the long run, a successful reform of UN peacekeeping would be as important to world peace as were the liberation of Kuwait and the destruction of Hussein's war machine. **MR**

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Ethics and Responsibility in Broadcasting


Major Frederick J. Chiaventone, US Army

The Gulf War produced another round in what has been almost continuous skirmishes between the military and the media. The author recounts that the well-reported differences over access and release of information were preceded by the often acrimonious relationship experienced in the Vietnam War and carried forward to US operations in Grenada and Panama. He highlights the efforts of the post-Grenada Sidle Panel and calls for renewed efforts by both institutions to cooperate in their efforts to serve American society.

TWO OF THE most powerful institutions in American society today are the military and the media. Each has within its power the capacity to shape the course of present and future events for the good or ill of the society at large. It is a measure of their efficacy how well and faithfully these two institutions perform their respective functions with a view toward the welfare of the society in which they serve.

This article is intended to examine, in brief, the long and often stormy relationship between these two institutions from its inception through the recent Gulf War in an attempt to determine whether they have honored the trust reposed in them by the American public for that, I feel, is the true measure of their ethical performance.

For more than 200 years, the US military has served to establish, maintain and secure the principles upon which the nation was founded. The US military system has been developed so as to place a minimum burden upon the people, to give the nation a reasonable defense and to reconcile individual liberties with national security.¹ Every man and woman, officer and enlisted, upon entering the armed services, swears a solemn oath—not to the administration in power or to any political party or figure—but “to support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic.”² Charged with the defense and security of the nation, the military plays a vital role in the



courtesy Cable News Network

preservation of the democratic process.

Also serving the democratic process, but in a less conscious fashion, is the Fourth Estate. The members of the press, those who publish the nation's newspapers and magazines, broadcast on the radio or project the images of television into the homes of millions of Americans, serve an equally vital function in providing to the electorate news and other information that is needed to make the decisions required of a self-governing population. Further, and perhaps more important, the press serves as a "watchdog" for the people.³ By observing and reporting on the activities of government institutions (the military among them), and presenting a pluralism of viewpoints, the press reveals or prevents abuses by those institutions of the power entrusted to them by the American public.

The military and the media, one institution pledged to uphold the Constitution, the other operating under its protection for the public

weal, both vital to the survival of our form of government, are institutions apparently in conflict with one another.⁴ For many years, this arrangement has worked to the advantage of the American people. However, the tensions and animosities between the military and the media have grown recently to such proportions as to seriously impair the ability of either to adequately fulfill its obligations to our society.

Some points that must be made at the outset concern the nature of the internal and external controls on each of these institutions—controls which might ensure that their conduct is within acceptable societal values. In the case of the military, these "controls" are most evident in the form of congressional legislation, public laws and international accords (for example, the Geneva and Hague accords), not to mention the various internal regulations, which include the Uniformed Code of Military Justice and applicable Standards of Conduct regulations. Constrained

to operate within this labyrinthine network of codes, laws and regulations, the soldier, even in times of war, is subject to intense scrutiny as to the "propriety" of his conduct and held accountable therefor. Violations certainly do occur, a fact that is not in itself surprising, considering the

Every man and woman, officer and enlisted, upon entering the armed services, swears a solemn oath — not to the administration in power or to any political party or figure—but "to support and defend the Constitution. . . ." Charged with the defense and security of the nation, the military plays a vital role in the preservation of the democratic process.


violent nature of warfare. What is surprising is the fact that, more often than not, the perpetrators of such violations are subject to censure and disciplinary action, often at the hands of their own forces.

In stark contrast to this highly sophisticated and often draconian system of controls, the atmosphere in which the media operate is characterized more by an absence of formal constraints. While most journalists and broadcasters would contend that they subscribe to various ethical standards, few would argue that these "standards" are compulsory, or even enforceable under the constitutional protections afforded by the First Amendment. There is, in fact, considerable latitude for interpretation by the individual as to what constitutes "acceptable" journalistic performance. Indeed, any attempt by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the courts or the government to impose restraints, of any sort, on the media is invariably met with storms of protest from that community. Thus it is apparent from the outset that in judging the ethical performance of the two institutions in question, one must make allowances for the fact that they are not equally matched in mechanisms for monitoring that performance.

A look at several cases is instructive. While mankind has engaged in the systematic and deliberate destruction of his own species since before the dawn of civilization, it has only been within the past 140 years that any organized efforts were made on a regular basis by the media to cover the activities of men at war. It has long been recognized that "the emotional environment of warfare has always been compelling," drawing most men under its spell.⁵ Reportage of combat, however, was for centuries accomplished only through the compilation of various second- and third-hand accounts, primarily for inclusion in official state histories.⁶ It was only in the first half of the 19th century that the media began to take a serious and contemporary interest in warfare.

A great many factors contributed to the emergence of the war correspondent, not least of which were the byproducts of the Industrial Revolution; an increasingly urbanized, literate and sophisticated population leading increasingly dehumanized lives. The attraction of war for the reading public has been widely speculated upon, but is probably best described by J. Glenn Gray (1970) and William Broyles (1984) when they speak of the "lust of the eye" and the natural hunger of humans to witness the novel, the bizarre, the spectacular as a form of release from the mundanity of everyday existence. Even the eminent H.D. Lasswell acknowledged this phenomenon, noting that "so deep is the fascination in war and all things pertaining to it . . . that a paper has only to be able to put up on its placard A GREAT BATTLE for sales to mount up."⁷

It was fortuitous for newspaper publishers that, in the mid-19th century, warfare still retained, at least superficially, much of the spectacular pageantry with which the martial tradition had long been associated in the popular imagination. The word pictures of the special correspondents conjured up for the public images of battlefields resplendent with plumed cavalry, sunlight glittering on lance points and gleaming bayonets, with valiant and colorfully uniformed hosts moving inexorably into the storm of combat. These images apparently exerted a remarkable,



An Air Force officer answers media questions on the crash of a military jet into an Indianapolis motel, 20 October 1987.

Those who publish the nation's newspapers and magazines, broadcast on the radio or project the images of television into the homes of millions of Americans, serve an equally vital function in providing to the electorate news and other information that is needed to make the decisions required of a self-governing population.

romantic attraction for the public. Perhaps they filled a deep and unspoken need for a taste of the exotic and colorful in counterpoint to the drab realities of industrializing nations. Whatever the rationale, newspaper publishers recognized the sales potential in such matters and rushed to capitalize on them.

The *Times* of London, almost inadvertently, sent to the Crimea in 1857 a flamboyant Irish adventurer by the name of William Howard Russell, with instructions to report back on the activities of French and British forces there in their campaign against the Turks and Russians. The result of this decision was the appearance in *The Times* of reports on the war, which galvanized the interest of the British public and sent that paper's circulation figures soaring.⁸ Rushing to follow the example of *The Times*, other periodicals in England sent a spate of "special correspondents" to cover the war there and were soon enamored of the salability of the resulting "copy."

While there can be little doubt as to the motivations of the newspapers for reporting on

warfare—certainly it was "newsworthy" but more so because it was also "profitable"—there was nothing inherently "wrong" in their decision to do so. Certainly, the British taxpayer had a legitimate interest in the foreign policy of his nation (for which he was paying) and there was little danger that the discussion of the combat in the newspapers would seriously affect the outcome of the conflict to the detriment of the nation. On the contrary, the reports of Russell and his colleagues actually contributed to the interests of the nation by pointing out serious deficiencies in the administration of the armies in the field. Newspaper reports castigating the high command for their inept handling of a campaign

that resulted in the deaths of more soldiers from disease and inadequate medical care raised a furor at home and led to much needed military reforms and the formation of an organization that would evolve into the International Red Cross. Thus it was that the media, in performing their

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function, indeed served the society in which they existed, and that performance, even in retrospect, can be adjudged as having been fundamental; justified.

The first serious questions as to what were appropriate standards for media coverage of warfare would not arise until the American Civil War. By the time the United States had its first experience with the media coverage of military topics, the development of the telegraph had surfaced to blur the distinctions between what was "proper" or "improper" for inclusion in daily newspaper reports.

For senior commanders of both the Federal and Confederate forces, the activities of the media were disturbing, not so much in questions of accuracy or even intent (although there were instances where both of these issues were in questions), but primarily over the utility of the newspaper reports to hostile intelligence services. With the ability of reporters to relay their copy to the home office almost instantaneously by electrical means, the information thus available for publication (particularly tactical information) was in many cases known both to the public and the enemy's spies before the armies in the field could act on it. Union generals William T.

Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant both seriously considered resigning their posts, feeling that the proclivity of the press for speculation on or revealing the plans of their armies seriously threatened the success of those plans and thus endangered the struggle for the preservation of the Union.¹⁰ Confederate general Robert E. Lee also was distracted by the occasional indiscretions (or overexhuberance) of the press and complained vigorously to the Confederate secretary of war, saying "... all such publications are injurious to us. We have difficulties enough interposed by our enemies without having them augmented by our friends."¹¹

Although neither side would make a serious effort at controlling the activities of the press, there was considerable debate as to whether the good of the public was indeed well-served by the publication of information which, although certainly newsworthy, could endanger the success of military operations and thus, the ultimate survival of the society within which the public existed. These apparent conflicts of interest, however heated during the war, seemed to vanish in the boisterous and expansionist mood of the country in the years following the Civil War. Whatever their differences, the media and the military entered a phase wherein both would exist in a spirit of hearty good fellowship.

The increasingly competitive marketplace from the 1870s through the end of the century lent itself readily to a style of journalism that thrived on the sensational and the lurid—topics nowhere so evident as in military campaigns.¹²

Thus, the military and the media shared a strangely symbiotic relationship wherein the military enjoyed the publicity and enhanced public esteem that correspondents provided, and the media enjoyed the expanded circulation and profits that invariably resulted from coverage of military campaigns involving gunsmoke and bloodshed.

Nowhere in our history is this tendency so blatantly obvious as in the role of the media in America's entrance and participation in the "splendid little war" with Spain in 1898. Engaged in a furious no-holds-barred circulation

drive, the fierce competition between the principal "yellow journals" of New York City, William Randolph Hearst's *Journal* and Joseph Pulitzer's *World*, manifested itself in a shameless campaign to stir

up a war fever in the American public. Said Edwin L. Godkin, a leading journalist of the Nation, "Nothing so disgraceful as the behavior of . . . these newspapers . . . has ever been known in the history of American journalism."¹³


What had particularly enraged Godkin was the decision by the *Journal* to publish the private correspondence of a Spanish diplomat, which contained derogatory references to President William McKinley. The purloined letter in question was published with the anticipation that its public debut would create such a public furor as to render futile any subsequent efforts to reach a peaceful resolution of differences between the potential belligerents.

Hearst, in anticipation of the results of his efforts, had dispatched the celebrated Western artist Frederic Remington to Cuba to cover the inevitable hostilities. Languishing in Cuba, the bored Remington had cabled Hearst, asking to be recalled as he did not think there would be a war. Hearst responded with a curt cable stating, "REMAIN IN CUBA—STOP—YOU FURNISH PICTURES I WILL FURNISH WAR—STOP."¹⁴

Whether or not the activities of journalists had any real impact on the final decision to fight what has since been recognized as a useless and wholly avoidable war is really immaterial. What was particularly disturbing was the attitude of the media that they not only could, but should, actively intervene in the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

As America entered the 20th century, the role

The media, although unwillingly at first, acceded to the demands of the government and lent its eventual full support to a campaign of propaganda and censorship directed at dehumanizing the enemy and exhorting the public to support a grand crusade for democracy. . . . [News served] the "higher purpose" of preserving the nation and, by extension, civilization from the depredations of Imperial Germany.



of the media in the conduct of foreign policy, particularly with regard to military operations, would experience a metamorphosis of the first order. The Industrial Revolution's swelling urban centers tended also to release manpower from subsistence activities and make that manpower available for military operations. It was during this period that the French Revolution concept of the "nation in arms" was replaced with the concept of the "nation at war."¹⁵ The total resources of nations were harnessed to support what Clausewitz described as the "continuation of politics by other means." President Wilson, stating that "It is not an army that we must shape and train for war. It is a nation," recognized that to motivate a modern nation for participation in the totality of mechanized war would require the full attentions not only of the military but of those who shaped public opinion.¹⁶

Having witnessed the plight of the European nations engaged in World War I, the US government knew that the only way the will of the isolationist American public could be steeled to en-

sure the unprecedented sacrifices that would be required to participate in the horrendous struggle was through a concerted effort to convince Americans of the justice of that cause. To this end, the organs of mass communication were suborned. Whatever our views of the

The Times of London, almost inadvertently sent to the Crimea in 1857 a flamboyant Irish adventurer by the name of William Howard Russell, with instructions to report back on the activities of French and British forces there in their campaign against the Turks and Russians. . . . [His] reports on the war . . . galvanized the interest of the British public and sent that paper's circulation figures soaring.

"necessity" of World War I in retrospect, the fact remains that in the context of the times, many felt that it was indeed a struggle for the survival of the Western democracies and, as such, demanded that certain sacrifices be made. The media, although unwillingly at first, acceded to the demands of the government and lent their eventual full support to a campaign of propaganda and censorship directed at dehumanizing the enemy and exhorting the public to support a grand crusade for democracy. It was in this context that news became "a weapon in the arsenal of war" and such concepts as truth and objectivity were subjugated to the "higher purpose" of preserving the nation and, by extension, civilization from the depredations of Imperial Germany.¹⁷

In this pattern that would continue through World War II and in Korea, the media voluntarily subordinated themselves to the "national interests." Rather than serving the public in their idealized roles as observers and watchdogs of the government, the media became parties to or active participants in the activities of the government. The question naturally arises as to whether this tendency on the part of the media was "correct," to which one can only respond that in the context of the times, those who engaged in

such practices may well have believed that it was "necessary."

While this was almost certainly a matter of expediency in some cases (journalists being reluctant to 'rock the boat' and thus risk losing the opportunity to observe and report on events of earth-shattering significance), media performance during this period cannot be attributed solely to economic self-interest. It must be conceded that a great many journalists, publishers, editors, film makers and broadcasters sincerely believed that the nation was engaged in a great struggle for survival and that any dangers posed by the voluntary (albeit temporary) forfeiture of constitutional guarantees (in the case of censorship), or objectivity (in the case of propaganda), were far outweighed by the specter of the alternative—subjugation of all media activities by brutal totalitarian governments. However Machiavellian such rationales must appear in hindsight, it is the height of hubris to attempt to apply subjective judgments about the morality of such activities from the relative comfort and safety of the present day.

Indeed, the question of the propriety of media practices in wartime is one of relatively recent origin, stemming, appropriately enough, from the national trauma of the Vietnam War era. In nearly every previous war, neither the public nor the military (beyond natural concerns for tactical security) ever seriously questioned whether the activities of the media were proper in the light of the nation's commitment to the ongoing struggle. In Vietnam, however, neither the goals and objectives of the nation nor the nature of the enemy was ever clearly delineated or understood. It was in this climate of uncertainty that many Americans began to question the efficacy and justice of the nation's involvement in Southeast Asia.

When the American commitment in Vietnam had been in its initial phase, news coverage of that commitment had been dominated by bureau chiefs and correspondents who had considerable experience with both the military and warfare in general. While it may be unduly harsh to imply that these individuals were co-opted by

A CBS newsman interviewing a Marine corporal, 11 August 1966.



News coverage [in Vietnam] had been dominated by bureau chiefs and correspondents who had considerable experience with both the military and warfare in general. . . . [As] America's stakes in the conflict escalated. . . this "corps" of journalists was augmented by an influx of younger, less experienced reporters . . . [who] tended to exercise considerably more circumspection than their older colleagues.

the military, it is probably not incorrect to assume that by dint of long association in combat, they were less inclined to be critical of individuals and units that they had come to know, trust and respect. As the war continued and America's stakes in the conflict escalated in terms of men and material resources, this "corps" of journalists was augmented by an influx of younger, less experienced reporters. These younger journalists, wishing to acquit themselves well, tended to exercise considerably more circumspection than their older colleagues when it came to accepting the "official" version of history as it happened. Perhaps more energetic or idealistic, they were also more aggressive in getting out to see what was going on, verifying leads, collecting their own information and reporting their own impressions.

