

AD-A252 795



The Professional Journal of the United States Army

SEPTEMBER 1991

THE GULF

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm



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Professional Bulletin 100-91, MILITARY REVIEW, appears monthly in English, bimonthly in Spanish and quarterly in Portuguese. Second-class postage paid at Leavenworth, KS 66049-0001, and additional entry offices. This publication presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. Its contents do not necessarily reflect the official US Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official US Army publications. MILITARY REVIEW reserves the right to edit material. Basis of official distribution is one per general officer and one per five field grade officers of the Active Army, and one per headquarters (battalion and higher) of the Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve. MILITARY REVIEW is available on microfilm from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI 48106, and is indexed by the PAIS (Public Affairs Information Service) Bulletin. Postmaster: Send change of address information to MILITARY REVIEW, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-0010. Telephone: (913) 694-6942 or IN 692-6942; Subscriptions (913) 694-6130.

MILITARY REVIEW (USPS 123-630)
 US ISSN 0893-4148

Military Review

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Prepared by
 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
 VOLUME LXXI - September 1991 - NO 9
 Professional Bulletin 100-91-9

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Victory in the Desert

This issue of *Military Review* sets the stage for a sustained discussion of operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* in future editions. Within these pages are points of departure for the professional study of the conflict beginning with senior leader perspectives concerning the conflict's major facets. Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock describes organization for the ground war; Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner discusses the air campaign; Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis and Major Harold E. Raugh Jr. recount the logistics and sustainment efforts; Colonel Peter C. Languen chronicles transportation requirements; and Major General Winant Sidle offers his views on the media-military feud. In an expanded "back of the book," we depart from the usual fare of book reviews and letters to offer the baseline documentation of the war, including a Gulf War timeline, a grouping of public statements by the key players in the drama and a bibliography for further study. In future issues, we intend to explore the component parts of the coalition victory as a means of bridging the gap between past and future warfare.

The story began even before Iraq's occupation of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 but captured an astonished world's attention with that Friday's attack. In the days and weeks that followed, Saddam Hussein crystallized worldwide contempt and a broad international response not seen since World War II. As the crisis unfolded, the coalition objectives became clear: Deter further aggression by Iraq; defend Saudi Arabia; enforce a growing number of mandatory United Nations sanctions; and, ultimately, expel Iraq from Kuwait and restore the Kuwaiti government. The US Central Command, orchestrating the mushrooming coalition effort, was given a mission just as clear: deploy forces; defend against Iraqi attack; and be prepared to conduct other operations as directed. The multitude of actions, however, that led to the coalition's ultimate military victory was as extraordinary and interdependent as the objectives and mission statements were simple and straightforward. Included in these critical tasks were holding the fragile coalition together, deploying and sustaining joint forces halfway around the world, devising a warfighting plan and then executing the plan.

To what extent the Gulf War stacks up against some of this country's and this Army's defining conflicts remains to be seen. Whether the Battle of 73 Easting or the rout along Hell's Highway compare to the Normandy Invasion, the Inch'on landing or the Battle of Gettysburg are puzzles for military professionals and historians to study, argue and discuss. As an institution, the Army is now hard at work putting the lessons and conclusions into focus, at disseminating the right lessons and discarding the wrong ones, all while getting itself back to the business of building itself down. The next crisis will tell how well we have met these current challenges.

What retrospect cannot dispute is that the right Army, with the right warfighting doctrine, the right equipment, the right leaders, the right soldiers and the right set of circumstances backed up the pledge that President George Bush made a scant year ago, "This (the Iraqi invasion) will not stand." And it did not.

The character and landscape of operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* are too big to put between the covers of a single volume, and *Military Review* will return to this topic time and again. The central truth of the war, a lesson easy to comprehend and already learned, is that victory was a tribute to the excellence, dedication and perseverance of Americans in service to their country worldwide and to family and public support at home. Without these, victory would not have been remotely possible. These great men and women at all levels, military and civilian, past and present, in theater and around the world, Active and Reserve, "made it happen." All discussion must begin and end with this point.

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
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ARMY OPERATIONS in the GULF THEATER

Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock, US Army

Amid the multitude of units and headquarters that deployed to Southwest Asia in Desert Shield and Desert Storm was the US Third Army from Fort McPherson, Georgia. The Third Army commander, Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock, describes the evolution of the Army ground forces from the early deployments through the successful conclusion of the ground campaign. He chronicles the rapid transformation of the Third Army from a contingency planning headquarters to the controlling headquarters for three armies in one: the Army component, the theater army and a numbered field army.



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ON 6 AUGUST 1990, the first two US Army officers, the Third Army commander and a Third Army logistics staff officer, arrived in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to begin organizing for Operation *Desert Shield*. The situation was bleak. Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait on 2 August, gaining control of that country in less than 36 hours. Some Iraqi forces had even violated Saudi territorial integrity briefly. The Iraqi army stood poised on the Kuwait-Saudi border; oil-rich eastern Saudi Arabia lay open.

No formal agreements with Saudi Arabia for host nation support or stationing of US soldiers existed. For assistance, Third Army had to rely initially on the relatively small but effective number of US military personnel who were members of the Office of the Project Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard, and the US Military Training Mission. When asked by Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, the Air Force component commander, what the Army had to protect the deploying US Air Force, a small pen knife was all the Army commander could produce.

There were some positive aspects to the situation. The Third Army commander knew the special challenges and military capabilities of the Middle East from a previous tour in Saudi Arabia. In addition, Third US Army, reactivated in 1982 as a planning and exercise headquarters for such a contingency, had just completed Central Command (CENTCOM) Exercise *INTERNAL LOOK 90* during July. The exercise presented a similar scenario that would be a useful starting point to build the army.

Evolving from just two officers in theater, Third Army would commence ground operations with over 333,000 soldiers to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait 201 days later.

This article will explain how Third Army organized on the Arabian Peninsula for operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. Third Army's organization for combat evolved from the CENTCOM mission and structure, and from the exhaustive analysis of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). METT-T considerations, in particular, weighed heavily

Third US Army, reactivated in 1982 as a planning and exercise headquarters for [a Southwest Asia] contingency, had just completed Central Command Exercise INTERNAL LOOK 90 during July. The exercise presented . . . a useful starting point to build the army.


EAC levels of command are not easily distinguished, and may include both the theater army and the numbered field army as separate headquarters. The former is primarily a departmental support headquarters, while the latter is a theater operational headquarters. During Desert Storm, the two functions were consolidated within Third Army.

in the decision to structure Third Army for three functions: the CENTCOM Army component command, the theater army (TA) in Southwest Asia and as a numbered field army. Each of these functions will be discussed later in the article. By organizing as three armies, Third Army met its responsibilities for joint and combined coordination, theater support operations and operational direction.

Army organization above corps, with its links to the joint and combined environment, is less easily described and understood than the structure at corps and below. The senior Army headquarters during *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, the Third US Army stationed at Fort McPherson, Georgia, took on the challenges of operating at the army level in an austere theater. This Third Army experience is testimony to the flexibility and adaptability of the US Army in theater operations.

Theater Organization


The army in theater must be structured to respond to both the operational chain of command—from the president and secretary of



Military Review/USACGSC
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
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defense through the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (if directed), to the unified commander in chief (CINC), to the Army commander—in providing operational direction to the Army

Missions assigned to CENTCOM for Desert Shield were to deter further Iraqi aggression, defend Saudi Arabia, enforce UN sanctions and, eventually, develop an offensive capability to liberate Kuwait. The Desert Storm military objective was to free Kuwait from Iraqi control by exercising that offensive capability.

forces assigned to the theater. Parallel to this joint line of authority is the Army's service chain of control—beginning again with the president and secretary of defense, through the secretary of the Army and Army chief of staff, to the senior Army commander in theater. This channel provides administrative, sustainment and other support to ensure that the CINC receives balanced, trained and equipped Army forces. These joint and Army chains complement each other in the execution of theater operations.

Military operations in theater required the integration of Army combat capabilities and support activities within a joint and combined framework. CINC missions and organizational



Commander may employ combinations of the above options.
Figure 1. Commander Combatant Command Options

guidance framed Third Army's structure in theater.

Missions assigned to CENTCOM for *Desert Shield* were to deter further Iraqi aggression, defend Saudi Arabia, enforce United Nations (UN) sanctions and, eventually, develop an offensive capability to liberate Kuwait. The *Desert Storm* military objective was to free Kuwait from Iraqi control by exercising that offensive capability.

While the Department of the Army (DA) provided forces to the CINC, he commanded assigned forces and decided how to organize the forces. Doctrinal choices for operational command are shown in figure 1. The CINC chose to organize forces assigned to CENTCOM as service component commands, such as Army Forces Command (ARCENT), and functional commands, such as Special Operations Command, Central Command (SOCCENT). This ensured one Army commander was responsible for all Army missions (except operational control of SOF [special operations forces]) in theater (fig. 2). In addition, the CINC chose to retain




Figure 2. Central Command command and control

the function of joint land component commander, thereby controlling Army and Marine ground forces while strongly influencing coalition forces. CENTCOM's broad, complex mission, which required unity of effort and the integration of vastly different US and allied forces, was the fundamental reason for these decisions. Third Army became ARCENT with the task of organizing Army forces in theater.

As ARCENT, Third Army was responsible to CENTCOM for many tasks:

- Planning ground operations.



The CINC chose to retain the function of joint land component commander, thereby controlling Army and Marine ground forces while strongly influencing coalition forces. CENTCOM's broad, complex mission, which required unity of effort and the integration of vastly different US and allied forces, was the fundamental reason for these decisions.

- Making recommendations to the CINC on the proper employment of the forces of the Army component.
- Accomplishing operational missions as assigned.
- Providing the CENTCOM reserve.
- Conducting joint training, including the training of other service and coalition forces as directed.
- Operating a theater communications zone to include interservice support.
- Conducting Army-specific functions such as internal administration and discipline, training, logistics and intelligence matters.
- Conducting joint and coalition coordination as required.
- Providing for theater civil affairs, enemy prisoner of war and psychological operations.
- Creating instruments for coalition cooperation and unity of effort.

In executing these tasks, ARCENT had to function as three armies (fig. 3): the first for service coordination with joint and combined forces (Army component command); the second for the generation, balancing and sustainment of

forces brought into the theater and performance of service-specific responsibilities (theater army); the third for the conduct of operations (numbered field army).

The assumption of these three roles and their associated responsibilities by the ARCENT commander was necessary for the efficient conduct of Army operations in theater. With the versatile capability for deploying and structuring Army forces above corps level, Third Army was prepared for the challenge of being three armies at once. Balancing the roles would require careful METT-T assessments.




Figure 3. Third Army Roles

Arab workers erecting tents for US personnel at a Saudi air base, mid-August 1990.



The Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia in August and September 1990 required combat forces on the ground before the development of an adequate sustainment base. This presented a significant logistics risk. Substantial host nation support was required for this early deterrence effort to be successful and later, to provide capabilities that otherwise would have required the deployment of thousands of additional soldiers.

METT-T Assessment

As in all operations, METT-T was the framework to assess key organizational parameters and the catalyst to transform doctrine into theater-specific solutions. METT-T assessment was dynamic and changed over time. At the theater level, METT-T was heavily influenced by the evolving geopolitical situation.

Though METT-T analysis is normally associated with lower-level tactical decision making, it is also applicable to the theater level. Thus, METT-T analysis became the cornerstone for ARCENT operational and organizational decisions.

Mission. *Desert Shield* missions were to generate combat power, to defend critical oil and port facilities in eastern Saudi Arabia and to transition to a defense in sector. Third Army had service responsibilities as well: theater coordination of psychological warfare, operation of the

theater communications zone, civil affairs and enemy prisoner-of-war operations, commanding (less operational control) Army SOF, operation of seaports and provision of all service support required by Department of Defense (DOD) policy (such as contracting and ground transportation support). The *Desert Storm* mission was an extension of *Desert Shield*'s: to conduct the theater main attack to destroy the Republican Guards Forces Command (RGFC). Other *Desert Storm* missions evolved over time; Third Army would provide a division minus as the theater reserve, an armor brigade to the Marine forces and attack helicopter and other support to the Egyptian corps.

Enemy. With the fourth largest army in the world, the Iraqi military possessed a wide range of modern equipment and soldiers experienced in desert fighting during the eight-year war with Iran. Shortcomings were apparent—limited ca-

Iraqi soldiers flash victory signs as their tank rumbles toward Kuwait City, 2 August 1990.



The Iraqi air force, while equipped with some of the most modern aircraft in the world, was clearly not capable of defeating coalition air forces, but could be a factor in limited operations. . . . Tactical proficiency and motivation varied widely in [most] units, with battle weariness, not battle hardness, being the legacy of the war with Iran.

The RGFC was the Iraqi center of gravity—its actions gave the best indicator of Iraqi intentions. Its defeat would achieve coalition objectives.

pability to replace and repair damaged equipment without outside assistance; great ethnic diversity that caused internal turmoil in the military; and little experience in complex, strategic offensive operations.

The Iraqi air force, while equipped with some of the most modern aircraft in the world, was clearly not capable of defeating coalition air forces, but could be a factor in limited operations. While the RGFC was the centerpiece of military prowess and loyalty to the Iraqi leadership, tactical proficiency and motivation varied widely in other units, with battle weariness, not battle hardness, being the legacy of the war with Iran. The RGFC was the Iraqi center of gravity—its actions gave the best indicator of Iraqi intentions. Its defeat would achieve coalition objectives.

Terrain. The operational area in Southwest

Asia challenged the capabilities of soldiers and equipment. Third Army operated in a desert the size of Florida, Georgia and South Carolina combined. While Saudi Arabia had modern seaports, the internal road network was not as versatile, resulting in transportation bottlenecks. Precise navigation in the open desert was a prerequisite for ground maneuver. Wide swings in climatology required careful training and equipping of soldiers; conditions experienced during training were often radically different from those of *Desert Storm*. The operational area experienced record rainfall during the ground war, hampering tactical mobility, close air support and intelligence gathering.

Troops. In contrast to the other theater armies (Eighth Army in Korea and Seventh Army in Europe), there were no longstanding coalition or host nation agreements in Saudi Arabia

upon which to build the Third Army presence. Third Army had developed a list of Total Army units needed, based on the scenario used in the *INTERNAL LOOK* exercise, a scenario almost identical to that which developed in August. In

An initial cap on the number of reservists who could be mobilized and time limits on the length of RC service complicated the tailoring of forces. Many joint and combined responsibilities required a long-term presence and involved units . . . unique to the RC.

this case, however, the Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia in August and September 1990 required combat forces on the ground before the development of an adequate sustainment base. This presented a significant logistics risk.

Substantial host nation support was required for this early deterrence effort to be successful and later, to provide capabilities that otherwise would have required the deployment of thousands of additional soldiers. Only the availability of pre-positioned supplies in theater provided the time required to coordinate the necessary host nation effort. An initial cap on the number of reservists who could be mobilized and time limits on the length of Reserve Component (RC) service complicated the tailoring of forces. Many joint and combined responsibilities required a long-term presence and involved units that were unique to the RC.

Time Available. As in all operations, time is an overarching constraint. Strategic factors such as the UN resolutions set the overall tempo. Strategic air and sealift restrictions limited the capability to deploy all desired forces, resulting in tailoring and sequencing the deployment of echelons above corps (EAC) units. The initial limit of six months of active duty for RC units influenced the flow of forces. Balancing forces to accomplish the mission within time constraints was the essence of the commander's continuing assessment and guidance.

The Three Armies

Third Army's focus on the three army roles changed over time based on METT-T. The initial focus was on its Army component command role to coordinate the joint and combined functions necessary to secure facilities to receive and sustain the arriving forces. Later, the focus was on a theater army to determine the forces needed and the order in which they were to deploy to the Arabian Peninsula. Finally, the focus was as a numbered field army to control combat forces during operations.

EAC levels of command are not easily distinguished, and may include both the theater army and the numbered field army as separate headquarters. The former is primarily a departmental support headquarters, while the latter is a theater operational headquarters. During *Desert Storm*, the two functions were consolidated within Third Army. An Army component command, on the other hand, is part of the CINC's joint structure and, as such, is not necessarily a separate level of command within the theater. The Army component command was also consolidated within the Third Army structure. While members of the Third Army staff did not separate their daily duties into neat categories for each army, they did focus on certain aspects of each role based on METT-T at the time. As previously stated, the initial *Desert Shield* concerns were with component army functions of joint and combined coordination.

Army Component Command. ARCENT consisted of all Army units on the Arabian Peninsula. ARCENT's responsibilities were in the operational chain of command and focused primarily on the Army's joint and combined coordination role. Joint and combined functions were as diverse as augmenting the CENTCOM staff, forming the Coalition, Coordination, Communication and Integration Center (the US-Saudi Arabia forum in which coalition issues were addressed) and modernizing of coalition forces. One of the first service component functions was to coordinate with Saudi Arabia for the entry of Army forces into theater, finding fixed facilities to house and support soldiers, ob-



Strategic factors such as the UN resolutions set the overall tempo. Strategic air and sealift restrictions limited the capability to deploy all desired forces, resulting in tailoring and sequencing the deployment of EAC units. The initial limit of six months of active duty for RC units influenced the flow of forces.

taining sources of potable water and renting transportation resources for the initial force.

The component command was the Army's link to CENTCOM and the other services in theater. This included planning for ground operations, Army input for the Air Tasking Order to synchronize air and ground operations, air targeting for Joint Forces Command-North (Saudi, Egyptian, Syrian and Kuwaiti combined corps) and liaison with all major ground forces.

ARCENT liaison teams, with significant communications capabilities, were assigned to all major ground forces (the two US corps, Joint Forces Command-North, Egyptian Corps, Marine Corps, Joint Forces Command-East and the CENTCOM reserve division). These liaison teams were robust, self-sufficient ministaffs, averaging 35 soldiers. Equipment and quality, selfless soldiers came from DA and the major commands to form these teams. They were a vital link for the CINC and the ARCENT commander.

The CINC used the liaison teams as a link with coalition forces, while the ARCENT commander employed them as a network among subordinate and adjacent units. They provided a reliable means of communication, a source of accurate, timely information between all ground forces and a mechanism for cross talk among all

ground units. These liaison teams were critical in the coordination of operations between coalition and US units. They provided essential staff expertise and advice on large-scale operations to our coalition partners in addition to working US coalition issues such as communications interface, force modernization and targeting. Liaison teams proved to be flexible and could be shifted to cover unexpected missions such as coordination with Iraqi representatives at Safwan concerning the terms of the suspension of offensive operations and movement of Iraqi displaced civilians to a Saudi Arabian refugee camp. High-level liaison teams, fully resourced, proved valuable during *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*.

ARCENT was a key player in the execution of Army operations in *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. It developed the theater logistics concept and ensured all Army operations were closely coordinated with the other services. As the CENTCOM action agent for the ground campaign plan, ARCENT defined clear objectives and planned synchronized actions in detail. Joint and combined coordination activities were not solely the function of ARCENT; other component responsibilities overlapped and were shared in many cases by Third Army in its other roles as theater army and numbered field army.

ARCENT liaison teams ensured mutually supporting fires among coalition forces. (Below) British M109 gunners in Kuwait prepare to fire a 155mm round at an Iraqi target.




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Theater Army. The TA reports through the service chain of command to generate and support Army forces within the theater and responds to the combat service support needs of joint and combined forces as defined by the CINC. The TA communicates directly with DA concerning these functions, but not in a direct superior-subordinate manner. The operational chain of command takes precedence if conflict between chains exists.

TAs are not fixed organizations, they are tailored to specific situations. This is accomplished through assignment of specialized Army units to assist and augment corps and division organizations. Requirements for Army forces during *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* were defined by the TA, identified and prepared by DA and the major commands worldwide and deployed in accordance with priorities set by the TA to balance the forces within theater. The TA on the Ara-

bian Peninsula consisted of the major subordinate commands (the two corps and a support element), EAC units and the headquarters.

The EAC structure is less easily understood than that of the corps, and the factors of METT-T have a much greater impact on its tailoring. Third Army formed EAC units when a requirement existed for specific missions and functions outside of the corps' tactical warfighting capabilities or when functional organizations were needed to coordinate or supplement existing corps capabilities. The development of the theater EAC structure involved setting deployment priorities for scarce air and sealift assets between competing organizations at both EAC and corps levels. It also involved the establishment of acceptable risk based on EAC unit closure in theater in accordance with the campaign plan. From these considerations EAC units were created at the appropriate time.



24th Infantry Division soldiers load M1 tanks on flatbed trailers after their arrival in Saudi Arabia.

The first EAC unit formed was the ARCENT Support Command, the key logistic operator at EAC. Its rapid development was critical to the reception and sustainment of early deploying forces. ARCENT SUPCOM used available host nation support and pre-positioned logistics stocks to provide a building block approach to combat service support in theater.

The first EAC unit formed was the ARCENT Support Command (SUPCOM), the key logistic operator at EAC. Its rapid development was critical to the reception and sustainment of early deploying forces. ARCENT SUPCOM used available host nation support and pre-positioned logistics stocks to provide a building block approach to combat service support in theater. These factors and the need for continuity in the execution of host nation support agreements mandated immediate establishment of the provisional SUPCOM in the first days of the crisis. The decision to form SUPCOM in Saudi Arabia was made in the first days of the deployment, when RC units were not available. During the first months of Operation *Desert Shield*, the length of RC service and total number of reservists called to duty were limited, which further complicated the introduction of a Continental United States-based RC headquarters.

Initially, SUPCOM was smaller than a doctrinal theater army area command, but was more

capable than a corps support command (COSCOM) headquarters. SUPCOM was tailored to take advantage of the substantial host nation assets and skilled workers. This reduced the need to deploy additional US Army units and retained the capability both to supplement corps sustainment efforts directly and to operate the theater communications zone.

Over time, the building of the EAC structure fell into four general categories. Some organizations deployed tailored for the mission. The TA built other EAC organizations around existing staff sections. A third category of EAC units was formed from various units because of a shortage of the type unit in the force structure or unique requirements. A fourth category was the doctrinal EAC unit not deployed because its mission was assumed by another organization.

EAC units that were in the first category, deployed intact, were 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade (Enemy Prisoner of War), 89th MP Brigade, 3d




Figure 4. EAC command and control

MP Group (Criminal Investigation Division), 8th Psychological Operations Task Force, 352d Civil Affairs Command, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, 7th Transportation Group, 32d Transportation Group, 475th POL Group, 111th Ordnance Group, 11th Signal Brigade, 416th Engineer Command, 411th Engineer Brigade, 513th Military Intelligence Brigade, Army Special Operations Forces and the Aviation Brigade.

In the second category, the Signal Command, Medical Command and Finance Command were built around existing staff organizations to augment theater capabilities while reducing the need to deploy additional units. The third category, Third Army SUPCOM, Personnel Command, Transportation Command and Task Force (TF) *Freedom* were EAC units organized in theater from various organizations based on METT-T. In the fourth category, three doctrinal TA EAC units did not deploy because their mission was assumed by other organizations (the TA Area Command, the Air Defense Command and the Special Ammunition Brigade) (fig. 4).

Most EAC organizations grew at the same pace as the rest of the theater so they would be functioning upon the start of hostilities. The 800th MP Brigade, for example, completed its deployment just prior to the beginning of *Desert Storm*. This allowed the brigade enough time to prepare for its enemy prisoner-of-war mission without taxing the theater support system. In

comparison, the 352d Civil Affairs Command was not fully activated until after the start of *Desert Storm* because its mission, restoration of Kuwait, was not relevant until liberation. TF *Freedom* was a tailored EAC organization, organized by ARCENT solely to coordinate the initial restoration of Kuwait. It contained elements from SUPCOM, 352d Civil Affairs Brigade, explosive ordnance demolition personnel and a number of other special units to assist the Kuwaitis in restoring basic services until a DOD agency was established to handle long-term restoration.

Establishment of EAC organizations was a complex process involving the overwhelming support by DA and major commands. Special recognition is appropriate to the RC units and soldiers for contributing their unique capabilities in a completely professional manner.

The TA also worked through the service chain to obtain additional key resources that contributed significantly to success. The development of a METT-T derived transportation structure was an example. This plan required additional drivers to augment the host nation truck fleet, heavy equipment transporters to move tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and additional HEMTT (heavy, expanded mobility tactical truck) fuelers to augment the ground forces that would maneuver deep in southern Iraq—all essential to the success of *Desert Storm*.

The TA also worked closely with DA and



Marine ground crews awaiting orders at one of the many large, modern airfields made available to coalition forces by the Saudis.

The decision to form SUPCOM in Saudi Arabia was made in the first days of the deployment, when RC units were not available. During the first months of Operation Desert Shield, the length of RC service and the total number of reservists called to duty were limited, which further complicated the introduction of a Continental United States-based RC headquarters. . . . SUPCOM was tailored to take advantage of the substantial host nation assets and skilled workers.

Army Materiel Command to modernize units, especially those equipped with the M1A1 Abrams tank and M2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle and countermine equipment, while they were training in Saudi Arabia. Support of these requirements by DA and the major commands was total and complete. Success in *Desert Storm* was founded on the efforts of many who did not deploy but selflessly supported all requirements.

The TA generated and supported Army forces and ensured they were at the right place at the right time to support the scheme of maneuver. The commander, Third Army, as the TA commander, continually set priorities for limited resources, balancing the force over time to build the TA that was ready to execute *Desert Storm*.

The Numbered Field Army. As the TA, Third Army commanded all Army forces in the-

ater, but was not in the operational chain. With execution of *Desert Storm* on 17 January, the theater assumed a greater complexity and scope. While creation of a joint or combined headquarters to serve as an intermediate operational headquarters between corps and the theater level is one option, a numbered field army was employed instead to coordinate the actions of the tactical corps conducting the theater main attack. By assigning Third Army this responsibility for operational direction of the two US maneuver corps, the CINC placed Third Army in his operational chain of command.

As an operational headquarters, Third Army was prepared to control up to five corps. Attainment of army operational objectives and the CINC's strategic goals was the focus. As such, the tactical-level wargaming was left largely to



VII Corps CG, Frederick M. Franks (center), with 1st Cavalry Division ADC, Josue Robles Jr. (left) and 22d Support Command DC Robert K. Guest.

Third Army's mobile command post served a different function than the tactical command post of the corps or division. The mobile command post was a horizontal command post and provided an additional capability for the commander to gather information and reallocate resources to solve near-term problems. It was not a command post for the commander to fight the close battle; the corps commanders accomplished that mission.

the corps. The staff supported this operational perspective with extensive situation assessment, estimate formulation and contingency planning.

Operational control of the corps required a number of actions: development of the operation plans for the Army's portion of the campaign plan, task organization of the corps and designation of the CENTCOM reserve division. It further required the synchronization of other Army assets such as intelligence gathering and the assignment of areas of responsibility and objectives to influence the outcome of the battle.

Key to successful operational command was the interaction of the two command posts, the main and the mobile, and the continuous interface with ARCENT liaison officers mentioned previously. As a numbered field army, Third Army's mobile command post served a different function than the tactical command post of the

corps or division. The mobile command post was a horizontal command post and provided an additional capability for the commander to gather information and reallocate resources to solve near-term problems. It was not a command post for the commander to fight the close battle; the corps commanders accomplished that mission.

The Third Army commander had a requirement to be where he could best influence the battle. In *Desert Storm*, that required him to be where he could best interact with key operational commanders: the Air component commander for air support, the Saudi Joint Forces Command for host nation support and, of course, the CINC. All three were located in Riyadh, as was the ARCENT main command post.

There was little need for the Army commander to "fight" the army battle forward from the mobile command post as a corps or division com-

mander would. The liaison teams provided an unfiltered view of the battle directly to the commander as it occurred, becoming a conduit for transmission of the commander's intent to subordinates and the subordinates' assessment of the battle in return. In this manner, the commander maintained a current picture of the battlefield.

The XVIII Airborne Corps and the VII Corps were the organizations that made things happen during *Desert Storm*, balancing the missions, caring for soldiers and executing the commander's intent. While ARCENT headquarters and EAC units set the stage for ground operations, it was the corps that maneuvered in southern Iraq and Kuwait to accomplish the objectives. The corps were the epitome of professional team players.

The numbered field army function of operational control of subordinate forces was not separate and distinct, but was integrated into the other responsibilities of Army component and TA. Third Army staff officers were hard-pressed to articulate which role they were performing at any moment during operations. Still, the requirement for Third Army to operationally control its subordinate corps, the VII and the XVIII, made it the senior operational headquarters for Army forces in theater—a numbered field army.

Army Operations

During *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, the army organized in theater according to doctrine as modified by the evolving METT-T. Size of operations was not the key parameter; basic functions within the theater were. The army in theater must always coordinate with joint and combined forces, generate and support forces and conduct operations. Unity of effort is a prerequisite in establishing priorities to balance the force.

In Southwest Asia, army capabilities above corps were organized around the Third Army

TF Freedom was a tailored EAC organization, organized by ARCENT solely to coordinate the initial restoration of Kuwait. It contained elements from SUPCOM, 352d Civil Affairs Brigade, explosive ordnance demolition personnel and a number of other special units to assist the Kuwaitis in restoring basic services until a DOD agency was established to handle long-term restoration.

Headquarters. As mentioned earlier, Third Army served as the Army component command, the theater army and as a numbered field army. As a deployable army headquarters, not a geographic continental army, Third Army had the versatility, flexibility and experience to accomplish these tasks. Ultimately, the total and selfless support by DA and the major commands was the key reason for success.


As the US Army evolves into a contingency force, deployment of forces to austere theaters will become more common. While Third Army's operation in Southwest Asia is one illustration of the army in theater operations, these same theater functions apply to the senior US Army headquarters for any operation, even if it is a corps or division. An important *Desert Storm* lesson learned is the need to train commands and individual staff officers on these functions and to gain the proficiency to perform them quickly. Third Army clearly demonstrated that the US Army has the organizational flexibility and professional soldiers to adapt to the most challenging situations. The overwhelming success of *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* is a credit to these professionals worldwide. **MR**

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THE AIR CAMPAIGN

Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, US Air Force

The air campaign of Desert Storm inflicted unprecedented damage on the Iraqi armed forces, preparing the battlefield for the swift and equally successful 100-hour ground campaign. The commander of US and coalition air forces outlines here the massive effort by planners, supporters and those who flew the sorties that brought the once proud Iraqi military to its knees. He also offers several important implications for future war that can be drawn from the dramatic results of air operations in the Gulf War.



MUCH has been said about the air campaign during Operation *Desert Storm*, some calling it the largest air operation in history, and others declaring it the most successful air war since the beginning of manned flight. I think those kind of statements should be left to the historians; time will surely be the judge of what occurred during Operation *Desert Storm*. My intent here is to tell the story as I saw it, as the commander of the coalition air forces. This is the story of ordinary people from across our country and around the globe working together in an unprecedented way to stop the brutal Iraqi aggression. The results serve as testimony to what can be accomplished when honorable people commit themselves to a higher moral calling and put service above self.

The *Desert Storm* air campaign story begins long before the first bomb struck Baghdad at 0300 on 17 January 1991. Actually, the preparation began in the mid-1970s as the US Air Force began a detailed analysis of the years of combat in Vietnam. The experience gained during our involvement in Southeast Asia proved invaluable in our preparation, planning and execution in Southwest Asia (SWA). Time and again, we would draw on our memories and experiences. People who fail to study their history are destined to repeat it, and we, the United States, were bound and determined not to make the same mistakes that had so frustrated our military efforts in Vietnam.

The following combined to form the basis of what happened during operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*:

- Unity of command and the joint forces air component commander (JFACC).
- The significance of strategic strikes at the heart of the enemy's governmental and command and control infrastructure.
- The absolute necessity of suppression of enemy air defenses.
- Increased survivability through timely use of electronic combat.
- Intense and realistic aircrew training.
- A logistic train to meet the needs of fluid and dynamic deployment and employment.

[The] National Command Authority . . . was willing to ensure that the military had the best possible equipment and weapons and the freedom to act, created an unprecedented synergistic effect. The equation was simple: the right national leadership, concrete national objectives, well-trained and motivated airmen and the right equipment to do the job.

These, coupled with a National Command Authority (NCA) that was willing to ensure that the military had the best possible equipment and weapons and the freedom to act, created an unprecedented synergistic effect. The equation was simple: the right national leadership, concrete national objectives, well-trained and motivated airmen and the right equipment to do the job.

With this as the background, I will describe how the US Central Command Air Force (USCENTAF) was formed, trained, deployed and fought. I will conclude with a discussion of the implications the air campaign will have on future conflicts.

A Decade of Preparation

USCENTAF was formed in the early 1980s as the Air Force component of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM). The requirement for specialization in the SWA region grew from anti-American occurrences commencing with the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the taking of hostages at the US Embassy in Tehran. The initial concept was the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), designed for the quick and efficient projection of power, enabling the United States to take immediate action around the globe, should the need arise. Because of the seriousness of the situation in the Middle East, it was determined that a unified command-level organization was required to focus the degree of attention necessary to deter and, if required, defeat aggression within the region. With the RDF concept as a base, USCENTCOM was created.

Once the parent command was established, immediate actions were initiated by its air component to meet the NCA and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) taskings. Planning staffs began focusing on potential threats. Working relationships with friendly countries were established and the foundations laid for agreements that would be critical for deployments and operations in times of crisis. Detailed studies and analyses of

logistic requirements and capabilities were conducted, identifying shortfalls and the need for pre-positioning of supplies and munitions. Also, immediate training began for desert warfare.

The realistic training programs, initiated nearly a decade ago, paid great dividends as our aircrews entered the conflict having been trained as they were expected to fight. Regional exercise scenarios gave us the opportunity to closely analyze our potential adversaries. Understanding the enemy gave us the opportunity to exploit his weaknesses. With strength against weakness being the prudent way to go, we placed a great deal of emphasis on our ability to operate at night. (Our sophisticated night capabilities proved to be an obstacle Iraq was never able to overcome.)

Annual and biannual exercises such as GALLANT KNIGHT, GALLANT EAGLE, BRIGHT STAR, QUICK FORCE, BLUE FLAG and RED FLAG paved the way to realistic and pragmatic expectations. As the years passed, we honed our ability to conduct air operations and fight in the desert and grew in our understanding of the uniqueness of our area of



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responsibility. Deployments into the desert gave us an understanding of the effects of heat, sand and dust on our personnel and equipment and allowed us to make adequate preparations to overcome the elements.

Also, early on, we realized the importance of "jointness." Therefore, we trained and planned together with our sister services. This togetherness resulted in joint concepts and

tactics that were to be major factors in the prosecution of *Desert Storm*. While nothing could have fully prepared us for what was to happen in August 1990, the realistic training of the 1980s had created a nucleus of trained specialists ready to react to the largest deployment tasking ever experienced by the Air Force.

The Total Force concept proved to be an absolute necessity. The integration of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard forces went extremely well. Training together in peacetime paid great dividends as Air Reserve forces blended in with their Active counterparts to form a very effective combat organization. From airlift, to tankers, to fighter squadrons, prior planning and training made it happen. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet also played a major role. Representatives from the US air carriers moved personnel and equipment in enormous quantities, flying all hours of the day and night to help ensure that missions objectives were met.

Deployment

The deployment phase was an awesome display of US determination and flexibility. Noth-



A B-52 flying low over the Pyramids during **BRIGHT STAR**, an annual exercise focusing on the Middle East, 10 September 1983.


Annual and biannual exercises . . . paved the way to realistic and pragmatic expectations. . . Deployments into the desert gave us an understanding of the effects of heat, sand and dust on our personnel and equipment and allowed us to make adequate preparations to overcome the elements.

ing we had ever attempted was even close to the size and magnitude of *Desert Shield*. The JCS apportionment process had provided USCENAF forces for planning purposes; however, when it came time to go, other forces were made available, and these assets had to be worked into the flow. The timing was critical and the sequencing essential. Getting the right capabilities into the theater early was critical to deter any further advance of the Iraqi army. The proper mixture of combat aircraft, combat support and combat service support had to be closely orchestrated to make all the pieces of the puzzle come together. The resulting deployment moved more tonnage in six weeks than the Berlin Airlift moved in 65 weeks. Identifying the right aircraft for the initial deployment and then selecting the follow-on forces to ensure the numbers and capabilities were present to accomplish the mission objectives provided a manageable schedule for bed-down (reception and placement of forces and support capabilities) and initiation of operational flying.

The challenges associated with the bed-down of the numbers of personnel and equipment were enormous to say the least. Rapid and often intense negotiations resulted in international agreements providing access to airfields. In many cases, any similarity between our assumed

basing locations and where the host nations agreed to let us operate were purely coincidental. Direct and often high-level dialogue was required to ensure that final locations were compatible with aircraft mission and capabilities. Sites close enough to the battlefield to ensure the timely entrance into the fight without unnecessarily jeopardizing the security of the assets were of primary concern.

