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THE POST COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE OPERATIONAL
LEVEL PLANNER IN INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in
partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of
Operations

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and
are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the De-
partment of the Navy or the Department of the Army.

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Abstract of

THE POST COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL PLANNER IN INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

The end of the Cold War will have a profound impact on US operational planners in the arena of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The purpose of this paper is to look at the significant changes in the operational environment of insurgency and counterinsurgency and to assess their impact on the operational planner. This paper is concerned with only those changes that will have a direct impact on changing how we have to approach insurgency and counterinsurgency, and not with the overall operational environment of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The most important change is that containment will no longer be used as a justification for involvement, nor will it be used to excuse morally questionable regimes or operational practices by US and allied forces involved in insurgency and counterinsurgency. Further, the ubiquitous presence of the media in any future operation will place a great demand on the operational planner to plan and conduct the campaign in a manner that will ensure the continued support of the people and legislature of the United States.

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THE POST COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL PLANNER IN INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War has fundamentally altered the operational environment in which the United States will conduct insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. The demise of containment as a justification for US intervention in Third World revolutionary warfare will cause the operational planner to have to review both the justifications for and the conduct of US engagement in insurgency and counterinsurgency. This post Cold War environment is also affected strongly by the increased presence of the media and its ability to affect the conduct of the protracted campaigns that are characteristic of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. These two factors will cause the operational planner to view the planning for and conduct of protracted campaigns in a different light than he would have during the height of the Cold War. The result will be strong constraints on why, when, and how the United States might become involved in these kinds of conflict. This paper will look at those salient characteristics of the post Cold War environment that will cause changes to our traditional method of operation in this level of warfare. I will first look at those characteristics of the operational environment of insurgency and counterinsurgency that are significantly different from conventional warfare, and that are affected by the changing environment. Next, I will look at the changing operational environment itself. From there I will examine how we will have to justify our engagement in insurgency

and counterinsurgency in the post Cold War world. Finally, I will look at how all of these factors impact on the operational planning for US involvement in insurgency and counterinsurgency in support of US national interests.

CHAPTER II

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

In the past several years there has been a renewed interest in the area of conflict that has been lumped together under the title Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, or SOLIC for short. The Spectrum of Conflict chart, which is used by the Armed Forces to show the relationships between three factors, 1) the levels of conflict, from engagement short of war all the way to nuclear war, 2) the likelihood of each level of war, and 3) the danger of those levels, indicates that the United States is much more likely to be engaged in the low end of the spectrum than it is in the high end.¹ The creation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, the Congressionally mandated formation of the Special Operations Command, and the writing or revision of a number of manuals, to include joint manuals², dealing with various aspects of SOLIC, are indicative of this renewed interest.

This renewed interest in the low end of the spectrum was also driven, in part, by the perceived failure of the United States to create an adequate strategy or operational campaign to deal with the insurgency in Vietnam, and with a number of post Vietnam insurgencies.³ to include Nicaragua and El Salvador.

While all of these actions should improve our ability to plan and conduct a counterinsurgency campaign, there have been recent changes in the international environment that will fundamentally alter how the operational planner proceeds in counterinsurgency campaign planning. The most obvious of these is the

collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. This change will alter the strategic implications of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, which in turn will impact on how campaign plans are constructed. This paper will deal with how the changed, and changing, strategic and operational environment affects the campaign planner planning a counterinsurgency or insurgency campaign in support of US national objectives.

To understand these changes, we must first understand how the operational environment of insurgency and counterinsurgency set them apart from other types of warfare. These characteristics cause the campaign planner to shape his campaign in a manner that is significantly different than other military campaigns. The changed environment will have a significant impact on these characteristics and thus on the campaign design itself. These characteristics are:

1. The primacy of politics
2. Lack of a clear starting point
3. Protracted warfare
4. Use of terror
5. The problem of reform

The first, and probably most important, operational characteristic is that insurgency and counterinsurgency are an interaction of political and military factors at a lower level and to a much greater degree than is conventional war or even special operations. Clausewitz's famous dictum "It is clear, consequently, that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation⁴ of political activity by other means." holds for all level of warfare. But in conventional warfare the objective of military operations is usually to defeat enemy military forces, or the economic infrastructure that sup-

ports them, in order to impose our will on an enemy government. In an insurgency the military instrument is used primarily to create political legitimacy for the insurgent, and is only part of a much larger political campaign to defeat a ruling government. In an insurgency, the target of both sides must be the people, for it is the people who will provide the resources that allow one side or the other to be successful.⁵

In both special operations and conventional military operations the politicians will set the terms under which force is used and then let the military execute an operation (although political control or interference may intrude to a greater or lesser degree during the execution of the mission), and will often let a military campaign run its course until it has achieved its goal. In insurgency, each and every military operation has direct political consequences and is waged, at the lowest level, to achieve political goals. The platoon leader in a conventional operation focuses on the destruction of enemy military capability, while the platoon leader in an insurgency is focussed on increasing the political control over the population. Thus political considerations are dominant at all levels and for all operations, and military operations are often constrained to a much greater degree by political concerns, even during execution,⁶ than are conventional operations.

