


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German Perceptions of the United States in World War II

Donald D. Asmus

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German Perceptions of the United States at Unification

Ronald D. Asmus

A Project AIR FORCE Report
prepared for the
United States Air Force

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PREFACE

This report analyzes data on East and West German attitudes toward the United States, the Atlantic Alliance, and the American troop presence from a survey taken at the time of German unification. It results from work on change in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the implications for the United States conducted under the project entitled "U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe: Options for a Changing Environment" for the National Security Strategies Program of Project AIR FORCE. This study is intended to be of assistance to Air Force officers and planners concerned with the future political and strategic environment in Europe. It should also be of interest to a wide range of readers interested in the future role of the United States in Germany and Europe.

SUMMARY

As they seek to assess the long-term implications of recent changes in Europe, American policymakers face the question of whether German unification will cause substantial shifts in German domestic and foreign policy and, if so, how such shifts might affect American interests in Germany and in the Atlantic Alliance. This question is interwoven with a broader set of issues regarding the potential effects of unification on German political culture and longer-term intellectual and societal trends and how such developments might influence Germany's domestic and foreign policy orientation.

Such issues are crucial for American policy for several reasons. Much of American policy toward Europe in the postwar period has been built around the German-American relationship. Moreover, one of the keys to the postwar stability of West German democracy was the Westernization of German political culture, a process in which the United States played a crucial role.

The point of departure in German-American relations in the 1990s is radically different, however. The American model, which exerted such a powerful influence on the early postwar West German elite, has long lost much of its attraction in German eyes. A reduced U.S. military presence will also translate into reduced American influence. Most important, Germans in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) are likely to turn to their West German brethren, not the United States, to learn concepts of democracy, capitalist economics, and Western security.

It would therefore be a mistake to assume that the same type of bonds that were created between the United States and West Germany will easily or automatically be now created with Germany's eastern part. Finally, Americans know almost nothing about the eastern part of Germany, and Germans in the former GDR have had no positive experience with the United States this century.

It was against this political backdrop that RAND commissioned a public opinion survey on East and West German attitudes toward the United States and the American role in Europe at the onset of German unification in October 1990. The data collected suggest three sets of conclusions. First, East Germans have an ambivalent and frequently negative image of American society. The lack of any pronounced sympathy for the United States in the former GDR stands in contrast not only to West German views of the United States, but also to the

tremendous sympathy that the United States enjoys elsewhere in formerly communist Eastern Europe.

Second, whereas East Germans recognize the positive American role in the political and economic reconstruction of the Federal Republic, this does not translate into support for a future U.S. military presence in Germany or for the Atlantic Alliance. On such issues, East Germans hold views far more critical than West Germans. Whereas three in four (74 percent) West Germans preferred continued German participation in NATO, two in three (68 percent) East German respondents opted for neutrality. Similarly, an overwhelming majority of eight in ten (79 percent) East Germans favored a complete U.S. withdrawal, while West Germans were split between favoring a complete withdrawal (46 percent) and favoring a limited contingent remaining (41 percent).

Such differences also translate into divergent views concerning models for Germany's security framework in the longer run. When presented with the choices of a more political NATO, a strengthened European Community assuming responsibility for security policy, or a system of collective security, West German preferences lie somewhere between a more political NATO and a strengthened European Community; East Germans, in contrast, opted for a collective security system that transcended the alliances.

Third, the factors explaining East German skepticism and ambivalence toward the United States must also be sought in the fundamentally different relationships of the United States with these two parts of Germany. In the West, the American experience was enthusiastically embraced by a society that was learning democracy and actively seeking integration into a broader Western community. This formative experience created a strong and cohesive societal bond between the two countries, making the management of this relationship far easier than a mere overlap of strategic interests would have allowed.

East Germans, in contrast, were never allowed to participate in the positive experiences of integration and multilateral institutions in the West. Twelve years of Nazi totalitarianism were followed by four decades of communist rule, each with its own brand of anti-Western and anti-American propaganda. The East German communist regime was perhaps the most ideological in the region as it sought to compensate for its lack of national base. Despite its revolutionary rhetoric and façade, the communist regime in East Berlin was in reality very conservative and sought to insulate its population from external Western influences. Throughout the postwar period East Germans remained isolated under one of the most restrictive travel regulations imposed by any communist regime in the region.

The longer-term political influence of trends and attitudes in the former GDR must nevertheless be assessed in the broader framework created through unification. As the two parts of Germany are increasingly integrated it will gradually become anachronistic to speak of separate East and West German views. The appropriate question is how the unification process will alter the political dynamics in a new Germany in ways that will affect American interests.

It may take at least a decade for East Germans to make the transition to Western political values and culture. This decade will also be a period when the Atlantic Alliance and the German-American relationship will face major decisions concerning the future. Against the background of the data presented here, three policy recommendations suggest themselves:

- First, there is a clear need for both sides of the Atlantic to recognize that the image of the United States in the former GDR is a problem that could have broader ramifications in a unified Germany. Moreover, American policymakers should not assume that the early postwar experience with West Germany will automatically be recreated in the east. The historical conditions under which the German-American relationship flourished in the early postwar period were unique and no longer exist.
- Second, U.S. policymakers must recognize the need to act jointly with the German government to address this potential problem. The United States can and should rely on West Germany to bring East Germans into the Western community. Many of the exchange programs that underlay the German-American relationship are financed either largely by the Germans themselves or jointly with American institutions. Germans' willingness to address this potential problem will be important, above all with regard to security policy and the American military presence.
- Third, it would nonetheless be a mistake to leave such a task to the Germans alone. To do so would be to abdicate vital American interests to another country, albeit one of our closest allies. The United States cannot afford simply to live off its past laurels in German-American relations but must demonstrate to East Germans not only why a close German-American relationship was important in the past, but why it remains critical in the future for both sides. The United States must strive to construct a relationship with the eastern part of Germany at a time when American influence will be considerably less than it

was in the 1950s and 1960s and may decrease even more, as the U.S. presence is further reduced.

Such tasks will not be easy, above all in light of budget austerity and competing demands on American resources. The United States should seek to expand our existing exchange programs with Germany to cover the former GDR and to offer East Germans the same types of opportunities we offered West Germans in the early postwar period. If such an expansion is not possible because of budget requirements, existing exchange programs with Germany should be structured to give preferential treatment to Germans from the former GDR for some future period of time.

