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Continuity and Change: Discussing Our Evolving Doctrine

In the past 18 months, our Army has been part of the victories on three separate fronts in three distinctly different campaigns. The freedoms now enjoyed by the people of Eastern Europe, Panama and Kuwait are the result, in part, of a vision.

Approximately 18 years ago, the Army systematically began preparing to meet the challenges of the future. The scope of that preparation was defined by some very specific threats to our national security, an existing force that was recovering from the Vietnam War, and the evolution of technology and tactics associated with modern warfare. To fight and win on the modern battlefield and to begin to look to future battlefields, the Army published the capstone doctrinal manual, Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5.

This updated 1976 FM—*Operations of the Army in the Field*—described how to fight and win. Yet, in the years that followed its publication, external and internal changes caused a continuing evolution of FM 100-5, first in 1982 and again in 1986. These doctrinal evolutions in turn caused changes in training strategy, force design, leader development and materiel acquisition. Our Army came to understand and put to use the teachings and principles found between the doctrine's camouflaged covers. The continual reevaluation of that original vision helped us to meet and stay out ahead of the demands we faced on recent battlefields. The doctrine worked.

Some might say our doctrine is not broken, so why fix it? I, along with many others, reported from the sands of Iraq that our doctrine was well understood and that it worked. But as we look ahead, the issue is not whether our doctrine is broken—it is not. The issue, now as before, is that we cannot stand still. Just as refinements to our doctrinal manuals throughout the 1970s and 1980s sharpened our fighting techniques and the way we executed operations, evolving doctrine will help us balance continuity with the need for change as we face the demands of the future. Now, more than ever before, evolving doctrine will help us keep ahead of change, as well as reverse the downturn in effectiveness that normally follows battlefield victory.

Evolving doctrine must balance the need for change with continuity—an art, not a science. While we must, on the one hand, reinforce that which helped us win, we must also look at new demands on our Army to determine if we need to adjust to meet those demands. Some areas that fall in the new, or at least increasing emphasis, category are: military forces and force used across the conflict spectrum, joint and coalition operations, deployment operations and operational sustainment. Our smaller Army will have to be more versatile if we are to have the employment capabilities required by commanders in chief as they use Army forces in the attainment of national security objectives.

Colonel Jim McDonough's article in this edition is an important step in initiating the discussion on our evolving operational doctrine. He addresses valid points that apply to both the current situation and the changing external conditions. Read his piece and then contribute your ideas to the discussion. I invite and encourage participation as we undertake this informed discussion.

Our task is to evolve our doctrine so that it meets the demands of the present and the future—a doctrine that can serve as an engine of change for our Army in training, organizational design, materiel requirements and leader development. To accomplish this task, we must combine intellectual rigor, thorough analysis and professional judgment so we strike the right mix of change and continuity. Our great Army demands that of its professionals, and our nation expects nothing less.

General Frederick M. Franks Jr.
Commander, TRADOC

Building the New FM 100-5 Process and Product

Colonel James R. McDonough, US Army

The peace between conflicts cannot be a resting period for our nation's Armed Forces. National security requirements in a constantly changing world demand a constant effort to shape our military capabilities to meet new challenges. Doctrine, according to the author, is the linchpin of this evolutionary effort. He offers his views on the vital importance of "process and product" as the Army once again revises its capstone doctrinal manual, Field Manual 100-5, Operations.



ONLY a very good army could do what we are about to do—maintain our fighting edge while moving through the dramatic changes of today and on into the future. The challenge to our senior leadership is two-sided. One side is intellectual: What is the future? What is the role of the Army in it? What changes are necessary, when do you make them and how do they take us to where we have to go? The other side is managerial: How do we preserve the institution—its ethos, traditions, values and competence—while we complete the transition? What are the levers of change? Who pulls them, how hard and how fast?

These are big questions indeed. Their essence is evolution and stability, both necessary in meeting the nation's needs in an era of uncertainty. The tension is inherent. Move too fast, and we risk the loss of our capabilities before we have available the wherewithal to replace them. Move too slow, and we meet the challenges of today a little while longer, then fall by the wayside, unprepared to keep up with the momentous change that has overtaken us. The stakes in handling that tension are nothing less than the security of the United States.

The solution lies in our doctrine. Doctrine offers us the opportunity to focus the Army as we transition through these watershed years while providing us the guidance needed to achieve the objectives our nation sets before us. In it, we have the opportunity to meet the intellectual and managerial challenge before us both in terms of process—engendering discussion, offering debate, coordinating action, building consensus—and product—compiling the body of principles by which we will endeavor to do our nation's bidding in peace, crisis and war. In the development and evolution of our doctrine, the process is as significant as the product.

This article is about that process and product. The US Army is about to revise its central war-fighting doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*. Under the leadership of the chief of staff of the Army and the direction of the commander, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), over the next 15 months or so, the

***Doctrine is not pure theory.
As it appears to the user, it is digested
theories without the corresponding
explanations, the intellectual distillation
of generations of thought mixed
with the practical observation of
recent developments.***

Army's doctrine will evolve. All of us have a part to play in this effort. All of us—and our successors as well—will live with the outcome. What follows is one man's view of what course events might take.

Why Change the Doctrine?

A pertinent question is why change our doctrine? After all, we have just come through three major victories—Panama, the gulf and the Cold War. Does this not suggest that our doctrine may not need adjusting? The answer is that doctrine must respond to both external and internal changes, and enough has occurred in both areas to warrant some new directions.

The Warsaw Pact has disintegrated; the Soviet Union is fragmenting ever more widely each day. The threat that prioritized our security arrangements for the last four decades has faded; its stark menace replaced by a more ambiguous, less predictable specter that retains the potential to do great harm, even without the cohesiveness to coordinate and discipline its bite. No longer is this a bipolar world, conveniently—if inaccurately—divided into two contending halves, East and West. The strategic order that held the West together in the face of a hostile, aggressive communist bloc is irretrievably altered. In its place comes fragmentation and a resurgence of ethnic animosities, national strife, contentious border disputes, aggressive religious fundamentalism and a growing number of regional instabilities.

At the same time, the structure of our military forces will change dramatically. New commands will form; old ones will be combined. Personnel strengths will shrink to pre-Korean War levels.



A Croatian National Guardsman draws a bead on Yugoslav Federal Army positions surrounding the eastern Croatian city of Vukovar, 26 August 1991.

The strategic order that held the West together in the face of a hostile, aggressive communist bloc is irretrievably altered. In its place comes fragmentation and a resurgence of ethnic animosities . . . aggressive religious fundamentalism and a growing number of regional instabilities. As the geopolitical, economic and military environments change to this degree, doctrine must adapt so that we are prepared to meet the objectives our nation sets before us.

The Active Army alone will lose more than one-third of its manpower. As the geopolitical, economic and military environments change to this degree, doctrine must adapt so that we are prepared to meet the objectives our nation sets before us.

An army's doctrine is the condensed expression of its fundamental approach to fighting (campaigns, major operations, battles and engagements), influencing events and deterring war. It must be definitive enough to guide specific operations, yet versatile enough to address diverse and varied situations worldwide. To be effective, doctrine must be dynamic. But change must not occur randomly; we must manage it to the Army's and the nation's advantage.

Doctrine can be the vehicle through which we manage the process of change, evolving the institution in a disciplined manner that ensures

a logical and well-reasoned approach compatible with the realities of an environment of peace, crisis and war. But understanding that doctrine must adapt is only the first step. The real challenge is to do it in such a way that all can sign up and produce in the end a doctrine we can live with.

Process

Doctrine is an authoritative statement on how we, as a professional organization, intend to operate. It comes with an official stamp of approval as the Army's guide to how we must meet the operational requirements of future commitments. Sir Michael Howard, the well-respected historian and noted commentator on military issues, has stated that the role of doctrine set in peacetime is not to be so wrong as to cause defeat when tested in battle.¹

We would hope to do better than that, although we should never forget that military doctrine is, in many ways, merely a best guess. It combines theoretical principles with the experiences of recent wars, adds to that combination the impact of current developments in technology and organizational structure and extrapolates, after intensive analyses, to the future.

Doctrine is not pure theory. As it appears to the user, it is digested theories without the corresponding explanations, the intellectual distillation of generations of thought mixed with the practical observation of recent developments. Although tested through historical reflection, simulations, war games, exercises, systems analysis and rigorous debate, it remains an imperfect science. Put another way, it is risky business. As such, there should always be an element of doubt as to the correctness of our doctrine.

Taken in measured doses, a little uncertainty should motivate us to continually check our doctrine against reality. The armies of history that have denied themselves the healthy introspection of questioning their doctrinal solutions have paid a heavy price indeed for their obstinacy. The Russians in 1914 at Tannenberg, the French in 1940 at Sedan and even the Americans in 1943 at the Kasserine Pass are but a few who had to admit defeat and drop back to reconsider their plan of action. Sometimes, it is possible to recover; at other times, by the first battle it is already too late.

There is tendency for conservative institutions such as the military to resist the need to change with the times. In his brilliant book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*, Thomas S. Kuhn wrote of the propensity for science (and military science is included) to wrap itself around its existing paradigm—its model of the truth—and deny the onslaught of evidence that indicates the time has come to replace it. Kuhn holds that all too often the guardians of the past are those vested with the leadership of the institution, who have come of age believing in the old ways of doing things and who feel that any endeavor to change threatens not only their status but the institution itself.²

But doctrine that spurns new information in order to preserve the old order for its own sake is not doctrine; it is dogma. It no longer allows honest questioning. Debate is stifled; heretics are excommunicated. In such ways, the seeds of

Doctrine that spurns new information in order to preserve the old order for its own sake is not doctrine; it is dogma. It no longer allows honest questioning. Debate is stifled; heretics are excommunicated. In such ways, the seeds of disaster are sown.

disaster are sown. Fortunately, the Army in which we find ourselves today knows better. It is not prepared to rest on its laurels. As Stephen Rosen has pointed out in his insightful article *New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation*, it is a myth that armies only learn from defeat. Good armies learn from victory as well.³

In August of this year, after an intensive review that included feedback from the field, especially from those involved in *Just Cause*, *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, and operations in other parts of the world, TRADOC published its Pamphlet 525-5, *AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Airland Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond*. This initiated a process that will develop into a revised version of FM 100-5.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 is, as its title implies, an operational concept. It flows from strategy, but is not doctrine. The process that leads to FM 100-5 will convert the operational concept into doctrine. That process should seek to reach a consensus built of the greatest wisdom of the collective Army.

Articles will be written, workshops will be held. Seminars, symposiums, briefings, papers, communications, tests, analyses, discussions and debate are all part of the process of reaching for that great wisdom. The intellectual exchange should not be confined to the Army. We will

Air Force personnel manhandling equipment onto a C-5 Galaxy during the initial stage of Operation Desert Shield, Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, 23 August 1990.



The battlefield environment should be reassessed to account for a transition from a forward-deployed to a power-projection posture. Things look a lot different if you do not assume you are already on the battlefield but have to get there. Demands on command, control, communications and intelligence will dramatically increase.

need to reach out to others, to explain ourselves, to coordinate our efforts and to garner support. Sound doctrine cannot be developed in a void. The doctrine of our sister services must be considered. We must integrate our efforts with joint and combined doctrine. The views of other nations matter, as do other government agencies. Influential groups—the Congress, the media, academia, industry—are stakeholders in the process. We must explain ourselves to all of them, draw upon their ideas and forge alliances that support our common goal of a stronger, more secure nation.

But most of all, we must use the process as a rudder to steer the course our Army will take as it moves into the future. All of the business of the Army—force structure, unit design, modernization, materiel, leader development, training, and so on—derives from doctrine. The process itself, therefore, has a valuable effect in controlling change within the Army.


Product

What, then, should the outcome be? Again, the answers are hard to formulate. At this early juncture, I can only propose. It will take many minds to provide us the best solutions.

Some things should not change. The conceptual ideas, tenets, imperatives and the battlefield framework found in current AirLand Battle doctrine apply to AirLand Operations as well. AirLand Operations does not radically change AirLand Battle; rather it expands and refocuses the concepts inherent in AirLand Battle for the Army in a changing strategic environment. It builds on the foundation of our current doctrine for the employment of Army forces across the operational continuum of peace, crisis and war.

In this, the Army will not be alone. It is difficult to conceive of any operational missions the US Army might undertake unilaterally in support of national objectives. Joint, interagency and combined/coalition operations will be the

Halftrack-mounted antiaircraft guns firing on German bombers from a ridge astride the Kasserine Pass, 24 February 1943



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norm. The *National Security Strategy of the United States* asserts that while we are not the world's policeman, we must be prepared to meet our responsibilities as the world's foremost democratic power. In that regard, deterrence remains the central component of our new national strategy. This strategy aims to deter war through international cooperation, confidence building, influence and interdependence, as well as the ability to project combat power.⁴

We must be prepared, therefore, to introduce effective force anywhere in the world on short notice and to stay until all national objectives are met. National and international forces are best able to do this in concert with one another. No uniformed service can do it alone. The more we integrate our doctrine, the better we are able to support one another and put limited resources to maximum effort.

Our nation will seek to achieve strategic objectives through the exertion of influence, suasion and, if need be, coercion. However, we seek to counter threats to the security of the United States, its citizens and its interests by means short of armed conflict if at all possible. The Army can

serve as one means of accomplishing national objectives in these ways. The value provided by our forward-presence forces, in concert with our demonstrated ability to rapidly project them (as well as contingency forces) into areas of vital interest, makes this capability credible and may influence whether our nation remains at peace or goes to war.

The battlefield environment should be reassessed to account for a transition from a forward-deployed to a power-projection posture. Things look a lot different if you do not assume you are already on the battlefield but have to get there. Demands on command, control, communications and intelligence will dramatically increase. We will need compatible, effective systems employable anywhere in the world. Quick and correct decisions will be needed for the commitment of resources. Force multipliers must be sequenced for introduction into contentious regions with the proper effect at the appropriate time.

The impact of technology will become even more significant as force levels are lowered, funding is constrained and the strategic environment

becomes more complex. Even in Third World contingency operations, it will not be uncommon for our forces to face high-technology systems in the hands of an enemy. Even though we

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We must integrate our efforts with joint and combined doctrine. The views of other nations matter, as do other government agencies. . . . The Congress, the media, academia, industry—are stakeholders in the process. We must explain ourselves to all of them, draw upon their ideas and forge alliances that support . . . a stronger, more secure nation.

might have an initial advantage, the interim between the fielding of a new technology and its counter is rapidly diminishing. We will consistently need to seek the optimal integration of tactics and technology. Our doctrine must more fully account for the impact of technology as a major variable in deterrence and the conduct of operations.

We can expect that public support will become even more important than it already is to the successful prosecution of military operations. Our doctrine must accommodate that reality. The American people prefer that operations conducted by our Armed Forces be decisive in nature, of short duration and of minimal cost in terms of casualties and national treasure. Force capability and campaign design should strive to achieve this. But if these conditions cannot be met, we will need to take steps to prepare public expectations and sustain public will.

Future doctrine should be expanded to incorporate our evolving missions in areas such as stability operations, nation assistance and contraband flow. The Army may well participate in each of these as our nation seeks to assist emerging nations, instill democratic values and establish legitimate political and economic institutions in the process.

Preparation for conflict necessitates a comprehensive integration of several factors. The ability to deploy rapidly and efficiently is a complex task that extends beyond mere deployment. An expansible Army requires a dynamic and robust industrial base, a balanced force mix and organizational flexibility that facilitates the integration of the Total Force—Active and Reserve Component units, sister services, governmental and intergovernmental agencies and multinational units.

Forces must be ready to fight when they get to where they are going. The Army must be prepared to conduct forcible entry operations and protect initial lodgments that allow for subsequent buildup. We must introduce the right forces in the proper sequence. Early deploying forces would most likely include combat units, reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition elements; command and control structures; and security and sustainment elements. They would be mutually supported by the joint efforts of our air and sea forces.

A power-projection force will no doubt place greater demands on materiel. Lightweight, compact weapons and support systems are necessary for rapid deployment against a determined, well-armed enemy. Extended logistics and fully integrated, real-time intelligence capabilities are just as essential. Support for and interface with joint systems will be critical. We will need vision to get from where we are now to where we need to be. Doctrine does best when it drives materiel acquisition, rather than merely adapting to it.

Our doctrine will also have to deal with the complex relationships across the levels of war, from the tactical to the strategic. Virtually all Army operations above the tactical level will be joint; they will often be combined. We can ex-



Children arriving at a school built by US military personnel in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, 1988.

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pect them to be conducted in an integrated joint operational environment and to be guided by regional campaign plans designed to support national and theater strategic objectives. Theater campaign plans should provide the necessary guidance from the commander in chief for the development of the respective land, air and naval component plans to support joint and combined operations. These seek to establish and retain the initiative at every opportunity to destroy the enemy's capability to wage war. Air, land and sea operations in theater should address the links between strategy, operational art and tactics to ensure that these are well understood. Time, space and distance relationships, the destructive power of modern weapons and the prevalence of public communications narrow the line between the different levels of war.

Although, in reality, battle is not segregated by distinct breaks in types of activities, the Army conducts operations that at least conceptually can be seen as four interrelated stages (as dis-

cussed in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5) designed to focus the activities of all elements of the force.

The first stage is preparation for the operation. This includes movement planning, examination of staging capabilities and intelligence preparation of the theater. Expeditious and thorough theater analyses will allow commanders to plan integrated fires, joint reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition and air and naval power. Doing this at the start sets the stage for seizing the initiative at the earliest possible moment.

The second stage involves using all means necessary to set the conditions to achieve decisive results. This is done by synchronizing joint fires such as long-range artillery, Army aviation, naval fires and tactical and strategic air assets. Concurrently, maneuver forces are positioned to achieve surprise, throw the enemy off balance, defeat his center of gravity and achieve decisive results.

The third stage encompasses the conduct of



Ordnance from Marine
FA-18 Hornets exploding
during a joint air attack
team demonstration at
Fort Benning, Georgia,
March 1988.

Successful warfare is a mixture of ever-reforming combinations: attack and defense, maneuver and firepower, linearity and nonlinearity, mass and economy of force, and so on. Operational art demands that we achieve the right balance between each of these as we design campaign plans to achieve strategic objectives.

actions to decisively achieve operational objectives. Once favorable conditions have been established for US and allied forces to defeat the enemy and achieve victory, maneuver forces are committed. Massed fires and synchronized maneuver are applied to critical targets to achieve decisive operational success.

The fourth stage stresses continuity of operations and consists of preparing to conduct follow-on battles, major operations, engagements or actions—to include redeployment—after the cessation of hostilities. Continuous operations are sustained throughout this stage.⁵

The 1986 version of FM 100-5 introduced several concepts germane to the practice of operational art. These could be expanded and integrated into a doctrinal discussion of theater operations. Notions such as the center of gravity, lines of operation and culminating points might be augmented by other relevant concepts such as decisive points, pivots of maneuver, phasing and branches and sequels from a theater-level perspective.

A solid understanding of the interrelationships between key concepts is critical to the conduct of successful battles and major operations. Though discussed in the 1986 version of

FM 100-5, these might be more clearly defined. Specific emphasis ought to be placed on describing the balance between maneuver and firepower, linearity and nonlinearity and offense and defense.

Maneuver warfare, while an important component of operational art, will not succeed without firepower. We maneuver to bring fires on the enemy. We bring fires on the enemy in order to maneuver. As retired General Donn A. Starry noted in his foreword to the Richard Simpkin book, *Race to the Swift*:

"By far the majority of winners in battle . . . were those who somehow seized the initiative from the enemy, and held it to the battle's end. Most often the initiative was successfully held by maneuver. This seems to be true whether defending or attacking, outnumbered or outnumbering."⁶

The idea is that maneuver is important, but only insofar as it seizes the initiative and maintains freedom of action. Maneuver is not an end in itself; neither is nonlinearity. While nonlinear operations may open up opportunities in a theater of operations allowing for integrated and mutually supporting activities in space and time, linear operations will still be needed. Field Mar-



Medics from the 3d Armored Division attending a wounded Iraqi soldier, February, 1991. Many commanders had to develop ad hoc solutions to deal with refugees, POWs and civil-military operations because of the lack of adequate doctrine to serve as a guide.

Disciplined operations become increasingly important as the rapid pace of modern warfare, combined with the enormous lethality of the available technology, has led to special concerns. We need to limit risk to friendly forces, be able to deal with large numbers of disoriented and often destitute prisoners of war and find ways to cope with the rapid breakdown of civil order in the area of operations.

shal Sir William J. Slim, the reconquerer of Burma in 1944, and as fine a practitioner of operational art as any produced in World War II, found it imperative to pull the bulk of his 14th Army back to the Imphal-Kohima Plain in order to consolidate his lines, establish a continuous front and draw the Japanese into a disadvantageous battle before resuming a bold, nonlinear offensive that eventually drove his enemy to precipitous defeat. His genius for the operational art was reflected in his wise selection of linear and nonlinear operations brought together in such a manner as to gain and maintain the initiative and eventually produce victory.

In like manner, we should discuss the balance between offense and defense. There can be no offense without a defense. Each contains within it elements of the other. At different levels of war, various combinations of offense and defense might apply. A preordained, dogmatic adherence to either offense or defense—as history has shown—could result in culmination and ultimate defeat.

Successful warfare is a mixture of ever-reforming combinations: attack and defense, maneuver and firepower, linearity and nonlinearity, mass and economy of force, and so on. Operational art demands that we achieve the right balance between each of these as we design campaign plans to achieve strategic objectives.

Theater-level logistics should be reexamined and addressed in greater depth in our evolving doctrine. A clarification of the terms and additional discussion may be required in such areas as a proposed move from decentralized to centralized logistics. Approaches that may solve theater-level issues may be unacceptable at the tactical level. It is clear, however, that particular emphasis should be placed on flexible, continuous, fully integrated logistics. Our doctrine should address this from initial deployment phases through the conclusion of the campaign and from theater to the lowest tactical level.