Once the real estate was acquired, the concept of bare base operations was put to the test. In many cases, everything that was needed to operate had to be brought in and set up. Intertheater and intratheater airlift were critical as supplies and equipment from all over the globe were identified for shipment to the theater. After arriving in Southwest Asia, this megatonnage needed to be moved quickly and efficiently to the users throughout the region. Tying all the bases together in an operational communication network was essential to making the bed-down work. A sophisticated network of multisource communications capability had to be built from the ground up to tie the coalition forces together so that timely command and control could become a reality. Literally turning a desert runway strip into a full-up combat operating base overnight was demonstrated time and again as unit after unit became combat ready.



C-5 Galaxy transports at Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, during the around-the-clock effort to supply coalition forces in Saudi Arabia.

The timing was critical and the sequencing essential. . . . The proper mixture of combat aircraft, combat support and combat service support had to be closely orchestrated to make all the pieces of the puzzle come together. [This] deployment moved more tonnage in six weeks than the Berlin Airlift moved in 65 weeks.

Organization

Management of this enormous force required some modification to the USCENTAF organizational structure, especially in the Directorate of Operations. The Air Force assets were divided into four divisions, each commanded by a brigadier general. The divisions, set up in accordance with mission specialties were fighters, electronic combat, strategic (bombers and tankers) and airlift. The wing commanders reported directly to the division commanders who, in turn, reported to the commander USCENTAF (COMUSCENTAF). This was instrumental in resolution of span-of-control problems and provided the wing commanders someone with whom to discuss their concerns.

COMUSCENTAF, also the JFACC, was able to concentrate on joint/coalition issues while maintaining easy access to the combat units. The USCENTAF director of operations, a major general, interfaced with the other components and coalition operations chiefs. He was responsible for the production and execution of the daily air tasking order (ATO). This several hundred-page document provided the coordinated taskings and guidance for the execution of the air campaign. All components and coalition nations participated in the ATO pro-

duction process. It was here that jointness proved its real value.

The joint force concept integrates all services into one coordinated plan and ensures the maximum use of available capabilities. Marine attack aircraft accompanied by Air Force suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) assets and escorted by Navy fighters made for effective and lethal packages. Working together, the services were able to limit duplication of effort, minimize breakdowns in communication and fly 110,000 sorties without running into each other or committing air-to-air fratricide. Jointness afforded us the opportunity to capitalize on our capabilities without losing service identities. Placing all air forces under the command of the JFACC was successful application of our military doctrine.

While the JFACC idea has been discussed for several years, this was the first time it was used in a major conflict. Consistency in guidance and a coordinated effort were the products of this unified command organizational concept. The unity within our military also set the stage for the integration of the coalition air forces into the air campaign.

Operating as a coalition was essential in keeping the war from becoming a United States-

versus-Iraq conflict. Continuous coordination was necessary to make sure that all coalition members' training, communications and objectives were compatible. The problems encountered from differences in doctrine and equipment were offset by the positive effect of all coalition partners working together for a common goal. We were actually able to capitalize on unique capabilities such as the Saudi runway attack weapons, the French air-to-ground missiles and the British precision-guided munitions. However, in the war's aftermath, it is the potential for a stable atmosphere in the region that remains as the real benefit of the coalition.


Operations and Initial Defense

Immediately upon arrival, the coalition forces began preparing for the defense of Saudi Arabia. If further aggression was to be deterred, Iraq had to be convinced that forces were present to counter any additional attacks. Initial forces arriving in theater were designed to do just that.

Defensive counterair forces to prevent aggressive Iraqi air operations arrived in theater and began flying combat air patrol alongside the Royal Saudi Air Force. Antiarmor and close air support assets were placed in strategic locations where immediate action could have been taken, had the Iraqi ground forces begun moving south. Airborne command and control aircraft began flying orbits to increase surveillance and be prepared to orchestrate air combat operations, had the situation dictated.

The D-day ATO was developed and refined. Initial integration of coalition forces began to take place. Each participating nation was given a new piece of the pie commensurate with its numbers and capabilities. To be ready to defend, significant logistics problems had to be overcome. Getting the missiles, bombs and bullets to the correct locations (to provide teeth for the tiger) was an absolute must. Supply lines were established to sustain operations and ensure critical resources were available. With this, the stage was set for the defense of Saudi Arabia, and energy could be directed toward the development of the offensive air campaign.

A Washington Air National Guard KC-135 refuels an F-15 during *Desert Shield*.



The integration of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard forces went extremely well. Training together in peacetime paid great dividends as Air Reserve forces blended in with their Active counterparts to form a very effective combat organization.

Planning the Offensive

The planning for the offensive air campaign began in Washington, DC, shortly after the invasion of Kuwait. A working group at the Pentagon formulated the initial target list, briefed it to the commander in chief of USCENTCOM prior to his deployment and then took it to COMUSCENTAF, who had deployed to Southwest Asia three days after Iraq invaded Kuwait. The entire operation needed to develop an offensive air campaign shrouded in absolute secrecy and the number of people involved kept to a minimum. This small group, working with the following specific objectives, produced the operations order and the ATO that became the initial phases of *Desert Storm*:

- Destroy/neutralize air defense command and control.
- Destroy nuclear, biological and chemical storage and production capability.
- Render ineffective national and military command, control and communications infrastructure.



F-14 fighters crowd the deck of the USS Saratoga during operations in the Red Sea, February 1991.

The joint force concept integrates all services into one coordinated plan . . . Marine attack aircraft accompanied by Air Force suppression of enemy air defenses assets and escorted by Navy fighters made for effective and lethal packages. Working together, the services were able to limit duplication of effort, minimize breakdowns in communication and fly 110,000 sorties without . . . air-to-air fratricide.

- Destroy key electrical grids and oil storage facilities.
- Deny military resupply capability.
- Eliminate long-term offensive capability.
- Disrupt and weaken Republican Guard forces.

The group, initially made up of representatives from each component and the British Roy-


al Air Force, began its efforts to produce a flyable ATO. Long hours of detailed study and analysis, emphasizing the identification of exploitable weaknesses, paid great dividends as the plan came together. Exploiting our strengths against Iraq's weaknesses was the objective of our investigation. For example, our ability to operate effectively at night and Iraq's weakness to defend during darkness resulted in heavy emphasis on night operations. Detailed study of strategic targets within Iraq was accomplished to determine timing and munition requirements. Extensive logistics analysis and planning ensured the correct munitions were scheduled to be at the right base at the right time. All this had to be done without divulging the fact that we were planning offensive operations against Iraq.

By the early part of September, we had an executable plan. From that point on, the plan was reviewed and modified as additional information and targets became available. As follow-on forces arrived in theater, the plan grew in size and complexity. The high security classification level and limited distribution restrictions placed on the plan made dissemination possible only on a strict need-to-know basis. Couriers with top secret clearance were used to distribute each new addition to the ATO to small target planning cells at the combat units. By the end of October, the Royal Saudi Air Force had become an active participant in the working group and other coalition nations were in-briefed as execution neared.

The ATO. The integrated ATO process is designed to produce a daily product of varying size dependent on the magnitude of the operation. In this case, the ATO grew to several hundred pages and served as the single source document for the entire flying operation of *Desert Storm*. It was a 48-hour process, so the initial planning was for targets to be struck two days down the road. It was a never-ending cycle, continuously taking place for as long as air operations were necessary.

The cycle began with USCINCCENT's decision on the weight of effort and where he wanted the emphasis of air operations placed. Targets were then selected. Interservice and interna-

F-117A Stealth aircraft preparing for a mission into Iraq from their base near the Red Sea. The great distance from targets—which prompted one pilot to quip that missions were like flying from Las Vegas to St. Louis and back—would have prevented Iraq from retaliating against this precious asset even if its air force had not been destroyed.




Rapid and often intense negotiations resulted in international agreements providing access to airfields. . . . Direct and often high-level dialogue was required to ensure that final locations were compatible with aircraft mission and capabilities. Sites close enough to the battlefield to ensure the timely entrance into the fight without unnecessarily jeopardizing the security of the assets were of primary concern.

tional coordination occurred. A master attack plan was generated. The end product was disseminated. By the time the unit received the ATO for a given day, the next day's ATO was well on the way to completion, and planning for the following day had begun. When the war began, we started with the ATOs for the first two days, which had been produced over the previous five months. By the third day, we were into the classic ATO process, turning out a new product every 24 hours.

Intelligence. A key factor in the production of an effective ATO is the availability of timely and accurate intelligence. Operations and intelligence interface is a must. Intelligence is a significant force multiplier in the modern air battle. Timely flow of information on enemy activities, capabilities and intentions is absolutely critical. The close integration of national, regional and local collection capabilities and analysis is essen-

tial to the battlefield management decision-making process. Whether it comes from local human sources or airborne collection assets, the data must be collected, analyzed and disseminated to the user as near a real-time rate as possible. Knowing both the condition of targets to be struck and the bomb damage assessment on those already hit is critical to the planner who is attempting to maximize the use of available resources. Understanding the enemy's defense capabilities and the plans for employment of his defense assets plays an important part in strike package size, makeup and timing. The *Desert Storm* demands on the system resulted in unprecedented cooperation between the intelligence community and the operations planners.

Command and Control. Having the best personnel, equipment and plans are meaningless if you cannot talk to anyone or have a functioning system for command and control. Building a



A coalition soldier peers up at the gaping hole blown through the roof of an Iraqi hardened aircraft hanger. General Schwarzkopf had warned Iraq's air force that if it did not come up and fight, its shelters would be destroyed "one by one by one."

By the end of the first day, the stage was set for the crushing defeat of the Iraqi military. By day two, we had control of the air, and by the fourth day, the Iraqi air force was virtually nonexistent. . . . As the objectives of the offensive air campaign were achieved, more and more attention could be focused on the preparation of the battlefield for the ground phase of the war.

communications infrastructure from scratch was one of the most significant challenges faced as our forces arrived in the theater. The demand for, and subsequent use of, secure communications placed a heavy load on the system, but proved to be of immeasurable value. Available satellites, leased land lines and tactical equipment had to be woven into a sophisticated net-

work to meet the communications needs of a dynamic and rapidly changing combat situation. Our ability to disseminate information was testimony to the successful efforts of the communicators. While being able to talk to one another was a critical first step, much work was necessary to ensure an effective command and control system existed. Procedures were developed to integrate permanent host nation radar sites with our mobile and airborne assets. The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) datalink was critical in providing essential information to those managing the conflict. The multiservice and multinational presence in the tactical air control center had access to the available intelligence and the means of coordinating with their respective headquarters. This closed the command and control loop with the coalition.

Execution

With the forces in place, the command, control and communications system up and operational and the plan ready, the coalition air forces stood prepared for the president's order to action. On 17 January, the air campaign was set into motion. With surgical precision, the initial strikes were flown to near perfection. The months of agonizing preparation, coordination and planning paid off. By the end of the first day, the stage was set for the crushing defeat of the Iraqi military. By day two, we had control of the air, and by the fourth day, the Iraqi air force was virtually nonexistent. Mission after mission struck at the heart of Iraq, systematically eliminating the enemy's warfighting capabilities. As the objectives of the offensive air campaign were achieved, more and more attention could be focused on the preparation of the battlefield for the ground phase of the war.

The preparation of the battlefield actually began with the first bomb falling on Baghdad. The establishment of air supremacy was essential to our ability to operate at will throughout Iraq, interdicting critical elements of the Iraqi war machine. The disruption of Iraq's command and control created confusion and chaos in a system that demands rigid adherence to



US F-15 and Saudi F-5 aircraft flying a mission over Iraq.

Initial forces arriving in theater were . . . defensive counterair forces to prevent aggressive Iraqi air operations. . . . [They flew] combat air patrol alongside the Royal Saudi Air Force. Antiarmor and close air support assets were placed in strategic locations where immediate action could have been taken, had the Iraqi ground forces begun moving south.

centralized guidance. The constant bombardment of the enemy ground forces and the precision-guided weapon attacks against armor and artillery took a tremendous toll on men and equipment. The unrelenting bombing, coupled with the effective interdiction of supply lines, made the Iraqi soldier susceptible to our psychological campaign. The thousands of leaflets that rained down on Iraqi soldiers appeared over and over again in the hands and pockets of surrendering soldiers. By the time the ground war began, their will to fight had been so damaged that a strong Iraqi resistance just did not exist. What transpired in the 100-hour ground war serves as testimony of the impact air power can have on the modern battlefield.

Implications for Future War

We have only begun to analyze all that transpired during the period of August 1990 through February 1991 and to find implications on future

war. It may be a bit premature to draw concrete conclusions, but I will list several perceptions that will have to be dealt with in the planning and execution phases of future conflicts.

- As the only nation with the ability to project the kind of power required to confront the type of aggression experienced in Kuwait, the United States must maintain a rapid deployment capability. Time becomes such a critical factor, and the rapid movement of well-trained, modern-equipped and highly mobile forces is the answer. From the beginning, our ability to project force made the difference.

- Airlift, sealift and pre-positioning make this kind of operation possible. Future conflicts will require forces to get there in a hurry, creating tremendous logistic requirements. What cannot be stored in theater will have to be moved in quickly and in an orderly manner. We must ensure that our lift capabilities are modernized and updated to meet future needs.

The control reporting center at King Khalid Military City where information from US ground-based radars, Saudi early warning systems and AWACS was processed.



A sophisticated network of multisource communications capability had to be built from the ground up to tie the coalition forces together so that timely command and control could become a reality. Literally turning a desert runway strip into a full-up combat operating base overnight was demonstrated time and again.

Available satellites, leased land lines and tactical equipment [were] woven into a sophisticated network to meet the communications needs of a dynamic and rapidly changing combat situation. . . . Procedures were developed to integrate permanent host nation radar sites with our mobile and airborne assets. The AWACS datalink was critical in providing essential information to those managing the conflict.

- The JFACC concept works. Consistency and unity in guidance reduce coordination conflicts. Operating under one coordinated plan improves efficiency and lessens the possibility of fratricide.

- Early air supremacy is critical. Plans must ensure that adequate forces are dedicated early in the campaign to seize control of the air. With the freedom to fly at will, the rest falls into place.

- Strategic planning for regional conflicts is essential. Much of the success experienced in the ground war was the result of strategic strikes at the heart of the governmental and industrial infrastructure. These attacks ultimately had significant impact on the military discipline and morale of the Iraqi troops.

- Stealth technology is worth every penny. Operating night after night against targets protected by 3,000 antiaircraft guns and 60 surface-to-air missile sites without a single loss or even taking a hit is positive proof of the protection

this technology offers. In addition, the stealth aircraft does not need extensive electronic combat support. This frees these assets to support other missions.

- Precision-guided munitions are essential to mission accomplishment with minimum collateral damage. It takes fewer sorties to destroy the target. This also reduces exposure and, therefore, reduces the potential for aircraft losses.

- The use of precision-guided munitions against armor is devastating. The experience in *Desert Storm* could have as much impact on the tank as the bullet had on the knight in shining armor.

- Rapid battlefield movement requires improved capabilities for the identification of friendly forces. It is critical that we acquire systems that will allow pilots attacking forces on the ground to quickly distinguish friend from foe.

Psychological operations
leaflets distributed by the
XVII Airborne Group

بطاقة مرور آمن

يسمح لحامل هذه البطاقة بعبور الحدود الدولية المشتركة سواء الشقيقة أو الصديقة وخاصة القوات الأمريكية والبريطانية والفرنسية وسيلقى معاملة حسنة من الجميع حتى يصل إلى اقرب قيادة للقوات المشتركة أمنا مطمئن دون ان يتعرض الى اي سوء . سوف يعامل طبقا لاتفاقية جنيف .

القوات المشتركة ومسرح العمليات




اوقف القتال الآن، حافظ على حياتك

عن الملحق، يجب من حامله تنفيذ بالمخطوط التالية:

1. اسحب ملحق الذخيرة من سلاحك.
2. اسلك على كتفك الايسر مع توجيه الذخيرة الى اليمين.
3. ارفع يديك فوق راسك.
4. من مواقع القوات المتعددة تجسيت بعد، دي فرد.
5. المقتدى برفع هذه الوثيقة فوق راسك.
6. اذا حصلت هذا، تنجو من الموت.

CEASE RESISTANCE - BE SAFE

To seek refuge safely, the bearer must strictly adhere to the following procedures:

1. Remove the magazine from your weapon.
2. Sling your weapon over your left shoulder, muzzle down.
3. Have both arms raised above your head.
4. Approach the Multi-National Force positions slowly, with the lead soldier holding this document above his head.
5. If you do this, you will not die.

The unrelenting bombing, coupled with the effective interdiction of supply lines, made the Iraqi soldier susceptible to our psychological campaign. The thousands of leaflets that rained down on Iraqi soldiers appeared over and over again in the hands and pockets of surrendering soldiers.

- Continued emphasis must be placed on improvements in space-based early warning and surveillance systems. Space-based, wide-area surveillance has a valuable role in the modern battle.
- Real-time dissemination of intelligence data is a must.
- The Total Force concept works. Future conflicts will find the Active and Reserve forces that have trained together, fighting side by side, to be an effective fighting team.
- The dynamic initial air phases set the stage for the successful ground operations with

minimum friendly loss of life. Future campaign planning will have to take this into consideration.

The air campaign in Southwest Asia is an example of what can be done when freedom-loving people of the world commit themselves to an honorable cause and have the resolve to stand by their convictions. What occurred in the gulf will have a lasting effect, not only on the way we prepare for and prosecute a war but on how the rest of the world views aggression and our opposition to it. Desert Storm will leave its mark on history, and air power will be a primary chapter. **MR**

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GOOD LOGISTICS IS COMBAT POWER

The Logistics Sustainment of Operation Desert Storm

Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis, US Army,
and Major Harold E. Raugh Jr., US Army

CENTCOM Commander General H. Norman Schwarzkopf was quick to report that the tremendous success of Operation Desert Storm was, in large measure, the result of the massive logistic effort; moving two corps and all their supplies to the western attack positions for the envelopment of the Iraqi army. The authors provide a recap of the planning and execution that began early in Desert Shield and carried the coalition forces to victory in the ground war.



THE OVERWHELMING victory in Operation Desert Storm was due not only to the unparalleled proficiency and unequalled confidence of the US forces' combat soldiers and leaders, but also to the highly successful implementation of an effective and farsighted logistic plan and operation.¹ The theaterwide logistic support of all US soldiers and their equipment in Southwest Asia was a spectacular accomplishment. At the start of the ground phase of Desert Storm (24-28 February 1991), the 22d Support Command (Theater Army Area), along with the 1st and 2d Corps Support Commands (COSCOMs) from the XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps, respectively, was responsible for sustaining more than 300,000 soldiers in 12,400 tracked combat vehicles and 114,000 wheeled vehicles. These forces were organized into two full Army corps and located in a harsh and inhospitable region where no military logistic infrastructure had existed previously.

Indeed, the foundation for the total success of Desert Storm was, in large measure, laid carefully during the previous two months when the 22d Support Command, with the 1st and 2d COSCOMs, developed the theater logistic support plan. The logistic plan was executed with unsurpassed efficiency and success by logisticians in the combat units, the forward support battalions, the divisions and corps support commands and the 22d Support Command.²

Formation of the Support Command

On the morning of 2 August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. Six days later, after hasty planning and coordination due to the short notice involved and urgency of the situation, a small group of logisticians from US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) J4 (Logistics Directorate) and the Pentagon arrived in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On the plane en route to Saudi Arabia, they formulated the original plan of what was later to become the mission of the Support Command (SUPCOM). This plan contained three major tasks: the reception, onward movement and sustainment of the

force deploying to Southwest Asia.

Since the National Command Authority had made the decision to immediately send combat units of the XVIII Airborne Corps to Saudi Arabia ahead of their support elements to deter Iraqi aggression, the small group of logisticians that

After the receipt of XVIII Airborne Corps, the development of the HNS infrastructure and the development of the logistics base, the mission was further expanded to include the "receipt, forward movement and sustainment of all forces in Saudi Arabia." This mission remained in effect for the receipt of the VII Corps from Germany.

landed on 8 August 1990 became the nucleus of all logistic support for Army troops arriving in country. Shortly after the arrival at Dhahran of the first elements of the 82d Airborne Division, a decision was made that a support command was needed to control all logistic support in the theater of operations. This decision was based on the lack of an Army logistics infrastructure needed to feed, shelter and supply the large number of soldiers arriving in Southwest Asia. It was further decided that the airfield at Dhahran and the ports at Ad Dammam and Al Jubayl would become, respectively, the APOD (aerial port of debarkation) and the SPODs (seaports of debarkation).

The SUPCOM, assisted by the 1st COSCOM from the XVIII Airborne Corps, immediately assumed all theater logistic responsibility. It took over responsibility for the APOD and, between 10 and 25 August 1990, received more than 40,000 troops from the XVIII Airborne Corps. An area support group and an area support battalion were also quickly formed. Additionally, the first elements of the 7th Transportation Group arrived in country on 12 August, became a major subordinate command of the SUPCOM and began planning to receive equipment at the ports, especially the Army,

Marine and Air Force equipment on prepositioned ships from Diego Garcia. Their cargo of food, tents, materiel, supplies and ammunition proved to be invaluable.

The SUPCOM headquarters initially consisted of only two elements: a command element and a logistics operations center (LOC). The LOC was the nerve center for the reception, onward movement and sustainment of all troops

The primary SUPCOM concern prior to D-day was the possibility of preemptive Iraqi air strikes and terrorist activity. Once hostilities began, however, attention became focused on the possibility of Scud attacks against logistics facilities and on limited enemy ground attacks that could have disrupted supply movement.

and equipment coming into country. The LOC, operating on 36-hour shifts, was initially manned by the handful of logisticians and in-theater liaison officers from each unit that arrived and by other borrowed military manpower. Another 18 hand-picked logisticians arrived on 14 August from the United States to supplement the small group of dedicated Americans.

On 16 August, while establishing his headquarters at Dhahran, where all US troops were arriving, Major General William G. Pagonis was appointed Commander, US Army Central Command (ARCENT)(Forward).³ Two days later, ARCENT formally established the ARCENT SUPCOM (Provisional), although it had been in operation since 10 August, with Pagonis as commander. On 27 August, a general staff was formed, augmented by soldiers from ARCENT headquarters, as the SUPCOM began to take shape.⁴

By late August 1990, the mission of the SUPCOM was expanded and outlined as follows:

- Deploy and organize host nation support (HNS) to receive and move onward soldiers and Marines entering the theater. Provide for

further development of the US-Saudi Arabia (SA) support infrastructure.

- Develop from zero base the ARCENT SUPCOM, using arriving US units and cadre with host nation elements. Mature to a combined US-SA support structure.

- Provide theaterwide logistics support for reception, onward movement and sustainment of US and combined forces.

After the receipt of XVIII Airborne Corps, the development of the HNS infrastructure and the development of the logistics base, the mission was further expanded to include the "receipt, forward movement and sustainment of all forces in Saudi Arabia." This mission remained in effect for the receipt of the VII Corps from Germany.

Receipt of XVIII Airborne Corps

Elements of the 82d Airborne Division first arrived at Dhahran on 9 August 1990. When they arrived, there was no logistic structure to support the troops, no transportation, no shelter from the 130-degree heat, no A-ration meal support, little water available, no available sanitary facilities and no postal support. The SUPCOM and 1st COSCOM worked feverishly to provide these items and did so in a remarkably short time. At the end of August, the mechanisms were in place to start providing basic necessities: shelter, food, water, transportation,




Figure 1. Comparison to Eastern United States



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
A key element in providing support was the HNS structure and contracting effort. A HNS cell and civilian contractor liaison officer worked these problems continuously within the SUPCOM LOC. The LOC, coordinating with the Saudi Arabian government, was able to acquire and provide fresh fruit, bottled water, other foodstuffs, transportation and billeting. Additionally, temporary camps with shelters were allocated to the incoming troops. The 82d Airborne Division was first quartered at a Saudi Arabian air defense site and eventually occupied several camps in the surrounding area.

By 30 September 1990, there were approximately 72,000 XVIII Airborne Corps troops in theater, supported by the SUPCOM and 1st COSCOM. One month later, most elements of the corps had arrived, and the SUPCOM and 1st

COSCOM were supporting approximately 97,000 troops. By this time, 1st COSCOM had established log base Pulaski and the SUPCOM established log base Bastogne to support the forward operation of XVIII Airborne Corps.

Receipt of VII Corps

On 8 November 1990, President George Bush decided to send an additional Army corps to Southwest Asia to support possible offensive operations to liberate Kuwait. The movement of the heavy armored corps from Germany placed additional strains on the logistics system. This was particularly evident at the port facilities. Not only were the SUPCOM and COSCOMs required to deploy another corps faster than the first, but this time, it was required to paint all of the forest green tanks arriving from Germany a sand color before their movement to the desert.



By 30 September 1990, there were approximately 72,000 XVIII Airborne Corps troops in theater. . . . One month later, most elements of the corps had arrived, and the SUPCOM and 1st COSCOM were supporting approximately 97,000 troops. By this time, 1st COSCOM had established log base Pulaski and the SUPCOM established log base Bastogne to support the forward operation of XVIII Airborne Corps.

This was a monumental task that had not been anticipated. By late November, a logistic infrastructure was in place to support the troops and to paint their equipment.

VII Corps vehicles and heavy equipment arrived at the ports of Ad Dammam and Al Jubayl during the following two and a half months. Because of limited billeting space, VII Corps troops were billeted initially in warehouses at the port of Ad Dammam and at a staging area near the port of Al Jubayl before they were moved to field locations. By the end of December 1990, the 22d Support Command, together with the 1st and 2d COSCOMs, had received over 221,000 troops in theater along with over 769,000 short tons of equipment. The equipment included more than 6,000 tracked combat vehicles and more than 59,000 wheeled vehicles. VII Corps had about 80 percent of its elements in theater on 17 January 1991.

Support Command Plans

The development of the theater logistic support plan was integral to the overall success of *Desert Storm*, and this planning began when Bush decided to send VII Corps to the theater of operations. By the end of November 1990, the five-phased theater logistics concept had been established, and the SUPCOM had published logistic operation plans (OPLANs) 91-1 and 91-2 detailing the initial phases of the projected offensive. The commander briefed the concept to all officers and noncommissioned officers of the command at a logistics exercise conducted on 4 December 1990, to ensure that all leaders understood the concept of the operation. The briefing and plans provided a single mission on which all leaders of the command could focus their attention in the following months. Additionally, the commander briefed the first three phases to Secretary of Defense Richard B.



US military vehicles
at Ad Dammam.

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Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin L. Powell on 27 December 1990. The following briefly describes the five-phased logistics support plan:

Phase Alpha: preparation and pre-positioning. This phase involved the repositioning of SUPCOM units and stocks of supplies from the south (vicinity of Dhahran and Al Jubayl) to the north along main supply route (MSR) Dodge, while simultaneously receiving and moving VII Corps to its tactical assembly areas. Additionally, huge logistics bases were built during December 1990 along MSR Dodge, near King Khalid Military City (KKMC) and along MSR Sultan, just south of KKMC. These log bases were designated Alpha, Bravo and Delta and were to contain all classes of supply supporting the two Army corps and echelons above corps.

Finally, to provide better command and con-

trol over the long distances, the SUPCOM LOC was divided, with a forward LOC established at KKMC. The duties and responsibilities of the forward LOC were identical to those of the main LOC at Dhahran with the exception that only the latter was responsible for issuing formal orders. This phase began in late November and lasted until the start of hostilities on 17 January 1991.

Phase Bravo: movement of the corps. Both the XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps moved simultaneously from their tactical assembly areas to their attack positions, with the SUPCOM assisting by providing the heavy transportation assets necessary to move the corps over the several hundred-mile stretch of desert. The tracked vehicles were then carried by the corps on heavy equipment transporters (HETs) to their attack positions. Many of these HETs were foreign-made (East German, Czech,

and so on) and were driven by foreign drivers.

Additionally, the 1st and 2d COSCOMs, with help from the SUPCOM, established two new log bases (Charlie and Echo) to support each corps when the offensive would commence. This phase, which coincided with the beginning of *Desert Storm* and continued through January 1991, reflected a total team effort of the SUPCOM and countless subordinate units.

Phase Charlie: the ground offensive.

This phase entailed the SUPCOM support and sustainment of the ground offensive into Iraq and Kuwait. The plan envisioned transportation of all commodities of supply, especially fuel, ammunition, food and water. Additionally, the construction of new log bases deep inside Iraq was anticipated to sustain the offensive, had it become necessary. This phase commenced on order at the start of the ground offensive on 24 February 1991.

Phase Delta: defense of Kuwait. This included SUPCOM support of civil-military affairs efforts to restore facilities and services inside liberated Kuwait. It began during the ground of-

fensive, once Kuwait City was liberated.

Phase Echo: redeployment. This phase involved SUPCOM support of redeployment (which was dubbed Operation *Desert Farewell*). It envisioned that the SUPCOM would provide the theaterwide assets to redeploy all elements of ARCENT. SUPCOM OPLAN 91-4 was the detailed logistic plan for this operation.

The Enemy Situation

Prior to the start of hostilities, the enemy forces in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operation (KTO) included some 42 divisions (about 500,000 soldiers) arrayed in a prepared, in-depth defensive posture. ARCENT believed the enemy possessed the ability to transition to short-notice offensive operations. The confidence of the SUPCOM, however, was bolstered with the arrival of the VII Corps in theater. The primary SUPCOM concern prior to D-day (17 January 1991) was the possibility of preemptive Iraqi air strikes and terrorist activity. Once hostilities began, however, attention became focused on the possibility of Scud attacks against logistics facilities and on limited enemy ground attacks that could have disrupted supply movement on the MSRs.

Operational Highlights

Movement of the Two Army Corps to Attack Positions. The movement of the XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps to their attack positions began on 20 January 1991 and contin-

Both . . . corps moved simultaneously from their tactical assembly areas to their attack positions, with the SUPCOM assisting by providing the heavy transportation assets necessary to move the corps over the several hundred-mile stretch of desert. The tracked vehicles were then carried by the corps on HETs to their attack positions. Many of these HETs were foreign-made and were driven by foreign drivers.

Host nation trucks hauling

Ships Unloaded

Type	Number
Fast Sealift Support Ship (FSS)	32
Roll-on/Roll-off (RORO)	153
Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH)	23
Breakbulk (BB)	172
Containerized (CNTR)	100
Heavy Lift Pre-positioned Ship (HLPS)	2
Seagoing Barge Elevator Equipped (SEBE)	5
Logistic Support Vessel (LSV)	6
Barge	1

TOTAL 494

SPOD Berths

Al Jubayl
18

Ad Dammam
36

Figure 3. Seaports of Debarkation
(Summary—7 August 1990 thru 26 March 1991)

Ships unloading military supplies at Ad Dammam.

By the end of December 1990, the 22d Support Command, together with the 1st and 2d COSCOMs, had received over 221,000 troops in theater along with over 769,000 short tons of equipment. The equipment included more than 6,000 tracked combat vehicles and more than 59,000 wheeled vehicles. VII Corps had about 80 percent of its elements in theater on 17 January 1991.

ued around the clock for two weeks. By 3 February 1991, both corps had closed in their attack positions. The XVIII Airborne Corps moved on both the northern and southern MSRs, while the VII Corps moved only on the northern route. The distances both corps had to travel were considerable: more than 500 miles for XVIII Airborne Corps and more than 330 miles for VII Corps.


The SUPCOM provided extensive support for this movement that involved transporting thousands of tracked vehicles and controlling the movement of tens of thousands of wheeled vehicles. For example, VII Corps alone had more than 7,000 tracked vehicles and more than 40,000 wheeled vehicles. The SUPCOM's 318th Movement Control Agency (MCA) coordinated this large movement by allocating blocks of time to each corps for move-

ment on their designated MSRs. The 89th Military Police (MP) Brigade provided support through MP checkpoints positioned on all routes of movement. At the peak of this movement, 18 vehicles per minute passed a single point on the northern route.

For this massive movement, the SUPCOM projected the need to provide approximately 1,300 HETs, 450 lowboys and 2,200 flatbeds, or a total of almost 4,000 heavy vehicles of all types. The SUPCOM acquired this large number of heavy equipment vehicles by using US assets and trucks provided by European countries, Egypt, and host nation assets. Many of the drivers were contracted civilians who came from South Korea, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt and other Third World countries.

Pre-positioning of Supplies at Logistics Bases. The SUPCOM pre-positioned sup-

A convoy of ammunition trucks approaching King Khalid Military City.



Critical to the success of the ground offensive was the sufficient theater stockage of Class I (food and water), Class III (fuel) and Class V (ammunition) supplies. By G-day (24 February 1991), there were approximately 29 days of supply (DOS) of Class I, 5.2 DOS of Class III and 45 DOS of Class V (although many of the preferred Class V items were stocked at over 100 percent required).

plies to support the ground offensive simultaneously with the movement of the corps to their attack positions. This entailed setting up log bases Charlie and Echo. The establishment of Charlie, however, to be located in the northwestern portion of Saudi Arabia, could not begin until the start of the air campaign. This was because a large-scale movement of troops to the west prior to this time could have alerted the Iraqis and caused them to shift their forces directly onto the path of one of the allies' axes of advance. Log base Charlie provided support to XVIII Airborne Corps and Echo supported VII Corps. The supplies for these log bases were transported along the southern MSR.

Critical to the success of the ground offensive was the sufficient theater stockage of Class I (food and water), Class III (fuel) and Class V (ammunition) supplies. By G-day (24 February

1991), there were approximately 29 days of supply (DOS) of Class I, 5.2 DOS of Class III and 45 DOS of Class V (although many of the preferred Class V items were stocked at over 100 percent required). By the cease-fire on 28 Feb-




Figure 4. Movement of VII and XVIII Corps

ruary 1991, there were 25 DOS of Class I, 5.6 DOS of Class III and about 66 DOS of Class V (based on consumption rates during the 100-hour ground war).

Daily support requirements for the corps were computed as follows:

- Ammunition Resupply: VII Corps—450 truckloads/9,000 tons; XVIII Airborne Corps—400 truckloads/5,000 tons.
- Fuel Resupply: VII Corps—400 truckloads/2.4 million gallons; XVIII Airborne Corps—480 truckloads/2.1 million gallons.

The significance of these requirements was the realization that the projected consumption rates and long lines of communication would result in an expenditure of supplies faster than the primary log bases could replenish. Accordingly, two contingency plans were developed. The first was to reduce the lines of communication by constructing roads following the two attacking corps, and the second was logistics over the shore operations if a port in Kuwait could be made available.

Support and Sustainment of the Ground Offensive. The SUPCOM planned to support the ground offensive, using the "90-mile rule," which allowed drivers to make a round trip in a 24-hour period. SUPCOM provided critical Class I, III and V assets 90 miles forward into Iraq from log bases Charlie and Echo to provisional log bases that would have been set up, if necessary, to sustain the offensive. Because

the ground offensive penetrated so deeply into enemy territory and because of its short duration, these provisional log bases were never

The movement . . . continued around the clock for two weeks. By 3 February 1991, both corps had closed in their attack positions. The XVIII Airborne Corps moved on both the northern and southern MSRs, while the VII Corps moved only on the northern route. The distances both corps had to travel were considerable: more than 500 miles for XVIII Airborne Corps and more than 330 miles for VII Corps.

fully set up. Instead, they became trailer transfer points where SUPCOM trailers were dropped for corps units to take farther forward. Had an extended resupply capability been necessary, the SUPCOM would have been prepared to meet that requirement.

Observations

The SUPCOM used doctrine whenever possible, but always tailored doctrine to meet the needs of the situation. In general, the most important area where doctrine helped was in providing guidance and standardization. Standardization was one of the reasons the SUPCOM




Figure 5. Theater Throughput of Supplies—Ground Offensive




Figure 6. Theater Fuel Resupply—Ground Offensive

was successful in logistically supporting an operation of this magnitude. However, the SUPCOM used standardized procedures and opera-

The SUPCOM used doctrine whenever possible, but always tailored doctrine to meet the needs of the situation. In general, the most important area where doctrine helped was in providing guidance and standardization. . . . [It] used standardized procedures and operations in a manner that did not stifle the initiative, drive and innovation of its subordinate commanders and soldiers. Under the harsh conditions of improvisation prevalent in August and September 1990, it was extremely important to solve problems and alleviate shortcomings in a timely manner.

tions in a manner that did not stifle the initiative, drive and innovation of its subordinate commanders and soldiers. Under the harsh conditions of improvisation prevalent in August and September 1990, it was extremely important to solve problems and alleviate shortcomings in a timely manner. If some unorthodox or different technique worked, it was used immediately. Doctrine was not allowed to stand in the way of the prompt and complete logistic




Figure 7. Theater Ammo Resupply—Ground Offensive

support of the soldiers in the Southwest Asia theater of operations.