The second characteristic is how these wars develop. Conventional warfare usually results when a clearly defined event, such as an invasion of territory or a surprise attack, creates the need for military operations. These events serve to create a

feeling of urgency among the population an initial surge of support for the war. An insurgency develops slowly over time through a combination of political pressures combining with an increase in low level violence until the level of violence creates a situation in which the violence can no longer be handled through normal police channels and it begins to create a threat to the survival of the state. This slowly evolving increase in the level of violence, and the growth of the political infrastructure that controls it, means that there is rarely a⁷ defining event around which the government can rally its people. The threat is much more difficult to define, and often the admission of the problem is in itself a political victory for the insurgents. The perception of crisis may be vague among the general population, and the same may be true for foreign powers supporting the attacked regime.

The slow development of crisis, and the political nature of the insurgency, creates the third condition, that a campaign of insurgency or counterinsurgency is usually one of protracted⁸ war. By protracted I do not mean the specific model used by Mao Zedong, but rather that the campaign itself takes a long time to complete. Just as the insurgent campaign takes a long time to gain the allegiance of the population, starting slowly and then building a larger and larger base, any campaign of counterinsurgency will have to take a similarly long time to regain the allegiance of the disaffected population or to secure the continued allegiance, or at least acquiescence, of the majority of the population. This means that the campaign planner for either an insurgency or counterinsurgency must plan for a long campaign.

A fourth characteristic is that the means used in an insurgency, and frequently a counterinsurgency, often include terror (or government repression in an counterinsurgency). This means that both sides often operate outside the laws of war and target innocent civilians. The use of terror by insurgents has sometimes been excused, or justified, as necessary to defeat a government that claims to have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The government, in turn, will often justify its actions by saying that if the insurgents don't follow the laws of war, then the government will be at a huge disadvantage if it does.⁹

A fifth salient characteristic is that insurgency almost without exception, results because there is some perceived problem with the legitimacy of the incumbent government. Whether this problem is real or is a fabrication of some ideology alien to the culture, if the people who support the insurgency believe that the government is illegitimate, then a successful campaign will have to restore the legitimacy of the government. Conversely, a successful insurgency works hard to undermine the legitimacy of the governments. What complicates this problem for the counterinsurgency campaign planner, is that once the question of illegitimacy is placed in the minds of the population, the only way to restore legitimacy is often to make some significant changes in the way the government shares both political and economic power. Thus any counterinsurgency campaign must deal with the fact that most likely the government being supported is not a strong, democratic regime, and that this alone will prejudice opinion against that government in the eyes of the American

public. There is a presumption, in the minds of many people, that an insurgency is only possible in a country that is poorly governed, repressive and unrepresentative.¹⁰ There is almost a presumption that at least some, if not all, of the insurgents claims must be legitimate. This implies that some kind of reform may be essential to both the restoration of legitimacy of the regime and to the maintenance of support for that regime by the people of the United States. This leads directly to the last characteristic, the problem of reform.

Reform in many third world countries is difficult. Rule in third world countries is often a result of the ruling body having gathered together enough special interests and power blocks that it controls the real sources of political, economic and military power in the country. This control, in turn, is often maintained by using the power of the government to send special economic and political favors to those who support the regime. It is these special favors that create the support among the special interests that allows the regime to stay in power, but it is also these special favors that are the target of the insurgent political campaign to attack the legitimacy of the ruling body. Reform that addresses the real grievances of the majority of the people may also mean taking away the privileges with which the government has bought the support of the power blocks in the country. If the power base of the government rests solely, or largely on those power blocks, then reforms that will destroy the power blocks will in turn destroy the power base of the government itself. If the government cannot shift its base of power to something more stable, such as the people itself, before it

looses the support of the special interests, then it will fall.
And the special interests are not interested in reform because it
will undermine their source of power, income and prestige.¹¹

CHAPTER III

THE INSURGENCY/COUNTER INSURGENCY ENVIRONMENT IN THE WAKE OF THE COLD WAR

Since the United States began to support the counterinsurgency effort of the Greeks in 1948, up until the United States' support for counterinsurgency in El Salvador, and our support for insurgents against the Soviet regime in Afghanistan our involvement in insurgency and counterinsurgency was based on our Post World War II policy of containment of communism. During that time, we were involved in numerous counterinsurgencies ranging from our huge involvement in Vietnam, to our small, mostly unnoticed involvements in several Latin American counterinsurgency efforts. Recently, we have been involved in supporting several insurgent forces, most notably the Afghans Mujihadeen, the Contras fighting against Nicaragua, and the Angolan insurgent forces of Jonas Savimbi.