The best approach to dealing with the uncertainties posed by German unification lies in an American policy that supports a broadening of contacts between the United States and the eastern part of Germany and articulates the ongoing need for close German-American ties. A healthier appreciation for the broader political benefits of Atlanticism and their continued relevance in a post-cold war world can best be guaranteed by spelling out to Germans in both areas of Germany why this relationship remains important to their own interests.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank Dr. Burkhard Dobiey from the Ministry of Intra-German Affairs for his help in facilitating cooperation between RAND and Infratest Kommunikationsforschung GmbH. A special word of thanks goes to Dr. Anne Koehler and Richard Hilmer from Infratest for their enthusiastic cooperation during this project. A final word of appreciation goes to Dr. Nancy J. Walker from USIA for her support in drawing up the initial questionnaire and subsequent analysis of the data, and to F. Stephen Larrabee for a careful and constructive review of an earlier version of the report.

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I. INTRODUCTION

As they seek to assess the long-term implications of recent change in Europe, American policymakers face the question of whether German unification will cause shifts in German domestic and foreign policy, and how such shifts might affect American interests in Germany and in the Atlantic Alliance. This question is interwoven with a broader set of issues as to how unification might affect German political culture and longer-term intellectual and societal trends and influence Germany's domestic and foreign policy orientation. Will the greater size, dynamism, and attraction of the successful postwar experience in the Federal Republic prove so strong that the 16 million eastern Germans will quickly become "West Germanized?" The resulting Germany would differ little from the Federal Republic that has been such a close ally of the United States throughout the postwar period. Or will a unified Germany, more Protestant and eastern-oriented as a result of the accession of some 16 million East Germans with little experience of democracy and the West, undergo subtle shifts in attitudes toward the United States and the Western Alliance?

Such issues are crucial for American policy for several reasons. West Germany has been one of our most important allies in Europe throughout the postwar period. Much of American policy toward Europe has been built around the German-American relationship, which has been one of the fundamental pillars of the NATO Alliance.

Furthermore, the American military presence in postwar Europe has been largely concentrated in the Federal Republic. Although that presence in Germany is being reduced as a result of the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), it still is an important factor shaping the European political and military landscape. Our ability to sustain a strategic partnership with Germany in the future is crucial to how the United States defines its interests and role in Europe. A shift in German attitudes toward the United States would have implications that reach well beyond the bilateral German-American relationship.

West German attitudes toward the United States were initially a crucial factor contributing to the consolidation of democracy in the Federal Republic. The postwar stability of West German democracy was tied to the Europeanization and the Americanization of German political culture. With much of its own history and past political traditions discredited by the Nazi experience, several generations of Germans looked to the outside world, above all to the United States, for

new models, democratic traditions, and experiences to emulate.¹ The receptivity and openness of many West Germans to American political, economic, and cultural influence clearly facilitated the forging of a new alliance and partnership with the Federal Republic in the early postwar period. The reorientation of German political traditions Westward was reinforced by the Federal Republic's alliance affiliation with NATO and the United States.²

The Americanization of the eastern part of Germany is not necessarily a precondition for the success of democracy there. The fact that unification has taken place according to Article 23 of the West German Basic Law guaranteed that the Germans in the East would be enveloped in the same postwar institutions that have proven so successful for West Germany. Despite the enormous political and economic challenges inherent in the reconstruction process, the postwar West German experience with democracy and the strength of the West German economy give the former GDR advantages no other Eastern European country enjoys. Its chances for a healthy political and economic renewal are better than anywhere else in formerly communist Eastern Europe.

This process will not be a repeat performance of the Federal Republic's experiences with democracy and America in the 1950s. Germans in the Federal Republic turned to the United States because of the attractiveness of American society and because they lacked any other positive models to emulate in their own quest to build a new country out of the ruins of Nazi Germany. East Germans now have a successful, attractive democratic experiment next door in the Federal Republic to study and to learn from. It would be a mistake to assume that the same types of bonds that were created between America and the Federal Republic in the 1950s will be recreated between the United States and Germany's eastern half.

Americans must also realize that they know almost nothing about the eastern part of Germany and how it differs from the Federal Republic. When Americans talk about Germany, they generally mean

¹For further details and documentation of the enormous popularity the United States enjoyed in early postwar West Germany, see Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann. *The Germans: Public Opinion Polls 1947-1966*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1981.

²In the early years of the Federal Republic, Adenauer and Schumacher believed that Germany's foreign policy orientation was decisive in setting the future course of German domestic politics and in determining the nature of German society. In this context, an alliance with the United States was not only a strategic asset but a precondition for the nurturing of German democracy. For further details, see the discussion in Wolfram Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989, pp. xiv-xv.

West Germany. The United States had almost no relationship with the former GDR before the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1974, as Washington strictly adhered to the policy of nonrecognition originally insisted upon by Bonn under Konrad Adenauer. For most of the 1970s, the United States maintained a very limited relationship because of residual problems over Berlin's status, unresolved claim settlements, and human rights. The situation improved somewhat in the early 1980s, but there were still limited relations between Washington and East Berlin.³

The reverse side of the problem is that East Germans have little personal knowledge of the United States. Indeed, there have been few if any positive associations between this part of Germany and the United States throughout this century. Following 12 years of Nazi totalitarianism and World War II came four decades of communist rule, each with its own brand of anti-Western and anti-American propaganda. On a broader societal level, East Germans remained isolated under the most restrictive travel rules imposed by any communist regime in East-Central Europe, allowing them little opportunity to compare the regime's official pronouncements with reality. Although they received daily West German radio and television, the overall effect of the West German media on the East Germans' image of America remains unclear and ambiguous.⁴

These remarks are intended solely to highlight the very different points of departure for the two German states as they embarked down the path of unity, defining a new relationship with their neighbors, including the United States. RAND has sought to establish some benchmarks for observing the future evolution of German politics and developing a database that will enrich future assessments of the potential implications of unification for American interests. This report does not claim to answer all the far-reaching questions posed above. Its purpose is limited to illuminating one small piece of this broader mosaic: possible differences in West and East German attitudes toward the United States and the American role in Europe.

The data presented here were collected in a survey conducted by Infratest Kommunikationsforschung GmbH for RAND and the Ministry of Inner-German Affairs in Bonn. The survey was conducted in October 1990 and benefited from Infratest's extensive work on East

³For further details, see Ronald D. Asmus, "Bonn und Ost Berlin: die Sicht aus Washington," *Deutschland Archiv*, March 1985, pp. 256-263.

⁴Many critics have alleged that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the West German media had become too critical and one-sided in its coverage of American society. The East German image of the United States may have been reinforced by this factor. For an overview of the influence of the Western media in the former GDR see Kurt Hesse, *Westmedien in der DDR. Nutzung, Image und Auswirkungen bundesrepublikanischen Hörfunks und Fernsehens*, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Cologne, 1985.

German attitudes.⁵ This survey was one of the most comprehensive conducted on these issues, including the first to take a systematic look at East German attitudes toward the United States.⁶ Data collected in the former GDR were complemented by a parallel survey conducted in the Federal Republic during the same time period, thereby providing an especially useful basis for comparison. Further technical data concerning the survey are included in App. A. Finally, this study also draws on data made available by the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Allensbach Institut fuer Demoskopie on West German attitudes toward the U.S. troop presence.