Another major achievement of the SUPCOM was the smooth integration of Reserve Component (RC) elements into the overall logistics structure. About 20 years ago, the Army's force structure was reorganized so that most of the combat service support (CSS) elements are in the RC. This permitted the soldiers in these units, many of whom perform the same military duties as they do in their civilian careers, to be mobilized and deployed without delay to Southwest Asia, where they carried out their duties in a remarkably effective manner. The earlier decision proved to be correct and valuable, as no time was wasted, after mobilization, retraining these citizen-soldiers to accomplish their individual tasks and unit missions. The payoff was that many RC soldiers drew individual and unit equipment and were performing their missions in the field within 48 hours of arriving in country.

In addition, since many of the RC elements are CSS units, eventually 75 percent of the strength of the SUPCOM, which peaked at 40,898 soldiers, was RC soldiers. The RC units conducted continuous operations in all areas of logistic support. The contributions of RC units were vital to the successful accomplishment of *Desert Storm*.

There must be, however, a proper ratio between CSS elements in the RC and in the Active Component. In the event of a military deployment to a hostile or potentially hostile theater of operations, elements such as the movement control center and MCA must be immediately deployable, or valuable time will be lost and confusion may result.

It is not the intent of this article to chronicle and assess the "lessons learned" from the logistic standpoint of *Desert Storm*. There were numerous shortfalls in doctrine that were overcome by superhuman efforts, initiative and tenacity. No one must lose sight of the tremendous civilian logistics infrastructure in country, which made up many shortcomings. All logistic activities, successes as well as shortfalls, have been fully

documented and are currently being studied to ensure that logistic support of the next military operation is even better than it was for Desert Storm.

The success of theater logistic support operations in Southwest Asia during Desert Storm was the direct result of effective centralized planning by the SUPCOM and audacious decentralized execution by the logisticians in the combat units, the forward support battalions, and the division and corps support commands. It was also the culmination of intense effort and farsighted planning conducted during Desert Shield. There were many other unsung logistics heroes, military and civilian, in these operations, in addition to the direct participants. They include those in Headquarters, Department of the Army, FORSCOM, Army Materiel Command, US Transportation Command, Military Traffic Management Com-

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mand, Military Sealift Command, Military Airlift Command, Defense Logistics Agency, US Army, Europe, Eighth US Army and a host of others, including the indispensable support of the American people. In short, it was a joint, multiechelon, Total Force effort, proving beyond a doubt that "Good Logistics is Combat Power." **MR**

NOTES

1. This article, of necessity, concentrates on the logistic aspects and support of Army units during Operation Desert Storm. The omission of US Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and allied operations is not meant to denigrate their invaluable contributions to the overall success of this campaign.

2. Much of this article is derived from memoranda, situation reports, daily command briefing slides and other documents of Headquarters, 22d Support Command, including: Memorandum, 23 March 1991, Subject: Command Report, Operation Desert Shield, 22d Support Command; Memorandum, 28 March 1991, Subject: Summary of External Logistics After Action Review (AAR) (ARCENT, XVIII and VII corps); Memorandum, 3 April 1991, Subject: Summary of MSC After Action Review; Memorandum, 5 April 1991, Subject: Command Report, 22d Support Command, Operation Desert Storm, 17 January-15 March 1991; Memorandum, 30 May 1991, Subject: Written After Action Report, Desert Shield/Desert Storm; and Memorandum, 24 June

1991, Subject: Draft-Logistical History of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Principal authors, among others, of these memoranda include LTC Russell A. Eno, LTC Wesley V. Manning, MAJ William W. Epley, 1LT Frank Behan and SGT Howard Miller. COL James Ireland also provided superb guidance and technical advice as this article was being written.

3. The ARCENT main headquarters remained in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia.

4. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 22d Support Command, was constituted 21 August 1965 in the Regular Army as Headquarters, Headquarters Company and Special Troops, 22d Field Army Support Command and activated that same day at Fort Lee, Virginia. It was inactivated 7 December 1970. It was redesignated 16 December 1990 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 22d Support Command, and activated at Fort McPherson, Georgia. The headquarters and command's colors were then transferred to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, the following day.

Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis serves concurrently as commander, Central Command (Forward); commander, US Army Central Command (Forward); and commander, 22d Support Command, Saudi Arabia. He holds B.S. and M.B.A. degrees from Pennsylvania State University. He has held various command positions such as commander, 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), 7th Transportation Group, Fort Eustis, Virginia; commander, Logistic Support Command, 193d Infantry Brigade, Panama; commander, Division Support Command, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado; deputy commander, 21st Theater Army Area Support Command, US Army, Europe. He has also served as J4, Forces Command.

Major Harold E. Raugh Jr. is currently en route to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization headquartered in Jerusalem. He holds a B.S. from the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, and an M.A. and Ph.D. from UCLA. An infantryman, he has served in the Berlin Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, 7th Infantry Division (Light); assistant professor, Department of History, US Military Academy, West Point; command historian, US Army Central Command (Forward) and 22d Support Command, Saudi Arabia.




MOVING AN ARMY

Movement Control for DESERT STORM

Colonel Peter C. Langenus, US Army Reserve

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The contributions of the many Reserve Component units during Desert Shield and Desert Storm have received much deserved recognition. None were more critical to the overall success of the campaign than those rendered by the 318th Transportation Agency (Movement Control) and the many, many units and headquarters responsible for planning and executing the massive movements of the two corps and all the supplies required to sustain them. This article provides an overview of the scope of this mission and the tremendous efforts of those who made it happen.



I can't recall any time in the annals of military history when this number of forces have moved over this distance to put themselves in a position to be able to attack . . .

Not only did we move the troops out there, but we literally moved thousands and thousands of tons of fuel, of ammunition, of spare parts, of water, and of food . . . because we wanted to have enough supplies on hand so that if we launched this and if we got into a slugfest battle, which we very easily could have gotten into, we'd have enough supplies to last for 60 days.

IN THOSE WORDS, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., commander in chief of the US Armed Forces, Central Command, described the challenges and the achievements of the transportation community during operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. The purpose of this article is to examine, in detail, those challenges and show how they were turned into extraordinary achievements.

The basic battle plan was simple to state: Attack the Iraqi forces from the west and north by means of a tactical envelopment, while fixing Iraqi forces in place through a feint involving a Marine amphibious assault and a joint Marine-coalition forces assault into southern Kuwait. To support the envelopment, the movement requirements called for the relocation of:

- Two US Army corps (the VII and the XVIII Airborne [ABN]) task organized with more than 190,000 soldiers.
- British and French contingents of nearly 45,000 soldiers.
- More than 95,000 trucks and other wheeled vehicles.
- More than 12,000 tanks and armored personnel vehicles requiring their own heavy lift.

In addition, a 60-day stockage level of Class I, II, III, IV, V, VIII and IX supplies required extensive movement support to meet the logistics support base pre-positioning requirements dictated by the campaign plan.

Limitations on movements were few, but they were crucial to ensuring the success of the campaign. To prevent the compromise of operation-

al security, moves could not begin until the air campaign had commenced and had to be executed to the maximum extent possible during hours of darkness. When the order to go was finally given on 17 January 1991, an endless

The Arabian Peninsula is a vast land mass roughly the size of the United States east of the Mississippi. . . . Much of the road network is simple macadam highway barely qualifying as two-lane country roads. One of these country roads was to be the main life line of the entire operation and would see most of the traffic. Its name was MSR Dodge.

ribbon of headlights piercing the darkness followed as units and supplies moved 400 to 500 miles west to frontline positions and forward logistic support bases. That seemingly endless journey was completed in just 21 nights and days after more than a month of detailed planning.

The responsibility for managing this massive movement fell to the 318th Transportation Agency (Movement Control), a Reserve Component unit headquartered in New York City. The 318th mobilized on 20 September 1990 and arrived in Saudi Arabia in early October. Throughout *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, the 318th functioned as the theater army movement control agency. The 318th was assisted by the 93d Movement Control Battalion (Provisional) and the 49th Movement Control Center (MCC). The 93d and 49th were composed of Active, Reserve and National Guard movement control teams (MCTs) and cargo documentation teams, task organized into provisional MCTs.

In addition to operational security limitations, many other factors made the difficult mission seemingly impossible. The Arabian Peninsula is a vast land mass roughly the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. Much of it is relentless desert with small inhabitations every 100 miles or so. There are some freeways comparable to the US interstate system, but much of

the road network is simple macadam highway barely qualifying as two-lane country roads. One of these country roads was to be the main life line of the entire operation and would see most of the traffic. Its name was MSR (main supply route) Dodge.

MSR Dodge was the preeminent MSR of *Desert Storm*, stretching from Abu Hadriyah, near the Persian Gulf, west past Hafar al Batin and beyond Rafhah. Its shoulders were nonexistent or nonforgiving. The brave soldiers driving this treacherous route quickly nicknamed it "Suicide Alley" or the "Highway to Hell." It roughly paralleled the Saudi-Iraqi border for hundreds of

miles, in some places almost touching the border, and in many places, within range of Iraqi artillery. It was almost completely lacking in services or amenities. To support the endless movement of more than 3,500 convoys, up to nine convoy support centers (CSCs) were constructed along the way, one approximately every 150 miles. These CSCs were capable of refueling hundreds of trucks an hour, each dispensing almost 100,000 gallons of fuel a day.

In addition to fuel, the CSCs provided basic life support systems such as latrines, aid stations, medevac capability, vehicle recovery, light maintenance capability, food and water and limited overnight rest capability. At many of these CSCs, a soldier was able to get an American hamburger or hot dog, french fries and a cold soda. They also served as communications control sites. In essence, they were the major milestones along the life line to the front lines.

US military truck assets were not sufficient in number to meet all of the theater lift requirements. To make up for the shortfall, a patchwork of US, Saudi Arabian and Egyptian military truck units was organized around military and commercial assets under the command and control of provisional and TOE (table of organization and equipment) truck battalions. Added to these were trucks donated by the German, Italian and Czechoslovakian governments. Additional vehicles were leased from host nation (HN) sources. These commercial vehicles were driven by US military volunteers, Saudi, Pakistani, Indian, Filipino, Korean and Turkish contract drivers. An air defense artillery (ADA) battalion was even given the mission to operate and maintain more than 100 Tatra (Czechoslovakian) 10-ton trucks to support the effort. The driver's military occupation specialty, 88M, quickly became the most critical and sought after logistic skill in the theater.

Figure 1 reflects the array of echelons above corps (EAC) heavy lift assets that were available for tasking. Those commercial contracted assets operated by HN or third country nationals (TCNs) were particularly hard to control. Quite often, they would not return within the 72 hours

Average Daily On Hand EAC Assets for Periods Shown

	COM FLT	US FLT	COM Czech. LBV Tatra	COM Tatra	US HET	US HET	Egypt. HET	Ital. HET	Mack HET
<i>Dec 1-15</i>									
CONT	315	-	220	-	225	-	-	-	-
MIA	133	-	75	-	26	-	-	-	-
O/H	182	480	145	-	199	-	-	-	-
<i>Dec 16-31</i>									
CONT	484	-	370	-	495	-	-	-	-
MIA	250	-	228	-	211	-	-	-	-
O/H	234	515	142	-	284	-	-	-	-
<i>Jan 1-15</i>									
CONT	*	-	228	-	348	-	-	-	-
MIA	*	-	65	-	16	-	-	-	-
O/H	353	544	163	45	332	42	-	-	-
<i>Jan 16-31</i>									
CONT	*	-	228	-	348	-	-	-	-
MIA	*	-	36	-	83	-	-	-	-
O/H	440	817	196	58	265	88	52	-	-
<i>Feb 1-13</i>									
CONT	618	-	233	-	349	-	-	-	-
MIA	94	-	25	-	68	-	-	-	-
O/H	534	891	208	163	281	99	100	60	48
<i>Feb 14-28</i>									
CONT	863	-	260	-	346	-	-	-	-
MIA	110	-	36	-	61	-	-	-	-
O/H	754	1004	223	151	285	100	99	60	48
<i>Mar 1-15</i>									
CONT	1017	-	274	-	346	-	-	-	-
MIA	85	-	9	-	62	-	-	-	-
O/H	933	1038	266	137	284	100	99	60	48
<i>Daily Av.</i>									
OR%	86%	86%	78%	46%	85%	80%	69%	67%	80%

*Data not tracked
 O/H—Number actually being used
 COM—Commercial
 FLT—Flatbed
 CONT—Number on vehicles under contract
 MIA—Missing in action vehicles (not returned within 72 hours)

LBV—Lowboy
 HET—Heavy equipment transporter
 OR—Operational Rate

Figure 1.

MOVEMENT CONTROL

allotted to complete a mission. Approximately 15 percent to 20 percent of the commercial assets were not available for tasking on a given day, which further burdened the movement control system.

Figure 2 shows the average daily allocation of EAC heavy lift assets in support of corps/EAC unit moves and the movement of theater sustainment cargo. These assets were "on the road" daily, providing mission support over and above corps assets. Among the major competing priorities for transportation assets early in *Desert Storm* were large movements of ammunition (800 trucks per day), tactical petroleum terminals (280 trucks) and tactical petroleum pipeline equipment (600 trucks). In addition to these controlled moves and allocations, the Military Traffic Management Command contract provided commercial carriers to move 40-foot containers. During *Desert Shield*, these carriers moved almost 11,000 containers and, during *Desert Storm*, almost 4,000 containers were moved in this manner.

The primary means of transporting troops around the theater was by HN bus. Contracts were negotiated almost immediately upon arrival of the first US elements in-country with com-

mercial businesses and the Saudi Arabian Public Transportation Company. From 1,300 to 1,700 buses were contracted for during the operation.

The primary means of transporting troops around the theater was by HN bus. Contracts were negotiated almost immediately upon arrival of the first US elements in-country with commercial businesses and the Saudi Arabian Public Transportation Company. From 1,300 to 1,700 buses were contracted for [and] . . . proved to be vital to the success of the operation.

Troop movement was one of the most critical issues in the theater, yet there was practically no doctrine or methodology available to assist in the management of such extensive bus assets. Various strategies were employed to manage the use of buses, from pooling of assets (as in everyday transportation motor pool operations) to direct assignment to units and major commands.

Key missions included aerial port of debarkation clearance, enemy prisoner-of-war (EPW)

Daily Average Allocation of EAC Assets

	H E T s				L O W B O Y S			
	VII Corps	XVIII Corps	Other EAC Moves	Total	VII Corps	XVIII Corps	Other EAC Moves	Total
Jan 7-16	243	81	16	340	160	10	5	175
Jan 17-31	240	70	3	313	84	63	5	152
Feb 1-13	59	21	266	346	80	60	5	145
Feb 14-28	4	6	392	402	54	17	90	161
Mar 1-15	5	281	99	385	-	85	84	169

	F L A T S												Total
	VII Corps	XVIII Corps	Classes of Supply								U/E	EAC	
			I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX		
Jan 7-16	315	92	-	-	-	-	463	-	-	-	-	112	982
Jan 17-31	409	174	-	-	-	-	509	-	-	-	-	95	1187
Feb 1-13	33	67	-	-	-	-	729	-	-	-	-	380	1209
Feb 14-28	*	*	41	121	29	53	811	1	142	35	99	90	1422
Mar 1-15	330	304	34	75	11	18	149	2	78	26	113	10	1150

*EAC trans assets were chopped to the corps during this timeframe U/E — Unit/equipment

Figure 2.



A patchwork of US, Saudi Arabian and Egyptian military truck units was organized around military and commercial assets under the command and control of provisional and TOE truck battalions. Added to these were trucks donated by the German, Italian and Czechoslovakian governments. . . . These commercial vehicles were driven by US military volunteers, Saudi, Pakistani, Indian, Filipino, Korean and Turkish contract drivers.

movement, US troop movement and port support activities. Extensive driver training was required to certify operators from each major user. Figure 3 is a profile of typical allocations that were made during the early *Desert Storm* time frame. HN provisional bus companies were formed under the command and control of US cadre and were continuously task organized to meet peak demands in the various areas. Bus transportation proved to be vital to the success

Unit / Activity	Quantity Issued
VII Corps	350 +
XVIII Corps	245 +
Seaport Operations	90
Airport Operations South	228
Airport Operations North	121
Area Support Operations	91
Medical Support	70
EPW Operations	114

Figure 3. Bus assets

of the operation. It added another dimension to the doctrine of movement control.

To facilitate the control of unit movements and the movement of sustainment cargo, the 318th, with engineer assistance, designed, contracted for and emplaced more than 490 traffic signs along key Saudi roads to assist US and TCN drivers in reaching their destinations. This proved to be invaluable in maintaining control and supporting the smooth and consistent flow of traffic as volume increased.

Final destinations for all of these trucks were vast logistic support bases situated on MSR Dodge. These bases were so large in size, approximately 30 miles by 30 miles, that they presented unique problems. Final destination reporting points (FDRPs) were set up along MSR Dodge that dispensed advice and directions to drivers. As the desert provided no man-made or natural terrain features to guide by, intricate strip maps were created with detailed time and distance leg-

(Below) M911 and M747 HETs moving M1A1 tanks northwest on MSR Dodge. (Inset) Erratic civilian traffic on MSR Dodge added to the dangers facing military and contract drivers.



MSR Dodge was the preeminent MSR of Desert Storm. . . . Its shoulders were nonexistent or nonforgiving. The brave soldiers driving this treacherous route quickly nicknamed it "Suicide Alley" or the "Highway to Hell." It roughly paralleled the Saudi-Iraqi border for hundreds of miles, in some places almost touching the border, and in many places, within range of Iraqi artillery.

ends. Filipino drivers were greeted by Spanish-speaking US soldiers offering help. Other HN drivers were directed by US soldiers with strip maps and directions written in Arabic. Placards were placed in vehicle windows and specific instructions given to the non-English-speaking drivers in some understandable dialect to facilitate the control of their movements as much as possible.

A trailer transfer point (TTP) system was implemented by the theater transportation groups (the 7th and 32d) to facilitate the movement of sustainment cargo, especially ammunition. US medium truck companies operated the TTP along the southern Ad Dammam-Riyadh-King Khalid Military City (KKMC) route, while commercial assets traveled in convoy configurations along the northern MSR Dodge route. All ammunition movements were intensively tracked by the movement control system.

As *Desert Storm* commenced, the need for in-transit visibility became extremely important. Origin MCTs would record DOD identification

code and trailer number data and pass it on to the 318th (forward) at KKMC. In-transit diversions were executed through the 49th MCC to meet the changing stockage levels in the theater storage areas.

To augment the limited wheel transportation assets, the 318th decided early on to exploit the Saudi rail system. Negotiations began in earnest between the 318th and the Ministry of Defense and Aviation for the use of this resource. That system consisted of a single passenger and a single freight route between Ad Dammam and Riyadh; however, the tonnage that the railroad was capable of moving more than made up for the single origin-destination. Once cargo arrived in Riyadh, an MCT coordinated the transshipment onto trucks headed north to the log bases along MSR Dodge.

Given the limited number of days to complete the movement before the ground war began, it was simply not possible to move the great quantity of soldiers and sustainment cargo by truck and bus alone. Therefore, a decision was made

to exploit the use of intratheater air assets. Those assets, C-130 Hercules transport planes, were initially assigned to move passengers and palletized cargo from the Dhahran and Riyadh areas to

As the desert provided no man-made or natural terrain features to guide by, intricate strip maps were created with detailed time and distance legends. Filipino drivers were greeted by Spanish-speaking US soldiers offering help. Other HN drivers were directed by US soldiers with strip maps and directions written in Arabic.

airfields near the logistic support bases, but this mission expanded quickly. The 318th functioned as the single validator of intratheater air missions for all US Army forces within the theater. Daily coordination was required to allocate and control the movement of 120 C-130s on a priority basis to meet mission requirements. Soldiers were manifested and planes dispatched by air terminal movement control teams. Where airfields did not exist, forward landing strips were created. The most frequently used forward strip was a 5,000-meter stretch of MSR Dodge itself! Traffic movement on Dodge was diverted to permit the C-130s to land.

Armed with the foregoing information on the transportation system and assets, you should now be ready to join a highway, rail, air (or water) movement in support of Operation Desert Storm.

VII Corps' Movements

Even after the air campaign had started, VII Corps equipment was still arriving by sea at the ports of Ad Dammam and Al Jubayl. As they had so many hundreds of times before, MCTs of the 93d Movement Control Battalion met the trucks, tanks, engineer equipment and artillery and helped organize the equipment and soldiers into convoys. Where the unit was not able to move with its own organic assets, the 93d would arrange for additional lift from theater assets to

complete the move. The 93d matched the load with the lift asset so that specialized equipment would be used properly. When the drivers and equipment were married up, a convoy clearance was given, authorizing that convoy to travel on the road system at a particular time. That clearance number was chalked on the truck doors before departing.

As each convoy proceeded past designated checkpoints, highway regulation point teams noted the clearance number chalked on the side of each convoy. They would then refer to their convoy projection chart to determine if that convoy was where it was supposed to be at that given time. If it was not, directions could be given to the military police to pull the errant convoy off to the side of the road, letting it proceed only after the properly scheduled convoys cleared the road space.

While VII Corps units continued to clear the seaport, other VII Corps units and the entire XVIII ABN Corps prepared to move from marshaling areas to tactical assembly areas. If the corps did not have sufficient internal assets to meet the lift requirements, they contacted the 318th through their own corps MCCs and requested additional truck assets. EAC assets, consisting of US, Saudi Arabian, Egyptian and contract trucks, were intensively managed and matched against these requests. Each day, corps additional lift requests were received, verified and met with appropriate lifts. MCCs for the two corps would then organize these trucks into convoys, assign convoy clearance numbers and contact the 318th, seeking approval of the time and road space requested.

When all of the convoy clearance requests were received by the 318th from VII and XVIII corps, they would be gathered with EAC sustainment movement requests to determine when the convoys would be allowed onto the MSRs. The idea, of course, was to ensure that multiple convoys would not be on the same road space at the same time. This process, known as deconflicting, consumed vast amounts of planning time. As many of the convoys had different start points, it was a complicated process. Al Jubayl



A blimp-like aircraft on fuel for C-130 Hercules transports

Daily coordination was required to allocate and control the movement of 120 C-130s on a priority basis. . . . Where airfields did not exist, forward landing strips were created. The most frequently used forward strip was a 5,000-meter stretch of MSR Dodge itself [where traffic] . . . was diverted to permit the C-130s to land.

is approximately 2 hours north of Ad Dammam. A convoy originating at Ad Dammam and one originating at Al Jubayl would have to begin at 2000 and 2140 respectively, not at 2000 and 2200, if conflict was to be avoided.

The immense volume of convoys and the sheer number of possible conflict points were so great that an enormous reporting problem ensued. To more easily manage this problem, a special cell was created to monitor movement. This cell, the theater movement control cell (TMCC), provided a 24-hour monitoring system capability that received, and then plotted, all highway movement. An enormous wall map with the MSR overlay on it was covered, from Ad Dammam in the east to the westernmost point on MSR Dodge, with colored pins denoting clearance number, start point and time, release point, number of trucks and any other pertinent information. Each time a convoy was noted anywhere along MSR Dodge, its progress

was plotted by moving the representative pin along the wall map.

Reports were called into the TMCC at 318th Headquarters, using a communications patchwork. That patchwork consisted of cellular telephones, hand-held radios, FM radios, high-frequency AM radios, electronic mail and typewriters. Representatives from the VII Corps, XVIII ABN Corps and the movement control battalions manned the TMCC with the 318th. This proved to be an outstanding management tool, enhancing control while providing visibility to the high volume of moves that were occurring on a daily basis.

As the volume of trucks on the highway increased, so did the number of railroad trains. What originally began as a several-times-a-week operation evolved into a system that sometimes ran two or three freight trains a day from Ad Dammam to Riyadh. Each train carried 75 containers, thus leaving critical wheeled



101st Airborne Division troops wait their turn to board an Air National Guard C-130 for their movement west.

As surface moves clogged the highways, intratheater C-130s filled the skies delivering passengers and cargo to forward destinations. . . . The coordinated move of the 82d and 101st Airborne divisions from Abqaiq and King Fahd International Airport to Rafhah, [covered] a distance of more than 500 miles.


assets available for other missions.

Railroad train reports were also called into the TMCC and plotted as they steamed toward Riyadh. At Riyadh, the trains were met by flatbed trucks ready to haul the containers north to join the procession on MSR Dodge. The 318th coordinated the movement of 71 trains and 3,994 railroad cars transporting almost 5,000 containers of sustainment and unit cargo.

Halfway up MSR Dodge, control of the wheeled convoys was handed off by the 93d Movement Control Battalion to the 49th. At each CSC, movement of the convoys was noted. While the convoy refueled and regrouped, instructions were given to the convoy commander to continue according to plan or to divert the convoy to another destination. Interspersed with the thousands of cargo trucks were hundreds of buses. Hundreds and hundreds of tourist buses, school buses, company buses, all kinds of buses, moved the troops not flown on C-130s.

At the end of its journey, the convoy would pull off the road at the designated FDRP. There, the procession of U.S., Saudi Arabian, Egyptian, Pakistani, Indian, Filipino, Korean or Turkish drivers would receive a strip map or be guided to their destination.

As surface moves clogged the highways, intratheater C-130s filled the skies delivering passengers and cargo to forward destinations. Several intratheater air moves are worth mentioning to depict the value, scope and importance of movement control. The first is the coordinated move of the 82d and 101st Airborne divisions from Abqaiq and King Fahd International Airport to Rafhah, a distance of more than 500 miles. More than 1,400 individual C-130 missions were executed to complete this monumental undertaking. Additionally, the 318th coordinated more than 25 spaceblock (reserved high-priority) missions to enable the 11th ADA to maintain Patriot missile batteries in a fully op-



An air defense unit splashes through the rain-soaked desert into Iraq.

Just days before the first convoys were expected to use the [new] bypass road, unusually heavy winter rains turned it into a quagmire. All efforts to make the bypass serviceable were rendered useless by additional rain. . . . The Saudi winter produces another weather phenomenon, shamals. Shamals are blizzards of dust and sand that produce blinding conditions, blocking out the sun in the same manner as any winter snowstorm.

erational status. Key components and parts were transported throughout the theater on an immediate basis to maintain all systems in an operational ready status.


Personnel replacements were also transported via intratheater air. More than 11,000 replacements were moved by C-130 from the Dhahran area to the VII Corps and XVIII ABN Corps over a three-week period. The 318th coordinated the airlift to coincide with the arrival of the replacements on strategic air (C-141, C-5 and commercial aircraft) from the United States or Germany and from personnel holding areas in the Dhahran area. Intratheater airdrop missions used low-altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES) techniques to provide more than 600 containerized delivery system (CDS) bundles of food and water to frontline soldiers and EPWs in Kuwait and Iraq. The repositioning, supporting and resupply capability provided by intratheater airlift became a tremendous combat multiplier when the movement control methodology and procedures employed by the 318th were adopted and executed by the requesting units. In addition to the 1,400 missions in support of the 82d and 101st divisions, more than 450 individual missions were processed during *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, moving 80,000

passengers and 20,000 short tons of supplies.

Coincident with the intratheater air moves and the convoys that rolled on MSR Dodge, the Persian Gulf itself provided a key MSR, supporting 11 major ports of call. Army logistic support vessels plied the waters between the ports of Ad Dammam, Al Jubayl, Al Mishab, Khafji, Jeddah, Al Manamah (Bahrain), Doha (Qatar), Abu Dhabi, Jebel Ali and Dubai (United Arab Emirates) and Raysut (Oman), moving over 18,000 short tons consisting of 398 containers, 68 tanks and assorted equipment. As heavy lift wheeled vehicles became scarce, this MSR and water transport capability provided an excellent alternate source of high-volume movement. More than 94 missions were coordinated by the 318th using this means of transportation.

Once the corps were in their marshaling areas, MCTs began a new phase of operations. The primary marshaling area for the VII Corps was southeast of the frontier city of Hafar al Batin. The final battle plan called for the VII Corps to cross the Iraqi border 39 miles northeast of Hafar al Batin. To do this, the entire corps would have to move 90 miles west, crossing MSR Sultan, and then 85 miles north to the border, crossing MSR Dodge on the way.

To avoid massive traffic jams created by XVIII



An off-road supply convoy winds its way north during the ground phase of Desert Storm.

Parallel to and south of MSR Dodge is an oil pipeline running on the surface for hundreds of miles. Huge mounds of desert sand were bulldozed on top of the pipeline to create 50 separate sŷtes to cross over the pipeline. . . . MCTs and military police [then] halted traffic on MSR Dodge to permit the crossings, which remained hidden under the natural and man-made shamals.

ABN Corps' convoys moving north and west with the VII Corps road crossings west and north, plans were made to construct a bypass road that would cut south and west of KKMV and the VII Corps' crossing sites. Heavy engineer assets were committed to this project. Just days before the first convoys were expected to use the bypass road, unusually heavy winter rains turned it into a mire. All efforts to make the bypass serviceable were rendered useless by additional rain. The first result of the untoward rain in the theater was that all convoys moving north and west ran into the VII Corps' road crossings. The second result was that all convoys moving north and west would meet at a single point in the city of Hattin, Al Barm. This late planning now had to be done to permit the movement of the VII Corps west and north while, at the same time, permitting the convoys to move north and west. A system of check points, or checkpoints, in the area was developed during which the VII Corps could cross the MSRs. To accomplish this with minimum disruption, the start time of convoys from each

away as Rakkah and Al Damam had to be carefully planned.

On the day that the road crossings were to begin, the weather took another and fortunately more kindly twist. In addition to unexpected rain storms, the Saudi winter showers, another weather phenomenon, added to the problems. Hizzards of dust and sand that looked like thick conditions, blocking out the sun in the same manner as any winter snow storm. As the divisions of the VII Corps began their movement to cross the MSR, the rain and the wind created thick clouds of dust, the shamals blocked their movement in an even greater fashion.

When the roads to Sŷŷŷ wheeled and trucked vehicles took this route to reach the road crossing sites on MSR Sudani, the convoys set up on the highway started to form in traffic. Hundreds of vehicles in line then passed the highway in hurried formations. The checkpoints were manned by VII Corps troops. S and S and military police. At the checkpoints, the convoys were checked for the time of their arrival and the time of their departure. The convoys were then

was masked by the storm. When the divisions finished their movement west, they turned north to cross MSR Dodge. A new challenge awaited movement control personnel. Parallel to and south of MSR Dodge is an oil pipeline running on the surface for hundreds of miles. Huge mounds of desert sand were bulldozed on top of the pipeline to create 50 separate sites to cross over the pipeline. After the thousands of vehicles of each division were channeled over the 50 mounds of sand, they went on line to cross MSR Dodge. MCTs and military police halted traffic on MSR Dodge to permit the crossings, which remained hidden under the natural and man-made shamals.

Once the great movement of supplies into the logistic bases was achieved and the great movement of both corps from their marshaling areas into their attack areas was achieved, movement control was once again called upon to support the battle plan itself.

There are virtually no roads leading north from Saudi Arabia into Iraq. Trails through the desert had to be marked so that the supply trains could follow the maneuver elements. Through a combination of chemical lights, bicycle reflectors and road signs, trails were marked north through the breach in the Saudi-Iraqi border. These trails then became the MSRs along which fuel, ammunition, food and water were carried as far north as the Euphrates River.

As the armored forces rolled forward, corps and EAC MCTs advanced, controlling movement, maintaining asset visibility and tasking assets for backhaul use. In every instance, the combat forces were followed in close order by the combat support and combat service support personnel. Movement control personnel got them all to their correct destinations.

The descriptions presented here are a simpli-


There are virtually no roads leading north from Saudi Arabia into Iraq. Trails through the desert had to be marked so that the supply trains could follow the maneuver elements. Through a combination of chemical lights, bicycle reflectors and road signs, trails were marked north through the breach in the Saudi-Iraqi border [to] . . . as far north as the Euphrates River.

fied view of what was an extraordinarily complex and difficult operation. The transportation accomplishments described by Schwarzkopf were essential to the success of *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. Never before had movement control been called upon to manage the simultaneous movement of two corps, while at the same time, controlling the movement of the thousands of trucks, tracks, trains, planes and ships needed to sustain a force of almost a half million soldiers.

In *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, more than 3,500 convoys were managed and more than 200,000 miles were driven each day—32,000,000 miles were driven in total. Massive movements such as those described in this article do not occur on their own. Behind the scenes was an intricate plan of movement control that was integrated into the framework and resources of the campaign plan and executed under the auspices of the 318th Transportation Agency (Movement Control). The men and women who performed the arduous mission of movement control rose to countless challenges and made these accomplishments possible. Their efforts reflect the extraordinary professionalism and pride they have in themselves, their mission and their country. **MR**

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BEHIND THE SCENES



The Gulf War Reheats Military-Media Controversy

Major General Winant Sidle, US Army, Retired

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It is ironic that the two national institutions that have traditionally been tasked with defense of our Constitution, the military and the media, have almost always been at odds with each other. Since Vietnam, the relationship has been especially strained. Retired General Winant Sidle, chief of Army information during the Vietnam War, offers his views as the controversy heats up again in the wake of media complaints about media access and restrictions during Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

MOST Americans seem highly pleased with the US military for the careful planning and outstanding conduct of operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. But there is one significant exception—the news media.

The media began to complain about how they were being handled in Saudi Arabia well before the end of Desert Storm, and the complaints continue even now—a surprising development in the view of many Americans. Polls taken since the end of hostilities have shown that most Americans thought the press coverage entirely adequate, even excellent in many instances.

John Q. Public must be asking why the media persists in making a fuss. Is there a problem with these media reporters and their bosses?

Actually, there is, and has been for years, a genuine problem in basic military-media relations. As Otis Pike said in an article written shortly after the Grenada operation in 1983:

“Our military is trained to win. Winning requires secrecy and an image of skill, courage, stamina, strength, and sacrifice.

“Our media are trained to report. Reporting must avoid secrecy and must also report blunders, cowardice, exhaustion, weakness, and agony, all of which demoralize us.”

These two philosophies obviously conflict. Our Founding Fathers surely wanted our military to win and our press to be free, although there is considerable difference in defining what free means as far as the media are concerned.

The military's position on this conflict today is that, yes, the press should cover military operations, but what it prints and airs should not impair the security of military operations or endanger troops.

The media's position seems to be roughly this: The American people must be informed of what the military is doing in combat, and it is up to the media to do this job by having reporters actually see what is going on. The media must be trusted not to impair operational security or endanger the troops. They must also report bad as well as good news, but both must be accurate.

What this amounts to is that the media agree they should protect military security and troop safety, but they want to do it their way.

The problem with this is that the military has learned through experience that some members of the press do not always know what will impair operational security or endanger the troops. In fact, I have encountered some newsmen who feel they must report everything they find out, no matter what the consequences. Fortunately, there are extremely few such reporters, but they are a factor.

The military also agrees with Pike's thought that military victory is more easily accomplished when the image of the military is a good one. Otherwise, not only is troop morale sometimes weakened, but the enemy is always encouraged when an unfavorable story is aired or printed, even if the story does not directly affect operational security or endanger the troops. The military also knows that the press reports bad news but, all too often, it is not entirely accurate or may be slanted to make the bad news appear worse than it actually is.

The media's rebuttal to this is that the American people must know the truth about their Armed Forces no matter how much it hurts. Media leaders, of course, claim that all reporters try to be accurate. I have worked with the media on and off since 1949, and I know that some reporters try harder than others in this regard.

Regardless of which view is more accurate, we have a serious philosophical conflict, and we must seek ways to resolve it.

Military victory is more easily accomplished when the image of the military is a good one. Otherwise, not only is troop morale sometimes weakened, but the enemy is always encouraged when an unfavorable story is aired or printed, even if the story does not directly affect operational security or endanger the troops.

A look at history is always instructive in trying to solve problems. In this case, history tells us that the United States has handled the problem in several different ways in the past, none of which has been completely satisfactory to both the media and the military.

Censorship. The original solution was censorship. Massachusetts had a censorship law in the early 1700s. But censorship was not always invoked as a solution. During the Revolutionary War, military-media relations were not much of a problem because there were few reporters, few newspapers, few readers, and news did not travel rapidly. During the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, there were more newspapers and readers, but reporters did not have the means of covering the fighting effectively, nor was the telegraph available except at the very end of the Mexican conflict.

During the Civil War, censorship was used by both sides, and some Union generals so disliked and distrusted the press that they barred them from some operations. Even under these circumstances, information that reached the press and was published proved, on occasion, to be harmful to military operations.

Censorship was imposed during the Spanish American War, but reports indicate that it was not imposed effectively in some instances and disregarded in others.

World War I censorship was not always successful, but this was normally offset by the patriotism of reporters who often did not report bad news even though they knew about it. US

At the end of the Korean War, censorship was apparently accepted by both the media and the military as the solution to their basic conflict. But then . . . the media grew vastly in size, television matured into a real media force, advances in communications technology greatly enhanced news-gathering activities and the government became reluctant to use censorship.