The one common thread in all of these examples was that we were supporting the non-communist side against the communist side. The theory of containment was that a gain for communism anywhere was a defeat for the West.¹ This caused us to support a number of regimes whose only saving grace was that they were anti-communist.² In many cases we supported repressive regimes against insurgents who were at least as much nationalist as they were communist.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the official end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the possibility of a monolithic, world wide communist threat to the West has receded into the past. There is no

longer a single communist threat to contain. This does not mean that there are no longer any communist regimes in the world (Cuba and the Peoples Republic of China for example). It does not mean that there are no longer any communist inspired insurgencies in the world (the Sendero Luminoso in Peru profess to be pure Maoist in philosophy³ and the Philippines New Peoples Army claims a Marxist Leninist ideological base⁴). Nor does it mean that there are no longer any communist states against which insurgencies are being waged (Until very recently we were still supporting the Mujihadeen against the communist regime in Kabul, there were armed insurgents fighting against the communist regime in Cambodia, and there may still be active insurgencies against Cuba and Vietnam). What it does mean is that these remaining Communist states, and these communist inspired conflicts, are no longer tied to any central direction (if they ever were, but that was the assumption of the policy of containment). Thus, the foreign policy justification for intervention in each case must now be based on the merits of the specific situation itself, and not in reference to some world wide threat. This is the most important change in the environment for the US operational planner of insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns. Without the external linkage to a perceived international threat to the United States, each situation will have to be analyzed based on its own merits, and not in reference to some external factors that might override internal ones.

But the collapse of the international communist threat does not mean that there will not be any threats to the US or that

they might not take the form of insurgency. Second only to the collapse of the communist threat in its impact on the operational planner for insurgency and counterinsurgency is the emergence of new threats that can lead to insurgencies. For these new threats will result is different political appeals to populations, new justifications for revolution, and consequent different approaches to the political military linkage inherent in insurgency and counterinsurgency.

There are a number of threats in today's world that might result in insurgency. One of the growing problems is the emergence of a new axis to replace the east-west axis that was characteristic of the Cold War. This is the North-South Axis.⁵ As the nations of the southern tier become more and more active in their protests about the profligacy of the northern tier in the exploitation of resources, the threat exists that this protest may take the form of armed conflict. One of the great disparities between the north and the south is the preponderance of military power in the north. But the salient feature of an insurgency is that it is a means for the weak to take on the strong, a means to start weak and to build strength gradually. It is not inconceivable that an insurgency could start by those who sympathize with the southern tier, directed against the weaker members of the northern tier in order to publicize the problem.

The increasing population pressure in lesser developed countries has created a problem that could lead to instability in two ways. First, increasing population pressures may cause the poorer people to resort to revolution to gain power in an attempt

to alleviate their suffering. This may affect countries that the US deems to be important to its national interests. At the same time, increasing populations may result in increased migration of poorer peoples to more prosperous nations. This creates large enclaves of people who are poor, often without franchise, sometimes discriminated against, and frequently desperate. This is a classic formula for insurgency. Germany is already facing the problem of huge immigrations that are creating a large, non-German population inside of Germany.

Another source for conflict that may lead to insurgency is the increased conflict over disputed borders. While the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact were intact, they kept the lid on many border disputes in Eastern Europe. Many of these problems have now erupted into open warfare. The problems in Yugoslavia and the debate over which former Soviet republics owns the Crimea are examples of this. In some cases, the problem is exacerbated by ethnic enclaves that are wholly contained within the borders of states run by other ethnic groups. The example of the Slovene minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina is such a case. In several cases, the imposition of a solution by conventional force of arms will only be the first round of the fight. After losing the conventional fight, and finding themselves in a state run by ethnic rivals, it is probable that at least some minorities will then take to insurgency to continue the struggle.

Akin to the ethnic problems, and often allied with it, are religious fundamentalist movements which are increasing in militancy. Many of these, especially Islamic radicals, believe, much

as the communists did, that their way is the only way and that they have a mission to proselytize and spread their religion, often with the force of arms. The religious factionalism of many states in middle East is well known, with Iraq and Iran being just two examples. These kinds of religious differences can easily erupt into insurgency if the weaker factions sees no way to win through conventional force of arms.

Another factor that is not tied directly to the collapse of the Soviet Union, but which will be of increasing concern in the post Cold War Era is the influence of the press. Much of the early reporting of the Vietnam war was unequivocally supportive of the US effort in Vietnam.⁶ This support did not erode until a number of reporters began to question the official line that was coming out of Vietnam and to see that things were not going well at all. This questioning of authority became widespread during the late sixties and early seventies, and has not abated to any great degree. There is still a distrust of the government among the media, that if it does not lead to criticism of everything the government does, certainly does cause the media to dig deeper and ask more penetrating questions than was the case prior to Vietnam. The problems with the media during Grenada, and the debate that emerged from Desert Shield and Desert Storm over the media pools and the media's demand for increasing access to an active military theater, coupled with the technology to report directly from the battlefield in real time, has created another factor that the campaign planner of an insurgency or counterinsurgency⁷ will have to take into account. He must expect three things from the media. They will be everywhere. They will not

necessarily be friendly. They will most certainly be looking for anything that can discredit the military.

