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THE JOINT LOGISTICS OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR
AND THE UNIFIED COMMAND J4

by

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
A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: *Douglas C. Redlich*

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Abstract of
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AND THE UNIFIED COMMAND J4

Current joint logistics doctrine espouses the necessity for detailed logistic planning, concurrent with operational planning, in order to promote unity of effort and prevent duplication of effort. The unified commander is authorized directive authority for logistics in order to insure economy of effort. The perception in the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) is that the Unified Command's J4 Logistics Directorate is in an advisory and monitoring role at the operational level, and that the Service component logistic commands can function in a harmonious role amongst themselves, with no directive authority, unless a critical situation arises that may hinder the Combatant Commanders mission. This perception has the components exercising coordination for logistics support. The synergistic effect of combat power and logistic support in a joint environment can only attain that momentum necessary if authoritative direction can be applied from the deployment to the employment of logistic forces. In this regard, there is a necessity for a focused unity of effort, directed towards integrating the Service logistic force capabilities and resources in order to support the combat forces as a whole. There must be an unbiased authority that can focus on the theater logistics concept and deviate from the norm when necessary. The reality is that the J4 must function as an advisor to the Combatant Commander, and additionally, have the authority to direct component logistic forces when necessary, in order to preclude

a critical situation from occurring. The Combatant Commander can authorize this authority, and joint doctrine must acknowledge the advantages.

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THE JOINT LOGISTICS OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR
AND THE UNIFIED COMMAND J4

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The operational level of war has been defined as the "link" between the strategic and tactical level. The operational level of war, in regards to logistic support, covers the deployment and employment of logistics forces, and the resources necessary for sustainment of all forces within a theater of war. In order to insure the effectiveness of the theater logistics system, the unified commander is authorized directive authority over logistics, but current doctrine allows components to basically coordinate and administer logistics support in the theater. There is no designated central authority which directs the capabilities and resources of all component logistics commands. The charter for the unified command's J4 Logistics Directorate is to advise the unified commander on logistic matters, and monitor the component logistics systems at the operational level. The Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) advocates that the Services are responsible for logistics support of their combat forces. At the operational level, there is a requirement for effective control of all theater logistics support in order to insure that logistic support is available at the proper time, place and in sufficient quantity, for the combat forces to

accomplish the mission.

The joint arena revolves around command and control of all forces. Doctrine for combatant forces, air, land, and sea, always provides for unity of command, yet the main factor which may constrain the commander's use of his combat forces, logistics, does not have a central controlling authority. In focusing upon the joint logistics operational level, and the need for centralized control of logistics forces, I will review the doctrine of combatant commands and Service relationships, the current and proposed joint logistics doctrine, the combatant commander's directive authority, and the unified command's J4 Logistics Directorate. All of the above provide a part of the key necessary for logistics control at the operational level. Can the J4 provide the coordinating authority necessary to control the theater logistics system? The perspective of the combatant commander's authority and control, and the capabilities of the J4 Logistics Directorate will be presented through the eyes of a logistician who has commanded Service logistics units at the captain and major level, attended the Armed Forces Staff College, served three and one half years working in a J4 logistics billet, and has participated in Desert Shield/Desert Storm working within the J4.

It is not my intent to cover the deliberate or crisis action portion of planning for logistic support, but to focus upon the capabilities required for control of logistics support at the operational level, and the most appropriate authority for providing this direction. My parameters for the operational level

of logistics begins at the aerial port of embarkation (APOE) and surface port of embarkation (SPOE), and ends when the component logistic units are uploaded for direct support of combat units. This paper will prove that the combatant commander has the inherent capability necessary to direct the joint theater logistics system.

CHAPTER II

COMBATANT COMMAND AND SERVICE RELATIONSHIPS

The Commander in Chiefs (CINCs) of unified commands are the warfighters. They have the ominous title of Combatant Commanders for Combatant Commands (COCOM). COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces in which operational control (OPCON) of these assigned forces is inherent. COCOM authority gives the CINC the full authority to organize and employ his forces as necessary in order to accomplish all assigned missions.¹