The data collected are organized in three sections, reflecting the thrust of three broad questions that guided this study. The first section focuses on East German attitudes toward the United States as a society. The second section examines East and West German attitudes toward the American role in Germany and Europe in the postwar period, including the American role in the events leading up to the unification of Germany. The final section explores East and West German attitudes toward the future American role in Germany and Europe, including attitudes toward NATO and a future American military presence in a unified Germany. The conclusion addresses some of the policy ramifications of these data for the United States.

⁵Infratest conducted survey research on East German attitudes for the West German government from 1969 through 1989 through the use of "indirect" polling methods—polling the attitudes of West German visitors to the GDR on the views held by their hosts. Beginning in 1990, Infratest polled East Germans directly. Infratest's archives contain a wealth of information that helps explain political trends, including the events leading up to the collapse of the East German communist regime in the fall of 1989.

⁶Survey research in the GDR was almost impossible before the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Infratest conducted survey research for the West German Ministry for Inner-German Affairs by questioning West Germans who had returned from visits to the GDR about the attitudes of the East Germans they had contact with. Following the opening of the border, several West German firms, some of dubious quality, conducted an initial wave of surveys. Their results were most often neither comprehensive nor representative as they relied on telephone questioning. Only a small portion of the East German population enjoyed telephone service, and members of the East German communist party were vastly overrepresented in this group. The United States Information Agency conducted an initial but small survey of East German attitudes toward NATO, American and Soviet troops, and related themes in June 1990; this information helped serve as a basis for this survey.

II. EAST GERMANS' ATTITUDES TOWARD U.S. SOCIETY

The image of the United States in the former GDR is hardly positive. When asked to rate how much sympathy they felt toward a selection of European countries, the United States, and the USSR, the East German respondents rated the United States last among the Western countries and only slightly ahead of the Soviet Union (see Fig. 1). What is particularly striking about East German views is the sympathy enjoyed by such affluent neutral countries as Sweden, Austria, and France. Also, a survey conducted by Infratest in October 1990 for the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* found considerable sympathy among West Ger-



SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952.

Fig. 1—East German sympathy toward foreign countries

mans for neutral countries.¹ The strong antipathy registered toward Poland seems to confirm the anti-Polish prejudices often reported in the former GDR. The lack of any pronounced sympathy for the United States stands in sharp contrast to survey research conducted by the USIA and other polling organizations suggesting that the United States enjoys tremendous sympathy elsewhere in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.²


To obtain a clearer picture of East German attitudes toward American society, the respondents were asked to rate a group of countries in five categories of societal performance—willingness to help one another, democratic values, social justice, the personal freedom of the individual, and a country's material standard of living. The United States received high marks in "personal freedom of the individual" and "material standard of living." It did poorly in all other categories and scored the worst mark of any country in the category "willingness to help one another" (see Fig. 2), tending to confirm the image of the United States as a rich country with a lot of individual freedom but also one that is harsh and frequently unjust, and where those who are less fortunate receive little sympathy or assistance.

Respondents were also asked to rate both American and Soviet societies in 11 categories. Viewing these results together permits a comparison of East German attitudes toward American and Soviet societies (see Fig. 3). Although the United States received more positive ratings than the USSR in most categories, it was also perceived as more "aggressive" and more "superficial" than Soviet society. Again, these are cliches that were dominant themes in East German communist propaganda as well as in intellectual leftist circles in both parts of Germany. Both American and Soviet societies were seen as quite different from German society.

The single most important source of news on the United States was West German television, followed by American films, music, and literature (see Fig. 4). With regard to their own media, a majority of East Germans were clearly aware that the image of America they had previously been given was flawed. When asked to describe the image of the United States they had received in the schools and through the


¹ Asked what country they viewed as a model for a future unified Germany, some 40 percent opted for Switzerland, followed by 29 percent favoring Sweden. A mere 6 percent viewed the United States as a model. See *Deutschland 2000. Erwartungen und Hoffnungen der Deutschen in Ost und West*, Munich, December 1990. See also the supplement published in the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* on January 4, 1991.

² A survey published on February 28, 1991, in Poland, for example, found that U.S. President George Bush was the most popular man in Poland and that the United States was most likely to be "Poland's true ally." See Polska Agencja Prasowa (PAP), March 1, 1991.



SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N - 952.

Fig. 2—East German assessment of United States compared with other countries



SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952.

Fig. 3—East German perceptions of American and Soviet society


	Major importance	Moderate importance	Minor importance	No importance
East German media	10	25	45	18
West German media	23	45	20	10
American films, music, literature	18	34	31	15
Information in schools	4	17	34	42
Personal contacts with Americans	7	10	14	67
Conversations with people who know U.S.	9	17	16	54
Personal experiences from trip to U.S.	0	0	0	0
Other sources	1	1	1	10

SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952.

Fig. 4—Importance of information sources

communist-controlled media, some three out of four (76 percent) believed that the United States had been portrayed too negatively. Some 93 percent of those polled responded that they had neither friends nor relatives in the United States, underscoring the extreme isolation of this part of Germany from the broad trends of American influence in West Germany.

Throughout the postwar period, East German propaganda cultivated the notion of the Federal Republic as a vassal and "Americanized" ally of the United States, whereas the GDR was more authentically German and incorporated the progressive traditions of German history. Although such an image was wildly inaccurate, the overwhelming influence of the United States in political and cultural terms in the Federal Republic has been the focal point of criticism of the far left and the far right in West Germany. In an attempt to test whether such notions had any resonance among East Germans and whether they were receptive to American influence, East Germans were asked to judge how strong they considered American influence to be in West Germany; they were also asked whether such influence was positive or negative. A majority (57 percent) of those polled considered U.S. influence in West Germany to be strong. East Germans were divided in assessing this influence, with one third (36 percent) claiming it was positive and nearly one-half (45 percent) finding it neutral. The latter figure may reflect a lack of familiarity about life in the Federal Republic and American cultural influence (see Fig. 5).



SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952.

Fig. 5—American influence


III. PAST AMERICAN ROLE IN GERMANY AND EUROPE

This survey also sought to assess East and West German appreciation for the role the United States played in the postwar reconstruction and defense of West Germany. The East Germans surveyed were asked to rate the role of the United States in the political and economic reconstruction of the Federal Republic, the role of the American troop presence in guaranteeing peace and stability, and the role of the Alliance in German unification. The same questions were asked in a parallel poll conducted in West Germany, giving us a look at both East and West German attitudes.