The effects of these factors relating to the media on Grenada, Panama and the Gulf War were mitigated by the fact that all three of them were short and there was limited opportunity for the debates over tactics, techniques, methods, etc, to impact directly on the conduct of the campaign. The very nature of protracted war during insurgency and counterinsurgency means that the campaign planner will not be shielded from this kind of impact. He will have to formulate his campaign with the expectation that it will be subject to intense scrutiny and that the protracted nature of the war will give this scrutiny time to take the form of direct criticism of the way the war is being fought. The protracted nature of the war means that this criticism will have time to affect how the war will be fought in the future.

While the above noted changes in the international environment have will have tremendous impact on the operational planner dealing with insurgency and counterinsurgency, there are several factors that have not changed, and which will continue to exert strong influence on the conduct of insurgency and counterinsurgency.

President Bush made the comment that at last the legacy of Vietnam had been erased by the victory in Desert Storm. But the victory over Iraq quashed only a part of the legacy of Vietnam. Much of the legacy of Vietnam is still with us in the arena of insurgency and counterinsurgency. What may have been erased in the desert was the stigma attached to military failure in Vietnam

and the divisiveness of that conflict. But our success in Desert Storm does not provide a formula for success in insurgency or counterinsurgency because of two salient points. First, and most obviously, Desert Storm was not an insurgency or counterinsurgency and the operational campaign planning has no relevance to and insurgency or counterinsurgency. Secondly, the war against Iraq was short and relatively inexpensive in terms of casualties. An insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign may not have to be costly in terms of US casualties, but it will be long, and democracies do not fight long wars well, they prefer short, decisive campaigns. Desert Storm has done nothing to change this fact and any insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign will still have to deal with how a democracy can fight a protracted war in which progress and success does not lend itself to simple, unequivocal measures of effectiveness that can be understood by the majority of people who get their information from a succession of 10-15 sound bites and who prefer to deal with simple, easily understood concepts rather than complex, multidimensional, and often ambiguous indicators. This, at least, has not changed in the wake of the cold war. For a people that want quick results, and who eschew long term commitments, this will be a significant problem.

The American experience with Vietnam, the American penchant to want quick and decisive conflicts, the wide latitude that the media will most likely have to investigate and report on the conflict, and the long drawn out nature of a counterinsurgency, will virtually ensure that an insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign is subjected to very close scrutiny. This in turn means that all facets of the campaign will be second guessed by critics

of whatever administration is in power and by whatever special interest groups think that they can tar the reputation of the military, the state department, or the government in general. This will be a great challenge to the operational planner.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEED TO REDEFINE VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THEY RELATE TO INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

The post Cold War environment will have a great impact on whether we become involved with insurgency and counterinsurgency. With the threat of monolithic, world wide communism no longer providing a test by which we can judge our national interests when confronting insurgencies or counterinsurgencies, we will need some other test to be applied to each situation to determine whether or not we should be involved in the campaign. We will have to judge each insurgency or counterinsurgency as a case by itself, and not related to some complex external threat, unless there arises some new multinational rallying point around which several countries will form a united block to attack our interests. I will address this later case as a separate issue. But first, the test we apply to individual cases will start with the National Interests as defined by the President of the United States. The key elements as they apply to insurgency and counterinsurgency are:

- o Reduce the flow of illegal drugs
- o National security and economic strength are indivisible. We seek to...ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and space.
- o Strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights.
- o A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.
- o Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance...
- o Air in combating threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking

Given these general national interests, what specific situa-

tions might justify our participation in an insurgency or counterinsurgency? During the cold war, our engagements in insurgency and counterinsurgency were dictated by containment, and not because any of the countries were in and of themselves vital to our national interests. The loss of South Vietnam, Nicaragua, Cuba, China, El Salvador, Afghanistan or any of the South American states to an insurgency would not have been a vital national interest in and of itself, if we did not perceive it as a loss to communism.

Are there any states where our prestige, our commitments, or the strategic value of the state as an ally is such that it would justify our engagement in helping them defeat an insurgency in order to ensure the survival of the current government? Israel (threatened by Palestinian terrorism/insurgency), France and Germany (threatened by a huge influx of potentially hostile refugees), or Saudi Arabia (an old line monarchy threatened by people yearning for political representation) might be cases where our commitments and interests are directly threatened. However, it is hard to imagine that France or Germany could not handle the problem themselves, or that if they could not, that we could do anything to assist them that they couldn't do themselves. The case of Israel might be different because of our long standing commitment to Israel and the powerful Israeli lobby in the United States. But from a strategic standpoint, a change of government in any of these countries would only be bad for us if the new government were hostile to the United States and deprived us of something we desperately needed, or were able to

translate their hostility into a clear and present danger. How might this be possible?