The Services are responsible for, "preparing forces and establishing reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies for the effective prosecution of war...", and "to provide logistic support for Service forces, including procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance...."² In basic terms, the Services provide fully trained combatant forces to the CINC and he can organize and employ them in any manner necessary to accomplish the mission. The Services remain in the loop by being responsible for providing logistics support for their forces. However, the CINC also has directive authority for logistics. Directive authority for logistics in peacetime ensures the CINC has some input to the Services on logistical support of assigned forces in order for the forces to be able to execute the operational plans. This authority is also suppose to prevent Service duplication of effort through economy of operation. It is not meant to discontinue service responsibility for logistics,

nor limit Service techniques, procedures, or organization for logistics support.3

In time of war or crisis action, this directive authority allows the CINC to usurp Service logistic support to their assigned forces when critical situations arise that make deviation from standard practices necessary in order to help support and accomplish the mission.4

This directive authority for logistics is the primary charter for the unified commands J4 Logistic Directorate to operate from during peacetime planning and wartime execution. I submit that there are some possible problems with this definition at the operational level of war which I will address in depth in a subsequent chapter.

CHAPTER III

JOINT LOGISTICS DOCTRINE

In order to understand the relationship of the J4 at the joint operational level of war, it is necessary to have a good basic grasp of the joint doctrine for logistics support. Some basic questions for the logistician are, what is joint doctrine and how do we make it work?

Joint doctrine is "the" buzzword of today whether one is in a joint command, component command, or attending any one of the Service schools. To mimic Andy Rooney, "Just what exactly do they mean by joint doctrine". According to the Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991, "Joint Doctrine is the fundamental principles issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective". These principles and their application are listed in JCS Pub 0-2 and provide guidance for Combatant Commanders (unified or specified) employing assigned forces.

All Services have come on-board with respective directives, FM's, and FMFM's which provide procedures and principles for logistic support "in" joint operations. Is this the same as doctrine for logistic support "of" joint operations? It may seem like a very subtle difference, but the scope of that subtle difference can balloon out of shape at the operational level when a component commander's logistic resources are diverted elsewhere

by the unified headquarters. This area also will be addressed in depth along with the CINC's directive authority for logistics in a subsequent chapter. Let us now take a look at doctrine for logistic support.

Doctrine for logistic support is the compilation of data from various sources based upon the most effective ways and means of providing logistic support gained through historical example, personal experiences at various planning and operational levels, wargaming, in-depth top-level school studies, and insights gained from the latest conflicts through lesson's learned reports. It is not a rigid checklist, but it is procedures for a commander to utilize during logistic support planning and operations. This doctrine, coupled with the commanders experience, judgment, and operational vision, provides the focus for conducting solid logistic support. Doctrine should not be totally replaced based upon the results of the latest conflict, regardless of how well new procedures worked, just as one doesn't plan to fight the next war based upon the results of the last one. One does tweak the doctrine by incorporating the finer points subsequent to studies or by wargaming it under different scenarios. As new technology will certainly influence the battlefield, so will it influence the logistic support of the forces involved. Doctrine for logistic support must exhort what many call the principles of logistic support: responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, attainability, sustainability, and survivability.¹ For the logistician in the J4, there is a new test pub being staffed throughout the Services and unified and specified

commands which addresses Doctrine For Logistic Support of Joint Operations; Joint Pub 4-0 dated June 1990. This test pub is written specifically for the Combatant Commander, but establishes logistics doctrine for the entire joint community; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, Component Commands, Subordinate Unified Commands, Joint Task Forces, etc., and is authoritative, not directive in nature. It is keyed to providing guidance to the services in preparing their plans and to providing a universal frame of reference for the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) in the creation, employment, and sustainment of combat power.² It is in this publication that the J4 Logistic Directorate of a Combatant Command can gain the doctrinal foundation necessary to plan and operate in the joint arena.

During the course of reviewing a multitude of material pertaining to logistics, the majority of the material was devoted to indepth planning requirements geared towards deployment. The main theme was a checklist approach to ensure one covered all the bases; if it is not in the plan, it will not be available when most needed. For those readings that did talk about the operational aspect, it was primarily the planning for logistic operational constraints. What is missing is the carryover factor of, whatever is deployed from one end must be employed on the other end. In concurrent operational planning, just as the forces are allocated based upon the mission, so to should the logisticians bridge the gap and detail plan the employment of logistic forces and resources. This is where the operational focus of logistic support is applied in order to create the

logistic momentum. It is the J4 Logistic Directorate that serves as the facilitator when the original logistic concept is followed, and it is also the J4 that should put on his "operator" hat when planned capabilities and resources do not materialize and a change or diversion of component logistic support is necessary to help towards accomplishment of the overall mission. This kind of operational talk, in relation to the J4 Logistic Directorate, kind of goes against the grain of espoused logistic doctrine which always comes across as the responsibility of the Services. I reference the directive authority which limits operational diversion only when a critical situation arises that may hinder the accomplishment of the overall mission. Should the J4 only step in at this critical time, or should they have been directing the Service logistics at all times, albeit in a supportive manner in order to promote unity of effort? Let us keep this line of thought for it will be discussed in a subsequent chapter along with the previously mentioned Service support of joint logistic doctrine and the CINCs directive authority.