When asked about the role that the United States played in establishing democracy in the Federal Republic, a large and nearly identical majority in both parts of Germany (90 percent in the West and 86 percent in the East) responded that the United States had made a substantial contribution to the establishment of democracy in the Federal Republic (see Fig. 6). A large majority (87 percent of West Germans and 93 percent of East Germans) also believed that the United States had made a substantial contribution to the economic reconstruction of the Federal Republic. The slightly higher East German figure is presumably linked to the acute awareness of many East Germans that the Marshall Plan provided West Germans with American aid at a time when East Germans were forced to pay reparations to the Soviet Union (see Fig. 7).

Respondents were also asked to assess the role of the United States and the American troop presence in maintaining peace and stability in Europe. Nearly nine out of ten West German respondents (87 percent) viewed the American troop presence as contributing to peace and stability; in the East German case, three of four respondents (73 percent) shared this view (see Fig. 8). Germans in both parts of Germany were less prepared to state that the U.S. troop presence had contributed to German unification. In the West some six of ten (59 percent) respondents agreed that the United States had contributed to unification through the stationing of its troops in West Germany and West Berlin. In the East, in contrast, only four of ten (43 percent) replied that they agreed (see Fig. 9). An overview of East and West German views on these issues is contained in Fig. 10.

Public opinion polling had already demonstrated that Germans in the East and the West gave considerable credit to Mikhail Gorbachev




SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952. WG: N = 2000.

Fig. 6—U.S. contribution to democracy

for German unity, and the German government has publicly acknowledged its gratitude for the Soviet leader's role in facilitating unification. To test whether Germans also acknowledged other factors that contributed to unification, mainly those that led to the subsequent radical changes in Soviet foreign policy, respondents were asked to rate how important five factors were in contributing to the collapse of communism in the GDR and overcoming Germany's division. These factors included the Western Alliance, Gorbachev's policies, the Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic, East German regime opposition, and the role of democratic reform movements in Poland and Hungary.


In both parts of Germany, respondents gave the most credit to Gorbachev, then to opposition movements in the GDR, reform movements in Poland and Hungary, and West German Ostpolitik. Although a slight majority of Germans in both East and West acknowledged the role of the Western Alliance, it was rated as the least important of these five factors (see Fig. 11).



SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952. WG: N = 2000.


Fig. 7—U.S. contribution to economic reconstruction

A final question asked in this section concerned the West German-American relationship. One constant theme of East German propaganda over the decades had been to present the Federal Republic as a submissive ally of the United States, above all in the NATO context. East Berlin repeatedly criticized Bonn for not showing more independence from Washington, implying that "German interests" were being sacrificed on the altar of Alliance solidarity. In the 1980s, for example, the government of Helmut Kohl was often portrayed as a puppet of American policy, above all on the issue of the deployment of the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF). Against this background they were asked about the German-American relationship and whether they believed that the United States still played the dominant role or whether the two countries had in the meantime become equal partners. Three-fourths of East Germans (75 percent) and two-thirds of West Germans (65 percent) responded that the two countries had become equal partners (see Fig. 12).




SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952. WG: N = 2000.

Fig. 8—U.S. troops and peace and stability




SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952. WG: N = 2000.

Fig. 9—U.S. contribution to unification




SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952. WG: N = 2000.

Fig. 10—Summary of U.S. postwar role



SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952. WG: N = 2000.

Fig. 11—East and West German opinion of the factors contributing to the collapse of Communism




SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952. WG: N = 2000

Fig. 12—U.S. dominance or partnership?

IV. THE FUTURE AMERICAN ROLE

The greatest divergence in East and West German assessments of the American role was revealed in responses to questions about the future American role in Germany and Europe. The clearest evidence of a polarization between East and West German views is evident on attitudes toward the future of NATO. When asked whether a unified Germany should remain a member of the NATO Alliance or opt for a policy of neutrality, some three of four (74 percent) West German respondents preferred NATO, while two of three (68 percent) East German respondents opted for neutrality (see Fig. 13). In the West German case, support for NATO is quite strong across the political spectrum and among all age groups. Although support is somewhat weaker among the center and left parties, as well as among the younger



SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952. WG: N = 2000

Fig. 13—East and West German views on the future of Germany and NATO


generations, a clear majority is in favor of NATO in all categories (see Fig. 14). In the East, in contrast, a solid majority is for neutrality across the political spectrum and among all age groups (see Fig. 15).

Differences in West and East German views were also underscored by answers to a series of questions concerning the future American troop presence. When asked whether the United States should withdraw all of its troops from Germany in conjunction with the scheduled Soviet troop withdrawal or whether a limited contingent of American troops should remain, some eight of ten (79 percent) East Germans polled favored a complete U.S. withdrawal. In West Germany, opinion was split, with 46 percent favoring a complete withdrawal and 41 percent preferring a limited contingent of troops to remain (see Fig. 16). A breakdown of these figures by party affiliation and age reveals that in West Germany only among the voters of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) does a majority favor retaining a limited contingent of American troops, and support for a limited troop presence is weaker among the younger generations (see Fig. 17).

In the East, in contrast, a clear majority across the political and age group spectrum was for a total U.S. withdrawal. Although the CDU's electoral performance in the October 1990 elections was equally strong in both parts of Germany, such results underscore the fact that those who voted for the CDU in the East do not necessarily share the views of their Western brethren on the United States and on security policy issues in particular (see Fig. 18).


East German attitudes toward the U.S. military presence must, of course, be seen in conjunction with evolving West German views on the U.S. troop presence. Extensive survey research has been conducted on West German attitudes toward the American military presence over the years, and the exact results of past polls have hinged upon the precise wording of the questions posed. More important, German attitudes toward NATO have been tied to changing perceptions of the Soviet threat and the course of East-West relations. Gorbachev's coming to power and the subsequent collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe, for example, led to a considerable drop in German threat perceptions and a corresponding dip in support for the Alliance and the U.S. troop presence.

Polling by the Allensbach Institute on long-term trends in the Federal Republic, for example, clearly documents a drop in a perceived need for American troops. For several decades now, the Allensbach Institute asked West Germans whether they were concerned about a threat from the Soviet Union, whether they believed that their military security could be guaranteed if there were no longer any American troops in the Federal Republic, and whether they would "greet" or "regret" the news of an American troop withdrawal.




SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. WG: N - 2000

Fig. 14—West German views on the future of Germany and NATO, by party and generation



SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952.


Fig. 16—East German views on the future of Germany and NATO, by party and generation



SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952. WG: N = 2000


Fig. 16—East and West German opinions on U.S. troop withdrawal

In a comparison of the springs of 1970 and 1990, public sentiments have totally reversed. In 1970, at the heyday of East-West detente, 50 percent by West Germans polled believed that the security of the Federal Republic could no longer be guaranteed without an American troop presence, with one of five asserting that West German security could be guaranteed without the American military presence. A similar proportion of 51 percent also said that they would “regret” an American troop withdrawal. By the spring of 1990, following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, only 21 percent of those West Germans asked believed that U.S. troops were needed to maintain German security, with 54 percent believing that their country’s security did not require the American military presence. Similarly, almost half of West Germans (49 percent) responded that they would “greet” the news of a U.S. troop withdrawal. The degree to which such trends correlate with declining perceptions of the Soviet threat is documented in Fig. 19.




SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. WG: N = 2000

Fig. 17—West German response to U.S. troop withdrawal by party and generation



SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952.

Fig. 18—East German response to U.S. troop withdrawal by party and generation




SOURCE: Allensbach, 10/89. WG: N - 2000

Fig. 19—West German support for U.S. troop presence

Proponents of retaining a residual American troop presence in a unified Germany have often justified it in the German debate as a prudent form of insurance against unforeseen trends in the East and a possible worsening of East-West relations in the future. When asked whether they believed that the total withdrawal of American troops might leave Germany insufficiently defended in the case of an eventual worsening of East-West relations, six of ten (64 percent) of the West German respondents agreed that the total withdrawal of U.S. troops could leave Germany insufficiently defended if East-West relations deteriorated. In contrast, 60 percent of the East Germans questioned did not agree at all with this statement (see Fig. 20).

The sensitivity of West German views on changing East-West trends was documented in the early months of 1991. Polls conducted by the USIA in West Germany following the Soviet use of military force in the Baltic Republics confirm the link in the western part of Germany between the Alliance and the consequences of a deterioration



SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952. WG: N = 2000.


Fig. 20—U.S. troop withdrawal and possible worsening of East-West relations

in East-West relations. In light of the uncertainty caused by the Persian Gulf War and the unrest in the USSR, the West German public's belief in the essentiality of the Alliance was given a substantial boost and reached levels not witnessed since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in late 1989. The same polls, however, show that a considerable drop in Gorbachev's popularity and growing concern about a return to "hard-line communism" in the USSR do not necessarily translate into concern over a future direct Soviet threat to Germany. In January 1991, only one in ten West Germans considered the USSR to pose a threat to Germany. Some 39 percent of West Germans considered Iraq a threat, and 23 percent of the respondents said that "no country" posed a threat.

East and West Germans also hold divergent views when assessing the appropriate model for Germany's long-term security framework. Respondents were asked to choose among a more political NATO, a strengthened European Community assuming responsibility for security policy, and a system of collective security. A clear majority of East German respondents (60 percent) opted for collective security. In contrast, West German preferences seem to lie somewhere between a political NATO (41 percent) and a strengthened European Community (30 percent) (see Fig. 21).

The question of unification's potential influence on the German commitment to European unification has also evoked considerable interest. Large majorities in the West (72 percent) and in the East (74 percent) clearly support the pursuit of European unity. A higher percentage of East German than West German respondents favored an acceleration of unification "lest a united Germany that is not firmly integrated become a factor of instability" (see Fig. 22).


Finally, Germans in both states were asked about Germany's future role in world politics, a question that had moved to the center of the German political stage in the fall of 1990 in light of the Persian Gulf crisis and a debate over changing the constitution to allow the participation of German armed forces in non-NATO missions. The participants were given two points of view and asked to choose the one they agreed with. The first view suggested that because of its past history and embrace of power politics, Germany should continue to adopt a reserved stance in world politics; the other asserted that a unified Germany should assume a more active role and take on more responsibility in world politics. Opinion was split between the two states, with a majority of West Germans (53 percent) favoring a more active role and a majority of East Germans (58 percent) preferring a continuation of a reserved stance (see Fig. 23).



SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952. WG: N = 2000

Fig. 21—Future security models


This split was subsequently reflected in the public debate in Germany over Operation Desert Storm and whether Bundeswehr units deployed to Turkey should engage in combat operations. A public opinion poll conducted by the West German survey firm INFAS in



SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952. WG: N = 2000

Fig. 22—Attitudes toward European unification

early February, for example, found that 66 percent of the West Germans polled believed that the war against Iraq was justified, whereas only 50 percent believed so in the former GDR. Although a clear majority of Germans in both parts of the country opposed the partici-



SOURCE: Infratest, 10/90. EG: N = 952. WG: N = 2000

Fig. 23—Germany's future world role

pation of Bundeswehr troops in the combat operations of the U.S.-led coalition, opposition in the western part of Germany was 59 percent and in the eastern part, 75 percent. When asked whether those Bundeswehr units deployed to Turkey should join combat operations if Iraq attacked Turkey, some 48 percent of West Germans and 56 percent of East Germans polled replied in the negative.¹

¹See the summary of the INFAS Survey in *Westdeutscher Rundfunk*, February 8, 1991, 1845h.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

East Germans have a critical image of the United States. East German views stand in contrast to those of both their West German brethren and people of other countries in Eastern and Central Europe. The factors explaining this contrast must be sought in the fundamentally different type of relationship that the United States has had with these two parts of Germany. In the West, the American experience was enthusiastically embraced by a society that was learning democracy and actively seeking integration into a broader Western community. Throughout much of the early postwar period, the United States occupied a mentor role toward the Federal Republic that gave it tremendous opportunities for influence. Although the Federal Republic has long outgrown the role of pupil of the United States, this formative experience of the 1950s and 1960s laid the foundation for a mature alliance and partnership that has survived for four decades. The tensions of the late 1970s and early 1980s notwithstanding, a strong and cohesive societal bond between the two countries has made the management of this relationship far easier than a mere overlap of strategic interests would have allowed.

East Germans were never allowed to participate in the positive experiences of integration into multilateral institutions in the West. Despite its revolutionary rhetoric and façade, the communist regime in East Berlin was in reality a deeply conservative state that tried to insulate its population from external Western influences. Similarly, the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) were never authentic multilateral institutions in the Western sense but a cover for the USSR to exert its control through bilateral relationships in which it was the senior partner. They stand in sharp contrast to the positive Westernizing experiences of the Federal Republic's integration into the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. As a result, communism in the eastern part of Germany inadvertently helped preserve traditional German and Central European political culture and mind sets.

Such trends were further reinforced by isolation. Whereas West Germans benefited tremendously from the countless exchange programs that became a standard part of Western life, turning the Federal Republic into the most open and Western society that German history has ever known, East Germans remained severely isolated under one of

the most restrictive communist regimes in the region, constantly exposed to massive anti-Western and anti-American propaganda. Moreover, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) regime was the most ideological communist regime precisely because of Germany's partition. Other communist regimes could seek to wrap themselves in the cloak of some variant of national communism, but East German communist rulers enjoyed no such luxury. Lacking any national basis of legitimacy, they sought to compensate through an excessive reliance on ideological indoctrination. Although West German television undoubtedly served as somewhat of a corrective lens, it suffered from its own myopia.