Further complicating matters was the nature of the war itself, with no discernible "frontline" and a native population which was itself riven by internal strife. With Buddhists, Catholics and rival political and military factions all competing

vigorously with each other for the "hearts and minds" of the people and the government backed by the United States riddled with evidence of corruption, it was not the clear-cut war of communist aggression the administration had portrayed to the public at home. Thus, the optimistic and generally positive pronouncements of the administration appeared, quite understandably, to be at odds with the impressions of chaos, which seemed to characterize daily life in a country at war.

After the Battle of Ap Bac in 1963, the US government announced a stunning victory by forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). When reporters who had witnessed the engagement and spoken to US military advisers on the scene described the action for the debacle it was, the Kennedy Administration attempted to take action to censure those journalists—among them David Halberstam.¹⁸ It was

apparently this attempt to manipulate the media, however unsuccessful, that resulted in the creation of a "credibility gap," which grew ever wider and culminated with the Tet Offensive of 1968. Correspondents took increasingly skeptical views of administration pronouncements on

Tactical information was in many cases known both to the public and the enemy's spies before the armies in the field could act on it. Union generals Sherman and Grant both seriously considered resigning their posts, fearing that the proximity of the press for speculation on or revealing the plans of their armies seriously threatened the struggle for the preservation of the Union.

the conduct of the war and eventually on the rationale for US involvement in that war. It was unfortunate for the military that as the most visible representatives of government policy, they were ideally placed for the most intense scrutiny by the media.

In January and February 1968, following a series of announcements by General William Westmoreland stressing the positive results of the US effort to date, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) irregulars launched a massive assault on the population centers of South Vietnam. Although this was a military debacle for the NVA and the VC, it did not appear to be the action of an enemy who was all but defeated—apparently the example of the Nazi's Ardennes Offensive of 1944 did not spring to mind.¹⁹ To the US media, Tet was perceived as an American and South Vietnamese defeat and that was the impression relayed to the American public. But it is not in the actual reporting of the Tet Offensive that the question of ethics arises, but in the aftermath. Peter Braestrup, Saigon bureau chief for the *Washington Post*, in a massive 1977 study of the coverage of the Tet Offensive, concluded that:

"The media tended to leave the shock and

confusion of early February as the final impression of Tet, and thus as a framework for news judgment and public debate at home. At Tet, the press shouted that the patient was dying, then weeks later began to whisper that somehow he seemed to be recovering...whispers apparently not heard amid the clamorous domestic reaction to the initial shouts."²⁰

More disturbing yet was the fact that NBC News recognized that coverage had been misleading and yet, rather than produce a follow-up to "set the record straight," made a conscious decision to let it go because, "... Tet was already established in the public's mind as a defeat ... therefore it was an American defeat."²¹ The coverage of Tet seems to have begun a trend in American reporting of the war in Vietnam that, to this day, leaves serious scars on the American psyche. Even members of the media are deeply divided in their opinions of their coverage of the war after Tet.

On the one hand are those such as David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan and Frances FitzGerald, who feel that they were initially too uncritical of the war and failed to ask the right questions early enough to prevent its widening.²² On the other hand, there are those journalists who, perhaps less vocal, agonize over their own work, feeling that they were perhaps unjustifiably critical of the US role in Vietnam. Robert Elegant has noted the reactions of many of these, including West German Uwe Siemon-Netto, who is haunted by the fact that having witnessed scores of atrocities by VC irregulars, consciously ignored them preferring to seek out and report on what he admits were rarer instances of American misdeeds.²³ Elegant recounts an incident in his own experience where he witnessed a US officer ordering an attack on enemy soldiers aborted because they were using women and children as shields. "Neither my colleague nor myself" said Elegant "thought the incident worth reporting ... [but] if the 9th Division had killed the civilians we would have filed copiously".²⁴

What is one to make of the soul-searching statement made by Eddie Adams (the photographer who took the picture of South Vietnamese

Police General Loan shooting a VC sapper through the head on a Saigon street) who says now that he misled the American public by not telling the whole story—that the VC sapper had minutes before been caught in the act of murdering Loan's best friend and family—thus allowing the public to form its own judgments about the incident.²⁵ What appeared to the American public as an incredibly cold-blooded act (which would later be used to characterize the corrupt nature of the war effort) turns out in reality to have been the passionate and understandable reaction of a man blinded by grief and anger.

Certainly the act of killing the VC sapper was wrong, even under the laws of war, but how much more "right" was the decision to publish half the story? What moral judgments can be applied to the participants in the struggle for South Vietnam? Were the media "wrong" in believing, as they initially did, that the US commitment to South Vietnam was justified? Were the soldiers who executed government policy, as they were bound by oath to do, "wrong" in not refusing to fight a war which some felt was immoral? (Although I have yet to find a war that was not in some measure immoral, however necessary). What about the media coverage of the war after the Tet Offensive? Was it "morally correct" that, between 16 September and 4 November 1968, of 188 network news reports (ABC, CBS and NBC) on the war, 188 were editorially against the administration's commitment to South Vietnam?²⁶

It is difficult to speculate on the tangible impact of media coverage of the war. There are opposing schools of thought as to whether it did or did not influence the decision to end the war as it was ended, but what is the measure of the morality of the attempt to influence the course of that war? Were journalists qualified to judge the justice of the cause? What of the fact that "... as late as 1968, not one American reporter in Vietnam could speak the language. Consequently, most correspondents were isolated from the Vietnamese, their culture, and their problems?"²⁷ Were the members of the media qualified to comment on the conduct of the war? Rob-

ert Elegant, himself a reporter in Vietnam, was appalled by the fact that his fellow journalists:

"... knew little about war in general from either experience of study—and less about the theory or practice of guerrilla war. They were untutored not only in languages, but also in history, culture, ethnography, and the economics of Indo-China . . . untroubled by acquaintance with Marxist theory or practice . . . hazy about the international balance of power, they were incapable of covering effectively a conflict involving all these elements."²⁸

If the ethical measure of an action is its positive benefits for society (or perhaps the individual), then who benefited from military actions in Vietnam and their coverage in the media? In the short run, probably none of the principal actors; the Vietnamese (North and South), the Laotian, Cambodians, Americans, all were to suffer

"[Reporters in Vietnam] knew little about war in general . . . and less about the theory or practice of guerrilla war. They were untutored not only in languages, but also in history, culture, ethnography, and the economics of Indo-China . . . untroubled by acquaintance with Marxist theory or practice . . . hazy about the international balance of power, they were incapable of covering effectively a conflict involving all these elements."

in one form or another for years to come. And in the United States specifically, the seemingly endless orgy of guilt, self-doubt and angry recriminations did nothing to enhance the reputations of and public confidence in either the military or the media. Military-media relations had entered a dark age, which probably reached its nadir at the time of Operation Urgent Fury.

Admiral Joseph Metcalf's decision to exclude the media from the initial phases of the Grenada operation resulted in a figurative firestorm in the press. Charges of censorship and arrogance were met with countercharges of irresponsibility and arrogance, and the two institutions found them-

selves in warring camps, more bitterly opposed than ever. The one bright spot in this unpleasant interlude was the formation of the Sidle Commission—a joint panel of military officers and retired journalists charged by the secretary of defense with examining the degraded state of military-media relations, and proposing some workable solutions to the dilemma. While many adherents, on both sides, were either suspicious or dismissive of the work done by this group, the result was akin to a productive marriage counseling session. At the very least, a dialogue was initiated. Problems were recognized and considerable effort made to craft some acceptable compromises.

The most significant development was the recommendation for a system of "press pooling" which, it was hoped, would ensure both timely press coverage of military actions while at the same time preserving operational security. Neither institution was entirely enamored of the idea and there were, naturally enough, difficulties in getting the system to work. In practice runs, the military would complain that the press representatives failed to show up for deployments or "blew security," while the press would retort that the military tended to mess up transportation arrangements or tried to herd the press around in nice, manageable groups. There were sufficient gripes to go around for everyone. By the time of Operation *Just Cause* in Panama, many of these "bugs" remained in the system and neither side was wholly satisfied with the performance of the other. But there was progress.

Some interesting developments were surfacing. For one, the attitude of journalists toward military personnel appeared to have softened appreciably. Even as strong a personality as CBS' Dan Rather tended to exhibit an understanding and appreciation of the professionalism and dedication of the individual soldier in his reportage.²⁹ There was also evidence that the military, although it had a way to go, was acquiring more sophistication in its ability to interact with media representatives. Yes, there were some mistakes (there always are), but the media found the military to be more cooperative than was pre-

viously the case. The military, for its part, immediately responded to media charges of "news management" with an internal review of procedures. The Hoffmann Report, released in March following the Panama operation, was indeed critical of Pentagon procedures for ensuring press access and produced some 17 recommendations for improving that performance in future operations.³⁰

While it is difficult to surmise what may have transpired in media staff meetings nationwide, there appears to have been little reciprocal effort on the part of the press to critique its own performance during *Just Cause*. And this, if an accurate assumption, is regrettable. The American public could not be well-served by this unconscious abrogation of responsibility. The results were apparent during *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, when the military seemed to be more adroit at managing the press than the press was at reporting it.

As with *Urgent Fury* and *Just Cause*, there was no dearth of voices of protest from among the rank and file of the press corps. There were the inevitable charges that the military had crafted a strategy to consciously exclude the press.³¹ Speculation about military "control" of the media prompted the question, "What are they trying to hide?" which must inevitably lead to a "breakdown in home-front confidence . . ."³² Not surprisingly, media surveys of the American public found that sympathy for the press was in acutely short supply. As Mary Mander indicated in an article, the military appears to have learned from its past mistakes and "demonstrated with remarkable unity of purpose and professional commitment an understanding of the media as an essential component in the successful conduct of the war."³³

It is only natural for many in the profession of arms to reflect on our media-related performance in the Gulf War with a justifiable sense of pride. The military acquitted itself well, the war was won rapidly and with minimal friendly loss, the American public was informed of what the Armed Forces were doing, and the American public backed our efforts unstintingly. If, as Mary

Mander asserted, information has become an essential component in the successful conduct of war, then the military was indeed obligated to understand and develop skill in utilizing that component as a combat multiplier. In the case of the Gulf War, the military indeed honored the trust reposed in them by the American public.

As to the role of the media, even the most cynical of soldiers would have to admit that for all their whining and posturing, the media did a credible job in informing the American public of the performance by the Armed Forces. National will was assured, soldiers' dedication and sacrifice were recognized and lauded, and the reputation of the military enhanced visibly. Without the presence of the media, these developments would not have come to pass. The value of the media is thus manifest.

The fact that some of the information skills employed by the military required a circumvention or outright thwarting of some of the efforts of the press corps should be no cause for gloating or overweening self-satisfaction. Rather, the fact that the media did not perform in some instances as well as they could, or should have, is cause for some concern. No, the media did not function as well as they might. Yes, there were probably instances where the military's performance or attitudes did not help matters—an Air Force briefer's blunt expression of personal distaste for the 4th Estate leaps to mind.

But, on the whole, the media will have to shoulder much of the responsibility for their own ineptitude. Unlike the military, the media seem to have failed to recognize and adapt to an environment in which their own technology has changed so radically. In his commentary in *Newsweek*, veteran reporter Walter Cronkite insisted that the image of Iraqi commanders monitoring CNN live was no more than science fiction and yet the image proved to be terribly accurate.³⁴ It should be disturbing when a profession fails to recognize the power of its own technology.

To dwell at length on the failures of the media in the Gulf War is not, however, the point of this article. I simply note that neither the military nor the media are flawless in leadership, education,

training, performance or managerial practices. There have been serious mistakes by all concerned. Both institutions should recognize and freely admit these errors and learn from them.

Again, it is regrettable that military personnel seem much more willing to engage in the necessary introspection than do their media counterparts. The tendency of some of the more vocal

The one bright spot [after Grenada] was the formation of a joint panel of military officers and retired journalists charged by the secretary of defense with examining the degraded state of military-media relations, and proposing some workable solutions to the dilemma [It recommended] a system of "press pooling" which, it was hoped, would ensure both timely press coverage of military actions while at the same time preserving operational security.

media pundits is to rail against the draconian repression of military censors, invoke the First Amendment, allude darkly to whispered conspiracy theories and generally look to place the blame anywhere but at their own doorsteps for a public trust neglected. It is an unfortunate and unproductive approach, and unworthy of a mature profession. For members of the military to encourage this practice through ridicule, derision or a "holier than thou" attitude would be equally unprofessional.

On a brighter note, however, the more vocal pundits alluded to, are not necessarily in the majority. There are many indications that the media, as a whole, tried to do a good job, recognized their errors as they were pointed out and did, indeed, try to learn from them. Many will recall, for example, how media anchormen quickly comprehended the fire adjustment value to the Iraqis of live coverage of Scud missile attacks and adopted a more guarded approach to reporting them. This was a responsible and ethical tack and should be recognized as such. It indicates that there is indeed hope for the future of military-media relations. It is a hope that we

can and should nurture and encourage.

As a final note, the fact that there is some friction between the military and the media is not necessarily bad. We in the military need an honest broker, a means as Robert Burns would say "to see ourselves as others see us." The media can help us to recognize our flaws and correct them, to become better at executing our public trust. We need the media and many in the military now recognize that fact. Their ability to better fill this role is, to some extent, dependent not only on the willingness of the media to recognize and correct their own shortfalls, but also on our willingness to help them do this. Rather than distance ourselves from the media, we must make a conscious and concerted effort to bridge the gap between "us" and "them." If our two institutions are to well and faithfully perform our functions with a view toward the welfare of American society, then we have an obligation to develop a healthy working relationship between us. It seems particularly appropriate to conclude with an extract from the final comments section

of the Sidle Commission Panel Report:

"An adversarial—perhaps politely critical would be a better term—relationship between the media and the government, including the military, is healthy and helps guarantee that both institutions do a good job. However, this relationship must not become antagonistic—an 'us versus them' relationship. The appropriate media role in relation to the government has been summarized partly as being neither that of a lap dog nor an attack dog, but rather, a watch dog. Mutual antagonism and distrust are not in the best interests of the media, the military, or the American public.

In the final analysis, no statement of principles, policies or procedures, no matter how carefully crafted, can guarantee the desired results because they have to be carried out by people—the people in the military and the people in the media. So it is the good will of the people involved, their spirit, their genuine efforts to do the job for the benefit of the United States, on which a civil and fruitful relationship hinges."³⁴ **MR**

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Preparing **SELF** for **COMBAT**

Major Fred V. Flynn Jr., US Army

This article delves into an often ignored aspect of leadership, the preparation that an individual leader must do to be ready to lead in combat. The author offers that senior leaders must prepare physically, mentally and spiritually for the demands of leadership on the battlefield. A leader's preparation of "self," he concludes, is as important as preparation of units.

Covering Force Battle at Dawn

0401. Lieutenant Colonel Joe Thurman sat up slowly from a fitful sleep in the red light of Headquarters (HQ) 66, not wanting to open his eyes. His wrist watch was still beeping as it announced stand-to. His first thought was of his family back in Germany . . . he hoped they were OK. The squadron had been alerted as usual by a phone call at "O-dark-thirty," and had rolled out immediately with no time for goodbyes.

His next thought was one that forever plagues soldiers before going into battle. "God, please help me and my men today. I hope I'm ready." Thurman was no "Bible thumper," but as of late, he felt the need to ask for help. He had only been in command of the 2d Squadron of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for five months, and prebattle jitters had him question-

ing himself momentarily.