The first threat that comes to mind, and one that might be applicable to the case of Saudi Arabia, is that a successful insurgency might bring to power a ruling regime that would cut us off from some raw materials to such a degree that it would seriously impact on our national economy. The United States is still a great trading nation and a huge consumer of natural resources, many of which come from overseas. The loss of access to some of these might be cause enough to become engaged. However, this has to be balanced with the fact that support for a government conducting a losing counterinsurgency might cause the kind of hostility that would cause the insurgents, once successful, to refuse to deal with us. We face this problem in Iran currently, where our support for the Shah has created a lasting and implacable hatred. We might well be better off sitting it out and dealing with whoever wins, than in taking sides. There are few countries in the world that will not trade with the United States, even countries with whom we have had conflicts in the past. Vietnam is anxious to trade with us, China desperately wants US trade, and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe wanted trade, even while they saw us as the great capitalist enemy. We would have to carefully balance the possibilities before we became engaged solely because of economic interests.

What of an attempt to create a regional hegemony through insurgency? If Saudi Arabia were to face an insurgency supported by Iraq, we might deem it to be in our vital interests to support the Saudi government. This might also be true of an indigenous

insurgency (one without outside aid) if we were convinced that the insurgents fully intended to export their revolution once they achieved power in one country. An example of Islamic revolutionaries in Iran and of Communist revolutionaries in Cuba fit that mold. But, the caveat is that exporting revolution has been a very difficult thing in the past and there have been few successful examples (Cuban support of the Sandanistas and Soviet support of the Vietnamese come to mind - but for each success there are literally dozens of failures). This would be a hard call, but could conceivably involve us.

Besides the economic threat and the threat of hegemony, what of other threats to our national security, fueled by insurgency, would present a clear and present danger to the United States? Two possible threats come to mind. If one or more drug cartels, which in some cases in Latin America are adopting some of the strategies of insurgents, or are forming alliances with the² insurgents, to increase their popularity among the population, were to decide to take over a country so as to secure a base free from government opposition from which to support their drug business, we could easily conclude that this was a direct and dire threat to our national security. If the Medellin and Cali cartels in Columbia were to attempt the overthrow of the Colombian government, and seemed to be making progress in that goal, we might very well conclude that intervention to support the Colombians, even to the extent of committing combat troops, was in our national interest. This campaign would take on many of the aspects of a counterinsurgency.

A second threat might arise from an insurgency that obtained nuclear or biological weapons and either used them or threatened to use them. Whether or not these attacks or threats were directed at the United States, the precedent might be enough cause our engagement. This is not as far fetched as it seems. With the Soviet Union disintegrating there are tens of thousands of nuclear devices that could fall into the wrong hands, either deliberately or inadvertently. Someone like Quadaffi or Saddam Hussein might see it as a way to strike at the United States by supplying such devices to insurgents that were clearly hostile to US interests.

There is another class of insurgencies that might cause the United States to become involved. We have had a couple of examples in recent years of insurgencies that are so obviously anathema to our values that we might justify our intervention based solely on the terrorist exploits of the insurgents. Even after all of our problems in Vietnam, when the Khmer Rouge came to power, their genocidal attacks on their own people were such that even some of the most vocal anti Vietnam war protesters demanded that we do something about the Khmer Rouge regime. Had we not just concluded our long and divisive war in Southeast Asia, the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge might have been enough to get us involved in what would almost certainly have taken on the aspects of a counterinsurgency campaign. Closer to home, and more recently, the Sendero Luminoso in Peru have pursued a program of terror such that we would have a hard time standing by and watching them rise to power. A plea from the Peruvian government to assist them, in the face of a mounting terror campaign by the

Sendoro Luminoso, might generate enough support for an intervention that it would be feasible.

Given the changed international environment, the operational characteristics of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and the new threats that might involve us in a counterinsurgency campaign (or possibly an insurgency campaign to overthrow a particularly heinous regime), what are the implications for the operational planner?

CHAPTER V

IMPLICATIONS FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNING

The decision to engage US military forces in an insurgency or counterinsurgency will have to be made in concert with clearly defined US national interests. The strategic decision will be whether to engage the forces and what forces to engage. Once this decision is made, it will then fall to an operational planner to plan a campaign to accomplish the goals set by the national strategy. The operational planner may not be military, it may very well be a civilian, such as the ambassador of the country to which the aid is being offered.¹ The senior military officer working with the ambassador, in this case, will then have to plan the military campaign that will support the overall political goals of the nation. The inability to use containment as justification, the new kinds of threats, and the ever present press questioning the decisions, will have a tremendous impact on this operational planner.

The first step that the operational planner must take is to ensure that his goals, as articulated by the national command authority, meet the test of the principal of war **objective**. In other words, the goal(s) must be clearly stated, decisive, and attainable.² One of the prime criticisms of the Vietnam war was that our goals were never stated clearly. Whether one believes this or not, the fact that many senior military leaders believed this to be the case means that there was a serious problem. To avoid this problem, the operational planner must ensure that he has his objective clarified and that it meets the test of achiev-

ability and decisiveness. If it fails on any of these tests, he must go back to the national command authority and get clarification until it does meet these tests. This is essential, particularly in an area where the campaign is likely to be long, multifaceted, and complex.

