


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Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island



"BACK TO THE FUTURE" IS NOT AN OPTION

—
EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY
FOR THE YEAR 2000

by

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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18 May 1992

92-20184



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92 7 98 101

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for Public Release; distribution is unlimited.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) C	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT, R.I. 02841		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) "BACK TO THE FUTURE" IS NOT AN OPTION — European Security Strategy for the Year 2000 (v)			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) CDR Rosanne M. LeVitre, USN			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT FINAL	13b. TIME COVERED FROM TO	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 19 JUN 92	15. PAGE COUNT 41
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
		Threat; Risks; Options; Security; Strategy; Status Quo	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)			
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20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <i>Unclassified</i>	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL CHAIRMAN, OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 841-3414	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL C

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I. INTRODUCTION.

Since November 1989, an unexpected wave of political and social changes has swept Europe, the United States, and the former Soviet Union from their respective Cold War foundations, leaving in its wake an unfamiliar landscape. The need to repair and rebuild political, economic and military structures is apparent, but in what image? Whatever their shape, they must be able to weather climactic change as the western democratic nations follow an uncharted path to a new and, hopefully, favorable world order.

This essay addresses the question of collective European security design and strategy for the year 2000. Extensive review of various analyses of and proposals for post-Cold War European security reveals an absence of fresh, innovative thinking by both political and military leaders. Decision-makers ritualistically revert to the past to justify their plans for the future. A viable U.S. military strategy for tomorrow's Europe requires an examination of the present unencumbered by past prejudices and presumptions.

This study examines the issue of European security with the intent of developing a EUCOM strategy which is innovative, flexible and capable of meeting both the risks and the opportunities of the twenty-first century. Conclusions are based on a *zero-based assessment of U.S interests in Europe and the threats to those interests*. The need for continuing American military engagement to safeguard those interests is critically appraised. Alternative strategic options are considered and a viable strategic plan for the U.S. European Com-

mand (EUCOM) is proposed. Given the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, the analysis is limited to conventional strategy only.

As does any analysis of the future, this essay necessarily makes certain assumptions:

1. Both domestic economic necessity and the desires of America's North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies will reduce or eliminate the United States predominant role.

2. A pan-European security organization with cooperative military ties to the United States and Canada will eclipse NATO.

3. As a deterrent to aggression, the U.S. will continue to extend its nuclear umbrella to Europe.

II. THE PAST IS NOT THE FUTURE - EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES TODAY.

1914 Cannot Happen Again. The political, economic, and military situation in Europe today is unique. Those who fear a return to the nationalistic imperialism of 1914 need to examine current trends more closely. Prior to World War I, there were many great powers in Europe, including Russia. The two world wars devastated the major European powers. Millions died, whole generations of men were eliminated and, except for the Soviet Union, industrial and economic bases laid in waste.

Europe was subsequently partitioned and dominated by two World War II allies which became superpowers. Today, one superpower, the Soviet Union, no longer exists. *Russia is not playing a role as a European power for the first time in centuries.* As a result, the United States, is contemplating a lessor role in Europe.

The situation in Europe is without historic precedent for a second, and more important reason. The Treaty on European Union, signed in December 1991 at Maastricht, the Netherlands, declared in principle Western Europe's intention to unify. The world's largest and most prosperous market would be created. Most internal border controls would be eliminated, creating a barrier-free market by late 1992. A common currency (1997) would be issued by 1997. Should this agreement be ratified by the twelve Maastricht signatories, a market eclipsing that of the United States will come into being. Limited provisions have been made to extend the EC sphere of prosperity to selected Eastern European nations. Recently, a six year tariff agreement was concluded between the EC and

Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. It establishes a free trade zone as a ready market for Eastern European exports. The agreement also grants these countries associate EC membership status, with the prospect of full EC membership within ten years.

The current Western European leaders came of age under the political tutelage, economic sponsorship, and military shield of the United States. As a result, Western Europe is securely democratic, generally prosperous, and appears dedicated to an open trading system. The predominant position of a united Germany is cause for concern for many Europeans. However, the Bonn of the 1990's is not the Weimar of the 1920's. Today's Germany is embedded in a structure of international alliances and institutions. Its democracy has deeper roots, and its external ambitions are subdued. There are no "stab in the back" legends or irredentist policies. In the absence of the Soviet threat, there is no apparent reason per se for the United States to maintain what some view as a large pseudo-occupation force in Germany.¹

American influence is responsible in part for the additional Maastricht protocol to establish common foreign and defense policies. This agreement is a natural outgrowth of years of political debate and cooperation within NATO. The nineteenth and early twentieth century-style European alliances designed to achieve hegemony through political-military intimidation and territorial acquisition have been replaced by the common goal of economic prosperity through close, peaceful cooperation. Thus, for the first time since the Treaty of Vienna (1815), a large portion of Europe is committed to reversing the centuries old

pattern of nationalistic rivalries and expansionism. However, this commitment is born of the benefits of extended peace vice the exhaustion of war.