It was still cold and dark as Thurman made his way toward the squadron tactical operations center (TOC). He rubbed his eyes, trying to wake up. His mouth was dry and tasted of morning breath. He licked his lips, cleared his throat and tried to utter a few words just to make sure he could sound authoritative when he made his entrance into the TOC. The first major chore of the day, though, was trying to get in.

"The guy who designed all of the flaps for the track extension could not have been a soldier," he said to himself. He struggled with one flap, then another, and yet another as he finally stumbled in. The white light hurt his eyes, but his eyes weren't the problem. His back and neck were still knotted up from sleeping on the troop seat of HQ 66.

"Morn'n, sir!" said Major Pete Franks, the squadron S3 (operations and training officer).

"Morn'n, Pete. We got comms with everybody?" asked Thurman, as he removed his helmet and rubbed the back of his stiff neck. His

The day of deployment, however, is not the time to start this critical, soul-searching process. How often does a leader rush into his house at the last minute, throw some TA-50 together, yell for more socks and . . . run out the door only to leave the family and himself feeling emotionally unsettled?

protective mask had not made a good pillow, and too much college football 18 years earlier had not helped the situation either.

"Yes, sir. Everybody. Warlord has digital with all FIST elements, and we have good comms with Blackhorse VI. Fox III is even up and talking today. Captain Mike Lynd must have lit a fire under him yesterday for not staying in the net. He has really turned that unit around. He's a good man, sir."

Thurman nodded. Lynd had taken command of Fox Troop less than one year ago after the old commander had been relieved. Lynd was not afraid of hard work, and the troops loved him. As a result, his cavalry troop was the most combat-ready unit in the squadron, and it was eager for battle.

"The Fox is ready," boasted Thurman. "Those boys will do well."

"Scouts reporting anything yet?" asked the squadron commander as he attempted to focus on the situation map.

"No, sir. Not yet. Well, we did get one report from Fox III about an hour ago. His scouts were dismounted and well forward occupying an observation post. They heard a lot of vehicles cranking piecemeal. Guess the bad guys' stand-to procedures ain't what they should be."

Thurman smiled, knowing that stand-to was difficult to perform even in the best of units. People just don't like to get up in the morning.

Suddenly, the radio cracked:

"Battle III, this is Fox VI. Lead Iraqi elements just crossed the border, and they're moving due south into engagement area (EA) Margie. Estimated time of arrival zero-five Mikes, over."

Fox VI was obviously excited. Franks moved quickly to the radio.

"FOX VI, this is Battle III. Roger. Stand by."

Thurman smiled again and said, "Let's do it, III. Call howitzer battery and give them a stand-by to fire," as he picked up the microphone to the other radio, took a deep breath and said, "Blackhorse VI, this is Battle VI, over."

"Blackhorse VI, over."

Somehow, when Blackhorse VI talked, it made the blood pump a little faster. Colonel Dan Brookshire had been playing this covering force game for many years. He knew his job, and no one ever questioned his will to close with and kill the enemy. He was good.

"This is Battle VI. Recon elements of the Iraqi forces just crossed the border and are headed into EA Margie. Request permission to engage with the Warlord element, over."

Brookshire smiled. His squadron commander was thinking clearly. Engage the enemy at the maximum possible range with artillery before ever firing a main gun round from the desert floor.

"Battle VI, this is Blackhorse VI. Roger. (pause) Leave some angry iron lay'n there, Thurm. Over."

"This is Battle VI. Roger. Engaging now. Out. God, it's actually happening. The war is about to start. I hope I'm ready. I hope my family is OK . . . so many things I should have said and done before I deployed, but no time to think about that now . . ."

"Warlord VI, this is Battle VI . . ."

What's This All About, Alfie?

Volumes have been written on the subject of preparing units for combat, and rightfully so as this is always the number one priority in peacetime. The focus of this article, however, is not on the unit but the senior leader. The purpose here is to emphasize that the senior leader should devote time and effort to preparing himself for



2d Armored Division Bradley's conducting gunnery training at Fort Hood, Texas, 1969.

Each leader needs to make the mental transition from peace to war before deploying to a combat zone. The bulk of a soldier's time is spent living and training in a peacetime environment. As a result, some artificialities are trained into the way he does business. These can be carried over into the combat zone if he does not make the mental transition from peace to war.

combat. This process involves examining the mental, physical and spiritual aspects of his daily life. By taking the time to explore these areas, the senior leader will better know himself and, as a result, will be more capable of leading others in combat. This important concept, by no mistake, is the first principle of leadership discussed in US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*.

"Through self-evaluation a leader or commander is able to recognize his strengths and weaknesses in order to determine his particular capabilities and limitations. As a result, he can take specific actions to further develop his strengths and work on correcting his weaknesses. This process enhances self-confidence as well as facilitates the ability to lead and command effectively at succeeding higher levels of responsibility."²

The day of deployment, however, is not the time to start this critical, soul-searching process. How often does a leader rush into his house at the last minute, throw some TA-50 together, yell for more socks and T-shirts, have a fuss with his wife and then run out the door only to leave the family and himself feeling emotionally unsettled? If a senior leader is to effectively prepare himself for combat leadership, he should take

the time before emergencies to examine the mental, physical and spiritual aspects of his day-to-day life.

Mental Preparation

So, how does one prepare himself mentally? There are three considerations in mental preparation: technical and tactical proficiency, combat leadership style and fear of combat.

First, it is important for a leader to be technically and tactically proficient. If a senior leader is not proficient, his men will quickly see this and will not risk their lives for him. "Good old boys" are great on the softball field, but "good old boys" who do not know how to fight and survive on the battlefield will not be respected, nor will they be followed.

Siegfried Sassoon makes this point well in his book, *The Memoirs of George Sherston*, about a World War I British infantry officer on the Western Front. In discussing Lieutenant Colonel Kinjack, the author says, "Personal charm was not his strong point, and he has made no pretention to it. He was aggressive and blatant, but he knew his job, and for that we respected him and were grateful."³

Yes, Kinjack knew his job. He was technically and tactically proficient. But, how did he acquire

these skills and thereby earn the respect of his men? Likewise, how does a senior leader today acquire these skills? Technical and tactical skills are taught in all Army schools, and they are trained at unit level. But, they really become a part of the leader through professional reading

Technical and tactical skills are taught in all Army schools, and they are trained at unit level. But, they really become a part of the leader through professional reading and personal study. This self-development reinforces schooling and operational experiences.

and personal study. This self-development reinforces schooling and operational experiences. It also provides the leader with a broader spectrum of views, thereby enhancing his technical proficiency.

Retired General Carl E. Vuono former Army Chief of Staff, makes the following point about proficiency.

"The Army has an excellent record of developing competence at all levels. Through each of the three pillars of our leader development program—through our schools, operational experience and self-development—we are creating legions of competent, confident leaders who are at the very foundation of our trained and ready Army. Today, we have the most tactically and technically proficient leaders our nation has ever fielded."⁴

As clearly pointed out by Vuono, there is no substitute for a leader's knowing his job. Technical and tactical proficiency builds self-confidence, and this confidence is quickly perceived and appreciated by his men. Soldiers will follow their commander if he knows his job and if he properly leads them.

Knowing how to lead men in combat is the second consideration in mentally preparing oneself. Just as the nation and the Army must undergo a transition from peace to war, so must the mind-set and the leadership style of a soldier.

No, the suggestion is not that a leader should separate peacetime and wartime leadership styles. However, the suggestion is that each leader needs to make the mental transition from peace to war before deploying to a combat zone.

The bulk of a soldier's time is spent living and training in a peacetime environment. As a result, some artificialities are trained into the way he does business. These can be carried over into the combat zone if he does not make the mental transition from peace to war. Retired Admiral Joseph Metcalf also observed this during his command of the Grenada invasion.

One day, while on board his command and control ship, he saw an Army helicopter circling overhead. It was severely damaged and running low on fuel as it landed on the deck of his ship. The pilot, an Army CWO 4, jumped out and said, "I need fuel, so I can get back into the fight." The crew on board the Navy ship was reluctant to give fuel to an Army helicopter, but finally did so after much debate and wasted time.

As the pilot attempted to lift off and get back to the business of fighting a war, a Navy limited-duty officer stopped him and said, "You have got to sign for the fuel." At this point, Metcalf saw the need to conduct an on-the-spot "attitude adjustment" session with his people.⁵

Metcalf's point was a simple one. Some of his people had not made the transition from the peacetime requirement of accounting for fuel to the wartime requirement of getting the job done quickly. The letter of the law is important in peacetime, but the spirit of the law is absolutely essential in combat. The spirit of the law says to get the job done as quickly, safely and efficiently as possible in order to accomplish the mission and save lives.⁶

Another point needs to be made concerning the transition from peace to war. In peacetime, perfection, or near perfection, is often the unstated goal of many senior leaders. Yet, one should not expect perfection during the confused times of battle. In the words of Retired Lieutenant General Gerald T. Bartlett, when he was commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), Fort Lea-

venworth, Kansas:

"Perfection is the enemy of 'good enough' on the battlefield. In war, 'good enough' is the best you can hope to achieve. Perfection is not a possibility because there is always a guy on the other side trying to ensure confusion in your plan. Do not drive yourself, or your men, crazy trying to achieve the impossible."⁷

Retired Major General John A. Lejeune, Marine Corps, also addressed this issue of making the transition from a peacetime leadership style to a wartime leadership style. He observed that, in peacetime, some senior leaders do not get "down in the mud" with their troops. It is just not in their nature to do this. But, in wartime, this is not an option.

"Your men must see that you share their every hardship. The study of leadership involves, therefore, first of all a study of human nature. One must put himself in the place of those whom he would lead; he must have a full understanding of their thoughts, their attitudes, their emotions, their aspirations, and their fears."⁸

What? Their fears? Lejeune must have made a mistake. Marines do not fear anything, or do they? Lejeune was a wise and honest man. He fully understood the human dimension of fear in combat which is the third and final consideration in mental preparation.

So, how does a soldier prepare himself to face fear? Lieutenant Colonel Pete Kindsvatter wrote an excellent leadership article on this very issue titled *Cowards, Comrades and Killer Angels: The Soldier in Literature*. It is written from the heart by a man who "walks the talk" daily.⁹ The article addresses fear in combat, how it affects soldiers and the burden of leadership. Finally, Kindsvatter identifies coping mechanisms for dealing with fear.

Fear and its effect on soldiers is a concern to every leader. It was even a concern to Audie Murphy, the most highly decorated soldier of World War II. Murphy spent some 400 days in the front lines and received 33 military awards, citations and decorations for his bravery.¹⁰ Unfortunately, the companion to bravery is often fear, and such was the case with Murphy.

Audie
Murphy



Audie Murphy . . . spent some 400 days in the front lines and received 33 military awards, citations and decorations for his bravery. Unfortunately, the companion to bravery is often fear, and such was the case with Murphy. He states that death, dismemberment and the failure to measure up to the expectations of the men around him were common anxieties.

He states that death, dismemberment and the failure to measure up to the expectations of the men around him were common anxieties. Even two decades after the war, Murphy was still plagued by his fears in the form of nightmares.¹¹

The point here is that fear is normal, and it should be expected in combat. Soldiers should not feel that they are suffering from cowardice just because they are experiencing fear.

The next issue as it relates to fear is the burden of leadership. The burden a senior leader carries is heavier than that of a private in a foxhole. Why? The senior leader not only has to deal with his own personal fears, but also with the additional burden of possibly sending the men he loves to their deaths.

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief of Operation *Desert Storm*, wrestled with this paradox daily. In paraphrasing

General Robert E. Lee, he says, "The military is the only calling I know that demands that you kill those you love the most; to be a good commander you must love your soldiers; to be a good commander you must send them out to die."¹²

Some soldiers cannot stand up to this additional burden of leadership. Guy Sajer, an East Front infantryman in World War II, proved his personal bravery in many battles during two years of fighting. However, when put in charge of an antitank ambush team, he was unable to provide the leadership needed in the middle of a desperate and uneven exchange between Russian tanks and German infantry.¹³ Sajer admits that the burden of a private is lighter than that of a leader, but he never knew it until he was put in charge.

How does one deal with the burden of leadership? How does one cope with the fears of combat? There are many coping mechanisms for dealing with fear. According to Kindsvatter, a soldier may find additional strength in one or all of the following:

- A closer relationship with God.
- A closer relationship with the men in his unit (comradeship).
- An attitude of "it can't happen to me."

An attitude of "live one day at a time" (wine, women and song).

Some soldiers may turn to God and their comrades for comfort and support. Others may choose to "escape" their environment via denial and a "devil-may-care" party mentality. These coping mechanisms provide a chance for the soldier to bring a sense of normality, peace and order to his otherwise disorderly life of kill or be killed.

Kindsvatter's last point is one that is seldom discussed, but concerns a very real coping mechanism used to deal with fear. Michael Shaara called it the "killer angel complex."¹⁴ Killer angels are soldiers who become very good at what they do. They live in an environment of kill or be killed, so they kill, and they do so with great efficiency.

These soldiers are not mentally ill. Most of them did not even know that the killer angel lurked deep within their souls. They kill in order to survive and to help keep a lid on the ever-

growing "well of fear" associated with prolonged combat. Just as there is an ever-diminishing "well of courage" that a soldier draws from in time of combat, there is, on the other side, an ever-increasing "well of fear."¹⁵

Physical Preparation


As already discussed, mental preparation is important to the senior leader. Physical preparation is no less important. This discussion addresses two aspects of physical preparation: the importance of good physical conditioning and the necessity of planning for regular and sufficient sleep.

First, physical training should be addressed. I recently conducted an interview with Roger J. Spiller, director of the Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC. He emphasized that in combat, good physical conditioning is second only to technical and tactical proficiency. Leaders who have poor or average physical conditioning are unable to stand up to the strain and stresses of war. Their morale is rapidly lowered, and they soon become demoralized.¹⁶

FM 22-103 also addresses physical fitness. It states that good physical conditioning is necessary for effective leadership and enhances the overall mental and physical health of a soldier.¹⁷ An experience in my own life provides a good example of this.

My unit had been in the field for approximately two months, and during that time we had performed no unit-level physical training. We went from the field straight to our border camp for a 30-day border rotation. Our mission was to guard the "Iron Curtain" along the former inter-German border.

It started snowing, and soon the ground was covered with 2 feet of snow. As luck would have it, we were tasked to conduct a platoon-size foot patrol. The patrol was to cover 20 kilometers of some very rough, mountainous and snow-covered terrain. It sounded to me like a chance to excel, so I volunteered to carry the M60 machinegun. About halfway through the patrol, I had to give up the M60. At the end of the patrol, I was totally exhausted. My ability to think, rea-



83d Infantry Division soldier stops to reload his rifle near Houffalize, Belgium, 15 January 1945.

Killer angels are soldiers who become very good at what they do. They live in an environment of kill or be killed, so they kill, and they do so with great efficiency. These soldiers are not mentally ill. . . . They kill in order to survive and to help keep a lid on the ever-growing "well of fear" associated with prolonged combat.

son and make quick and accurate decisions was gone. Once back at the border camp, I went to my room and became violently ill. I was physically and mentally exhausted because I had allowed myself to get out of shape.

The good news is that I learned an invaluable lesson. Prolonged field duty, eating on the run, insufficient sleep and a lack of physical training had caught up with me on this one little foot patrol. It all had a cumulative effect, but in my opinion, the lack of good physical conditioning is what did me in. This experience showed me clearly that I could not be an effective leader in combat if my physical conditioning was lacking.