Leaders learned from World War I experience and imposed total censorship quite successfully during World War II. We had voluntary censorship at home and mandatory censorship in the combat zones. This censorship, which was sometimes especially stringent in certain areas, did not bring a rash of complaints from reporters, probably because of patriotism and their almost complete freedom of movement and access to commanders.

We also had censorship in the Korean War, first voluntary and then mandatory. Although there were some complaints from the media, it seemed to work satisfactorily. As the conflict drew to a close, the censorship seemed both competent and effective. At the end of the Korean War, censorship was apparently accepted by both the media and the military as the solution to their basic conflict.

But then, something happened. The media grew vastly in size, television matured into a real media force, advances in communications technology greatly enhanced news-gathering activities and the government became reluctant to use censorship. Perhaps the biggest change came with the Vietnam War, which caused a significant attitude alteration between the military and the media.

In the early phases of this conflict, when US military presence in Vietnam was primarily in the form of advisers to the South Vietnamese, the small press corps in Saigon began to complain that it was being misled by American offi-

cials. The Pentagon reporters soon began to voice the same complaint.

In some instances, the media at both locations proved to be correct. It now appears that the misleading was due to inaccurate reports from the field and the fact that the Johnson administration was trying to put the best possible face on the conflict. This effort included at least some attempts to manipulate the news and the creation of the "Credibility Gap."

Many newsmen began to mistrust the military, some to a point of overreacting, allowing their mistrust to affect their coverage. This, along with the fact that some of the press complaints were unfounded and others were misleading, resulted in the beginnings of widespread military mistrust of the overall media. Although many officials, commanders and public affairs officers continued to get along well with many media representatives and organizations, to include maintaining a mutual trust, the understanding and cooperation gap between the media and the military continued to grow.

As the war progressed, unfavorable stories about the military in Vietnam also grew, resulting in increased distrust, even dislike, of the press by the military—even though some of the stories were true or partially true. The coverage of the Tet offensive was especially misleading and negative; many claim it was the turning point for public support of the war.

Another important factor in the increasing distrust of the media by the military was the arrival in Vietnam of many young, inexperienced reporters who knew little about the military or the Vietnamese. Their stories were often inaccurate or slanted negatively because of this inexperience. Those who stayed long enough improved, but many were on short assignments and never gained the needed experience. Similarly, there were some young "advocacy" reporters who felt that the American people were incapable of understanding the facts and strove to editorialize negatively in their news stories. Of course, there was also a small quota of young reporters trying to make a name for themselves who did not seem to care whether their stories

were entirely accurate or not.


Of course, not all of the Vietnam media coverage was negative. In fact, postwar studies and analyses have shown that the preponderance of coverage was either favorable or neutral. Unfortunately, those of us who served in Vietnam had the impression that the reporting was mostly unfavorable; and many in the military felt that the press was a major factor in the United States backing out of Vietnam. This dislike and distrust of the press continued after the war and still exists in some degree today.

You may ask at this point why the United States did not impose censorship in Vietnam. The Department of Defense (DOD) studied the matter carefully and found that censorship would have had to include participation by the South Vietnam government, and no one, including the media, wanted that. In addition, it was recognized that a reporter could avoid censorship by filing his story from Bangkok or Hong Kong. He would lose his accreditation, but the story would be out.

Ground Rules. As a substitute for censorship, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), developed 15 ground rules forbidding reporters to reveal such things as planned offensives, troop movements and similar material clearly of value to the enemy. If a reporter violated these rules, he would lose his MACV accreditation. That, in essence, would mean he could not get transportation out of Saigon or deal with the military in Saigon or elsewhere in country.

This system worked quite well. Although the records have been lost, the recollections by the public affairs chiefs who served in Vietnam of reporters whose accreditations were either revoked or suspended for violating the ground rules indicate that only nine (out of the hundreds and hundreds of reporters who covered the war at one time or another) lost their accreditation. Further, only two of these violations seriously endangered operational security or troop safety. However, some feel that even one such occurrence was too many.

After Vietnam and before Grenada, the mili-



Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, General Eddie G. Wheeler, making a statement to the press at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Saigon, October 1969.

In Vietnam . . . the misleading [of the press] was due to inaccurate reports from the field and the fact that the Johnson administration was trying to put the best possible face on the conflict.

This effort included at least some attempts to manipulate the news and the creation of the "Credibility Gap."

tary felt that media coverage of the military continued to be somewhat antagonistic and negative, so the distrust continued unabated. This distrust, undoubtedly, was reciprocated by some media representatives.

Although never admitted, the military's distrust of the media at the time of the Grenada operation in 1983 had to be part of the reason the media were not permitted on Grenada for the first two days, and only a pool was allowed on the third day. It is interesting to note that, according to the opinion polls conducted at the time, the public overwhelmingly agreed with the exclusion of the press. Apparently, part of the reason was that the public agreed that the press had been too negative in the past.

In any event, the press furor after Grenada was so strong that then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General John W. Vessey Jr., asked

me to head a panel of newsmen and public affairs and operations officers that met in February 1984. The panel was to make recommendations as to how the military should handle the media in future military operations. Our recommendations were approved by both the JCS and the secretary of defense and implemented shortly thereafter.

Pool. The Sidle Panel recommendation that has received the most attention was the use of press pools in cases where the military situation precluded unlimited participation by the media. The press pool was envisioned as a small group of reporters, depending on the situation, composed of representatives of the major print, television, news magazines, and radio newspapers, if possible (radio was optional). The criterion used to select the reporters would give precedence to those that cover the widest American audience. DOD would select the agencies, and the latter would select the reporters. Material generated by the pool would be made available to all interested agencies not included in the pool.

The pool would be alerted shortly before an operation began, then transported to the scene at, or soon after, H-hour. Members would be briefed and provided with escorts and transportation to assist them in covering the story. They would also be provided with meals, billeting and a means to file their material back to their home offices.

The panel also recommended that the largest possible pool should be used initially, and the pool would be replaced by "full coverage" as soon as feasible. The panel pointed out, however, that "full coverage" was a relative term, and this "might be limited in cases where security, logistics, and the size of the operation . . . would not permit any and all bona fide reporters to cover an event." The panel felt that any limitations on full coverage would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

The panel was concerned that too many reporters might arrive on the scene, making it impossible to permit every reporter to go into the field. This concern stemmed from the fact that


more than 700 ostensible reporters showed up in Barbados, West Indies, to cover the Grenada operation. The panel found this mind-boggling since the largest number of in-country correspondents in Vietnam on any one day was 648. Grenada involved less than one-tenth of the military force that was in Vietnam when the 648 were there.

Following the panel recommendation, DOD instituted the National Media Pool (NMP) in 1984. Several practice runs were held during major military maneuvers to help work out the bugs. This pool was used during the Persian Gulf naval tanker escort operation in 1987, and, although there were some complaints, it seemed to work adequately. During Operation Just Cause in Panama in December 1989, the NMP was activated, but the concept did not work well. The pool arrived late; it was not permitted to cover the operation adequately; and other reporters were already on the scene and kept arriving.

Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Before considering the media-military relationship in operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, we should examine what happened to the censorship concept that seemed to be the solution to safeguarding operational security and troop safety after the Korean War. DOD moved away from this concept during the 1960s and 1970s. Because censorship was not feasible in Vietnam, DOD decided that it would not be feasible or necessary again. As a result, the Army's Field Press Censorship reserve units, which were designed to exercise censorship during military operations, were disbanded in 1977.

As a replacement concept, DOD adopted the Sidle Panel recommendation that the ground rule system be used in future military operations. Incidentally, the panel made this recommendation in 1984 because the military no longer had a trained censorship capability, and the use of ground rules seemed to be the only system available to exercise the necessary control over the media concerning operational security and troop safety.

When *Desert Shield* erupted, DOD chose to implement the pool concept, but it was modified



An NBC crew filming a telecast from Khe Sanh, 3 March 1968.

As the war progressed, unfavorable stories about the military in Vietnam also grew, resulting in increased distrust, even dislike, of the press by the military—even though some of the stories were true or partially true. The coverage of the Tet offensive was especially misleading and negative. . . . The arrival in Vietnam of many young, inexperienced reporters who knew little about the military or the Vietnamese [resulted in] stories [that] were often inaccurate or slanted negatively because of this inexperience. Those who stayed long enough improved, but many were on short assignments.

considerably before the operation ended. A 17-person NMP accompanied the first troops into Saudi Arabia in early August 1990, and by all accounts, the system worked well for the two weeks the pool operated. However, as troops poured into the operations area, so did media representatives. In fact, there were nearly 800 correspondents there by December and, when the war ended, there were over 1,600 correspondents on hand. The NMP was shut down after about two weeks because the large number of nonpool reporters on the scene made it unnecessary.

It became obvious early that the large number of reporters was going to be hard to handle. Most of the reporters wanted to see the action when it began, but there were simply too many for the military to accommodate. Therefore, DOD decided to initiate a system of pools to provide access to as many newsmen as possible.

The press prefers to be on its own during battle but, as any military person who has seen combat knows, too many reporters on hand trying to cover an action can impair operational security and troop safety. Too many reporters on their own can impede the conduct of a battle. This is particularly true when the large majority of the correspondents is not experienced in covering combat, which was the case in Saudi Arabia. Some try to question troop leaders in the heat of a fight. Others draw unwarranted conclusions because they do not know or understand what is going on. Many are unfamiliar with military tactics and, by their actions on the ground, can inadvertently create problems by exposing troop positions or movements, or by filing stories that will be helpful to the enemy.

In *Desert Storm*, an overriding problem was that the operation was not like World War II,

The Sidle Panel recommendation that has received the most attention was the use of press pools in cases where the military situation precluded unlimited participation by the media. . . . DOD would select the agencies [that covered the widest American audience], and the latter would select the reporters. Material generated by the pool would be made available to all interested agencies not included in the pool.

Korea or Vietnam. With the unusually large number of correspondents, reporters could not ride around in the truck one unit to another as in World War II or Korea. Nor could they jump into helicopters for a ride into the action as in Vietnam.

Desert Storm ground action covered huge distances, required great mobility and the action was chaotic. Reporters covering troop units had to ride with the troops and could not tag along in their own vehicles. Commanders could not handle large numbers of reporters because very few seats were available. The unit commander had to know in advance how many reporters he would have to take along so that he could accommodate them.


The DOD/Central Command (CENTCOM) solutions to the number of reporters and operational security/troop safety problems were two-fold. The numbers problem was handled by the use of up to 20 small pools, varying in size for the most part from seven to 17 members. By February 1991, there were almost 200 reporters in the field, all as pool members, with about half covering the Army and the remainder split up among the Marines on land and at sea, the Navy and the Air Force. Pools were in place before the air campaign began, the number varying with the situation.

The ratio of numbers of reporters covering the action versus total reporters available in the the-

ater compares favorably with World War II and Vietnam figures. According to DOD, on D-day in World War II, there were 461 reporters accredited to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, but only 27 went ashore with troops. In Vietnam during Tet, of about 600 correspondents accredited to MACV, less than 100 were in the field on any one day during the offensive. In addition, research shows that the Vietnam press corps averaged about 400 during 1967-1969. Of this number, only about 40 were in the field on a given day. Mathematically, these figures work out to:

- World War II, D-day—6% of available news people in the field.
- Vietnam, Tet—15% of available news people in the field.
- Vietnam, 1967-1969 average—10% of available in the field.
- Desert Storm, February 1991—14% of available news people in the field.

The operational security/troop safety problem was handled via ground rules. On 15 January 1991, DOD issued 12 ground rules and two pages of additional media guidance. This was the final modification of ground rules issued earlier during Desert Shield. CENTCOM provided its final guidance on pool operations and security on 30 January. The difference between the use of these ground rules in Desert Storm and similar rules in Vietnam was that in Vietnam, the press was its own censor. After a story came out that violated the ground rules, the reporter concerned had his accreditation suspended or canceled. In Desert Storm, all material prepared by a pool member had to be reviewed by the public affairs officer accompanying the pool for adherence to the ground rules. If the public affairs officer approved the material, it was forwarded as soon as possible to the appropriate news agency in Dhahran for release. If the review indicated that something should be changed or deleted and the reporter did not agree, the story was forwarded to the CENTCOM press center in Dhahran for review. If the review officer there agreed that the story violated the ground rules and the reporter or his agency did not, it was appealed to the Pentagon.



A journalist interviewing military personnel during operations on Grenada. October 1983.

After Vietnam and before Grenada, the military felt that media coverage of the military continued to be somewhat antagonistic and negative, so the distrust continued unabated. This distrust, undoubtedly, was reciprocated by some media representatives . . . Although never admitted, the military's distrust of the media at the time of the Grenada operation in 1983 had to be part of the reason the media were not permitted on Grenada for the first two days, and only a pool was allowed on the third day.

If the public affairs security review officer at the Pentagon thought there was a problem, the matter was discussed directly with the appropriate bureau chief or editor in the United States. If, after this discussion, the news agency still wanted to use the story, they could do so. This system of security review was, therefore, not equivalent to censorship where the government makes the final decision. The main problem with the *Desert Storm* security review system was the delay often created in putting out the story.

The security review system applied only to correspondents in the pools. All correspondents were required to abide by the ground rules, but print, photo, television and radio items generated by the media in rear areas were not reviewed.

Based on all of the above, it would appear that the current media outcry is not fully warranted. However, there is validity to some of their

complaints. Let us look at the major complaints voiced thus far.

One complaint is that some pools, perhaps most, assigned to cover a unit(s) were kept in a group at all times and not allowed to split up to get a more complete picture of what was going on. Why the military did this does not seem to make much sense in view of the security review backup system. Splitting up a pool may mean additional escorts are needed, but it should not mean that a public affairs officer has to be with each segment of the pool. In Vietnam, when a group of reporters was brought to the scene of action, the major unit involved often provided guides for each small group and, in many instances, for individual reporters. Guide sources included the major unit's public affairs staff, some lower-unit commanders who were not unhappy to be accompanied by a reporter or two, assistant

Reporters conducting interviews with US personnel after the liberation of Kuwait City, February 1991.



With the unusually large number of correspondents [covering *Desert Storm*], reporters could not ride around in jeeps from one unit to another as in World War II or Korea. Nor could they jump into helicopters for a ride into the action as in Vietnam. *Desert Storm* ground action covered huge distances, required great mobility and the action was chaotic. Reporters covering troop units had to ride with the troops.

operations, or other miscellaneous sources.

This *modus operandi* has, in fact, been fairly standard for the majority of pools created by the military since World War II and prior to the Sidle Panel. This is what the panel had in mind when it recommended the use of pools in the first place.

Another pool problem occurred in some cases during *Desert Storm* when the pool was not dispatched in a timely fashion. This should be easy to correct with proper planning and priority.

Timely transmission of news stories is vital to the press. DOD has already admitted that this did not occur in some instances. Nor is this a new problem when the military has to handle story transmissions. It can be solved by proper planning, priority assignment and adequate resources. Dedicating adequate resources is also a factor when estimating how many reporters can cover an action. Sometimes there may just be

too many reporters attempting to file their stories and insufficient communications outlets to accommodate them all in a timely fashion.

The media do not like pools. One recent post-*Desert Storm* recommendation made by a group of high-level media executives agreed that pools might be needed initially, but they should be disbanded after 36 hours and then reporters should be on their own.

Such a rule cannot be applied to all military operations on two counts. First, there is no way to predict when a pool can be disbanded and, based on my experience, 36 hours would be too soon in many instances. Pools may have to continue for the duration, as in *Desert Storm*.

Second, if there are too many reporters trying to cover an operation, such as the 1,600 at *Desert Storm*, they could never be allowed to roam the battlefield at will. In our wars during this century, the military has had to provide reporter trans-

portation more often than not. The press can and should be transported by the military if that is the only way the reporters can do their job. But this transportation must be furnished in a way that does not significantly interfere with operations. The military cannot provide an on-call taxi service for individual reporters working on their own.

Still another media complaint that apparently has some basis in fact is that public affairs pool escorts kept reporters under too tight control, keeping them away from negative news, according to the press. Very little negative news has cropped up as the result of press digging after Desert Storm, so it appears that there was not much, if anything, to conceal from the reporters. But the tight control complaint is still valid. Not allowing the pools to split up is *prima facie* evidence of this, as is the fact that some pools required mandatory monitoring of all interviews. This requirement was eliminated as the war went on. However, an interview should be monitored if the person being interviewed requests it, which is often the case.

As an aside, it is easy to understand why a public affairs officer escort might be too strict, even though he should not be. Public affairs officers are well aware of the negative approach some reporters and news agencies have taken during and after Vietnam. I recall seeing a cable sent by a major television network to its Saigon bureau chief in the 1966-1967 period. It said essentially, "When the Army does something well, it is not news. It is expected. So, concentrate on when the Army does something wrong. That's news." Based on this network's current nightly news program, the network is still sometimes operating by this principle.

Nonetheless, pool escorts should not be too strict. We must all remember that when the military does something wrong or unwise, the taxpayers have a right to know about it, unless it would be of genuine help to the enemy. In such cases, publicity should be deferred until there will be no gain for the enemy upon its release.

The media executives also claim that the Desert Storm media restrictions promoted news man-



CNN's Carl Rochelle
taping a report from the
destroyer USS Kidd in
the Strait of Hormuz.
22 July 1987.

[A] pool was used during the Persian Gulf naval tanker escort operation in 1987, and although there were some complaints, it seemed to work adequately. During Operation *Just Cause* in Panama in December 1989, the NMP was activated, but the concept did not work well. The pool arrived late; it was not permitted to cover the operation adequately; and other reporters were already on the scene and kept arriving.

agement designed to provide a sanitized version of the war. This is not a new complaint. We heard many such allegations during the Vietnam War. There may have been some truth to them then, but news management was not the intent of the Desert Storm restrictions. In most cases, Desert Storm restrictions can be directly linked to operations and were designed solely to preserve military security and troop safety.

Possible Solutions. Having studied both the media's complaints and the military's



Bryant Gumbel talking to troops before a *Today Show* taping, September 1990

The main problem with the *Desert Storm* security review system was the delay often created in putting out the story. The security review system applied only to correspondents in the pools. All correspondents were required to abide by the ground rules, but print, photo, television and radio items generated by the media in rear areas were not reviewed.

concerns, it appears to me that there are some reasonable solutions to the military-media problems concerning coverage of combat operations. I believe that a first step toward an agreement can be accomplished by appropriate DOD officials meeting with senior major media executives and negotiating a "guideline" solution.

A possible solution could be for both sides to agree to the following as a workable set of guidelines:

- Operational security and troop safety considerations must take precedence over any other factors.

- To make it possible for reporters to be "on their own" to the maximum degree possible without impairing operational security and troop safety, the number of reporters and backup personnel covering a combat operation must be limited to a reasonable figure.

- The maximum number will vary with the situation, but a guideline based on the discussion above might well be a ratio of 500 news people for a 500,000-man US or coalition force. This includes reporter backup personnel.

- If a coalition is involved, the 500 will include appropriate foreign news agency representatives, based on the number of foreign na-

tions involved and the size of their military contingents. If only US forces are involved, some major foreign news agencies should still be represented.

- If the news media are unable to agree on a reporter limitation, DOD will have to establish the maximum and enforce it via the accreditation process.

- The bulk of the press representation involved should be provided by news agencies that have the greatest coverage and impact on the American public and the people of coalition nations.

- Pools will be used initially, when necessary (which will be almost all of the time), in all operations. These pools will be as large as possible. Normally, the pools will be split up after arrival at their destinations.

- Each pool will be accompanied by at least one public affairs officer whose mission is to arrange maximum coverage consistent with security and troop (not reporter) safety requirements.

- Guides will be provided by visited units to assist reporters in covering the story when the pool splits up.

- The public affairs escort officer, assisted by the visited unit, will provide for briefings, inter-

views, transportation, meals, billeting and communications means to transmit copy, films and tapes from the poolers to the rear.

- If pools are required for an extended period, correspondent members will be rotated periodically to and from the rear and to other units.

- Media representing specific US localities where units are normally stationed will have a low pool priority, but should be afforded the opportunity to visit the troops occasionally on a special basis. If necessary, DOD should allow such reporters into the operations area for short visits even if their presence exceeds the overall reporter maximum.

A last and critical guideline is required for security control. Currently, the media and the military have three choices in this matter. For future operations, they should agree on one of these:

- DOD to issue appropriate ground rules to prevent information becoming public that will damage operational security or troop safety.

- DOD to issue such ground rules and, in addition, make arrangements for rapid security review and transmission of reporters' products.

- In lieu of either of these options, field press censorship will be used. To ensure that DOD is prepared to handle censorship efficiently, DOD must activate and train field press censorship reserve units. DOD ground rules will serve as the basis of censorship action.

I personally prefer field press censorship as the best solution. It has worked well before and provides the greatest freedom of action for reporters, as well as totally protecting security and troop safety. It can also be handled rapidly as in World War II and Korea. The other two solutions do not provide total protection.

Cooperation. The secret of successful military-media relations is cooperation. The military and the press rarely recognize the fact that they really need each other. The need for the press to cooperate with the military is obvious:

A 17-person [media pool] accompanied the first troops into Saudi Arabia in early August 1990, and by all accounts, the system worked well for the two weeks the pool operated. However, as troops poured into the operations area, so did media representatives. In fact, there were nearly 800 correspondents there by December and, when the war ended, there were over 1,600 correspondents on hand.

noncooperation may seriously impair their access to military operations. ~~It is obvious, but~~ nonetheless real, is the need for the military to cooperate with the media. ~~The American tax-~~ payer has the right to know what the military is doing, except when this is precluded by military security or troop safety considerations. The mission of providing this information to the public is a primary responsibility of the media. The military also needs to get full public recognition and credit for the good job that it almost always performs. The primary means of informing the public and getting this credit is again through the media.

As the Sidle Panel wrote in concluding its report: "The optimum solution to ensure proper coverage of military operations is to have the military—represented by competent, professional public affairs personnel and commanders who understand media problems—working with the media—represented by competent, professional reporters and editors who understand military problems—in a nonantagonistic atmosphere. The panel urges both institutions to adopt this philosophy and make it work."

These conclusions are just as valid today in light of the the most recent media-military confrontations during and after Desert Storm. **MR**

Major General Winant Sidle, US Army, Retired, resides in Pinehurst, North Carolina. A veteran public affairs officer and chairman of the Sidle Commission, he served as chief of information, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Army's chief of information; and deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs.

TRACKING THE STORM

It has been more than a year since the invasion of Kuwait and more than six months since the liberation of Kuwait and the cessation of hostilities. In the aftermath, the necessary and considerable effort to study and draw lessons from the war shifted into high gear. The Army immediately set about the task of sifting through the experiences of the war effort and searching for the important lessons.

To assist in this effort, *Military Review* departs from its traditional format and departments to present a condensed review of the major events, important people and actions of this short but pivotal period. The remainder of this edition is intended to provide to our readers, the students and faculties in our schools, leaders in the field and all interested professionals, a minireference document to study the events of the Gulf War. The information used to compile this section was gathered from a wide range of official and unofficial sources. Many Army and Department of Defense headquarters and agencies provided materials, and the *Military Review* staff cross-checked information from numerous official documents, after-action reports and scores of civilian publications.

Obviously, the relevant material for this presentation is voluminous; it could fill several editions with useful and interesting information. The focus herein was narrowed to provide a recap of the more important facts, events and actions in a manner that facilitates the objective review and study of the war.

The following sections are offered:

- A chronology of events surrounding the invasion and liberation of Kuwait.
- The United Nations resolutions.
- The member nations of the coalition and their force contributions.
- Several key presidential addresses to the nation.
- The joint resolution of Congress.
- The president's address to the Iraqi people.
- The letter sent to Saddam Hussein, rejected by his foreign minister.
- Selected quotes of key congressional leaders during the period.
- General Schwarzkopf's strategy briefing.
- A bibliography of additional readings available on the subject.

We at *Military Review* acknowledge that despite our considerable efforts, this is not, and cannot be, a complete and final report on the war effort. Certainly, there are important aspects that are not covered here. But, we hope this presentation will prove useful to the continuing study of the Gulf War and the valuable learning process that will follow.

Finally, *Military Review* pledges to continue to pursue and to publish reports, reviews, experiences and important lessons from those who contributed to and continue to participate in the execution of missions in the gulf. Let us not forget that Operation *Provide Comfort* has only recently ended. We still have significant forces in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and the gulf, faithfully serving the nation. This and future editions of *Military Review* are dedicated to providing our readers with objective coverage and frank discussions of US military actions in *Desert Shield*, *Desert Storm*, *Provide Comfort*, and whatever follows.

Chronology

February 1990

19 Iraqi President Saddam Hussein demands US remove its warships from Persian Gulf.

March 1990

10 British journalist Farzad Bazhoft is tried and convicted of espionage in Iraq. He is subsequently hanged on 15 March. United Kingdom (UK) recalls its ambassador over the incident.

30 US intelligence confirms Iraq has built permanent missile launchers in western Iraq, putting Tel Aviv within range of Scud missiles.

April 1990

2 Hussein says Iraq has binary chemical weapons and threatens to "make fire eat half of Israel if it tries anything against Iraq."

17 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates (UAE) say they will lower oil output because of glut and low prices.

■ Dow Jones Industrial Average closes at 2765.77; New York Mercantile Exchange oil closes at \$19.87 per barrel.

May 1990

3 Emergency Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) meeting agrees to lower output.

28-30 At Arab League Summit in Baghdad, Hussein calls for Arabs to liberate Jerusalem, pushes for attacks on US for supporting Israel, demands \$27 billion from Kuwait and deplores Kuwaiti and UAE overproduction of oil.

June 1990

26 Hussein warns Kuwait and UAE to curb excess production so price can rise from \$14 to \$25 per barrel.

27 Iraq fails to reach an agreement with Turkey and Syria on sharing of Euphrates waters.

July 1990

10 In Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, at OPEC meeting, Kuwait and UAE agree to abide by their oil quotas; Saudis will cut production; Iraq agrees to Iranian proposal to raise price to \$25 per barrel.

15 Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz sends letter to Arab League Secretary-General Klibi, accusing Kuwait of stealing oil from Rumaila oil field and conspiring to reduce Iraq's oil income.

17 Hussein threatens military action if Kuwait and the UAE fail to comply with oil quotas; says drop in oil prices has caused Iraq to lose billions in oil revenues.

18 Kuwait cabinet discusses Iraqi demand for \$2.4 billion for Rumaila oil, calls military alert and emergency session of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

20 Kuwait claims that Iraq's belligerence is aimed at getting them to write off Iraq's \$10 billion war debt.

22 Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak goes to Baghdad to mediate dispute, says he has Hussein's "assurances" that Iraq would not move against Kuwait.

24 Iraq deploys troops on the Kuwaiti border.

■ US places six warships in the area on alert and begins conducting a military exercise with the UAE.

25 Mubarak says that Iraq and Kuwait plan to meet in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to resolve their differences.

■ Hussein tells April Glaspie, US ambassador to Iraq, "Yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle." She tells Hussein that US has no opinion about Iraq's border dispute with Kuwait; however, she warns against use of force.

■ Hussein sends President George Bush a message expressing his desire to resolve the crisis peacefully.

26 At OPEC meeting in Geneva, Kuwait agrees to lower quotas and higher prices. Benchmark price set at \$21

per barrel. Hussein moves another 30,000 troops to border.

31 Talks between Iraq and Kuwait open in Jeddah.

■ Iraq demands cession of disputed Kuwaiti territory and \$10 billion.

■ Iraq masses 100,000 troops on Kuwait's border.

August 1990

1 Iraq walks out of talks with Kuwait. Dow Jones closes at 2,899.26; oil closes at \$21.54 per barrel.

2 Iraqi forces invade, seize and occupy Kuwait at 4:00 a.m. (Kuwaiti time).

■ Bush signs executive order banning trade with Iraq, freezes assets of both Iraq and Kuwait and calls on other nations to take similar action.

■ UK, France and Switzerland freeze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets.



■ United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopts Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

■ Soviet Union suspends delivery of all military equipment to Iraq.

■ Iraq warns other countries not to come to Kuwait's assistance. "We will make Kuwait a graveyard for those who launch any aggression."

3 Resistance forces continue to fight in Kuwait City.

■ Iraq masses troops along the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border.

■ Bush warns Iraq not to invade Saudi Arabia. US offers to defend Saudi Arabia against an Iraqi attack.

- Iraq announces it will begin withdrawing troops on 5 August.
- US and Soviet officials in Moscow issue a joint statement condemning the invasion and calling for an immediate Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
- State Department says that American oil field workers are missing.



- Arab League members condemn the invasion of Kuwait; five nations vote against the condemnation or abstain.
- Japan, West Germany, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg freeze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets.
- Dow Jones closes at 2,809.65; oil closes at \$24.49 per barrel.

- 4 Iraq announces a new military government for Iraqi-controlled Kuwait.
- European Community (EC) imposes sanctions and embargo against Iraq.
- Bush meets with advisers at Camp David, MD; then calls King Fahd Ibn Abdel Aziz of Saudi Arabia to offer American military aid.
- Jordan describes Iraq's Hussein as an Arab patriot.
- Satellite photos indicate reinforcement, not withdrawal, of Iraqi troops in Kuwait.
- Canada and Japan ban oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait and suspend all trading with those countries.

- 5 Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney departs for Saudi Arabia to discuss deployment of American troops there.

- Bush says that US and allies will not allow a puppet regime in Kuwait and that Iraq lied about pulling out of Kuwait.

- 6 UNSC adopts Resolution 661, placing a trade embargo in Iraq.
- Cheney shows satellite photos to Saudi officials depicting the Iraqi troop

concentrations along their northern border; King Fahd agrees to permit the deployment of US troops on Saudi soil to prevent an Iraqi attack.

- Iraqi soldiers continue to round up foreigners in Kuwait and begin transporting them to Iraq.
- Iraq reduces flow of oil through Turkish pipeline due to receiving end being full.
- Kuwait's emir offers to talk about trading territory for Iraqi withdrawal.
- King Fahd requests US military assistance.
- Bush orders US forces to Saudi Arabia.
- Hussein announces his seizure of Kuwait is irreversible.

- 7 US begins moving air forces to region; deploys 1st Tactical Fighter Wing; 82d Airborne Division begins deploying; first pre-positioned ship departs from Diego Garcia for the gulf.

- State Department reports about 3,500 Americans are trapped in Iraq and Kuwait because all airports and border crossings have been closed.
- Turkey shuts off flow of oil through its pipeline.
- OPEC announces it will make up the oil shortfall caused by the international embargo.

- 8 Bush tells a national TV audience that "a line has been drawn in the sand" and that 50,000 US troops may be sent to Saudi Arabia as part of a multinational force.

- Iraq announces that Kuwait is its 19th province.
- UK announces it will send additional air and naval forces to defend Saudi Arabia.

- 9 UNSC adopts Resolution 662, declaring the annexation of Kuwait "null and void."

- Bush sends letter to Congress complying with War Powers Resolution.
- Cheney and General Colin L. Powell, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, brief members of House and Senate on Desert Shield.

- 10 Iraq orders all embassies in Kuwait closed by 24 August.

- Emergency Arab summit votes 12 to 8 to send a Pan-Arab force to join the American troops in Saudi Arabia.
- Hussein makes television appeal to Arab masses to "revolt against oppression" in a holy war against foreigners.

- Military Sealift Command activates 18 ships of Ready Reserve Fleet.
- Dow Jones closes at 2,716.58; oil closes at \$26.23 per barrel.

- 11 Arabs in Yemen and Jordan demonstrate against US involvement.
- Egyptian and Moroccan troops begin to arrive in Saudi Arabia.

- 12 National Media Pool deploys to Saudi Arabia.


- The US says it will use force, if necessary, to interdict trade with Iraq.
- Hussein announces peace plan based on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories.

- 13 Iraqi troops in Kuwait continue to round up foreigners.

- First Fast Sealift ship departs for the gulf.
- King Hussein of Jordan meets with Hussein in Baghdad.

- 14 King Hussein flies to Washington to meet with Bush.

- 15 Hussein offers to meet Iran's conditions to end their state of war.
- F-117 "Stealth" fighters begin deploying to the Middle East.



- 16 Bush authorizes US forces to participate in multinational maritime intercept operations. Iraq now has about 160,000 troops in Kuwait.

- 17 Bush decides to call up military reserves; also activates 38 civil reserve air fleet (CRAF) aircraft to transport soldiers to the Middle East; CRAF aircraft

CHRONOLOGY

eventually fly more than 5,300 missions in support of operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*.

- First pre-positioned ship arrives in gulf.

- Dow Jones closes at 2,681.44; oil closes at \$27.36 per barrel.

18 Two US warships fire warning shots across the bow of two Iraqi oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf.

- UNSC adopts Resolution 664, demanding Iraq free all hostages immediately.

- Saudi Arabia calls for emergency OPEC meeting to raise oil production.

19 Iraq offers to release all foreigners if US forces pull out of gulf region.

20 Bush declares that Americans held in Iraq and Kuwait are hostages.

- Iraq orders all embassies in Kuwait to close by the end of the week.

- Iraq announces that Western hostages will be moved to vital military installations to use them as human shields to deter any attack.

- OPEC refuses to meet in emergency session; Saudi Arabia announces it will increase oil production to make up for loss of Kuwaiti oil.

- UAE allows US forces base access.

22 Bush signs the executive order placing 48,000 American reservists on active duty by 1 September.

- The US announces that it will defy the order to close its embassy in Kuwait.

- Jordan announces that it is closing its borders and asks the UN for relief.

- Saudi Arabia says it will provide fuel for US forces.

23 Hussein talks with British hostages on Baghdad television.

24 Iraq warns Kuwaitis the penalty for hiding foreigners is death.

- Iraqi troops surround embassies of several Western countries and cut off electricity and water.

- State Department criticizes USSR for keeping military advisers in Iraq.

- Cheney invokes the Feed and Forage Act of 1861, allowing DOD to spend more money than has been appropriated by Congress.

- Dow Jones closes at 2,532.92; oil closes at \$30.91 per barrel.

25 UNSC adopts Resolution 665, authorizing force to halt ships violating the economic blockade.

- Iraq promises to release dependents of American diplomats from Kuwait who are being held in Baghdad.

26 UN announces that the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Javier Perez de Cuellar will meet in Jordan with Iraq's foreign minister to discuss the gulf crisis.

27 First Fast Sealift ship arrives in Saudi Arabia.

- OPEC agrees to oil production increase by some member countries.

28 C-5A crashes in Ramstein, Germany en route to gulf; 13 killed.

- Hussein announces that he will allow all women and children to leave Iraq.

- US expels Iraqi Embassy personnel and places tight travel restrictions on those remaining.



- Bush returns from Kennebunkport to brief about 170 members of Congress, who support his handling of the crisis.

- Mubarak says if Iraq leaves Kuwait, all Arabs will ask foreign troops to leave.

- US deployment reaches 50,000 troops.

30 Bush says he will request money from other nations to offset the military costs of *Desert Shield* and results of economic embargo.

- Japan pledges \$1 billion.

31 Dow Jones closes at 2,614.36; oil closes at \$27.32 per barrel.

September 1990

4 Iraq has about 165,000 troops in Kuwait; another 100,000 outside the border of Kuwait and about 2,200 tanks.

5 Hussein calls for an Islamic holy war against US forces in the gulf and for the overthrow of King Fahd.

6 Iraq imposes a new penalty, life imprisonment, for anyone caught trying to flee Kuwait.

7 First US evacuation flight from Kuwait carries 167 Americans home.

- Iraq is put on list of states sponsoring terrorism.

- Dow Jones closes at 2,619.55; oil closes at \$30.04 per barrel.

9 At Helsinki summit meeting, Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev declare unconditional support for international sanctions against Iraq.

10 Iran and Iraq renew full diplomatic relations.

- Iraq offers free oil to developing countries if they break the coalition blockade.

11 Bush addresses joint session of Congress on Iraqi crisis.

- Bush tapes an 8-minute message to the Iraqi people.

- Japan increases its pledge to \$2 billion.

13 UNSC adopts Resolution 666, permitting humanitarian food shipments to Iraq provided that they are distributed by third parties such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent.

- Japan increases its pledge to \$4 billion.

- Syria agrees to send 10,000 troops to the gulf.

14 Iraqi troops storm French and Belgian ambassadors' quarters in Kuwait.

- UK announces it will send 6,000 troops to the gulf.

- Dow Jones closes at 2,564.11; oil closes at \$31.76 per barrel.

15 Flight arrives in US carrying 285 American and Canadian citizens.

- Soviet Union offers to raise Iraq's issues diplomatically after its withdrawal from Kuwait.

- US deployment reaches 150,000 troops.

- Germany pledges \$2 billion to *Desert Shield*.