All is not yet perfect. The Maastricht Treaty was expected to be ratified quickly and in effect by 31 December 1992. However, despite its tremendous economic potential, resistance to ratification is growing. At issue are concerns over surrender of national sovereignty, aid to the community's "poor four" (Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece), and EC expansion. In part, opposition to the treaty reflects a general mood of uncertainty gripping Western Europe. The root cause is economic recession and the rapid pace of political change. Further, the ruling parties in France, Germany and Italy which have wholeheartedly supported the agreement, suffered significant defeats in March and April 1992 local elections. While opposition may slow ratification, approval of the Maastricht Treaty remains likely given the enormous political and economic advantages. A note of caution is warranted. The EC is not a panacea for future instability on the European continent. To quote Stanley Hoffmann, Director of the Center for European Studies at Harvard University, "though we do not know how much of a difference the EC will make, it is quite clear that since the Community does not extend beyond Western Europe it leaves all kinds of problems in Eastern Europe."²

The United States – the Insolvent Superpower. It is true that the United States is today the world's only genuine superpower. However, American power is significantly tempered by several factors.³

– The United States has emerged from the Cold War in a precarious economic position. The country is struggling with an unprecedented national debt,

a decaying infrastructure, and serious socio-economic problems. Just how precarious the American economic condition is can be debated. However, there is general agreement that the U.S. must put its house in order. A nation which is broke cannot remain a superpower. Domestic problems are eroding the strengths on which the country depends to project influence and power abroad. Furthermore, in the post-Cold War world, competition among nations is shifting from the military to the economic battlefield. *Thus, the biggest national security threat to the United States in the near term is its own declining economic and social infrastructure.*

A weakened America will foster some instability overseas. The country will be perceived as incapable of fulfilling its international political, economic and military leadership roles. Since World War II, a resource-limited U.S. has not been a consideration in American or European military planning. It is now.

- *Due to economic recession and social ills, the American national mood is more parochial.* For example, after the Gulf War the American public has demanded that other countries bear a fair share for defense of the new world order. Desert Shield/Storm was the first instance in U.S. history where the country sought financial assistance to fight a war. Parochialism is also exemplified in public support for trade protectionism. The percentage of Americans who favor trade barriers is at its highest levels since the 1930's.

- *Cold War alignments have broken down, leading to three geopolitical changes that overshadow all others for the United States:* the emergence of a

unified Germany, the liberation of eastern Europe, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

- Power has been accrued by new economic giants, diverse regions, and institutions. The Group of Seven economic meetings may now reflect contemporary power more realistically than a NATO meeting or Bush-Yeltsin summit.

Despite its domestic difficulties, America still retains the vital interests to which mandate engagement in international affairs. However, fewer resources mean U.S. policy-makers must make critical choices. The central question is where on a global scale should scarce resources be committed? As in the past, a region's relative importance to U.S. economic and geopolitical interests will determine the extent of involvement.

When Franklin Roosevelt made the conscious decision that Europe was the first priority in World War II, he unwittingly shaped American foreign policies for the next five decades. Since 1941, U.S. national security and military strategy has become increasingly Eurocentric. As a result, America ultimately became the linchpin in a system of European security arrangements. Europe became America's oldest and deepest commitment. The commitment did pay off.

By the end of 1991, the American alliance with Europe had achieved its basic goals. The continent is unified, Eastern Europe is liberated, and the Russian military threat is greatly reduced. A change in U.S. European strategy is necessary and inevitable. The danger is Europe has receded. What U.S. re-

sources remain allocated to Europe must be apportioned giving equal consideration to legitimate U.S. interests in other regions of the world.

U.S. Interests in Post Cold War Europe. America cannot simply withdraw from the international arena. An interdependent world economy and global mass communication render self-sufficiency and isolationism unrealistic and unachievable national goals for any country in the twenty-first century. Thus, America continues to have a stake in Europe's future. What are the U.S. national interests in a post-Cold War Europe? There are many answers from various quarters. A study by the Working Group on Changing Roles and Shifting Burdens in the Atlantic Alliance provides a succinct, representative, and reasonable view of these interests:⁴

- *Preserve democratic values, stable governments and economies.*

- *Preserve peaceful relations among the nations of Europe.* Given the lethality of modern weapons, the human cost of a third European war this century would be unprecedented. Even if the U.S. remained uninvolved militarily, the economic cost would be horrendous. America's monetary systems and financial markets are inextricably tied to those of Europe. Simply put, the U.S. cannot afford a war in Europe.

- *Preventing conditions in which the risk of war could grow.* This is perhaps the most crucial American interest in Europe today. It is the foundation for all other American interests. Its attainment requires concerted effort on all fronts, political, diplomatic, economic, and military. It must be the central focus

for strategic planning. However, existing allied agreements are not designed to address the type of problems which can undermine peace. Defense arrangements structured to meet the "Soviet threat" cannot cope with the multiple security concerns of a free Europe. Substantive change is required. *Unfortunately, the 1991-92 NATO structural changes (withdrawal of U.S. VII Corps, creation of a multinational corps) and the "new NATO strategy" were an attempt to preserve the Alliance. They are not designed to meet the next challenge in Europe today: how to embrace the new states of eastern Europe and the emerging independent republics of the CIS.*

The inability of existing security mechanisms to meet these challenges is exemplified by their failure to quell the Yugoslavian Civil War. For the foreseeable future, nationalistic and ethnic rivalries which erupt into conflict put European stability at risk. The problem is that these conflicts have the potential to expand. For example, a widening Yugoslavian conflict could bring Greece, Hungary, Albania, or Bulgaria into the fight. The Balkan states are not the only source of potential conflict in Europe today. There is always the chance that national and ethnic ambitions could bring a "European Saddam Hussein" to power.

Since European stability and peaceful relations are in the U.S. national interests, it follows that America must decide how much direct responsibility it is willing to take to keep Europe free of conflict. Hard questions need to be answered. Do we or don't we wish to play in a European security area which now spans from the Atlantic to the Urals? Are we willing to become engaged in eastern Europe? If we chose to participate, will the role be as a predominant, equal

or lesser partner? If we don't want to play, can our national interests be adequately served by Europeans providing for a European defense? Are we willing to gamble that the past really isn't the future in Europe?