An example from the other side of the fence is provided by Retired Lieutenant Colonel Barry Bridger. He was a US Air Force pilot and a prisoner of war (PW) for six years during the Vietnam War. He states:

"Physical fitness was one of the key elements to our survival in the Hanoi Hilton. We did everything we could to stay in good shape, to include doing push-ups and sit-ups in the cell. Physical fitness made our bodies tough, but our minds even tougher."¹⁸

In summary, physical fitness is of the utmost importance and must be a vital part of the leader's combat preparation. It hardens bodies, minds and spirits, and helps to reduce the effects of stress.

But, physical conditioning is only one aspect of preparing oneself physically. Unfortunately, some of the brightest minds and the strongest bodies become absolutely worthless after 72 hours of continuous field operations. Why? They try to do everything themselves, and they are reluctant to delegate to their subordinates. As a result, they do not sleep.

In the words of Napoleon, "Fatigue makes cowards of all men." Sleep is absolutely essential if one is to make clear and accurate decisions on a very unforgiving battlefield. Sleep plans should be developed and practiced in peacetime and strictly adhered to in time of war. Supposedly, this is common knowledge, but results from the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, tell a different story. As a general rule, senior leaders do not adhere to sleep plans. This is especially true at battalion and brigade levels as evidenced in a 1988 Academy of Health

Sciences sleep deprivation study.

During this study, all soldiers were required to wear a sleep monitor around their wrists for the entire 14-day NTC rotation. After 72 hours of field operations, senior leaders started to make bad decisions. Why? They were averaging only 3 hours of sleep per day in a very stressful environment. The noncommissioned officers did

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comparatively better as they slept 4 to 6 hours daily. The privates did the best of all, averaging 8 hours of sleep per day.¹⁹

Senior leaders need to better understand and practice what the Academy of Health Sciences is trying to teach the Army. In prolonged combat, soldiers need 6 to 8 hours a day for personal hygiene, food, water and sleep. Also, catnaps and rest periods should be taken whenever possible in addition to the prescribed hours of sleep.

A clarification needs to be made at this point. Acceptable performance can be sustained on 4 hours of sleep per day for several weeks. But for prolonged combat, the body needs 6 to 8 hours of sleep daily to help reduce the debilitating effects of mental fatigue and combat stress.²⁰

So what is the solution to the sleep dilemma? In my opinion, there are six components:

- A senior leader must trust his subordinates, and he must delegate authority to them. This is, without a doubt, the most important aspect of solving the sleep problem.

- Develop sleep plans and stick to them. When the commander is asleep, the executive officer and S3 should be awake. Also, do not forget the common sergeant major when developing the senior leader sleep plan.

- Organize the staff to facilitate continuous operations. Two shifts of 12 hours each is one possible arrangement.

- Rest and catnap when possible to relieve physical fatigue. This is not a substitute for sleep; sleep is a must to relieve mental fatigue.

- Use the buddy system to watch each other. The CSM must be able to say "Old man, go to sleep. We've got the conn."

- Anticipate and plan ahead for tactical moves and operations in order to allow for sleep.²¹

The importance of regular and sufficient sleep cannot be overstated. Senior leaders should develop sleep plans in garrison, practice them in a field environment and execute them in time of war. The lives of soldiers hinge on decisions made by leaders.

Other relevant factors, not unrelated to those already discussed, are diet, health habits and acclimatization. Suffice it to say, these are all critical ingredients in preparing oneself physically for combat. Neglect in any one of these areas can lead to a leadership failure when one is stressed to his limits by the rigors of war.

Spiritual Preparation

The final aspect of preparing oneself for combat is spiritual preparation. For the purpose of this discussion, the spiritual realm not only encompasses the leader's relationship with God but also his relationship with his family and friends. These three combined make up the spiritual self.

First, a look at the leader's relationship with family and friends is in order. This can often be a great source of strength in combat if the soldier has taken the time to cultivate the relationship properly. Retired US Army Colonel Roger H. C. Donlon, the first Medal of Honor winner in Vietnam, elaborated on the importance of family and friends to a soldier in a combat zone.

"When your mettle is tested, you'll draw

strength from sources deep within that you never knew existed. Family and friends back at home are two of these sources of strength. Take the time before deploying to make sure your relationship with these people is what it should be.

"Who doesn't have a son, daughter, mother, father, brother, sister or a friend, with whom he could never seem to see eye-to-eye? This is normal, but it is important to make the relationship secure before you deploy. It's OK to disagree, but it's not OK to deploy with unresolved issues in your mind. A leader needs to be at peace with himself and his family before he deploys."²²


The other source of spiritual strength comes from an individual's relationship with his god. This relationship is very personal and may differ from one soldier to the next. But in combat, religion has at least one common theme as explained by Colonel Dave Peterson, head chaplain for US Central Command.

Religion, be it Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish or other, provides a sense of peace and comfort to many soldiers in the chaotic and stressful environment of war. Thousands of soldiers in the desert of Saudi Arabia have renewed their belief and trust in their god as they face the possibility of dying.²³

Obviously, religion can be a tremendous source of strength, and the ultimate source of peace and tranquility in a soldier's life. During Bridger's six years of captivity as a PW in Vietnam, he says that he, and men such as retired Admiral James B. Stockdale, "drew daily from the overflowing well of strength. Religion was very important to us, and I never met an atheist in the Hanoi Hilton. We needed God to get through that terrible ordeal."²⁴

The peace, comfort and strength a soldier draws from his relationship with family, friends and God in time of war are clearly illustrated in the following historical example from the Civil War. It is worth quoting at length, as it is the essence of what spiritual preparation is all about.

Merritt J. Simonds was assigned to Kilo Company, 42d Illinois, during the Civil War. He was present for duty at the Battle of Chickamagua and on 20 September 1863, he was wounded and



Navy pilot P. E. Galardi
in a North Vietnamese
prison cell, 1968.

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left behind on the battlefield. He lay there in excruciating pain for seven days, exposed to the brutal mountain elements of North Georgia. Food, water and medical attention were scarce. In the pocket of his Union blue uniform was his diary. The following are excerpts from Simond's diary:

20 Sep "The fight rages with fury. Many of our brave boys fall. I am struck in the right leg just above the knee—shatters the bone some. I try to get off the field but cannot. Wm. Mott is wounded in the thigh. Frank Sunder is wounded in the right leg below the knee. The Rebs help

him off. George Palmer and John Edmonds are killed. We all lay here together. God only knows how many more fall after this. We are repelled and driven back. I lay here until night. The Rebs promise to take me off, but do not."

21 Sep "The Rebs carry off their wounded and bury their dead, but do not take us off. We lay here suffering from the sun and for water. The Rebs gave us some blankets and water. We lay here all day suffering a great deal."

22 Sep "We pass a restless night. Do not know whether our enemies intend to take us off or not. God help us to endure it. His will be done whether we live or die."

23 Sep "We have lain here now three nights and nearly four days and no signs of relief, although the Rebs continue to promise us. We have to lie on our backs all the time, which makes it very hard on the rough ground, but we will put our trust in God and abide the consequences. May His Holy Will be done."

24 Sep "Some of our men and a doctor comes to see us today. We are removed away from the dead bodies around us. I learn with sorrow that Sherwin was killed. Shot through the head while at the post of duty. I hope to God that he was prepared. My leg is much swollen and painful."

25 Sep "Still alive. I bear up under my suffering as well as I can, with God's help, for without his mercy I should not have been here. I know others are suffering with me. We get some soup and coffee from the hospital and the promise of being taken off tomorrow."

26 Sep "The morning dawns and two are taken. Myself and the 42nd are here yet. We patiently wait until noon, but no relief comes."

Simonds was finally removed from the battlefield and taken to an aide station in Crawfish Spring on the evening of 26 September 1863. Four days later, he was returned to Union hands in an exchange of wounded. At first, it was thought he would recover, but on 27 October 1863, he wrote to his father:

"Since I last wrote I have been growing worse. My leg is now mortifying above the knee and the doctors say I cannot live more than two days at the longest.

"You must not take this to heart, but look to a higher source for comfort, for it is God's will, and I feel resigned to my fate. I hope to meet you all in a better world.

"I would like to have my body taken home and buried beside my mother.

"I am comparatively comfortable at present. There is no pain in my leg.

"I have had some things which I authorize Wm. Mott to take home and some others I authorize Geo. Wright to sell and send the money to you. I am owing Sherwin King \$2.00. Will you please pay his father, as poor Sherwin is no more.

"Father, my mare and colt I wish you to keep in remembrance of me. My love to all my family connections and tell them I would have written to many if I had thought sooner.

I now bid you all a kind good-bye."²⁵

On 29 October 1863, Simonds died. Truly, his relationships with God, family and friends were great sources of strength and comfort as he lay on the field of honor struggling between life and death.

In summary, by preparing himself mentally, physically and spiritually, a senior leader will better know himself. This will enable him to more capably and confidently lead the soldiers entrusted to him. Too often, a leader devotes all of his effort to getting his unit ready for deployment, but totally ignores getting "self" ready for deployment. At the last minute, he runs into the house, grabs his gear, has no time for meaningful goodbyes and rushes out the door.

A senior leader must take the time today to make things right in his life if he is to be at peace with himself and at his full potential when the next battle starts. Writing letters to mothers of fallen sons and daughters is the toughest thing a leader will ever have to do. He owes it to himself, and his soldiers, to be at his absolute best when the combat situation is at its absolute worst.

Blackhorse Sir!

Brookshire walked out of the regimental command post just in time to see the attack birds from Combat Aviation Squadron streaking overhead toward EA Margie. He took a short

ride to his awaiting helicopter. Already on board were the regimental S3, Major Tom Crocker and the new regimental fire support officer (FSO), Major Fred Harris. The old FSO had been killed two days earlier by incoming artillery. Harris had come up from the main battle area (MBA) within the past 16 hours, making him the newest member of the regiment.

Once his headset was adjusted, Brookshire said, "Let's fly over to EA Jennifer. Battle VI will be shaping a penetration that way for the Bengal and the Bandit squadrons to work out on. I know they're chomp'n at the bit to get into the fight, and we'll be ready when the bad guys get there."

As he lifted off for EA Jennifer, the command net came alive. It was old Thurman, and he could not have been more pleased with himself.

"Blackhorse VI, this is Battle VI. They're travel'n blind, Colonel! They're travel'n blind! The Copperheads and Fox Troop's scouts took out most of the bad guy recon elements. We're kill'n tanks now. It's a turkey shoot, sir. They can't see a thing, over."

Brookshire looked at his S3 and, with a pleased and knowing grin, said, "Now who would have ever thought of using Copperheads to kill enemy recon elements?"

The FSO never even turned around. He just kept staring out the left side of the helicopter smiling. He may have arrived from the MBA only 16 hours earlier, but the regiment was now fighting a plan that he had rehearsed in his mind over and over again. Yes, he was indeed ready for this fight . . . mentally, physically and spiritually.

NOTES

1. "The Fox is Ready" is the motto of Fox Troop, 2/11 ACR. It was made popular by retired CPT Bob Lynd while serving as the commander of "the Fox" from 1984-1986. He was truly one of the finest soldiers I have ever known. He loved the Army and his troops, and they loved him. In August 1989, Lynd made his last PCS move to Hollywood, Florida where he is now stationed as permanent party personnel in a small cemetery. Lynd died of cancer at the ripe old age of 33. Rest in peace Bob Lynd. "The Fox is Ready."
2. US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels* (Washington, DC: June 1987), 81. In my opinion, this is the most important leadership principle. A leader who does not know his strengths and weaknesses will ultimately fail.
3. LTC Peter S. Kindsvater, "Cowards, Comrades, and Killer Angels: The Soldier in Literature," *Parameters* (June 1990):42.
4. General Carl E. Vuono, "Professionals and the Army of the 1990s," *Military Review* (April 1990):4.
5. "Attitude adjustment" was a phrase coined by Major Chuck King of staff group 19C, class of 1990-1991, US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is, without a doubt, the best combat engineer I have ever known. "Attitude adjustment" implies that someone is about to have their priorities rearranged.
6. This story of the damaged Army helicopter is a paraphrase from an interview conducted with Admiral Joseph Metcalf. He was a guest speaker at CGSC in October 1990. During his lecture, Metcalf spoke of his experiences while serving as the commander of the Grenada invasion. He is truly a warrior of the first degree and a most impressive senior leader.
7. This is a quote from LTC William A. Knowlton Jr. as he was paraphrasing retired LTG Gerald T. Bartlett. Knowlton teaches leadership in the battalion and brigade pre-command course (PCC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and heard Bartlett address the PCC classes many times. Striving for perfection in combat was a danger that he stressed to the PCC attendees.
8. Retired MG John A. Lejeune, "A Legacy of Spirit and Leadership," *Marine Corps Gazette* (July 1979):E-5.
9. Kindsvater is a superb leader and writer, and he greatly influenced me in the writing of this essay. Having served with Pete in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, I know he is one who "walks the talk" daily.
10. Audie Murphy, *To Hell and Back* (New York: Holt, 1949). Paraphrase from the forward of the book.
11. Brian Burnes, "Redefining Fear," *The Kansas City Star*, 27 February 1991, see Military, F-8, Column 1. Paraphrase from an interview with Dr. Roger Spiller.
12. Joseph L. Galloway, "The Bear," *US News and World Report* (11 February 1991):36-37.
13. Kindsvater, 33, paraphrase.
14. Michael Shaara, *The Killer Angels: A Novel* (New York: McKay, 1974).

"Killer Angels" is a term used by Shaara to describe COL Joshua Chamberlain's superbly trained troops who fought during the Civil War. They were perfect killing machines, and thereby earned the title of "killer angels."

15. This is the theory of Major Fred Flynn and is not reflected in any one written source that I have read. However, it is a theory that has been developed as a result of reading many of the books listed in this bibliography.

16. This is a paraphrase from a personal interview with Spiller, director of Combat Studies Institute (CSI), CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Spiller is one of the nation's leading experts in this area of men in battle and combat leadership. The interview was conducted 20 March 1991 in Spiller's office at Fort Leavenworth . . . truly a scholar and a gentleman.

17. Paraphrase from FM 22-103, 84.

18. Interview with retired LTC Barry Bridger conducted on 12 February 1991. Bridger spoke to a combat leadership class at CGSC concerning his experience as a prisoner of war (PW) for six years during the Vietnam War.

19. This is a paraphrase from an interview conducted with MAJ Marion Lee Burn, III, on 15 March 1991. Lee was in section 22, CGSC class of 1990-1991. He spent four years at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, and his last two years were spent as the brigade fire support combat trainer from 1988-1990. He is a brilliant soldier, a close friend, and graciously consented to this interview.

20. This is a paraphrase from classroom instruction given by LTC Dave Smith, combat leadership instructor, Center for Army Leadership, Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 1991. This class focused on the horrors of combat, sleep deprivation, battle stress and techniques for dealing with these problems.

21. My opinion on solving the sleep problem has been shaped by a 1990 Army Research Institute study conducted by Dr. Earl Pence. The title of this study is "National Training Leadership Lessons Learned." This study was never published.

22. Quote from retired COL Roger H. C. Donlon during a personal interview conducted on 23 March 1991. Donlon now resides in Leavenworth, Kansas.

23. This is a paraphrase from Dr. George B. Kuykendall, director of Lay Ministries at Fort Leavenworth. He received this information in the form of a letter from COL Peterson.

24. Bridger interview. It should be noted here that LTC Bridger was a PW in the Hanau Hilton with Admiral James B. Stockdale. Stockdale was later to be awarded the Medal of Honor.

25. Merritt J. Simonds, "Personal Diary Excerpts," Chautauooga New Free Press, 27 November 1977. Clipping is in the Hamilton County Bicentennial Library. This vignette was made available to me courtesy of Dr. Glenn Robertson of the CSI at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Robertson and Simonds shared my soul by their accounts of men in battle, and provided the inspiration necessary for the writing of this essay.