Tactical operations as discussed in the current version of FM 100-5 are sound. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield has proved its

worth (although at the operational level a doctrine for intelligence preparation of the theater might be more appropriate). The discussion of the tactical offense, tactical defense and the effects of combat multipliers could remain essentially unchanged. Additional discussion might be appropriate in regard to tailoring of forces and multinational concerns. Disciplined operations become increasingly important as the rapid pace of modern warfare, combined with the enormous lethality of the available technology, has led to special concerns. We need to limit risk to friendly forces, be able to deal with large numbers of disoriented and often destitute prisoners of war and find ways to cope with the rapid breakdown of civil order in the area of operations.

A major expansion of current doctrine should occur in the area of conflict resolution. In both operations *Just Cause* and *Desert Storm*, commanders were faced with the requirement to conduct operations after the cessation of hostilities. Without adequate doctrine to serve as a guide, many had to develop ad hoc solutions to deal with refugees, prisoners of war and civil-military operations. How we deal with them in doctrine has implications for the success of campaign plans in meeting strategic objectives. Additionally, recent international and bilateral agreements have accentuated arms control and verification as a mission for US military forces. In each of these areas, there exists a doctrinal shortfall that we should address in an expansion of FM 100-5.

Our current warfighting doctrine as expressed in the 1986 version of FM 100-5 is largely con-

fined to considerations of conventional, mid- to high-intensity warfare. Yet, we find ourselves engaged around the world in a variety of missions that fall outside of this scope. Doctrine should address nonconventional operations in operations short of war, during limited hostile action and in conditions of war and its aftermath. It should also address operations in nuclear, chemical and biological environments. The 1986 version of FM 100-5 reduced the nuclear discussion to less than a page. This ought to be expanded.

The recently assigned missions of curtailing contraband flow—whether it be narcotics, arms or illegal immigration—should be more clearly defined. Other missions include security assistance, nation assistance, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. All of these missions may warrant doctrinal elaboration.

These are my thoughts on expanding our doctrine. While I cannot say, with any degree of certainty, just how it will all come out, I am convinced that the journey we take in getting there is of paramount importance. The process causes us to look beyond these times of turmoil to the needs of the future. That alone is "value added" to our Army.

All of us need to remain open-minded and make a concerted effort to reach within ourselves and out to others as we strive to help our doctrine evolve. It is not change for the sake of change; rather it is change for the sake of security and progress. "Good enough" is not a risk we can afford to take. The stakes are high; the consequences sobering. Our Army and our nation demand our full attention. **MR**

NOTES

1. Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*, no. 119, (March 1974):3-11.
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THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

As the Army tackles the daunting challenge of building itself down in an era of changing mission requirements and shrinking budgets, many traditional systems are being reviewed. The Total Force concept and specifically the role of the Reserve Components (RCs) are now the focus of debate. The following articles present differing views on this controversial issue. The first two offer similar recommendations for an Active Component (AC) cadre for RC units at division and even brigade level. The potential for significant improvements in peacetime command and control, training, mobilization time and combat readiness are cited. Finally, Army guardsmen assess the major influences on US military strategy and policies and offer their views on the proper role of the Guard in a changing strategic environment.





A CADRE SYSTEM for the US ARMY

Colonel Charles E. Heller, US Army Reserve

AS WE bask in the euphoria of our victory in the gulf, we should also realize that the war with Iraq was an anomaly in US military history. The great success was well-deserved, but largely the result of an opponent allowing us to fight exactly the first battle for which we had prepared since the Vietnam War. The more prevalent consequence at the outset of hostilities has been costly first battles, revealing a lack of peacetime readiness, sometimes even after lengthy mobilizations. In his enlightening study of 10 of America's first battles, historian John Shy finds that five were defeats (Long Island, Queenston, Bull Run, Kasserine, and Osan/Naktong), four of five victories were very costly (San Juan, Cantigny, Buna and Ia Drang), with the fifth, the opening battle of the Mexican War on the Rio Grande in May 1846, a victory with significant American casualties.¹ And sad to say, regardless of how unprepared we were and how costly each experience was in terms of men and materiel, the post-war lessons have largely gone unheeded.

An obvious lesson that is already apparent from experiences in *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* is the need for a rapidly expandable force structure that can provide combat-ready units to augment forward-deployed or contingency forces. It is time that the US military learns from past mistakes and aggressively moves to enhance readiness *before* we are called.

In light of current force-reduction proposals, should the United States find itself at war sometime in the future, a cadre system may be an essential element to expand the US Army. By definition, a cadre is a military unit's peacetime complement of officers and enlisted personnel,

serving full time in selected key positions. They provide an internal structure that maintains equipment, plans and trains for combat. Cadre personnel are required for combat and usually deploy with their expanded unit. This system of unit manning, as in the case of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), can be cost-effective, maintain an expansible force structure, reduce mobilization time and improve deployed combat effectiveness.

The force structure cuts that will occur during this decade demand that existing Total Army policy be refined and given new direction. This is especially true if the Army's senior leadership is not comfortable with some aspects of the current policy for use of Reserve forces (as it appears was the case of the nondeployment of Reserve Component (RC) combat units for *Desert Shield*). If such is the case, then alternatives must be proposed.

In the coming years, it is also likely that defense dollars will be limited, resulting in the nation's inability to field an Active Component (AC) large enough to fight even the smallest of conflicts on a protracted basis. In such an environment, the adoption of a cadre system can mitigate the reluctance to use RC combat units. A cadre system will also further Total Force policy by allowing for the full and complete integration of the RC units into a streamlined Total Army.

Historical Precedents

There have been attempts in the past to implement a cadre system for the US Army. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun was instructed, on 11 May 1820, to plan for reducing the Army's

strength. He told Congress that if it was necessary to shrink the Regular Army, plans must be made for the force to be able to expand rapidly.² Calhoun offered Congress an "Augmentation" of the Regular Army or cadre system.³ Officer strength remained untouched while each unit contained a minimum number of enlisted soldiers. Upon mobilization, recruits benefited from being trained by, and then entering battle with, experienced Regular Army cadre. Congress rejected the concept as too costly and disbanded units to reach lower force levels.

At the end of the Civil War, Congress again reduced force levels of the Regular Army. General William T. Sherman, then commanding general, expressed concern. In the 1880s, in addition to establishing an officer education system, Sherman ordered Civil War veteran Emory Upton abroad to examine the military establishments of other nations.

Upton was impressed with the German army's rapid mobilization of its federal reserve forces for its war with France in 1870. He wrote Sherman that the United States could "... not maintain a great army in peace, but we can provide a scheme for officering a large force in time of war."⁴ He enunciated his ideas in a manuscript titled *Military Policy of the United States from 1775*. One proposal called for a regional unit system manned by Regular Army cadre responsible for training citizen-soldiers in the immediate geographic area.⁵ While Upton's work offered an alternative to break the cycle of early defeats, it remained clear that there would be no change in the need for a more efficient peacetime force structure, as evidenced by the mobilization of unprepared volunteer units for the Spanish-American War in 1898.

At the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, the need for an efficient force structure was once again apparent. It fell to Secretary of War Elihu Root, who assumed office in 1899, to search for new alternatives. Struck by the Army's obvious unpreparedness for that conflict, Root, searching for alternatives, had Upton's work published. Unfortunately, all of Root's efforts had little impact on the peacetime

force structure. As a consequence, when war was declared in April 1917, the first US division deployed in World War I did not see combat for several months.

The heavy losses suffered by US divisions in World War I combat can be directly related to

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the failure in peacetime to maintain a cost-efficient, expandable force structure for war. Again, as in previous wars, the Army attempted to make up for peacetime neglect after hostilities commenced. At the outbreak of war in April 1917, the War Department made an effort to implement a cadre system. All new Regular Army regiments would contain cadre drawn from existing formations. As the Army grew in size, the General Staff decided that a minimum of 961 enlisted Regulars should be assigned to the new 28,000-man square divisions (four brigades). This figure was reduced because the troops were not available.⁶

The last-minute preparations were readily apparent. Training for officers and enlisted soldiers was so poor that the American Expeditionary Forces had to establish a complete Army school system, from basic infantry training to officer education, in France. Even then it was common to find a soldier in the trenches who did not know how to wear a gas mask or an officer who could not read a map. The Army's performance was consistently inferior throughout the war. Attack plans were too rigid, supporting fires poorly coordinated or inadequate, cover and concealment ignored, there was no initiative in the attack, and the concept of fire and maneuver

US medics removing wounded
from Vaux, France, 22 July 1918.



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seemed not to exist. There was, as one historian noted, a lack of "tactical sophistication." At Soissons, France, for example, from 18 to 21 July, the attacking 26th Infantry, 1st Division, some 3,000 officers and men, had 200 effectives at the conclusion of the offensive. This number of casualties was a sad commentary on the lack of creative military peacetime preparation for war.⁷

At the conclusion of the war, Chief of Staff General Peyton C. March set about to establish a peacetime Regular Army of half a million men. However, the nation was in no mood to support plans for a large standing army. Congress, seeking alternatives, sent a draft universal military service bill to the War Plans Division of the General Staff. There, a subcommittee concurred with the concept and added its own details. To organize the manpower generated by universal military training, the subcommittee

recommended the creation of a 48-division federal reserve to provide the basis for a cadre of Reserve and Regular Army officers. March, intent on a large Regular force, refused to support the legislation, and it died in Congress.⁸

The basis for the Army's restructuring during the interwar period then became the National Defense Act of 1920.⁹ This legislation amended and reaffirmed the 1916 act, stating that the Army of the United States comprised the Regular Army, the National Guard and the Organized Reserves. General John McAuley Palmer, a confidant of General John J. Pershing, helped draft the act and also recommended a national army composed of a small, well-trained professional Regular Army, the National Guard, and an army of "citizen soldiers" organized into units and, when war was declared, an "army of volunteers."

Palmer's idea incorporated a cadre system to

Noncommissioned officers going over the fine points of bayonet training before instructing their men. I Corps School, Gondrecourt, France. 18 August 1918.



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the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC). Reserve officers and noncommissioned officers would make up the cadre of the ORC units. Upon mobilization, this cadre had responsibility for training recruits. The Regular Army was responsible for strategic forward deployment and a continental force prepared for immediate deployment. The National Guard's mission provided continental defense and then reinforcement of a Regular Army expeditionary force. These missions remain intact today.

The Army saw ORC officers as enhancing the mobilization readiness of all three components. Beyond peacetime unit cadre functions, these excess ORC officers were assigned two critical mobilization missions. The first was as fillers for Regular Army and National Guard units, few of which were at wartime strength. This mission is duplicated today by US Army Reserve officers in

the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Their second mission was as additional cadre for ORC units in each of the corps areas to achieve a mobilized force of 27 infantry and six cavalry divisions, nondivisional support units and headquarters staffs. In addition, the Army hoped to place 20 reservists in each company (noncommissioned officers and "specialists") to assist in training upon mobilization. However, even though the 1920 Defense Act called for an "Enlisted Reserve Corps," this potential pool of pretrained manpower was not organized until 1938.

The Army decided, according to Brigadier General John Ross Delafield, an officer in the ORC, that Reserve officers would not have the "necessary time and have the skill level and ability to organize and maintain the federal reserve units." To correct these deficiencies, the Army opted for a cadre within the ORC cadre using

Regular officers in key positions. Each Reserve division would have a "well qualified Regular Army officer as Chief of Staff" with "one or two

The force structure cuts that will occur during this decade demand that existing Total Army policy be refined and given new direction. This is especially true if the Army's senior leadership is not comfortable with some aspects of the current policy for use of Reserve forces (as it appears was the case of the non-deployment of Reserve Component combat units for Desert Shield).

... Regular Army officers to assist him" and a "suitable Regular Army officer as Executive Officer for each Reserve regiment."

A number of Regular Army officers and enlisted personnel served at each corps area headquarters "working over Organized Reserve affairs." The Army believed that these officers and enlisted men were "absolutely necessary to the success" of the Organized Reserve because they could "devote their whole time to the interests, to the development, to the organization and to the training of the units to which they are assigned without interruption or distraction of other principal pursuits." Reserve officers commanded the units and "preserve(d) the unit authority and military system."¹¹

The Army's vision of a prepared ORC was not to be fulfilled. As Delafield noted to Army War College students in 1925, "In the organization and training of the reserves, as in every other Service, the appropriations are always the limiting factor." His audience was well aware of the fiscal restraints placed on the Army.¹²

As the Depression took its toll on the nation, General Douglas MacArthur, the new chief of staff, testified to Congress during 1932 Army Appropriation hearings that he would continue to support the RCs at the expense of force modernization.¹³ There was no question that the Regular Army establishment remained con-

vinced that a well organized and trained Reserve was an essential part of national defense.

Later in the decade, the General Staff began to develop annual Protective Mobilization Plans for national defense. The plans were unrealistic and based on nonexistent manpower and very optimistic timetables. In 1939 with war raging in Europe, the plan called for the Regular Army and the National Guard, as an initial protective force of 400,000, to "withstand any onslaught" until reinforced by ORC cadre units.¹⁴

Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. The following week, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared a state of national emergency and authorized an increase in the size of the Regular Army. However, by not activating ORC units, Army expansion ignored prewar mobilization planning, a situation that was repeated later in Korea, in Vietnam and to some extent, in *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. Reserve officers with prewar assignments to Regular Army units and headquarters received early call-up notification. As the Regular Army expanded and the National Guard federalized, Reserve officers were called to active duty on an availability basis, as fillers.¹⁵ The Selective Training and Service Act was passed on 16 September 1940. The Army reached a strength of almost one and a half million men by 30 June 1941. Before plans were prepared to absorb additional manpower, Japanese naval air forces attacked Pearl Harbor, and the tempo and urgency of mobilization increased. Plans were then developed to fill new cadre units.

In 1942, as units of the ORC were activated, it was their numerical designations, not the personnel, that were brought on active duty. The Order of Battle for World War II lists 26 ORC divisions. When these divisions were activated, only a few officers remained. Others were either drawn off to fill Regular Army and National Guard units or to serve in a multitude of staff assignments. These ORC divisions then "were not reserve divisions in any real sense of the word."¹⁶ These units and nondivisional units, on mobilization, had to have new cadres assigned from previously mobilized Regular Army or National Guard units.



During the hard fighting for Fort Stotsenberg, 37th Infantry Division soldiers track down snipers on the southwestern tip of Clark Field, Luzon, 11 or 12 February 1945.

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General George C. Marshall, chief of staff, approved an Army General Headquarters organization and training plan for a cadre system in January 1942. The plan authorized a division cadre of 9.8 percent. This provided 172 officers and 1,190 enlisted men for an infantry triangular division (three brigades) with an authorized strength of 452 officers and 13,425 enlisted men. Cadre size increased several times until it reached 216 officers (50 percent of authorized strength) and 1,460 enlisted men, or 12 percent of the authorized division strength.¹⁷ Once the last soldier in camp arrived, the cadre was ready to begin the 13-week mobilization training program.¹⁸

A decision was made in the fall of 1942 to increase the number of troops reporting to a newly activated division by 15 percent. The Army deemed this necessary because, prior to the completion of a training cycle, divisions were required to provide cadres for other forming units.¹⁹ Division commanders were torn by the need to send quality soldiers to serve as cadre for the new units and a desire to retain the best sol-

diers for their own units. It remains a source of amazement to scoring officers that the Army was "as able to obtain the selection of a very high percentage of superior personnel as nuclei for the new divisions."²⁰

The cadre system developed for World War II mobilization worked. Although there were instances of poor performance, the majority of units deployed overseas became effective fighting forces. One can only speculate on how much more effective early deploying units might have been in combat if the Army had been able to implement a fully manned and trained prewar cadre system for the ORC during the interwar period. At the conclusion of World War II, the Army sought means to maintain an effective fighting force in the face of postwar budget cuts and continues in that effort today.

The IDF Model

Other armies around the world have also attempted to overcome similar obstacles. One such army, the IDF, seems to have resolved the

problem of funding a large Army by placing 60 percent of its forces in the reserves. It may be accurate to state that there has never been a citizen army that has mobilized as rapidly and fought as effectively as the IDF.

In 1949, the IDF adopted Switzerland's citizen army concept. The Swiss army was composed of a small cadre of regular forces primarily responsible for training, long-range planning and maintenance of a "massive civilian army supported by large qualities (sic) of armor, artillery, air force, etc." Service in the army was, and is, mandatory and so too is reserve duty. For Israeli purposes, the Swiss model was a workable solution for a country whose population and economy could not afford a large standing army.²¹ The Israelis created a small cadre of permanent service (Keva) officers and noncommissioned officers; a compulsory service (Hova) composed of draftees, men and women; and a large body of ready reserves (miluimm) that included all the soldiers who complete their compulsory active duty service.²²

The most critical and unique aspect of the IDF is the miluimm, which is "its most important operational component rather than just being an appendage to the regular force." The key to the IDF's battlefield successes is the miluimm, which contains 60 percent of its total strength and 65 percent of its combat units. Miluimm and Keva units are intermixed and interchangeable in all deployed formations.²³

To fill these formations, every Israeli citizen is required to perform military service. After a soldier's compulsory service or Hova has ended, he or she enters the miluimm. This year of no training requirements is similar to the US Army's IRR category of RT-12 (recently trained in the last 12 months) whose members performed so admirably in *Desert Storm*. In the miluimm, men are eligible for mobilization until age 55 and childless women until age 34. Each reservist, until a certain age, is liable to be called up for 31 days annually, plus time for other training.²⁴

Reservists are assigned to units near their homes in a position to match their military occupation skill. If a soldier has a civilian occupation that matches a military specialty, he or she is cer-

tain to be placed in that specialty when conscripted. If it is likely a certain specialty will be understrength in the miluimm, the IDF will overstrength it in the active force. The Israelis firmly believe that it is not efficient to change a soldier's specialty once he has acquired the skills on active duty.²⁵

Approximately 65 percent of the IDF's combat units are in the reserve or miluimm compared to about 52 percent in the US Army today. The basic unit in the IDF is the brigade, either armor, infantry or airborne. The brigade is a self-contained tactical unit made up of three battalions with combat service and combat service support units. Each unit has its own armory. Training is conducted at the armory or at special centers. Periods of active duty might also find a miluimm unit relieving a Keva unit on border duty or performing internal security patrols. Unit equipment is never switched between individuals or crews who perform their own maintenance when training.²⁶

To maintain the miluimm in a high-readiness posture, the IDF relies on a cadre system. The specifics of this system are not exactly known; as in so many other aspects of the IDF, much of the information is classified. However, the general outline of this system is available from open sources. First there are administrative, headquarters and service positions within the Keva that are occupied by reservists not serving in the combat brigades. This is a relatively late (1970s) practice for the IDF. Israeli service school instructors are also assigned as cadre to miluimm formations and spend five days in the classroom and the sixth day with a miluimm unit. Even though the IDF is a reserve establishment, its senior officers are in the Keva. Division commanders are regulars. Divisions, while having no organic forces permanently assigned, do coordinate the activities of the brigades assigned. Some brigade commanders and their staffs are also Keva, but others are commanded by reservists, assisted by miluimm staffs.²⁷

Regardless of the component of the brigade commander or his staff, each miluimm brigade has a small cadre of Keva soldiers responsible for

Israeli M50 Sherman tanks
(converted from M4A3E8s)
climbing up the Golan Heights.
The aged Shermans success-
fully engaged Syrian T-62s in
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.



Approximately 65 percent of the IDF's combat units are in the reserve or miluimm compared to about 52 percent in the US Army today. The basic unit in the IDF is the brigade, either armor, infantry or airborne. . . Each unit has its own armory. . . Unit equipment is never switched between individuals or crews who perform their own maintenance when training. . . The number of days the Israeli citizen-soldier trains varies . . . [but] the minimum amount of time required by law [during peacetime] is very close to the drill days authorized for US RC units.

administration and the maintenance of stores and equipment. The miluimm brigade has a Keva liaison officer who functions as a personnel manager and maintains contacts with the reserve soldiers. This officer has counterparts in each of the brigades. He has a direct line to the battle commanders, who might be either Keva or miluimm officers, and with their staffs that may also be a composite of the two components.²⁷

Because of the need to have equipment ready for immediate use and because of modern weapon sophistication, another cadre exists within each miluimm unit. This is a cadre of Keva non-commissioned officers and enlisted men who are the day-to-day "maintenance, repair and supply specialists." It is this cadre system that gave the Israelis in the 1973 Middle East War the ability "to have substantial elements of four reserve divisions fighting actively on both fronts within 30 hours of the surprise Arab offense and is proof of the general efficiency of the system, and of its overwhelming success in this instance."²⁹

The Israeli army's force structure provides the example of just how sharp that readiness edge can be honed for mobilization. The US Army

does not have the need to mobilize its Reserve units as rapidly as the IDF requires, but needs a more responsive system than the one in place today, especially for combat units such as the roundout brigades. The number of days the Israeli citizen-soldier trains varies a great deal and is dependent on the political climate of the region. However, the minimum amount of time required by law in a realistic, peacetime environment is very close to the drill days authorized for US RC units. If the IDF has accepted this time as a standard and fields its reserve immediately into combat, is it not possible for the US RCs to shorten their mobilization time?

The IDF has a very positive attitude toward its reserve. Obviously with the bulk of the force in the miluimm, the emphasis has to be there. The IDF cadre system is extremely successful, and assignments of Keva officers to reserve units are accepted as the norm and apparently do not affect career mobility. In fact, these assignments even enhance advancement. Keva officers are assigned down to battalion level in command and staff positions. These cadre are placed in IDF miluimm units with no particular motive other

than finding the best officer for the assignment. There appears to be no official or unofficial ratio of miluimm to Keva command positions. Miluimm officers who show promise can command at brigade level and are on some division headquarters staffs. The elements of stability, experience and knowledge of Keva officers are major factors that produce superior battlefield results for miluimm units.

Since Keva cadre soldiers mobilize with the miluimm unit, their expertise is of extreme value in combat and adds to the efficiency of the unit. The number of individuals assigned is unavailable, but it appears significant. This arrangement seems to be similar to US Mobilization and Training Equipment Sites/Equipment Concentration Sites and Area Maintenance Support Activities. The most significant difference between the two armies appears to be the IDF's emphasis on driver and crew responsibility for an assigned vehicle.