All things considered, it would be unwise for the United States to unilaterally withdraw from Europe at this time. There are enough interests and unknowns to warrant continued involvement. However, it is time for fresh thinking. The "NATO theology" must be reexamined with a "Vatican II spirit." There must be a recognition that the Alliance cannot remain relevant without fundamental change. The core beliefs will likely remain the same, i.e. the importance of U.S. engagement and/or the necessity of cooperative defense. However, the manner in which they are practiced must be altered. *It is the form, not the commitment, which must change.*

III. WHERE IS THE THREAT? WHAT ARE THE RISKS?

Today's world is one of risks vice identifiable threats.⁵ Webster's New World Dictionary defines "risk" as the chance of injury, damage or hazard. A "threat" is defined as an expression of intent to hurt or destroy. In Europe, U.S. interests are continually at risk, but rarely threatened. Thus, the U.S. military strategy and mind-set must shift the focus from a definable, monolithic Soviet threat to managing those generic risks most likely to escalate to military, political or economic confrontation. The most prominent of these are listed in Table One, below.

Table One
Risks and Threats in Today's Europe

Causes	Risks and Threats
▪ Borders that don't make sense (Balkans/CIS) ▪ Nations with too many arms for defense (Libya/CIS) ▪ Nationalism, religious/ethnic differences (E Europe/CIS) ▪ Economic rivalries (U.S./EC) ▪ Mass Immigration (Balkans/CIS to EC)	▪ Armed conflict and occupation of territory ▪ Arms proliferation and offensive action ▪ Armed conflict and occupation of territory ▪ Possible European Saddam Hussein ▪ Tariffs, restrictive trade, embargo, blockade ▪ Social upheaval and right-wing extremism which destabilizes governments

Eastern Europe - Partner or Problem? Predominant among the risks to U.S. interests in Europe are those resident in the newly independent eastern European states. In 1989, American Cold War interests in eastern Europe were largely satisfied with the collapse of the communist regimes. However, American interests in this area did not subsequently evaporate. The unfinished business for the U.S. and its western European allies is rapprochement and incorporation of these countries into the European community. There is a danger that the strengthening of western Europe through ratification of the Maastricht agreement will institutionalize the economic division of Europe.

Allowing a new, invisible political-economic iron curtain to divide Europe is a prescription for major trouble.⁶ There are signs this is already happening as few Maastricht signatories want to extend the benefits of EC membership east. There are two primary reasons for this. First, there is a lingering fear of mass immigration from east to west. Second, there are limited resources available in the west to help the east.

Long term stability requires Eastern Europe become a partner vice remain a problem. *It is therefore in the American interest to promote the evolution of current alliances and agreements into a broad-based European economic and security community incorporating the EC, WEU and NATO.* As previously mentioned, the Yugoslavian Civil War is but a prototype of future risks and threats to stability in Europe. There are many "Yugoslavia's" lurking beneath the surface in eastern Europe, e.g. nationalistic and ethnic disputes over Kosovo, Transylvania, Macedonia, Moldova, and Slovakia. A partnership and positive

stake in general European prosperity could diffuse the threat of continual strife in the east.

The CIS - More than a Risk, Less than a Threat. Notably absent from Table One is a resurgent, expansionist CIS/Russia with the capability to project power through massive military force. The CIS continues to possess a huge armed force. It currently has between 3.2 and 3.4 million troops under the joint command and control of the republics. The Russian Republic's current contribution is about 70% or 2.5 million.

The threat diminishes when the woeful plight of the CIS economy is considered. The CIS economy is worse than that of many Eastern European states. As a result, military readiness undermined severely. Hundreds of thousands of military personnel are due to be released from active service over the next several months with minimal prospects for work or housing. Moreover, economic dislocation also extends to the civilian workforce. In the post-Cold War world, the Russian threat to Western Europe has changed. If economic reforms do not succeed, the long-feared Russian invasion could take the form of mass immigration vice armored columns through the Fulda Gap.

The total number of men under arms in the CIS will be much smaller than the Bush Administration had forecast. The CIS military will also become much more fragmented than expected. All the republics have declared their intent to replace the federated CIS force with republic-run state militaries. In a surprising reversal of policy, even President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree on 07 May 1992 which now establishes a separate Russian Republic Army, with Yeltsin as its

commander-in-chief.⁷ This force will be between 1.2 and 1.3 million men, a reduction of approximately 700,000. Western military attaches have reported that it will be some time before the exact breakdown of responsibilities and forces among the CIS republics becomes clear.⁸ General Pavel Grachev, Deputy CIS Defense Minister and newly appointed Russian Army commander, stated in April 1992 that Russian forces would be assigned more defensive positions, with thin concentrations of heavy battle tanks and attack aircraft in western Russia.⁹ Of note, CIS forces are scheduled to be completely out of the Baltic States, Poland, Germany, and Moldova by 1994.

On 07 May 1992, the Commonwealth and the Ukrainian military commands announced that all tactical nuclear weapons had been transferred to Russia. If these public announcements are true, then all tactical nuclear weapons now reside in the Russian Republic. CIS strategic forces (ICBM) remain stationed in Russian, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan. The president of each republic theoretically has a veto regarding the use of missiles on his territory. However, ultimate command and control of nuclear weapons remains with Moscow.

U.S. officials believe that force reduction and reorganization are being driven by economic pressures. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has publicly estimated that it will take a minimum of two years for resurgent, aggressive Russian state to regenerate the forces necessary to threaten western Europe.¹⁰ The CIS still retains the requisite force to take action against individual eastern European states. However, the planned reductions in CIS/Russian military forces sends a reassuring political signal which reduces the near-term security fears in both western and eastern Europe. With massive economic prob-

lems and CIS cohesiveness in question, it is likely that CIS/Republic forces will be preoccupied with internal matters for some time.