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MR WWII ALMANAC

The 1941 Maneuvers

By Christopher R. Gabel

Fifty years ago this autumn, World War II was entering its third year. The United States, facing the prospect of total war on a global scale, had shaken off its legacy of military unpreparedness and commenced the largest peacetime mobilization in its history. The US Army, which numbered only 190,000 men in 1939, had grown to a strength of nearly 1.6 million two years later, thanks to conscription and the induction of Reserve components. New doctrines emerged, most notably those pertaining to armored warfare and tactical air power. New arms and equipment of every sort began to replace the materiel left over from World War I. Although by no means ready for war, the nation had done much to overcome 20 years of virtual disarmament.

Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, to whom was assigned the mission of preparing the reborn Army for war, organized and directed what would prove to be the largest training exercises in US history—maneuvers pitting entire field armies against each other in mock battle. These maneuvers would not only provide the ultimate in realistic, large-unit training but would also afford the Army an opportunity to field-test the new doctrines of mechanized and aerial warfare.

The great maneuvers began in September 1941 with an exercise involving Second Army (eight divisions and an "air task force" of some 300 combat aircraft) under the command of Lieutenant General Ben Lear and Third Army (12 divisions and some 300 aircraft) with Lieutenant General Walter Krueger in command. (Krueger's chief of staff was a relatively obscure colonel named Dwight D. Eisenhower.) The battleground was a 30,000-square-mile area centered on northwest Louisiana. McNair, as maneuvers director, gave each army an offensive mission that produced a gigantic five-day battle in the vicinity of Camp Polk, Louisiana.

Infantry, artillery and armor surged back and forth in engagements adjudicated by umpires attached to each unit. Aircraft staged simulated ground attacks and whirled through the sky in spectacular dogfights. Logisticians conducted combat-

condition supply operations, engineers built bridges and executed simulated demolitions, signalmen strung wire, and medical personnel attended to casualties (both simulated and real). Ultimately, the exercise ended with Second Army giving ground, its flanks in danger of envelopment.

Another maneuver followed a few days later. This time, Second Army had the mission of defending Shreveport, Louisiana, against Third Army, which was attacking from the south. As the maneuver unfolded, Second Army avoided contact with its larger adversary, relying on delaying actions and simulated demolitions to postpone battle. Frustrated, Third Army sent the 2d Armored Division, with Major General George S. Patton Jr. in command, on an "end run" through Texas which placed Patton in the enemy's rear. The Louisiana maneuvers ended with part of Patton's command lodged in Shreveport itself.

From Louisiana, the action shifted to a 9,375-square-mile maneuver area astride the North Carolina-South Carolina border. Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum's First Army, consisting of eight divisions and 320 combat aircraft, squared off against the heavily reinforced IV Corps, commanded by Major General Oscar W. Griswold, which included five divisions and 366 aircraft. The Carolina maneuvers, conducted during November 1941, began with an encounter battle in which Drum's First Army crossed the Pee Dee River on a 50-mile front, then pinned down and decisively enveloped IV Corps in the vicinity of Monroe, North Carolina. A notable feature of this maneuver was the virtual destruction of an armored division by First Army's mobile antitank forces. A second maneuver witnessed the successful defense of Camden, South Carolina, by IV Corps. Nine days after the conclusion of these maneuvers, Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, signaled the beginning of real war for the US Armed Forces.

All told, more than 740,000 men, 27 of the Army's 34 divisions and nine air groups participated in the Louisiana and Carolina maneuvers. Sixty-one soldiers lost their lives during these exercises.



An M24 light tank of the 7th Cavalry Brigade, Mechanized, overtakes a squadron of horse-drawn artillery during the 1941 maneuvers.

In financial terms, the 1941 maneuvers cost the Army more than \$20 million. Was it all worthwhile? Although originally conceived as the capstone of a unit-training program, the 1941 maneuvers had little impact on the units that went on to actually fight World War II. The divisions, corps and armies that trained in 1941 were dismembered and reorganized in the expansion program that followed Pearl Harbor. Nor did the maneuvers greatly influence the leadership of the wartime Army. Of the 42 division, corps and army commanders who took part in the maneuvers, only 11 subsequently commanded in combat.

As a laboratory for testing new doctrine, the 1941 maneuvers produced mixed results. Although the maneuvers prompted a beneficial revision of armored doctrine, they also added impetus to the creation of a "tank destroyer" doctrine that never worked in combat. Serious flaws in air-ground doctrine went undetected in the maneuvers and were not put right until 1944.

Nonetheless, the benefits accruing from the 1941 maneuvers were significant, though they came in

less tangible form. Thanks to the maneuvers, a generation of young officers who seldom, if ever, had seen more than a regiment assembled in one place, learned to move, sustain and fight entire field armies. Many soldiers saw real tanks and combat aircraft for the first time in Louisiana and the Carolinas. The maneuvers exposed training deficiencies—great and small—in time for the Army to rectify them before the shooting began in earnest. Perhaps most important, the 1941 maneuvers acclimatized Americans—both in and out of uniform—to the fact that neutrality was at an end. War was coming, but for once, the United States would not be caught completely unprepared. The 1941 maneuvers demonstrated to the world that the American colossus had stirred from its slumber. **MR**

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MRINSIGHTS

Measures of Effectiveness—The Key to a Successful National Drug Control Strategy

By Major Craig L. Carlson, US Army Copyright 1991

In April 1989, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) formed a division to manage US Army antidrug operations. As the first action officer assigned to DCSOPS for this purpose and as one of many Pentagon action officers assisting in the development of the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) and the Army Counternarcotics Plan, and from my continued research while attending the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, I offer some observations and opinions. I am surfacing only a few of the dilemmas the NDCS must confront if its strategy is to succeed, and it should be noted that these dilemmas are only a fraction of those facing the men and women engaged in the effort nationally.

The Department of Defense (DOD) entered the war on drugs with much fanfare. The American public and US Congress overwhelmingly approved this increased DOD emphasis. Now, as a result of military involvement, federal law enforcement agencies (LEAs) have more sophisticated equipment and intelligence at their disposal. This is a good start; however, the LEAs are not always enthusiastic about using military personnel to deter drug trafficking. The root of this reluctance is a systemic problem: The manner in which Congress funds LEAs with antidrug dollars undermines a synchronized interdiction strategy.

Historically, the federal LEAs have justified their budgets and articulated their effectiveness by parading arrest, seizure and prosecution statistics before Congress. The importance of these statistics is ingrained in the values of those making up the law enforcement rank and file. They are taught to investigate crime, make arrests, confiscate contraband and prosecute criminals. They are promoted to their organization's executive levels by adhering to these values. The men and women of the federal LEAs are honorable, dedicated civil servants; however, their systems' values undermine the nation's overall effort in the drug war. The systems that

have worked well for many years have now become enemies to their own "soldiers." To contribute fully to winning the drug war, the LEAs' measures of effectiveness (MOEs) must merge with the strategic goals of the NDCS.

Deterrence must become a major part of the national strategy. In his book, *Games Nations Play*, John Spanier describes deterrence as a measure taken to dissuade an adversary from conducting an activity detrimental to the desires of the state. He says, "Deterrence equals diplomacy. It is not a military concept. . . . The test of deterrence is not in the use of force but in the threat of force, or coercion."¹ Deterrence to the drug trafficker is the increased perception of risk that influences him not to traffic in drugs.

LEAs have a myopic view of deterrence, only viewing deterrence from its impact on their organization rather than as a cooperative effort with other participants in the NDCS. Deterrence suffers from the same influences keeping LEAs from sharing information effectively. To share information or diligently pursue a deterrence strategy would reduce each LEA's arrest and seizure "body-count" statistics, thus affecting its ability to compete for congressionally funded antidrug dollars. Examining this phenomenon from the drug war's front line to the congressional budget process can help us understand the extent of the problem.

On the front line, agents are assigned caseloads by their supervisors. An agent may work on a case for months, putting heart and soul into it. The case becomes a personal pride matter, and the organization's values support that pride. For example, the agent will not share "his" or "her" information with another who could solve the case, but who might get credit for the bust. Such "turf guarding" occurs even between agents in the same office. It is worse when the agent requesting information is a member of another LEA.

LEAs compete for congressional appropriations by displaying caseload statistics. These statistics

provide MOEs and help justify future budgets. The budget argument's bottom line is: Agency X made more arrests and had more drug seizures than agency Y; therefore, agency X should get a higher percentage of congressional appropriations. Each LEA's financial survival rests on its ability to express its effectiveness.

MOEs are very important to an organization's success. Dr. Michael R. Anderberg from the Center for Naval Analyses describes an MOE as "a structured criterion for making judgments or decisions. They have many forms. In general, they summarize performance of a system in comparison with: a standard, goal or an ideal (the perfect system); some alternative system, real or proposed, or the same system in another time or context."²

Selecting appropriate MOEs for an endeavor is critical to its success. Commanders, supervisors, agents and soldiers must know the criteria against which they are scored. This is fundamental to understanding the commander's intent (or ultimate purpose) for their actions and keeps their efforts centered on complementary missions.

The acceptance of an MOE not focusing the organization's effort toward the objective is detrimental. For instance, an appropriate MOE for a football team is the number of points scored compared to the opponent's. An inappropriate MOE might be the number of plays run. It might have some value as an MOE, but it fails to focus the team toward the appropriate objective or end product.

It is not uncommon for an organization to select an MOE that measures an associated symptom having no direct bearing on the intended outcome. An example of an inappropriate MOE is the use of body counts during the Vietnam War. The body-count statistic did not represent an accurate appraisal of progress toward the national objective of containing communism (or any of the other national objectives verbalized at the time). It was also subject to manipulation.

An organization adopting an MOE unsuitable to its purpose may be guilty of what David Hackett Fischer calls, "the reductive fallacy [that] reduces complexity to simplicity, or diversity to uniformity" by confusing a necessary cause with a sufficient cause.³ In drug interdiction, the necessary cause is the drug trafficker; the sufficient cause is the high profit from drug trafficking and the low risk of detection.

MOEs developed for an organization must first consider the desired result for which the organization strives. The mission objective must be stated so it is indeed measurable. The primary concern should be that an MOE achieves an accurate ap-

praisal of the progress or lack of progress an organization is making toward its objective.

A US General Accounting Office (GAO) report to Senator Sam Nunn, chairman, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, US Senate, rendered the finding that while the funding for the drug interdiction program continues to increase, its effectiveness is unknown. Federal agencies and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) monitor drug interdiction program accomplishments and costs; however, they have not yet identified a way to measure and compare the different programs' performances. The report went on to state:

"While the [law enforcement] agencies generally view increased seizures as an indicator of program success, a decrease in seizures does not necessarily mean a program is less effective than it was previously or less effective than other programs making more seizures. Such decreases may be due to a variety of factors that could be equated with a program's success, such as that the drug interdiction programs may have deterred some smugglers from bringing illegal drugs into our country and/or caused other smugglers to switch from one mode of transportation to another or to change their tactics. Because good measures of program performance have yet to be developed, it is not possible to determine accurately whether resources are being appropriately allocated to fight the drug war."⁴

Investigations, arrests and prosecutions are necessary national strategy elements; however, they are the least efficient and cost-effective. Arrests lead to increased demands on the criminal justice system, increased burdens on the prison system and higher costs for the taxpayer. If the NDCS' success was dependent upon investigating, arresting and prosecuting every drug trafficker, the cost would be prohibitive.

The NDCS must have linear MOEs that cross agency boundaries. No single agency will "win" the war on drugs. Each agency's (or relevant actor's) effort must be synchronized with the efforts of all others. For example, if DOD were to sustain highly visible and publicized training exercises along the southwest border and, at the same time, the LEAs experienced a decline in arrests, this would be a positive indication of a successful strategy. A corresponding decline in the number of drug-related emergencies reported over the same period would also be a positive indication of effectiveness. Such analysis of lessons learned could improve the effectiveness and synchronization of efforts between agencies. As long as Congress continues to provide funds without the development of linear MOEs,

there is little hope for synchronization of efforts.

Other than congressional appropriations, LEAs obtain money through the Federal Asset Forfeiture Fund. These funds are the proceeds from the sale of illegally derived assets seized from drug users, traffickers, pushers and kingpins. The funds are divided among the LEAs that contribute seized assets to the fund. In this way, the budget of each federal LEA profits from its own effectiveness. On the surface, this appears to be a good motivational tool. But in practice, it is not true.⁵ In fact, it increases the bitter competition between agencies and undermines the synchronization efforts of the NDCS. The current, ineffective control of incoming drugs along the southwest border is a good example of the systematic problem created by inappropriate MOEs and the Federal Asset Forfeiture Fund.

Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) in El Paso, Texas, is a joint service headquarters responsible for coordinating military support to antidrug operations on the land portion of the southwest border. JTF-6 responds to requests for DOD assistance but may not initiate independent military deployments. The organization responsible for coordinating law enforcement operations on the southwest border is the Operational Alliance (OPAL). It is a joint LEA headquarters, also located in El Paso.⁶

At the request of OPAL, JTF-6 coordinates the deployment of the military elements that will give support to the LEAs detecting illegal drug traffic. The military operations are usually small, and publicity is kept to a minimum. OPAL desires low-key operations that result in arrests, seizures and prosecutions, not ones deterring drugs from crossing the border or interfering with ongoing investigations. This ensures that arrests and seizures occur which result in "good" reports portraying the operation's effectiveness.

When DOD performs high-visibility unit training on the southwest border, smuggling by land stops in that area. Two US Customs operations conducted in 1983, using air defense artillery units from Fort Bliss, Texas, confirm this phenomenon.⁷

Traffickers know the military is reporting suspicious activity to LEAs. Military visibility raises the perceived risk to traffickers, resulting in a positive deterrent effect; however, few, if any, arrests or seizures result. This is unacceptable to the LEAs because it runs contrary to the realities of their budgeting system and decreases their share of the Federal Asset Forfeiture Fund.

If the deterrent effect was exploited properly, it would allow LEAs to focus valuable manpower on legal ports of entry. The amount of drugs entering the United States through legal ports is unknown;

however, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates 85 percent is hidden in legitimate means of transportation.⁸ The US Customs Service estimates that only 10 percent of cargo containers are inspected due to its lack of manpower and the overwhelming size of the task. To appreciate the difficulty, one need only consider that over 8 million cargo containers arrive at US seaports annually.⁹ Inspection is a time-consuming, manpower-intensive, unattractive task. As a result, cargo container inspection offers little risk to drug traffickers.

Although deterrence appears to reduce drug trafficking, LEAs do not want deterrence. It conflicts with their values and threatens their survival. The agencies are protecting their future. They fear Congress will realign the law enforcement community to fight the drug war. Their concerns are genuine, as illustrated by the recent creation of the DEA and the ONDCP.

To date, the war on drugs has supported the economic theory of supply and demand. If a large-scale searching of cargo containers occurred, seizure statistics would be expected to rise for a short time. Heavy business losses and increased risk would cause the drug supply to be reduced. It would also force the drug lords, who are worthy adversaries and capable, resilient businessmen, to search for other ways to smuggle their poison.

Interdiction combined with deterrence will directly reduce supply. Its effectiveness cannot be determined from each agency's separate contributions. It must be measured through linear analysis between all agencies. Combined interdiction and deterrence will result in reduced numbers of arrests, seizures, drug-related medical emergencies and drug-related crimes. This effectiveness would create windows of opportunity for other NDCS elements. The time required for drug cartels to research and change smuggling methods would benefit the demand-reduction efforts in the United States. It would also create opportunities for larger seizures in the source countries where drugs are stockpiled awaiting shipment. Our drug-interdiction strategy must maintain pressure and exploit every opportunity to increase risk to the smuggler.