CHAPTER IV

DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY FOR LOGISTICS:

GOOD IDEA WHICH NEEDS IMPROVEMENT

In Chapter 2, Combatant Command and Service Relationships, I presented the definition of Directive Authority for Logistics and made comments that there may be problems with this definition at the operational level. In Chapter 3, Joint Logistics Doctrine, I presented two additional points which basically tie-in with directive authority for logistics; the way components write and practice joint doctrine for logistics, and the joint pubs which espouse letting the component logistic commands do their job with minimum interference from higher headquarters, which means to me, management by exception.

I believe the Services have a narrow perspective, Service oriented, on their logistics commands, and when that command is deployed in support of their combat forces, the perspective by the Service component commander is even narrower. They are there to support the respective Service forces first, and the overall unified commands mission becomes secondary.

If one takes a look at how the CINC employs his forces, specifically in today's joint operations, he will normally retain control and fight his ground forces, and the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) will fight the air forces, yet the logistics forces retain individuality by being in support of their Service combat forces. I am not advocating a single service

logistics command, but I am advocating some type of joint "command" authority over the logistics commands at the operational level. The idea of the CINC having directive authority is sound, but everyone knows that his primary focus during combat will be with the air and ground combat forces, not logistics forces. The CINC only wants to be told that the weapons systems readiness is 95% plus, and that the troops have food to eat, and fuel and munitions for their vehicles or aircraft. This is a fact of life for the logistician, but the means of exerting influence over the logistics commands can be changed. I believe that the only time the CINC will be told about a logistics problem is when it becomes critical. One may say that is the way it should work, unless the reason it becomes critical is due to component mismanagement or misjudgment of their logistics system. One has to remember that the component operational commander has to fight his forces, the same as the CINC has to fight all forces, so something has to give and it will normally be in the logistics arena.

The CINC does have a J4 Logistics Directorate which according to most joint pubs is responsible for analyzing war tasks, monitoring theater logistic buildup and capabilities, and advising the CINC on logistic supportability of courses of action. The new Joint Test Pub 4-0 covers just about every logistic planning consideration known to a logistician, and does in fact state, in one eight line paragraph buried in an appendix, that the J4 coordinates logistic support by, "directing the movement of logistic resources from one Service component or one

geographic area to another in the theater". Although the paragraph header pertains to coordinating logistic support for an upcoming operation, it could easily be expanded to coordinating theater logistic support and fill the present void. The above information should be pulled out of the appendix and put up front in the new Joint Test Pub 4-0, and every other publication that talks about joint logistics support. A CINC should identify his J4 Director as being the senior logistics authority in the theater and layout his responsibilities similar to the JFACC. In the last joint operation, Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the ground and air component staff G4's were a one-star for the Army, an O6 for the Marines, and an O6 for the Air Force. The component logistic commanders held the rank of three-stars for the Army, one-star for the Marines, and an O6 for the Air Force. The J4 Director in a unified command is normally a two-star, so one can see what problems may arise if significant capabilities and resources are at stake. Directive authority is needed by the J4 Director and it should not be implied, but should be stated in the operations plans for all to see.

The operational aspect of joint logistic support cannot be left to the Services. Yes, the Services can plan the operational phase of logistic support unilaterally, and they can have in writing all the ISSA's known to a logistician, but the bottom line is that Services are focused on the support of their own forces first. It takes a group of unbiased (read purple) military personnel from all the Services, united under sound leadership and practicing sound logistic doctrine, to maintain the focus of

the theater logistics system, and to provide operational direction to the component logistic commands when needed.

Perhaps before I stated that the J4 should be the responsible logistics authority in the theater, I should have asked if the J4 is capable of performing this mission.