IV. MILITARY PLANNING FOR EUROPE - THERE IS MORE THAN ONE OPTION.

The Current Plan. Planning for fewer U.S. military forces in Europe began in March 1990 when the Secretary of Defense tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a basing plan on the assumption that American forces in Europe would be reduced to 225,000. The target was 195,000 in Central Europe and 30,000 elsewhere in the theater. The Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement, nearing completion, was the impetus for planning force cuts.¹¹ Although specific manpower limits were not included in the CFE treaty signed in November 1990, the U.S. proceeded with its plans for a drawdown of forces in Europe. The final figure of 150,000 included all ground, air, and sea forces. EUCOM is expected to reach this "Base Force" number by 1995. The force composition is one Army Corps (92,0000), 3-4 Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings, one forward-deployed Navy carrier battle group (CVBG), and one forward-deployed Amphibious Ready Group (ARG).

When President George Bush delivered his national security strategy speech (Aspen, Colorado 2 August 1990), EUCOM's "Base Force" was policy. The force levels appeared prudent for several reasons. The Soviet Union was still intact. Its military strength remained formidable despite concrete successes in arms control negotiations. The U.S. force reductions sent a positive signal vis a vis the arms control process, yet left enough troops in place to reassure its NATO allies while providing a credible deterrent.

One year after the Aspen speech, the Soviet Union collapsed and was replaced by a federated state, the CIS. Yet despite the Soviet Union's demise and

a growing Federal deficit, the Bush Administration resisted Congressional and public pressure to further reduce the U.S. military in Europe.

Implicit in this refusal is a reluctance to thoroughly reexamine the actual number of forces actually needed to achieve America's national security objectives in Europe. Instead, the Administration has tried to justify the force levels decided upon prior to the collapse of the CIS. Forces are now justified based on the "stability role" of U.S. forces, U.S. commitment to the "new NATO strategy," and the ability to influence through forward presence. The testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, before Congressional Budget Committees provides example:

The credibility of our capability and intent to respond to crises will continue to depend on maintaining forward presence forces capable of joint and combined operations. Over the past 40 years, the day-to-day presence of U.S. forces in regions vital to our national interest has been key to averting crises and preventing war. ...[The 150,000 ground troops] will be the leading edge of our contribution to the new NATO strategy. We are committing a corps to Europe because it represents the smallest fighting element with sufficient combat, logistics, communications and intelligence capabilities to conduct and sustain combined operations.

The United States committed to the "new NATO strategy" after a series of meetings during the spring of 1991. The strategy focuses on a myriad of threats across the spectrum of conflict. It replaces the Soviet-centered strategy of the past. Table Two highlights key shifts in strategy. Of note, the "new NATO strategy" does not change current Alliance restrictions on out-of-sector (out-of-area) operations.

Table Two
The "New NATO Strategy" - A Comparison

OLD	NEW
▪ Specific Defense ▪ Forward Defense ▪ Fixed Defensive Positions ▪ Flexible Response/Early Use of Nuclear Weapons ▪ National Formations ▪ Smaller Reserves/Rapid Mobilization ▪ Short Warning	▪ General Defense ▪ Reduced Forward Presence ▪ Mobility and Flexibility ▪ Use of Nuclear Weapons Last Resort ▪ Multi-National Formations ▪ Greater Reliance on Reserves ▪ Longer Warning Time

To compliment this new strategy, NATO agreed to a major force reorganization. The new Alliance structure has four components:

1. A brigade-sized Immediate Reaction Force capable of response within 72 hours. This is a highly mobile force.

2. A multi-national Rapid Reaction Corps (70,000) under British command, capable of action within 5-7 days. This corps is comprised of both heavy and light ground forces, plus air and sea components. The U.S. has offered one of its two Germany-based divisions for use in this contingency Corps, along with a combat aviation brigade.

3. A Main Defense Force comprised of seven corps. One of these corps is the U.S. V Corps at Frankfurt, comprised of one American division and one Ger-

man division. The second American division is subordinate to the II German Corps at Ulm.

4. An Augmentation Force of undetermined size, made up of American and Canadian units. These forces are expected to total 28% of NATO's future force structure. Current proposals for American forces call for a five division contingency corps (VII Corps plus two divisions) based in the continental United States (CONUS).¹³

The U.S. military force commitment to the "new NATO strategy" is not finding many supporters on Capital Hill, in the press, or on main street. It is a hard sell primarily because the strategy and force decisions were made prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. With no discernible threat except "instability" and "history repeating itself," General Powell, General Galvin and others have the impossible task of defending the current plan without substantive options to offer. For example, when questioned by legislators historically friendly to defense about deployment options for the Corps-sized Army (95,000), the generals adhered to the requirement that these troops be PCS'd to Europe with dependents.¹⁴ The rigidity stems from intense political pressure not to deviate from the European Base Force concept. As a result, several key Congressmen remain unconvinced and have stated that EUCOM should expect authorization of no more than 75,000 troops total (air, land, sea) by 1995.

On the surface, it appears the JCS and the CINC need to rethink the problem. In fact, they are quietly doing so. Unfortunately, the political strait-jacket comes at a time when the U.S. should be openly leading the Alliance to

develop a long-term military strategy for Europe. The case for American presence in Europe would be compelling if viable alternatives were presented which reflect the current European security environment. With a menu of strategic options, EUCOM and the National Command Authority (NCA) could seize the initiative in the defense debate, both at home and in Europe.