In October 1986, an article written by, then, Congressman Richard B. Cheney and Major (P) Thomas N. Harvey, US Army, was published in *Military Review*. It addressed the growing recognition within Congress and DOD of the sterility in our reactive approach to strategy formulation and the need for creative military thought:

"It does not appear the defense establishment has the institutional inclination, nor Congress the

bureaucratic restraint, to allow the integration of interservice thinking to produce truly cohesive global and regional strategies—strategies that are realistically consistent with available resources. . . . While there has been progress, there is not a consistent mechanism permitting the candid exchange of concerns and ideas among the services, unconstrained by parochial budget strategies.”¹⁰

These comments were not intended for application to the drug war or, specifically, the integration between the civilian LEAs and DOD; however, the problem they addressed within the military is precisely the problem experienced between the agencies executing the NDCS. This article should be mandatory reading for all participants in the drug war because many of the recommended solutions are directly importable.

The drug war is managed by committee and has no single individual charged with adequate authority (below the president). The “drug czar,” as the director of the ONDCP is called, is only as powerful as the Cabinet and Congress will allow. The position of director is below Cabinet level. It is not likely Cabinet members would willingly place their forces under the command or control of anyone outside their own department. Even with William J. Bennett’s outspoken personality while director, the position was hollow. This explains, in part, why the LEAs have not been challenged in their MOEs’ selection and why DOD has developed passive, level-of-effort MOEs that only provide quantitative data pertaining to equipment loans, aircraft hours, man-days and other like data.

DOD has other concerns that are valid but detrimental to a cooperative effort. The first concern is the fear the drug war will drain the global resources available to the department. Other questions that repeatedly surface include: Can the drug war be won? Is the drug war a bottomless pit for the military resources? What percentage of DOD forces will have to be committed to win? Can DOD perform the mission without placing national security at risk from other threats, or violating domestic law or American citizens’ rights? Individual career concerns exist about the value of serving in antidrug-related positions. Some view assignment to this national effort as one outside the military mainstream that would result in the loss of promotion or command opportunities. Some concerns are parochial, others are broader, but they all effectively dampen the military’s aggressive spirit.

Jeffrey Record, in a *Baltimore Sun* article, addressed a significant point:

“Thoughtful military professionals, however, are under no illusions that the Pentagon can play a de-

cisive or even significant supporting role in the war on drugs, and they are understandably uneasy over the prospect that public expectations of their efforts could be fanned by irresponsible politicians to unreasonable heights.”¹¹

DOD could play a larger role in the drug war. A cautious DOD approach to commitment in the drug war, however, is appropriate. Excellent planners and strategists with global discernment are available within DOD to help orchestrate an integrated strategy between the participants of the NDCS. They are not involved due to the absence of a firm hand on the helm of the NDCS and the parochial fears of the other agencies involved.

The military could also operate within the parameters of domestic law to fight the drug war. Congress has shown a willingness to interpret or modify legislation to allow greater military involvement. Much caution is warranted when addressing military involvement and the potential effects on the rights of American citizens. However, DOD involvement is not a matter of deploying divisions to seal the southwest border. It is a matter of sustaining a presence that raises the perceived risk to traffickers with highly visible unit training (company- to battalion-size training deployments) combined with increased training flights from DOD installations and platoon-size operations coordinated with OPAL and run by JTF-6. These missions would provide good training opportunities that, at the same time, would deter smuggling.

Military involvement does not mean changing posse comitatus or other laws limiting military authority over American citizens. The laws and their intent are good. The bureaucratic turf guarding and adherence to doctrine and MOEs for the sake of preserving turf is, however, ruinous to the NDCS. Drug investigations netting a handful of arrests may need to take second place to a strategy of deterrence. Stop the drugs before they cross the border by raising the perceived risk to the potential trafficker.

Is the NDCS undermined by the MOEs currently used by federal LEAs and DOD? Yes, the established MOEs are not interactive between the participants, and their nonlinear interpretation is detrimental to cooperation between agencies. DOD level-of-effort statistics are not qualitative, fail to measure effectiveness and acquiesce to demands from LEAs instead of seeking proactive involvement.

LEAs and DOD are not capable of independently developing the appropriate MOEs for successful execution of the NDCS. It is inappropriate for an MOE to be driven from the bottom level of an

organization. DOD is one participant in the NDCS. It can only address the effectiveness of its own effort in detection and monitoring or command, control, communications and intelligence. DOD is not capable of evaluating how its contributions affect the success or failure of other participants.

DOD established a joint staff with the authority to integrate planning and ensure the synchronization of efforts between the United States' Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. To advance, the NDCS needs a similar, but much broader, arrangement. The staff must be composed of civilian and military personnel who understand the capabilities and limitations of each element of national power they represent. The staff members must be committed to solving the problem and free to plan without fear of retribution from parochial bureaucrats within their own organizations. This command climate will be difficult to attain. It took an act of Congress, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, to force the acceptance of "jointness" between the military services.

The DOD joint staff took years to overcome bureaucratic resistance. This was not as difficult as the challenge facing the NDCS; however, lessons learned from the DOD experience should be exploited by the president, Congress and ONDCP.

In the recent Gulf War, the commander in chief (CINC), Central Command, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, and his joint staff developed the strategy and force structure required to accomplish the mission they were given. Schwarzkopf, in turn, gave each component commander a mission to perform within the integrated scope of the strategy. Many more interactive roles and missions furthering the attainment of strategic objectives flowed through the chain of command to subordinate commanders. The resulting effectiveness of the combined effort was determined by the CINC, not by the individual subordinate commands.

Under no circumstances should a subordinate commander be expected to articulate effectiveness outside his sphere of influence. Only the CINC and his joint staff can be responsible for addressing overall effectiveness. It was not the air-component commander that assessed the success of the theater strategy. Only the CINC, with an integrated view of all elements of combat power and their cumulative effect on the enemy, is capable of assessing the effectiveness of the strategy.

DOD has institutionalized the responsibilities of each level of command (leadership) and developed reporting procedures to monitor the execution of its

joint military operations. However, the NDCS lacks the organizational structure, agency integration and necessary leadership to orchestrate the efficient, successful execution of the NDCS. This lack has resulted in myopic MOEs that fail to accurately assess the integrated efforts of all participants.

To effectively execute the interdiction side of the drug war, the LEAs and DOD must formalize a unifying command structure and collectively develop linear MOEs that result in synchronization of efforts. Furthermore, only through the use of interactive quantitative data and linear analysis can the qualitative effectiveness of the NDCS be measured.

The LEAs must use DOD to its full potential. This will not happen until Congress realizes the negative impact of arrest and seizure statistics or until the federal LEAs are allowed to overcome their congressional budget dependence on antidrug dollars derived from these measures.

The most formidable opponent in the war on drugs is not the drug lord, coca grower, trafficker or user. It is the bureaucratic inertia within our own government. *MR*

NOTES

1. John Spanier, *Games Nations Play*, 6th ed., (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1987), 163.
2. Interview with Dr. Michael R. Anderberg, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), Alexandria, VA, 15 November 1990. Anderberg is the author of CNA information manual, *Literature Pertinent to Analysis of Department of Defense Roles in Anti-Drug Operations*, July 1990.
3. David Hackett Fischer, *Historian's Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, Inc., 1970), 172.
4. General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Sam Nunn, chairman, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, US Senate, *Drug Interdiction* (December 1990):1.
5. Mark L. Goldstein, "Drug Wars, Turf Wars," *Government Executive* (January 1990):25.
6. Information gleaned from statement of Lieutenant General George R. Stotser, commander, Joint Task Force 6, to Defense Subcommittee, Senate Appropriations Committee, 24 April 1990.
7. Exercises QUICKLOOK I and QUICKLOOK II. Author participated in both deployments and after-action reviews of these exercises.
8. US Army-US Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict briefing, "Illicit Drugs and National Security: An Executive Summary of the Threat and a Rational Response," undated (includes the January 1990 National Drug Control Strategy).
9. Office of National Drug Control Policy, *1989 National Drug Control Strategy* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), 73.
10. Richard R. Chaney and Thomas N. Harvey, "Strategic Underpinning of a Future Force," *Military Review* (October 1986):5-6.
11. Jeffrey Record, "In the Trenches of the Drug War," *Baltimore Sun*, 5 June 1990.

MAJ Carlson is the air defense and field artillery personnel management officer at 1st Personnel Command, Heidelberg, Germany. He has a B.S. from Texas A&M University and an M.M.A.S. from the US Army Command and General Staff College. He was previously assigned as an action officer in the US Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans Anti-Drug Division, Washington, DC.

MR SUMMARIES

A New Defense Strategy for Changing Times

By Dick Cheney

March/April 1991, *Defense* 91

"As Congress and the administration work together on the fiscal 1992-1993 defense budget request, the Defense Department has been engaged in two formidable tasks. First, the men and women of the armed forces, under the mandate of the United Nations, were engaged in a war to liberate Kuwait. Second, even as America was fighting the war, the Defense Department was engaged in a major process of restructuring and reducing military forces to adapt to changes in the . . . post-Cold War era.

"Underpinning each of these tasks is a new strategy for America's defense set forth publicly in a speech by President George Bush . . ." Cheney says the new strategy "directs attention away from a global war beginning in Europe . . . [and] focuses our efforts instead on regional contingencies and on sustaining the forward military presence . . . to deter outbreak of regional wars."

He says the "new strategy also emphasizes that technological breakthroughs will change military art. . . [and that] we still need quality forces and we will still need to maintain and modernize our strategic nuclear capabilities." He adds that it is understood the world is still a dangerous place, so we have to be able to rebuild the force, if necessary.

Next, he discusses the "extraordinary changes in the strategic environment" caused by the changes in Eastern Europe. He credits the Soviets with helping the changes happen and for taking steps toward reform within the Soviet Union itself. But he adds that "moves toward democracy and demilitarization of the Soviet Union that we all welcomed now appear to be in doubt. Recent, worrisome events raise questions about the prospects for needed economic and political reform and the Soviet Union's future course."

Cheney says the Soviets' economic situation is bleak. "The central government rejected the Shatalin plan," which according to Cheney was the only real prospect for reform of the economy. He says the Soviets made things even worse by "reasserting the priority of state orders in the economy,

authorizing the KGB to search business enterprises for economic data and otherwise countering the movement toward free markets and prices."

Cheney does not show much hope for Soviet political reform either. He cites the crackdown of freely elected governments in the Baltic States, reversal of progress in human rights and a campaign attacking press freedoms.

"The failure of reform would not necessarily mean a return to the worst days of the Cold War, but it would prevent movement to across-the-board cooperation with the Soviet Union."

Cheney continues, "A true demise to the Cold War . . . promises many positive effects on regional conflicts, including greater superpower cooperation, with the most dramatic example to date being the Soviet support in the United Nations against Iraq."

He also says that without a bipolar world, destructive forces previously kept in check could be unleashed. "There is some thought that Saddam Hussein saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to pursue his own expansion. . . ."

"We face the sobering truth that local sources of instability and oppression will continue to foster conflicts small and large virtually across the globe." He cites the Gulf War as the type of conflict most likely to confront us again. He says we will face "major regional contingencies against foes well-armed with advanced conventional and unconventional weaponry."

On future warfare, Cheney says, "Security is the first requirement upon which all our individual and national aspirations depend. . . . The USSR has a modernized capability to destroy this country with little warning." He makes this statement to note our vulnerability not to imply a "bolt-from-the-blue attack. . . ."

"We must also ensure the safety of our commerce and our people at home and abroad as they pursue the normal conduct of their daily affairs. Thus, our security requires maintaining capabilities for deterrence and defense across the broad spectrum, from low-intensity threats and non-combatant evacuation efforts to strategic nuclear threats."

He says it is also necessary to help others provide for their own security from time to time. "And at times, where our interests merit the sacrifice, it will be necessary to use force to deter aggressors or defend freedom."

He says the new strategy shifts its focus to regional threats and requirements for crisis response and forward presence. This focus is what will be used to size and shape our future force.

"Finally, we must recognize that when the United States is engaged . . . in responding to a

substantial regional crisis, potential aggressors in other areas may be tempted to capitalize on our preoccupation. The requirements of both deterrence and defense dictate that we not reduce forces to a level that would leave us overly vulnerable to this threat."—DGR

MR LETTERS

LIC Errors Exposed

I would like to correct some errors that crept into my article, "Emerging Doctrine for LIC," in the June 1991 issue. First, US Army Field Manual 100-20/US Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, *Low Intensity Conflict* (LIC), was published on 5 December 1990 and distributed in the spring of 1991.

Second, the sixth sentence in the first column of page 53 should read, "Thus, the wags who call LIC 'low-interest conflict' have inadvertently stumbled upon a greater truth than they know." The sentence makes no sense as published. To make matters worse, it was repeated in bold print on page 56.

Third, the third sentence in the final paragraph on page 54 should read, "It could not win and could even drive people into the arms of the enemy." This is doctrinally important. Excessive violence is counterproductive.

Finally, the series of publications formerly known as Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications, abbreviated "JCS Pubs," is now officially designated Joint Publications, abbreviated "Joint Pubs."

I should also like to add that retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Larry Hamby, a respected expert on LIC, who read my article, cautioned me against giving the impression that LIC is only a reflection of the American perspective. Especially in support for counterinsurgency, dominance of the political instrument is inherent in the nature of the conflict and not a policy option. Success can be achieved only through political, social and economic reform.

This answers Regina Gaillard's question, in the same issue, of why we associate military civic action (MCA) and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) with counterinsurgency. We can conduct MCA and HCA outside the context of insurgency, but we cannot succeed in counterinsurgency without them. This is consistent with the excellent articles, also in the same issue, by Lieutenant Colonel John T. Fishel, US Army Reserve, and Major Eduardo Aldunate, Chilean Army. The thesis of

my article is that "LIC may be a policy option for our role in international conflicts."

LTC John B. Hunt, USA, Retired, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, USACGSC

The above errors were due to faulty editing. We regret any embarrassment experienced by LTC Hunt as a result.—Editor.

Combined Services, Not USAF, Are Kings

Once again, air power enthusiasts are taking the lead and learning the wrong lessons from a war. Lieutenant Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger's letter (April 1991 *Military Review*) describes a shift in the nature of warfare that will make ground and naval forces merely a "support" arm, useful only to fix the enemy or guard air bases.

This is not the first time we have heard this argument. From Giulio Douhet, to William (Billy) Mitchell, through Hermann Göring, air power enthusiasts have prophesied the demise of naval and ground forces and that the "new age" of warfare would be fought almost exclusively from the skies. Meilinger correctly points out that our previous wars were won by all three services working together, but as I understand his letter, somehow this was not the case during Operation Desert Storm. One of the key ingredients to our success during the operation was all the services working together under one unified commander using AirLand Battle doctrine. No one service was decisive.

I wonder if Meilinger examined why Iraq was defeated with minimal casualties since he did not mention AirLand Battle doctrine and its emphasis on maneuver warfare over attrition warfare. This, in my opinion, is the significant lesson of the war—maneuver warfare using each service to its best advantage in a coordinated effort has the capability to achieve decisive results with minimal cost. The

soldier and Marine still had to go in and "take" the ground. Would Meilinger's thesis have been different if more casualties had been caused by direct frontal assaults?

Also, what kind of future war is Meilinger referring to? Is the US Air Force (USAF) only planning to fight other air forces whose principal reason for flying is to escape to a neutral safe haven? Air power may have been a very significant contributor to our victory in the Gulf War, but would it achieve similar results in NATO's central front against a well-trained, equipped and motivated opponent in the air? I doubt it. As to the helicopter playing only a "minor" role in the conflict, Meilinger is obviously not aware of the airmobile assault of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) deep behind enemy lines and the decisive role it played during the campaign.

In an era of shrinking budgets, Meilinger's letter strikes me as an attempt to justify the continued existence of the USAF as a separate service rather than a serious attempt to examine the reasons for success. Let us study this conflict in such a way that we do not learn the wrong lessons or further parochial service interests. In the future, all the services need to work together in a combined arms environment—not as separate services seeking legitimacy.