16 Bush addresses the Iraqi people on Baghdad television.

■ UNSC adopts Resolution 667, condemning Iraq's aggressive actions against embassies in Kuwait.

■ Egypt says it will send a mechanized division to Saudi Arabia.

17 General Michael J. Dugan, Air Force Chief of Staff, is relieved after his public statements on the situation in the gulf region.

■ Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union reestablish diplomatic ties.

18 US intelligence reports Iraqi forces in Kuwait are about 360,000.

■ The Netherlands announces it will send a squadron of fighters to Turkey as part of NATO.

■ Argentina announces troop deployment to the gulf.

19 Bush says if peaceful efforts fail, "We are prepared to take additional steps."

■ Iraq impounds assets of countries supporting the embargo.

■ Cheney approves imminent danger pay for US troops serving in the gulf.

20 Saudi Arabia cuts oil exports to Jordan.

21 Hussein promises the "mother of all battles" if the coalition forces attempt to free Kuwait by force.

■ Iraq expels three US diplomats and 11 military attachés from European embassies; US expels three Iraqi diplomats from Washington.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,512.38; oil closes at \$35.43 per barrel.

22 US chartered flight leaves Baghdad for London, raising the number to 2,000 Americans evacuated from Kuwait and Iraq.

23 Hussein vows to retaliate against Saudi Arabia and Kuwaiti oil fields and Israel if attacked.

24 UNSC adopts Resolution 669, emphasizing that only the special sanctions committee has the power to permit humanitarian aid shipments to Iraq or occupied Kuwait.

25 UNSC adopts Resolution 670, imposing an air embargo on Iraq.

■ About 430,000 Iraqi troops in Kuwait Theater; 3,500 tanks; 2,500 armored personnel carriers; 1,700 artillery pieces.

27 UK and Iran resume diplomatic relations.

28 Bush meets with Kuwait's emir in Washington, who tells him that Iraq is pillaging Kuwait and repopulating the country with outsiders.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,452.48; oil closes at \$39.51 per barrel.

29 US says the timetable for possible military action against Iraq is shortening.

October 1990

1 US Congress passes joint resolution supporting Bush's efforts to "deter Iraqi aggression."

2 US deployment reaches 170,000 troops.

■ In UN, Saudi Arabia urges Iraq to leave Kuwait to bolster the claims of the Palestinians.

■ French troops arrive in Saudi Arabia.

3 East and West Germany are united into one Germany.

■ Amnesty International reports on atrocities in Kuwait.

■ Hussein tours Kuwait.

4 Cheney announces that 25 nations have contributed to the deployment of forces.


5 Dow Jones closes at 2,510.64; oil closes at \$37.99 per barrel.

7 Israel begins distributing gas masks to its civilians, except Palestinians.

Army Deployment Comparisons

First 30 Days	WWII 7 Dec 41	Korea 1950	Vietnam 1965	Saudi Arabia 1990
Passengers Shipped To Theater	29,839 Most by ship	11,990 Aug	16,300	38,083
Passengers Airlifted To Theater				
Tons of Supplies & Equipment Shipped	-	76,965 July	-	123,590
Tons of Supplies & Equipment Airlifted	-	-	-	39,991
First 60 Days				
Passengers Shipped To Theater	91,045 Most by ship	22,716	85,563	106,000
Passengers Airlifted To Theater				
Tons of Supplies & Equipment Shipped	560,160 Most by ship	400,437	1.2 million	400,000
Tons of Supplies & Equipment Airlifted		-	38,564	106,000
First 90 Days				
Passengers Shipped To Theater	138,424 Most by ship	32,357	85,562	183,030
Passengers Airlifted To Theater				
Tons of Supplies & Equipment Shipped	836,060	979,833	1.3 million	1,071,317
Tons of Supplies & Equipment Airlifted	-	-	38,564	175,668

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Community Relations Office



8 Israeli police kill 19 Palestinians at the Temple Mount in Jerusalem.

12 Dow Jones closes at 2,398.02; oil closes at \$39.69 per barrel.

14 Israel refuses to accept UN mission ordered by UNSC.

17 Secretary of State James Baker tells a Senate committee that the administration would consult with Congress, but not seek its prior approval for any attack against Iraqi forces.

18 US deployment reaches 209,000 troops.

19 Iraq announces it will begin gas rationing on 22 October.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,520.79; oil closes at \$33.79 per barrel.

20 US antiwar marches staged across the country.

■ Canada abandons its embassy in Kuwait, leaving only the US, UK and French embassies open.

21 Former UK Prime Minister Edward Heath secures the release of 70 elderly and ill British citizens from Baghdad.

■ Cheney says the US believes it has full authority from the UN to justify an attack against Iraqi troops in Kuwait.

■ Palestinian kills 3 Israelis in retaliation for Temple Mount killings.

■ Cincinnati Reds complete sweep of Oakland Athletics in World Series.

23 Powell meets with General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander, US Central Command, to evaluate the status of the force deployment.

■ US deployment reaches 210,000 troops.

■ Iraq says all French hostages can leave.

24 Cheney and Baker brief members of Congress about *Desert Shield* prior to the adjournment of Congress.

■ Newly released American hostages claim they were starved and denied medical attention by their Iraqi captors.

26 Dow Jones closes at 2,436.14; oil closes at \$33.01 per barrel.

28 US Congress adjourns for the rest of year.

29 UNSC adopts Resolution 674, calling for the release of hostages and holding Iraq liable for damages to Kuwait.

30 Ten US sailors are killed when a steam line explodes on the USS *Iwo Jima*, off Bahrain.

November 1990

1 Bush says, "The fight isn't about oil, the fight is about naked aggression that will not stand." Insists that he wants a peaceful solution to the crisis.

■ Iraq announces that family members of hostages will be permitted to visit Iraq during the Christmas holidays.

2 Bush announces that he will visit American troops in Saudi Arabia on Thanksgiving Day.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,490.84; oil closes at \$34.00 per barrel.

4 Syria's 9th Armored Division begins arriving in Saudi Arabia.

5 Baker and King Fahd reach agreement on command and control for military. American troops will be commanded by American officers if offensive operations are launched against Iraq.

■ US and Saudis agree that both must concur on going to war, and if war is approved, US will be free to conduct operations outside Saudi Arabia.

■ President Turgut Ozal, Turkey, rules out a second front against northern Iraq.

6 US deployment reaches 230,000 troops.

■ China agrees not to block a UN resolution authorizing use of force.

7 UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher says, "Either he gets out of Kuwait soon, or we and our allies will remove him by force."

8 Bush announces that he plans to double the size of the force in the gulf.

■ 74 Japanese hostages from Iraq arrive in Japan.

■ VII Corps ordered to deploy to Saudi Arabia.

9 UN General Committee refused request from Iraq to brand the US military presence in the gulf as a threat to peace; instead, they branded Iraq the aggressor and accused Iraq of obstructing the UN procedures.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,488.61; oil closes at \$33.89 per barrel.

10 Cheney indicates that no decision on troop rotation has been made.

13 National Guardsman files suit challenging the presidential authority to send troops to the gulf.

■ Congressmen urge Bush to call a special congressional session to debate the gulf crisis.



14 Cheney authorizes activation of 72,500 reservists who may be needed in Saudi Arabia.

■ Authorization to extend current call-up from 90 to 180 days is approved.

■ Saudi pilot flies an F-15 to Sudan and is granted asylum.

■ Poland and Germany agree on mutual borders.

15 Amphibious Exercise *Imminent Thunder* begins in Persian Gulf.

■ Hussein says he will release hostages if US promises not to attack.

16 Bush departs on trip to Europe and the Middle East. Baker rejects a Soviet suggestion that the solution to the crisis be linked to the Israeli occupation of land claimed by the Palestinians.

■ Former President Jimmy Carter criticizes deployment of additional troops.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,550.25; oil closes at \$29.78 per barrel.

18 Hussein offers to begin releasing hostages on Christmas Day. US rejects proposal.

19 Iraq announces that it will send another 250,000 troops into Kuwait. Calls up 60,000 reserves and 100,000 conscripts; moves six divisions to southern Iraq.



■ Gorbachev declines to back a UN resolution authorizing an attack to drive Iraq from Kuwait.

■ About 75 American hostages arrive on a flight in Washington.

20 Forty-five members of the House of Representatives file suit to force Bush to seek congressional approval before attacking Iraq.

■ Hussein orders all German hostages freed.

22 Bush visits American troops in Saudi Arabia on Thanksgiving Day.

■ UK announces it will send 14,000 more troops to the gulf, raising its total to 30,000.

■ Thatcher resigns as UK prime minister.

23 Cheney authorizes worldwide involuntary extension of foreign service tours indefinitely; extends training at Army schools through the traditional Christmas and New Year holiday and suspends retirements or discharges.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,527.23; oil closes at \$31.90 per barrel.

25 Egyptian gunman ambushes Israeli bus; kills 4; wounds 26.

■ Lawsuit by 45 members of the House of Representatives results in Supreme Court ruling that they have no legal standing to raise the issue.

■ Gorbachev tells Aziz, "If Iraq really wants a settlement in the entire region and is trying to avoid the worst, it must now openly declare and show in its ac-

tions that it is leaving Kuwait, freeing hostages and, in general, is not preventing anyone from leaving Kuwait. Otherwise, the UN resolution will be adopted—a tough resolution."

27 Testimony before the UNSC reports atrocities by the Iraqi military.

■ John Major selected to replace Thatcher as prime minister.

■ Saudi Arabia offers the Soviet Union a \$1 billion loan.

28 UNSC adopts Resolution 677, condemning Iraq for attempting to drive out Kuwaitis and repopulate their country.

29 UNSC adopts Resolution 678, giving Iraq until 15 January 1991 to comply with all previous resolutions. After that date, the coalition forces were authorized "to use all necessary means" to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and honor all resolutions.

30 Bush offers to send Baker to Baghdad and invites Aziz to Washington for talks.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,559.65; oil closes at \$28.85 per barrel; second largest one-day drop.

December 1990

1 Iraq accepts Bush's proposal to talk, but wants to include the Palestinian issue.

■ Cheney authorizes the call-up of 63,000 more reservists and guard members, raising the total to 188,000.

2 Baker says sanctions may never work against Iraq. Also, US will not attack if Iraq leaves Kuwait and releases all hostages.

■ Iraqi armed forces fire Scud missiles within Iraq.

■ Second contingent of F-117s depart for the Arabian Peninsula.

3 US deployment reaches 240,000 troops.

4 First US troops leave Europe for the gulf.

■ Iraq says all Soviets may leave, if the Soviet Union agrees to pay for uncompleted contracts.

6 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) extends tax filing deadline for military members participating in *Desert Shield*.

■ Hussein announces that he will release all hostages, citing a changing US position.

■ US proposes UN Middle East conference.

7 State Department announces US Embassy staff in Kuwait will return to the US.

■ Army National Guard combat brigades mobilized for training.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,590.10; oil closes at \$26.58 per barrel.

8 Iraq says Aziz will travel to Washington on 17 December but Hussein will not be able to see Baker until 12 January.

11 France says it will send 4,000 more troops to gulf, raising its total to 10,000.

12 US accuses Iraq of stalling.

■ Hussein replaces the defense minister with Major General Abbas, hero of Iran-Iraq war.

13 US Embassy staff leaves Kuwait.

■ Pentagon rents cruise ship *Cunard Princess* for gulf soldiers' rest and recuperation.

■ VII Corps headquarters deploys to Saudi Arabia.

14 Last group of American hostages evacuated from Iraq.

■ Aziz visit on hold until Baker visit is scheduled.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,593.81; oil closes at \$26.55 per barrel.

15 Iraq cancels Aziz visit saying "Iraq alone" will set the date for Baker's visit.

16 Twenty-three hundred Soviet technicians not allowed to leave Iraq.

17 US deployment reaches 260,000 troops.

18 Cheney and Powell depart for visit to Saudi Arabia.

19 Lieutenant General Calvin Waller, deputy commander, CENTCOM, says, "Every unit will not be combat-ready until after 1 February. His remarks touch off storm for "undermining US policy."

■ France says Iraq's pullout from Kuwait must include "every square meter."

20 Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze resigns.

21 Cheney says, "There won't be any restrictions" on the military in the event of a war.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,633.66; oil closes at \$25.92 per barrel.

22 Bob Hope and his entourage arrive in the Middle East for Christmas shows.

24 Iraq recalls ambassadors from coalition capitals for consultations.

■ King Fahd appeals to Hussein, "It is better to opt for peace than for war."

25 Cheney and Powell tell Bush that US forces will not be ready until after the 15 January deadline.


■ Pope John Paul II speaks out against possibility of Gulf War.

26 Iraqi armed forces fire another Scud missile, which lands in Iraq; not fired toward US and coalition forces.

■ Iran calls for gulf security talks to keep major powers out of the region.

■ CENTCOM holds first media briefing in Saudi Arabia.

■ US deployment reaches 300,000 troops.



27 Jordan conducts military maneuvers in western part of country.

■ Israel goes on full military alert but does not call up reserves.

■ Members of House of Representatives urge Bush to delay military action until economic sanctions can work.

28 Iraqi ambassadors return to coalition capitals saying Iraq is ready for serious and constructive talks to end the crisis.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,629.21; oil closes at \$27.57 per barrel.

29 Congressional Democrats threaten to cut off funds for *Desert Shield* unless the administration seeks congressional approval prior to attacking Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

■ Poland sends two ships and a medical team to the gulf.

■ Iraq begins building up its forces on the Turkish border.

31 Japan offers to resume aid to Iraq if it withdraws from Kuwait.

■ Baghdad says it wants to talk.

January 1991

1 Hussein: "Let them mass whatever number they can, because God will protect us from evil and save Iraq.... If Iraq can't have Kuwait, nobody can."

■ Jordan military takes up defensive positions facing Israel.

■ Bush says Hussein doesn't know what he is up against.

■ Albania schedules free elections for 10 February.

2 NATO orders planes to Turkey; 18 planes from German air force deploy.

■ Iraqi forces in Kuwait Theater about 530,000.

■ US deployment reaches 325,000 troops.

■ Coalition forces deployed now number about 245,000 troops.

3 Pan American Airways suspends flights to Israel and Saudi Arabia, citing escalating insurance rates.

■ US Congress convenes, deliberates about when to debate the gulf question.

■ UK expels seven Iraqi diplomats.

■ US offers Baker-Aziz meeting in Geneva on 7, 8 or 9 January.

4 Exiled Kuwaiti government announces it will provide about 300 volunteers to support US military.

■ Iraq accepts Aziz meeting in Geneva on 9 January.

■ Congressional debate on use of force to begin on 10 January.

■ EC invites Aziz to talks on 10 January.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,566.09; oil closes at \$24.90 per barrel.



6 Hussein says, "The results of this battle will be great, and all the world and future generations will talk about it."

■ Speaker of the House Thomas Foley comments on the upcoming debate for the use of force, "The House will narrowly authorize use of force." Senator Robert Dole, (R) (KS) says, "The Senate would vote 60-40 to approve force."

■ Five airlines suspend flights to Israel; cite escalating insurance rates as the reason.

7 The 48th Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, deploys to Fort Irwin, California.

8 Bush submits letter to Congress asking for authorization to use "all necessary means" to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.

9 Baker and Aziz talk in Geneva and fail to resolve the crisis. Aziz refuses to accept letter from Bush and says, "Iraq will absolutely attack Israel if war breaks out." Israel vows to respond.

■ UNSG Perez de Cuellar scheduled to visit Baghdad on 12 January.

10 US Congress opens debate on dealing with the Persian Gulf crisis.

■ Israel advises its population to prepare for war.

11 State Department warns that Iraqi terrorists are planning attacks around the world if war breaks out over Kuwait. Also warns Americans living in Israel, Sudan, Yemen, UAE, Qatar, eastern Saudi Arabia and Jordan to leave.

■ Saudis tell Baker they agree to war, if necessary.

■ Federal Aviation Administration moves to increase security for air travelers.

■ Military Airlift Command passes 10,000 strategic airlift missions flown in support of *Desert Shield*; carried more than 370,000 passengers and more

than 346,000 tons of cargo.

- Dow Jones closes at 2,501.49; oil closes at \$27.49 per barrel.



12 US Congress authorizes the administration to use the forces necessary to fulfill UN commitments.

- UNSG Perez de Cuellar meets with Hussein in Baghdad, but makes no progress.
- US closes its embassy in Baghdad.
- US expels all but four Iraqi diplomats.
- Egypt agrees to be part of the attack force; Syria declines "at the present."

14 Bush tells congressional leaders that there has been "no ray of hope" from Iraq for a diplomatic solution.

- Antiwar demonstrations held in many US and European cities.
- Abu Iyad, PLO chairman Yasir Arafat's deputy, is assassinated.
- Iraqi National Assembly votes to continue Hussein's policy and defend Kuwait.
- Israeli Supreme Court orders free issue of gas masks to Palestinians.

15 UN withdrawal deadline passes.

- Iraq closes its border with Turkey.
- White House official says, "It's no longer a question of whether, but when" coalition forces will attack.

16 Bush orders 30-day supply of oil from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve be made available for sale on the world market.

- French forces placed under US control.
- Greece agrees to US use of bases and ports for logistic support.

17 Coalition aircraft begin taking off at 12:50 a.m. Saudi time; destinations Kuwait and Iraq. Concurrently, Bush addresses the nation: "The liberation of Kuwait has begun. . . . We will not fail"—6:30 p.m., 16 January (Washington, DC time.)

- Desert Storm begins 2:30 a.m., in

Baghdad with massive air and missile attacks on targets in Kuwait and Iraq.

- Turkey authorizes use of bases for air strikes on Iraq.
- Hussein declares, "The great show-down has begun! The mother of all battles is under way. . . . Iraq will never surrender."
- Iraq launches Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia; three missiles strike Israel, one missile intercepted in Saudi Arabia by US Patriot missile.
- Iran says it may join the war if provoked by Iraq.
- Iraq claims 44 coalition planes shot down.
- San Francisco police arrest about 600 demonstrators at Federal building, others march on Brooklyn Bridge.
- Dow Jones closes at 2,623.51; gains 114.60 points, second largest gain in history. Oil prices drop \$10.56 per barrel, largest drop in history; closes at \$21.44 per barrel.

18 UK promises to send another army battalion and air force squadron to Persian Gulf.

- Cheney declares an airlift emergency and orders 20 airline companies to provide up to 181 aircraft to move troops and equipment to the Persian Gulf.
- Bush and other leaders caution against euphoria of early success, warning that it could be a long war.
- Coalition air forces drop 2,500 tons of ordnance in first 24 hours.



- US troops attack offshore oil platforms, capture first Iraqi enemy prisoners of war (EPWs).
- Soviet Union reports it is attempting to persuade Hussein to end fighting.
- Israel vows to defend itself, but promises not to respond to Iraq's Scud attack.
- Air campaign passes 2,000 sorties in first 36 hours.
- Seven aircraft lost; all crews listed as missing.
- Dow Jones closes at 2,646.78; oil closes at \$19.25 per barrel.

19 US tells Iraq that the coalition intends to treat EPWs in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention.

- Scud missiles hit Tel Aviv, injuring roughly 17 people.
- Israel vows to defend itself but refrains from attacking.
- US sends Patriot batteries from Europe to protect Israel.
- King Hussein says Iraqi Scud missiles bound for Israel do not violate Jordanian air space but Israeli warplanes headed for Iraq would.
- US Marines and Iraqi forces exchange gunfire along border.
- India, Algeria and the Soviet Union offer peace proposals to Iraq.
- Air campaign passes 4,700 sorties.
- Ten Iraqi aircraft destroyed.
- US deployment reaches 460,000 troops.

20 Iraqi television shows pictures of captured coalition airmen.

- Iraq launches 10 Scuds at Saudi Arabia; nine are intercepted by Patriot missiles, one falls in gulf.
- Soviet commandos shoot their way into the Interior Ministry Building in Vilnius, Lithuania.
- Antiwar protesters march in Libya and Germany.
- Pro-war demonstrations occur in several US cities.
- One hundred thousand protesters march in Moscow, call for Gorbachev's resignation.
- Planes fly strike missions on Iraq from Incirlik, Turkey.
- Air campaign passes 7,000 sorties.
- Iraqi losses total 15 aircraft. Coalition losses total 10 aircraft.

21 A downed US Navy pilot is rescued in Iraq.

- Iraq says it will use coalition prisoners of war (POWs) to act as shields against coalition air attacks. Claims to have shot down 12 more coalition aircraft.
- Japan says it will raise its contribution to \$10 billion.
- US Army begins activation of 20,000 members of the Individual Ready Reserve.
- Four CBS newsmen are reported missing near Saudi-Kuwaiti border.
- Bush declares the Persian Gulf a combat zone.
- Coalition losses total 14 aircraft.
- US deployment reaches 472,000 troops.

22 Six Scud missiles launched at Saudi Arabia; one is intercepted by Patriot missile, other five fall in desert, no damage.

■ Gorbachev calls for a peaceful solution to the Gulf War.

■ Iraqis set oil storage tanks and facilities in Kuwait on fire.

■ Scud missile strikes Tel Aviv, three people killed.

■ Air campaign passes 10,000 sorties.

■ Iraqi forces in Kuwait Theater number more than 545,000; 4,200 tanks, 2,800 armored personnel carriers and 3,100 artillery pieces.

23 US officials deny claims by Hussein that coalition aircraft struck a baby formula plant; state it was a chemical weapons plant.

■ Iraq suspends the sale of gasoline to its population.

■ Iraq threatens Turkey for allowing coalition forces to use Turkish air bases.

■ Saudi Arabia begins importing oil products.

■ US Navy jets attack Iraqi naval vessels.



■ Iraq launches Scud missile attacks at Saudi Arabia and Israel; all Scud missiles are intercepted by Patriot missiles; no injuries.

■ Bush urges that Hussein be brought to "justice."

■ Powell says, "Our strategy for dealing with this army is very simple: First we're going to cut it off, then we're going to kill it."

■ Germany offers \$170 million in emergency humanitarian aid to Israel.

■ Qatar flies first combat mission.

■ Air campaign passes 12,000 sorties.

■ Iraqi losses total 17 aircraft. Coalition losses total 19 aircraft.

24 Saudi officials report two oil slicks moving south from Kuwait. Coalition claims Iraq dumped the oil; Iraq claims

oil slick caused by coalition bombing raids.

■ Mubarak says, "The wheel of war has turned. . . . The only way to stop it is the withdrawal from Kuwait and restoration of its legitimate government."

■ US Army call-up of Reserve and National Guard personnel passes 190,000.

■ US deployment reaches 475,000 troops.

■ UNSC urges Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait.

■ Iraqi forces fire rockets at US Marine positions near Khafji, Saudi Arabia.

25 Two Iraqi F-1 Mirage jets downed by Saudi F-15 pilot.

■ Scud missiles launched at Israel and Saudi Arabia; two people killed.

■ Japan says it will send military aircraft to support noncombat missions.

■ French aircraft fly first missions into Iraq; target Republican Guard.

■ Coalition forces attack and seize island of Qaruh, taking 51 Iraqi EPWs.

■ Exiled Kuwaiti government pledges \$13.5 billion; Germany, \$1 billion.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,659.41; oil closes at \$21.35 per barrel.

26 Oil spill grows, threatens Saudi Arabia's desalinization and industrial plants and gulf environment.

■ Pentagon confirms submarine-launched cruise missile fired from USS Louisville. First cruise missile launched in combat from a submarine.

■ Iraqi warplanes begin flying to Iran for safety.

■ US F-15s shoot down three Iraqi MiG-23s.

■ Scuds launched at Israel and Saudi Arabia; all intercepted by Patriot missiles.

■ Protesters march in Washington, DC, Los Angeles, San Francisco and other US cities.

■ Germany increases its pledge to \$3.5 billion.

■ Soviet envoy expresses concern that coalition forces might exceed UN mandates.

■ Saudi Arabia pledges \$13.5 billion to war effort.

27 Schwarzkopf comments on Iraqi air forces, "If they won't fly up to meet us, we will fly down and destroy their hardened shelters one by one by one."



■ Coalition air campaign passes 18,500 sorties; 23 planes lost, 17 to combat; 45 Iraqi planes destroyed, 27 coalition personnel missing, 110 Iraqi EPWs.

■ Coalition forces bomb Iraqi-held oil facilities in Kuwait to stop oil from being dumped into the gulf.

■ New York Giants defeat Buffalo Bills 20-19 in Super Bowl XXV.

■ Iraqi planes flee to Iran; total 39. Iran states any aircraft defecting into their country will remain there until the war ends.

■ Two F-15s shoot down four MiG-23s; 26 Iraqi planes shot down in air combat.

28 Iraq claims coalition POWs have been injured by coalition bombing raids.

■ Bush says, "The war in the gulf is not a Christian war, a Jewish war, or a Muslim war—it is a just war. . . . Our cause could not be more noble."

■ Hussein says his troops "will win the admiration of the world with their fighting prowess."

■ Baghdad radio says Mubarak will be assassinated by an Egyptian soon.

■ Iraqi losses total 26 aircraft in air-to-air combat; 69 aircraft flown to Iran. Coalition losses total 19 aircraft.

29 US Marine battalion fires artillery, mortars and TOW missiles at Iraqi bunkers in Kuwait. No US casualties.

■ US and Soviet Union offer Iraq a cease-fire if Iraq makes an "unequivocal commitment" to withdraw from Kuwait.

■ Bush delivers State of Union address.

■ Germany promises \$5.5 billion more for war effort.

■ French defense minister resigns after disagreeing with use of military force.

■ Pro-war rallies continue across the US.

30 US troop deployment passes 500,000.

■ Coalition air campaign passes 30,000 sorties.

■ Iraqi losses total 29 aircraft in air-to-air combat; 89 aircraft flown to Iran; coalition losses total 19 aircraft.

■ Iraqi tanks and troops advance into Saudi Arabia and seize the town of Khafji. Attacks are countered by US Marines, Saudi and Qatari forces. Eleven Marines killed.

■ Schwarzkopf says coalition has air supremacy and is reducing the Scud threat.

■ Turkish security aide assassinated.

■ Dutch agree to send Hawk missiles to Turkey.

■ Scud missile launches reach 53; 27 at Saudi Arabia and 26 at Israel.

■ US Air Force begins dropping BLU-109 smart bombs to destroy aircraft in hardened shelters.

■ Red Cross convoy of medical supplies crosses Iran-Iraq border.

■ US stations diplomats in the Soviet Union's Baltic republics.

■ AC-130 reported downed over Iraq; 14 crewmen missing.

■ First US female soldier reported missing.

■ King Fahd and Mubarak offer Hussein an immediate cease-fire if he announces Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait.

■ King Fahd says, "Our goal is not to occupy Iraq, it is to restore Kuwait."

■ Saudi and Qatari forces, backed by US artillery, retake Khafji.

■ Sheik Abdul-Aziz Bin Baz, Saudi Arabia's leading interpreter of Islamic law, calls Hussein "enemy of God."

31 B-52s operating from NATO bases in Spain bomb Iraq.

February 1991

1 Coalition air forces bomb a 10-mile-long Iraqi armored column headed toward Saudi Arabia.

■ France grants permission for B-52 overflights from England to Iraq.

■ Libyan President Moamar al-Gaddafi predicts the Gulf War will escalate into World War III.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,730.69; oil closes at \$21.34 per barrel.

2 Two Scuds strike Israel; no casualties. Patriot shoots down Scud over Saudi Arabia; two injured by falling debris.

■ Coalition losses total 21 aircraft.

■ Pope John Paul II criticizes the violence and death in the war.



3 Coalition air campaign passes 41,000 sorties.

■ Budget Director Richard Darman says war will add \$15 billion to 1992 federal budget deficit, despite allied pledges.

■ Italy's Communist Party changes its name to Democratic Party of the Left.

■ B-52 bomber crashes in Indian Ocean; 3 crewmen missing.

■ US bombing reported to be heavier than total bombs dropped during World War II.

■ Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark arrives in Baghdad to seek peaceful settlement to Gulf War.

■ One Scud missile launched at Saudi Arabia; intercepted by Patriot. Two Scud missiles launched at Israel.

4 Iran resumes official relations with the US. Iran offers to mediate peace talks.

■ Bush sends \$1.45 trillion federal budget to Congress; \$295 billion for defense.

■ Attempted pipe bombing of fuel storage tanks in Norfolk, VA; later exposed as insurance scam.

■ Iraq closes a seawater-desalination plant in Kuwait.

■ Syrian and Iraqi forces exchange fire

along the border.

■ US reduces its embassy staff in Jordan.

■ Iraq suspends fuel sales to its civilians.

■ Syrian forces repel Iraqi probe on Saudi-Kuwaiti border.

■ Bush says he will not reinstate the draft.

6 US F-15s shoot down two Iraqi jets as they try to flee to Iran; 120 Iraqi planes in Iran.

■ Cheney and Powell fly to gulf to assess the war.

■ Iraq severs diplomatic ties with the United States and five other coalition members.

■ Saudi costal patrol boat sinks Iraqi patrol boat off Khafji.

7 A-10 shoots down Iraqi helicopter; F-15 shoots down two helicopters.

■ USS Wisconsin joins USS Missouri in firing at Iraqi positions in Kuwait; first time since Korean War the former has fired its guns in combat.

■ Israeli commandos raid PLO base in Lebanon.

■ Cheney, en route to gulf, declares date for ground war beginning is open.

8 Battleship USS New Jersey decommissioned.

■ Coalition aircraft shoot down two, possibly three, Iraqi aircraft.

■ Thirteen more Iraqi aircraft fly to Iran.

■ Scud missile launched at Saudi Arabia; intercepted by Patriot.

■ Cheney and Powell meet in Riyadh for more than 8 hours with Schwarzkopf and other military leaders.

■ US deployment reaches 505,000 troops.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,830.69; oil closes at \$21.92 per barrel.

9 Coalition air campaign passes 57,000 sorties.

■ Gorbachev warns that military operations in the gulf threaten to exceed UN mandate; says he is sending an envoy to Baghdad for talks with Hussein.

■ Kuwait's emir requests that Kuwaiti ground forces be included in the liberation of Kuwait.

■ One Scud missile launched toward Israel; intercepted by Patriot.

CHRONOLOGY

10 Hussein addresses his nation; pledges victory and praises the people for their steadfastness and faith.

11 Bush says coalition is in no hurry to begin the ground campaign.

■ News reports from Egypt say that Iraq officials privately estimate that more than 15,000 Iraqi troops have been killed.

■ Iraq orders all 17-year-old males to sign up for military service or face legal action.



■ One Scud missile launched at Saudi Arabia and one launched at Israel; no injuries; Scud launches total 61.

■ Coalition air campaign passes 62,000 sorties.

12 Coalition forces open combined air-land-sea bombardment campaign against Iraqi staging areas in southern Kuwait.

■ Estimates place the cost for fighting the effects of the oil slick at \$1 billion over the next six months.

■ Soviet envoy Yevgeny Primakov meets Hussein in Baghdad; Hussein says that Iraq is prepared to negotiate a solution to the war.

■ More than 50 oil fields are burning in Kuwait.

■ Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Saadoun Hammadi says, "Iraq is ready to engage in the land battle at any time."

13 US F-111s drop two bombs on fortified underground facility in Baghdad. Iraqi officials claim at least 500 civilians are killed. US officials claim the bunker was used for military command center and not a public shelter.

■ Coalition air campaign passes 67,000 sorties.

■ US troop deployment reaches 514,000.

■ Soviet Union announces the Warsaw Pact will dissolve on 1 April.

14 Southwest Iran hit by earthquake; measures 5.6 on Richter scale.

■ Pentagon officials say coalition planes have destroyed 1,300 Iraqi tanks, 800 armored personnel carriers and 1,100 field artillery pieces.

■ UNSC meets in closed-door session to discuss the war.

■ Antiwar demonstrators splash a Pentagon doorway with blood and oil to protest the Gulf war.

15 Iraq says that it is ready to withdraw from Kuwait, but adds conditions: Israel must withdraw from all Arab territory, Iraqi debts must be forgiven and the coalition nations must pay to rebuild Iraq.

■ President dismisses Iraqi offer as "cruel hoax."

■ Coalition forces continue to move supplies forward in preparation for the ground campaign.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,934.65; oil closes at \$20.88 per barrel.

16 US attack helicopters conduct night raids on Iraqi positions.

■ Iraqi officials claim British jets killed 130 civilians.

■ Iraq's ambassador to the UN says that Iraq will use weapons of mass destruction if coalition bombing continues.

■ Pentagon says Iraq deliberately damaged civilian areas as propaganda.

■ Pentagon says US forces are prepared to launch ground, air and sea assault.

■ Coalition air campaign passes 76,000 sorties.

■ US deployment reaches 523,000 troops.

17 Two Scud missiles fired at Israel.

■ Bush says Iraq's takeover of Kuwait will end "very, very soon."

■ Coalition and Iraqi troops clash along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border; 20 Iraqis surrender to Apache helicopter.

■ Aziz arrives in Moscow to talk with Gorbachev. Aziz says it's up to the coalition forces to act on Iraq's peace proposal.

■ US military intelligence estimates that 15% of Iraq's fighting forces in Kuwait have either been killed or wounded.



18 USS *Tripoli* and USS *Princeton* are struck by floating mines, damaged but still operational.

■ US Air Force helicopter search and rescue team rescues US pilot in Kuwait, 40 miles north of the Saudi border.

■ Coalition air campaign passes 80,000 sorties.

19 Coalition air forces conduct first daylight bombing raids on Baghdad.

■ Baghdad radio reports Aziz has returned from Moscow with a peace proposal.

■ Bush says Soviet proposal falls "well short" of what is needed to end the war.

■ Iranian newspaper cites Iraqi official as saying Iraq has suffered 20,000 dead and 60,000 wounded.

■ One Scud missile fired at Israel.

■ Saudi officials say oil slick is smaller than initially feared.

■ Coalition air campaign passes 83,000 sorties.

20 One American killed and seven wounded in fighting along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. US helicopter destroys Iraqi bunker complex; up to 500 Iraqis surrender.

■ US planes attack 300 Iraqi vehicles 60 miles into Kuwait, destroying 28 tanks.

■ Baghdad radio says Aziz will travel back to Moscow with Hussein's reply to the Soviet peace proposal.

■ Schwarzkopf says Iraqi military is on the "verge of collapse."

■ US officials warn Iraq to announce a timetable for withdrawing from Kuwait as a condition for peace settlement.

■ A total of 68 Scud missiles have been launched; 33 at Saudi Arabia and 35 at Israel.

■ Coalition air campaign passes 86,000 sorties.

21 Three Scud missiles launched at Saudi Arabia.

■ Cheney authorizes the National Defense Service Medal to all members of the Armed Forces serving since 2 August 1990.

■ Soviet spokesman Vitaly Ignatenko announces Iraq and Soviet Union have agreed on plan that could lead to Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

■ Hussein declares Iraq is prepared to fight the ground war.

■ Cheney says coalition forces are preparing "one of the largest land assaults of modern times."

■ Seven US soldiers killed in helicopter crash.

22 Iraq sets fire to more than 150 Kuwaiti oil wells.

■ Iraqi information official brands US position as "shameful ultimatum."

■ Soviet Union announces eight-point withdrawal plan.

■ Bush rejects the Soviet peace plan, deplores Iraq's "scorched-earth" destruction of Kuwaiti oil fields. He demands Iraq begin withdrawal from Kuwait by noon 23 February to avoid ground war.

■ Administration sends first official Gulf War bill to Congress—\$15 billion—claims that the full amount may not be needed.

■ Four Scud missiles fired at Saudi Arabia.

■ Coalition air campaign passes 91,000 sorties.

■ Dow Jones closes at 2,889.36; oil closes at \$17.91 per barrel.

23 About 533,000 Iraqi military forces are in the Kuwait Theater.

■ US officials say Iraqi soldiers are rounding up Kuwaitis to torture, execute or hold as hostages.

■ Approximately 200 Kuwaiti oil wells and facilities are burning.

■ Coalition air campaign passes 94,000 sorties.

■ 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR)

cuts berms into Iraq.

■ 1st Infantry Division conducts Apache raids near breach sites.



24 Coalition ground offensive begins at 4:00 a.m. Saudi time.

■ Cheney suspends regular news briefings.

■ Bush tells nation, "The liberation of Kuwait has entered the final phase." Schwarzkopf is authorized to "use all forces available, including ground forces, to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait."

■ Schwarzkopf declares first days of coalition ground offensive as "dramatic success." Allied casualties are light; more than 5,500 Iraqis are captured.

■ Coalition forces conduct feints at Wadi al Batin and elsewhere with amphibious units, while two Marine divisions and Arab forces attack toward Kuwait City. XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps conduct huge left flanking movement in Iraq. Objectives are to take Kuwait City and to seal off and then destroy Iraqi forces in Kuwait Theater. 2d ACR is 45 kilometers inside Iraq by 5:00 p.m. Saudi time.