The IDF cadre system is battle-proven. Miluimm unit readiness, rapid mobilization and combat effectiveness are partially the result of the influence of high-caliber Keva officers and enlisted personnel assigned as commanders, staff officers and support personnel. The Israelis have proved that a cadre system can be effective even with 60 percent of its total force and 65 percent of its combat arms units in their reserve.

A Cadre System for the US Army


While the United States continues to have the luxury of more time to mobilize than the Israelis, reductions in force and the new global environment dictate an improved or more viable system than now exists. Fortunately, our 20th century conflicts were either small or far removed geographically. This meant that regardless of how long and halting mobilization was, the nation's survival was never at stake. Deep Army appropriation cuts, not seen since the Depression, now come at a time that is more dangerous than the 1930s and with global commitments not imagined in the interwar period. With the experience gained in *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, the time has arrived to reexamine

our traditional force structure and break through the conflicting philosophies and preconceived attitudes to develop a viable force structure for the future.

A cadre system for a portion of the AC, Army National Guard and Army Reserve is essential to maintain a viable deterrent force. There must continue to be an AC of sufficient strength for immediate deployment, Ready Reserve troop program units to support contingency operations and units of the Army National Guard to reinforce early deployment. The actual size of each must be determined by the National Command Authority, not only considering security needs but also selecting the most cost-effective mix. The recommendation for the cadre system is a concept; the actual numbers, units and geographical locations will require a significant amount of staff work that is beyond the scope of this article. Some consideration must also be given to the mix of these cadre units within larger units. Troop reductions and budgetary considerations will have a significant impact on what the cadre systems will look like and how the entire force is eventually packaged.

One cadre system could consist of a number of AC units selected to be withdrawn from overseas and units currently stationed in the United States. The AC cadre in this instance should consist of key command, staff, support personnel, officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted soldiers. The cadre maintains the unit's administrative integrity and equipment. There must also be another mission to make the system cost-effective. The cadre in this regard will be responsible not only for equipment maintenance and routine administration but also the screening and training of IRR soldiers within a reasonable commuting distance. Peacetime missions such as the "war on drugs" should also be considered.

To date, IRR soldiers have had no requirement to train other than a one-day screening. The secretary of the Army has the authority to call them to active duty for 30 days of training annually. The IRR can be called to active duty only if war is declared or in a state of national emergency as in *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*.



Soldiers servicing 4th Infantry Division M60A1s prior to their transfer to National Guard Center, Colorado.

Deep Army appropriation cuts, not seen since the Depression, now come at a time that is more dangerous than the 1930s and with global commitments not imagined in the interwar period. With the experience gained in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the time has arrived to reexamine our traditional force structure and break through the conflicting philosophies and preconceived attitudes to develop a viable force structure for the future.

If either occurs, IRR RT-12 soldiers are to be used as fillers for deploying units regardless of the component of the receiving unit. This was accomplished efficiently and effectively during *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. The balance of the IRR is to be used as casualty replacements. Thus, the primary source of pretrained manpower readily available in a crisis, beyond the AC and the Selected Reserve, is the IRR. With the advances in computer technology, cadre units could provide refresher training in the screening process or during additional active duty for training periods for this critical manpower pool.

The second cadre system involves units of the Army National Guard, Army Reserve and some AC units. All past mobilizations have occurred in phases. As with current time-phased deployment schedules, some units will be selected earlier because current planning requires their mobilization, perhaps as part of, or in support of, a contingency corps rapid deployment force. Units that have early deployment requirements can be staffed with additional Active Guard Reserve officers and enlisted personnel and with

nondeploying AC trainers. The percentage of cadre would vary, based on the deployment requirements and the complexity of the weapon systems or support equipment. High priority AC units at cadre strength could be composed of drilling Mobilization Augmentees. Upon mobilization, these units would have priority for IRR RT-12 soldiers. An enhancement to the program could see the preassignment of IRR soldiers, especially those in the same geographic location as the unit.

Some cadre units must be located based on population density to ensure sufficient Ready Reserve participation and IRR soldier involvement. The US Army Recruiting Command can locate battalions and stations according to population density. The IRR screening program is successful in pulling in most IRR soldiers living a 50-mile radius from each recruiting station. Other cadre units can be located at existing installations. Constant monitoring of demographic factors is essential.

The change in the command and control of the Army Reserve is ideal for a cadre system. The

Army Reserve Personnel Center, which by regulation, now manages all Army Reserve officers, will be able to manage them in fact as well. Currently, the center manages Active Guard Reserve, Individual Mobilization Augmentees and IRR members. The center will now, for the first time, manage troop program unit enlisted soldiers. This centralized management for the Army Reserve can enhance a cadre system.

One problem the Army faces now that also affects the cadre system is military occupation specialty (MOS) mismatch. The Israeli army deliberately overstrengths certain MOSs to ensure that these skills appear in its reserve units. To introduce such a program would be an act of faith on the part of the AC, for it implies an integrated Total Army concept of mutually supporting components. However, this leads to another problem within the force.

There still remains a lack of understanding about, and a decisive commitment to, the RCs on the part of a portion of the AC. If the Congress continues to support the current force structure with an across-the-board personnel reduction, this problem will remain an irritant. However, as the influences of a peacetime environment after *Desert Storm* become greater,

budget adjustments will continue in a downward spiral, and the AC will continue to diminish in size. To plan any sizable operation, even a Grenada or Panama, will require increasingly more rapid mobilization of RC units.

Greater emphasis must be placed on a flexible force structure that is economically sound and professionally responsive. A balanced combination of AC units, early deploying AC cadre units, Army Reserve and Army National Guard units with increased Active Guard Reserve cadre and supporting AC personnel will provide a trained and ready force that has rapid mobilization and deployment capability. These forces will give follow-on Army Reserve and Army National Guard units time to mobilize, conduct postmobilization training and then, if required, deploy.

The United States has never followed through on plans for an effective peacetime force structure. The cadre system offers an opportunity to create a viable force within peacetime budget constraints. A cadre system for the US Army can work, perhaps not with the rapidity of the Israeli army, but with sufficient effectiveness to meet this nation's defense requirements. What is needed first is a commitment and dedication to a true one-Army concept. **MR**

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13. Kilgrew, V-25.

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17. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley and William R. Kent, *U.S. Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1948), 435-36.
18. *Ibid.*, 442.
19. *Ibid.*, 438.
20. *Ibid.*, 440.
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22. Reuven Gal, *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986), 11.
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24. Edward Luftwak and Daniel Horowitz, *The Israeli Army, 1948-1973* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), 75 and 79; Roibant, 82-83; and Gal, 39 and 42.
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26. Luftwak, 78; Gal, 39, 179 and 233; and Roibant, 87.
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RESERVE COMPONENTS' C² TACTICAL

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Rozman, US Army
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WE WILL have a smaller post-Gulf War Army. With this reduction in Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces, it becomes obvious to all professionals that training will take on added importance, especially in the RC. These realities pose several questions that must be answered if readiness is to be adequately maintained. Will the Reserves (the Army National Guard [ARNG] and US Army Reserve [USAR]) be able to train to standard in a smaller force? If the training resource pool grows proportionately smaller with the force, will the Army, on its lesser base, be able to "surge train" as it did in the early stages of *Desert Shield*? Will this smaller Army be able to support an intensive postmobilization "lane training strategy" like the one used to train three ARNG heavy brigades in the winter of 1990-1991?

The answers to these questions are being pieced together now from the unfolding lessons of operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. This article addresses one very important area of concern—tactical command and control (C²) of RC maneuver units in peacetime. Specifically, it focuses on the role this command element plays in peacetime training. Much of what we are learning from the Southwest Asia mobilization increasingly points toward a need for ways and means of "jump starting" RC unit training in order to rapidly bring it to AC standard. This need is especially critical if the organized force base, Active and Reserve, grows smaller. C² may be an area that can provide optimum leverage.

This view appears to be particularly valid based on postmobilization day (M-day) experience

Much of what we are learning from the Southwest Asia mobilization increasingly points toward a need for ways and means of "jump starting" RC unit training in order to rapidly bring it to AC standard. This need is especially critical if the organized force base, Active and Reserve, grows smaller. C² may be an area that can provide optimum leverage.

with the three heavy ARNG brigades activated in November and December 1990. Because of the difficulties experienced by their C² elements in rapidly achieving effectiveness in the challenging training regimen required of maneuver formations, C² appears to be a particularly lucrative area to focus resources and effort to rapidly bring units to standard. To achieve expeditious integration of these key RC units into the Active force, C² as the controlling agent of unit training to standard is the essential catalyst. This includes premobilization and postmobilization training.

The questions and discussions offered here are intended to find better methods to meet the peacetime and transition-to-war C² requirements. The recommendation proposed is made considering mobilization requirements on a smaller force structure.

The Heavy Force Challenge

Because the range of combat, combat support and combat service support units in the Reserves is so immense, this discussion is restricted to

consideration of the heavy maneuver force. This does not mean that the discussion is irrelevant to the other arms. More important, the heavy force maneuver unit depends on successful mastering of support, leader, tactical and execution skills at

The heavy force maneuver unit depends on successful mastering of support, leader, tactical and execution skills at an increasingly rapid pace of operations at all levels . . . Along with political, doctrinal and other reasons, tremendous technological changes have caused an exponential advance in complexity. . . . The heavy force brigade or division depends on synergy from an extensive array of individual and collective skills. It has to achieve this synergy in an environment of unforgiving lethality.

an increasingly rapid pace of operations at all levels from individual soldier to brigade. Along with political, doctrinal and other reasons, tremendous technological changes have caused an exponential advance in complexity on the heavy force battlefield. So the heavy force situation best illustrates the objective of this article. More than any other force package, the heavy force brigade or division depends on synergy from an extensive array of individual and collective skills. It has to achieve this synergy in an environment of unforgiving lethality and one in which there are few master practitioners of the C² art.

It is key to note that with the advent of force-on-force training technologies, the wise and perceptive Active Army commander and his C² headquarters quickly learned their limitations on the modern heavy force battlefield. The National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, with its instrumentation, the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), and detailed after-action review process, has proved to be a humbling place that has

shown (and continues to show) the full-time professional how much he does not know.

Considering that the AC full-time professional has the advantage of eating, sleeping and living in the environment of unit administration, maintenance, personnel management, discipline, and so forth, these mundane but essential subsystems have become second nature. They are almost a reflex in the juggling act of establishing priorities for a heavy force commander. In contrast, his part-time Reserve counterpart does not regularly experience this environment and even when he does it is amid Reserve-unique (particularly for the ARNG) challenges of soldier retention issues, familiarity, political considerations, and the like.

Of even more concern, the systems of personnel administration, discipline, maintenance, supply and others are different from those of the Active Army. Even with a "well-oiled" machine, going from a known system to a different one is not easy and takes time. When confronted with multiples of new systems, without generous adjustment time worked in, the transition could be "rough" (if not resulting in a total breakdown of unit function). It is important to note here that we are not even talking about the business of training to standard in the demanding art of tactical and operational movement and employment of forces (moving, shooting and communicating of units).


Given a reality like the one just discussed, how does the Army approach the difficult challenge of being able to expand itself from a smaller base during mobilization? How does it expand through varying, and possibly increasing, levels of force size in response to a wide range of potential contingency operations (CONOPS) along the continuum of conflict? How will the Army be able to do this if it is significantly smaller than it is today, particularly if its Active training infrastructure of institutions, individual and leader training systems are included in the downsizing of the Army?

It is very clear that there must be a viable Reserve structure that can quickly "fill out" the force to necessary expanded levels. But, we must

now ask whether the Total Force systems that have evolved can meet the challenge of training an expanding force? Certainly, we can see relative validity in the current system with Reserve combat service support units and individuals. The service support skills developed in peacetime are almost immediately transferable to a full-time military sphere. The most obvious example would be the medical area. However, arms such as heavy maneuver, which depend on a tough, training regimen to achieve synergy, have a tremendous challenge in peacetime. Even with the intense full-time effort of Active units, it is not easy. For the Reserves it is harder, and the traditional system may need revision. This is particularly the case if the Reserve heavy forces must be used quickly.

Let us assume, then, that the nation will have an immediate need for additional heavy force units. These units will have to be less dependent on a robust Active Army training base for certification in meeting "trained to standard" requirements because the smaller force will be lean. If the country requires rapid train-up of these forces, we must seek alternative methods to bring soldiers and units to basic levels of skill qualification. We must identify a factor that can compensate for time.

A possible answer is the C^2 mechanism. If C^2 elements can maintain high levels of competency, the major effort during train-up can focus on providing competent soldiers and crews that can be more quickly organized into ready units. These units can then be moved through a rapid, tough, go-to-war train-up strategy and can be brought up to collective training standard quickly. But this highly competent C^2 mechanism is not easily achieved. C^2 has proved to be one of the most difficult of the battlefield operating systems for the RC leadership to master in its limited training time. Leaders with active service levels of competency in C^2 are needed to "jump start" the system. How do we get them? How do we structure the Reserves to maintain an adequate level of C^2 proficiency so that their units can focus their train-up time and emphasis more efficiently? One answer is a C^2 structure at bri-



1st Cavalry Division operations officers at the NTC.

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gade and above, fully manned by full-time Active soldiers, and we should investigate that avenue as a solution.

The remainder of this article presents a possible approach. Discussion is generated with full knowledge that some of what is being offered treads on emotional areas. This is particularly

The AC full-time professional has the advantage of eating, sleeping and living in the environment of unit-administration, maintenance, personnel management, discipline, and so forth. . . these mundane but essential subsystems have become second nature. They are almost a reflex in the juggling act of establishing priorities for a heavy force commander. In contrast, his part-time Reserve counterpart does not regularly experience this environment and even when he does it is amid [the] Reserve-unique challenges.

true of the ARNG. The intent is not to divest the Guard of a mission or the nation of its militia. In fact, the approach endeavors to preserve the best of the ARNG traditions, while confronting the emerging realities of the smaller, fiscally constrained, CONOPS-oriented Army. This is a world where technical incompetence of maneuver forces promises to reward that incompetency with large-scale death of our soldiers. Nevertheless, it remains a world where the nation may have to rapidly expand its forces to significant levels from a smaller Active base.

This discussion fully appreciates that what is being considered—rapidly available units trained to a high standard—is a function of many factors. However, as a single area that might exponentially contribute to a solution, especially on reduced means, the focus will be on the C² area. The potential payoff is worth a sincere and objective review.

A C² Approach for the Maneuver Unit Reserves

The title of the article refers to tactical C² of Reserve units. There can be considerable argument over a precise definition of this notion. For purposes of this discussion, it applies to a peacetime C² node (headquarters) that oversees all warfighting training, individual and collective, of a set of subordinate units. On mobilization,

this node fulfills its wartime C² function.

Previous comments alluded to the recent experiences with competency levels that can be expected from certain types of inactive C² nodes upon mobilization, especially the types of C² that promise to become more difficult to master. These are the maneuver types of C², particularly for the heavy force. The anticipated reduction in size of the CONOPS Army and the time required for our traditional Reserve C² system to reach certification standards based on recent ARNG brigade mobilizations do not bode well for future battlefield success. We must seek an alternative system.

A model worth considering is as follows:

- For maneuver (combat arms) forces, organize nothing above the battalion level. It could be argued that the level should be company or brigade, but for the purpose of discussion here, battalion is most appropriate.
- Tactical C² above that level is fully AC headquarters, responsible for training and contingency mission readiness.

In the case of ARNG units, the militia function remains intact in that, for administration (and strictly state requirements), the battalion and separate companies report directly to the state adjutant general, who also retains a post-mobilization mission as currently described, possibly one that could be expanded and refined.

Such a system retains the proud tradition of the ancient National Guard regiments, some of which saw active service in the early Colonial Indian Wars and against the French in the Seven Years' War (French and Indian War).¹ In the case of the infantry particularly, we have the only maneuver units of our Army that fly battle streamers from the Revolution. To say the least, this heritage is worth preserving, even if resources are constrained.

The issue, certainly a political one, is what happens to ARNG, and to a lesser degree, USAR brigade and divisional command headquarters? Certainly, on tradition alone, some of these headquarters represent great and worthy American military history in World War I, World War II and Korea. However, none have

An M60A1 fires during
a night exercise at Fort
Hood, Texas.



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fought since.² Certainly, some of these could be used to create the C² system proposed here.

More germane to the discussion, what happens to the part-time senior officer practitioners of the art of war? It is possible that in the heavy maneuver arena, in a CONOPS environment, we have reached a point of national transition. That is, the business has become so specialized, complex and technical that it requires the dedication of full-time professionals. Otherwise it will not work. This is certainly a tough pill to swallow given tradition, law and political interests. However, in terms of senior-leader roles, all is not bleak. All senior leaders above the grade of lieutenant colonel, of all Army components, will have to accept a smaller system anyway; so the real issue becomes one of making our smaller Army as good as possible with considerably fewer resources. Tough choices cannot be avoided.

An important point must be made here. This is not a slap at the professionalism and dedication of Reserve leaders. Even with the somewhat slower C² systems and less capable weapons of World War II, to produce proficient C² at regi-

mental (today's brigade) and division levels in National Guard units, substantial periods of train-up were necessary to reach the standard of that time.³ Significant infusions of leader personnel from the Active Army pool were part of the process (Regular Army, Army Reserve and Army of the United States). In fact, the divisions, as the war progressed, came to have the personnel character of most other divisions in the Army. This was a result of individual replacements at the soldier level from the draft pool and complemented what was happening with the leaders.⁴

The same situation occurred with the six Guard divisions federalized for Korea. Even though a fair percentage of the Guardsmen in 1950 had battle experience that was only five years old, the divisions, during their post-M-dav train-up, received significant numbers of people from the Active Army replacement system to bring them up to strength. They all required a four- to six-month train-up before deployment overseas (40th and 45th Infantry divisions to Korea and the 28th and 43d Infantry divisions to

Germany, the 31st and 47th remaining in the Continental United States).⁵ The 43d Infantry, from September 1950 until its return from Germany to the United States and state control in June 1954, was over that time transformed into

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a division very similar in makeup to Active divisions of that time.⁶ For example, the division chief of staff and regimental commanders by 1952 were all Regular Army officers.⁷ In fact, the division that returned, less the small contingent of remaining Guardsmen, was redesignated as the 9th Infantry Division.⁸

If a smaller force, in a world requiring more rapid force availability, must have some of its critical maneuver elements, (particularly parts of its heavy force structure) in the Reserves, it is becoming increasingly critical to bring these formations more rapidly to certification. As the C² function also becomes increasingly complex, our current system fails to meet the requirement.

Noting recent and past experience, the answer may be the fully Active brigade and divisional headquarters outlined here. These headquarters would have no troop units permanently assigned during peacetime. However, they would have a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) complement of RC battalions. They would be responsible for "war training" these battalions in peacetime up to platoon level on the 39 Reserve training days available each year. These headquarters would be organized under the Continental US armies (CONUSA). They would be responsible for the pre-M-day and post-M-day training strategy and execu-

tion up to certification of the brigade by the CONUSA.

These headquarters would consist of a mix of Active Army, USAR and ARNG officers and soldiers in a full-strength brigade or division headquarters organization. All Reserve personnel would be in an active duty, full-time capacity. The commander and operations and training officer would be Active Army officers. The deputy commander would be of the RC that provided the majority of the subordinate battalions and separate companies.

These headquarters, in addition to planning and supervising the war training of their assigned battalions, would be responsible for conducting their own aggressive warfighting training. The objective would be a headquarters trained to standard as a tactical C² element. They would accomplish this mission through individual and collective training designed to build and perfect the ability of the headquarters to C² subordinate battalions, train them and properly orchestrate all necessary support functions. This training would incorporate use of command post exercises (CPXs), Army Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) exercises and C² of Active battalions from other Active brigades for exercises and training purposes.

Through this device of fully Active and thoroughly trained C² nodes (headquarters), the activation, training and ultimate fighting of Reserve battalions would be in the hands of seasoned staffs experienced in modern C² functions and professional in its execution. The leadership problems and dislocations of the past at brigade (regimental) and divisional levels would be greatly mitigated. Reserve units will be more focused on maintaining readiness standards at the level to which they are trained and, therefore, will become a known quantity for strategic planners. With individual and platoon-level training accomplished by the Reserve battalions during their 39 training days per year, and brigade and division headquarters training accomplished by Active full-time commanders and staffs year-round, postmobilization training can then focus on collective unit training at compa-



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ny to battalion levels. This produces a much more manageable training effort and a force that can be ready for contingency missions in a much shorter time.

Because the brigade and division C² elements are composites, full-time ARNG and USAR officers are not denied the opportunity to advance and obtain experience. If anything, such opportunities are enhanced through a tighter association with Regular Army counterparts in a fully operational active duty environment. RC assignments to these postings can be on a rotational or long-term basis, whichever is more prefer-

able to the two components in terms of career progression. Also, rank structures could be developed whereby the deputy commander of a brigade, whose commander is an Active Army colonel, might also be a colonel (similar to a system used by the German *Bundeswehr's Bundesheer*). This relationship would have to be carefully considered for its ramifications, but it could work.

The objective, then, is to have all tactical C² structure in the Army at brigade and division levels on a fully Active footing. Some of it, the most ready for deployment, consists of fully manned

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Active Army formations (today's AC force structure). The remainder of brigade and division maneuver force headquarters would control ARNG and USAR units for contingency mission training. Each ARNG unit would remain under its state adjutant general for state missions. In other words, this is a system of cadre headquarters to which Reserve units are assigned. Using this system, it is anticipated that the Army could reduce the train-up time of Reserve forces because of an immediately proficient C² capability.

Certainly, there is a broad range of different combinations that could be applied. Some examples include: a mix of Active and Reserve battalions assigned to AC headquarters, different mixes of components in the C² elements of these headquarters such as some commanded by USAR or ARNG officers with Active Army deputies, and so forth. However, as the recent experience with the intense heavy force training of the ARNG brigades activated for *Desert Storm* has shown, it takes more than 70 days to bring inactive heavy force C² elements to baseline competency. As the Active Army professional

has learned through demanding rotations at the NTC and its virtual war environment, it is a tough, complex business, and the battlefield is pitiless. Even the wisest Active C² element, trained in an active duty situation, improves and more fully appreciates what it does not know. This battlefield does not know politics back home, only performance and results.