CHAPTER V

J4 FUNCTION, ORGANIZATION, AND "TOOLS" OF THE TRADE

The charter for the J4 Logistic Directorate of a unified command actually touches upon all three levels of war; strategic, operational, and tactical. At the strategic level the directorate is responsible for formulating a logistic system in order to support the CINCs area of responsibility (AOR), maximizing capabilities and resources necessary to support forces in the AOR (deployment and employment), and generating resources from the industrial side to equip and support the combat forces. At the operational level and tactical level the above responsibilities still apply although the scope may be reduced somewhat. There should be no doubt that at all levels the J4 is actively involved with the time and space factors of deploying, employing, and sustaining all forces introduced into the theater. The difference between the operational level and tactical level for logistic support is only a matter of scope. Although the J4 will normally not operate at the tactical level, they most certainly will facilitate logistic harmony at this level. Since the operational level is considered to be the link between the strategic and tactical level of war, I believe it is the most important from the standpoint of logistic support. It is from this level that the logistic directorate plays its most important role. Although planning is continuous until the objective is achieved, it is at this level that the main efforts are devoted to the deployment

and employment of the logistic support system.1

I believe that all unified command logistic directorates are appropriately staffed in peacetime to transition to a wartime level of planning and operations at the operational level. The intent of that statement does not preclude the directorate from requesting or accepting liaison personnel from supporting commands and agencies or component commands, for these personnel are recognized for their expertise and knowledge of parent command organization for getting things done in an expeditious manner. The intent is to show that the directorate has the capability in personnel and expertise to expand to meet wartime requirements with minimum disruption if properly organized in peacetime.

Figure 1 is a basic wiring diagram which shows divisions commonly found in a logistic directorate. The divisions are given names mainly to describe functional responsibilities found within the J4. The main addition added to the typical J4 organization is the Joint Logistic Operations Center (JLOC), which would give the J4 the capability to expand from peacetime to wartime organization with maximum harmony and minimum disruption. It could be placed anywhere within the diagram as a division (as shown), a branch within a division, or a cell within a branch, all of which is standard terminology within a unified command J4 Directorate. Regardless of where it is placed, the main point is that the JLOC provides the nucleus for wartime expansion and works directly for the J4 Director. Realizing the personnel cutbacks all commands are facing, this JLOC can be setup with a

FIGURE 1

J4 LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE ORGANIZATION





FIGURE 2

J4 JOINT LOGISTICS OPERATIONS CENTER ORGANIZATION



* WHEN NEEDED

minimum of three officers, although four is preferable.

The JLDC's charter, in peacetime, crisis action, and wartime, would be to act as the focal point for all "codeword" programs established within the unified headquarters requiring J4 participation, handle all message traffic above the secret level, provide initial briefings on directorate message traffic, and headquarters command center updates, prior to the J4 Director's daily meetings with the CINC, coordinate all current operational action officer inputs to the J4 Director, maintain close working relationships with the other main directorates, and be the focal point for all crisis action and wartime expansion requirements.

Since the only difference between crisis action and wartime requirements is the degree of expansion, I will focus on the wartime expansion of the J4. Figure 2 represents the J4 Directors play with the CINC, components, and the JLDC. Obviously, the key player in the J4 is the Director who is normally a two star. He is the one that has to sell the CINC on the theater logistic system and the amount and type of data that the CINC really needs to know when assessing his theater logistics. This is to preclude the entire directorate from becoming nothing but "bean counters" in processing a multitude of non-essential reports and charts for show purposes. There is a bigger show in town which demands more of the staffs time. As previously mentioned, the J4 Director cannot be restricted by chain of command to deal solely with component headquarters G4's, who are normally colonels. He has to deal proactively with both the G4's and the logistic commanders. It is important that the J4 Director deal personally with these

people when problems arise between respective subordinates.

The JLDC organization as depicted in figure 2 is quite simple yet very effective. The JLDC director and team chiefs would be the same officers as those in peacetime. With the expansion, the regular divisions would remain the same with the exception of each furnishing representatives to the JLDC, and representatives, when required, to the Joint Operations Center (JOC) or planning group. Additionally, Sustainment Division would internally have a functioning Joint Petroleum Office (JPO) and a Joint Munitions Office (JMO), and the Mobility Division would have a Joint Movement Center (JMC), the senior member of each being the representative to the JLDC. Attachments from supporting commands, components, and supporting agencies (Defense Fuels and Army Munitions) would be worked into these cells and/or the JLDC.