A Range of Options Worth Considering. Given U.S. national interests in Europe, some degree of military engagement is desirable. There are several ways for America to do this. Three strategic options exist and should be considered concurrently. The extent of U.S. involvement varies with each. The strategies are titled the *Status Quo*, the *"Son of NATO" Approach*, and the *Pacific Approach Strategy*. Table Three (following page) lists the essential elements of these strategies. The following discussion analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of each. *Of note, none of the options call for bringing the CIS into a European collective security arrangement at this time.*

1. *Status Quo Strategy.* The Status Quo strategy commits the U.S. to the "new NATO strategy." A forward-deployed Base Force (150,000) is America's standing contribution to the Alliance. A major objective is to keep NATO together, primarily for political and security threat reasons. The Alliance military infrastructure, as modified in 1991, remains intact, with the United States the predominant member. CINCEUR continues to be double-hatted as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). The bounds of NATO's security umbrella remain the same. NATO's operations would not include "out-of-sector" actions. Joint European action outside the continent is left to the Western European Union

Table Three
Strategies for Europe

Option	1 Maintain the Status Quo (Full Forces)	2 "Son of NATO" (Modified Forces)	3 The "Pacific" Approach (Minimal Forces)
National Security Strategy	• Strategic Deterrence • Full Forward Presence • Crisis Response • Reconstitution	• Strategic Deterrence • Flexible Forward Presence • Crisis Response • Reconstitution	• Selective Strategic Deterrence • Minimal Forward Presence • Selective Crisis Response • Reconstitution
EUCOM Theater Strategy	• Deter potential crises • Keep NATO together • U.S. predominance in NATO • Retain capability for unilateral action • Bilateral military assistance to Eastern Europe • Wait and See on CIS	• Deter potential crises • Broaden the scope of the Alliance • U.S. equal partner in two pillar Alliance (North American and WEU) • Retain capability for unilateral action • Eastern Europe into the alliance on a case basis • Wait and See on CIS	• Deter potential crises on case basis • U.S. maintain foothold in Europe through bilateral and/or multilateral alliances. • Establish UNPE • Capability for unilateral action primarily from COMUS • Eastern Europe into Alliance on a case basis • Wait and See on CIS
EUCOM Forces	• 1 Corps • 3-4 TFW • 1 CVBG • 1 ARG • POMCUS	• 1 Division • 2-3 TFW • 1 CVBG or 1 ARG • CAT's • POMCUS	• Army and AF in COMUS • 1 CVBG or 1 ARG deployed • CAT's • POMCUS
Missions	• Deter and Defend • Deploy and employ forces to resolve conflict • Build NATO through Allied training	• Deter and Defend • Deploy and employ forces to resolve conflict • Nation-building • Humanitarian Assistance • Train with expanded Alliance	• Maintain and defend the SLOC's • Reconstitute and defend on a case basis • Nation building • Humanitarian assistance • Train per alliance agreements

(WEU) or ad hoc coalitions with the United States. Politico-military dealings between member nations and Eastern Europe or the CIS are on a bilateral basis.

a. *Advantages.* This strategy maintains a proven defense mechanism within which EUCOM is the leader and principal warfighter. Through NATO, the United States maintains a visible, tangible role on the continent. The forces assigned demonstrate American credibility and intent to defend Western Europe. Continued NATO cohesion serves as a warning should a resurgent Russia contemplate reasserting hegemony over Eastern Europe. It also provides a mechanism to keep German actions within a collective European framework. NATO also provides a basis for political-military cooperation outside of Europe.

(From a purely military standpoint, the Alliance is a force multiplier. It provides interoperable theater assets. In certain instances like Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, NATO's force capability can be drawn upon for ad hoc U.S. or UN coalition response outside of Europe. Accessibility to European air space and base facilities are assured, thereby simplifying training exercises and staging for contingencies.

b. *Disadvantages.* The force levels required for this strategy are very expensive. Given the enormous federal deficit and strong public pressure to spend government monies on mounting infrastructure problems, the U.S. must press for increased burden-sharing by its NATO allies. This, plus the temptation to link trade disputes to the level of America's force commitment to Europe, are divisive.¹⁵ More importantly, the Status Quo strategy gives minimal Alliance attention to Eastern Europe. A perception is left that the U.S. is not a

player in Eastern European nation-building. Many Europeans consider nation-building the key issue to future stability on the continent. For example, Peter Ludlow, director of the Center for European Policy Studies in Brussels (an organization closely tied to the European Community) states:

In the last few months, the US has tended to hype up its leadership role of the West. The reality is that the US is a minor player in terms of the reconstruction of Eastern Europe and, inevitably, the Soviet Union. It's not that you're busy. It's that you don't have very much to give.¹⁶

Under the Status Quo strategy, American forces serve a political purpose more than traditional military one. At the lower levels, this could lead to a lost sense of purpose. Readiness could suffer. With no discernable threat, the European public will be less tolerant of the inconvenience routinely caused by NATO exercise activity. Training restrictions appear inevitable. Historically, access to European air space and bases has been problematic for U.S. "out-of-sector" contingency operations. Allied actions during the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1986 air operation against Libya are cases in point.

There are some indications the U.S. may not be allowed to maintain large forces forward deployed in Europe. Various NATO members may bow to growing domestic pressure and ask the U.S. withdraw its ground troops in 1994. (Recent public opinion polls in Germany show 58% of the populace want all U.S. troops out of the country.) This is the year the CIS is supposed to be completely out of Eastern Europe. Should this happen, the Status Quo strategy has a minimal shelf life.

Finally, with overall American force levels reduced, there is a requirement to carefully balance force deployments among theaters. For example, an argument can be made that USCINCPAC deserves a larger apportionment than currently allocated in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). General Powell acknowledged as much during testimony before Congress in February, 1992.¹⁷

2. *"Son of NATO" Strategy.* Implicit in the adoption of this strategy is a conscious U.S. decision to change the nature of its involvement in Europe. EUCOM missions remain essentially the same. However, the scope of existing defense agreements is changed. The Alliance becomes a two pillar coalition, North American (U.S. and Canada) and European (WEU). The United States plays an equal vice predominant role, with the position of SACEUR rotating among the members. *This arrangement is the embryo which will develop into a future pan-European security organization.* The Alliance actively plans for future Eastern European membership, especially from the more stable nations of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Cooperative programs with eastern European militaries are arranged under Alliance auspices vice bilateral initiatives.