Finding the Assets

At first, formation of fully Active brigade and division C² units for the entire force sounds like a massive undertaking. It may seem even more difficult in view of currently authorized and certainly, projected Active and Reserve force levels. However, the Active Army personnel may be available in the form of soldiers and officers assigned to the readiness regions, some US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) assets, recruiting commands, and so forth. Noting that these units will be hybrids of Active, Reserve and ARNG forces, the personnel in such a program are probably available with appropriate reorganization. This would be possible since the essential functions for many of these current organizations would be assumed by the proposed C² units. This is apparent when we review readiness region functions that provide substantial Active Army counterpart support to a fully manned, part-time Reserve C² structure.

Probably more germane than all of this rationale is the very real possibility that by 1995, the Army will not be able to afford to man and train the force the way it has been doing it. The current system will have to change regardless. In terms of equipment, it is basically available in the structure today. The projected brigade and division C² unit requirements for the force over the next five years will decrease as the force structure decreases.

The New Total Force

In this discussion of an approach for producing an expanded battle-ready ground maneuver force from Reserve assets, the focus is on a C² solution. We have seen the increasing difficulty of taking the continually modernizing lethal and



Senior divisional officers inspecting annual National Guard training.

The objective, then, is to have all tactical C² structure in the Army at brigade and division levels on a fully Active footing. Some of it, the most ready for deployment, consists of fully manned Active Army formations. The remainder of brigade and division maneuver force headquarters would control ARNG and USAR units for contingency mission training. . . . This is a system of cadre headquarters to which Reserve units are assigned . . . The Army could reduce the train-up time of Reserve forces because of an immediately proficient C² capability.

complex heavy force from inactive status and quickly training it to certifiable standards for combat employment. It is now obvious that problems exist in our current system of Reserve training of combat formations that must achieve combat-ready certification quickly upon mobilization. It begs for a solution that offers a way to jump start Reserve combat formations in the training and certification process.

Finding the best solution is particularly critical when we realize that budget alone will cause the Army to reduce to a much smaller Active force. This force will be more dependent on the Reserves for expansion, particularly in an environment where CONOPS training and readiness will be the rule. A model for a revamped C² structure combining AC professionalism and competency with RC individual and small unit

training strengths. This solution takes the form of following straightforward concepts:

- Fully active brigade and division C² elements staffed by full-time Active Army, USAR and ARNG personnel for all RC maneuver battalions.
- These C² elements would control all RC maneuver units for peacetime warfighting training.
- RC maneuver forces would be organized only up to battalion.
- Peacetime training of RC battalions and companies would focus on individual military occupational specialty qualification and collective training up to platoon level.
- ARNG units for state missions would continue to respond to state adjutants general.
- Career development issues for ARNG

The recent experience with the intense heavy force training of the ARNG brigades activated for Desert Storm has shown, it takes more than 70 days to bring inactive heavy force C² elements to baseline competency. . . . Even the wisest Active C² element, trained in an active duty situation, improves and more fully appreciates what it does not know. This battlefield does not know politics back home, only performance and results.

and USAR officers would be adapted to accommodate a scheme of periodic assignment to active duty with the Active brigade and division headquarters.

Certainly, there may be legal, political and other hurdles to these admittedly controversial proposals. However, the time for rigid adherence to previously acceptable, traditional systems is past. This is particularly true now for finding ways to rapidly expand the heavy force to meet a wide array of missions in a CONOPS environment. The battlefield we are talking about is far too deadly and our future forces will be too scarce and valuable a commodity to squander. We must find solutions, such as those proposed here, regardless of how politically unappealing they may be. Our smaller force for the future must be composed of the best mix of Active and Reserve components. It must also be trained in such a way that gives our soldiers the best chance for success on the battlefield and makes the best use of our nation's human and material resources. **MR**

NOTES

1. Such units as the 182d Infantry (in 1733, the 1st Regiment of Militia of Middlesex), Massachusetts National Guard, which claims an organization date of 1636, along with other Massachusetts regiments, provided the basis for annually formed provincial regiments during the Seven Years' War, sometimes taking the field itself for short periods, exemplify these traditions. This particular regiment is authorized battle streamers to its colors for Lexington, Boston, Quebec, New York 1778 and New York 1779. For a discussion of lineage and honors for the 182d and others such as the 116th and 176th Infantry, two Virginia regiments that saw much service during the Seven Years' War (though both regiments have earlier lineage, they both trace from the 1st and 2d Virginia regiments of this war, the 1st having been commanded by Colonel George Washington) and the Revolution, see James A. Sawicki's *Infantry Regiments of the U.S. Army* (Dumfries, VA: Wyvern Publications, 1981). For a discussion of how provincial regiments were raised from militia units in Massachusetts and other colonies, see Fred Anderson's *A People's Army* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 26-27.

2. For a good summarization of battle service for divisional units that now exist only in the Army Reserve or National Guard see, *The Army Almanac* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Company, 1959), 650-95. The listings are for World War I, World War II and Korea. Though Reserve divisions were mobilized during the Cuban missile crisis and Berlin Wall situation, none have seen battle since Korea.

3. Some insight to the leader problems encountered is provided in a discussion in LTC Marvin A. Kreidberg and 1LT Merton G. Henry's *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-212, 30 November 1955), 604-605. The following quote from page 604 is interesting: "In National Guard units the state of training was such that men who were themselves incompletely trained were called on to give basic training to raw selectees. Mobilization plans and regulations had made no provisions for assembling the cadres—officer and noncom-

missioned—of the National Guard units enough in advance to train them to receive and in turn train their units when mobilized." Page 605 has an equally illuminating point: "The National Guard had on its rosters many officers and non-commissioned officers who because of a lack of adequate training were not adept either in military skills or leadership." The 32d Infantry Division was brought into active federal service in May 1940, Shelby L. Stanton's *Order of Battle U.S. Army in World War II* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984), 112. Units of the division first entered combat in September 1942 and still were not trained to standard for the type of warfare they encountered, Lida Mayo's *Bloody Buna* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1974), 54. By this point in the war, key commanders of the divisions, (for example, MG Edwin F. Harding, commander, 32d Division) were Regular Army officers. The bottom line is that training to standard takes time, even in a less technocratic war and, ultimately, takes the most talented trainers in the force to succeed.

4. A very good discussion as to why this occurred is provided in Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer and Bell I. Wiley's *U.S. Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1947), 244-45.

5. James F. Schnabel, *U.S. Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), 124-25, 294, 345 and 385; provides considerable discussion about readiness challenges and the character of these units.

6. A letter, dated 11 September 1972 from the US Army chief of military history, provided a lineage and honors for the 169th Infantry, a subordinate unit of the 43d Infantry Division, that established 5 September 1950 as the mobilization date with 15 June 1954 as the release date from active federal service.

7. Unnumbered pages 14 through 17 of 43d Infantry Division Pictorial Review, 1952, and the Register of Graduates, United States Military Academy, verify the Regular Army status of these officers.

8. Reassignment orders for CPT R. W. Rozman, June 1954

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The ARMY NATIONAL GUARD in a Changing Strategic Environment

**Colonel Gary L. Adams, Army National Guard, and
Lieutenant Colonel Dwain L. Crowson, Army National Guard**

ON 13 DECEMBER 1636, three Massachusetts Bay militia regiments were organized, later to be mobilized for the Pequot War of 1637. In 1775, they fired the "shot heard round the world" at the battles of Lexington and Concord to begin the Revolutionary War.¹

Following this auspicious beginning, the Founding Fathers placed the militia clause in the Constitution so that the new nation would rely on a small standing army in peacetime yet could expand its forces in war through the use of a large, trained citizen-soldier militia.² This is the background of, and the basis for, the modern-day National Guard. But will this militia serve the nation as well in the future as it has in the past? As we face the challenge of a changing strategic environment, we must ask ourselves whether the National Guard can play a major role in our new national military strategy and, if it can, what that role should be. On this subject, President George Bush said, "... reserves will be important, but in new ways. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term mobilization has diminished. We can now adjust the size, structure and readiness of our reserve forces to help us deal with the more likely challenges we will face."³

To determine the proper role for the Army National Guard (ARNG), it is necessary to understand the relationship of the ARNG to the threat situation; our military strategy to counter the threat; the Army's doctrine for generating and applying combat power; the assignment of appropriate roles and missions; the force struc-

ture mix; levels of resourcing; and, finally, the factors of force readiness and availability.

This article makes a collective assessment of how the threat, strategy, doctrine, mission, force mix, resourcing, readiness and availability are related to defining how the ARNG can be used under the Total Force policy to secure objectives associated with both federal and state missions. New and sometimes controversial views are presented, with the primary purpose being to help establish a basis from which to determine the future role of the ARNG in our national defense.


The threat is the logical starting place for such an assessment because when paradigm-shifting events occur in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and elsewhere, that alter the nature of threats to our national security, then the entire Army must make major revisions in how it organizes and conducts its military affairs to counter these threats.

Threat. The Preamble to the Constitution specifies this nation's purpose and the justification for the establishment of its Armed Forces, which are:

- To form a more perfect union.
- To provide for the common defense.
- To promote the general welfare.
- To secure the blessings of liberty.⁴

It is critical that we identify the threats requiring a "common defense" so that we can ensure an American military force and capability adequate to protect the inalienable rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." In

Opposing force armor bearing down on a training unit's position at the National Training Center.



The Army's doctrine must apply equally to all its components. Only one set of doctrinal principles can govern mobilization, deployment, operational art, tactics and redeployment. Even though there is but one doctrine, it must take Reserve Component units into account to employ them effectively.

this light, the National Guard is justified by a variety of threats in the following areas:

- National security.
- The drug war.
- Natural disasters.
- Civil disorder.
- The environment.
- The quality of life in local communities and states.

The National Guard is uniquely qualified to assist in dealing with all of these threats because of its proven capabilities and dual federal and state status.

Strategy. As the threats change, so must our strategy and doctrine change to keep our forces as viable deterrents. The new defense strategy emphasizes that our Armed Forces maintain strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, effective crisis response capability and a capacity to reconstitute themselves. In this con-

text, it will be necessary for strategists to define how the ARNG will participate in this matrix.⁵

Strategy is the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure policy objectives by the application or threat of force.⁶ Thus, it is logical to conclude that strategy also includes the art and science of employing National Guard forces. Examples of the ARNG forward presence are the Equipment Maintenance Center it operates in Kaiserslautern, Germany, and the Aviation Classification Repair Activity Depot at Brussels, Belgium. The Guard enhanced the Army's forward presence in 1990 by deploying 21,475 personnel and 724 units for overseas deployment training in 58 countries.⁷

The "cadre division" concept will offer the ARNG the opportunity to be a major force in the reconstitution process. However, the future of the ARNG lies in its ability to provide combat-ready troops, from a Continental

United States (CONUS) base, to respond rapidly to regional conflicts or major wars.

Doctrine. The Army's doctrine must apply equally to all its components. Only one set of doctrinal principles can govern mobilization, deployment, operational art, tactics and redeployment. Even though there is but one doctrine, it must take Reserve Component (RC) units into account to employ them effectively. For example, the commander responsible for developing the operational art for a campaign could be faced with a major regional conflict where forward-deployed or rapidly deployable contingency forces may only be able to deter or delay the enemy until early reinforcements arrive in theater. When early and follow-on reinforcements are in place, the commander would have the combat power to conduct defensive or offensive operations. AirLand Battle doctrine under a particularly large, protracted or concurrent contingency scenario would have to accommodate large numbers of major ARNG combat units—as well as combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. Guard roundout brigades might constitute one-third of the combat power in the early reinforcement package, and the follow-on reinforcements, if needed, would likely include ARNG divisions, unless divisions from Europe or Korea were withdrawn.

Under a low-intensity scenario of short duration, Active Army forces would respond with assistance from ARNG units that have unique capability assets, such as linguists. Mid- to high-intensity operations of 120 days or longer will require substantial RC participation. Therefore, modern mobilization, deployment and redeployment doctrine for the RCs will be just as essential as AirLand Operations doctrine is in how we fight on the next battlefield.

Tactics in future campaigns will also have to be tailored to RC capabilities if reinforcing units arrive with older, less capable equipment. For example, while an Active Army division with new M1A1 tanks and perhaps 60 days' combat experience in theater would spearhead an attack, a newly arriving ARNG division



Guardsmen on a joint Guard-law enforcement team coordinate with helicopter support during a search mission, Osceola County, Florida, 1990.

Approximately 730,000 Guard man-days were expended [in FY 1991] in support of local, state and federal counterdrug operations.

As the importance of this mission grows, it should affect pending force structure decisions because current organization, equipment and manpower allotments are insufficient to provide the [high-tech] equipment and specially designed organizations the Guard requires.

with older M60A3 tanks might be assigned to protect a flank.

Mission. After analyzing how emerging strategy and doctrine impact on the ARNG, it is appropriate to look ahead at missions that can be assigned to the Guard. The Guard's mission today, as in the past, is to help maintain world peace and order by deterring war or, if necessary, fighting and defeating the enemy. Defense planners must realize that the paramount mission of the Guard is to provide trained and equipped forces when mobilized by Congress or the president.

The Constitution empowers Congress "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute

the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions."⁸ The Guard is uniquely suited to repelling invasions, since it has units in

When paradigm-shifting events occur in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and elsewhere, that alter the nature of threats to our national security, then the entire Army must make major revisions in how it organizes and conducts its military affairs to counter these threats.

3,200 communities in the 50 states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam and the District of Columbia.

Guardsmen in volunteer and full-time status can also be a potent force in the "war on drugs." In Fiscal Year (FY) 1991, approximately 730,000 Guard man-days were expended in support of local, state and federal counterdrug operations. As the importance of this mission grows, it should affect pending force structure decisions because current organization, equipment and manpower allotments are insufficient to provide the high-technology equipment and specially designed organizations the Guard requires.

To provide protection and relief during natural disasters such as Hurricane Hugo or the San Francisco Bay area earthquakes, the indispensable services of trained soldiers (who are immediately available to governors or other state and local agencies) are absolutely essential. In FY 1990, there were 292 state emergencies that required call-ups of the Guard. Guardsmen provided relief and assistance during 77 natural disasters and six civil disturbances that involved 23,000 guardsmen and used 207,000 man-days. Whether it is responding to floods, forest fires, prison disorders, winter blizzards or search-and-rescue missions, the ARNG is the most capable military component to call.

Guard and Reserve units can continue to enhance the image of the United States by rendering assistance to foreign nations such as with en-

gineer and medical unit support. Furthermore, by training with host nation personnel, particularly in the Third World, US citizen-soldiers contribute to world stability.

Before the Guard is assigned national security missions, however, all factors affecting the accomplishment of those missions must be considered. Moreover, the National Command Authority (NCA), under the Graduated Mobilization Response system, must have access to the RCs and be able to flexibly apply them in force generation and projection across a wide spectrum of contingencies. When operational security and surprise are important to the success of contingency missions, it is more difficult to involve the RCs. Ordinarily, Reserve forces must be resourced at levels consistent with their assigned missions to assure they maintain the correct readiness posture. Finally, RC units must be capable of deploying by the required dates specified in contingency plans so their "availability" is appropriate to their missions.

Force Mix. Once appropriate missions for the Guard are understood, this factor helps define the force structure the ARNG needs to accomplish these missions. Impending fiscal restraints and the changing international situation not only mean the Total Force will be smaller but also that it will be restructured to support emerging reliance on strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response forces and reconstitution forces. This means changes will likely be made in the force mix, or in the balance between heavy, light and special operations forces; however, this balance must also include the right force mix of Active, ARNG and US Army Reserve (USAR) units. An optimal mix would be one that provides forces of the appropriate size, structure and availability to counter likely threats. But this must be a force that is affordable.

Missions should be assigned to each Army component dependent on its availability, the relative peacetime cost to maintain it and its ability to perform.

If the RCs can meet the required deployment


dates with combat-ready units, combat and CS missions and force structure should be placed primarily in the ARNG, with CSS placed in the USAR. This rationale is simply based on cost-effectiveness and the traditional assignment of units between the ARNG and USAR. If the mission requires substantial forward-deployed forces or rapid deployment of CONUS-based forces, the mission and force structure obviously belong to the Active Army. The challenge is in instances where there is uncertainty about the size of the required force and where rapid deployment of some portion of the force is necessary—and later deployment of reinforcements is anticipated. Then, the mission must be assigned to both components, proportionate to the need.⁹

On the average, it costs 30 percent as much to sustain an ARNG unit than an Active Army one. While equipment procurement costs for various types of units are essentially the same for both components, base operations programs and operational tempo expenditures can be reduced substantially by transferring missions to the RC. However, the largest savings come from the military pay account, because the personnel costs of ARNG soldiers is only 20 percent of that for Active Army soldiers. In addition, the ARNG has only 12 percent full-time manning—a further cost advantage.

Next, the resourcing, readiness and availability necessary for the Guard's force structure to accomplish its assigned missions must be analyzed because these factors determine how much reliance should be placed on the ARNG.

Resourcing. With the impending budget reductions, the overriding concern for the military should be to retain the most cost-effective defense capability within our forces. Calls for an equal or fair share approach to budget reductions should be ignored; cost-effectiveness should govern our decisions, since it results in the greatest combat power in relation to our expenditures.

The ARNG FY 1991 annual budget of \$6 billion consumed less than 10 percent of the entire



Guardsmen search the wreckage of a crashed United Airlines jet for survivors, Sioux City, Iowa. 19 July 1989

In FY 1990, there were 292 state emergencies that required call-ups of the Guard. Guardsmen provided relief and assistance during 77 natural disasters and six civil disturbances that involved 23,000 guardsmen and used 207,000 man-days. Whether it is responding to floods, forest fires, prison disorders, winter blizzards or search-and-rescue missions, the ARNG is the most capable military component to call.

Army budget, yet the Guard has approximately one-third of the total Army personnel strength and furnishes almost one-half of the Army's combat units.¹⁰ Therefore, when striving to meet those missions that they can perform effectively, the ARNG and USAR are among the most cost-effective bargains in the defense budget.

Over the past 10 years, the National Guard has developed into a force that is combat ready (82 percent of ARNG units are rated C3 or higher).¹¹ However, there is a definite price to be paid in order to maintain a Guard that has the readiness posture required for assigned wartime missions. To correct battlefield deficiencies noted during *Desert Storm* will require that the

RCs receive more resourcing in terms of full-time cadre support, extra man-days for specialized training and the equipment required to be interoperable with Active forces.

Readiness. *Desert Storm* made it clear that the Guard units were ready and willing before being asked, came when called, served with professionalism and proved, in combat, that they could fight and win. The overwhelming evidence is that their readiness in terms of personnel, equipment and training was sufficient for

[Changes] in the balance between heavy, light and special operations forces . . . must also include the right force mix of Active, ARNG and USAR units. An optimal mix would be one that provides [affordable] forces of the appropriate size, structure and availability to counter likely threats.

them to perform the mission. The resource investment made under Total Force policy proved to be worth the price.

Some question whether ARNG units can attain the training readiness required for future conflicts. This view usually stems from misconceptions about the performance of National Guard units mobilized for *Desert Shield*. The fact is that the Army was able to rapidly deploy 23 ARNG colonel-level commands and 37 lieutenant colonel commands to the US Central Command area of operation in support of *Desert Storm*. Two ARNG field artillery brigades deployed to Saudi Arabia within 45 days of being mobilized and performed well in the ground campaign, supporting the British 1st Armoured Division, the US VII Corps and French forces. Brigadier Christopher Hammerbeck, the commander of 4th Armoured Brigade (United Kingdom) said this about the support received from the 142d Field Artillery Brigade (Arkansas and Oklahoma ARNG):

"From the US Army, we got the National

Guard 142d Artillery Brigade with [one battalion] of MLRS and [two battalions] of M110. By golly, they were good. I was able to see the bombardment laid down in front of me . . . the 142d was firing over my head . . . it was a sight I shall remember for the rest of my days. Talking with an Iraqi artillery commander after the war, he told me that 90 percent of his crews on that position had been killed or wounded when this initial bombardment had gone in. He lost more than 70 guns in the space of an hour, which was a pretty major achievement."¹²

Even though the analysis of the readiness condition, postmobilization training and deployment criteria for the three ARNG roundout brigades is not complete, several conclusions can be drawn. General Carl E. Vuono, then Army chief of staff, stated the most important conclusion after the three brigades had completed their unparalleled postmobilization training for *Desert Shield* when he said, "The roundout concept is a viable concept," thus paving the way for this practice to continue playing an important role in the force mix.¹³ The readiness reporting system needs to be revised so it gives a true picture of a unit's combat capabilities. Deployment doctrine should be expanded to delineate when combat units would be deployed under minimum standards (C3) and when they should expect to receive extensive postmobilization training so they can deploy fully combat ready (C1). Even with the improvements that will be forthcoming from the recent lessons learned, indications are that roundout units will continue to require 60 to 120 days postmobilization training to complete maneuver training at the battalion and brigade levels.

Was the ARNG as ready as it could have been prior to *Desert Shield*? The answer is no. From a lessons-learned perspective, improvements are warranted so readiness can be enhanced. Battle staff synchronization skills need to be sharpened. The ability of ARNG units to sustain themselves logistically during extended field maneuvers has to be improved. Units must learn the Army maintenance system and

rely less on the ARNG's peacetime system. Gunnery and maneuver proficiency to at least platoon level is an imperative, which means that units must train on adequate ranges. Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) must master the Common Task Test (CTT) so they can aggressively train their soldiers on these tasks at every opportunity.

Greater emphasis on leader development is required if Guard officers and NCOs are to keep pace with their Active counterparts. Active Guard Reserve or full-time manning personnel need to possess solid leadership traits and high tactical proficiency. A working knowledge of US Department of the Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, and *AirLand Operations* doctrine must become the rule rather than the exception. These deficiencies were largely corrected during postmobilization training, but with proper command emphasis, they could be corrected during weekend drills and annual training periods.

There are products on the shelf that the Army and National Guard can use to enhance ARNG readiness for future missions. Full use of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³), the battalion and brigade Pre-Command Course (PCC) and the Tactical Commanders Development Course (TCDC) would be combat power multipliers for Guard commanders and their staffs. The upcoming Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) will enable ARNG divisions to train effectively. Access to combat training centers is the ultimate training experience, and Guard roundout or round-up units should complete a rotation through the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, or Joint Readiness Training Center, Little Rock Air Force Base and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, during the tenure of each commander. Proposed regional training sites would offer the ranges and maneuver space for combat units and special facilities for CS and CSS units.