The pulse of the JLDC is the Administrative Cell which coordinates all incoming and outgoing information. It processes all message and teleconference traffic, mans all communications, and updates all maps and charts for briefings. The heart of the JLDC is the director, team leader, division representatives, and joint cells which act upon all action correspondence and communications. This is the team which utilizes the "tools" which have been promulgated to all concerned regarding the theater logistics system, Annex D Logistics to the Operation Order. They also have the capability to displace a nucleus, with updated status in all areas, when needed, as depicted in the fly-away echelon in figure 2. The JLDC and the "tools" are the ways and means of ensuring the proper deployment and employment of

logistic support. The majority of all logistic problems fall within certain "tool" categories. These problems will be dissected and put back together into a workable solution by the JLDC. This recommendation will be presented to the J4 Director for concurrence or consultation with the CINC, with results coming back to the JLDC for implementation. The JLDC works in a dynamic environment with possible far reaching implications. It is meant to be a facilitator for maintaining the logistics momentum, and for operationally influencing the action by possibly restructuring component capabilities and resources in order to support the accomplishment of the unified commands mission.

The ability of ground forces, air forces, and naval forces to initiate and sustain combat operations is based upon logistics support. The entry of forces into a theater of war is based upon how one intends to employ them, therefore one is organized for this capability at the APOE and SPOE in order for the combat capability to be immediately available for use upon debarkation, if necessary. It is important for the J4 to ensure that the sequencing of logistic support, i.e., personnel, equipment, and resources, be directly proportional to the amount of combat forces introduced into the theater that require the support.

As previously mentioned, the key document for logistics support is Annex D, the logistics document prepared by the J4 Directorate. This annex is the final document derived from the logistics estimates prepared for supporting the Commander's courses of action, whether for campaign plans or operational

plans. The process for organizing this annex is intertwined with operational planning. It is the orchestration of support forces capabilities and resources organized into a detailed theater of war logistics system. It provides for unity of effort by providing the operational guidance necessary for the deployment and employment of logistic support. The basic format for the annex can be found in numerous publications. It is not my intent to discuss each paragraph, or to discuss all information that is required, but to focus on the "tools" which provide the focus of logistic support at the operational level.

The J4 must function in the facilitator mode and the operational mode. As facilitators they are primarily concerned with standardizing efforts and allowing the components to utilize existing policies and procedures in order to sustain their own forces. The operational mode goes a few steps further by being able to manipulate the logistics system in order to accomplish the overall mission. The key "tools" which are of prime importance to the J4 are the concept of logistic support, resource availability, component responsibilities, supply and distribution, and component logistic status reports.

a. Concept of Logistic Support. The concept should cover the deployment and employment of logistic support. It should be used as a roadmap by the J4 and component logisticians. If constraints appear during the execution phase, the JLCC should critically examine the ripple effect that could result and adjust accordingly. If for some reason a critical situation could result in the future, it is at this time that operational adjustments

must be made to the current logistics system in order to maintain the logistics momentum in the long-run. The concept should be broad in scope, but detailed by phases in accordance with the operations plan. Coverage should include, at a minimum, the locations of all support headquarters, initial sustainment until lines of communication are established, Host-Nation Support agreements, accompanying days of supply, logistic support sequencing (air and surface) priorities, designation of common user logistic facilities and services, supply build-up policy to include initial build-up priority, Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) and Prepositioning Ships SPOD and latest arrival dates (LAD), on-call status of MPS and Prepositioned POL tankers, discharge locations and responsibilities, APOD planning, surface lines of communication (SLOC) planning, geographical sector responsibilities, and logistic constraints. Besides being a detailed roadmap for the J4, this portion of the annex provides the components the vision necessary for unity of effort in the logistics system.

b. Resource Availability. This area should cover the availability of all classes of supply, but should concentrate on the top three; Class I (food and water), Class III (POL), and Class V (air and ground munitions). These require detailed tracking from start to finish in operations. The synergistic effect of joint operations, air, naval, and ground combat forces, depends upon adequate sustainment of these classes. Realizing that sequencing or phasing of resources for individual components may become disrupted, the JLCC should have alternate means

available to preclude the shortages by possible reallocation of assets and resources in a timely manner in order to maintain the logistic momentum.