The United States and the German-American relationship were a major target of East German propaganda, which portrayed the United States as the citadel of merciless capitalism and a hegemonic power in political, economic, and cultural terms. The German-American relationship was repeatedly termed the "main axis" of aggressive, revanchist, and imperialist forces. Communist East German media coverage of the United States furnished extraordinarily one-sided coverage of American life; East Germans were consistently exposed to a demonization of U.S. policy. Even when the SED authorities were forced to soften their coverage of life in West Germany in the 1980s as a growing number of East Germans visited the Federal Republic, the United States remained public enemy number one.

One must still ask why East German views of the United States differ from those in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, where Washington's prestige is far higher. The answer may lie in the fact that for many Eastern Europeans opposed to their communist regimes, the United States and American policy served as beacon of hope for future change, an orientation that was reinforced by official U.S. policy and the U.S.-financed Radio Free Europe. In addition, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary pursued somewhat less restrictive travel and exchange programs. The people of these nations also had thriving communities in the United States that allowed them to maintain links and have a window open to the United States.

In contrast, the East Germans looked toward Bonn, not Washington, for their salvation. Even in East German dissident circles one frequently heard the view that the American presence was actually an inhibiting factor for change, as it gave the USSR justification for remaining in place. Many East German intellectuals, while rejecting the SED's strict form of orthodox communism, nonetheless aspired to some form of democratic socialism and shared the radical chic anti-Americanism that dominated intellectual life in West Berlin and parts of West Germany. Many East Germans seemed to believe that a

Soviet withdrawal from their country was inconceivable without a corresponding American withdrawal from the Federal Republic and that a diminution of the U.S. presence was a precondition for greater German freedom and national rapprochement.

However, there are some grounds for hope and optimism with regard to the future. Many of the past views held by East Germans were a product of a very artificial and isolated environment and will be shed rapidly. Moreover, the data presented here do suggest that East Germans are aware that their image of America in the past was skewed.

There is every indication that East Germans are interested in learning about the United States. Although the allure of American society may have diminished since the early postwar period, American culture still exerts a tremendous attraction. Equally important, the data clearly show East German appreciation for the role of the United States in the political and economic reconstruction of the Federal Republic. Solid majorities recognize the American contribution to the development of democracy and the rebuilding of the German economy and that the German-American relationship has evolved into one of equality and partnership.

On these issues, the views of East Germans parallel those of West Germans. The problem arises in East German views on security issues, above all their assessments of the future role of the Atlantic Alliance and the American troop presence. There is less recognition of the role of the United States and the Atlantic Alliance in contributing to peace and stability and to those factors that made German unification possible; with regard to the future, East Germans show little support for either the Alliance or for an ongoing U.S. troop presence in Germany. On the issue of NATO versus neutrality, for example, East and West German views are almost polar opposites. There is no reservoir of goodwill for Western concepts of collective defense in the eastern part of Germany, where neutralist sentiments still dominate.

East German views toward the United States, as well as other issues, are obviously going to change. Past prejudices nurtured by propaganda will continue to break down as East Germans have access to more balanced information about the United States, are able to visit the United States, and can see the positive benefits of a close relationship with Washington and membership in the Western Alliance. Such processes will take time, and their outcome is not predestined. Equally important is the question of how policymakers can seek to influence such processes and steer them in the proper direction.

An important policy issue is how quickly the East Germans will become Westernized or "West Germanized" in their political views and orientation. Chancellor Helmut Kohl has repeatedly stated that

although the tasks of economic reconstruction in the East will be enormous, the most difficult challenge produced by unification will be the political and moral reconstruction of civil society and the learning of democratic values. Many observers expect it to take at least a decade for East Germans to make the transition to Western political values and culture. This decade will also be a crucial period in which the Atlantic Alliance and the German-American relationship are overhauled and redefined.

Perhaps a more crucial issue is the effect of such trends in East Germany on a unified Germany. One school of thought notes that East Germans have voted overwhelmingly for a Western political framework and orientation. Moreover, the views of some 16 million East Germans will be dwarfed in a unified Germany, where they will represent less than a quarter of the population. Such trends in East Germany therefore represent only a small problem that will sort itself out over time as East Germans are integrated into the institutions and political culture of West Germany. East Germans will also eventually learn the value of (and embrace) the Western Alliance and the United States.

Another school of thought, however, is far less sanguine about trends in the western part of Germany because it sees East Germans playing a less passive role in a new all-German framework. This school asserts that East German trends will exacerbate existing or emerging problems in the Federal Republic, above all with regard to West German attitudes toward the United States. They point, for example, to past studies that have demonstrated a considerable erosion in West German support for an American troop presence. Moreover, although the East Germans are no doubt a minority, they do account for some 20 percent of the new German Bundestag, a proportion that could easily provide the swing votes on many crucial issues in the future.

It is too early to conclude which of these two schools of thought will turn out to be correct. This report is limited to obtaining some initial data and serving as a benchmark against which to measure the future evolution of German attitudes toward the United States. Against the background of the data presented here, three policy recommendations suggest themselves:

- First, there is a clear need on both sides of the Atlantic to recognize that the image of the United States in the former GDR is a problem that could have broader ramifications in a unified Germany. Moreover, policymakers should not assume that West Germany's formative experience in the early postwar period will automatically be recreated in the East. The

historical conditions under which the German-American relationship flourished in the early postwar period were unique and no longer exist.

- Second, U.S. policymakers must recognize the need to act jointly with the German government to address this potential problem. The United States can and should rely primarily on our West German allies to bring East Germans into the Western community and to expose them to the benefits that many in the Federal Republic take for granted. In addition, many of the exchange programs that support a strong German-American relationship are financed either largely by the Germans themselves or jointly with American institutions. German willingness to address this potential problem will be important.
- The third policy conclusion is that it would be a mistake to leave it to the Germans alone. To do so would be to abdicate vital American interests to another country, albeit one of our closest allies. The United States must strive to construct a relationship with the eastern part of Germany at a time when American influence will be considerably less than it was in the 1950s and 1960s and may decrease further as Germany assumes a more influential position in Europe and in the Western Alliance. More important, the United States must demonstrate to East Germans not only why the close German-American relationship was important in the past but why it remains critical for both sides in the future.

The United States may also face a special problem with regard to East German attitudes toward security issues as the provisions of the final treaty on German unity prevent the deployment of Allied troops in the former GDR. This may make it more difficult to break down the views of East Germans on such issues because they will remain less integrated and exposed to the influences of NATO's multilateral institutions. In these circumstances, the best recipe for dealing with such changes is to encourage a healthier appreciation of the broader political benefits of Atlanticism and their continued relevance in a post-Cold War world.