■ Hussein urges troops to kill "with all your might" in radio speech.

■ More than 300 attack and utility helicopters of 101st Airborne Division strike more than 50 miles into Iraq.

■ Iraq launches two Scud missiles into

Israel and two missiles at Saudi Arabia; no injuries.

■ Kuwaiti government moves to Dhahran, prepares to reenter Kuwait.

25 Baghdad radio airs a message from Hussein calling for Iraqi armed forces to withdraw from Kuwait to positions held on 1 August 1990. Hussein hails the Iraqi occupation and announces the withdrawal from Kuwait as a "victorious" stand against US-led forces.

■ Marlin Fitzwater, White House spokesman: "The war goes on."

■ Kuwait's Independence Day. Coalition forces are on the outskirts of Kuwait City.

■ UNSG Perez de Cuellar says attacks into Iraq are justified to free Kuwait.

■ Iraqi Scud missile hits US barracks in Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia. Eventual toll: 28 dead, 90 wounded; last Scud missile launched, total 78 Scuds.

■ US officials report four US soldiers killed, 21 wounded in the first two days of coalition ground assault; over 25,000 Iraqis taken prisoner; 270 Iraqi tanks destroyed.

■ 1st UK Division completes passage through breach.

■ Coalition air campaign passes 97,000 sorties.

■ US releases assets from seven Kuwaiti banks to allow settlement of pre-war obligations.

■ More than 500 oil well heads are burning in Kuwait.

■ Silkworm missile launched at USS *Missouri*, shot down by HMS *Gloucester*.

■ Soviet Union presents a new peace plan.

■ Warsaw Pact disbands military union.

26 US rejects new Soviet peace plan.

■ Kuwait's emir declares three months of martial law in freed Kuwait.

■ Brigadier General Richard Neal in Riyadh says Iraqi military are in "full re-



treat" with coalition forces in pursuit; Iraqi EPWs number 30,000-plus, number to climb to 63,000.

- Coalition air campaign passes 103,000 sorties.
- Hussein announces Iraqi occupation forces will withdraw completely.
- Residents of Kuwait City celebrate end of occupation. Resistance groups set up headquarters to control city.
- VII Corps attacks Republican Guard divisions along western Kuwait border. XVIII Corps forces reach Euphrates valley, completing encirclement of Iraqi forces, and begin attacks to the east.
- US Embassy is back in US control.
- Soviet Union requests a cease-fire.

27 Kuwaiti troops raise national flag in Kuwait City.

- Republican Guard divisions are crushed in large tank battle with VII Corps and 24th Infantry Division.
- Bush declares in television address suspension of offensive combat and lays out conditions for permanent cease-fire. "Kuwait is liberated. . . . Iraq's army is defeated. . . . Our military objectives are met."
- Schwarzkopf explains strategy of Gulf War (see page 96).
- Kuwait says it will never negotiate with Iraq on boundary dispute, despite UN resolution to do so.
- UNSG Perez de Cuellar recommends disbanding UN Iran-Iraq Observer Group.

28 Coalition troops begin destroying captured or abandoned Iraqi armored vehicles and equipment.

- In Moscow, Soviet military says it will relook its strategy, in light of the defeat of Soviet arms and tactics in the Gulf war.
- US is investigating reports that Jordan provided arms to Iraq despite the embargo.
- Soviet Union calls for limiting arms

supplies to the entire region.

- German Chancellor Helmut Kohl says Germany will seek a constitutional amendment to permit German participation in future UN military actions.
- US deployment reaches 539,000 troops.
- Coalition air campaign passes 110,000 sorties.
- Iraq accepts US terms for cease-fire.
- Cease-fire begins 8:00 a.m. Saudi time; 100 hours from the start of the ground campaign; 1,012 hours from the start of *Desert Storm*.

March 1991

1 Kuwait International Airport is open.

- US, UK, France and Canada reopen their embassies.
- Aziz calls for US withdrawal from Iraq.
- 82d Airborne Division takes 1,000 EPWs when it takes a battalion commander, who talks his men into surrendering.
- Published statistics show that more Americans died on US highways in January than during operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*.
- Dow Jones closes at 2,909.90; oil closes at \$19.38 per barrel.

2 Retreating Iraqi unit engages US forces, loses 140 armored vehicles, no US casualties.

- UNSC adopts Resolution 686, suspension of offensive combat.
- Kuwaiti cabinet affairs minister says elections to the National Assembly would be held in three-six months.

3 Coalition and Iraqi commanders meet in Safwan, Iraq, to discuss conditions for official cease-fire.

- Soviets and Indians reject sanctuary for Hussein.
- Two Iraqi brigades move from Turkish border to Baghdad.

4 Iraq frees 10 POWs—six Americans.

- Refugees report civil revolt in several southern Iraqi cities.
- Iraq's parliament voids the Kuwait annexation.
- Kuwaiti Crown Prince Saad Abdallah returns to Kuwait.
- Iraq says deserters will be pardoned if they return to their bases within a week.
- Saudis now producing 8.4 million bar-



rels of oil per day, up from 5.3 million in August, say they will keep up that production level because of war costs.

5 US casualties reported as 115 killed in action, 330 wounded in action, 35 missing in action and six POWs.

- Baghdad radio announces Iraq's decision to return to Kuwait possessions seized. Also plays text of decision by the Revolution Command Council, which rescinded all council decisions pertaining to Kuwait.
- Iraq orders most foreign journalists out by end of the week.
- Assessments indicate Iraqis blew up 535 Kuwaiti oil wells; a total of 800 of Kuwait's 1,080 wells are inoperable.

6 Bush addresses joint session of US Congress, says "Aggression is defeated. . . . The war is over." Also calls for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

- Thirty-five coalition POWs arrive in Riyadh.
- Eight Arab nations of the coalition meet in Damascus, Syria, to form gulf peacekeeping force.
- Japan raises its contribution pledge to \$13 billion.

7 US Corps of Engineers issues a \$46 million contract to do restoration work in Kuwait.

- Kuwait's government resumes operations.

8 First US troops return home.

- Iraq frees nearly 1,200 Kuwaiti hostages, 40 journalists and two more US POWs.
- Dow Jones closes at 2,955.20; oil closes at \$19.31 per barrel.

12 OPEC agrees to cut production 5% to reduce glut and raise prices. Also sets production quotas for members. Oil closes at \$19.68 per barrel.



13 The remains of 13 coalition troops returned by the International Red Cross; five US and eight UK service members.
 ■ Kuwait tells UN that Iraq stole \$100 billion worth of property.

14 Thirty-seven thousand US troops have redeployed from the gulf.
 ■ Emir returns to Kuwait.

15 Schwarzkopf warns Iraq that US will shoot down any Iraqi combat aircraft flying.

■ US dropped 88,500 tons of bombs, 6,520 tons were "smart" weapons.

■ Powell says the military concern in August was that Iraq could have taken Saudi ports, which were later used for the military buildup.

16 Hussein acknowledges internal revolt, vows to crush it and promises to transform regime to a multiparty democracy.

■ US troops in Saudi Arabia told not to eat, drink or smoke in public, in respect for Islamic month of Ramadan.

17 US military officially denies Iraq permission to fly its fixed-wing aircraft.

■ Kuwaiti government says it will hold elections in six months to a year.

18 UN mission arrives in Kuwait to evaluate the extent of damages, caused by the Iraqi occupation and the war.

■ A total of 17,849 Iraqi EPWs have been repatriated.

■ Eighty thousand US troops have redeployed from the gulf.

19 Kuwaiti banks say they will reopen on 21 April to issue currency. Iraqis stole \$950 million in gold and \$1.2 billion in notes.

20 F-15 shoots down an Iraqi fighter; US reiterates warning that any fixed-wing Iraqi aircraft flying will be shot down.

■ Kuwaiti cabinet resigns under criticism for failing to quickly restore services.



■ Kurds claim to have captured Kirkuk, while Iraq rushes armored reinforcements north.

■ Iraq accuses Iran of encouraging the rebellion, Iran issues a denial.

■ Senate votes to withhold \$55 million from aid to Jordan because of its support for Iraq.

22 F-15 shoots down another Iraqi fighter; violation of Iraq's agreement not to fly any fixed-wing aircraft.

26 An additional 2,793 EPWs have been repatriated.

28 More than \$28 billion in contributions have been received.

■ About 141,500 US troops have deployed from the gulf leaving roughly

411,500 US troops in the gulf.

■ Another 4,494 EPWs have been repatriated.

April 1991

2 Approximately 167,000 US troops have redeployed from the gulf.

■ More than \$30.8 billion in contributions have been received.

3 UNSC adopts Resolution 687, establishing formal cease-fire to the Gulf War.

5 UNSC adopts Resolution 688, condemning Iraq's oppression of the Kurds.

6 Operation *Provide Comfort* begins.

7 Airdrop relief effort begins delivering supplies into northern Iraq.

8 US medical personnel provide inpatient care to about 150 Iraqis and up to 600 outpatients per day.

■ Refugee camp for 6,000 set up south of Safwan.

9 UNSC adopts Resolution 689, establishing the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission.

Operation *Provide Comfort* continued into July. US forces remain in the gulf today as UN missions continue to monitor Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions. Kuwaiti, US and coalition efforts remain focused on rebuilding Kuwait, reducing environmental damage and opening the way for renewed peace initiatives.

Army Reserve Component Call-up

Chronology of Call-up

22 August 1990— President (by executive order) granted secretary of defense authority to call to active duty up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for up to 90 days, with an additional 90-day extension (Title 10, U.S.C. section 673 (b)).

23 August 1990— Secretary of Defense authorized Army to call 25,000 selected reservists for combat support, combat service support roles.

13 November 1990— An additional 90 days were authorized with increased combat support/combat service support levels to 55,000 Army reservists.

1 December 1990— Levels increased to 115,000 Army reservists.

19 January 1991— Levels increased to 220,000 Army reservists. Tour extensions increased from 180 to 360 days for all reservists.

20 January 1991— Nearly 20,000 members of the Individual Ready Reserve are subject to be called up for one year.

Total Called to Active Duty

Date	Units	Personnel
29 November	514	58,165
31 December	815	104,795
11 January	835	108,564
15 January	844	109,562
22 January	—	128,287
23 January	1004	133,511
24 January	—	137,983
26 January	—	141,290
30 January	—	143,067
8 February	—	148,476
11 February	1022	149,154

UN Resolutions

Between 2 August 1990, the date of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, and 9 April 1991, the Security Council adopted 16 resolutions relating to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait.

Resolution 660, 2 August 1990

Condemned the invasion of Kuwait. Demanded Iraq's unconditional, immediate withdrawal and called on both countries to begin negotiations. (Adopted 14-0; Yemen did not participate.)

Resolution 661, 6 August 1990

Imposed a trade and financial embargo on Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Established a special sanctions committee to implement the resolution. Called upon UN members to protect the assets of Kuwait around the world. Called for restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. (Adopted 13-0; Cuba and Yemen abstained.)

Resolution 662, 9 August 1990

Declared Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void. (Adopted by unanimous vote.)

Resolution 664, 18 August 1990

Demanded the immediate release of foreigners from Iraq and Kuwait and the right of diplomats to visit their nationals. Insisted that Iraq rescind its order closing diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait. (Adopted by unanimous vote.)

Resolution 665, 25 August 1990

Called upon UN members with ships in the region to enforce sanctions by inspecting and verifying cargoes and destinations. (Adopted 13-0; Cuba and Yemen abstained.)

Resolution 666, 13 September 1990

Reaffirmed that Iraq was responsible for the safety and well-being of foreign nationals. Specified guidelines for the delivery of food and medical supplies. (Adopted 13-2; Cuba and Yemen against.)

Resolution 667, 16 September 1990

Condemned Iraqi aggression against diplomats and diplomatic compounds in Kuwait. Demanded the immediate release of foreign nationals. (Adopted by unanimous vote.)

Resolution 669, 24 September 1990

Emphasized that only the special sanctions committee had the power to permit food, medicine or other humanitarian aid shipments to Iraq or occu-

pied Kuwait. (Adopted by unanimous vote.)

Resolution 670, 25 September 1990

Expanded the economic embargo to include air traffic in or out of Iraq and Kuwait, except for humanitarian aid authorized by the special sanctions committee. Called on UN member nations to detain Iraqi ships that could be used to break the naval embargo. (Adopted 14-1; Cuba against.)

Resolution 674, 29 October 1990

Demanded that Iraq stop mistreating Kuwaiti and other foreign nationals. Reminded Iraq that it is liable for damages to foreigners or their property resulting from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. (Adopted 13-0; Cuba and Yemen abstained.)

Resolution 677, 28 November 1990

Condemned Iraq's attempts to change Kuwait's demographic composition. Also condemned Iraq's destruction of Kuwaiti civil records. (Adopted by unanimous vote.)

Resolution 678, 29 November 1990

Demanded Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. Authorized UN members "to use all necessary means" to bring about Iraqi withdrawal after that date. (Adopted 12-2; China abstained; Yemen and Cuba against.)

Resolution 686, 2 March 1991

Called for the suspension of offensive combat operations and for Iraq to take the necessary measures which would permit a definitive end to the hostilities. (Adopted 11-1; China, India and Yemen abstained; Cuba against.)

Resolution 687, 3 April 1991

Demanded restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate government, and set specific conditions for a formal cease-fire. (Adopted 12-1; Yemen and Ecuador abstained; Cuba against.)

Resolution 688, 5 April 1991

Condemned Iraq's oppression of the Kurds. (Adopted 10-3; China and India abstained; Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabwe against.)

Resolution 689, 9 April 1991

Provided for the establishment of the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission. (Adopted by unanimous vote.)

Forces Committed


The Coalition Members:

Afghanistan: 300 *mujahidin* troops
Argentina: 2 frigates, 450 troops
Australia: 1 guided-missile frigate, 1 destroyer, 1 supply ship
Bahrain: 3,500 troops
Bangladesh: 2,000 troops
Belgium: 2 minesweepers, 1 fighter squadron to Turkey
Canada: 2 destroyers, CF-18 squadron (30 fighters plus transport aircraft), 1,700 troops
Czechoslovakia: 200-man chemical defense unit and 150 medical personnel
Denmark: 1 corvette and 29-man medical team
Egypt: 40,000 troops, about 400 tanks
France: 22,000 troops, 14 ships, 1 aircraft carrier, more than 75 aircraft, 350 tanks
Germany: 1 squadron of fighters to Turkey
Greece: 1 frigate in Red Sea
Hungary: 40-man medical team
Honduras: 150 troops, possibly 350 more
Italy: 4 ships, 8 Tornado fighters, 1 squadron of fighters to Turkey
Kuwait: 11,500 troops, 35 combat aircraft



Morocco: 2,000 troops
Netherlands: 2 frigates, 1 squadron of F-16s to Turkey
New Zealand: 2 C-130s
Niger: 480 troops
Norway: 1 coast guard cutter, 1 military supply ship
Oman: 25,500 troops, 75 tanks, 12 patrol ships, 50 combat aircraft mostly guarding Strait of Hormuz
Pakistan: 12,000 troops
Poland: 2 ships, 1 medical team
Portugal: 1 naval support vessel assisting British ships

Coalition Maneuver Units (as of 23 February 1991)



FORCES COMMITTED



Qatar: 7,000 troops, 24 tanks, 9 coastal vessels, 19 combat aircraft

Saudi Arabia: 110,500 troops, 550 tanks, 180 combat aircraft, 8 frigates

Senegal: 500 troops

South Korea: 5 C-130s, 150 air force pilots

Spain: 2 corvettes, 1 destroyer

Syria: 21,000 troops, 300 armored vehicles; 50,000 troops in Syria on Iraqi border; 2,000 in United Arab Emirates

Turkey: 120,000 troops on the Iraqi border to deter Iraqi attack; allowed the United States to operate from the air base at Incirlik. NATO had 42 aircraft from its allied mobile force also based at Incirlik

United Arab Emirates: 43,000 troops, 200 tanks, 80 combat aircraft, 15 ships

United Kingdom: 42,000 troops; 58 fighter planes, reconnaissance aircraft and helicopters; 170 tanks; 16 warships

United States: More than 527,000 troops, more than 1,200 tanks and 2,200 armored personnel carriers, including M1A1 Abrams tanks; more than 100 warships, including battleships *Missouri*




and *Wisconsin* and aircraft carriers *Midway*, *Ranger*, *Saratoga*, *John F. Kennedy*, *America* and *Theodore Roosevelt*; more than 1,800 Air Force, Navy and Marine fighters, bombers and other warplanes, ranging from the F-117A Stealth fighters to B-52 bombers; and more than 1,700 helicopters

Other Nations:

Soviet Union: 2 warships in the gulf area

Romania: Mobile field hospital team, 180 military experts on chemical warfare

Singapore: 30-member medical team serving in a British hospital



President Speaks to Nation

The Deployment of US Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia

By President George Bush, 8 August 1990

"In the life of a nation, we're called upon to define who we are and what we believe. Sometimes these choices are not easy. But today as president, I ask for your support in a decision I've made to stand up for what's right and condemn what's wrong, all in the cause of peace.

"At my direction, elements of the 82d Airborne Division as well as key units of the United States Air Force are arriving today to take up defensive positions in Saudi Arabia. I took this action to assist the Saudi Arabian government in the defense of its homeland. No one commits America's Armed Forces to a dangerous mission lightly, but after perhaps unparalleled international consultation and exhausting every alternative, it became necessary to take this action. Let me tell you why.

"Less than a week ago, in the early morning hours of August 2d, Iraqi armed forces, without provocation or warning, invaded a peaceful Kuwait. Facing negligible resistance from its much smaller neighbor, Iraq's tanks stormed in blitzkrieg fashion through Kuwait in a few short hours. With more than 100,000 troops, along with tanks, artillery, and surface-to-surface missiles, Iraq now occupies Kuwait. This aggression came just hours after Saddam Hussein [president of Iraq] specifically assured numerous countries in the area that there would be no invasion. There is no justification whatsoever for this outrageous and brutal act of aggression.

"A puppet regime imposed from the outside is unacceptable. The acquisition of territory by force is unacceptable. No one, friend or foe, should doubt our desire for peace; and no one should underestimate our determination to confront aggression.

"Four simple principles guide our policy. First, we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime. And third, my administration, as has been the case with every president from President [Franklin D.] Roosevelt to President [Ronald] Reagan, is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. And fourth, I am determined to protect the lives of American citizens abroad.

"Immediately after the Iraqi invasion, I ordered

an embargo of all trade with Iraq and, together with many other nations, announced sanctions that both freeze all Iraqi assets in this country and protect Kuwait's assets. The stakes are high. Iraq is already a rich and powerful country that possesses the world's second largest reserves of oil and over a million men under arms. It's the fourth largest military in the world. Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence. Much of the world is even more dependent upon imported oil and is even more vulnerable to Iraqi threats.

"We succeeded in the struggle for freedom in Europe because we and our allies remained stalwart. Keeping the peace in the Middle East will require no less. We're beginning a new era. This new era can be full of promise, an age of freedom, a time of peace for all peoples. But if history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors. Only 14 days ago, Saddam Hussein promised his friends he would not invade Kuwait. And four days ago, he promised the world he would withdraw. And twice we have seen what his promises mean: His promises mean nothing.

"In the last few days, I've spoken with political leaders from the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the Americas; and I've met with Prime Minister Thatcher [of the United Kingdom], Prime Minister Mulroney [of Canada], and NATO Secretary General Woerner. And all agree that Iraq cannot be allowed to benefit from its invasion of Kuwait.

"We agree that this is not an American problem or a European problem or a Middle East problem; it is the world's problem. And that's why, soon after the Iraqi invasion, the United Nations Security Council, without dissent, condemned Iraq, calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait. The Arab world, through both the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council, courageously announced its opposition to Iraqi aggression. Japan, the United Kingdom, and France and other governments around the world have imposed severe sanctions. The Soviet Union

and China ended all arms sales to Iraq.

"And this past Monday, the United Nations Security Council approved for the first time in 23 years mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. These sanctions, now enshrined in international law, have the potential to deny Iraq the fruits of aggression while sharply limiting its ability to either import or export anything of value, especially oil.

"I pledge here today that the United States will do its part to see that these sanctions are effective and to induce Iraq to withdraw without delay from Kuwait.

"But we must recognize that Iraq may not stop using force to advance its ambitions. Iraq has massed an enormous war machine on the Saudi border capable of initiating hostilities with little or no additional preparation. Given the Iraqi government's history of aggression against its own citizens as well as its neighbors, to assume Iraq will not attack again would be unwise and unrealistic.

And therefore, after consulting with King Fahd [of Saudi Arabia], I sent Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to discuss cooperative measures we could take. Following those meetings, the Saudi Government requested our help, and I responded to that request by ordering US air and ground forces to deploy to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

"Let me be clear: The sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the United States. This decision, which I shared with the congressional leadership, grows out of the longstanding friendship and security relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. US forces will work together with those of Saudi Arabia and other nations to preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia and to deter further Iraqi aggression. Through their presence, as well as through training and exercises, these multinational forces will enhance the overall capability of Saudi armed forces to defend the kingdom.

"I want to be clear about what we are doing and why. America does not seek conflict nor do we seek to chart the destiny of other nations. But America will stand by her friends. The mission of

our troops is wholly defensive. Hopefully, they will not be needed long. They will not initiate hostilities, but they will defend themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and other friends in the Persian Gulf.

"We are working around the clock to deter Iraqi aggression and to enforce UN sanctions. I'm continuing my conversations with world leaders. Secretary of Defense Cheney has just returned from valuable consultations with President Mubarak of Egypt and King Hassan of Morocco. Secretary of State Baker has consulted with his counterparts in many nations, including the Soviet Union, and today he heads for Europe to consult with President Özal of Turkey, a staunch friend of the United States. And he'll then consult with the NATO foreign ministers.

"I will ask oil-producing nations to do what they can to increase production in order to minimize any impact that oil flow reductions will have on the world economy. And I will explore whether we and our allies should draw down our strategic petroleum reserves. Conservation measures can also help; Americans everywhere must do their part. And one more thing: I'm asking the oil companies to do their fair share. They should show restraint and not abuse today's uncertainties to raise prices.

"Standing up for our principles will not come easy. It may take time and possibly cost a great deal. But we are asking no more of anyone than of the brave young men and women of our Armed Forces and their families. And I ask that in the churches around the country prayers be said for those who are committed to protect and defend America's interests.

"Standing up for our principle is an American tradition. As it has so many times before, it may take time and tremendous effort, but most of all, it will take unity of purpose. As I've witnessed throughout my life in both war and peace, America has never wavered when her purpose is driven by principle. And on this August day, at home and abroad, I know she will do no less.

"Thank you, and God bless the United States of America."

Beginning of Air Campaign in the Persian Gulf

By President George Bush, 16 January 1991

"Just 2 hours ago, allied air forces began an attack on military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. These attacks continue as I speak. Ground forces are not engaged.

"This conflict started 2 August when the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless neighbor. Kuwait—a member of the Arab League and a

member of the United Nations—was crushed; its people, brutalized. Five months ago, Saddam Hussein started this cruel war against Kuwait; tonight the battle has been joined.

"This military action, taken in accord with United Nations resolutions and with the consent of

the United States Congress, follows months of constant and virtually endless diplomatic activity on the part of the United Nations, the United States and many, many other countries. Arab leaders sought what became known as an Arab solution, only to conclude that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to leave Kuwait. Others traveled to Baghdad in a variety of efforts to restore peace and justice. Our secretary of state, James Baker, held a historic meeting in Geneva only to be totally rebuffed. This past weekend, in a last-ditch effort, the secretary-general of the United Nations went to the Middle East with peace in his heart—his second such mission, and he came back from Baghdad with no progress at all in getting Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.

"Now, the 28 countries with forces in the gulf area have exhausted all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful resolution, have no choice but to drive Saddam from Kuwait by force. We will not fail.

"As I report to you, air attacks are under way against military targets in Iraq. We are determined to knock out Saddam Hussein's nuclear bomb potential. We will also destroy his chemical weapons facilities. Much of Saddam's artillery and tanks will be destroyed. Our operations are designed to best protect the lives of all the coalition forces by targeting Saddam's vast military arsenal. Initial reports from General [H. Norman] Schwarzkopf are that our operations are proceeding according to plan.

"Our objectives are clear. Saddam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait. The legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place, and Kuwait will once again be free. Iraq will eventually comply with all relevant United Nations resolutions; and then when peace is restored, it is our hope that Iraq will live as a peaceful and cooperative member of the family of nations, thus enhancing the security and stability of the gulf.

"Some may ask, 'Why act now? Why not wait?' The answer is clear. The world could wait no longer. Sanctions, though having some effect, showed no signs of accomplishing their objective. Sanctions were tried for well over five months, and we and our allies concluded that sanctions alone would not force Saddam from Kuwait.

"While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged and plundered a tiny nation—no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities, and among those maimed and murdered—innocent children.

"While the world waited, Saddam sought to add to the chemical weapons arsenal he now possesses an infinitely more dangerous weapon of mass destruction—a nuclear weapon. And while the world waited, while

the world talked peace and withdrawal, Saddam Hussein dug in and moved massive forces into Kuwait.

"While the world waited, while Saddam stalled, more damage was being done to the fragile economies of the Third World, the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, to the entire world, including to our own economy.

"The United States, together with the United Nations, exhausted every means at our disposal to bring this crisis to a peaceful end. However, Saddam clearly felt that by stalling and threatening and defying the United Nations he could weaken the forces arrayed against him.

"While the world waited, Saddam Hussein met every overture of peace with open contempt. While the world prayed for peace, Saddam prepared for war.

"I had hoped that when the United States Congress, in historic debate, took its resolute action, Saddam would realize he could not prevail and would move out of Kuwait in accord with the United Nations resolutions. He did not do that. Instead, he remained intransigent, certain that time was on his side.

"Saddam was warned over and over again to comply with the will of the United Nations—leave Kuwait or be driven out. Saddam has arrogantly rejected all warnings. Instead, he tried to make this a dispute between Iraq and the United States of America.

"Well, he failed. Tonight, 28 nations, countries from five continents—Europe and Asia, Africa and the Arab League—have forces in the gulf area standing shoulder to shoulder against Saddam Hussein. These countries had hoped the use of force could be avoided. Regrettably, we now believe that only force will make him leave.

"Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our military commanders to take every necessary step to prevail as quickly as possible and with the greatest degree of protection possible for American and allied service men and women. I've told the American people before that this will not be another Vietnam. And I repeat this here tonight. Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back. I'm hopeful that this fighting will not go on for long and that casualties will be held to an absolute minimum.

"This is a historic moment. We have in this past year made great progress in ending the long era of conflict and cold war. We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the

conduct of nations. When we are successful, and we will be, we have a real chance at this new world order, an order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the UN's founders.

"We have no argument with the people of Iraq. Indeed for the innocents caught in this conflict, I pray for their safety. Our goal is not the conquest of Iraq. It is the liberation of Kuwait. It is my hope that somehow the Iraqi people can, even now, convince their dictator that he must lay down his arms, leave Kuwait and let Iraq itself rejoin the family of peace-loving nations.

"Thomas Paine wrote many years ago: 'These are the times that try men's souls.' Those well-known words are so very true today. But even as planes of the multinational forces attack Iraq, I prefer to think of peace, not war. I am convinced not only that we will prevail, but that out of the horror of combat will come the recognition that no nation can stand against a world united. No nation will be permitted to brutally assault its neighbor.

"No president can easily commit our sons and daughters to war. They are the nation's finest. Ours is an all-volunteer force, magnificently trained, highly motivated. The troops know why they're there. And listen to what they say, for they've said it better than any president or prime minister ever could.

"Listen to Hollywood Huddleston, Marine lance corporal. He says, 'Let's free these people so we can go home and be free again.' And he's right. The terrible crimes and tortures committed by Saddam's

henchmen against the innocent people of Kuwait are an affront to mankind and a challenge to the freedom of all.

"Listen to one of our great officers out there, Marine Lieutenant General Walter Boomer. He said, 'There are things worth fighting for. A world in which brutality and lawlessness are allowed to go unchecked isn't the kind of world we're going to want to live in.'

"Listen to Master Sergeant J. P. Kendall of the 82d Airborne. 'We're here for more than just the price of a gallon of gas. What we're doing is going to chart the future of the world for the next 100 years. It's better to deal with this guy now than five years from now.'

"And finally, we should all sit up and listen to Jackie Jones, an Army lieutenant, when she says, 'If we let him get away with this, who knows what's going to be next?'

"I have called upon Hollywood and Walter and J. P. and Jackie and all their courageous comrades-in-arms to do what must be done. Tonight, America and the world are deeply grateful to them and to their families. And let me say to everyone listening or watching tonight: When the troops we've sent in finish their work, I'm determined to bring them home as soon as possible.

"Tonight, as our forces fight, they and their families are in our prayers. May God bless each and every one of them and the coalition forces at our side in the gulf, and may He continue to bless our nation, the United States of America."

Allied Ground Operations in the Persian Gulf

By President George Bush, 23 February 1991

"Good evening. Yesterday, after conferring with my senior national security advisers, and following extensive consultations with our coalition partners, Saddam Hussein was given one last chance—set forth in very explicit terms—to do what he should have done more than six months ago: withdraw from Kuwait without condition or further delay, and comply fully with the resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council.

"Regrettably, the noon deadline passed without the agreement of the government of Iraq to meet demands of United Nations Security Council Resolution 660, as set forth in the specific terms spelled out by the coalition to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait. To the contrary, what we have seen is a redoubling of Saddam Hussein's efforts to destroy completely Kuwait and its people.

"I have, therefore, directed General Norman

Schwarzkopf, in conjunction with coalition forces, to use all forces available, including ground forces, to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait. Once again, this was a decision made only after extensive consultations within our coalition partnership.

"The liberation of Kuwait has now entered a final phase. I have complete confidence in the ability of the coalition forces swiftly and decisively to accomplish their mission.

"Tonight, as this coalition of countries seeks to do that which is right and just, I ask only that all of you stop what you are doing and say a prayer for all the coalition forces, and especially for our men and women in uniform who this very moment are risking their lives for their country and for all of us.

"May God bless and protect each and every one of them. And may God bless the United States of America. Thank you very much."

Suspension of Allied Offensive Combat Operations

By President George Bush, 27 February 1991

"Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated. Our military objectives are met. Kuwait is once more in the hands of Kuwaitis, in control of their own destiny. We share in their joy, a joy tempered only by our compassion for their ordeal.

"Tonight the Kuwaiti flag once again flies above the capital of a free and sovereign nation. And the American flag flies above our embassy.

"Seven months ago, America and the world drew a line in the sand. We declared that the aggression against Kuwait would not stand. And tonight, America and the world have kept their word.

"This is not a time of euphoria; certainly not a time to gloat. But it is a time of pride: pride in our troops; pride in our friends who stood with us during the crisis; pride in our nation and the people whose strength and resolve made victory quick, decisive and just. And soon we will open wide our arms to welcome back home to America our magnificent fighting forces.

"No one country can claim this victory as its own. It was not only a victory for Kuwait but a victory for all the coalition partners. This is a victory for the United Nations, for all mankind, for the rule of law, and for what is right.

"After consulting with Secretary of Defense [Richard B.] Cheney, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General [Colin L.] Powell, and our coalition partners, I am pleased to announce that at midnight tonight, Eastern Standard Time, exactly 100 hours since ground operations commenced and six weeks since the start of Operation *Desert Storm*, all US and coalition forces will suspend offensive combat operations. It is up to Iraq whether this suspension on the part of the coalition becomes a permanent cease-fire.

"Coalition political and military terms for a formal cease-fire include the following requirements:

"Iraq must release immediately all coalition prisoners of war, third country nationals and the remains of all who have fallen. Iraq must release all Kuwaiti detainees. Iraq also must inform Kuwaiti authorities of the location and nature of all land and sea mines. Iraq must comply fully with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. This includes a rescinding of Iraq's August decision to annex Kuwait, and acceptance in principle of Iraq's responsibility to pay compensation for

the loss, damage, and injury its aggression has caused.

"The coalition calls upon the Iraqi government to designate military commanders to meet within 48 hours with their coalition counterparts, at a place in the theater of operations to be specified, to arrange for military aspects of the cease-fire. Further, I have asked Secretary of State [James A.] Baker to request that the United Nations Security Council meet to formulate the necessary arrangements for this war to be ended.

"This suspension of offensive combat operations is contingent upon Iraq's not firing upon any coalition forces and not launching Scud missiles against any other country. If Iraq violates these terms, coalition forces will be free to resume military operations.

"At every opportunity, I have said to the people of Iraq that our quarrel was not with them, but instead with their leadership and, above all, with Saddam Hussein. This remains the case. You, the people of Iraq, are not our enemy. We do not seek your destruction. We have treated your prisoners of war with kindness. Coalition forces fought this war only as a last resort and look forward to the day when Iraq is led by people prepared to live in peace with their neighbors.

"We must now begin to look beyond victory in war. We must meet the challenge of securing the peace. In the future, as before, we will consult with our coalition partners. We've already done a good deal of thinking and planning for the postwar period, and Secretary Baker has already begun to consult with our coalition partners on the region's challenges. There can be, and will be, no solely American answer to all these challenges. But we can assist and support the countries of the region and be a catalyst for peace. In this spirit, Secretary Baker will go to the region next week to begin a new round of consultations.

"This war is now behind us. Ahead of us is the difficult task of securing a potentially historic peace. Tonight though, let us be proud of what we have accomplished. Let us give thanks to those who have risked their lives. Let us never forget those who gave their lives. May God bless our valiant military forces and their families, and let us all remember them in our prayers.

"Good night, and may God bless the United States of America."



President Bush visiting troops in Saudi Arabia on Thanksgiving Day, 22 November 1990.

Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the Cessation of Hostilities

By President George Bush, 6 March 1991

Speaker Thomas S. Foley: "Mr. President, it is customary at joint sessions for the chair to present the president to the members of Congress directly and without further comment. But I wish to depart from tradition tonight and express to you on behalf of the Congress and the country, and through you to the members of our Armed Forces, our warmest congratulations on the brilliant victory of the *Desert Storm* operation."

"Members of the Congress, I now have the high privilege and distinct honor of presenting to you the president of the United States."

The President: "Mr. President. And Mr. Speaker, thank you, sir, for those very generous words spoken from the heart about the wonderful performance of our military."

"Members of Congress, five short weeks ago I came to this House to speak to you about the state of the union. We met then in time of war. Tonight, we meet in a world blessed by the promise of peace."

"From the moment Operation *Desert Storm* commenced on 16 January until the time the guns fell silent at midnight one week ago, this nation has watched its sons and daughters with pride—watched over them with prayer. As commander in chief, I can report to you our Armed Forces fought with honor and valor. And as president, I can re-

port to the nation aggression is defeated. The war is over."

"This is a victory for every country in the coalition, for the United Nations. A victory for unprecedented international cooperation and diplomacy, so well led by our secretary of state, James Baker. It is a victory for the rule of law and for what is right."

"*Desert Storm's* success belongs to the team that so ably leads our Armed Forces: our secretary of defense and our chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Dick Cheney and Colin Powell. And while you're standing—[laughter]—this military victory also belongs to the one the British call the 'Man of the Match'—the tower of calm at the eve of *Desert Storm*—General Norman Schwarzkopf."

"And recognizing this was a coalition effort, let us not forget Saudi General Khalid, Britain's General de la Billiere, or General Roquette of France—and all the others whose leadership played such a vital role. And most importantly, most importantly of all, all those who served in the field."

"I thank the members of this Congress—support here for our troops in battle was overwhelming. And above all, I thank those whose untiring love and support sustained our courageous men and women—I thank the American people."

"Tonight, I come to this House to speak about the world—the world after war. The recent chal-

lenge could not have been clearer. Saddam Hussein was the villain; Kuwait, the victim. To the aid of this small country came nations from North America and Europe, from Asia and South America, from Africa and the Arab world—all united against aggression. Our uncommon coalition must now work in common purpose: to forge a future that should never again be held hostage to the darker side of human nature.

"Tonight in Iraq, Saddam walks amidst ruin. His war machine is crushed. His ability to threaten mass destruction is itself destroyed. His people have been lied to—denied the truth. And when his defeated legions come home, all Iraqis will see and feel the havoc he has wrought. And this I promise you: For all that Saddam has done to his own people, to the Kuwaitis, and to the entire world, Saddam and those around him are accountable.

"All of us grieve for the victims of war, for the people of Kuwait and the suffering that scars the soul of that proud nation. We grieve for all our fallen soldiers and their families, for all the innocents caught up in this conflict. And, yes, we grieve for the people of Iraq—a people who have never been our enemy. My hope is that one day we will once again welcome them as friends into the community of nations. Our commitment to peace in the Middle East does not end with the liberation of Kuwait. So tonight, let me outline four key challenges to be met.