"Son of NATO" requires a modified force level, with fewer Army units forward deployed. All U.S. forces are on rotational deployment (6-12 months), with the exception of EUCOM headquarters staff and selected combat support and combat service support organizations. There is heavy reliance on European ground forces and US air and maritime forces during the initial stages of a theater conflict. In a prolonged war, America's major contribution are reconstituted forces mobilized and deployed from CONUS. This strategy places a

premium on presence, nation-building and humanitarian assistance operations as evidence of EUCOM capabilities and intentions. Greater numbers of military civic action teams (CAT's) are introduced to the theater. They become an Alliance asset to be used to help rebuild the infrastructure of eastern Europe.

a. *Advantages.* "Son of NATO" is a long-term, flexible strategy which promotes the evolution of current alliances and agreements into a broad-based European economic and security community. As an equal partner, the United States retains an important, albeit lesser, role in shaping Alliance policy. By maintaining an Alliance structure, a mechanism still exists in which German actions remain within a collective European framework. The continued deployment of forces demonstrates American intent to remain committed to European defense. Despite being smaller in number, forward-deployed American forces are the "tip of the sword." They represent a powerful capability which should continue to deter a resurgent Russia or a European Saddam Hussein.

"Son of NATO" also benefits the American economy, both directly and indirectly. Fewer forward deployed forces cost less and free money for investment in America's infrastructure. It indirectly helps the American economy by forcing the fully reconstructed European economies to more equitably absorb the costs of military defense. Thus, they no longer have the luxury to concentrate on economic development absent the defense burden endured by most nations.

From a military standpoint, "Son of NATO" provides the same structural advantages as the Status Quo strategy. The forces still support the "new NATO strategy," albeit with fewer U.S. ground troops. The Alliance maintains an integrated command structure and interoperable systems. U.S. forces continue to exercise with the Alliance and base access is provided. By rotating deployments, the United States strengthens its active forces designated to reinforce Europe. All will have operated in theater for an extended period. The addition of service Civic Action Teams (CAT's), which have a proven track record in PACOM, gives EUCOM the means accomplish CINC tasking on the lower spectrum of military engagement, i.e. nation-building in Eastern Europe.¹⁸ Civic Action Projects are relatively cheap and exercise military-related skills such as combat engineering. CAT's can foster the trust and cooperative spirit necessary to expand security agreements to the East. It also demonstrates to the allies a cooperative attitude in developing Eastern Europe.

b. *Disadvantages.* As in any new endeavor, adopting the "Son of NATO" strategy entails some risk. Just as a parent must learn to let go of his grown children, this strategy encourages western European to fly on its own. Thus, the U.S. will relinquish its preeminent role for that of an equal partner. Consensus, never easy in NATO, may be harder to attain. With less horsepower, the CINC may find it much more difficult to plan for and accomplish his assigned JSCP tasks. The "Son of NATO" strategy provides for the eventual extension of the Alliance to selected countries in Eastern Europe. There is a danger the Alliance could overextend itself and subsequently lose its cohesion. Should a resurgent Russia emerge, Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian membership could be perceived as threatening. This may precipitate historic Russian behavior, i.e.

mobilization, saber-rattling, and eventual military action to "take back" these countries in the interest of Russian national security.

The "Son of NATO" strategy complicates the CINC's warfighting ability. It may be difficult to get political approval to subordinate U.S. forces to a foreign commander. Americans are used to being in-charge. Even if approval is obtained, it will require a change in the mindset of the American military officer. Extensive retaining is probably required. It is difficult to overcome 40 years of experience in which U.S. force commanders routinely had the final say. Subordinating to a foreign commander on the battlefield is culturally difficult for both the warfighter and the American public.

With fewer forces on the continent, the U.S. is in a weaker position to rapidly redeploy ground forces to the Middle East or Africa for contingency operations. Most forces will have to deploy from CONUS. Additionally, the preparedness of EUCOM forces will vacillate as units enter and leave the theater.

3. *The "Pacific Approach" Strategy.* The "Pacific Approach" is a primarily a maritime strategy and based on the PACOM model. The National Security strategy for the European theater is modified and calls for selective strategic deterrence, minimal forward presence and limited crisis response. A series of bilateral agreements delineate America's specific commitments to European defense. The burden of collective European defense is shifted from the U.S. to other organizations. Principal among these is the United States.

U.S. policy becomes the establishment of a standing UN peacemaking force (UNPK).¹⁹ The purpose of the UNPF would be to intervene early in a nation-state disputes to deter and prevent their escalation into regional or local wars. The UNPF gives the United Nations a credible standing military arm to enforce world order. This force, along with a collective pan-European security organization, become the ultimate guarantors of European security on the continent. The United States does commit forces to the UNPF, with American representation on the revitalized UN Military Staff Committee.

The "Pacific Approach" strategy preserves the capability of unilateral U.S. action in the European theater. However, the focus shifts from land to sea. America's reliance on imported raw materials and oil requires that the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC's) remain open. Thus, the CINC continues to be tasked with maintain and defence of the Mediterranean SLOC's, including access to the Suez. EUCOM is allocated one forward-deployed CVBG or ARG at all times to accomplish this mission. These maritime assets are also the principal instruments of American presence in Europe.

The United States retains a foothold on the continent mainly through bilateral military agreements. These provide for cooperation (POMCUS, interoperable systems) and annual combined exercises. U.S. Army and Air Force units deploy aperiodically to continent for training. Specific military assistance agreements with stable Eastern European governments are concluded. The CINC retains the CAT's for nation-building. The maritime forces and the CAT's can be used for humanitarian assistance, as directed. With few forward deployed land forces and a major maritime focus, EUCOM headquarters may shift to Italy or

Spain. Regardless of location, the staff will remain in Europe vice return to CONUS.

a. *Advantages.* The major advantages to the "Pacific Approach" are twofold. First, it is considerably less expensive and puts the onus on the Europeans to provide for their own defense. Secondly, it begins to remove from the United States the role of world policeman. Given America's domestic problems, it is important the country avoid the trappings and the expense of world policing. World policing has undermined superpowers throughout history, *a la Pax Britannica*.²⁰

This strategy provides a military foothold in Europe which can support the national interests, particularly defense of the SLOC's. It allows for unilateral action unencumbered by the prospect of Alliance veto. To be sure, the U.S. would desire European support for its actions. However, it is easier and faster to obtain bilateral support vice Alliance consensus in times of crisis.