Such tasks will not be easy, above all in light of budget austerity and competing demands. Ideally, the United States should seek to expand our existing exchange programs with Germany to cover the former GDR and to offer East Germans the same types of opportunities we offered West Germans in the early postwar period. If such an expansion is not possible because of budget constraints, we should

deliberately skew our existing exchange programs with Germany to give preferential treatment to Germans from the former GDR for some period of time. This must be a priority jointly recognized and supported by the German and American governments.

Appendix A

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Data were obtained from 952 personal interviews in the former GDR and 1,938 interviews in West Germany. Interviews took place over one month beginning October 1, 1990, in the former GDR and October 13, 1990, in West Germany. A total of 647 interviewers retained by Infratest Kommunikationsforschung, GmbH, conducted the interviews.

Two multistage samples of households were selected from area frames taken from West German official statistics. The samples were stratified and were "equal probability to the household level," meaning that each household included in the frame had an equal probability of being selected into the sample. One member of each household was randomly selected to be interviewed.

Table A.1 describes rates of contact and participation in both samples.

Data were weighted in analysis to conform to Amtliche Statistik population proportions current as of December 1989. The weighting criteria were as follows:

Table A.1

RATE OF CONTACT AND PARTICIPATION IN EAST AND WEST GERMAN SAMPLES

	East Germany	West Germany
Invalid/ineligible frame listings	1.5%	1.3%
No contact with household/respondent	11.2%	11.3%
Respondent refusal	15.0%	18.2%
Other nonresponse (respondent ill, unavailable, not competent)	3.4%	4.5%
Total nonresponse	29.6%	34.0%
Total interviews completed	971	1938
Interviews not analyzed	19	0
Net sample for analysis	952	1938

SOURCE: Infratest Kommunikationsforschung, GmbH.

1. The sample of households was weighted geographically, in the former GDR by county and municipality and in West Germany by state.
2. Respondents were weighted geographically (in the former GDR by county, in West Germany by state) and by age and sex.

Proportions are not exactly equal to true population values because of sampling and nonsampling errors. Table A.2 gives an estimate of sampling error, including a design effect to account for cluster homogeneity, calculated as:

$$95\% \text{ confidence interval} = P \pm 1.96 \sqrt{P(1 - P)/N}$$

where P is the sample proportion and N is the sample size.

Nonsampling errors, for example interviewer misreading, are more difficult to measure and are not accounted for in this estimate.

Table A.2
ESTIMATE OF SAMPLING ERROR

Proportion	East Germany (N=952)	West Germany (N=1,938)
	Confidence interval (P ±)	
5	1.96	1.37
10	2.70	1.89
15	3.21	2.25
20	3.59	2.52
25	3.89	2.73
30	4.12	2.89
35	4.28	3.00
40	4.40	3.08
45	4.47	3.13
50	4.49	3.15
55	4.47	3.13
60	4.40	3.08
65	4.28	3.00
70	4.12	2.89
75	3.89	2.73
80	3.59	2.52
85	3.21	2.25
90	2.70	1.89
95	1.96	1.37

SOURCE: Infratest Kommunika-
tionsforschung, GmbH.

Appendix B

QUESTIONNAIRE

Question 1:

I will read you the names of several countries. I'd like to know from you how sympathetic you are to these countries. Please use the scale from +5 to -5 to respond. The higher you go on the scale, the more sympathetic you are; the lower you go, the less sympathetic you are. In each case, tell me whether you have ever been to the country.

Country	+5 to -5	No comment (percent)	Have already been there once? (percent)		No comment (percent)
			yes	no	
France	+2.8	4	9	87	4
Austria	+3.3	3	20	76	4
Soviet Union	+1.3	3	36	61	4
Italy	+1.8	4	6	89	5
Poland	+0.1	4	58	39	3
USA	+1.6	5	1	95	4
Sweden	+2.8	4	3	92	5
Cuba	+0.3	4	1	94	5
England	+2.0	4	2	93	5
Hungary	+2.0	3	38	59	3

Question 2:

I'd like you to evaluate several countries from different standpoints. There are five categories that you can use to rate each country according to a numbering system. "1" means a "very good" rating; "6" means a "very bad" rating. The numbers in between are for gradation purposes.

Please rate the countries I will read to you according to their material living standards. Even if you do not know an individual country specifically, you may have formed an impression of that country.

(Interviewer: If respondent declines to give a rating please record the value "0".)

What is your opinion in each case regarding personal freedom of the individual, social justice, etc.?

Country	Material standard of living	Personal freedom of individual	Social Justice	System shaped by democracy	Willingness to help one another
USA	2.2	1.8	3.5	2.6	3.5
Hungary	3.7	2.8	3.3	2.9	2.5
Soviet Union	5.0	4.3	3.8	3.8	2.4
France	2.3	2.1	2.6	2.3	2.5

Now please rate the two parts of Germany in terms of how you evaluate the *present* situation.

East Germany (GDR)	3.3	2.9	2.9	3.1	2.2
West Germany (FRG)	1.4	1.8	2.5	2.2	2.9

Question 3:

You undoubtedly have certain perceptions of any foreign society. How do you feel about American and Soviet society? I will now give you a list of opposing characteristics. Please mark the box you think best describes American society. The farther to the left you go on the 7-position scale, the stronger you judge the characteristic on the left to be. The farther to the right you go, the stronger you judge the characteristic on the right side to be.

	SCALE 1 through 7		No Comment (Percent)	
	USA	USSR	USA	USSR
progressive/reactionary	3.0	3.7	3	2
superficial/reflective	3.9	3.7	3	3
major cultural achievements/ minimal cultural achievements	3.1	2.6	3	3
open-minded/close-minded	2.3	3.3	4	3
aggressive/peaceful	4.4	2.8	3	3
strong national confidence/ weak national confidence	2.3	2.6	4	2
hard-working people/ lazy people	2.7	3.6	3	3
has great future/ has no future	2.9	3.6	3	2
tolerant/intolerant	3.2	3.6	4	4
similar to us/ different from us	5.1	5.2	3	3
inefficient economy/ efficient economy	3.0	5.2	5	4

Question 4:

How important were the following sources of information for your image of the United States? (Percent)

	Major impor- tance	Moderate impor- tance	Minor impor- tance	No impor- tance	No comment
Radio, television, and newspapers in the former GDR	10	25	45	18	2
Western radio, television, and newspapers	23	45	20	10	2
American films, music, and literature	18	34	31	15	2
Information provided in school	4	17	34	42	4
Personal contact and conversations with Americans	7	10	11	67	5
Conversations with people who know the United States	9	17	16	54	5
Personal experience from a trip to the United States	0	0	0	0	99
Other sources	1	1	1	10	87

Question 5:

Previously a very negative image of the United States was portrayed in the GDR in the schools and in the media. How would you judge this presentation of the United States today? Which of the opinions listed below would you agree with? (Percent)

	Agree
The image of the United States previously portrayed in the GDR corresponds with reality	2
A number of aspects were exaggerated but by and large this image corresponds to reality	19

A number of negative aspects of the United States may have been portrayed correctly, but in general the United States was described far too negatively	55
The image of the United States was portrayed far too negatively in the GDR	21
No comment	3

Question 6:

Do you have relatives or friends in the United States? (Percent)

Relatives	5
Friends	3
Neither	93
No comment	1

Question 7:

When you consider relations between the Federal Republic and the United States after the Second World War, please tell me whether you strongly agree, partially agree, partially disagree, or strongly disagree with the viewpoint listed below.

