Surprise: The Korean Case Study
Abstract
Clearly military surprise is among the greatest dangers a country can face. Despite a knowledge of this danger, responsible leaders have failed to prevent surprise at the start of most wars. To help explain this apparent contradiction and to suggest explanations why surprise occurs, a general theory of surprise is developed. This theory is developed by synthesizing existing literature on surprise with a prior knowledge of governmental and military organizations. The major strategic and operational surprises of the Korean War are examined in the context of this theory. The theory of surprise can be distilled into six key concepts that are generally illustrated by the surprises of Korea. This analysis points toward both the complexity of surprise and its likelihood for occurrence in the future. Recommendations for dealing with this problem at the strategic/political and operational levels are discussed and include: an increased awareness of surprise theory through education; a more rigid approach toward decision making in foriegn policy; appropriate military doctrine; mobile and flexible forces. Surprise, Korea, Operations, Strategy, Deception, Misperception, Risk, China, Truman, Macarthur.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 18, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA253155
Entities
People
- Paul Odell
Organizations
- Naval War College