Finally, the "Pacific Approach" frees additional ground and air forces for use in other theaters and the UNPK. This is important given U.S. military force reductions and the global scale of American national interests.

b. *Disadvantages.* The disadvantages of this strategy are primarily military. From a political-economic standpoint, the United States will remain engaged in Europe and elsewhere irrespective of alliances and defense agreements. The sheer size of the U.S., the multi-national nature of American business and the reliance on imported raw materials precludes neo-isolationism.

Thus, active U.S. participation in international organizations such as the U.N. or GATT are assured.

From a military standpoint, this strategy makes defending the national interests difficult. The direct commitment to collectively defend Europe is obviated. The deterrent value of a UNPK or pan-European security pact is unknown. It is difficult to predict whether this arrangement would deter a resurgent Russia. Fewer forward-deployed forces reduce American overall military capability in the region. Preparedness and interoperability with allied militaries suffer. The ability to redeploy ground and air forces from Europe to Southwest Asia is lost. Finally, ready access to bases and air space is limited by how many and what kind of bilateral agreements are negotiated.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE.

The Bottom Line: The current strategy for the European theater has been overcome by events. It was carefully formulated in 1990, prior to demise of the Soviet Union and the onset of the Gulf War. In two short years a new international security environment emerged. Yet, U.S. strategic planning has remained transfixed on the old security order.

The "Status Quo" remains the EUCOM strategy of choice. Militarily, it provides ample protection for American national interests. However, this approach makes no substantive commitment to shore up security in a wider Europe. International leadership today requires a strategy which goes beyond the realm of national self interests. To simply repackage an old policy and force structure to try to meet budget restraints eventually undermines American credibility as Europe's leader. Ultimately, President Bush's new world order lacks validity if America's response is refortifying its role as international policeman. Times have really changed in Europe. A new, different security environment exists. It comes at an opportune moment. America, beset by a 3 trillion dollar deficit and serious domestic problems, cannot long be the world's policeman (or Europe's) and remain strong. To do so would be damaging and self-defeating.

The European security environment is not yet benign enough for the United States to withdraw completely. Additionally, it may take years to reach consensus to standup a UNPK. Ultimately, the Europeans must take the lead in providing their own security. They must be weaned from dependence on America to do so. Regardless, U.S. forces are absolutely necessary to maintain the Medi-

terranean SLOC's. Eastern Europe must be brought into a western security network vice slip into a security vacuum. Methods must be found to prevent local and ethnic disputes from precipitating a wider regional crisis. The CIS is unraveling. The type of government which will eventually lead Russia is unknown. All this requires American presence and leadership, albeit not in the current form. Neither the "Status Quo" strategy nor the "Pacific Approach" meet the challenges of the future.

The Plan: The most viable strategy to maintain long-term security in Europe is "Son of NATO." It provides for reasonable reductions and cost savings while retaining American commitment to Europe. It is the most flexible in meeting future challenges to European security. It is an adaptive strategy.

To implement this strategy, EUCOM should follow a definitive plan as follows.

1. *Allied Command Relationships:* General Galvin will retire during the summer of 1992. He will be replaced by an American Army officer as SACEUR. Plan for the first European SACEUR to assume command in 1995-96. Thereafter, the SACEUR position should rotate among the Alliance military members.

2. *New Alliance Agreement:* By the beginning of 1994, a new Charter should be ratified which provides for Alliance expansion. Under the new agreement, the United States becomes an equal partner in a two pillar Alliance. France reintegrates into the Alliance military structure (WEU pillar). A specific plan for Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Hungarian membership is approved. The

old NATO infrastructure will be the organizational basis for the new, expanded Alliance. Failure to reach a new agreement should be grounds for the U.S. to reconsider its participation in the Atlantic Alliance. The need for change is paramount. The bottom line is that NATO, in its present form, cannot last forever.

3. *Rotational Deployments:* U.S. Army and Air Force rotational deployments should commence in 1994. Army presence in Europe should be reduced to a Division by 1995.

The "Son of NATO" strategy involves risks. However, it is less risky than taking chances with Congressionally mandated reductions and/or a sudden European decision to ask America to withdraw forces. While it is not a panacea for complexities of future European security, it is certainly the most viable and responsive answer to today's unconventional threats. It moves NATO in the direction of pan-European security while rightfully reducing America's European security burden. Furthermore, the strategy encompasses enough force to meet unexpected threats.

The new world order requires a new form of leadership. The United States has a historical opportunity to shape the European security environment for years to come. The time is now. As Louis D. Huddleston points out:²¹

Few periods in this nation's history will ever again offer America the opportunity to better align its defense strategy - that is, achieve a better relationship of means to ends - than now. We have the advantage of preeminent superpower status, and environment of emerging democracies, and a diminished Soviet threat. Will America take advantage of this opportunity and transform its defense strategy to match the transformations of the new world order, or will this become a time for *Pax Americana*?

NOTES

1. William G Hyland, "The Case For Pragmatism," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1991/92, p. 47.

2. Jeremy Dann and Stephen Rosenthal, "Coping with the Uncertainties of European Security," *Harvard International Review*, Vol XIV, No. 1, Fall 1991, p. 3.