Do you think that the United States played a significant role in establishing democracy in the Federal Republic? (Percent)

	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>
Strongly agree	49	40
Somewhat agree	41	46
Somewhat disagree	8	9
Strongly disagree	1	3
No comment	1	2

Question 8:

And what about the economic reconstruction of the Federal Republic? Do you think that the United States made a major contribution to the economic reconstruction of the Federal Republic? (Percent)

	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>
Strongly agree	45	62
Somewhat agree	42	31
Somewhat disagree	10	4
Strongly disagree	2	1
No comment	1	2

Question 9:

And when you consider the presence of American troops, do you think that the United States has contributed to the maintenance of peace and stability in Europe through the stationing of its troops on the territory of the Federal Republic and in West Berlin? (Percent)

	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>
Strongly agree	47	27
Somewhat agree	40	46
Somewhat disagree	9	18
Strongly disagree	3	8
No comment	1	2

Question 10:

And do you think that the United States has contributed to the overcoming of the division of Germany through the stationing of its troops in the Federal Republic and in West Berlin? (Percent)

	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>
Strongly agree	21	13
Somewhat agree	38	30
Somewhat disagree	28	36
Strongly disagree	12	19
No comment	1	2

Question 11:

When you consider the developments in the last few years that ultimately led to the demise of the SED regime, how large a role do you think that the resolute stance of the Western Alliance played? Please tell me using the following scale. (Percent)

	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>
Very large	18	15
Somewhat large	39	42
Not large	34	30
Insignificant	6	12
No comment	3	1

How large a role do you think Gorbachev's policies played?

Very large	75	73
Somewhat large	22	22
Not large	2	4
Insignificant	0	0
No comment	1	1

How large a role do you think the FRG's *'Ostpolitik'* played?

Very large	19	26
Somewhat large	47	48
Not large	27	21
Insignificant	4	3
No comment	2	2

How large a role do you think regime opposition by political and church groups in the GDR played?

Very large	42	55
Somewhat large	36	34
Not large	18	8
Insignificant	3	2
No comment	2	1

How large a role do you think democratic reform movements in Hungary and Poland played? (Percent)

Very large	44	31
Somewhat large	40	45
Not large	11	19
Insignificant	2	3
No comment	2	1

Question 12:

In your opinion, how much is life in the Federal Republic shaped by the influence of the United States? (Percent)

	<u>East</u>
Very strongly	12
Fairly strongly	45
Not very strongly	30
None at all	2
Don't know	11
No comment	1

Question 13:

And do you think that this influence is generally positive, negative, or neutral? (Percent)

	<u>East</u>
Positive	12
Negative	17
Neutral	45
No comment	3

Question 14:

When you consider the present relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic, do you think the United States still plays the dominant role or has this relationship in the meantime become one between more or less equal partners? (Percent)

	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>
The United States plays a dominant role	35	23
The United States and the FRG are more or less equal partners	65	75
No comment	1	0

Question 15:

The Soviet Union is withdrawing all of its troops from a united Germany. The U.S. has declared its willingness to significantly reduce its troops as well. Do you think that the U.S. should also withdraw all of its troops from Germany or should a limited contingent remain? (Percent)

	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>
The United States should withdraw all troops	46	79
A limited number should remain	41	13
Don't know	12	8
No comment	0	0

Question 16:

Many people believe that the total withdrawal of U.S. troops might leave Germany insufficiently defended in the case of an eventual worsening of East-West relations. (Percent)

	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>
Strongly agree with this opinion	18	5
Partially agree with this opinion	46	34
Strongly disagree with this opinion	35	60
No comment	1	5

Question 17:

In your opinion, what type of alliance policy should a united Germany pursue in the future? (Percent)

	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>
A united Germany should remain a member of NATO	74	31
A united Germany should adopt a status of military neutrality	25	68
No comment	1	1

Question 18:

Different models for Germany's future security policy are currently under discussion. In your opinion, which of the following models best corresponds to Germany's long-term security interests? (Percent)

	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>
A more politically oriented NATO remains the precondition for German security.	41	13
The EC will assume a greater responsibility for security policy and replace NATO	30	27
The military blocs should be replaced by a system of collective security between East and West	27	60
No comment	2	0

Question 19:

Different views exist on the role of the United States in the world. I will now list several of these views. Please tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with this view. (Percent)

The United States is a guarantor of peace and security in the world.

	<u>East</u>
Agree	39
Disagree	57
No comment	4

The U.S. intervenes too much in the affairs of other countries.

Agree	69
Disagree	27
No comment	4

The U.S. will remain a key ally of a united Germany in the future.

Agree	83
Disagree	15
No comment	2

The United States only pursues its own interests in its interventions in crisis areas.

Agree	56
Disagree	39
No comment	5

To the degree that Europe wins in influence, the U.S. will lose in significance as a great power.

Agree	65
Disagree	32
No comment	3

U.S. intervention in crises usually serves the common interests of the Western world.

Agree	63
Disagree	34
No comment	3

Question 20:

Now for a question on European unity. In your opinion, what position should the government of a united Germany adopt? (Percent)

	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>
European unification should be put on the back burner for the time being as the Germans must first take care of themselves.	25	27
European unification should be pursued as before.	58	48
European unity should clearly be accelerated as a united Germany that is not firmly integrated could become a factor of instability.	16	24
No comment	1	1

Question 21:

European unification will provide the EC with more room for maneuver in political terms. In your opinion, what type of foreign policy should the EC pursue? (Percent)

	<u>East</u>
Closer relations with the U.S. than with the Soviet Union	7
Closer relations with the Soviet Union than with the U.S.	3
Balanced relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union	90
No comment	1

Question 22:

Unification has also raised the question of Germany's future role in world politics. There are two points of view on this issue. Which of these views do you agree with? (Percent)

	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>
Some say that because of its past history and its previous embrace of power politics, Germany should continue to adopt a reserved stance in world politics	53	41
Others say that because of its future importance a united Germany must now assume a more active role and take on more responsibility in world politics	45	58
No comment	2	1