MAJ Jeffrey D. Jore, USA, Department of History, US Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado

Air Power Not Decisive at Operational Level

It was interesting to see LTC Phillip S. Meilinger's letter (*Military Review* April 1991) in reference to my article on the "Master Weapon" (*Military Review* January 1991). In it, I posited that the helicopter would be the master weapon of the future at the tactical level of war. At the operational level, I very much agree with Meilinger that the airplane is the master weapon—just as the intercontinental ballistic missile is the master weapon at the strategic level.

At the operational level, the air campaign has historically set the conditions for success in the ground campaign. For example, the breakout at Saint Lo, France, during World War II, was a result of proper conditions being set by the air campaign. The Gulf War has again shown this to be true.

I am, however, hesitant to sign up for the idea that a decision can be attained from the air in a ground theater of operations. Ground still has to be seized and occupied to gain a decision on land. Additionally, against a first-rate enemy, the total

air supremacy enjoyed in the gulf would be unlikely. Thus, as with the helicopter at the tactical level, at the operational level, air power will be the master weapon but will not provide a decision.

In the Gulf War, we very wisely maximized our capabilities vis-à-vis the Iraqis. The great qualitative edge enjoyed in the air allowed us to dictate the nature of the battlefield to the enemy. We fought where it was most profitable for the United States to fight—in the air and from the air. Every service did its part, maximizing the capabilities of each while minimizing the limitations of each. Air power alone could not have won the war, just as ground power alone could not have won the war. (The national will would not have supported the number of casualties required to win the war solely with ground forces.)

So once again, the lesson is clear: Combined arms at every level of war, with each service assisting and complementing each other, is the key to victory.

MAJ Anthony M. Coroalles, USA, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii

New Master Weapon—News Media

I just read Major Anthony M. Coroalles' thought-provoking "The Master Weapon: The Tactical Thought of J. F. C. Fuller Applied to Future War" (*Military Review* January 1991). It occurs to me that, at the political-strategic level, the new "master weapon" is the news media, especially television. They control the public's reaction to war. Public reaction, in turn, determines how much support and latitude the Armed Forces receive.

Unlike the tactical weapons Coroalles discusses, however, the military does not own the news media. For the military, the news media are more like one of what Coroalles calls the "conditions of war." He notes that conditions of war can either be avoided, overcome with action or turned to an advantage. He also shows that the best solution is usually to turn a condition to an advantage.

Unfortunately, with regard to the news media, the military seems more inclined to either run away or use a steamroller. In the Gulf War, this was done by limiting news media access and suppressing information. On the other hand, some demonstrated considerable skill at turning the news media to an advantage—notably Lieutenant General Thomas W. Kelly and General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. Turning the news media to an advantage is easy, honorable and acceptable to them—just tell them the facts, copiously and often.

We need more faith in the US Constitution's wisdom. One need not admire the professionalism of journalists to recognize that freedom of journalism does work, just as our Founding Fathers envisioned. News media competition creates its own checks-and-balances dynamic by exposing errors and revealing truth. Sadly, many public affairs officers (PAOs) are just as suspicious of the news media and equally as hostile to the idea of integrating a news media role to our warfighting plans as any other soldier.

Perhaps it is time for everyone—fighters, PAOs and, yes, journalists—to begin discussing the news media's influence over the outcome of war and what everyone can do to turn this fact of life to our country's advantage.

MAJ Harry F. Noyes III, USAR, San Antonio, Texas

"Do It Yourself" CSS in the Gulf

Military Review's April 1991 issue, devoted to the combat service support (CSS) effort during Operation *Desert Shield/Storm* articulates the many challenges and successes of the logistics community. I will never dispute the herculean sealift task in moving armored units in record time or the fact that more troops and supplies were moved in a shorter time than any other time in history. Everyone recognizes our soldiers, sailors and airmen worked tirelessly and were genuinely focused on accomplishing their mission.

As a commander of a direct support field artillery battalion, I would, however, like to offer a user's perspective of Operation *Desert Shield/Storm's* logistics by class of supply or service:

Class I (Rations): Meals ready-to-eat (MREs) were readily available. T-rations were not. Class Bs were often drawn on a daily ration cycle instead of being pushed in a 2-2-3 cycle. This resulted in unreliable ration break schedules, additional ration runs and exposure for our people. When a support unit moved, it was usually two to three days before any ration cycle resumed. Variety was limited. Not many soldiers in my battalion will ever voluntarily eat chili and rice again. Bottled water was a real lifesaver. Bulk water production was inadequate during movement and, in fact, struggled to keep pace even when units were stationary, as when we entered Kuwait and Iraq. Laundry was done by each soldier in a tub when water was available. Field laundries were not available until April, and by then, we were suspect of any system outside our control and continued to use our tubs. Quality of rations and bottled water availability seemed to increase as the level of headquarters increased.

Class II (Clothing and Individual Equipment): Self-Service Supply Center items were nonexistent. We deployed with as much as we could haul and then locally purchased what we needed. Replacement TA-50, boots and uniforms were not available in quantity until we redeployed. I had two soldiers in tennis shoes for two weeks. Other units in the brigade had even more soldiers in this condition. These items seemed to be issued by division/corps based on bulk rather than on the needs of the soldiers.

Class III (Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants): Bulk fuel was fine until the last day of the exploitation; by then, we had outrun the capability to push fuel forward. The personal efforts of the support battalion commander bringing trucks forward got us to Kuwait. Package products were almost nonexistent. Battery acid, multigrade oil and hydraulic fluid became critical items of supply. At one point, I used captured Iraqi oil for servicing high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles and light trucks. Once in Kuwait, general officer involvement was required to get the requisite fuel and package products to the division.

Class IV (Construction Material): Sandbags, wire and plywood were controlled at the general-officer level throughout January and February due to supply constraints. In the redeployment assembly area, Class IV was abundant. People were giving it away—rather than turning it in or shipping it back.

Class V (Ammunition): There was more than enough ammunition in terms of tonnage in the theater. Flow of information, management and distribution made ammunition supply a real challenge. There was not a single agency in the corps that knew by type and quantity the location of the ammunition we were required to upload. Multiple forms, to include Form 581s (approved by numerous agencies), signature cards and assumption-of-command orders, were required at the materiel management center, ammunition supply point and forward arming refueling point. These factors, in turn, caused numerous trips and often caused our ammunition trains to be queued for over 24 hours. My battalion drew five different lots of red bag powder, four of white bag and three of green bag, complicating both ammunition management and gunnery. This was anything but a smooth operation.

Class VII (Major End Items): I lost one heavy, expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT), one M577, two M548s and a couple of trailers. The HEMTT was replaced in three months, the M577 in four months, and I never received replacements for the rest of the equipment. Replacement radios (deployed at 75 percent authorization) and secure devices (deployed at 57 percent authorization) that were promised prior to deployment and that were

then in-country never materialized.

Class VIII (Medical Material): If you needed it, you had better have deployed with it. Medevac was usually out of radio range, did not have secure radios, was nonresponsive or got lost on the way to the landing zone.

Class IX (Repair Parts): I deployed with 100 percent of my prescribed load list (PLL) and every spare part I could cram in a military-owned demountable container or truck. At the announcement of the cease-fire, I was at 95 percent zero balance of M109 lines. The first nonauthorized stockage list part we received was in mid-March. Major assemblies were in much better shape, with the exception of 113-series assemblies. The availability of major assemblies stopped for two to three days when support units moved. We had to scrounge, trade and use some other techniques to keep the M109 fleet at 100 percent. Battalion guys made things happen—not logisticians.

Administration: A big portion of personnel support comes from the corps. As a Continental United States (CONUS) division, our support remained in CONUS. Promotion packets that we sent back to CONUS in February, March and April were waiting for me upon redeployment in mid-May. The Standard Installation/Division Personnel System data base was never updated during deployment—battalions provided updated disks and marked-up C27 reports. Replacements came without orders and preparation for overseas movement (units) packets and were usually treated like cattle until they arrived in the unit. Strength accounting was entirely bottom-up, with no corresponding data update formats/reports. Notification of promotion was untimely and usually without orders. Accounting for soldiers in the medical evacuation channels was nonexistent. There has been no improvement in this problem in the last 20 years. I will not even comment on the mail.

Here are the bottom lines: my battalion had plenty of ammunition, vehicles never ran out of fuel, troops had an adequate quantity of food, and I fought 100 percent of my combat systems. All this was accomplished by key officers and noncommissioned officers in the battalion. There is no doubt that every class of supply we needed was in-country and at a log base somewhere. Our logistics systems and people are not user friendly or customer-oriented.

I offer the following suggestions so we do not have to do this again:

- Reinvent the word "push" in logistics operations vice "pull." Our systems are completely pull-oriented.

- Fix the field feeding system. MREs are too easy an answer. Our soldiers need hot meals.

- CSS doctrine is fine and makes sense. However, a forward support battalion or main support battalion in a heavy division is not structured to execute the published doctrine. Give those commanders the assets to do their jobs.

- Redesign CSS training and development programs to put leaders in the field who are service- and customer-oriented. Continue the combat arms detailing for lieutenants. This would produce majors who are familiar with the user end of the business.

- Put adequate support units in the division. For the "corps plug" units we must have, ensure they train with the divisions they habitually support. Just having visibility of the organization for combat would help. Many times we just stumbled across small units in the field that had parts and the capability to fix things. This is not very efficient. One unit did not deploy with home station PLL—they were told the state would have to pay for the replenishment. Lots of misinformation out there could be avoided by proper training.

LTC Harry M. Emerson III, USA, Commander, 1st Battalion, 5th Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Riley, Kansas

"Scrounging 101"— Required Combat Course

I am retired from the US Air Force and have been in the logistics business for 52 years, including 25 years active military service during which I had a fair bit of time in combat situations. Based on this experience and from the newspaper articles I read during Operation Desert Shield/Storm, I must comment on one point Major John E. Shephard Jr. raises in his article, "Thomas Becker, Ollie North and You: The Importance of an Ethical Command Climate" (*Military Review* May 1991). (Shephard provides a fine article. My comments are relative only to the areas I cite.)

Shephard seems to make the case that a "good supply person" will always follow procedures and never do anything if it is not squeaky clean. I can understand the purity of this claim, but I cannot accept it in reality. Always, it seems to me, the logistics forces have to find ways to get their mission accomplished. After all, effectiveness is the name of the game, particularly in combat. It would be extremely foolish for a combat support organization to insist on the correct paperwork, for example, before munitions resupply might be accomplished. Would it not be better to issue and, then later, make the paperwork fit the experience?

Then too, Shephard's criticism of the supply

sergeant who "took care" of his commander and organization seems out of place. I know I have had a number of experiences in which success would not have been possible in the combat theater had we not had excellent scroungers working with and for us. Furthermore, we were not always on the receiving end. Often, to be successful, we gave to others or permitted them to "steal" from us.

These "scroungings" took place between the services and in different combat scenes from World War II through Vietnam. In World War II, we found the US Navy to be very rich in the things we needed, did not have and could not get. Without the other services, we probably could not always have done our jobs, and the overall mission would have suffered.

I do not claim it is proper for organizations to have organized bands of thieves working the terrain, but I do claim that ingenuity and scrounging are essential and should not be talked down. In fact, I think it might be beneficial if all troops were taught how to scrounge, but then, that would make it legitimate and most of the thrill of accomplishment would probably be lost.

Jerome G. Peppers, USAF, Retired, Fairborn, Ohio

Wanted: More On SAAS and USA-USMC Operations

I was surprised and disappointed that Rheta S. Phillips did not mention, other than a cursory ref-

erence, the use of the Standard Army Ammunition System (SAAS) (levels 1, 3, 4 and division ammunition officer) in her article, "Logistics Automation Support for *Desert Storm*" (*Military Review* April 1991). Discussing the SAAS application on the modern battlefield would be most beneficial to today's ordnance officers. Please include future articles in *Military Review* on SAAS in Southwest Asia, or maybe Phillips could write another article pertaining to this subject.

CPT Mark L. Moravits, USA,
Sierra Army Depot, Herlong, California

I would like to see articles on joint US Army-US Marine Corps operations during Operation *Desert Shield/Storm*. Because of the diversity and complexity of the Gulf War, I believe such articles might show the ways the two services were able to complement one another, particularly in the ground war.

In-depth articles on the use of remotely piloted vehicles or unmanned aerial vehicles, joint artillery raids, breaching efforts, use of joint maneuver forces and the mobility/countermobility/survivability efforts would be beneficial to *Military Review* readers.

I look forward to the future publication of articles on this subject.

MAJ John Flanagan, USMC, USACGSC

Military Review would welcome and consider for publication articles on SAAS and US Army-US Marine Corps joint operations during the Gulf War.—Editor.

MR BOOK REVIEWS

THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR, VOLUME II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 by Bruce Cummings. 958 pages. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 1990. \$99.50.

Professor Bruce Cummings continues to demonstrate that the origins of the Korean War were much more complex than traditionally portrayed. His sprawling, rich and passionate work is a sophisticated (if idiosyncratic) treatment of the war's Korean and international origins, as well as an interpretation of US foreign policy. A brief review cannot fairly demonstrate this book's complexity—a qualification that has become *de rigueur* in book reviews, but which is mandatory in this case. No reader will agree with everything Cummings asserts or writes—indeed, this reviewer was alternately informed, intrigued and infuriated by what he read—

but all future historians will have to address Cummings' arguments.

The Roaring of the Cataract examines, at length, the Korean War and its origins from the Korean perspective, and the nature of US foreign policy from 1945 to 1950. As he wrote in volume 1, Cummings believes the Korean War was "civil and revolutionary in nature." A "local affair" stemming from social changes imposed by Japanese colonial rule, competition among nationalist factions quickly began after the Japanese Empire's 1945 collapse. The bitter struggle for dominance and Korean independence between Korean social and political factions continued "through a dialectic of revolution and reaction" until 1950. By then, 100,000 lives had been lost and "conventional battles . . .

only continued the war by other means."

While the civil conflict began in 1945, Cummings explains "armed conflict," that is, multibat-talion clashes, began between the North and South regimes in 1949 along the 38th parallel. From 1949 to June 1950, after the withdrawal of US and Soviet forces, there was escalating violence, political repression, guerrilla movements in the South and continued public statements by the North and South Korean leaders that each intended to unify Korea. The June 1950 invasion was the North's reaction to deteriorating chances for Korean unification under Northern auspices.

Several influences, Cummings believes, coalesced in June 1950 to determine the invasion's specific timing: temporary Northern military superiority over the South (a result of Soviet aid and the return to North Korea of the Chinese civil war veterans); the defeat in the South of pro-North guerrillas (which greatly diminished chances of a successful insurrection); fear of US plans to revive Japan; concern Korea might be permanently divided; and simple Northern desire to retaliate for Southern border incursions. Given the political goals and the intensifying hostilities of 1949 to 1950, a major attack was the next logical step.

Perhaps even more provocative to many readers will be Cummings' supposition that the original North Korean objective in June 1950 was to capture Seoul; the assumption was that losing its capital would cause the Southern regime to fall. North Korean goals, Cummings suggests, escalated only after the Republic of Korea army displayed a distinct disinclination to fight.

As for "that enticing but irrelevant question" of who started the Korean War, Cummings states, it "cannot be answered." Indeed, he emphasizes, this is the wrong question to ask about a civil war. Ultimately, of course, the Koreans lost control of their war as larger powers joined the fray and made it an international war. While Americans think of Korea as our first "limited war," Cummings reminds us the war became a "total war" for Koreans, with Korean civilian casualty rates (especially in the North) exceeding those sustained by either Japan or North Vietnam.

The Korean turmoil did not take place in a vacuum. In his US foreign policy examination, Cummings proposes that in Korea the Cold War began in 1945 when the US military initiated a de facto containment policy, presaging what would become de jure national policy within a few years. Cummings highlights US foreign policy makers' uneasy convergence on containment, a compromise policy around which various factions could unite. But se-

rious differences between factions always remained. Competing with containment was "rollback" sentiment, roiling beneath a misleadingly calm and nonpartisan surface, and possessing the allure of positive action against communism.