Just as a clearly defined objective is critical to creating a workable campaign plan, a clear justification for US involvement is critical to gaining and maintaining the support of the US people and their elected representatives for the protracted time required to implement the plan. The campaign planner should insist that the justification clearly support vital national interests and that these interests are clearly articulated to the American public. If the people do not understand why the engagement is vital to national interests, then it will be next to impossible to maintain their support for a protracted campaign, even if everything else goes perfectly. As noted earlier, the campaign planner can expect a ubiquitous and intrusive press that is not necessarily friendly. The press will be looking for things to criticize and once found they will make them known to the public. Without a clear justification for US engagement, the criticism of the campaign will certainly erode support for it at home.

Without the menace of world wide communism to justify many questionable actions, and with the likely presence of the press, the operational planner will have to ensure that not only is the justification for the engagement clear, and tied to a clear threat to US national interests, he will also have to ensure that the campaign plan itself, and the methods used to execute the

campaign plan, both by the US and the host nation's government, can stand close scrutiny and exposure to a skeptical public. Any actions that might erode support at home, regardless of their efficacy in quelling the insurgency, will probably be unacceptable to the political leadership that is seeking to maintain support among the population in the United States during a protracted campaign.

A key factor in the acceptability of the plan will be the moral aspect of the campaign. While the American public might have overlooked morally questionable actions during the Cold War, when the specter of communism seemed to justify these actions, without the communist threat they will most likely result in severe criticism that will affect our ability to execute the plan. Future planners can expect the moral aspect of the campaign to come under intense scrutiny because of the excesses of Vietnam and because of the increasing concern with conducting our policy on a moral plane that is superior to our adversaries, even if this means ceding some effective tools to the enemy. We must be seen, at least by those who share our Judeo-Christian moral philosophy, to be fighting a morally right and justified campaign. If not, we can expect to lose support both domestically and internationally.

The moral issue leads directly to a discussion of repressive regimes. During the containment period, the United States supported any number of repressive regimes because they were actively anti-communist. We seemed to follow the old adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. As a result we supported Diem

and Thieu in Vietnam, Somoza (for a period of time) in Nicaragua, Pinochet in Chile, the Shah in Iran, and numerous other authoritarian and dictatorial regimes, because it was seen as the lesser to two evils. Without the international communist threat to justify this, we can no longer afford, nor should we, support repressive regimes. This will be one of the most difficult areas to address for the campaign planner.

The problem of repression is particularly difficult because any state that is under attack will normally suspend some civil rights as a tool to fight an enemy that is not bound by conventional law and moral behavior. Abraham Lincoln suspended habeas corpus during the American Civil War, and the British suspended many civil rights during their successful campaign against the insurgents in Malaya.⁴ But there are levels of repression and there are legitimate and illegitimate reasons for the suspension of certain civil liberties. The level of repression and corruption that plagued South Vietnam for much of the war was far beyond that necessary to fight the insurgency.⁵ Repression was often used against the legitimate opposition to the ruling parties, and repression was frequently applied almost arbitrarily and collectively, serving to alienate the very population that it was supposed to be protecting. This level of repression, this kind of unjustifiable repression, cannot be tolerated by the United States in any country that it actively supports. Moreover, terror and repression on the part of governments conducting a counterinsurgency has often been excused because third world countries "place a lower value on human life than we do". The use of terror and repression by Western powers has almost univer-

sally been deplored in these kinds of wars.

What can we do about this? The first point is that we must do something about it, because failure to do so will quickly erode support for the counterinsurgency and US aid to it at home and abroad. We must make a rational, moral calculation of what is acceptable and what is not, and insist that the host nation abide by these rules.⁷ We cannot excuse it based on the excuse that they have different traditions and ways of doing things. We cannot, because we cannot be seen to be supporting the very kinds of behavior that we so soundly and rightly condemn in our enemies.

There are at least three ways we can influence the host nation to accept our plan in this area. First, we must make it clear to the host nation government that we **will** withdraw aid and support if they don't acquiesce in our demands.⁸ We tried this in Vietnam, but the Vietnamese never really believed that we could withdraw, until it was too late for them to do anything about it.⁹ We cannot let ourselves become so tied to the host nation that we cannot withdraw if they show an unwillingness to play by our rules. The second way to influence them is to provide additional aid if they will stop the unacceptable practices. This provides a positive incentive for them to change. The third way is to help the government in power to stay in power, even if they have to alienate some of their traditional power bases in order to fight the kind of moral campaign that we will insist on. This may be the trickiest part of all, because it means that we may have to prevent some power blocks inside the

country from undermining the government in order to place a more pliant leadership in charge. Battling these entrenched interests may require that we provide additional subsidies to the rulers or that we use our own forces to prevent entrenched interests from conducting coups.

The requirement for both a moral campaign and the subordination of military to political ends in a protracted counterinsurgency also means that if we have to commit substantial numbers of American troops to combat we will have to do a serious reevaluation of how we fight. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has said that if we fight, we intend to deliver a massive blow and beat the enemy soundly and quickly.¹⁰ This approach is clearly not applicable to a counter insurgency. The American military fights with massive firepower.¹¹ But the use of massive firepower is often counter productive in an insurgency. Because the insurgents like to mask themselves in and among the population, it is often difficult to bring massive firepower to bear without also putting the civilian population at risk.¹² In counterinsurgency, the application of firepower, in most cases, must be limited and judicious. The American military does not train for this, but will have to learn it if we are going to engage in a counterinsurgency.