3. William G. Hyland, "The Case For Pragmatism," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1991/92, p. 44.

4. The Working Group on Changing Roles and Shifting Burdens in the Atlantic Alliance, "Excerpts from The United States and NATO in an Undivided Europe," Naval War College Force Planning Faculty, ed., *Fundamentals Of Force Planning Vol II: Defense Planning Cases* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1991), pp. 192-193. Working Group members are as follows: David Abshire, Norm Augustine, Barry Blechman, Bill Bradley, Harold Brown, Zbigniew Brzezinski, David Calleo, William Cohen, Lynn Davis, Russell Dougherty, Joseph Fromm, Andrew Goodpaster, Lee Hamilton, Arthur Hartman, Dave McCurdy, Edward Meyer, Sam Nunn, Rudolph Penner, Rozanne Ridgway, Alice Rivlin, Peter Rodman, Patricia Schroeder, Simon Serfaty, William, William Y. Smith, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt.

5. Admiral Michael Boorda, USN (Commander-in-Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe), untitled address, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: March 1992. Concept of a world of risks vice unidentifiable threats taken from ADM Boorda's remarks. Postulated risks and threats are extracted from multiple sources including ADM Boorda's remarks.

6. William G. Hyland, "The Case For Pragmatism," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1991/92, p. 47.

7. Serge Schmemmann, "Yeltsin Decrees New Russian Army," *The New York Times*, 08 May 1992, p. A11.

8. *Ibid.*

9. Eric Schmitt, "Russia Is Said to Plan for a Smaller Armed Force," *The New York Times*, 05 April 1992, p. A:6.

10. Serge Schmemmann, "The Red Army Fights a Rearguard Action Against History," *The New York Times*, 29 March 1992, p. E4. In addition to economic problems, poor morale and organizational difficulties would make it difficult for the CIS to rapidly regenerate a credible fighting force. Schmemmann reports that "Draft-dodging and desertions are rife. A recent article in the military daily Krasnaya Zvezda said soldiers were deserting for a variety of reasons - the danger and futility of serving in the Caucasus, resistance to the Ukrainian oath, severe hazing, ethnic tensions. Morale among career officers has been sapped by shortages of housing and money. Various reports have said that as many as 300,000 military families lack

housing and that forces withdrawn from Eastern Europe were rapidly swelling the number. Military orders are not being met. Krasnaya Zvezda said suppliers failed to deliver 100,000 tons of food and 2.3 million tons of fuel last year. Officers have a new saying, the paper reported: 'Off the boat and into the unemployment office.' Equally painful has been the loss of identity...In January 1992, a poll of officers in the former Soviet military found that 95% of those questioned felt demoralized."

11. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Overseas Basing: Air Force and Army Processes for Selecting Bases to Close in Europe*, Report to the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives (Washington: April 1991), p. 2.

12. Steve Vogel, "Hard Sell - Lawmakers Eye Bush's Force Target in Europe", *Army Times*, 24 February 1992, p. 31.

13. Larry Grossman, "NATO's New Strategy," *AIR FORCE Magazine*, March 1992, p. 31.

14. William Matthews, "U.S. European Command", *Army Times*, 16 March, 1992, pp 12-13. This article reported that when General Galvin insisted two Army divisions should remain in Europe, committee Chairman Sam Nunn, D-Georgia, suggested basing a brigade from each division in the United States and sending the soldiers to Europe only for unaccompanied training tours. "That approach has proven disastrous during three previous attempts," said General Crosbie Saint, commander in chief of U.S. Army Europe. "It is expensive to ship troops and equipment back and forth to Europe, and combat readiness suffers. It takes six months to train soldiers from the United States to work effectively with troops based in Europe. And such long unaccompanied tours destroy morale."

15. Steve Vogel, "NATO braces for attack from the West," *Army Times*, March 09, 1992, p. 16. Vogel reports that Vice President Dan Quayle ruffled some feathers at the February 1992 NATO Security Conference by hinting future U.S. participation in NATO will be related to resolving outstanding trade issues between the United States and Europe. General Galvin, USCINCEUR, commented that "what the argument at Munich tells you is, there's a lot more to security than just military forces and strategy. There is the economic side to it...your ability to defend has a lot to do with your economy."

16. Jonathan Kaufman, "America no longer first in Europe's new politics," *Boston Sunday Globe*, February 16, 1992, pp. 1 and 19.

17. Steve Vogel, "Hard Sell - Lawmakers eye Bush's force target in Europe," *Army Times*, February 24, 1992, p. 32.

18. Civic Action Teams (CAT's) are resident in all services. They are small units of engineers and builders whose military mission is to quickly build support facilities after territory has been taken. It was this role which made Navy Seabees famous during the World War II Pacific island campaign. Today, CAT's are assigned year round to various locations in the Pacific. CAT projects in Micronesia have fostered excellent relationships between the U.S. military and island governments.

This produced a basing rights agreement in Palau, which will provide U.S. nuclear submarines with a port in the Philippine Sea, east of the Philippine Islands. This crucial agreement was a key provision to the fallback plan should the U.S. lose access to Subic Bay. It was negotiated during the early 1980's and is now needed 10 years later. Of note, service CAT's are part of the regular forces and should not be confused with Special Operations Forces (SOF), some of which have similar capabilities.

19. Louis D. Huddleston, "Policing the New World Order: An Alternative Strategy," *Comparative Strategy*, Volume 11, Number 1, 1992, p.5. Huddleston develops the UNPF concept fairly extensively in this article. He envisions a UNPF of approximately 20,000 personnel, with ground, air, naval and general support elements. Operational commitment of the force would rest with the Security Council. The UN Military Staff Committee would be enhanced and they would act as primary advisors to the Security Council on UNPF employment. The positions of UNPF Commander and Deputy Commander would be appointed on a rotational basis by the Security Council. The UNPF would be on 48 hour alert at all times. Since it is a standing force, proficiency is maintained through routine exercises and training.

20. *Ibid.* p. 13.

21. *Ibid.*

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