"First, we must work together to create shared security arrangements in the region. Our friends and allies in the Middle East recognize that they will bear the bulk of the responsibility for regional security. But we want them to know that just as we stood with them to repel aggression, so now America stands ready to work with them to secure the peace. This does not mean stationing US ground forces in the Arabian Peninsula, but it does mean American participation in joint exercises involving both air and ground forces. It means maintaining a capable US naval presence in the region—just as we have for over 40 years. Let it be clear: Our vital national interests depend on a stable and secure gulf.

"Second, we must act to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them. It would be tragic if the nations of the Middle East and Persian Gulf were now, in the wake of war, to embark on a new arms race. Iraq requires special vigilance. Until Iraq convinces the world of its peaceful intentions—that its leaders will not use new revenues to rearm and rebuild its menacing war machine—Iraq must not have access to the instruments of war.

"And third, we must work to create new opportunities for peace and stability in the Middle East. On the night I announced Operation *Desert Storm*, I expressed my hope that out of the horrors of war might come new momentum for peace. We've learned in the modern age geography cannot guarantee security, and security does not come from military power alone.

"All of us know the depth of bitterness that has made the dispute between Israel and its neighbors so painful and intractable. Yet, in the conflict just concluded, Israel and many of the Arab States have for the first time found themselves confronting the same aggressor. By now, it should be plain to all parties that peacemaking in the Middle East requires compromise. At the same time, peace brings real benefits to everyone. We must do all that we can to close the gap between Israel and the Arab states—and between Israelis and Palestinians. The tactics of terror lead absolutely nowhere. There can be no substitute for diplomacy.

"A comprehensive peace must be grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security and recognition and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. Anything else would fail the twin test of fairness and security. The time has come to put an end to Arab-Israeli conflict.

"The war with Iraq is over. The quest for solutions to the problems in Lebanon, in the Arab-Israeli dispute and in the gulf must go forward with new vigor and determination. And I guarantee you: No one will work harder for a stable peace in the region than we will.

"Fourth, we must foster economic development for the sake of peace and progress. The Persian Gulf and Middle East form a region rich in natural resources—with a wealth of untapped human potential. Resources once squandered on military might must be redirected to more peaceful ends. We are already addressing the immediate economic consequences of Iraq's aggression. Now, the challenge is to reach higher—to foster economic freedom and prosperity for all the people of the region.

"By meeting these four challenges, we can build a framework for peace. I've asked Secretary of State Baker to go to the Middle East to begin the process. He will go to listen, to probe, to offer suggestions—to advance the search for peace and stability. I've also asked him to raise the plight of the hostages held in Lebanon. We have not forgotten them, and we will not forget them.

"To all the challenges that confront this region

of the world, there is no single solution—no solely American answer. But we can make a difference. America will work tirelessly as a catalyst for positive change.

"But we cannot lead a new world abroad if, at home, it's politics as usual on American defense and diplomacy. It's time to turn away from the temptation to protect unneeded weapons systems and obsolete bases. It's time to put an end to micromanagement of foreign and security assistance programs—micromanagement that humiliates our friends and allies and hamstring our diplomacy. It's time to rise above the parochial and the pork barrel, to do what is necessary, what's right and what will enable this nation to play the leadership role required of us.

"The consequences of the conflict in the gulf reach far beyond the confines of the Middle East. Twice before in this century, an entire world was convulsed by war. Twice this century, out of the horrors of war, hope emerged for enduring peace. Twice before, those hopes proved to be a distant dream, beyond the grasp of man. Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided—a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict and cold war.

"Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a world order in which 'the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong . . .' A world where the United Nations—freed from cold war stalemate—is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations. The Gulf War put this new world to its first test. And my fellow Americans, we passed that test.

"For the sake of our principles—for the sake of the Kuwaiti people—we stood our ground. Because the world would not look the other way, Ambassador [Shaikh S. N.] Al-Sabah, tonight, Kuwait is free. And we're very happy about that.

"Tonight, as our troops begin to come home, let us recognize that the hard work of freedom still calls us forward. We've learned the hard lessons of history. The victory over Iraq was not waged as 'a war to end all wars.' Even the new world order cannot guarantee an era of perpetual peace. But enduring peace must be our mission. Our success in the gulf will shape not only the world order we seek, but our mission here at home.

"In the war just ended, there were clearcut objectives—timetables—and, above all, an overriding imperative to achieve results. We must bring that same sense of self-discipline, that same sense of urgency, to the way we meet challenges here at

home. In my State of the Union address and in my budget, I defined a comprehensive agenda to prepare for the next American century.

"Our first priority is to get this economy rolling again. The fear and uncertainty caused by the gulf crisis were understandable. But now that the war is over, oil prices are down, interest rates are down and confidence is rightly coming back. Americans can move forward to lend, spend and invest in this, the strongest economy on Earth.

"We must also enact the legislation that is key to building a better America. For example, in 1990, we enacted a historic Clean Air Act. And now we've proposed a national energy strategy. We passed a child care bill that put power in the hands of parents. And today, we're ready to do the same thing with our schools and expand choice in education. We passed a crime bill that made a useful start in fighting crime and drugs. This year, we're sending to Congress our comprehensive crime package to finish the job. We passed the landmark Americans with Disabilities Act. And now we've sent forward our civil rights bill. We also passed the aviation bill. This year, we've sent up our new highway bill. And these are just a few of our pending proposals for reform and renewal.

"So, tonight I call on Congress to move forward aggressively on our domestic front. Let's begin with two initiatives we should be able to agree on quickly—transportation and crime. And then, let's build on success with those and enact the rest of our agenda. If our forces could win the ground war in 100 hours, then surely the Congress can pass this legislation in 100 days. Let that be a promise we make tonight to the American people.

"When I spoke in this House about the state of our union, I asked all of you: If we can selflessly confront evil for the sake of good in a land so far away, then surely we can make this land all that it should be. In the time since then, the brave men and women of *Desert Storm* accomplished more than even they may realize. They set out to confront an enemy abroad, and in the process, they transformed a nation at home. Think of the way they went about their mission—with confidence and quiet pride. Think about their sense of duty, about all they taught us about our values, about ourselves.

"We hear so often about our young people in turmoil—how our children fall short, how our schools fail us, how American products and American workers are second-class. Well, don't you believe it. The America we saw in *Desert Storm* was first-class talent. And they did it using America's state-of-the-art technology. We saw the excel-

lence embodied in the Patriot missile and the patriots who made it work. And we saw soldiers who know about honor and bravery and duty and country and the world-shaking power of these simple words. There is something noble and majestic about the pride, about the patriotism that we feel tonight.

"So, to everyone here—and everyone watching at home—think about the men and women of *Desert Storm*. Let us honor them with our gratitude. Let us comfort the families of the fallen and remember each precious life lost.

"Let us learn from them as well. Let us honor those who have served us by serving others. Let us honor them as individuals—men and women of every race, all creeds and colors—by setting the face of this nation against discrimination, bigotry and hate. Eliminate them.

"I'm sure that many of you saw on the television the unforgettable scene of four terrified Iraqi soldiers surrendering. They emerged from their bunker—broken, tears streaming from their eyes, fearing the worst. And then there was an American soldier. Remember what he said? He said: 'It's OK. You're all right now. You're all right now.' That scene says a lot about America, a lot about who we are. Americans are a caring people. We are a good people, a generous people. Let us always be caring and good and generous in all we do.

"Soon, very soon, our troops will begin the march we've all been waiting for—their march home. And I have directed Secretary Cheney to begin the immediate return of American combat units from the gulf. Less than 2 hours from now, the first planeload of American soldiers will lift off

from Saudi Arabia, headed for the U.S.A. It will carry men and women of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division bound for Fort Stewart, Georgia. This is just the beginning of a steady flow of American troops coming home. Let their return remind us that all those who have gone before are linked with us in the long line of freedom's march.

"Americans have always tried to serve, to sacrifice nobly for what we believe to be right. Tonight, I ask every community in this country to make this coming Fourth of July a day of special celebration for our returning troops. They may have missed Thanksgiving and Christmas, but I can tell you this: For them and for their families, we can make this a holiday they'll never forget.

"In a very real sense, this victory belongs to them—to the privates and the pilots, to the sergeants and the supply officers, to the men and women in the machines, and the men and women who made them work. It belongs to the Regulars, to the Reserves, to the National Guard. This victory belongs to the finest fighting force this nation has ever known in its history.

"We went halfway around the world to do what is moral and just and right. We fought hard and, with others, we won the war. We lifted the yoke of aggression and tyranny from a small country that many Americans had never even heard of, and we shall ask nothing in return.

"We're coming home now—proud, confident, heads high. There is much that we must do, at home and abroad. And we will do it. We are Americans.

"May God bless this great nation, the United States of America. Thank you all very, very much."

Letter to Congressional Leaders

By President George Bush, 8 January 1991

"Dear _____:

"The current situation in the Persian Gulf, brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait, threatens vital US interests. The situation also threatens the peace. It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for peace if Congress were now to go on record supporting the position adopted by the UN Security Council on 12 separate occasions. Such an action would underline that the United States stands with the international community and on the side of law and decency; it also would help dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's leaders that the United States lacks the necessary unity to act decisively in response to Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait.

"Secretary of State [James A.] Baker is meeting with Iraq's foreign minister on January 9. It would have been most constructive if he could have presented the Iraqi government a resolution passed by both houses of Congress supporting the UN position and, in particular, Security Council Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently stated my desire for such a resolution. Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for peace and safeguard this country's vital interests.

"I therefore request that the House of Representatives and the Senate adopt a resolution stating that Congress supports the use of all necessary means to implement UN Security Council Resolution 678. Such action would send the clearest pos-

sible message to Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw without condition or delay from Kuwait. Anything less would only encourage Iraqi intransigence; anything else would risk detracting from the international coalition arrayed against Iraq's aggression.

"Mr. Speaker, I am determined to do whatever is necessary to protect America's security. I ask Congress to join with me in this task. I can think of no better way than for Congress to express its support

for the president at this critical time. This truly is the last best chance for peace.

Sincerely,
George Bush"

Note: Identical letters were delivered to Thomas S. Foley, speaker of the House of Representatives; Senate majority leader, George J. Mitchell; Senate minority leader, Robert Dole; and House minority leader, Robert H. Michel. MR

Congressional Resolution

Joint Resolution Authorizing Use of Military Force Against Iraq

12 January 1991

TO AUTHORIZE THE USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES PURSUANT TO UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 678. . .

Whereas the government of Iraq without provocation invaded and occupied the territory of Kuwait on August 2, 1990; and

Whereas both the House of Representatives (in HJ. Res. 658 of the 101st Congress) and the Senate (in S. Con. Res. 147 of the 101st Congress) have condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and declared their support for international action to reverse Iraq's aggression; and

Whereas Iraq's conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and its demonstrated willingness to use weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat to world peace; and

Whereas the international community has demanded that Iraq withdraw unconditionally and immediately from Kuwait and that Kuwait's independence and legitimate government be restored; and

Whereas the UN Security Council repeatedly affirmed the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter; and

Whereas, in the absence of full compliance by Iraq with its resolutions, the UN Security Council in Resolution 678 has authorized member states of the United Nations to use all necessary means, after January 15, 1991, to uphold and implement all relevant Security Council resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area; and

Whereas Iraq has persisted in its illegal occupation of, and brutal aggression against Kuwait: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution."

SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES

(a) **AUTHORIZATION.** The president is authorized, subject to subsection (b), to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674 and 677.

(b) **REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION THAT USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS NECESSARY.** Before exercising the authority granted in subsection (a), the president shall make available to the speaker of the House of Representatives and the president pro tempore of the Senate his determination that:

(1) the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United Nations Security Council resolutions cited in subsection (a); and

(2) that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.

(c) **WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.**

(1) **SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION.** Constituent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this sec-

tion is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

(2) **APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS.** Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.

SECTION 3. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

At least once every 60 days, the president shall

submit to the Congress a summary on the status of efforts to obtain compliance by Iraq with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in response to Iraq's aggression.

** Senate voted 52-47 to pass the resolution.*

** House of Representatives voted 250-183 to pass the resolution.*

Messages to Iraq and the World

Address to the People of Iraq on the Persian Gulf Crisis

By President George Bush, 16 September 1990

"I'm here today to explain to the people of Iraq why the United States and the world community has responded the way it has to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. My purpose is not to trade accusations, not to escalate the war of words, but to speak with candor about what has caused this crisis that confronts us. Let there be no misunderstanding: We have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. I've said many times, and I will repeat right now, our only object is to oppose the invasion ordered by Saddam Hussein [president of Iraq].

"On August 2d, your leadership made its decision to invade, an unprovoked attack on a small nation that posed no threat to your own. Kuwait was the victim; Iraq, the aggressor.

"And the world met Iraq's invasion with a chorus of condemnation: unanimous resolutions in the United Nations. Twenty-seven states—rich and poor, Arab, Moslem, Asian and African—have answered the call of Saudi Arabia and free Kuwait and sent forces to the gulf region to defend against Iraq. For the first time in history, 13 states of the Arab League, representing 80 percent of the Arab nation, have condemned a brother Arab state. Today, opposed by world opinion, Iraq stands isolated and alone.

"I do not believe that you, the people of Iraq, want war. You've borne untold suffering and hardship during eight long years of war with Iran; a war that touched the life of every single Iraqi citizen; a war that took the lives of hundreds of thousands of young men, the bright promise of an entire generation. No one knows better than you the incalculable costs of war, the ultimate cost when a nation's vast potential and vital energies are consumed by conflict. No one knows what Iraq might be today,

what prosperity and peace you might now enjoy, had your leaders not plunged you into war. Now, once again, Iraq finds itself on the brink of war. Once again, the same Iraqi leadership has miscalculated. Once again the Iraqi people face tragedy.

"Saddam Hussein has told you that Iraqi troops were invited into Kuwait. That's not true. In fact, in the face of far superior force, the people of Kuwait are bravely resisting this occupation. Your own returning soldiers will tell you the Kuwaitis are fighting valiantly in any way they can.

"Saddam Hussein tells you that this crisis is a struggle between Iraq and America. In fact, it is Iraq against the world. When President [Mikhail] Gorbachev and I met at Helsinki [9 September 1990], we agreed that no peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their neighbors. Never before has world opinion been so solidly united against aggression.

"Nor, until the invasion of Kuwait, has the United States been opposed to Iraq. In the past, the United States has helped Iraq import billions of dollars worth of food and other commodities. And the war with Iran would not have ended two years ago without US support and sponsorship in the United Nations.

"Saddam Hussein tells you the occupation of Kuwait will benefit the poorer nations of the world. In fact, the occupation of Kuwait is helping no one and is now hurting you, the Iraqi people, and countless others of the world's poor. Instead of acquiring new oil wealth by annexing Kuwait, this misguided act of aggression will cost Iraq over \$20 billion a year in lost oil revenues. Because of Iraq's aggression, hundreds of thousands of innocent foreign workers are fleeing Kuwait and Iraq. They are

stranded on Iraq's borders, without shelter, without food, without medicine, with no way home. These refugees are suffering, and this is shameful.

"But even worse, others are being held hostage in Iraq and Kuwait. Hostage-taking punishes the innocent and separates families. It is barbaric. It will not work, and it will not affect my ability to make tough decisions.

"I do not want to add to the suffering of the people of Iraq. The United Nations has put binding sanctions in place not to punish the Iraqi people but as a peaceful means to convince your leadership to withdraw from Kuwait. That decision is in the hands of Saddam Hussein.

"The pain you now experience is a direct result of the path your leadership has chosen. When Iraq returns to the path of peace, when Iraqi troops withdraw from Kuwait, when that country's rightful government is restored, when all foreigners held against their will are released, then and then alone, will the world end the sanctions.

"Perhaps your leaders do not appreciate the strength of the forces united against them. Let me say clearly: There is no way Iraq can win. Ultimately, Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait.

"No one—not the American people, not this president—wants war. But there are times when a country, when all countries who value the principles of sovereignty and independence, must stand against aggression. As Americans, we're slow to raise our hand in anger and eager to explore every

peaceful means of settling our disputes; but when we have exhausted every alternative, when conflict is thrust upon us, there is no nation on Earth with greater resolve or stronger steadiness of purpose.

"The actions of your leadership have put Iraq at odds with the world community. But while those actions have brought us to the brink of conflict, war is not inevitable. It is still possible to bring this crisis to a peaceful end.

"When we stand with Kuwait against aggression, we stand for a principle well understood in the Arab world. Let me quote the words of one Arab leader, Saddam Hussein himself: "An Arab country does not have the right to occupy another Arab country. God forbid, if Iraq should deviate from the right path, we would want Arabs to send their armies to put things right. If Iraq should become intoxicated by its power and move to overwhelm another Arab State, the Arabs would be right to deploy their armies to check it."

"Those are the words of your leader, Saddam Hussein spoken on 28 November 1988, in a speech to Arab lawyers. Today, two years later, Saddam has invaded and occupied a member of the United Nations and the Arab League. The world will not allow this aggression to stand. Iraq must get out of Kuwait for the sake of principle, for the sake of peace and for the sake of the Iraqi people."

This televised address was recorded on 12 September 1990 and broadcast unedited in Iraqi on 16 September.

Bush's Letter to Saddam Hussein

5 January 1991

"Mr. President:

"We stand today at the brink of war between Iraq and the world. This is a war that began with your invasion of Kuwait; this is a war that can be ended only by Iraq's full and unconditional compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 678.

"I am writing you now, directly, because what is at stake demands that no opportunity be lost to avoid what would be a certain calamity for the people of Iraq. I am writing, as well, because it is said by some that you do not understand just how isolated Iraq is and what Iraq faces as a result.

"I am not in a position to judge whether this impression is correct; what I can do, though, is try in this letter to reinforce what Secretary of State [James A.] Baker told your foreign minister and eliminate any uncertainty or ambiguity that might exist in your mind about where we stand

and what we are prepared to do.

"The international community is united in its call for Iraq to leave all of Kuwait without condition and without further delay. This is not simply the policy of the United States; it is the position of the world community as expressed in no less than 12 Security Council resolutions.

"We prefer a peaceful outcome. However, anything less than full compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 678 and its predecessors is unacceptable.

"There can be no reward for aggression. Nor will there be any negotiation. Principle cannot be compromised. However, by its full compliance, Iraq will gain the opportunity to rejoin the international community.

"More immediately, the Iraqi military establishment will escape destruction. But unless you with-

draw from Kuwait completely and without condition, you will lose more than Kuwait.

"What is at issue here is not the future of Kuwait—it will be free, its government will be restored—but rather the future of Iraq. This choice is yours to make.

"The United States will not be separated from its coalition partners. Twelve Security Council resolutions, 28 countries providing military units to enforce them, more than 100 governments complying with sanctions—all highlight the fact that it is not Iraq against the United States, but Iraq against the world.

"That most Arab and Muslim countries are arrayed against you as well should reinforce what I am saying. Iraq cannot and will not be able to hold on to Kuwait or exact a price for leaving.

"You may be tempted to find solace in the diversity of opinion that is American democracy. You should resist any such temptation. Diversity ought not be confused with division. Nor should you underestimate, as others have before you, America's will.

"Iraq is already feeling the effects of the sanctions mandated by the United Nations. Should war come, it will be a far greater tragedy for you and your country.

"Let me state, too, that the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weap-

ons or the destruction of Kuwait's oil fields and installations. Further, you will be held directly responsible for terrorist actions against any member of the coalition.

"The American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort.

"I write this letter not to threaten, but to inform. I do so with no sense of satisfaction, for the people of the United States have no quarrel with the people of Iraq.

"Mr. President, UN Security Council Resolution 678 establishes the period before 15 January of this year as a 'pause of good will' so that this crisis may end without further violence.

"Whether this pause is used as intended, or merely becomes a prelude to further violence, is in your hands, and yours alone. I hope you weigh your choice carefully and choose wisely, for much will depend upon it."

Signed,
George Bush

Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz refused to accept the letter, 9 January 1991.

Bush's Message to Allied Nations on the Persian Gulf Crisis

8 January 1991

"More than five months ago in the early morning hours of August 2nd, Iraqi forces rolled south and the rape of Kuwait began. That unprovoked invasion was more than an attack on Kuwait, more than the brutal occupation of a tiny nation that posed no threat to its large and powerful neighbor. It was an assault on the very notion of international order.

"My purpose in speaking to you, the people of countries united against this assault, is to share with you my view of the aims and objectives that must guide us in the challenging days ahead. From the center of the crisis in the Middle East, to people and countries on every continent, to the families with loved ones held hostage, to the many millions sure to suffer at the hands of one man with a stranglehold on the world's economic lifeline, Iraq's aggression has caused untold suffering, hardship and uncertainty.

"In the more than five months since August 2nd, Iraqi troops have carried out a systematic campaign of terror on the people of Kuwait—unspeakable atrocities against men and women, and among the maimed and murdered, even innocent children. In the more than five months since August 2nd, Iraq's action has imposed economic strains on na-

tions large and small—among them some of the world's newest democracies at the very moment they are most vulnerable. And yet, Iraq's aggression did not go unchallenged.

"In the five months since August 2nd, the world has witnessed the emergence of an unprecedented coalition against aggression. In the United Nations, Iraq's outlaw act has met a chorus of condemnation in 12 resolutions with the overwhelming support of the Security Council. At this moment, forces from 27 nations—rich and poor, Arab and Muslim, European, Asian, African and American—stand side by side in the gulf, determined that Saddam's aggression will not stand.

"We're now entering the most critical period of this crisis. For the past five months, Saddam [Hussein] has held the world and the norms of civilized conduct in contempt. In the next few days, Iraq arrives at a deadline that spells the limit of the civilized world's patience.

"Let me be clear about the upcoming deadline. January 15 is not a 'date certain' for the onset of armed conflict; it is a deadline for Saddam Hussein to choose, to choose peace over war. The purpose of declaring this deadline was to give Saddam fair

warning: Withdraw from Kuwait, without condition and without delay, or—at any time on or after that date—face a coalition ready and willing to employ “all means necessary” to enforce the will of the United Nations.

“Every one of us, each day of this crisis, has held out hope for a peaceful solution. Even now, as the deadline draws near, we continue to seek a way to end this crisis without further conflict. And that is why, back on November 30th, I offered to have Secretary Baker travel to Baghdad to meet with Saddam Hussein. And that is why, even after Saddam failed to respond, failed to find time to meet on any of the 15 days we put forward, I invited Iraq’s foreign minister [Tariq Aziz] to meet with Secretary Baker in Geneva on January 9th.

“In Geneva, we will be guided by the will of the world community—expressed in those 12 UN resolutions I mentioned a moment ago. I didn’t send Secretary Baker to Geneva to compromise or to offer concessions. This meeting offers Saddam Hussein a chance—possibly the final chance—before the UN deadline to resolve by peaceful means the crisis that he has created.

“Saddam may seek to split the coalition, to exploit our sincere desire for peace, to secure for himself the spoils of war. He will fail—just as he has failed for more than five months. I know that pressures are now building to provide Saddam some means of saving face, or to accept a withdrawal that is less than unconditional. The danger in this

course should be clear to all. The price of peace now on Saddam’s terms will be paid many times over in greater sacrifice and suffering. Saddam’s power will only grow, along with his appetite for more conquest. The next conflict will find him stronger still—perhaps in possession even of nuclear weapons—and far more difficult to defeat. And that is why we simply cannot accept anything less than full compliance with the United Nations dictates: Iraq’s complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

“I began by saying that Iraq’s action was more than an attack on one nation—it is an assault on us all, on the international order we all share. We who have witnessed in this past year an end to the long years of cold war and conflict, we who have seen so much positive change, stand now at a critical moment, one that will shape the world we live in for years, even decades, to come.

“The key now in meeting this challenge is for this remarkable coalition to remain steadfast and strong. If we remain in the days ahead nations united against aggression, we will turn back not only the actions of an ambitious dictator, we will, as partners, step forward toward a world of peace.

“Thank you, and may God bless all of you.”

This message was recorded 6 January at Camp David, Maryland. It was broadcast at noon on 8 January over the US Information Agency WORLDNET satellite network. MR

Selected Quotes from Congressional Debate (party, state and vote in parentheses)

Senator Howell Heflin (D) (AL) (Yes): “The Iraqis must realize the terrible destruction they will face if invaded. They must realize that it will be far different from the Iran–Iraq War.”

Senator Arien Specter (R) (PA) (Yes): “If we do not follow through at this stage, if Iraq does not withdraw voluntarily from Kuwait . . . we will be building a more powerful Iraq, and we will be fighting this war at another day . . . with greater loss of life, American lives.”

Senator George J. Mitchell (D) (ME) (No) Senate Majority Leader: “But prematurely abandoning the sanctions and immediately going to war also involve risk. . . . How many people will die? How many young Americans will die? That is a risk, a terrible risk. . . .

Senator Paul Simon (D) (IL) (No): It is too easy here, or in the Oval Office, in an antiseptic kind of situation to say we are going to make a decision that will cost thousands of lives, tens of thousands of lives, not just Americans, but Iraqis, and a lot of innocent people.”

Representative Douglas Applegate (D) (OH) (No): “America’s national societal and economic stability is not threatened, my friends. . . . Is Saddam Hussein worth the sacrifice of American life and blood? And I say, hell no.”

Representative Jack Fields (R) (TX) (Yes): “There is no real evidence that sanctions will work in the short term. We are giving Saddam the time to fortify and make it difficult for our people, if in fact we have to use force”

Senator Sam Nunn (D) (GA) (No): “We may disagree in this chamber, but when this vote is over—and I expect I will not be on the prevailing side—when the vote is over, we are going to stand united.”

Central Command Briefing

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, US Army

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Wednesday, 27 February 1991

"Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for being here.

"I promised some of you a few days ago that as soon as the opportunity presented itself I would give you a complete rundown on what we were doing, and more importantly, why we were doing it—the strategy behind what we were doing. I've been asked by Secretary [Richard B.] Cheney to do that this evening, so if you will bear with me, we're going to go through a briefing. I apologize to the folks over here who won't be able to see the charts, but we're going to go through a complete briefing of the operation.

"This goes back to 7 August through 17 January. As you recall, we started our deployment on the 7th of August. Basically what we started out against was a couple of hundred thousand Iraqis that were in the Kuwait theater of operations. I don't have to remind you all that we brought over, initially, defensive forces in the form of the 101st, the 82d, the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, the 3d Armored Cavalry, and in essence, we had them arrayed to the south, behind the Saudi task force. Also, there were Arab forces over here in this area, arrayed in defensive positions. That, in essence, is the way we started.


"In the middle of November, the decision was made to increase the force because, by that time, huge numbers of Iraqi forces had flowed into the area, and generally in the disposition as they're shown right here. Therefore, we increased the forces and built up more forces.

"I would tell you that at this time we made a very deliberate decision to align all of those forces within the boundary looking north towards Kuwait—this being King Khalid Military City over here. So we aligned those forces so it very much looked like they were all aligned directly on the Iraqi position.

"We also, at the time, had a very active naval presence out in the gulf, and we made sure that everybody understood about that naval presence. One of the reasons why we did that is it became very apparent to us early on that the Iraqis were quite concerned about an amphibious operation across the shores to liberate Kuwait—this being Kuwait City. They put a very, very heavy barrier of infantry along here, and they

proceeded to build an extensive barrier that went all the way across the border, down and around and up the side of Kuwait.

"Basically, the problem we were faced with was this: When you looked at the troop numbers, they really outnumbered us about 3-to-2, and when you consider the number of combat service support people we have—that's logisticians and that sort of thing in our Armed Forces, as far as fighting troops, we were really outnumbered 2-to-1. In addition to that, they had 4,700 tanks versus our 3,500 when the buildup was complete, and they had a great deal more artillery than we do.




The buildup, 3 August–17 January: Allied forces took up positions near Kuwait and practiced amphibious attacks, leading Iraq to concentrate its forces mainly on fortifying Kuwait's border and coasts.

Abbreviations:
 RG — Republican Guards
 Fr — French Division
 S — Saudis others
 UK — British Division
 Eg — Egyptian Divisions
 Syr — Syrian Division
 USM — US Marine Divisions
 101 — 101st Airborne Division
 24 — 24th Infantry Division

"I think any student of military strategy would tell you that in order to attack a position, you should have a ratio of approximately 3-to-1 in favor of the attacker. In order to attack a position that is heavily dug in and barricaded such as the one we had here, you should have a ratio of 5-to-1 in the way of troops in favor of the attacker. So you can see basically what our problem was at that time. We were outnumbered as a minimum, 3-to-2, as far as troops were

concerned; we were outnumbered as far as tanks were concerned, and we had to come up with some way to make up the difference.

"I apologize for the busy nature of this chart, but I think it's very important for you to understand exactly what our strategy was. What you see here is a color coding where green is a go sign or a good sign as far



Air war, 17 January–23 February: Once Iraq's air force had been grounded or destroyed and could no longer watch allied moves, troops and supply bases quickly shifted west. Air attacks destroyed bridges, troops and artillery. US Special Forces landed deep in Iraq.

as our forces are concerned; yellow would be a caution sign; and red would be a stop sign. Green represents units that have been attrited below 50 percent strength; the yellow are units that are between 50 and 75 percent strength; and of course the red are units that are over 75 percent strength.

"What we did, of course, was start an extensive air campaign, and I briefed you in quite some detail on that in the past. One of the purposes, I told you at that time, of that extensive air campaign was to isolate the Kuwaiti theater of operations by taking out all of the bridges and supply lines that ran between the north and the southern part of Iraq. That was to prevent reinforcement and supply coming into the southern part of Iraq and the Kuwaiti theater of operations. We also conducted a very heavy bombing campaign, and many people questioned why the extensive bombing campaign. This is the reason why. It was necessary to reduce these forces down to a strength that made them weaker, particularly along the front line barrier that we had to go through.

"We continued our heavy operations out in the sea because we wanted the Iraqis to continue to believe that we were going to conduct a massive amphibious operation in this area. I think many of you recall the number of amphibious rehearsals we had, to include *Imminent Thunder*, that was written about quite extensively for many reasons. But we continued to have those operations because we wanted him [Saddam

Hussein] to concentrate his forces—which he did.


"I think this is probably one of the most important parts of the entire briefing I can talk about. As you know, very early on we took out the Iraqi air force. We knew that he [Saddam Hussein] had very, very limited reconnaissance means. Therefore, when we took out his air force, for all intents and purposes, we took out his ability to see what we were doing down here in Saudi Arabia. Once we had taken out his eyes, we did what could best be described as the "Hail Mary play" in football. I think you recall when the quarterback is desperate for a touchdown at the very end, what he does is he sets up behind the center, and all of a sudden, every single one of his receivers goes way out to one flank, and they all run down the field as fast as they possibly can and into the end zone, and he lobs the ball. In essence, that's what we did.

"When we knew that he couldn't see us any more, we did a massive movement of troops all the way out to the west, to the extreme west, because at that time we knew that he was still fixed in this area with the vast majority of his forces, and once the air campaign started, he would be incapable of moving out to counter this move, even if he knew we made it. There were some additional troops out in this area, but they did not have the capability nor the time to put in the barrier that had been described by Saddam Hussein as an absolutely impenetrable tank barrier that no one would ever get through. I believe those were his words.

"So this was absolutely an extraordinary move. I must tell you, I can't recall any time in the annals of military history when this number of forces have moved over this distance to put themselves in a position to be able to attack. But what's more important, and I think it's very, very important that I make this point, and that's these logistics bases. Not only did we move the troops out there, but we literally moved thousands and thousands of tons of fuel, of ammunition, of spare parts, of water, and of food out here in this area, because we wanted to have enough supplies on hand so if we launched this, if we got into a slugfest battle, which we very easily could have gotten into, we'd have enough supplies to last for 60 days. It was an absolutely gigantic accomplishment, and I can't give credit enough to the logisticians and the transporters who were able to pull this off, for the superb support we had from the Saudi government, the literally thousands and thousands of drivers of every national origin who helped us in this move out here. And of course, great credit goes to the commanders of these units who were also able to maneuver their forces out here and put them in this position.

"But as a result, by the 23d of February, what you found is this situation. The front lines had been at-

tritted down to a point where all of these units were at 50 percent or below. The second level, basically, that we had to face, and these were the real tough fighters we were worried about right here, were attritted to someplace between 50 and 75 percent. Although we still had the Republican Guard located here and here, and part of the Republican Guard in



Ground war, 24 February a.m.: Saudis and US Marines attacked Kuwait to pin down Iraqis. US airborne troops and French troops moved quickly north.

this area—they were very strong, and the Republican Guard up in this area, strong; and we continued to hit the bridges all across this area to make absolutely sure that no more reinforcements came into the battle. This was the situation on the 23d of February.

"I shouldn't forget these fellows. That SF stands for Special Forces. We put Special Forces deep into the enemy territory. They went out on strategic reconnaissance for us, and they let us know what was going on out there. They were the eyes that were out there, and it's very important that I not forget those folks.

"This was the morning of the 24th. Our plan initially had been to start over here in this area, and do exactly what the Iraqis thought we were going to do, and that's take them on head-on into their most heavily defended area. Also, at the same time, we launched amphibious feints and naval gunfire in this area, so that they continued to think we were going to be attacking along this coast, and therefore, fixed their forces in this position. Our hope was that by fixing the forces in this position and with this attack through here in this position, we would basically keep the forces here, and they wouldn't know what was going on out in this area. I believe we succeeded in that very well.

"At 4 o'clock in the morning, the Marines, the 1st Marine Division and the 2d Marine Division, launched attacks through the barrier system. They were accompanied by the US Army Tiger Brigade of the 2d Armored Division. At the same time, over

here, two Saudi task forces also launched a penetration through this barrier. But while they were doing that, at 4 o'clock in the morning over here, the 6th French Armored Division, accompanied by a brigade of the 82d Airborne, also launched an overland attack to their objective up in this area, As Salman airfield, and we were held up a little bit by the weather, but by 8 o'clock in the morning, the 101st Airborne air assault launched an air assault deep into enemy territory to establish a forward operating base in this location right here. Let me talk about each one of those moves.


"First of all, the Saudis over here on the east coast did a terrific job. They went up against the very, very tough barrier systems; they breached the barrier very, very effectively; they moved out aggressively; and continued their attacks up the coast.

"I can't say enough about the two Marine divisions. If I used words like brilliant, it would really be an underdescription of the absolutely superb job that they did in breaching the so-called impenetrable barrier. It was a classic, absolutely classic, military breaching of a very, very tough minefield, barbed wire, fire trenches-type barrier. They went through the first barrier like it was water. They went across into the second barrier line, even though they were under artillery fire at the time—they continued to open up that breach. Then they brought both divisions streaming through that breach. Absolutely superb operation, a textbook, and I think it will be studied for many, many years to come as the way to do it.

"I would also like to say that the French did an absolutely superb job of moving out rapidly to take their objective out here, and they were very, very successful, as was the 101st. Again, we still had the Special Forces located in this area.

"What we found was, as soon as we breached these obstacles here and started bringing pressure, we started getting a large number of surrenders. I think I talked to some of you about that this evening when I briefed you on the evening of the 24th. We finally got a large number of surrenders. We also found that these forces right here, were getting a large number of surrenders and were meeting with a great deal of success.

"We were worried about the weather. The weather was going to get pretty bad the next day, and we were worried about launching this air assault. We also started to have a huge number of atrocities of really the most unspeakable type committed in downtown Kuwait City, to include reports that the desalinization plant had been destroyed. When we heard that, we were quite concerned about what might be going on. Based upon that, and the situation as it was developing, we made the decision that rather than wait until



24 February p.m.: Breakthroughs in Kuwait and reports of Iraqi atrocities led allies to launch further attacks ahead of schedule.

the following morning to launch the remainder of these forces, that we would go ahead and launch these forces that afternoon.


"This was the situation you saw the afternoon of the 24th. The Marines continued to make great progress going through the breach in this area, and were moving rapidly north. The Saudi task force on the east coast was also moving rapidly to the north and making very, very good progress. We launched another Egyptian/Arab force in this location, and another Saudi force in this location—again, to penetrate the barrier. But once again, to make the enemy continue to think that we were doing exactly what he wanted us to do, and that's make a headlong assault into a very, very tough barrier system—a very, very tough mission for these folks here. But at the same time, what we did is continued to attack with the French; we launched an attack on the part of the entire VII Corps where the 1st Infantry Division went through, breached an obstacle and minefield barrier here, established quite a large breach through which we passed the 1st British Armored Division. At the same time, we launched the 1st Armored Division and the 3d Armored Division and because of our deception plan and the way it worked, we didn't even have to worry about a barrier, we just went right around the enemy and were behind him in no time at all, and the 2d Armored Cavalry [Regiment]. The 24th Mech Division also launched out here in the far west. I ought to talk about the 101st, because this is an important point.