This means we will have to recognize the constraints on the application of firepower and create stringent rules of engagement. Then we will have to indoctrinate all of our soldiers, especially the leaders, in both what we are doing and why we are doing it, and then ruthlessly enforce this discipline in the field. This will seem an alien way of fighting and will certain-

ly create some morale problems among those soldiers who see their friends die while the firepower that could have saved them sits idly by. But we must do this, both for the effect it will have on the overall outcome of the campaign, and because if we don't, the resulting negative publicity may well result in us not being around long enough to see the problem through to successful conclusion. Thus, we will have to take additional risks while fighting certain engagements in order to see the whole program achieve success. This may be the most difficult part of any commitment of large numbers of American combat troops. Fortunately, we have the best, smartest, and best disciplined armed forces now that this nation has ever fielded. If ever an armed forces had the soldiers, sailors, airmen that could be trained and disciplined to change their way of fighting for a good cause, we do. And, at the same time we are training our own soldiers to this standard, we must ensure that we are training the army of the host nation to the same standards, and not simply dusting off lesson plans on conventional war for our training programs.

If we are going to be able to stick out a protracted war in an era of ubiquitous media, then we must manage the image of the war, as well as the conduct of the war. This does not imply censorship nor does it imply concealing problems, altering statistics, or lying about the inevitable failures that will occur. It does mean that the campaign plan should accept and plan on the fact that any such campaign will be closely scrutinized by the media. This means that every operation, every program, and every other facet of the campaign, should be able to stand up to inde-

pendent and critical review. The plan must include how to deal
with the media. ¹³ If we accept that they are going to get to the
stories, one way or another, we will be better able to deal with
them when they do. We will also be better able to deal with the
distortions that will inevitably arise. If we have granted
reasonable access to the media (consistent with security con-
cerns), then we should expect that most of them will tell the
truth that the occasional distortion will be exposed for what
it is. If we try to hide things, or cover up the problems, they
will come to light anyway and we will have no credibility in
trying to explain what has happened.

At the same time, we should make sure, as much as we can,
that the excesses of the enemy and the real threat that they pose
to the security of the United States are clearly exposed. If we
create a sense of trust and confidence among the military and the
press through open, honest and frank discussions and treatment,
if we are scrupulously honest and forthcoming with the problems,
if we don't exaggerate the successes, and if we conduct our
campaign in as moral a manner as possible, then when we point out
the real excesses of the enemy, our credibility will be much
higher and the damage to the other side consequently much great-
er. This can help create the support from the American public
that we will need to succeed in this kind of war.

Finally, the campaign planner must do everything he can to
get our nation's allies involved in the campaign. This will have
several benefits. First, it will spread the burden of the cam-
paign out among a greater number of participants, thus lessening
the impact of it on any one participant. In a protracted con-

flict this could become important. Second, it can serve to demonstrate wide spread acceptance of the threat and of our goals in fighting it. This will help to legitimize our engagement in the counterinsurgency in the eyes of both the domestic and the international arena. Finally, many of our allies have significant experience in fighting insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well a regional expertise that we cannot hope to match. By taking advantage of this we can further increase our effectiveness and thus shorten the length and cost of the campaign.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The post cold war era has confronts us with a much more difficult problem in the operational arena of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Only if we take into account the changed, and changing environment, as well as the enduring realities of revolutionary warfare, can we hope to create a campaign that has any chance of success. Key to this success will be the ability to stay the course in a protracted campaign. This staying power will only exist if we can convince the American people that there is a real threat to our national interests and that our engagement in suppressing that threat is correct and moral. The real challenge is to sustain that support over years and years of long, drawn out struggle. Time has been one of the key weapons of our past enemies in this arena and we must learn to cope with the problems that protracted warfare brings to a democracy. Only by clearly articulating the threat and then approaching the solutions from a moral standpoint can we hope to succeed.

NOTES

Chapter II

1. One version of the chart is shown in Howard Lee Dixon, Low Intensity Conflict: Overview, Definitions, and Policy Concerns (Langley Air Force Base, Virginia: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, June 1989), p. 4.

2. For example, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, Joint Test Pub 3-05 (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 1990), Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, JCS Pub 3-07 (Initial Draft) (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1989), and Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Field Manual 100-20 and Air Force Pamphlet 3-20 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Departments of the Army and the Air Force, 5 December 1990).

3. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., "Low-intensity Conflict: Future Challenges and Lessons from the Reagan Years", in Fundamentals of Force Planning Vol. I: Concepts, edited by the Force Planning Faculty, Naval War College (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1990), pp. 321-338.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 87.

5. Sam C. Sarkesian, "Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: An Introduction," in Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (Chicago: Precedent Publishing Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 7-11, and Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber & Faber, 1977), p. 282.