The outdated system of 15 days for annual training could be replaced with two 15-day peri-

ods or three 10-day periods for high-priority units. High-tech, low-density military occupational skills (MOS) need to be filled by full-time

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The ARNG FY 1991 annual budget of \$6 billion consumed less than 10 percent of the entire Army budget, yet the Guard has approximately one-third of the total Army personnel strength and furnishes almost one-half of the Army's combat units . . . the ARNG and USAR are among the most cost-effective bargains in the defense budget.

personnel. Personnel, finance and maintenance systems can be automated to match Active Army systems. Commitment and accountability on the part of the leadership will correct shortcomings associated with doctrine, CTT and staff procedures. These changes are attainable.

We must not pretend the ARNG should maintain the same peacetime training readiness as its Active counterpart. General John R. Galvin, supreme allied commander, Europe, commented: "It all boils down to the fact that you cannot train as well on about 40 days a year as you can on about 250 days a year. And that's the difference between the Reserve and Active forces."¹⁴ It makes sense to conserve resources and maintain a lower readiness profile, perhaps C3 during peacetime, if there is sufficient warning time to conduct postmobilization training to improve readiness conditions to C1. This allows

RC units to train to the same standard, but on a lesser number of tasks. Even high-priority units such as roundout brigades with an early reinforcement mission will likely have time between mobilization and deployment to enhance readiness to full mission-capable status. Under the emerging strategy and AirLand Operations doctrine being formulated, the Guard can be ready.

There is a definite price to be paid in order to maintain a Guard that has the readiness posture required for assigned wartime missions. To correct battlefield deficiencies noted during Desert Storm will require that the RCs receive more resourcing in terms of full-time cadre support, extra man-days for specialized training and the equipment required to be interoperable with Active forces.

Availability. Carl von Clausewitz stated the purpose of peacetime armies when he said: "The whole of military activity must relate . . . to the engagement. The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained . . . is simply that he should fight at the right place and at the right time."¹⁵ Perhaps the critical question about ARNG units is not whether their readiness will be sufficient for the mission but whether they can be at the right place at the right time.

When a mission is allocated, there are several factors that need to be considered to determine the availability of a force to accomplish that mission. First, there is warning time. Active forces are more able to respond to a worst-case or short-warning scenario. The opposite is generally true for Reserve forces, since a longer warning time translates into more reaction time for them. Once the NCA decides to react to a crisis with military force, the time required for mobilization, deployment and employment in theater must be factored into the decision before it can be determined if Reserves are ap-

propriate for the mission.

Two improvements are still needed to increase the availability of both the Guard and the Reserve for activation. First, the Army's mobilization procedures need refinement so each RC can be integrated more efficiently. Second, the authority for the president to involuntarily activate the Selected Reserves (Title 10 US Code 673b) should be modified permanently so the Department of Defense (DOD) can have ready access to at least 200,000 reservists for more than an initial 90 days plus a 90-day extension. The current law is too restrictive and is likely to cause serious bottlenecks in future mobilizations similar to those encountered during *Desert Shield*. Ideally, the mobilization system and call-up authority would be tailored to complement our strategy for force generation and projection.

The Defense Program has projected the Army end strength (Active and Reserve) is to be reduced by nearly 27 percent. Accordingly, DOD has proposed to reduce the ARNG from its current end strength of 457,000 to 321,000 by 1995. A smaller Army in the future is clearly the mandate. Since we are willing to forgo the strength of numbers, the challenge will be to retain a Total Force powerful enough to counter tomorrow's threat, keeping in mind that force reductions present real risks to readiness.

A proposed smaller Army of four corps and 20 divisions would mean continued reliance on Guard combat forces for execution of crisis response missions under our new strategy. Even five fully structured Active Army divisions based in CONUS would be only the foundation and cornerstones upon which to build force packages that can be deployed for major regional contingencies. ARNG brigades and divisions would be among the building blocks for particularly large or protracted contingencies, while USAR and Guard CS and CSS would be necessary to complete the structure for any substantial deployment.

General Creighton W. Abrams, the Army's post-Vietnam chief of staff, built a 16-division force that was reliant on the Reserves to the ex-

An M109 self-propelled howitzer moves into a battery position during Desert Storm.



The Army was able to rapidly deploy 23 ARNG colonel-level commands and 37 lieutenant colonel commands to the US Central Command area of operation in support of Desert Storm. Two ARNG field artillery brigades deployed to Saudi Arabia within 45 days of being mobilized and performed well in the ground campaign, supporting the British 1st Armoured Division, the US VII Corps and French forces.

tent that they could not be deployed without a Reserve call-up. "They are not taking us to war again without calling up the Reserves," Abrams was heard to say on many occasions. Retired Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr. wrote, "The post-Vietnam Army General Abrams sought to create was designed deliberately to form an inter-related structure that could not be committed to sustained combat without mobilizing the Reserves. . . . General Abrams hoped this . . . would correct one of the major deficiencies of the American involvement in the Vietnam War—the commitment of the Army to sustained combat without the explicit support of the American people . . ."16

There is an inherent danger in developing, as some have recommended, an Active corps that

is completely self-contained and fully capable of being rapidly deployed for contingencies such as *Just Cause* in Panama. Such a corps could, undoubtedly, complete this type of mission more efficiently than having to rely on Reserve "volunteers" to assist. However, the danger lies in the precedent this would set in the eyes of the American people. If we were to successfully fight in several small future contingencies without the RCs, the nation would fall back into the syndrome of believing the Reserves are only forces of last resort in major wars—the very thing Abrams sought to prevent. Then RC readiness would suffer, and resolve to use them would diminish. One lesson from Vietnam we should never forget is that Active forces should never try going it alone unless they are willing to risk

losing the support of Congress and the average citizen. *Desert Storm* confirmed once again that unity on the home front makes it easier to win on the battlefield. RC participation in a conflict will not assure national unity, but it definitely helps.

A Total Force approach to winning future conflicts will also require a unity of purpose and effort among the components of the Army for achieving the common goals and objectives that best serve our nation. Around the year 56, Paul, the apostle, emphasized this point when he wrote the following to the Corinthians as disputes threatened the unity and strength of their organization:

"For the body is not one member, but many. . . . And the eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee: nor again the head to the feet, I have no need of you . . . but God hath tempered the body together . . . that there should be no schism in the body; but *that* the members should have the same care one for

President[ial authority] to involuntarily activate the Selected Reserves should be modified permanently so the DOD can have ready access to at least 200,00 reservists for more than an initial 90 days plus a 90-day extension. The current law is too restrictive and is likely to cause serious bottlenecks in future mobilizations similar to those encountered during Desert Shield.

another. And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honored, all the members rejoice with it."¹⁷

Unity of purpose between the Active, Guard and Reserve is an imperative if the Total Force policy is to achieve its full potential. May the Army and the National Guard forever be as a two-edged sword poised as a deterrent or wielded for our "common defense." **MR**

NOTES

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3. President George Bush, (Speech) "United States Defenses—Reshaping Our Defenses," Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colorado, 2 August 1990.

4. US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], 14 August 1981), 1.

5. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment, (March 1991) 2-4 and 2-5.

6. US Department of the Army FM 100-5, *Operations*, (Washington, DC: GPO, May 1986), 9.

7. Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Programs FY 1990*, (March 1991), 96.

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10. Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Programs FY 1990*, 10.

11. MG Donald Burdick, Director, Army National Guard, "MG Donald Burdick Discusses Army Guard Readiness," *NATIONAL GUARD* (January 1990) 6.

12. "A Remarkable Campaign," *SOLDIER*, magazine of the British army, (15 April 1991):13-15.

13. GEN Carl E. Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, quoted in "The 48th Brigade—A Chronology from Invasion to Demobilization," *NATIONAL GUARD* (May 1991):15.

14. GEN John R. Galvin quoted in John G. Roos and Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Desert Storm Bares 'Roundout' Flaw but Validates Army Modernization Goals," *Armed Forces Journal International* (April 1991) 14.

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
16. Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in War-time," *Parameters* (Summer 1991) 45-46.

17. 1 Corinthians 12:14-16 (in part).

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SENIOR LEADER VISION



The CASE of the LUDENDORFF BRIDGE

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy G. Murphy, US Air Force

US Army Field Manual 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, serves as a reference point for leadership and command at large-unit level. The author cites its key concepts as he examines the orders and actions of Allied and German leaders during the fighting at Remagen in World War II. He points out that differences of vision and command climate led to the Allies' quick capture of the Ludendorff Bridge, opening the German heartland to Allied attack. He emphasizes the importance of a strong central vision as well as a positive, realistic command climate to the Allied success at Remagen and in future operations.

GENERAL Dwight D. Eisenhower said of the incident, "The final defeat of the enemy, which we had long calculated would be accomplished in the spring and summer campaigning of 1945, was suddenly now, in our minds just around the corner."¹ When Adolf Hitler heard of the incident, "His anguished rage," according to one author, "knew no bounds."² What occurrence inspired such hope in one leader and such wrath in the other? On the afternoon of 7 March 1945, elements of the US First Army seized intact the only remaining bridge over the Rhine River at Remagen, Germany. The last great natural barrier protecting the German homeland had been breached; the end of the German Third Reich became inevitable.

Historians tend to attribute US forces' seizure of the Ludendorff railway bridge at Remagen to "luck" or "fortune," which often occurs in war. This is incorrect. Specific German errors caused the bridge to remain standing when the Americans entered Remagen, and these errors (call them fortune if you will) offered only an opportunity. Luck and fortune did not get the Americans across the bridge that day. Rather, their capture of the bridge was the result of initiative and physical courage of which they can be justifiably proud.

There are many complex reasons behind the outcome of the battle for the bridge at Remagen. But a major contributor to German failure and American success that day was the vision of senior leaders on each side and the organizational climates that resulted from their respective visions. This article will focus on these factors by first relating a short historical account of the battle for the bridge, then contrasting the "vision" and "organizational climate" of the German and US armies and studying the impact they had on the tactical outcome at Remagen.

The Battle

The action at Remagen occurred in the aftermath of the Germans' Ardennes counteroffensive. The Allies spent most of January 1945 reducing the Bulge and reestablishing the line they had gained by early December the year before. After a short operational pause

Brigadier General William M. Hoge



Leading elements of Combat Command B reached the heights above Remagen just before noon on 7 March and discovered the railroad bridge still standing . . . Hoge, without contacting higher headquarters, changed the mission of his entire command and ordered his men to capture the bridge.

at the Roer River, the Allied offensive continued with a two-phase push to reach the Rhine River. General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery's 21st Army Group resumed the offensive first and reached the Rhine on 9 March. General Omar N. Bradley's 12th Army Group resumed the offensive in the south on 23 February and by 6 March, elements of both the First and Third armies were nearing the Rhine.

The German situation, meanwhile, had seriously deteriorated. The Ardennes counteroffensive had depleted Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt's operational reserve, and he simply did not have the combat power required to stop the Allied offensive in front of the Rhine. Nevertheless, Hitler ordered von Rundstedt to keep a large bridgehead in front of the Rhine south of Cologne. Although the bridgehead had no chance of successfully holding Bradley's forces, Hitler steadfastly refused to give up any German territory without a fight. This order stranded most of the German 15th, 7th and 5th Panzer armies in front of the Rhine. Later, the chief of staff of Germany's Army Group B decried this "incredible" order, saying these forces would have been far better employed preparing defenses on the east side of the Rhine.³

Remagen and the Ludendorff rail bridge fell in the sector of the US First Army under Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges, who assigned it to Major General John W. Leonard's 9th Armored Division (AD). On the morning of 7 March, the 9th AD's orders were to reach the Rhine River and link up with elements of General George S. Patton Jr.'s Third Army, entrapping the remaining German forces on the west side of the Rhine.⁴

Leonard ordered his Combat Command A to seize the crossing sites on the Ahr River and link up with elements of the Third Army to the south.⁵ To Combat Command B, under Brigadier General William M. Hoge, he gave the order "to establish a bridgehead over the Ahr at Sinzig and to reach the Rhine River in zone. Be prepared to continue attack south along the river."⁶ Though Leonard and Hoge discussed the possibility of taking the Ludendorff Bridge if it was still standing, it was not part of the day's plans because nobody expected the bridge to remain intact.⁷

Leading elements of Combat Command B reached the heights above Remagen just before noon on 7 March and discovered the railroad bridge still standing. Hoge arrived in the area about an hour later and ordered his men to capture the town as rapidly as possible. With the town secured and the bridge still standing, Hoge, without contacting higher headquarters, changed the mission of his entire command and ordered his men to capture the bridge.

The task of crossing the bridge under fire fell to Company A, 27th Armored Infantry Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Karl H. Timmermann. In the few minutes before they started across, the Germans detonated a tank trap, leaving a 30-foot crater in the western approaches to the bridge. Prior to the crossing, German explo-

sives on the bridge detonated, but failed to collapse the bridge. Despite having witnessed these explosions and knowing he was probably on a suicide mission, Timmermann led his company on a brilliant attack across the bridge and captured both the bridge and the railroad tunnel on the eastern side.⁸

During the seizure of the bridge, Hoge received an order from division to continue his attack down the western side of the river. He ignored this order (in fact, disobeyed it) until his command secured the bridge, then went back and informed Leonard that he was across the Rhine.⁹ Leonard confirmed Hoge's actions, then requested III Corps to release him from his mission to link up with elements of Third Army. The corps chief of staff, without attempting to contact the commander who was in the field, approved Leonard's request, releasing Combat Command A to help exploit the bridgehead. Corps orders were quickly affirmed by First Army, 12th Army Group and Eisenhower himself at Supreme Headquarters.¹⁰

On the east bank of the river, confusion over German defenses was natural, in that its army was retreating so rapidly in the face of the enemy. It was also self-induced, for two primary reasons. The first was Hitler's heavy-handed control of his field forces. He absolutely refused to allow regular army units to retreat, requiring written permission for units not in contact to withdraw behind the Rhine.¹¹ Army Group B was even precluded from sending staff officers back to plan defenses east of the Rhine.¹²

There is another example of Hitler's undue control, which would directly impact the battle at Remagen. In the month before the battle, US bombs destroyed a bridge at Cologne with a lucky hit on demolition chambers that had already been prepared. This incident caused Hitler to require written orders from the responsible tactical officers before a bridge could be destroyed. One result of this order was that the explosives for the Ludendorff Bridge did not arrive until the morning of 7 March, just a couple of hours before the Americans.¹³

Another, more critical reason for the Germans' poorly prepared defenses was the confusing and constantly changing command relationships for the area around Remagen.¹⁴ Responsibility for the bridge was consistently a problem in the weeks before 7 March. The *Wehrkreis*, a "home guard" controlled by Heinrich Himmler, defended all the land east of the Rhine until, at some point, responsibility transferred to the Field Army as it retreated. The relationship between these two organizations was poor, and the changeover rarely went well. On 1 February, responsibility for the bridge changed from *Wehrkreis* VI to *Wehrkreis* XII, damaging what little groundwork had been laid between the organizations.

The German 15th Army took responsibility for the area around Remagen on 26 February. Instead of placing the bridge under the

Specific German errors caused the bridge to remain standing when the Americans entered Remagen . . . Luck and fortune did not get the Americans across the bridge that day. Rather, their capture of the bridge was the result of initiative and physical courage.

Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt



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LXXIV Corps, in whose sector it fell, Field Marshal Walter Model, Army Group B Commander, set up a special unit under Lieutenant General Walther Botsch, responsible for defending the eastern bank of the river between Bonn and Remagen. On 6 March, Botsch was relieved to take command of a corps, and responsibility fell to General Richard von Bothmer, the Bonn defense commander.

Command relationships at the bridge itself were no better. Captain Willi Bratge was in overall command, but Captain Karl Friesenhahn, an engineer, commanded the bridge itself and was responsible for its destruction. Neither officer controlled the air defense artillery around the bridge.

The final change of responsibility for the bridge came early on the morning of 7 March, when 15th Army assigned it to the LXVII Corps, which was located 40 miles west of the bridge with units "scattered at uncertain points along a broken front, trying desperately to defend their loosely held positions and at the same time assemble for a counterattack they had been ordered to make."¹⁵ Under the circumstances, the best the corps commander could do was send his executive officer, Major Hans Scheller, to assume responsibility for a bridge 40 miles to his rear.

Scheller arrived at the bridge near midday, just before the Americans reached the high ground to the west and thus had only about 2 hours to acquaint himself with his new command before the Americans reached Remagen. Although they were in town, Scheller chose to leave the bridge open until an artillery battalion crossed, leaving the bridge intact when American tanks reached the western side. Scheller finally ordered the bridge destroyed, but the explosive charges failed. Scheller was forced to ask repeatedly for a volunteer willing to go out to the bridge and activate the emergency detonator. This detonator worked, just as US troops began to cross the bridge, but because the charges were damaged, they failed to collapse the bridge.¹⁶

Scheller attempted to organize a defense of the eastern side of the bridge, but did not have enough forces to hold the Americans, much less push them back across the bridge. After withdrawing into the railroad tunnel, Scheller, having no communications with higher headquarters, left on a bicycle to notify authorities the Americans were across the river. The remaining German troops at the bridge, under Bratge, surrendered to US forces later that evening.¹⁷

German attempts to counterattack the bridgehead were slow and ineffective, and on 7 March, the US Army was across the Rhine to stay. These are the essential facts surrounding the fight for the Ludendorff Bridge. But what leadership issues caused these events to occur as they did? The answer may be found, to a large degree, in the respective visions of the senior leaders and the organizational climates those visions caused.



Comparing US and German Senior Leader Vision

US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, defines "vision" this way:

"Vision is a senior leader's source of effectiveness. . . . It can be an intuitive sensing, a precise mission, or a higher commander's intent for a campaign or battle. Regardless, it is the reference point against which the senior leader measures progress."¹⁸

Thomas E. Cronin says vision is "having an excellent idea or clear sense of direction, a sense of mission."¹⁹ Both of these views portray vision as a focus on an overriding idea or mission central to everything a leader or his organization does.

Senior leader vision in war begins with the ability of political leaders to communicate their vision—the political aim of the war. The vision of military leaders ought to be directly extracted from that of their political leaders.

The major Allied powers in World War II had a diversity of political considerations behind their participation in the war. In a sense, however, the allied nature of their effort reduced the central Allied political vision to the lowest common denominator. Few things from World War II were quite so clear-cut as the Allies' strategic goal, first expressed at the 1943 Casablanca conference—unconditional surrender of the Axis powers. Stephen E. Ambrose said:

"This was the finest alliance in history. The partners agreed upon the broad goal and the broad strategy—the total defeat of the Axis powers brought about by first assuming a defensive role in the Pacific and an offensive one in the Atlantic. That they stuck to the agreement was their greatest accomplishment."²⁰

The orders given to Eisenhower before the Normandy invasion reflected this single-minded purpose. They stated simply, "You

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Eisenhower translated [his] mission into an eight-phase campaign for the European Theater of Operations. One of these eight original points was the, "complete destruction of enemy forces west of the Rhine, in the meantime constantly seeking bridgeheads across the river."

will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her Armed Forces."²¹ A simple mission, certainly, in essence if not in execution, from which Eisenhower drew his essential military vision.

Eisenhower translated this mission into an eight-phase campaign for the European Theater of Operations. One of these eight original points was the, "complete destruction of enemy forces west of the Rhine, in the meantime constantly seeking bridgeheads across the river."²² Capturing a bridge across the Rhine, then, was conceived very early as an important element in a concise plan that resulted from a single-minded mission.

Eisenhower's vision was not limited only to himself and his staff. It permeated his armies. Bradley later indicated that his primary objective was the destruction of the German army.²³ He also noted the original agreement between the leading Allied commanders:

"Long before D-Day, Ike, Monty and I had agreed upon a broad plan for defeating Germany . . . Our primary objective was the Ruhr industrial complex, the main source of Hitler's steel production. We believed that when Hitler perceived our objective, he would commit his remaining ground forces to its defense. We would encircle the Ruhr and in one stroke destroy or capture both his army and his war production base, bringing the war to an end."²⁴

The simple missions given the commanders of US forces for 7 March continued to stress this simple vision—trapping and destroying German forces in front of the Rhine. At the same time, all of the US commanders recognized the value of the intact Ludendorff Bridge to their final goal.

One might think that it is easy to have a simple, shared vision when all is going well and your side is winning. A short look at senior leader vision on the German side, however, will show this to be untrue.

Senior leader vision differed with the Germans since it was embodied much more into the personality of Hitler, who was both the political leader and supreme army commander. Even in the early, heady days of German victory, German army leaders did not share Hitler's complex vision.

Hitler announced his essential political vision for the German nation very early in *Mein Kampf*. According to William L. Shirer, this vision included four main themes. Hitler wanted, first, a Germany that dominated the world. Second, he wanted to expand Germany to the east. Third, Hitler's vision required unification of all German people under a single government and finally, it required "purification" of the German master race from Slavic and Jewish blood.²⁵

Many German generals did not share this grandiose vision. General Ludwig Beck resigned over the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Generals Bradley and Eisenhower in France



The orders given to Eisenhower before the Normandy invasion reflected this single-minded purpose. They stated simply, "You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her Armed Forces."

Senior German generals opposed both the invasion of Poland and the invasion of Belgium and France. During the invasion of Russia, Hitler's "Commissar Order" required the immediate "purification" by execution of the political officers attached to Russian military units. Later, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein called this order,

In the US Army, a simple, shared vision was easily translated into a military vision that was shared at all levels. On the other hand, the vision of the senior political and military German leader—Hitler—was complex and difficult. It was morally nefarious. It was unachievable at any stage, and it was not shared by his subordinates.