"Once the 101st had their forward operating base established here, they then went ahead and launched into the Tigris and Euphrates valleys. There are a lot of people who are still saying that the objective of the United States of America was to capture Iraq and cause the downfall of the entire country of Iraq. Ladies and gentlemen, when we were here, we were 150

miles away from Baghdad, and there was nobody between us and Baghdad. If it had been our intention to take Iraq, if it had been our intention to destroy the country, if it had been our intention to overrun the country, we could have done it unopposed, for all intents and purposes, from this position at that time. That was not our intention, we have never said it was our intention. Our intention was truly to eject the Iraqis out of Kuwait and destroy the military power that had come in here.

"So this was the situation at the end of 24 February in the afternoon.

"The next two days went exactly like we thought they would go. The Saudis continued to make great progress up on the eastern flank, keeping the pressure off the Marines on the flank here. The Special Forces went out and started operating small boat operations out in this area to help clear mines, but also to threaten the flanks here, and to continue to make them think that we were, in fact, going to conduct amphibious operations. The Saudi and Arab forces that




25-26 February: As French units guarded the flank, allied armor wheeled east to strike Iraq's Republican Guards. Forces in Kuwait penetrated crumbling Iraqi defenses. A US mobile division raced to the Euphrates to block an escape route.

came in and took these two initial objectives turned to come in on the flank heading towards Kuwait City, located right in this area here. The British UK passed through and continued to attack up this flank. Of course, the VII Corps came in and attacked in this direction shown here. The 24th Infantry Division made an unbelievable move all the way across into the Tigris and Euphrates valley, and proceeded in blocking this avenue of egress out, which was the only avenue of egress left because we continued to make sure that the bridges stayed down. So there was no way out once the 24th was in this area, and the 101st continued to operate in here. The French, having succeeded in achieving all their objectives, then set up a flanking position, a flank guard position here, to

make sure there were no forces that could come in and get us from the flank.

"By this time we had destroyed, or rendered completely ineffective, over 21 Iraqi divisions.

"Again, today we had a very significant day. The Arab forces coming from both the west and the east closed in and moved into Kuwait City where they are now in the process of securing Kuwait City entirely



27 February: Allied armor pressed east to attack Republican Guards in northern Kuwait and southeastern Iraq. Arab forces and US Marines took Kuwait city and its airport.

and ensuring that it's absolutely secure. The 1st Marine Division continues to hold Kuwait International Airport. The 2d Marine Division continues to be in a position where it blocks any egress out of the city of Kuwait, so no one can leave. To date, we have destroyed over 29—destroyed or rendered inoperable—I don't like to say destroyed because that gives you visions of absolutely killing everyone, and that's not what we're doing. But we have rendered completely ineffective over 29 Iraqi divisions. The gates are closed. There is no way out of here; there is no way out of here; and the enemy is fighting us in this location right here.

"We continue, of course, overwhelming air power. The air has done a terrific job from the start to finish in supporting the ground forces, and we also have had great support from the Navy—both in the form of naval gunfire and in support of carrier air.

"That's the situation at the present time.

"Peace is not without a cost. These have been the US casualties to date. As you can see, these were the casualties we had in the air war; then of course, we had the terrible misfortune of the Scud attack the other night which, again, because the weapon malfunctioned, it caused death, unfortunately, rather than in a proper function. Then, of course, these are the casualties in the ground war, the total being shown here.

"I would just like to comment briefly about the ca-

sualty chart. The loss of one human life is intolerable to any of us who are in the military. But I would tell you that the casualties of that order of magnitude considering the job that's been done and the number of forces that were involved is almost miraculous, as far as the light number of casualties. It will never be miraculous to the families of those people, but it is miraculous.

"This is what's happened to date with the Iraqis. They started out with over 4,000 tanks. As of today, we have over 3,000 confirmed destroyed—and I do mean destroyed or captured. As a matter of fact, that number is low because you can add another 700 to that as a result of the battle that's going on right now with the Republican Guard. So that number is very, very high, and we've almost completely destroyed the offensive capability of the Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. The armored vehicle count is also very, very high, and of course, you can see we're doing great damage to the artillery. The battle is still going on, and I suspect that these numbers will mount rather considerably.

"I wish I could give you a better number on this, to be very honest with you. This is just a wild guess. It's an estimate that was sent to us by the field today at noontime, but the prisoners out there are so heavy and so extensive, and obviously, we're not in the business of going around and counting noses at this time to determine precisely what the exact number is. But we're very, very confident that we have well over 50,000 prisoners of war at this time, and that number is mounting on a continuing basis.

"I would remind you that the war is continuing to go on. Even as we speak right now there is fighting going on out there. Even as we speak right now there are incredible acts of bravery going on. This afternoon we had an F-16 pilot shot down. We had contact with him, he had a broken leg on the ground. Two helicopters from the 101st, they didn't have to do it, but they went in to try and pull that pilot out. One of them was shot down, and we're still in the

Iraqi Forces in Kuwait Theater of Operations

Republican Guards: 8 divisions,
total 110,000 troops

Other units: about 36 divisions,
approximate total 435,000 troops
(42 divisions rendered combat ineffective)

Iraqi Equipment in Theater of Operations

	Maximum present	Air war losses	Ground war losses	Total losses
tanks	4,550	1,685	2,162	3,847
APCs *	2,880	925	525	1,450
artillery	3,257	1,485	1,432	2,917

* Armored Personnel Carriers

process of working through that. But that's the kind of thing that's going on out on that battlefield right now. It is not a Nintendo game—it is a tough battlefield where people are risking their lives at all times. There are great heroes out there, and we ought to be very, very proud of them.

"That's the campaign to date. That's the strategy to date. I'd now be very happy to take any questions anyone might have."

I want to go back to the air war. The chart you showed there with the attrition rates of the various forces was almost the exact reverse of what most of us thought was happening. It showed the front line troops attrited to 75 percent or more, and the Republican Guard, which a lot of public focus was on when we were covering the air war, attrited less than 75. Why is that? How did it come to pass?

"Let me tell you how we did this. We started off, of course, against the strategic targets. I briefed you on that before. At the same time, we were hitting the Republican Guard. But the Republican Guard, you must remember, is a mechanized armor force for the most part, that is very, very well dug in, and very, very well spread out. So in the initial stages of the game, we were hitting the Republican Guard heavily, but we were hitting them with strategic-type bombers rather than pinpoint precision bombers.

"For lack of a better word, what happened is the air campaign shifted from the strategic phase into the theater. We knew all along that this was the important area. The nightmare scenario for all of us would have been to go through, get hung up in this breach right here, and then have the enemy artillery rain chemical weapons down on troops that were in a gaggle in the breach right there. That was the nightmare scenario. So one of the things that we felt we must have established is an absolute, as much destruction as we could possibly get, of the artillery, the direct support artillery, that would be firing on that wire. That's why we shifted it in the very latter days, we absolutely punished this area very heavily because that was the first challenge. Once we got through this and were moving, then it's a different war. Then we're fighting our kind of war. Before we get through that, we're fighting their kind of war, and that's what we didn't want to have to do.

"At the same time, we continued to attrit the Republican Guard, and that's why I would tell you that, again, the figures we're giving you are conservative, they always have been conservative. But we promised you at the outset we weren't going to give you anything inflated, we were going to give you the best we had.

He seems to have about 500–600 tanks left out of more than 4,000, as just an example. I wonder if in an over-

view, despite these enormously illustrative pictures, you could say what's left of the Iraqi army in terms of how long could it be before he could ever be a regional threat, or a threat to the region again?

"There's not enough left at all for him to be a regional threat to the region, an offensive regional threat. As you know, he has a very large army, but most of the army that is left north of the Tigris/Euphrates valley is an infantry army, it's not an armored army, it's not an armored heavy army, which means it really isn't an offensive army. So it doesn't have enough left, unless someone chooses to re-arm them in the future."

You said the Iraqis have got these divisions along the border which were seriously attrited. It figures to be about 200,000 troops, maybe, that were there. You've got 50,000 prisoners. Where are the rest of them?

"There were a very, very large number of dead in these units—a very, very large number of dead. We even found them, when we went into the units ourselves, we found them in the trench lines. There were very heavy desertions. At one point we had reports of desertion rates of more than 30 percent of the units that were along the front here. As you know, we had quite a large number of prisoners of war that came across, so I think it's a combination of desertions, of people that were killed, of the people that we've captured, and of some other people who are just flat still running."

It seems you've done so much, that the job is effectively done. Can I ask you, what do you think really needs more to be done? His forces are, if not destroyed, certainly no longer capable of posing a threat to the region. They seem to want to go home. What more has to be done?

"If I'm to accomplish the mission that I was given, and that's to make sure that the Republican Guard is rendered incapable of conducting the type of heinous acts that they've conducted so often in the past, what has to be done is these forces continue to attack across here and put the Republican Guard out of business. We're not in the business of killing them. We have PSYOP [psychological operations] aircraft up. We're telling them over and over again, all you've got to do is get out of your tanks and move off, and you will not be killed. But they're continuing to fight, and as long as they continue to fight, we're going to continue to fight with them."

That move on the extreme left, which got within 150 miles of Baghdad, was it also a part of the plan that the Iraqis might have thought it was going to Baghdad, and would that have contributed to the deception?

"I wouldn't have minded at all if they'd gotten a little bit nervous about it. I mean that, very sincerely. I would have been delighted if they had gotten very, very nervous about it. Frankly, I don't think they ever

knew it was there. I think they never knew it was there until the door had already been closed on them."

I'm wondering how much resistance there still is in Kuwait, and I'm wondering what you would say to people who would say the purpose of this war was to get the Iraqis out of Kuwait, and they're now out. What would you say to the public that is thinking that right now?

"I would say there was a lot more purpose to this war than just get the Iraqis out of Kuwait. The purpose of this war was to enforce the resolutions of the United Nations. There are some 12 different resolutions of the United Nations, not all of which have been accepted by Iraq to date, as I understand it. But I've got to tell you, that in the business of the military, of a military commander, my job is not to go ahead and at some point say that's great, they've just now pulled out of Kuwait—even though they're still shooting at us, they're moving backward, and therefore, I've accomplished my mission. That's not the way you fight it, and that's not the way I would ever fight it."

You talked about heavy press coverage of Imminent Thunder early on, and how it helped fool the Iraqis into thinking that it was a serious operation. I wondered if you could talk about other ways in which the press contributed to the campaign. (Laughter)

"First of all, I don't want to characterize *Imminent Thunder* as being only a deception, because it wasn't. We had every intention of conducting amphibious operations if they were necessary, and that was a very, very real rehearsal—as were the other rehearsals. I guess the one thing I would say to the press that I was delighted with is in the very, very early stages of this operation when we were over here building up, and we didn't have very much on the ground, you all had given us credit for a whole lot more over here. As a result, that gave me quite a feeling of confidence that we might not be attacked quite as quickly as I thought we were going to be attacked. Other than that, I would not like to get into the remainder of your question."

What kind of fight is going on with the Republican Guard? And is there any more fighting going on in Kuwait, or is Kuwait essentially out of the action?

"No. The fight that's going on with the Republican Guard right now is just a classic tank battle. You've got fire and maneuver, they are continuing to fight and shoot at us as our forces move forward, and our forces are in the business of outflanking them, taking them in the rear, using our attack helicopters, using our advanced technology. I would tell you that one of the things that has prevailed, particularly in this battle out here, is our technology. We had great

weather for the air war, but right now, and for the last three days, it's been raining out there, it's been dusty out there, there's black smoke and haze in the air. It's an infantryman's weather—God loves the infantryman, and that's just the kind of weather the infantryman likes to fight in. But I would also tell you that our sights have worked fantastically well in their ability to acquire, through that kind of dust and haze, the enemy targets. The enemy sights have not worked that well. As a matter of fact, we've had several anecdotal reports today of enemy who were saying to us that they couldn't see anything through their sights and all of a sudden, their tank exploded when their tank was hit by our sights. So that's one of the indications of what's going on."

If there's no air support, are you saying . . .

"A very, very tough air environment. Obviously, as this box gets smaller and smaller, okay, and the bad weather, it gets tougher and tougher to use the air, and therefore, the air is acting more in an interdiction role than any other."

Can you tell us why the French, who went very fast in the desert in the first day, stopped in Salman and were invited to stop fighting after 36 hours?

"Well, that's not exactly a correct statement. The French mission on the first day was to protect our left flank. What we were interested in was making sure we confined this battlefield—both on the right and the left—and we didn't want anyone coming in and attacking these forces, which was the main attack, coming in from their left flank. So the French mission was to go out and not only seize Al Salman, but to set up a screen across our left flank, which was absolutely vital to ensure that we weren't surprised. So they definitely did not stop fighting. They continued to perform their mission, and they performed it extraordinarily well."

When Iraq's air force disappeared very early in the air war, there was speculation they might return and provide cover during the ground war. Were you expecting that? Were you surprised they never showed themselves again?

"I was not expecting it. We were not expecting it, but I would tell you that we never discounted it, and we were totally prepared in the event it happened."

Have they been completely destroyed? Where are they?

"There's not an airplane that's flown. I'll tell you where they are. A lot of them are dispersed throughout civilian communities in Iraq. We have a lot of indications—we have proof of that, as a matter of fact."

How many divisions of the Republican Guard now are you fighting, and any idea how long that will take?

"We're probably fighting on the order of . . . there were a total of five of them up here. One of them we have probably destroyed yesterday. We probably de-



General Schwarzkopf in CENTCOM Headquarters with Joint Forces Commander General Khalid bin Sultan, 17 January 1991.

stroyed two more today. I would say that leaves us a couple that we're in the process of fighting right now."

"Did you think this would turn out. I realize a great deal of strategy and planning went into it, but when it took place, did you think this would turn out to be such an easy cakewalk as it seems? And secondly, what are your impressions of Saddam Hussein as a military strategist?" (Laughter)

"Hi.

"First of all, if we thought it would have been such an easy fight, we definitely would not have stocked 60 days' worth of supplies on these log bases. As I've told you all for a very, very long time, it is very, very important for a military commander never to assume away the capabilities of his enemy. When you're facing an enemy that is over 500,000 strong, has the reputation they've had of fighting for eight years, being combat-hardened veterans, has a number of tanks and the type of equipment they had, you don't assume away anything. So we certainly did not expect it to go this way.

"As far as Saddam Hussein being a great military strategist, he is neither a strategist, nor is he schooled in the operational arts, nor is he a tactician, nor is he a general, nor is he a soldier. Other than that, he's a great military man. I want you to know that." (Laughter)

"General, I wonder if you could tell us anything more about Iraqi casualties on the battlefield; you said there were large numbers. Are we talking thousands, tens of thousands? Any more scale you can give us."

"No, I wish I could answer that question. As you can imagine, this has been a very fast-moving battle, as is desert warfare, and as a result, even today when I was asking for estimates, every commander out there said we just can't give you an estimate; it went too fast, we've gone by too quickly."

"You went after very quickly, the special operations took. Could you tell us what their mission was?"

"We don't like to talk a lot about what the special operations do, as you're well aware. But in this case, let me just cover some of the things they did."

"First of all, with every single Arab unit that went into battle, we had Special Forces troops with them. The job of those Special Forces was to travel and live right down at the battalion level with all those people to make sure they could act as the communicators with friendly English-speaking units that were on their flanks, and they could also call in air strikes as necessary, they could coordinate helicopter strikes, and that sort of thing. That's one of the principal roles they played, and it was a very, very important role.

"Secondly, they did a great job in strategic reconnaissance for us.

"Thirdly, the Special Forces were 100 percent in charge of the combat search and rescue, and that's a tough mission. When a pilot gets shot down out there in the middle of nowhere, surrounded by the enemy, and you're the folks that are required to go in and go after them, that is a very tough mission, and that was one of their missions.

"And finally, they also did some direct action missions, period."

General, there have been reports that when the Iraqis left Kuwait City, they took with them a number of the Kuwaiti people as hostages. What can you tell us about this?

"We've heard that they took up to 40,000. I think you've probably heard the Kuwaitis themselves who were left in the city state that they were taking people, and that they have taken them. So I don't think there's any question about the fact that there was a very, very large number—young Kuwaiti males taken out of that city within the last week or two. But that pales to insignificance compared to the absolutely unspeakable atrocities that occurred in Kuwait in the last week. They're not a part of the same human race, the people that did that, that the rest of us are. I've got to pray that that's the case."

Can you tell us more about that?

"No sir, I wouldn't want to talk about it."

Could you give us some indication of what's happening to the forces left in Kuwait? What kind of forces are they, their size and are they engaged at the moment?

"You mean these up here?"

No, the ones in Kuwait, the three symbols to the right. "These right here?"

Yes.

"I'm not even sure they're here. I think they're probably gone. We picked up a lot of signals of people. There's a road that goes right around here and goes out that way. And I think they probably, more than likely, are gone. So what you're really faced with is you're ending up fighting these Republican Guard heavy mech and armor units that are there, and basically what we want to do is capture their equipment."

So they are all out of Kuwait then? So in fact they are all out of Kuwait?

"No, I can't say that. I wouldn't be the least bit surprised if there are not pockets of people all around here who are just waiting to surrender as soon as somebody uncovers them and comes to them. But we are certainly not getting any internal fighting across our lines of communication or any of that sort of thing."

General, not to take anything away from the Army and the Marines on the breaching maneuvers . . .

"Thank you, sir. I hope you don't."

But many of the reports that the pools have gotten from your field commanders and the soldiers were indicating that these fortifications were not as intense or as sophisticated as they were led to believe. Is this a result of the pounding that they took that you described earlier, or they were perhaps overrated in the first place?

"Have you ever been in a minefield?"

No.

"All there's got to be is one mine, and that's intense. There were plenty of mines out there, plenty of barbed wire. There were fire trenches, most of which we set off ahead of time. But there were still some that were out there. The Egyptian forces had to go through fire trenches. There were a lot of booby traps, a lot of barbed wire. Not a fun place to be. I've got to tell you probably one of the toughest things that anyone ever has to do is go up there and walk into something like that and go through it, and consider that while you're going through it and clearing it, at the same time you're probably under fire by enemy artillery. That's all I can say."

As tough as it was, was it less severe than you expected? I mean, were you expecting even worse, in other words?

"It was less severe than we expected, but one of the things I attribute that to is the fact that we went to extensive measures to try and make it less severe, okay, and we really did. I didn't mean to be facetious with my answer, I just got to tell you that is a very tough mission for any person to do, particularly in a minefield."

General, is the Republican Guard your only remaining military objective in Iraq? And I gather there have been some heavy engagements. How would you rate this army you face—from the Republican Guard on down?

"Rating an army is a tough thing to do. A great deal of the capability of an army is its dedication to its cause and its will to fight. You can have the best equipment in the world, you can have the largest numbers in the world, but if you're not dedicated to your cause, if you don't have the will to fight, then you're not going to have a very good army. One of the things we learned right prior to the initiation of the campaign, that of course contributed, as a matter of fact, to the timing of the ground campaign, is that so many people were deserting, and I think you've heard this, that the Iraqis brought down execution squads whose job was to shoot people in the front lines."

"I've got to tell you, a soldier doesn't fight very hard for a leader who is going to shoot him on his own whim. That's not what military leadership is all about. So I attribute a great deal of the failure of the Iraqi army to fight, to their own leadership. They committed them to a cause that they did not believe in. They all are saying they didn't want to be there, they didn't want to fight their fellow Arabs, they were lied to, they were deceived when they went into Kuwait, they didn't believe in the cause, and then after they got there, to have a leadership that was so uncaring for them that they didn't properly feed them, they didn't properly give them water, and in the end, they kept them there only at the point of a gun."

"So I can't—now, the Republican Guard is entirely



General Schwarzkopf with
1st Armored Division commander
Ronald H. Griffith and VII Corps
commander Frederick M. Franks,
January 1991.

different. The Republican Guard are the ones that went into Kuwait in the first place. They get paid more, they got treated better, and oh by the way, they also were well to the rear so they could be the first ones to bug out when the battlefield started folding, while these poor fellows up here who didn't want to be here in the first place, bore the brunt of the attack. But it didn't happen."

General, could you tell us something about the British involvement, and perhaps comment on today's report of 10 dead through friendly fire?

"The British, I've got to tell you, have been absolutely superb members of this coalition from the outset. I have a great deal of admiration and respect for all the British that are out there, and particularly General Sir Peter de la Billiere who is not only a great general, but he's also become a very close personal friend of mine. They played a very, very key role in the movement of the main attack. I would tell you that what they had to do was go through this breach in one of the tougher areas, because I told you they had reinforced here, and there were a lot of forces

here, and what the Brits had to do was go through the breach and then fill up the block, so the main attack could continue on without forces over here, the mechanized forces over here attacking that main attack in the flank. That was a principal role of the British. They did it absolutely magnificently, and then they immediately followed up in the main attack, and they're still up there fighting right now. So they did a great job."

General, these 40,000 Kuwaiti hostages taken by the Iraqis, where are they right now? That's quite a few people. Are they in the line of fire? Do we know where they are?

"No, no, no, we were told, but again, this is—a lot of this is anecdotal, okay. We were told that they were taken back to Basra. We were also told that some of them were taken all the way back to Baghdad. We were told 100 different reasons why they were taken. Number one, to be a bargaining chip if the time came when bargaining chips were needed. Another one was for retribution because, of course, at that time Iraq was saying that these people were not

Kuwaitis, these were citizens of Iraq and therefore, they could do anything they wanted to with them. So I just pray that they'll all be returned safely before long."

General, the other day on television, the deputy Soviet foreign minister said that they were talking again about rearming the Iraqis. And there's some indication that the United States, as well, believes that Iraq needs to have a certain amount of armament to retain the balance of power. Do you feel that your troops are in jeopardy finishing this off, when already the politicians are talking about rearming the Iraqis? How do you feel about that?

"Well, I certainly don't want to discuss, you know, what the deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union says. That's way out of my field. I would tell you that I'm one of the first people that said at the outset that it's not in the best interest of peace in this part of the world to destroy Iraq, and I think the president of the United States has made it very clear from the outset that our intention is not to destroy Iraq or the Iraqi people. I think everyone has every right to legitimately defend themselves. But the one thing that comes through loud and clear over, and over, and over again to the people that have flown over Iraq, to the pilots that have gone in against their military installations, when you look at the war machine that they have faced, that war machine definitely was not a defensive war machine, and they demonstrated that more than adequately when they overran Kuwait and then called it a great military victory."

General, before starting the land phase, how much were you concerned by the Iraqi planes coming back from Iran? And do we know what happened to the Iraqi helicopters?

"As I said before, we were very concerned about the return of the Iraqi planes from Iran, but we were prepared for it. We have been completely prepared for any type of air attack the Iraqis might throw against us, and oh, by the way, we're still prepared for it. We're not going to let down our guard for one instant, so long as we know that capability is there, until we're sure this whole thing is over."

"The helicopters are another very interesting story. We know where the helicopters were. They traditionally put their helicopter near some of their other outfits, and we tracked them very carefully. But what happened is despite the fact that Iraqis claim that we indiscriminately bombed civilian targets, they took their helicopters and dispersed them all over the place in civilian residential areas just as fast as they possibly could. But quite a few of them were damaged on airfields, those that we could take on airfields. The rest of them were dispersed."

General, I'd like to ask you, you mentioned about the

Saudi army forces. Could you elaborate about their role on the first day?

"The Saudi army, as I said, the first thing they did was they—we had this Bahrain attack that was going through here, and of course we were concerned about the forces over here again, hitting the flanks. That's one of the things you just don't want to have happen to your advancing forces."

"So this force over here, the eastern task force, had to attack up the coast to pin the enemy in this location. The forces—again the Saudi forces over in this area were attacked through here, again, to pin all the forces in this area because we didn't want those forces moving in this direction, and we didn't want those forces moving in that direction."

"It's a tough mission, okay, because these people were being required to fight the kind of fight that the Iraqis wanted them to fight. It's a very, very tough mission."

"I would point out, it wasn't only the Saudis. I tell you it was the Saudis, it was the Kuwaitis, it was the Egyptians, it was the Syrians, it was the Emiris from the United Arab Emirates, it was the Bahrainis, it was the Qataris, and it was the Omanis, and I apologize if I've left anybody out. But it was a great coalition of people, all of whom did a fine job."

Is there anything left of the Scud or chemical capability?

"I don't know. I don't know. But we're sure going to find out if there's anything—you know, the Scuds that were being fired against Saudi Arabia came from right here, okay. So obviously, one of the things we're going to check on when we finally get to that location is what's left."

General, could you tell us in terms of the air war of how effective you think it was in speeding up the ground campaign? Because obviously, it's gone much faster than you ever expected? And . . . how effective do you think the AirLand battle campaign has been?

"The air war, obviously, was very, very effective. You just can't predict about things like that. You can make your best estimates at the outset as to how quickly you will accomplish certain objectives. But, of course, a lot of that depends on the enemy and how resilient the enemy is, how tough they are, how well dug in they are."

"In the earlier stages, we made great progress in the air war. In the latter stages, we didn't make a lot of progress because frankly they—the enemy—had burrowed down into the ground as a result of the air war."

"Now that, of course, made the air war a little bit tougher, but when you dig your tanks in and bury them, they're no longer tanks. They're now pill boxes. That, then, makes a difference in the ground campaign. When you don't run them for a long time, they have seal problems, they have a lot of mainte-

nance problems and that type of thing.

"So the air campaign was very, very successful and contributed a great deal. How effective was the air-ground campaign? I think it was pretty effective myself. I don't know what you all think."

Can you tell us what you think as you look down the road would be a reasonable size for the Iraqi army, and can you tell us roughly what the size is now if the war were to stop this evening?

"With regard to the size right now, at one time Saddam Hussein was claiming that he had a 7 million man army. If he's got a 7 million man army, they've still got a pretty big army out there.

"How effective that army is, is an entirely different question. With regard to the size of the army he should have, I don't think that's my job to decide that. I think there are an awful lot of people that live in this part of the world, and I would hope that is a decision that's arrived at mutually by all the people in this part of the world to contribute to peace and stability in this part of the world, I think that's the best answer I can give."

You said the gate was closed. Have you got ground forces blocking the roads to Basra?

"No."

Is there any way they can get out that way?

"No. That's why the gate's closed."

Is there a military or political explanation as to why the Iraqis did not use chemical weapons?

"We've got a lot of questions about why the Iraqis didn't use chemical weapons, and I don't know the answer. I just thank God they didn't."

Is it possible they didn't use them because they didn't have time to react?

"You want me to speculate, I'll be delighted to speculate. Nobody can ever pin you down when you speculate.

"Number one, we destroyed their artillery. We went after their artillery big time. They had major desertions in their artillery, and . . . that's how they would have delivered their chemical weapons, either that or by air. And we all know what happened to their air. So we went after their artillery big time, and I think we were probably highly, highly effective in going after their artillery.

"There's other people who are speculating that the reason they didn't use chemical weapons is because they were afraid if they used chemical weapons there would be nuclear retaliation. There are other people that speculate that they didn't use their chemical weapons because their chemical weapons degraded, and because of the damage that we did to their chemical production facilities, they were unable to upgrade

the chemicals within their weapons as a result of that degradation. That was one of the reasons, among others, that we went after their chemical production facilities early on in the strategic campaign.

"I'll never know the answer to that question, but as I say, thank God they didn't."

General, are you still bombing in northern Iraq, and if you are, what's the purpose of it now?

"Yes."

What's being achieved now?

"Military purposes that we—exactly the same things we were trying to achieve before. The war is not over, and you've got to remember, people are still dying out there. Okay? And those people that are dying are my troops, and I'm going to continue to protect those troops in every way I possibly can until the war is over."

How soon after you've finally beaten the Republican Guards and the other forces that threaten you, will you move your forces out of Iraq, either into Kuwait or back into Saudi?

"That's not my decision to make."

What are you going to try and bring to justice the people responsible for the atrocities in Kuwait City? And also, could you comment on the friendly fire incident in which nine Britons were killed?

"I'm sorry, that was asked earlier and I failed to do that.

"First of all, on the first question, we have as much information as possible on those people that were committing the atrocities, and, of course, we're going through a screening process, and whenever we find those people that did, in fact, commit those atrocities, we try and separate them out. We treat them no differently than any other prisoner of war, but the ultimate disposition of those people, of course, might be quite different than the way we would treat any other prisoner of war.

"With regard to the unfortunate incident yesterday, the only report we have is that two A-10 aircraft came in, and they attacked two scout cars, British-armored cars, and that's what caused the casualties. There were nine KIA [killed in action]. We deeply regret that. There's no excuse for it. I'm not going to apologize for it. I am going to say that our experience has been that based upon the extremely complicated number of different maneuvers that were being accomplished out here, according to the extreme diversity of the number of forces that were out here, according to the extreme differences in the languages of the forces out here, and the weather conditions and everything else, I feel that we were quite lucky that we did not have more of this type of incident.

"I would also tell you that because we had a few

earlier that you know about, that we went to extraordinary lengths to try and prevent that type of thing from happening. It's a terrible tragedy, and I'm sorry that it happened."

Was it at night?

"I don't know. I don't believe so because I believe the information I have, that a forward air controller was involved in directing that, and that would indicate that it was probably during the afternoon. But it was when there was very, very close combat going on out there in that area."

General, the United Nations General Assembly was talking about peace. As a military man, you look at your challenge, and you can get some satisfaction out of having achieved it. Is there some fear on your part that there will be a cease-fire that will keep you from fulfilling the assignment that you have? Is your assignment as a military man separate from the political goals of the . . .

"Do I fear a cease-fire?"

Do you fear that you will not be able to accomplish your end, that there will be some political pressure brought on the campaign?

"I think I've made it very clear to everybody that I'd just as soon the war had never started. And I'd just as soon never have lost a single life out there. That was not our choice.

"We've accomplished our mission, and when the decision makers come to the decision that there should be a cease-fire, nobody will be happier than me."

General, we were told today that an A-10 returning from a mission discovered and destroyed 16 Scuds. Is that a fact, and where were they located?

"Most of those Scuds were located in western Iraq. I would tell you that we went into this with some intelligence estimates that I think I have since come to believe were either grossly inaccurate, or our pilots are lying through their teeth, and I choose to think the former rather than the latter, particularly since many of the pilots have backed up what they've been saying by film and that sort of thing.

"But we went in with a very, very low number of these mobile erector launchers that we thought the enemy had. However, at one point we had a report that they may have had 10 times as many. I would tell you though, that last night the pilots had a very, very successful afternoon and night as far as the mobile erector launchers, most of them in western Iraq were reportedly used against Israel."

General, you've said many times in the past that you do not like body counts. You've also told us tonight that enemy casualties were very, very large. I'm wondering with the coalition forces already burying the dead on the

battlefield, will there ever be any sort of accounting or head counts made or anything like that?

"I don't think there's ever been, ever in the history of warfare, been a successful count of the dead. And one of the reasons is the reason you cite: that's because it's necessary to lay those people to rest for a lot of reasons, and that happens.

"So I would probably say no, there will never be an exact count. Probably in the days to come, you're going to hear many, many stories, either overinflated or underinflated, depending upon whom you hear them from. The people who will know the best, unfortunately, are the families that won't see their loved ones come home."

If the gate is indeed closed, as you said several times, and the theories about where these Kuwaiti hostages are—perhaps Basra, perhaps Baghdad—where could they be? And was the timing for the start of the ground campaign a purely military choice, or was it a military choice with political influence on the choice of date?

"That's two questions. When I say the gate is closed, I don't want to give you the impression that absolutely nothing is escaping. Quite the contrary. What isn't escaping is heavy tanks. What isn't escaping is artillery pieces. What isn't escaping is that sort of thing.

"That doesn't mean that civilian vehicles aren't escaping. That doesn't mean that innocent civilians aren't escaping. That doesn't mean that unarmed Iraqis aren't escaping. And that's not the gate I'm talking about. I'm talking about the gate that has closed on the war machine that is out there . . .

"The timing for the beginning of the ground campaign, we made military analyses of when that ground campaign should be conducted. I gave my recommendation to the secretary of defense and General Colin Powell. They passed that recommendation on to the president, and the president acted upon that recommendation.

"Why, do you think we did it at the wrong time?"
(Laughter)

I'm wondering if your recommendation and analysis were accepted without change.

"I'm very thankful for the fact that the president of the United States has allowed the United States military and the coalition military to fight this war exactly as it should have been fought. And the president in every case has taken our guidance and our recommendations to heart and has acted superbly as the commander in chief of the United States.

"Thank you very much."

Congratulations, general.

"Thank you."

From MR's Bookshelf to Yours

To understand the events leading up to, encompassing and still to come from the Gulf War, a foundation of knowledge gained from reading is essential. But to focus this reading only on the United States' and Iraq's roles in the recent war would be the same as pretending the end of the Cold War affects only the Soviet Union and the United States. We need to understand the entire Middle East—its history, culture, religious and political influences, present leaders and past wars—to glimpse the Middle East's perception of its and our place in the "new world order." The following bibliography presents the latest editions of those books that have proved their worth in these areas. Within the different categories, you should be able to create your own reading agenda. If, however, you could read only one of the books listed below, an excellent choice would be *A History of the Arab Peoples* by Albert Hourani.

No list is definitive. You will not find, for instance, anything on the specific weapons of war, chemical and biological warfare or the use of the environment for purposes of war—topics that will doubtless be more fully addressed in future books. Nor will you find the spate of newly published Gulf War books that are appearing almost daily. These and other books projected in the near future appear in a separate bibliography. Only time will tell which of these new books are valuable.—Editor

History and Culture of the Middle East

A Concise History of the Middle East, 4th revised edition, by Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. 465 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1991. \$50.00 clothbound. \$24.95 paperback.

The Crusades Through Arab Eyes by Amin Maalouf. 312 pages. Schocken Books, Inc., New York. 1989. \$12.95.

The History of Egypt, 3d edition, by P. J. Vatikiotis. 560 pages. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD. 1986. \$16.95.

A History of Israel, Volume II: From the Aftermath of the Yom Kippur War by Howard M. Sachar. 336 pages. Oxford University Press, Inc., New York. 1988. \$9.95 paperback.

A History of the Arab Peoples by Albert Hourani. 576 pages. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 1991. \$24.95.

The Middle East: A History, 4th edition, by Srdnev N. Fisher and William L. Ochsenswald. 860 pages. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., New York. 1989. \$32.50.

The Modern History of Iraq by Phebe Marr. 382 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1991. \$16.95.

A Peace to End all Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914–1922 by David Fromkin. 624 pages. Henry Holt & Co., New York. 1989. \$39.95.

Religious and Political Influences

The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, 3d edition, by Fred J. Khouri. 640 pages. Syracuse University Press, Syra-

cuse, NY. 1985. \$29.95 clothbound. \$17.95 paperback.

The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967 by Fouad Ajami. 250 pages. Cambridge University Press, New York. 1982. \$12.95 paperback.

Arafat: In the Eyes of the Beholder by Janet Wallach and John Wallach. 465 pages. Carol Publishing Group, New York. 1990. \$21.95.

Arms and Oil: U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf by Thomas L. McNaughten. 226 pages. The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 1985. \$10.95.

Assad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East by Patrick Seale. 552 pages. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. 1990. \$14.95.

Ataturk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey by Lord Kinross. 615 pages. William Morrow & Co., Inc., New York. 1964 (out of print).

The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949 by Benny Morris. 416 pages. Cambridge University Press, New York. 1988. \$39.50.

Conflicts and Contradictions: Israel, the Arabs and the West Bank by Meron Benvenisti. 221 pages. Shapolsky Publications, Inc., New York. 1989. \$9.95 paperback.

Contemporary Islamic Movements in Historical Perspective by Ira M. Lapidus. 76 pages. University of California Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, CA. 1983. \$6.50 paperback.

Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts

Determine How We See the Rest of the World by Edward W. Said. 186 pages. Pantheon Books, New York. 1981. \$8.95.

East Bank/West Bank by Arthur R. Day. 196 pages. Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York. 1986. \$17.50 clothbound. \$8.95 paperback.

From Beirut to Jerusalem by Thomas Friedman. 525 pages. Doubleday & Co., Inc., New York. 1990. \$12.95.

House of Saud: The Rise and Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World by David Holden and Richard John. 569 pages. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., New York. 1982 (out of print).

Ideals and Realities of Islam by Seyyed H. Nasr. 188 pages. Unwin Hyman, Inc., Winchester, MA. 1983. \$14.95 paperback.

In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade 1979-1989 by Robin Wright. 288 pages. Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York. 1989. \$19.95.

Iraqi Power and United States Security in the Middle East by Stephen C. Pelletiere, Douglas V. Johnson II and Leif R. Rosenberger. 95 pages. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (Available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office [GPO], Washington, DC.) 1990. \$3.25 paperback.

Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History by Rudolph Peters. 245 pages. Mouton de Gruyter, Hawthorne, NY. 1984. \$40.75 clothbound. \$21.95 paperback.

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
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
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

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


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