c. Component Responsibilities. This area is characterized by the assigning of detailed logistic support responsibilities to each component. For those classes of supply that a particular component will be responsible for in theater distribution, a by-date in the form of CXXX or DXXX should be included. Critical areas should be identified and tasked on a, "Be prepared to..." basis, such as the Army operating Logistics Over the Shore, if ports are damaged or constrained, by utilizing lighterage from MPS transports once the ships are offloaded. The Army component should have available sites identified. The JLDC must track the progress of those components responsible for theater distribution and have timely alternate plans available if it is seen that the components cannot meet the distribution date due to a lack of capability or resources. These alternate decisions must be compared against the other "tools" to discern what ripple effects may occur.

d. Supply and Distribution. Although the very detailed aspects will be covered in appendixes to Annex D, the very essence of each appendix should be covered in this section. Specific guidance must cover the level of supply, i.e., emergency resupply from other theaters, supply build-up, expected level of intensity for computing consumption rates, and local acquisition of supplies and services. All Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSA's) and Common Item Support (CS) should be identified.

Considerable attention should be devoted to ammunition supply and support. Obviously this is a high value area for the J4 and demands pro-activeness. It sets the wheels in motion for sustainment. An operational example where the J4 may have a direct impact on the accomplishment of the mission is in the area of consumption rate versus quantity on-hand of munitions. Reallocation from one component to another may have to occur, or the entire combat force may have to constrain consumption if an overall theater shortage has occurred and all forces are engaged at the same intensity level. Obviously the CINC will make this call based upon input from the J4, and it may also require a pause in action dependent upon the operational scheme of maneuver.

e. Logistics Status Reports. These reports are submitted by the components to the J4 and their respective Service logistic commands. The format for this report is promulgated by the unified command and certain parts of the report are subsequently used as input to the unified commands situation report forwarded to the Joint Staff. This report should be initiated by the components as soon as their logistics headquarters enters the theater. This report should be detailed to the point of presenting an accurate picture of the component's logistic system. At a minimum it should contain present capabilities and resources available, forecast on meeting ISSA's, and list updated priorities for the follow-on echelon of people, equipment, and supplies if different from the established time-phased deployment plan. Additionally, it should provide a detailed matrix for Class

I, III, and V by days of supply on-hand, and readiness status of combat weapons systems, essential support vehicles, and equipment. During periods of combat a column should be added to show combat damage and losses to major systems and munitions expended. The importance of accurate reporting must be continually emphasized. The consolidation of these component reports will be used by the JLDC in supportability estimates of current and subsequent planned operations.

All five of these "tools" allows the JLDC to present a clear picture of the Theater Logistics System to the J4 Director who in turn will brief the CINC. It also provides the vision needed by the JLDC to influence the action where needed in order to maximize logistic support to the warfighters.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The theater logistics system encompasses the deployment and employment of logistics forces, equipment, and supplies. Just as combat forces from all Services are integrated into a fighting force, so too must the Services logistics commands be integrated into providing support for the force as a whole. This paper was concerned with the mental construct of the J4 Logistics Directorate at the operational level of war. The intent was to review basic Joint Doctrine and determine the organization, functions, means, and level of authority needed by the J4 to operate in a theater of war environment.

I believe the current logistics doctrine, specifically that of the Joint Test Pub 4-0, is very sound, but dances around the employment phase of logistic support by alluding to joint cooperation at the expense of authoritative control. I totally agree with the intent of creating a "we" vice "they" environment at the joint level, but someone other than the CINC at the unified level has to provide forced direction to the components. The J4 Logistics Directorate should assume that role of advisor, facilitator, and operator. The means of promulgating that role for the J4 is within the CINC's authority. If all campaign and operational plans for fighting and support were perfect in detail, down to the accomplishment of the mission, decentralized command and control for logistic support would be appropriate.

Unfortunately, one does not live, nor fight, in a perfect world. Harmony is nice, but direction is necessary. The J4 is the CINC's means of insuring that capability and resources are provided at the right time and place. The integration necessary to zero out the time and space problems resides with the J4, for they have created the logistics concept, and are capable of coordinating this concept which will sustain the forces until the mission is accomplished.

NOTES

Chapter II

1. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 0-2 : Unified Action Armed Forces, (Washington: December 1986) , p. 3-9.

2. Ibid., pp. 2-1-2-2.

3. Ibid., pp. 3-14-3-15.

4. Ibid.

Chapter III

1. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 4-0 (Test Pub) : Doctrine For Logistics Support of Joint Operations, (Washington: June 1990) , p. I-1.

2. Ibid. p. ii.

Chapter V

1. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 4-0 (Test Pub) : Doctrine For Logistics Support of Joint Operations, (Washington: June 1990) , p. I-1.

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