"utterly unsoldierly. To have carried it out would have threatened not only the honour of our fighting troops but also their morale."²⁶

In 1942, when Hitler's empire had expanded to include nearly all of Europe, his vision was equally grand. Hitler, according to Shirer, believed at this time that decisive victory was in his grasp. He believed he would soon encircle Moscow from the east and west and that the Russians were finished. He felt he would soon be able to make peace with Britain and the United States and believed his next move should be to push forces through Iran and the Persian Gulf and link up with Japan in the Indian Ocean.²⁷

His generals saw it differently. Shirer says, "Almost all of the generals in the field, as well as those on the General Staff, saw flaws in the pretty picture. They could be summed up: The Germans simply didn't have enough resources to reach the objectives Hitler had insisted on setting."²⁸

In the days immediately surrounding the events at Remagen, Hitler's vision was even more out of touch with reality and less shared by his armies. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, whom Hitler appointed commander in chief of the West immediately after Remagen, later told of Hitler's vision related to him on his assumption of command. Hitler told Kesselring the decision lay in the east, that Russia would never penetrate his forces in the east, that western forces would hold if the Remagen bridgehead could be reduced, and that Kesselring's mission was to hold until "new fighters and other novel weapons" could be employed in overwhelming numbers.²⁹

Not surprisingly, Kesselring found the facts at the front to be quite different. He offers evidence of how little Hitler's army shared his vision at this time and, incidentally, the resulting impact on command climate (to which we will turn presently). Kesselring says:

"The differences between the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and the Army command which had existed for years had meanwhile become increasingly evident. Their irreconcilable mistrust had a paralyzing and in many cases disintegrating effect with the consequence that the Army Command felt itself hamstrung and misunderstood . . . This latent hostility was the grave of initiative, damaging to the unity of command and wasteful of energy."³⁰

In an interview after the war, German General Edward Hans Karl von Manteuffel said this about the German army:

"After the Ardennes failure, Hitler started a 'corporal's war.' There were no big plans—only a multitude of piecemeal fights . . . From that time on, the main concern of most of the German commanders seems to have been, not whether they could stop the Allies' advance, but why the Allies did not advance faster and finish the war quicker. They were tied to their posts by Hitler's policy and Himmler's police, but were praying for release."³¹ By March 1945, vision in the German army had died.



Adolf Hitler flanked by his henchmen Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring (left) and Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels two days after the 20 July assassination attempt which nearly killed him, 22 July 1944.

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The impact of vision on command climate suggested by Kesselring above becomes even more clear upon further examination.

Comparing US and German Command Climates

FM 22-103 defines "command climate" as "a shared feeling, a perception among the members of a unit about what life is like."³² Though this is a difficult concept to quantify, Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Glick summarized several studies of command or organizational climate and found six common indicators of a healthy "climate." These indicators were:

- A sense of mission.
- Trust.
- Decentralized decision making.
- Clear standards.
- Teamwork.
- Prudent risk-taking.³³

The most interesting element of Glick's findings is that a shared sense of mission lies at the root of a healthy command climate. But a "sense of mission" is the essence of Cronin's definition of vision we saw earlier. Indeed, FM 22-103's discussion of vision clearly suggests

Many German generals did not share [Hitler's] grandiose vision. General Ludwig Beck resigned over the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Senior German generals opposed both the invasion of Poland and the invasion of Belgium and France. . . . In the days immediately surrounding the events at Remagen, Hitler's vision was even more out of touch with reality and less shared by his armies.

One day, Bradley's staff complained that Patton was not pushing his front column fast enough. Bradley told them, "Patton knows what he's doing, just keep your shirt on and you'll see." The next day, a German counterattack hit Patton's lead column and because he had held them back, the attack was easily defeated . . . Bradley's was the reaction of a leader who implicitly trusted his subordinates.

a strong interrelationship between a command's climate and its leader's vision.³⁴ Kesselring recognized the same kind of relationship between an army's vision and its organizational health in 1945. There should be an obvious link, then, between these concepts, and we may assume that a senior leader's vision has a profound impact on his command's climate. This article will check that assumption, using five of Glick's six indicators to measure the command climates in the US and German armies during the battle for the Ludendorff Bridge.

The first—and most important—element of a healthy command climate is a shared sense of mission. From the discussion above, we have already seen the stark contrast between a simple mission widely shared by US leaders and continually impossible missions rarely shared by German leaders.

The second element is trust between leaders and subordinates. By 1945, the US Army in Europe was at its peak, and trust among its leaders was remarkably strong. Eisenhower said of Bradley:

"I unhesitatingly class General Bradley's tactical operations during February and March, which witnessed the completion of the destruction of the German forces west of the Rhine, equal in brilliance of any that American forces ever conducted."³⁵

Eisenhower felt the same way about Hodges, the First Army commander. He attributes the First Army's success to Hodges' "own efficient and decisive leadership."³⁶

This trust went deeper than just Eisenhower for his subordinates. Bradley called Hodges "one of the most skilled craftsmen of my entire command . . . I had implicit faith in his judgment, in his skill and restraint. Of all my Army commanders he required the least supervision."³⁷

One might get the idea that these are the happy reminiscences of warriors who had won a great victory. A short anecdote is sufficient to show this trust existed during the war as well as in the memoirs that followed the war.

In the days immediately following the events at Remagen, Patton's Third Army advanced rapidly toward Frankfurt and the Rhine. One day, Bradley's staff complained that Patton was not pushing his front column fast enough. Bradley told them, "Patton knows what he's doing, just keep your shirt on and you'll see."³⁸ The next day, a German counterattack hit Patton's lead column and because he had held them back, the attack was easily defeated and they moved on.³⁹ Bradley's was the reaction of a leader who implicitly trusted his subordinates. No worried telephone calls; no frantic messages; no telling Patton to get moving—just a simple, "Keep your shirt on. Patton knows what he's doing."

Similar trust in subordinates did not exist on the other side of the Rhine. Hitler's mistrust of his generals is legendary and need not be repeated here. But there is ample evidence that mistrust infected

his armies at all levels, especially in 1945, when the Reich was falling apart. Kesselring noted, "Nazi party spying on the population and military destroyed the army's willingness to cooperate and gradually caused intolerable friction and resentment on the part of officers and men."⁴⁰ Falsification of troop strengths was common at this time in the German army, and Bratge was accused of cowardice when he warned Army Group B headquarters, on 7 March, that the Americans were coming.⁴¹

Suspicion and mistrust existed at all levels in the German army. This mistrust had a serious impact on the third element of a healthy climate, teamwork.

German preparations for, and defense of, Remagen showed a serious lack of teamwork. The jealous relationship between the Field Army and *Wehrkreis*, and the confused and conflicting command relationships severely impacted the Germans' ability to plan effective defenses east of the Rhine. Likewise, when the time came for good teamwork in battle, Scheller had to repeatedly ask for volunteers to go out onto the bridge and detonate the emergency charges.

On the other hand, in the proficient US Army teamwork was, in 1945, probably at its all-time high. Bradley relates an incident in January 1945 when the 5th Ranger Battalion called for 50 volunteers from rear echelon troops and was "trampled in the rush of a thousand applicants."⁴²

Good teamwork was also clearly evident in the actions at the bridge by Timmermann's company which, despite severe personal danger, crossed a bridge wired for detonation and captured the bridge and the tunnel on the other side. This type of teamwork and the physical courage that enabled it to hold up under extreme stress are the direct results of an outstanding command climate and the soldiers' trust for their leaders.

The fourth element of a healthy climate is decentralized decision making. It is in this area that the contrast between the US and German armies had its greatest impact on the tactical outcome at Remagen. Hoge ignored orders from higher headquarters, risked the loss of a battalion and changed his command's mission to seize an unforeseen opportunity. Had he waited to get permission, the opportunity probably would have been lost. Once Hoge notified his superiors, commanders at every level confirmed his actions before checking with their superiors.

On the German side, commanders dealt with an entirely different decision-making climate. Army commanders were not allowed to move or even *plan* the move of troops to defensive areas in the rear without written permission, leaving them unprepared to defend Remagen. Bridge commanders, including Friesenhahn, required written orders to destroy a bridge. Commanders were unable and afraid to make even the simplest decisions on their own authority.

Field Marshal Albert Kesselring



Hitler told Kesselring the decision lay in the east, that Russia would never penetrate his forces in the east, that western forces would hold if the Remagen bridgehead could be reduced, and that Kesselring's mission was to hold until "new fighters and other novel weapons" could be employed in overwhelming numbers.

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Hitler's oppressively centralized decision-making rules also slowed reaction to the American capture of the Remagen bridge. General Kortzfleisch wanted to commit the 106th Gun Brigade against the bridgehead, but Hitler would not allow it.⁴³ It seems nearly unbelievable that a supreme commander 400 kilometers in the rear would control the commitment of a brigade-size unit, but this was the norm for the German army in March 1945. This stilted decision-making process was, more than anything else, responsible for the confused defenses of the bridge and the ponderous, insufficient reaction to US troops capturing this critical asset.

The final indicator of a good command climate is prudent risk-taking by subordinates. We have already seen this to be true in the actions of Hoge, who risked the loss of a battalion and the failure of his written mission, to capture the bridge. But Hoge's risk was both rewarded and confirmed by each of his superiors. (Bradley's response: "Hot dog, Courtney [Hodges], this will bust him wide open ... Shove everything you can across.")⁴⁴ Only two weeks later, Hoge was promoted to command a division.

German leaders, on the other hand, lived in constant fear of retribution for their decisions, risky or not. Hitler court-martialed the "persons responsible" for loading the explosives into the Cologne bridge which was destroyed prematurely.⁴⁵ Scheller chose to keep the Ludendorff Bridge open to allow the escape of an artillery battalion, then lost the bridge to the Americans. For this risk, he paid his life.⁴⁶ These messages were not lost on remaining German officers. One German officer noted that in the aftermath of Scheller's court-martial, "We trembled as several days later we heard about the result of that court-martial trial ... The same thing could have happened to every one of us."⁴⁷

Each of the five elements of a healthy climate, then, clearly existed in the US Army and, just as obviously, were absent in the German army during the battle for the bridge at Remagen.

Lessons Learned

Two important lessons may be gleaned from the battle for the Ludendorff Bridge. The first is the critical importance to an army of a strong central vision. In March 1945, a simple senior leader vision existed in the US Army that was shared throughout the organization. At the same time, the German army was hobbled by a complex, unattainable vision that its soldiers often ridiculed.

A second lesson is the link between senior leader vision and the command climate—a link clearly illustrated on both sides in the battle at Remagen. Senior leader vision directly impacted the command climates of the respective armies, positively in the US Army and very negatively in the German. Indeed, the impacts on command climate were so severe that they directly affected the tactical outcome in the battle for the Ludendorff Bridge.

These concepts—vision and command climate—are difficult to grasp and often not completely understood. But leaders *must* understand and develop these concepts, for, as at Remagen, they may be the difference between victory and defeat. **MR**

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Joint Task Force **PANAMA** JUST CAUSE—Before and After

Lawrence A. Yates

Operation Just Cause has been viewed as a swift and effective military action that brought the crisis in Panama to a satisfactory conclusion. The author describes the role and efforts of Joint Task Force Panama in the two years of confrontation before Just Cause, during the intervention phase itself and in the early stages of the rebuilding effort. He cites the commanders, staff and units for exceptional performance in an extraordinary and complex operation.



This article is based on interviews the author conducted with participants in the Panama crisis; on unclassified/declassified briefings and documents; and on material appearing in the public media and professional journals.

FOR MANY Americans, including no small number in the Armed Forces, US military involvement in the recent crisis in Panama is synonymous with Operation *Just Cause*, executed in December 1989 and January 1990. In reality, the military was continuously and, at times, deeply involved in the crisis from its inception in mid-1987. The Reagan administration reinforced US troops in Panama in spring 1988. A year later, President George Bush deployed more troops in order to protect US citizens and assert US treaty rights. In each case, speculation on the possibility of war filled the media. Yet, when hostilities failed to materialize and as other international concerns such as Eastern Europe and Tiananmen Square came to dominate the headlines, US military activities in Panama connected to the crisis receded from public scrutiny.

Virtually overlooked was the work of Joint Task Force (JTF) *Panama*, the organization activated by the commander in chief, US Southern Command (CINCSO) in April 1988 to coordinate security operations, engage in contingency planning and manage the day-to-day tactical aspects of the crisis. The purpose of this article is to acquaint the reader, by way of a brief narrative, with the pivotal role played by JTF *Panama* before, during and after *Just Cause*.

The crisis in Panama erupted in June 1987 after General Manuel Antonio Noriega, commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), cashiered his one-time heir apparent, Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera. In retaliation, Diaz Herrera accused Noriega of drug trafficking, election fraud and murder. Thousands of Panamanians, including influential business and financial leaders, took to the streets in an outpouring of anti-Noriega sentiment. Demonstrations and national strikes rocked Panama City, as the opposition attempted to depose the general, the

real power behind the country's democratic facade. Noriega tried to quell the disturbances by arousing nationalistic fervor, racial prejudice and, increasingly, anti-American sentiment. When words failed, he resorted to armed repression.

As violence in Panama escalated, spokespersons for the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the Panama-based unified

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headquarters responsible for US military interests throughout Central and South America, advised US citizens to avoid demonstrations while traveling to and from the several US installations in the country, to conduct themselves with propriety and, in general, not to interfere in Panama's internal affairs. The new CINCSO, General Fred F. Woerner, loathed Noriega but believed that long-term US interests in Panama and Latin America, the future of the Panama Canal and the safety of US citizens and servicemen in Panama dictated a policy of prudence that would keep the United States on the sidelines of the crisis and prevent a breakdown in relations between the PDF and the US military.

Washington, however, could not continue a business-as-usual relationship with the Panamanian dictator. Emotions surrounding the drug issue in the United States made such a course politically unfeasible. Congress, the State Department and other federal agencies mounted

a campaign of economic, financial and political actions aimed at forcing Noriega to step down. In February 1988, two federal grand juries in Florida indicted the dictator on drug-related

Noriega brushed aside Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle's effort to fire him and . . . thwarted a coup attempt by a small cabal of disgruntled PDF officers. Noriega charged the US military with complicity in these actions. He also questioned SOUTHCOM's right to operate inside Panama.

charges. The indictments and other sanctions transformed Panama's internal conflict into a US-Panama crisis.

In late February, Noriega brushed aside Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle's effort to fire him, and on 16 March, the general thwarted a coup attempt by a small cabal of disgruntled PDF officers. Noriega charged the US military with complicity in these actions. He also questioned SOUTHCOM's right to operate inside Panama. Consequently, relations between the PDF and the US military reached the breaking point.

As economic sanctions against Panama began to take their toll, the incidents of burglaries and theft rose in the country, much of the crime committed by Panamanians intruding onto US installations. Noriega, although negotiating secretly with US officials, intensified his anti-American posturing and stepped up PDF harassment of US citizens and the detainment of US service personnel. When, on 28 March, the PDF stormed the Marriott Hotel in Panama City, arresting and manhandling opposition members and foreign journalists—the latter including five Americans—US concern over the safety of American lives and property peaked.

In light of these developments, the Pentagon and SOUTHCOM could not dismiss the possibility of some form of military confrontation with the PDF. At the direction of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in late February, SOUTHCOM and its components began contingency planning in a crisis action mode. The gamut of contingencies ran from protecting American lives and property to planning offensive operations to defeat the PDF. Most analysts doubted that Noriega would be foolish enough to provoke an all-out US military response, but it would be imprudent not to plan for that possibility. Staff officers reworked the old operation plan (OPLAN) to defend the Panama Canal, in essence creating a new plan, *Elaborate Maze*, that assumed a hostile, rather than a neutral or friendly, PDF. One element of the old OPLAN carried over to the new was the requirement for a JTF to provide command and control for units conducting defensive or offensive conventional operations against the designated enemy.

The number of US units in Panama available for such operations increased that spring. As the threat to American lives, property and interests in Panama rose, the Reagan administration deployed augmentation forces to assist in-place US units with the mission of security enhancement. Between mid-March and mid-April, a brigade headquarters and two battalions of military police (MP), a rifle company of Marines, an aviation task force (TF) from the 7th Infantry Division (Light) (7th ID [L]) and other units arrived in Panama from the United States. Their presence helped lower the crime rate on US bases, but raised the issue of command and control. Giving a JTF operational control (OPCON) over the units involved and tactical management of the crisis would allow SOUTHCOM, which had become fixated on the situation in Panama, to regain much of its regional focus.

If a JTF were created, US Army South (USARSO), a major Army command and the Army component of SOUTHCOM, would provide the commander and the bulk of the staff. By mid-March, a handful of officers on the USARSO staff were already engaged in contingency planning and other functions a JTF would assume. Furthermore, communications between USARSO and the other SOUTHCOM components were upgraded in anticipation



This victim of PDF harassment had "Yanki" scratched into her arm with a knife.

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of a decision to activate the JTF.

Yet, CINCSO delayed making the decision. The PDF had been read into certain portions of the old OPLAN, knew the operational significance of a JTF and could very easily regard its creation as a provocation, even a prelude to hostilities. Woerner, while advocating a firm approach toward the PDF, had no orders to begin a war, so he deferred a decision as long as he could. But the requirements of contingency plans, the increasing need for tactical command and control and a virtual ultimatum from USARSO forced the issue. On 9 April 1988, with no fanfare, Woerner activated JTF *Panama*.

JTF *Panama*

Major General Bernard Loeffke, the commanding general, USARSO, assumed command of JTF *Panama*. At Loeffke's insistence, it

was a trim organization, based on a manning document of 80 to 121 slots. USARSO staff, donning a second hat out of necessity, filled most of these positions, thus imparting a distinctly greenish (Army) hue to a purple (joint) canvas.

Placed OPCON to JTF *Panama* for the purpose of crisis management were virtually every unit stationed in Panama and those brought in as augmentation. JTF *Panama*'s mission was to protect American lives and property, conduct joint training and exercises and draft contingency plans. It also had to be prepared, if called upon, to execute the plans.

Within days of its activation, JTF *Panama* received its baptism under fire. On the night of 11 April, the Marine company sent to Panama to enhance security detected signs of intruders on the Arraijan Tank Farm, a fuel storage area north of Howard Air Force Base (AFB), on the

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west bank of the canal surrounded by hilly, jungle terrain. In a tragic incident, the effort to find the intruders resulted in the death of one Marine from friendly fire. The shock of this had yet to wear off when, the very next night, the Marines engaged in a major fire fight with an estimated 20 to 50 intruders. A week later, in the area west of Howard AFB, a Special Forces (SF) team reported armed men advancing on its position. Again, shots were fired and a reaction force from the 1-508th, 193d Infantry Brigade, attempted linkup with the isolated SF team.


These incidents set the tenor of the crisis for the next year. To the harassment of Americans and violations of the Panama Canal treaties, the PDF had now added armed intrusions onto US installations, particularly the tank farm, and north of that, the Rodman Naval Station ammunition supply point. The number and intensity of these intrusions varied between spring 1988 and spring 1989. US officers assumed that the PDF mounted these operations to provide experience for certain units, to keep pressure on US troops and, perhaps, to provide an incident that would make the United States look bad in the world press or create a martyr for Noriega's cause.

While contending with the PDF, JTF Panama made internal adjustments, particularly during the first weeks and months of its existence. The 12 April fire fight at the tank farm, for example, had revealed a serious command and control problem. The Marine company posted there, Loeffke discovered, was not, in fact, OPCON to


JTF Panama but, rather, to a Navy captain who reported to the US Atlantic Command. CINCSO quickly rectified the problem by placing the company under the Marine forces (MARFOR) component of JTF Panama.

Not so easily resolved, however, was the issue of command and control of special operations forces (SOF). In the incident of 20 April west of Howard AFB, conventional forces and SOF had operated in areas adjacent to one another. Yet, coordination between the units had been poor, in part because the SOF believed that, for security reasons, they could not divulge information regarding their mission and methods. This tactical disconnect was mitigated when the SOF agreed to provide a liaison officer to conventional forces when safety and operational necessity so dictated. A related issue of who would be in charge of running special operations connected with the crisis—the commander, JTF Panama (or one of his subordinates) or the commander, Special Operations Command South, who worked directly for CINCSO—was never resolved to either party's satisfaction.

Other adjustments included streamlining reporting procedures so that information flowed through proper channels in a timely way. Still, SOUTHCOM often received reports of incidents well before JTF Panama. Equally irritating to the JTF were the demands SOUTHCOM placed on it for immediate information, whether



JTF Panama, Spring 1988—Spring 1989



PDF personnel searching American vehicles at a checkpoint outside Fort Clayton's main gate, 2 July 1988.

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accurate or not, regarding any run-in with the PDF. Under pressure from Washington, Woerner had quickly learned that the JCS preferred inaccurate information to no information at all.

Efforts to enhance interservice communications—mainly providing everyone compatible and secure equipment, getting them to operate on the same variables and teaching each service the terminology of the others—proved much more successful.

With no end in sight to the crisis, US military intelligence organizations in Panama had to increase their intake, particularly from human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, without violating the canal treaties or the rules governing military forces in a "friendly" host nation. These legal constraints guaranteed that intelligence usually fell short of what field commanders desired. Although the quantity and quality of intelligence improved as the crisis continued, resourcing intelligence collection was not a high priority until just months before hostilities.

For Loeffke, a larger issue was getting the

forces assembled under JTF *Panama* to think and act "joint." To further this goal, he mandated that a major joint training event be scheduled every two weeks and that other opportunities to combine the training schedules of two or more services not be overlooked. If the Army, for example, had an air assault exercise planned, Loeffke might ask that the Air Force get involved with an AC-130, the Navy with their sea-air-land team (SEALS) and the Marines with their fleet antiterrorism security team (FAST). Soon the JTF staff began to anticipate the general, and this ad hoc approach to joint training yielded to a formal weekly training meeting at which the operations and staff officers from the sister services would meld their separate training plans into joint undertakings. Loeffke, on more than one occasion, proclaimed that the "success story" of JTF *Panama* rested primarily with the opportunities it afforded for joint training in a crisis environment.

The adjustments made by JTF *Panama* and the success of joint training could not ensure

complete efficiency or avert all interservice rivalry. The nature of the crisis, while in many ways making each service more dependent on the others, also brought to the surface some deep-seated differences. None of these, save the issue of SOF, was more irreconcilable than the conflict between the MARFOR component and the JTF Panama staff over rules of engagement (ROE) and various operational constraints.

