The Hundred Hour End Point: An Operational Assessment
Abstract
The decision to end the Persian Gulf War at 280800C February 1991 is assessed in operational terms. The paper argues that an operational pause at that time was appropriate given concerns with respect to fuel, maintenance, displaced logistical architecture, unsecured rear areas and fatigue. The paper further argues that advantages gained from a limited continuation of the attack into Basra, Iraq would not have been worth the costs, and that Iraqi units that escaped through Basra after the ceasefire do not explain the survival of Saddam Hussein's regime. Briefly addressing potential-counterarguments, the paper then discusses the doctrinal implications of a ground war best ended in its hundredth hour, an encirclement too costly to close, and a dictator too stable to be overthrown by external military disaster alone.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 19, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA253244
Entities
People
- John S. Brown
Organizations
- Naval War College