Before the war, no matter how attractive the concept appeared to Americans, rollback simply was impractical. Still, the rollback idea was not abandoned completely. Cummings reveals the tension between containment and rollback in key national policy pronouncements before June 1950. The success at Inch'on provided an unexpected and tempting opportunity to achieve a public victory over communism, and Cummings highlights the ease with which policy makers reached a new consensus to implement rollback. He also notes how quickly the consensus ruptured after the Chinese intervention signaled rollback's failure. Despite later republican rhetoric, the Korean War debacle eliminated rollback as a viable foreign policy option.

This book is based on prodigious research (including Korean language sources) and the latest Western historical literature. Methodologically, the author forms historical "mosaics" by presenting large amounts of information, and then he examines, considers and interprets the manifest patterns. This style has its strongpoints; it encourages critical analysis and shows to great advantage Cummings' sensitivity to change over time. Free association and wide-ranging speculation, however, perhaps encourages a few more conspiracy-thesis explanations than evidence warrants. Cummings' analysis of Dean G. Acheson's "Defense Perimeter" speech is a good example; he intimates a plotting Acheson subtly encouraging some egregious Northern action.

Cummings has successfully recaptured the Korean War—"the one that began in the ruins of the Japanese Empire and ended in early 1951, a war pursued through political strife, rebellion, unconventional insurgency, border fighting, and conventional assaults." For this reason alone, he has written a very important book. No one can finish this book without an awareness of the war's long gestation on the Korean peninsula. The traditional tale of US-Soviet confrontation, too, is more satisfying with the Korean people placed on center stage as active participants. Cummings' success at recapturing the American mind-set may be less convincing to readers.

This is a book for the specialist. Readers interested in the war's Korean origins but who would prefer a shorter account may cut their teeth on John Merrill's *Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War*. While I disagree with some of Cummings' specific interpretations and theories, his larger arguments deserve serious, critical reading. Given this book's heft

(which, at about \$30 per pound, you will feel in both your arm and your wallet), most will opt to borrow *The Roaring of the Cataract* from their libraries—all of which should purchase this important work.

Stephen J. Lofgren, *The Center of Military History, Washington, DC*

MY COUNTRY, MY RIGHT TO SERVE: Experiences of Gay Men and Women in the Military, World War II to the Present by Mary Ann Humphrey. 285 pages. HarperCollins Publishers, New York. 1990. \$19.95.

In *My Country, My Right to Serve*, Mary Ann Humphrey sets a tough task for herself—she wants people who read her book to abandon their long-standing prejudices and support the elimination of the policies prohibiting gays from serving in the Armed Forces. Herself a “victim” of US Army policy demanding the removal of gays from military units, Humphrey has collected first-person accounts from more than 40 professed homosexuals who have served on active duty or in the Reserves during the last half-century.

These men and women relate tales remarkably like those from any sampling of narratives by careerists and draftees—with one notable exception. Everyone has something to say about what it was (or is) like to live and work as a homosexual in an openly homophobic profession that swiftly eliminates such individuals from its midst. As one might expect, there is a good deal of special pleading in this book. The built-up hostility comes through in more than one of the narratives of these soldiers, sailors and airmen forced to live dual lives to protect their reputations and those of their sexual partners, or to keep jobs many of them really enjoy.

Some people will never be convinced by any argument that the services should welcome the integration of homosexuals into the force. Those sympathetic to the plight of gays do not need to be convinced. But for readers who might be able to overcome moral scruples or psychological barriers to accepting gays, this book misses the mark. Rather than gathering data on the performance of homosexuals in the service or in other occupations or professions, Humphrey relies almost exclusively on anecdotal evidence from the “victims” themselves. Some spend considerable time digressing about service life inequities that have little to do with their sexual orientation. Those who will be hard to sway probably will not be touched by the accounts of so many “whiners.”

It is too bad Humphrey chose this strategy to treat a subject of such importance. After all, this book is intended to make us look first at who we are rather

than what we do so that the “straight” population who clearly makes up the majority of the military can see that discrimination practiced against gays is actually counterproductive to the establishment and maintenance of good order and discipline.

Humphrey is certainly right about one thing. *Something* must be done to address the issue of gays’ right to serve, especially in light of Supreme Court decisions to allow full participation in virtually every other occupation by anyone regardless of sexual orientation. Our present policies are ineffective; the changes occurring outside the military strongly suggest that now is the time for the services to confront this issue head-on. The military services cannot continue to hide their heads in the sand and rely on Gestapo techniques to eradicate the “problem.” Society has already decided that gays have a right to do many things, and it has long been commonplace to consider the military a reflection of society.

LTC Laurence W. Mazzeno, *USA, Retired, Grand Junction, Colorado*

IN THE MEN’S HOUSE: An Inside Account of Life in the Army by One of West Point’s First Female Graduates by Carol Barkalow with Andrea Raab. 283 pages. Poseidon Press, New York. 1990. \$19.95.

In *The Men’s House* is a candid, forthright and interesting personal account of the experiences of a female graduate from the first class to include women in its ranks at the US Military Academy, West Point, New York. Captain Carol Barkalow, a transportation officer currently serving on active duty on the US Army Staff and a US Army Command and General Staff Officer Course selectee, relives those days since she entered the all-male bastion as a new cadet in the summer of 1976.

Barkalow does not write to harm, discredit or affix blame because she does not divulge a tale of bitter memories, and she expresses no regrets about her decision to serve in the military. As a member of the second class at the academy to include women, I found her reflection of the struggles of the first women at the academy to be accurate.

In 1975, it was a controversial decision for the US Congress to authorize the admittance of women to the academy; however, in proper military fashion, the academy leadership reacted quickly to integrate the institution. Changes in facilities, uniforms, living areas and curriculum were made to ease the transition. However, as Barkalow points out, staff and faculty members and male cadets were not as accepting of and adaptable to the new changes in their closed environment. West Point, a time-honored, conservative society preserved in rich tradition, did not enthusiastically welcome the newcomers.

BOOK REVIEWS

The admission of women at the academy became a media event. Barkalow and her female classmates faced intense scrutiny, peer pressure and microscopic evaluation from male counterparts throughout their four years there. She found it necessary to constantly prove herself to gain acceptance. Even today, she views each new assignment as a proving ground. Reflecting favorably on the academy, she states, "Despite its limitations, the academy had helped define me and it's still the compass by which I steer."

She details her struggles and triumphs, and presents the Army as an organization akin to a "men's house"—male-dominated, very traditional in its beliefs and still adapting to the integration of women in today's force. She concludes that barriers of sexism and prejudice still exist in either a blatant or subtle form despite the progress of the Army's equal opportunity efforts.

As she recounts her days as a platoon and company commander, she addresses the state of male-female interpersonal relationships in the Army. While she attains success through perseverance, hard work and excellent performance, she discovers she is an outsider to the inner circles male officers form, circles that enable them to cultivate close bonds and enhance their professional connections. Most women officers are not a part of these informal networks that often assist the male officer's professional advancement either through mentorship or comradeship. These important and often powerful contacts yield valuable information yet remain inaccessible to most women. Thus, they find entry into the "men's house" guarded and restricted.

Barkalow serves as an example of how far the Army has advanced and that job performance can determine success in the military regardless of gender. She recognizes that women are still pioneers in the military and a minority of its number, but overall, she considers the military as an organization offering a wide range of opportunities. Women's integration into the military is an evolutionary process presenting its own unique challenges.

CPT Debra L. Fix, USA, US Army Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

MILITARY BRATS: Legacies of Childhood Inside the Fortress by Mary Edwards Wertsch. 452 pages. Harmony Books, New York. 1991. \$20.00.

As a US Air Force "brat" and a US Army wife, I resent the fact that this book may be read by persons who have no real knowledge of military life and that it might be accepted as truly representative of military families. It is not. For all its statis-

tics and footnotes, this book cannot reveal more than a slice of past military life as viewed by the author who describes herself as a daughter of an alcoholic, abusive father and as a member of a dysfunctional family.

This slice is made all the more narrow as a result of the process used by Mary Edwards Wertsch to solicit the stories of others. These 80 military brats, raised from about 1940 to the end of the 1970s, Wertsch says, were found for interviews only through word of mouth or in response to a couple of newspaper articles about the book. The reader is left *without* interviews from the many happy, well-adjusted military brats who were never invited to tell their stories.

For unhappy military brats, this book can confirm that their feelings are shared. For others, the book should be considered to be a very restricted look at the memories of 80 people not pleased with their childhood environment. It is unfortunate that the author had an unhappy childhood; it is comforting to hope this writing project was therapeutic for her. But it is misleading to present this volume as indicative of all past, present and future military brats and their memories or opinions.

Patricia B. Rubenstein, Springfield, Virginia

CHAPPIE: America's First Black Four-Star General by J. Alfred Phelps. 366 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, CA. 1991. \$19.95.

J. Alfred Phelps' biography of General Daniel "Chappie" James Jr. is superb. Beginning with Chappie's childhood days in the streets of Pensacola, Florida, and ending with his death in February 1978, Phelps' portrait of Chappie shows how sheer determination and hard work can overcome the discriminatory practices and stereotypes garnered against a race of people. This book covers many historical events for blacks in the military, most notably Chappie's promotion to general that made him America's first black "four star."

Chappie attended college at Tuskegee, Alabama, and was among the first blacks taught to fly in the Civilian Pilot Training Program offered there. This training eventually led to his joining the US Army Air Corps as a fighter pilot. Phelps cites many examples of Chappie and his fellow black officers' struggles to overcome discrimination and segregation both in the military and society, such as not being afforded the same privileges as their white counterparts—joining the officers' club or residing in military housing.

Chappie dispensed with these problems by believing in God, country, the flag and the power of

excellence, as taught by his parents early in life. As a youngster, he adhered to his mother's philosophy of success—to be ambitious, to develop whatever skills he had to the fullest and to make the best of the opportunities afforded. Chappie was a charismatic person who knew how to influence people, a natural crowd pleaser and a talker. He was able to speak to unfriendly crowds and gain their appreciation. As the first black ever to speak before the Daughters of the American Revolution, he left them in awe. He used all his talents to achieve feats not accomplished by others and to excel at whatever job he was asked to do, thus disproving the stereotypes applied to his race.

The author, a black American, served as an airman for more than 20 years, retiring in 1967 as a master sergeant. During his military career, he probably experienced hardships similar to Chappie's. Phelps captures the excitement and drama in Chappie's life; the reader can feel the emotion in the story. This is especially true near the end of the book when he describes the final months of Chappie's life. This is a story worth telling, an outstanding demonstration of how someone can succeed in America.

MAJ Gregory R. Reid, USA, USACGSC

GEOPOLITICS AND THE DECLINE OF EMPIRE: Implications for United States Defense Policy by George M. Hall. 244 pages. McFarland & Co., Inc., Jefferson, NC. 1990. \$29.95.

George M. Hall's premise is that "global conditions have changed to the point where military power has met its match, and that match is national power." His eight elements of national power—military, thermonuclear, demographics, geographic, economic prowess, technological capability, ethos and infrastructure—are used to examine complex interrelationships and to determine relative national power and implications for US defense policy.

First, Hall concentrates on the science and art of geopolitics, the eight elements of national power and the nature of war. He then applies his logic to US defense concerns, focusing on the large standing forces considered necessary to maintain equilibrium through deterrence, concluding that "precedence should be given to the concept of international justice rather than peace itself."

Hall divides all nations into two camps—the salient powers and the minor states. Salient powers possess the bulk of available geopolitical clout and are less likely to use war as a national policy instrument. Minor states outnumber salient powers almost 20-to-1. These nations have fought or are where the world's wars have been fought for the last 45 years. They lack the clout, alliances or geographic positions to successfully deter invasions; are neutral through choice or by location; or are bent on regional aggrandizement to improve their national power. Hall addresses each minor nation and their implications for US defense policy.

Saddam Hussein should have read this book. Had he taken the analysis to heart, he might not have destroyed his foreign policy options by placing his military in a situation where a coalition with legitimacy was able to inflict great damage on Iraq's ability to conduct war. Through Hussein's inept handling of the war, Iraq can no longer serve as a legitimate regional power. A minor state under Hall's division, Iraq has further weakened its regional and world position to the point where it now lacks deterrence capability and will likely suffer the fate Iraq itself intended for Kuwait and, before that, Iran.

This work is intelligent and insightful. It is not intended as an introductory text for geopolitics, but it is a scholarly examination of emerging geopolitical changes and their implications for US defense policy.


**MAJ Joseph A. Kotch Jr., USA,
US Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia**


Annual US Army Operations Research Symposium

The 30th Annual US Army Operations Research Symposium will be held 13 and 14 November 1991 at Fort Lee, Virginia. Some 300 government, academic and industrial leaders are expected to participate. Attendance is limited to those presenting papers and those nominated as observing participants. Papers that address the theme, "Army Analysis—The New Realities," are solicited. Mail inquiries to Director, US Army TRADOC Analysis Command—Fort Lee, ATTN: ATRC-LS, Fort Lee, VA 23801-6140. Phone inquiries should be made to Alan Cunningham, AUTOVON 687-3449 or commercial (804) 734-3449.

U.S. Horse Cavalry Association Moves

The U.S. Horse Cavalry Association (USHCA) moved its national headquarters on 1 May 1991 to Fort Riley, Kansas, to be near the U.S. Cavalry Museum and U.S. Cavalry Memorial Research Library which it sponsors. The 15th annual USHCA bivouac will be held 4 through 6 October 1991 at Fort Riley/Junction City, Kansas. For further information, contact USHCA, P.O. Box 2325, Fort Riley, KS 66442-0325 or call (913) 784-5797.





Atlantic Charter: Roosevelt and Churchill, August 1941

The only election Franklin Delano Roosevelt ever lost occurred in 1920, when running as the Democratic Party's candidate for vice president of the United States. In that landslide election, the victorious Republicans portrayed Roosevelt and his running mate as champions of the League of Nations, which would commit America to be policeman of the world. Roosevelt never forgot that public approval was absolutely necessary when formulating war aims for America.

In 1940, however, public opinion did not support Roosevelt's personal belief that America had to play a more direct role in the war. Polls showed that 67 percent of the country supported military aid to the allies, but only 27 percent approved entry into the war. Roosevelt realized that he had to present to the public an inspiring list of war aims and goals if he were ever to ask the nation to make serious sacrifices. This was his incentive for drafting the Atlantic Charter.

Winston S. Churchill, the prime minister of Great Britain, was far less interested in formulating long-range war aims and goals, partly because England then was fighting simply to stay alive. Churchill, nonetheless, realized that Britain could not survive without US support, and to win that support he had to dispel US concerns about so-called British imperialism. So, he was inclined to approve Roosevelt's initiative for a public statement of war aims by and for democratic nations.

The actual document, like all joint communiqués, was a compromise statement. The Americans wanted the British to renounce, specifically, their own empire in the third, fourth and fifth articles of the charter. They, of course, refused. Britain wanted America to commit itself to membership in a postwar league of (or united) nations. Roosevelt, still gun-shy from 1920, refused to give the isolationists that political target to attack. But, aside from these specific disagreements about tone and emphasis, both leaders agreed on the major planks:

Atlantic Charter

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First—Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second—They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third—They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth—They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth—They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all Nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security;

Sixth—After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all Nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh—Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth—They believe that all of the Nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by Nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such Nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

Franklin D. Roosevelt
Winston S. Churchill



Articles to Watch for:

Army Operations in the Gulf Theater
Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock, US Army



The Air Campaign
Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, US Air Force



Good Logistics Is Combat Power
The Logistic Sustainment of Operation Desert Storm
*Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis, US Army, and
Major Harold E. Raugh Jr., US Army*

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