Colonel Arnie Rossi, the JTF Panama chief of staff, used the term "twilight zone" to describe the situation in which the US military found itself in Panama. The United States was not at war with Panama, yet the situation could hardly be defined as peace. Panama was not a war zone, yet Panamanian and US troops were actively engaged in a war of nerves, mind games and an occasional exchange of fire. While much of the

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PDF evinced hostility toward US troops, other Panamanians professed friendship for the Americans living in their midst.

There were also the articles of the canal treaties that placed legal constraints on what US troops could do in Panama. Yet, no US officer in authority even hinted that the US government violate or abrogate the treaty. The situation in Panama was extremely complex, full of nuances and permeated with ambiguity. An unfortunate act of violence by US troops might not only trigger a confrontation unwanted by Washington but also might concede Noriega the "moral high ground" in the crisis. In this twilight zone between war and peace, the US military, constrained by political and military consider-


ations, had been given the mission of being firm but not provocative. The proper response seemed one of restraint.

While the Marines agreed with the need for restraint, they maintained that the peacetime ROE in effect in Panama were too restrictive. With the Beirut tragedy uppermost in their minds, MARFOR commanders argued that the ROE did not provide adequate protection for their men. The rules for warning trespassers, even armed intruders, left Marine guards vulnerable, the commanders protested, as did the narrow definition of what constituted hostile intent. The commander and staff of JTF Panama countered that, if the PDF were really trying to kill US soldiers or destroy US property, it could have done so easily on any number of occasions.

Convinced that Noriega sought no military showdown with the United States and fearful lest an incident on a US installation result in killing innocent Panamanians, Loeffke, with the backing of CINCSO, refused to relax the ROE. On occasion the JTF staff claimed the Marines lacked fire discipline; the Marines vehemently denied the charge—"We are not cowboys!" one officer protested—while countercharging that the Army evinced a garrison mentality in Panama. Both sides to the debate argued their positions on the ROE eloquently, but since both could produce valid reasons to support their respective case, they could find no basis for conciliation. One MARFOR commander indicated that on most differences of opinion, the Marines and the Army could sit down and work out the problem. The controversy over operational constraints, however, was the exception to that generalization.

As the crisis wore on into summer and fall 1988, the falling crime rate and only intermittent activity on the tank farm and ammunition supply point begged the question of reducing the number of US troops in Panama and perhaps deactivating the JTF. The spring war scare had subsided. The MP brigade headquarters and one of its battalions returned to the United States in the fall, although efforts by the 7th ID (L) to retrieve its aviation TF proved largely unsuccessful.

Captured trespassers being processed at Fort Kobbe after a major MP operation, June 1988.



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ful. The activities of JTF *Panama* itself continued to eat into USARSO's regional missions, but talk of deactivation proved premature. If SOUTHCOM was concerned in the spring that activating JTF *Panama* might appear to the PDF as a bellicose act, the US military now worried that its deactivation might send a signal of weakness. There was also the message from Washington that nothing should be done to "rock the boat" in Panama during the US presidential campaign. Finally, as long as it was possible that the crisis might suddenly escalate, JTF *Panama* needed to remain in place as the tactical headquarters for conventional operations.

Thus, JTF *Panama* won a stay of execution—first, until after the US elections; then, until President Bush's inauguration; and, after that, until the Panamanian elections in May 1989. Meanwhile, joint training and security enhancement missions proceeded on a generally routine basis, punctuated on occasion by increases in

PDF harassment and fire fights at the tank farm and ammunition supply point. Loeffke saw to it that guard duty at the two facilities fell not just to combat troops but to combat support and combat service support units as well. Before assuming their post each night, guards had to qualify in night firing, "survival Spanish" and using night vision devices. Meanwhile, JTF *Panama* continued to revise its contingency plans.

Those plans had taken their basic form in April 1988 when the JCS directed that *Elaborate Maze* be broken down into separate operation orders (OPORDs) for defensive operations (*Elder Statesman*, then *Post Time*), offensive operations (*Blue Spoon*), civil-military and stability operations (*Krystal Ball*, then *Blind Logic*) and a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) (*Klon-dike Key*). Together, this series of plans would be called the *Prayer Book*. SOUTHCOM kept control of *Blind Logic*, while JTF *Panama* wrote the OPORDs for conventional operations. (A

separate Joint Special Operations Task Force *Panama*, activated in March 1988, worked directly for CINCSO, as did JTF *Panama*, and was responsible for planning special operations.)

Taking their cue from JCS guidance reflected in CINCSO OPODs, JTF *Panama* staff officers submitted the first drafts of their assigned subordinate plans in April 1988. In the months that

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followed, these plans would be modified and revised, always with substantive input from JTF *Panama* components and units outside Panama such as the 7th ID (L) and 12th Air Force, all of which had key roles to play under the plans.

From the outset of the planning process in February and March, there had been talk of involving the XVIII Airborne Corps in a planning and operational capacity. Loeffke had successfully resisted the suggestion early on, but in summer 1988, SOUTHCOM invited the corps to become the executive agency for planning and, should the plans be executed, the operational JTF. JTF *Panama* conceded that it required certain corps assets in the event of hostilities but vigorously protested the full-scale participation by the airborne headquarters. JTF *Panama* could do the planning, Loeffke argued, and, with only limited augmentation from the XVIII Airborne Corps, run a war. The issue remained unresolved until November when the JCS operations directorate (J3) decided against JTF *Panama*. In February 1989, in a cordial gathering of the appropriate planners, the XVIII Airborne Corps became the executive agency for plan-

ning. The transition came at an opportune time, as crisis took a turn for the worse that spring.

That turning point came in the aftermath of presidential elections in Panama on 7 May. In the weeks before the election, JTF *Panama* reviewed and updated its plans for enhancing security, evacuating US citizens and handling refugees, among other contingencies, many of which had been addressed a year earlier. Uppermost in the minds of the commander, staff and field units was the potential for violence inherent in the electoral campaign. That potential was realized once Noriega recognized his candidates had lost the election. The general nullified the results and ordered his Dignity Battalions of so-called patriotic Panamanians to attack a victory march led by the winning candidates. Two of the candidates and several other marchers were severely beaten. In the crackdown that followed, opposition members were arrested, jailed and in some cases, tortured.

As the situation threatened to get out of control, Bush sent additional troops to Panama, to include a brigade headquarters and a battalion from 7th ID (L), a battalion from the 5th ID Mechanized (5th ID [M]) and a Marine light armored infantry company with light armored vehicles ideal for amphibious operations in Panama. The buildup, code-named Operation *Nimrod Dancer*, further enhanced US security but also accomplished the pre-positioning of units called for in the contingency plans. As had occurred the previous year, conventional units entering Panama during *Nimrod Dancer* became OPCON to JTF *Panama*.


New troops entered Panama as other Americans were leaving under Operation *Blade Jewel*. The intention of *Blade Jewel* was to reduce the number of military dependents in Panama and to bring on post military personnel living in the civilian community. Designed as a preliminary measure to "clear the decks" in the event of hostilities, the operation served the purpose of a partial NEO (thousands of American citizens living in Panama were not affected) but lacked the legal status of a formal evacuation. This fact, to-

gether with the short notice given many families that they had to leave the country by midsummer, created no small amount of resentment, personal hardship and confusion. Although each service was responsible for its own people, JTF Panama monitored the operation, often making up the rules as it went along. Innovative thinking and dedicated efforts, together with timely assistance from the Department of the Army, helped accomplish the mission. Absent throughout, however, was the necessary doctrinal guidance for this kind of quasi-evacuation. In effect, "doctrine" was being made on the spot.

With the additional forces arriving in Panama, JTF Panama created three TFs. The TF under the 7th ID (L) brigade commander had the Atlantic side of the canal area as its area of responsibility (AOR); the TF under the 193d Brigade commander had as its AOR the east bank on the Pacific side; and the TF under the MARFOR commander exercised authority over the west bank on the Pacific side.

Mission changes for JTF Panama accompanied the changes in organization. US troops would no longer simply react to PDF provocations but would reassert many American treaty rights that the PDF had been violating at will. Evidence of the new assertiveness included convoys of military vehicles moving from one side of the canal area to the other, an increase in high-visibility joint exercises and the seizing of US property that had been leased to the PDF in better times.

The assertion of treaty rights, in the words of one JTF Panama officer, put the United States "in a provocative mode," although one in which it continued to claim the moral high ground. The concern, of course, was that this course would lead to a confrontation with the PDF.



Military Support Group, JTF Panama, Spring 1990

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Guidance from higher headquarters left no doubt that all measures, up to and including deadly force if need be, would be used to accomplish the mission. Washington was not bluffing, although Bush did not desire war. Noriega evidently was convinced of US determination, as the PDF made little effort to interfere with the convoys and exercises. In addition, PDF harassment of Americans and armed intrusions onto US facilities came to a virtual halt during the summer.

This did not stop Noriega from turning some operations under *Nimrod Dancer* to his advantage in his campaign of psychological warfare, an area in which most analysts agreed the general excelled. For example, in one particular show of force, MPs were inserted into Fort Amador, an installation shared by the PDF with US servicemen and families. Noriega arrived soon after the insertion, with his media in tow. Smiling, the general shook hands with an MP and offered himself up for arrest if the MPs were inclined to apprehend him. In minutes, he had softened the impact of the operation, transforming a pressure tactic into a comic event. Loeffke conceded Noriega's "great propaganda ploy" and took steps to prevent its repetition.

With Noriega and the PDF refusing to contest the assertion of US treaty rights, the danger of war in summer 1989 receded. If hostilities came, it would be through accident, not design. To those US officers still hoping to avoid a major war and its long-term ramifications, a number of

unintentional confrontations that could have provided a *casus-belli* caused deep concern. In one six-week span, from late May through June, there were at least six unanticipated incidents in which the two sides only narrowly averted hostilities. Several of these near misses derived from poor coordination or simply bad luck (a wrong turn, for example, bringing PDF and US troops into unwanted contact). Rarely are military operations executed without some snag.

More disturbing, however, was the mind-set of the combat units entering Panama—they simply had not been prepared to anticipate the situation they confronted. Units from the 7th ID (L) and the 5th ID (M), by their own admission, arrived in Panama assuming that war was under way or imminent. Instead, they entered the twilight zone, with its areas of gray, its ambiguity and its legal and political constraints. Trained in a sterile “force-on-force” environment, they went through the mental agony of adapting: learning how to forgo combat in favor of psychological war games, applying the ROE creatively to unique and unanticipated missions, observing the letter of the canal treaties and learning how to operate in an environment in which friends (the majority of Panamanians) and enemies (the PDF and Dignity battalions) were intermingled. One brigade commander noted that, given the realities of the crisis, he had come to rely more on his staff judge advocate than his operations officer and that he would gladly have traded one of his rifle companies for an MP company “well trained in peacetime

ROE.” The professionalism of the US soldier, his flexibility and his ability to adapt to confusing and uncertain conditions contributed to keeping the crisis from spilling over into hostilities through unintentional action.


War did not break out, but neither did the crisis abate. Diplomatic efforts by the Organization of American States failed to resolve the impasse. In a widely publicized comment, Bush implied that he would not be saddened if elements within the PDF overthrew Noriega. US assertiveness seemed designed, in part, to put pressure on the PDF in hopes of encouraging such a development. But by the end of June, the PDF remained unresponsive. Under directives from the JCS and guidance from SOUTHCOM, JTF Panama began studying options for “ratcheting up” US pressure tactics. The planning to squeeze the PDF harder began under Loeffke, but execution fell to his successor, Brigadier General (soon promoted to Major General) Marc Cisneros, the former SOUTHCOM J3.

In late summer and into fall 1989, Cisneros oversaw a series of joint PURPLE STORM training events and smaller SAND FLEA exercises, the latter calculated to irritate and confuse the PDF and to demolish its conviction that the well-being of the institution depended on Noriega remaining in power. Both kinds of exercises were also designed to rehearse parts of the contingency plans for defensive and offensive operations and to desensitize the PDF to the frenetic activity of the US troops near PDF installations. To enhance the readiness of US forces, Cisneros also initiated combat readiness exercises (CREs) to reduce the time needed for units under his command to reach the points from which they could begin operations called for under the plans.

From the viewpoint of JTF Panama, the intensified exercises, which at one point included the temporary shutdown of a causeway connecting Amador with island-based PDF units beyond, did raise the enemy's level of anxiety and frustration. But available evidence to date provides no link between this increased pressure and the decision by a handful of PDF officers to attempt to overthrow Noriega in early October. By coinci-

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A company of the 5th Infantry Division conducting a freedom-of-movement exercise across the Panama Canal Swing Bridge, May 1989. The troops are en route to Albrook Air Force Station.



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dence, JTF Panama had a CRE scheduled for 2 October, but the coup attempt did not materialize as planned. When the plotters did take over Noriega's headquarters at the *Comandancia* the next day, another CRE put US troops in position to respond to any contingency. As the Bush administration discussed courses of action, however, PDF elements loyal to Noriega quashed the uprising. Noriega survived; the coup's leader and several of his comrades did not. SOUTHCOM's position under the new CINCSO, General Maxwell R. Thurman, was that support for the coup attempt was not in America's best interest since the plotters were ill organized, poorly led and not the least bit interested in establishing a democratic government.

It became clear in the aftermath of the coup attempt that if Noriega was to be driven from power, the United States would have to do it. During *Nimrod Dancer*, the XVIII Airborne Corps moved decisively into the planning process, and the product of these efforts, which grew out of the evolutionary process begun with *Elaborate Maze*, was revised again after the coup to conform to Thurman's directives. The new XVIII Airborne-Thurman plan differed in one

major respect from the previous version: instead of a gradual buildup of troops, as Woerner envisioned, SOUTHCOM would deploy troops rapidly and, together with in-place troops, mount a massive assault against PDF facilities. The JC Staff approved the plan in early November. In the event of offensive operations against the PDF, JTF South, commanded by the corps commander, Lieutenant General Carl W. Stiner, would be activated. JTF Panama would be deactivated, its staff and units placed under Stiner. The final version of the plan for tactical operations was designated JTF South OPCODE 2.

A number of coordination meetings and commanders' tactical seminars were held between the XVIII Airborne Corps, JTF Panama and other participating headquarters in late October, November and December. At one point, in response to a bomb threat against US installations in Panama, JTF South was even activated for about a week. Throughout the fall, rumors circulated about what kind of PDF transgression would trigger US intervention in Panama, but, by mid-December, few saw such drastic action as likely (although many considered it possible).

When he was informed at a staff meeting, in

15 December, that the Panamanian opposition wanted the United States to oust Noriega, the acting chief of staff, USARSO, retorted, "We're waiting for them to do it."

With the additional forces arriving in Panama, JTF Panama created three TFs. The TF under the 7th ID (L) brigade commander had the Atlantic side of the canal area as its area of responsibility; the TF under the 193d Brigade commander had . . . the east bank on the Pacific side; and the TF under the MARFOR commander exercised authority over the west bank.

That afternoon, Noriega gave a vitriolic anti-American speech after the Panamanian legislature named him head of state. Emotions in Panama ran high, culminating the next night in the shooting death of US Marine Lieutenant Robert Paz at a PDF roadblock and the subsequent abuse of a Navy lieutenant and his wife. Within 24 hours, Bush ordered intervention in Panama. *Just Cause* kicked off at 0045, 20 December.

Just Cause

Stiner directed *Just Cause* from the operations center at Fort Clayton. As planned, staff officers from the now deactivated JTF Panama provided support. Units that had been OPCODED to JTF Panama, especially the 193d Infantry Brigade and the battalion from the 5th ID (M), encountered some of the heaviest fighting of the intervention. As the key elements in TF Gator, the 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry (M) and a company from the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry (Airborne), led the deadly assault on the Comandancia. Meanwhile, the rest of the 1-508th neutralized the PDF company at Fort Amador, following an air assault of the installation.

The 5th Battalion, 87th Infantry, secured various US housing areas and took out several targets, including the local traffic police station, the Balboa Deni (national intelligence) station, the

Ancon Deni station and the PDF engineer compound. The battalion also took the brunt of the PDF "counterattack" at the police station on 22 December. The Marine TF *Semper Paratus* secured the west bank and the Bridge of the Americas and took out a PDF station during the first day of operations. TF Atlantic secured key facilities, seized Renacer Prison, neutralized the PDF 8th Company at Fort Espinar and isolated, then took, Colón.

MP units, in the forefront of the US response to the crisis before *Just Cause*, were parceled out to each TF to perform their traditional battlefield missions. The aviation and engineer battalions and the area support group stationed in Panama were kept busy throughout the operation, while the Air Force provided AC-130 close air support and performed yeoman's work in bringing troops and supplies into the country, despite an intense ice storm at Pope AFB, North Carolina, as paratroopers began to deploy the night of the 19th. The Navy, for its part, secured coastal sites and provided support for SEAL and other special operations.

In sum, the combat, combat support and combat service support elements that had trained and worked under JTF Panama served with courage and distinction during the combat phase of *Just Cause* and were instrumental in its successful outcome. They had much for which to be proud. That the media, in their infatuation with the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82d Airborne Division, overlooked this contribution caused some resentment among the units stationed in-country. With a resigned sense of cynicism, the 193d began referring to itself sardonically as "the Stealth Brigade."

Cisneros also made a significant contribution to bringing the fighting to a swift conclusion, saving perhaps hundreds of lives in the process. On 20 December, he traveled to the Atlantic side. While there, his attention was called to a PDF prisoner, a naval officer who professed no fondness for Noriega. Cisneros returned to Fort Clayton where, with the help of this officer, he placed telephone calls to PDF commanders throughout the country, convincing them fur-

ther resistance was futile. Cisneros again made his presence felt when he participated as the military's principal representative in the Byzantine negotiations to arrange Noriega's departure from the papal nunciature into US custody.

Rarely in this kind of contingency operation is there a clear demarcation between the combat phase and the stability phase, the latter driven by the need to reestablish law and order and provide nation assistance. In Panama, as in the Grenada and Dominican Republic interventions before it, the stability phase did not begin after the combat phase but during it, well before adequate numbers of civil affairs specialists had arrived on the scene and while MPs were still conducting their battlefield missions. As a result, combat units often found themselves performing civil affairs, constabulary, security patrols and other noncombat missions.

Some combat units had anticipated performing such duties on a temporary basis, but few had actually prepared for this eventuality. The sudden transition from combat to stability duties, with the latter's restrictive ROE and political constraints, caused frustration and, before rigid fire discipline could be imposed, sometimes tragic incidents. Units that had been stationed in Panama long enough to know the people, their behavior, their customs and the terrain tended to make the transition from warrior to constable with greater ease and effect than those units deployed exclusively for *Just Cause*.

Initial civil affairs, civil-military, constabulary, stability and nation-assistance missions lacked adequate coordination. To provide centralized direction to the military's efforts in these areas, a military support group was set up in mid-January and placed under JTF Panama, which had been reactivated with the redeployment of the XVIII Airborne Corps. The nation-assistance effort, initially called *Promote Liberty*,

One brigade commander noted that, given the realities of the crisis, he had come to rely more on his staff judge advocate than his operations officer and that he would gladly have traded one of his rifle companies for an MP company "well trained in peacetime ROE." The professionalism of the US soldier . . . contributed to keeping the crisis from spilling over into hostilities through unintentional action.

continues today and presents JTF Panama with perhaps its greatest challenge. If this post-crisis phase fails to achieve its objectives, many Panamanian and US lives taken during *Just Cause* will have been lost in vain.

In conclusion, JTF Panama did not win the war in Panama, but for more than two years, it provided day-to-day management of the crisis, planned contingency operations, enhanced the security of US personnel and property, trained assigned forces to think and act "joint," conducted exercises that served as rehearsals of the OPLANs, coordinated with other headquarters having responsibilities in the crisis, set the stage for possible US intervention and became the military vehicle for assisting the US Embassy in its efforts to rebuild and restructure Panama. Despite manpower shortages, occasional interservice friction and being put, at times, in a "learn while you earn" situation, the operation of JTF Panama and the units attached to it was instrumental in successfully resolving the crisis. To say the least, its performance was distinguished, effective and essential. Its existence puts into proper perspective the fact that *Just Cause* was but one phase of the US military's involvement in the Panama crisis. **MR**

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AirLand Operations: Are Unit Changes Needed?

By Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Stouder, US Army

The purpose of this article is to stimulate thought and discussion in our profession about the changes in unit organizations being contemplated by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Fort Monroe, Virginia, as an extension of the AirLand Operations (formerly called AirLand Battle—Future [ALBF]) concept. Are these changes necessary to prosecute AirLand Operations, or are they simply drills to either deceive the uninitiated or rationalize TRADOC's problem-solving model; that is, doctrine has changed, therefore, organizations must change?

One of the constants in our US Army is change. Change is necessary for our Army to accomplish its mission in an ever-changing world. Change must be driven by threat analysis, technology evolution and resources considerations. Our challenge is to balance the requirements for change with the "goodness" inherent in stability in the warfighting business.

TRADOC has proposed changes in AirLand Battle (ALB) as it is currently outlined in US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*.

ALBF (the umbrella concept) and its more recent form, AirLand Operations, are evolutionary extensions of ALB. As an extension of developing the AirLand Operations concept, TRADOC is looking at several "alternative" organizations. TRADOC's analysis of the implications of doctrine, training, materiel, leader development and force design comprise the following elements of the framework upon which the alternative organizations are based:

- Agile battalions: Three companies, supported by external repair and supply.
- Combined arms brigades: Combined arms integration focus is at brigade instead of battalion.
- An unburdened tactical commander: Mission logistics is pushed to unit by brigade and corps logisticians.
- Corps-based AirLand Operations: The corps is the echelon for flexible task organization and, now, for massed combat support.
- Division is the tactical echelon: The division uses flexible command and control (C²).

TRADOC's alternative base designs for the combined arms brigade, mechanized infantry bri-




Figure 1. Clear Alternative Base Combined Arms Brigade

gade and the maneuver battalion are shown in figures 1, 2 and 3, respectively. TRADOC force designers state that "the most significant design change proposed is that of a combined arms brigade to provide better strategic flexibility and operational agility."