6. For a discussion of these points, see David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 89-96.

7. A counter example was the Franco-Algerian war where the Algerians started the war with a single blow on 1 November 1954 and then announced formally the start of the insurgency. See Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 83-104. This is the exception, however. In most other insurgencies, the government declared a state of emergency only after a long accumulation of events, for examples see Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), pp. 46-47 for Malay, pp. 83-88 for Kenya, and pp. 119-125 for Cyprus. For the development of the insurgency in South Vietnam, see Guenter Lewy, America In Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 18-40.

8. I say usually, because at least one counterinsurgency was a fairly short campaign. Che Guevara's attempt to create an insurgency in Bolivia lasted almost exactly 11 months, from 7 November 1966 to 7 October 1967, when it was defeated in battle by Bolivian troops. See The Diary of Che Guevara (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), pp. 20-21, and p. 189.

9. For a good discussion of the role of terrorism in insurgency and counterinsurgency, see Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982), Chapter 8, "Terrorism", pp. 152-194.

10. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace Keeping (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Book, 1974), p. 8.

11. Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counter-Insurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1977), pp. 86-87, and Todd R. Greentree, The United States and the Politics of Conflict in the Developing World: A Policy Study (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, October 1990), p. 20 and p. 29.

Chapter III

1. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 91. This entire book deals with the intricacies of containment in its different manifestations. Chapter 4 deals with the evolution of containment into the form used to justify intervention anywhere the communist menace raised its head.

2. Good examples are support for Batista in Cuba, Somoza in Nicaragua, and Diem in South Vietnam. While we abandoned each of them eventually, we supported them for a considerable period of time when we knew they were violating human rights and were repressive towards their own people.

3. LTC Fernando Carbajal, "Case Study on Peru", in Low Intensity Conflict (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, November 1991), p. 93.

4. Lawrence Grinter, "History of the Philippine Insurgency", in Low Intensity Conflict (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, November 1991), pp. 27-30.

5. The South Commission, The Challenge to the South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 1-24.

6. Neil Sheehan, A Bright and Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), p. 315.

7. Major General Winant Sidle, "A Battle Behind the Scenes: The Gulf War Reheats Military-Media Controversy", Military Review (September 1991), pp. 52-63.

Chapter IV

1. National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: The White House, August 1991), pp. 3-4.

2. For the connection of the Sendero Luminoso to drugs, see Carbajal, p. 103-105.

Chapter V

1. For a discussion of the organization of control in a counterinsurgency operation of US forces, see JCS Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Chapter II, pp. II-6 to II-16. Also see Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, pp. 53-57.

2. For a discussion of the principle of war Objective, see FM 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, May 1986), p. 173. For a discussion of the need for a clearly articulated policy goal, see Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces, Joint Pub 1 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 11 November 1991), p. 22.

3. The importance of the link between a moral war and support from the American public for the military is stressed in JCS Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces, p. 9.

4. For a discussion of British methods in Malaya, see Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malay and Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 52-55, and Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960 (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 141-143.

5. For a discussion of repression in Vietnam see Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin, 1984), pp. 227-230, and Lewy, pp. 90-94. For the Vietnamese Army's role in this, see Lewy, pp. 177-182.

6. An excellent discussion of the uses and abuses of terrorism is Martha Hutchinson, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria 1954-1962 (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1978). While the specifics in the book deal with the Franco-Algerian war, its discussion of the roles, uses and impact of terrorism is much more general and applicable to almost any insurgency setting. In particular, Chapters II, VI, and VII contain very good discussions of the impact of revolutionary terrorism on the world scene and how it affects both the revolutionary and the counterrevolutionary. Also see, Peter Bahnsen

and Captain William H. Burgess III, US Aid to Democratic States Facing Totalitarian Revolutionary Warfare: Twelve Rules (Langely Air Force Base, Virginia: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, December 1987), pp. 1-2.

7. See Thompson, pp. 52-55 for a discusses how the government can impose strict measures to fight an insurgency and still operate within accepted moral codes.

8. NWC 2125 U. S. Country Team in a Counterinsurgency Setting (Newport, R.I.: Operations Department, United States Naval War College, n.d.), pp. 1-2. This paper discusses the role of the Ambassador in this regard.

9. Lewy, p. 20 and Karnow, p. 383.

10. The idea of massive use of military force pervades JCS Pub 1. For example, "The objective is the employment of overwhelming military force designed to wrest the initiative from opponents and defeat them in detail...", p. 47 and "We should strive to operate with overwhelming force, based not only on the quantity of forces and material committed...", p. 22.

11. While we profess to be using maneuver warfare (and we are), maneuver is used to bring overwhelming power to bear at the right place and time. The effects of this maneuver may be to dislocate the enemy's command and control, but the instrument that best does this is overwhelming firepower. We still have no instance of an enemy force quitting simply because we showed up on the battlefield where we were not expected.

12. Lewy, pp. 95-107.

13. This is explicitly stated in JCS Pub 1, p. 41, "...we in the US Armed Forces must account for our actions with the American people whom we serve, by dealing openly and well with the representatives of the nation's free press.

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