As we look at these three "clear alternative base case organizations," several points require attention. The scout platoon and nonlinear-of-sight antitank company at the brigade level and the increase in engineer capability are positive changes that have evolved from our experiences at the combat training centers (CTCs). Maneuver battalions have been de facto assigned to brigades for years even though our doctrine has stated that battalions are attached to brigades by the division commander according to mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available. Artillery, air defense, engineers and combat service support (CSS) remain in direct support. But is this significant change? Assign the artillery battalion, air defense battery, engineer battalion and forward support battalion (FSB) to the brigade, and we have a true combined arms brigade and a truly significant design change.

The most significant design change is in the maneuver battalion. Going from four to three line companies reopens a debate we seem to revisit every seven to 10 years. The proposals in the first three figures for the mortar platoon and antitank unit continue discussions that have been going on for years. The removal of the maintenance platoon and support platoon from the maneuver battalion is not just significant. It is a radical and revolutionary change!

TRADOC has models that it uses to facilitate change. The first step in any modeling process is to "define the problem." We must ask ourselves what we are trying to fix or achieve with this organizational change. TRADOC does not fully articulate the problem with our current organizations. Have the field commanders voiced dissatisfaction with current unit organizations? Have lessons learned from the CTCs (and, now, operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*) surfaced problems that mandate change? We must ask ourselves, "Do we have problems that require these changes in organization?" Or if we have problems, "Do the solutions lie solely in organization change?"

Why should we reduce the line companies in a maneuver battalion from four to three? TRADOC analysis offers a "clear alternative base maneuver battalion" that employs the "rule of three"—easier to command, more agile and generating combat power faster. TRADOC proposes a structure savings, on one hand, and, then on the other hand,

suggests reinvesting the fourth company in more Active component brigades.

Have we heard this debate before? You bet we have! Remember the Division Restructuring Study? Division 86? Army of Excellence? Prior to Division 86 implementation, maneuver battalions had three line companies, but years of test and evaluation resulted in the Division 86 structure under which we now operate. "Examination of data collected from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Division Restructuring Study led to a four-tank platoon, three-platoon company, four-company battalion structure."¹ The mechanized infantry battalion was increased to four line companies to keep it compatible with the four-company tank battalion.

What has changed since these studies? The methodology used in all these studies defined the battlefield in terms of critical tasks that must be performed to win. Winning has always meant defeating the enemy by fire and maneuver. What in AirLand Operations has changed that necessitates combat power reduction?

The latest study conducted by TRADOC Analysis Command (TRAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,




Figure 2. Mechanized Infantry Brigade (MAPEX Version)




Figure 3. Clear Alternative Base Maneuver Battalion

Three-Company Heavy Brigade

- Start faster
- Less vulnerable to enemy reconnaissance
- Quick reaction to new situations
- Less impacted by restricted terrain
- Shortened enemy reaction time
- Combat power concentrated faster
- Pace of decision making is reduced
- Sufficient nonlethal munitions available
- Reconstituted sooner

Four-Company Heavy Brigade

- Finish faster
- More habitual relationships after task organized
- More flexible to support counterreconnaissance, reconnaissance and to react to new situations
- Better protection for mobility assets
- More combat power available to concentrate
- Observe/control more terrain
- Decisive operations may be started earlier
- Retain more combat power

A Three-Company Heavy Brigade Is Agile

A Four-Company Heavy Brigade Is Flexible

Both accomplish the mission
... when conditions are properly established.

Figure 4 Heavy Brigade Analysis

compared a 3 X 4 brigade structure to a 3 X 3 brigade structure. The results are in figure 4. Do these results mandate change? AirLand Operations, coupled with the clear alternative base maneuver battalion, requires the maneuver battalion commander to do more with less. What is more important—to start fast or finish faster? Success on the battlefield is defined by mission accomplishment. Weighing the analysis results in terms of contribution to mission accomplishment clearly shows the 4-company battalion is the best choice.

Some other thoughts on this subject are worthy of discussion. AirLand Operations is offensive in nature. Having four maneuver companies allows a battalion commander to fight a main and supporting effort and maintain a reserve. A three-company battalion would be hard pressed in that endeavor. Current mechanized infantry brigades have 12 line companies with which to task organize. With only nine companies, the brigade commander is severely constrained and will have one battalion pure all the time, or three battalions with the same number and type of companies.

What is the net effect in infantry soldiers on the ground? Figure 5 depicts a Soviet-type threat and US organizational ability for dismounted infantry.

The current Bradley infantry platoon table of equipment has two dismounted squads of nine men each. Including the platoon leader and radio telephone operator, a Bradley platoon can dismount 20 soldiers. With the reduction of one line company per maneuver battalion, there is a 25 percent reduction in dismounted infantry strength. The US

Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, is looking at adding a third squad to the Bradley platoon which would increase the dismounted strength from what we have now. The problem is "Where does the third squad ride?" The future infantry fighting vehicle currently being developed at the US Army Infantry School could solve this problem, but how do we fix this problem between now and 2004? Add more Bradleys to the platoon? Add M113A3 armored personnel carriers? Accept the reduction in dismounted infantry strength? Tough questions, with each answer having an associated cost in dollars, equipment, personnel or war-fighting capability.

The TRADOC Heavy Brigade Analysis being conducted by TRAC says the 3-company battalion is agile while the 4-company battalion is flexible. Since TRADOC's "clear alternative" calls for the 3-company battalion, then we must assume agility is more important than flexibility.

What is agility? FM 100-5 defines agility as "the ability of friendly forces to act faster than the enemy." Agility on the battlefield also includes mobility, endurance and organizational flexibility. The 3-company battalion is more mobile (not because it is smaller), but does it have the required endurance and flexibility?

FM 100-5 also states, "In the end, agility is as much a mental as a physical quality." The mental aspect of agility is attained through education, experience and, primarily, through training.

Platoes being smaller make a battalion more agile. We have always been pride that US soldiers have

the ability to "think on their feet." Are today's leaders not capable of the mental aspect of agility so that the answer is to reduce the physical aspect of agility? Are today's maneuver battalion commanders not competent enough to maneuver four companies?

Proposed changes in the brigade structure have given battalion commanders an additional concern regarding mortars. Maneuver battalions currently have six 107mm mortars with two fire direction centers. The 120mm mortar is a big improvement over the 107mm mortar. Is four the right number? Six or eight?

The Close Combat Study Group results have indicated it takes four indirect fire weapons to get maximum effect. That was the rationale for eight-gun artillery batteries. Is employing four 120mm mortars without the capability for split section operations worth degradation in capability? Is it affordable to field an eight-gun platoon?

As a maneuver battalion commander, I must have mortars. They provide the battalion with immediate smoke, suppression and illumination. Mortars give the flexibility to assign artillery priority to the main effort and mortar fire to the supporting effort. What is the correct number of gun systems? Four is too few, while eight is too costly. We have made two sections of three work for years; let us keep six guns in the heavy mortar platoon.

The TRADOC alternative eliminates the antitank company and replaces it with an antitank platoon. There has been a lot of discussion regarding the antitank company. At the bottom of all dissatisfaction with this unit is the M901 Improved TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) vehicle (ITV). This slow, difficult-to-maintain weapon system has been a thorn in our side for years.

What if we got rid of the ITV and filled the antitank company with an antitank weapon system, mounted on a Bradley chassis, that could fire multiple, simultaneous engagements and kill tanks at a far greater range than the TOW missile system? The line-of-sight antitank, which fires a kinetic energy missile, is the proposed replacement

for the ITV.

If we remove the prejudice toward the ITV, should we keep the organization? Antitank units have been used by armies since the advent of the tank. The infantry battalion commander must have organic ability to kill tanks. The antitank unit frees the tank and infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) of antitank missions and allows them to be employed in maneuver. With an antitank unit, the maneuver battalion commander can influence the battle by blocking/overwatching the enemy with antitank assets and using tanks en masse for shock effect during maneuver to close with and defeat the enemy.

What is the correct number of weapons systems, and what is the correct organizational structure? TRADOC is attempting to determine the proper mix of medium and heavy antiarmor systems. Preliminary results indicate that below 12 systems in the antitank company there is a significant efficiency degradation and only slight efficiency increase with 18 or 24 systems. As far as organizational structure, 12 systems should be organized into a company to facilitate C², training, administration and employment. It is also better to have a captain as the principal trainer and battalion antiarmor adviser than a lieutenant because of the experience level and ability to manage the multiple systems on today's battlefield. Another company headquarters also gives the battalion commander flexibility during mission analysis by providing another headquarters to task organize.

The most significant and revolutionary change proposed by the TRADOC alternatives is that "repair and supply are removed from the maneuver battalions and centralized in the FSB to increase agility and improve service support efficiency."⁴

This concept does not pass the commonsense test. Removing maintenance and resupply from a maneuver battalion will neither ensure agility nor improve service support efficiency. The heavy maneuver battalion has agility because the commander owns a maintenance capability and a limited resupply capability. Requiring the maneuver battalion commander to coordinate with a unit outside his

Dismounted Infantry

Threat	US Equivalent	Army of Excellence 4 Companies (2 sqd platoons)	AirLand Operations 3 Companies (2 sqd platoons)	AirLand Operations 3 Companies (3 sqd platoons)
Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) 650	Mechanized Brigade	480	360	522
	Armored Brigade	240	180	261
Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) 2,900	Mechanized Division	1,200	900	1,305
Tank Division 1,750	Armored Division	960	720	1,044

Figure 5.

chain of command for maintenance and all resupply *will not* improve support efficiency. FM 100-5 states that friction (accumulation of chance errors, unexpected difficulties and confusion of battle) impedes agility.⁵ Removing maintenance and supply from a maneuver battalion is like throwing sand in a machine that is currently working effectively.

Let us now look at the support plan for the maneuver battalion. The US Army Ordnance School, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, has developed a plan for logistic support, designed for a US Army corps fighting under a nonlinear war-fighting scenario. A major component of this plan is the battlefield maintenance system, particularly as it applies to the maneuver battalion.⁶

The current maintenance platoon in the maneuver battalion will be reorganized as a combat maintenance platoon. This platoon will be organic to the combat maintenance company found in the FSB. Additionally, the FSB retains the forward support maintenance company, combat supply company, medical company and the combat transportation company.⁷ As the maneuver battalions get smaller, the logistic tail gets larger.

Combat maintenance platoons would occupy maneuver battalion motor pools and would provide all 20- and 30-level maintenance to the battalion with which they are habitually associated. There is ongoing discussion concerning rewriting the technical manuals to give more maintenance tasks (making some current 20-level tasks into 10-level tasks) to the crew and reworking the maintenance allocation charts.

The combat maintenance platoon would provide all Class IX (Repair Parts) and Class III (Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants) package products. Vehicle crews would carry limited "combat spares"—the extent of which is yet to be determined by the proponent schools.

Battlefield recovery would also be the responsibility of the combat maintenance platoon and the combat maintenance company. There are also ongoing discussions that would allow maneuver battalions to keep enough recovery vehicles to do "in-stride" recovery.

Battle damage assessment and repair will be accomplished by the combat maintenance platoon to include vehicle cannibalization. Civilian augmentation will be provided to perform scheduled service to compensate for the shortfall of man-hours. All maintenance records will be maintained by the combat maintenance platoon via the Automated Maintenance Management System (AMMS).

The maneuver battalions will retain a small number of fuel HEMTTs (heavy expanded mobility

tactical trucks) (currently proposed as three) to support emergency fuel requirements. The FSB combat supply company will move fuel forward to unit locations and refuel vehicles in position.

Ammunition will be resupplied by the combat transportation company, in the same manner as fuel, with cargo HEMTTs. Battalions will retain a limited capability to haul emergency ammunition resupply.

The nonlinear battlefield envisioned by AirLand Operations is offensive in nature and requires the maneuver battalion commander to operate dispersed, move fast and mass at the time and place required to kill the enemy. The extended nonlinear battlefield distances require mobile and self-sufficient maintenance. The battalion commander must control his logistic preparation and resupply. Maintenance and logistics must be responsive to the task force needs; maintenance and logistics will not be responsive unless he *owns* a significant capability.

Many battlefield maintenance system aspects are required to improve our Army's maintenance posture, but the system can be implemented without removing the maintenance platoons from the maneuver battalions. There are several concerns about the system worth noting:

- It is based on optimistic resource levels.
- It requires new support vehicles (armored maintenance vehicles, rapid recovery vehicles and high-mobility contact trucks); a highly responsive supply system; new and improved automation; and a C² system.
- Increased crew maintenance tasks may overburden tank/IFV crews.
- Battle damage assessment and repair supplemented by cannibalization is not directly controlled by the maneuver battalion commander.
- It eliminates maneuver commander control over maintenance.
- It severely restricts company/battalion Class IX stockage.

We have problems in force logistic support that need to be addressed. There are warts in the way we do maintenance in our Army. TRADOC is proposing major surgery to fix the warts. I think our Army deserves a second opinion before we do such radical surgery. That second opinion must come from the field commanders. Army organizational changes or changes in concepts for support must be thoroughly evaluated and tested before implementation.

TRADOC is trying to remove the support burden from the maneuver battalion commander. To the heavy force commander, task force mainte-

nance and support are not burdens. They are accepted requirements. The heavy force views maintenance the same as aviators—combat readiness is tied directly to maintenance. Logistics and maneuver are inexorably linked in the “winning on the battlefield” equation. The maneuver commanders must own the assets to make this equation work in training and combat.

The best learning laboratories we have are the CTCs. Lessons learned have told us we have problems in maintenance and logistics support but that the fix at maneuver battalion level is *training* not organizational changes. The many lessons already learned from operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* tell us the same. If we are to hold the maneuver battalion commander responsible for his force's readiness, we must give him the resources to accomplish his readiness mission.

Today's maneuver battalions' structure has proved itself. The structure was tested during the Division 86 studies and has been proved over the years. The unit organizations suit the mission requirements for units stationed around the world. The organizational structure has proved sound at the CTCs and, most recently, during operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. Today's maneuver battalion has the speed to move 300 kilometers quickly, and its inherent CSS enables the force to maintain momentum to defeat the enemy. How many maneuver

battalion commanders during Operation *Desert Storm* would have given up one of their line companies, their maintenance platoon and support platoon? Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* certainly highlighted problem areas in our logistics system, but we should not make our maneuver battalions the bill payers for fixing CSS. **MR**

NOTES

1. Division 86 Final Report, US Army Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 1981, with June 1983 addendum: Division Restructuring Evaluation, Independent Evaluation Report, Brigade Phase, vol. 1, Executive Summary, CAC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, December 1979.
2. US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 1986, 16.
3. *Ibid.*
4. TRADOC Working Draft, Trends and Implications for the US Army's Future AirLand Battle, 34.
5. FM 100-5, 16.
6. Draft Concept for Logistic Support of the Nonlinear Battlefield, US Army Ordnance School, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 1 August 1990.
7. *Ibid.*, 11.

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MR LETTERS

Closing Argument on *Stormtroop Tactics*

While I am flattered that *Military Review* should devote so much space to a discussion of my *Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918*, I am somewhat distressed that Daniel J. Hughes, despite two opportunities to publish his views on my book (August 1990 and July 1991 issues), has failed to address or even identify the book's major themes. The comments Hughes does make, both in his initial review and in his reply to Professor Bradley J. Meyer's comments, deal with peripheral issues—material I included in the book to provide readers with both a framework and a place to begin. In some cases, Hughes is technically correct. In others, he is badly mistaken. In all the points he makes, however, his comments serve not to provide readers with information about a

book they might consider reading but to mislead them as to both the book's subject and author's character.

Stormtroop Tactics is not about the *Drill Regulations* of 1906. Neither is it about the Prussian guard or even operational art. Designed to be a companion to the pathbreaking works of Graeme C. Wynne (*If Germany Attacks*) and Timothy T. Lupter (*The Dynamics of Doctrine*), it tells the story of German tactical innovation in World War I from a new perspective—that of small-unit commanders in the field. Thus, an introductory chapter provides basic information on the German army before World War I. A concluding chapter makes some links to what happened after 1918. The bulk of the book, however, consists of detailed battle descriptions, the evolution of certain combat techniques and the organization and training of combat units.

Hughes takes exception to much of the terminology I use. Clearly he prefers literal, word-for-word translations hence his fondness for "War Academy" rather than "General Staff Academy," "task" rather than "mission" and "Royal Prussian Guards" rather than "Imperial Guard." While there is much virtue in that approach, I opted for translations I thought would better convey the meaning of the German term to today's English-speaking reader. The General Staff Academy was a school run by the General Staff with the aim of producing candidates for the General Staff. The General Staff Academy bears much more of a resemblance to a modern staff college than a modern war college. A mission is a job to be done where the emphasis is on the outcome rather than the process. The Imperial Guard was a formation with the twin tasks of guarding the person of the emperor and serving as a field formation of the federal army.

The few paragraphs on German regulations before World War I that I include in *Stormtroop Tactics* are important to make a simple point: Germany's prewar regulations, however advanced they might have been in relation to those of other major powers, were not up to the task of preparing soldiers for modern battle. The contemporary literature on the subject, written before the regulations were tested by combat in 1914, sheds little light on that problem. Studying the World War I battles, however, does. For that reason, I spared the reader an extensive prewar debate and focused my attention on the actual fighting.

My short discussion of the *Drill Regulations of 1888* makes a similar point. That the *Drill Regulations of 1888* had many virtues (such as the simplification of both formal drill and terminology) is not at issue. Nor is the fact that they were an improvement over regulations issued in 1847—a time when armies were still equipped with muzzle-loading muskets—contested in the least. What is important for my relatively modest aim of setting the stage for an extensive World War I discussion is that they were retrogressive in respect to both the military technology of the time (magazine rifles, smokeless powder and shrapnel shells) and the regulations (those of 1873, not 1847) that they replaced.

My discussion of the tactics of the infantry regiments of the guard corps likewise serves, not to make a sweeping generalization about all 300 years of Prussian military history, but to comment on a particular set of units at a particular point in time. The fact that the officers of the Imperial Guard scored well on the General Staff Academy entrance examination and the fact that many of the officers who played a role in the reshaping of German tac-

tics after 1914 spent some time with those regiments does not negate the far more important fact that small-unit tactics in the guard infantry regiments were seriously behind the times.

In explaining this phenomenon, I overstressed the social role of the guard officer. I should have mentioned other causal factors—the habit of practicing combat tactics on the parade ground, the Kaiser's personal fondness for military spectacle, the deliberate cultivation of a premodern sense of honor in guard officers and the tendency of upwardly mobile officers of the German army to focus on problems above the battalion level rather than small-unit tactics. Nonetheless, I stand by my characterization of the Imperial Guard as tactically behind the times. The proof of this comes not only from the costly frontal assaults carried out by guard infantry regiments in the fall of 1914 but also the fact that, after a long period out of line to refit and retrain, these same regiments carried out the same sort of attacks (with the same sort of disastrous results) during the battle of Gorlice-Tarnów in May 1915.

The shortcomings Hughes finds with *Stormtroop Tactics* are not only poorly based in fact, they deal not with the book I wrote but with the book I did not write. The subtitle of my book, *Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918*, clearly lays out the scope of the work. It is about what happened in four short but eventful years. A book providing "a long-term perspective on the evolution of the Prussian army's theory and its infantry tactics" would, perhaps, make use of the unnamed "important sources in the German archives" and unspecified "literature readily available" that Hughes condemns me for having overlooked. That book, however, has yet to be written.

Finally, I must object to the "cheap shots" with which Hughes ends both his reviews. "Sloppy scholarship," citations that "are not professional" and a "lack of knowledge . . . of basic scholarly procedures" are serious charges. They require evidence.

Bruce I. Gudmundsson, *Stafford, Virginia*

A Case for More Research

I expended considerable effort attempting to follow the logic behind Dr. Regina Gaillard's article, "The Case for Separating Civic Actions from Military Operations in LIC [low-intensity conflict]," in your June 1991 issue. I must admit to failure for several reasons, most important of which is that she appears to have made hasty judgments based on incomplete information in a disjointed attempt to support her pet "US Development Corps" concept.

If Gaillard's research had included the vast and diverse Pacific Command area of responsibility, she would have discovered that humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) activities are being carried out there by Active and Reserve Component civil affairs, engineer and medical personnel, both unilaterally and in cooperation with foreign militaries and with no link to LIC. Unilateral projects have been completed in places such as Tuvalu and Western Samoa, which have no military establishments. Cooperative efforts have been undertaken with the militaries of Bangladesh, Madagascar, Tonga and Papua New Guinea, to name a few. In none of these cases was there a link to counterinsurgency or LIC. Thus, when one considers the bigger picture beyond Latin America, there appears to be no compelling link between HCA or civic action activities and counterinsurgency or LIC, as Gaillard claims.

Since HCA activities are being carried out by US personnel and units with the requisite skills and capabilities, and foreign military personnel can receive training in these fields through the International Military Education and Training program, establishment of a separate development corps would appear to be superfluous.

Finally, exaggeration of the role of military civic action might only result in militarization of the development process, a condition clearly counter to Gaillard's own expressed affinity for democratic institutions.

LTC Stanley E. Henning, USA, J3 Civil Military Operations Branch, US Commander in Chief, Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii

Lack of Basic Knowledge²

I read your editorial on media-military relations on the first page of the July 1991 *Military Review*. While I am in general agreement with your opinion, I feel the issue of mutual ignorance on the part of both officers and journalists is significantly understated.

I have been a US Army public affairs officer with two Reserve commands since 1982 and have seen and have been interviewed by hundreds of civilian journalists. The recent mobilization of Reserve forces for the Gulf War alone accounted for 102 separate media contacts, ranging from on-camera interviews to requests for background material. I continue to be amazed and appalled at the lack of basic knowledge and professionalism on the part of civilian media representatives.

If a civilian journalist were sent to cover a story of the first heart transplant at an area hospital, the

editor would expect that journalist to know at least some basic information—that the heart is a relatively important organ, its approximate location in the human body and the difference between a doctor and a nurse. In other words, a professional news gatherer would have done a little homework before showing up at the hospital door.

Journalists covering military operations come to us with no basic knowledge and do not know the difference between officers and sergeants or between Army soldiers and Marines. We must spend much time with these reporters providing very basic knowledge, and we are never sure if they got it right until we are misquoted.

The idea of a media chair at the Command and General Staff College is appropriate, as is media instruction in early officer education. But the ignorance problem is a double-edged one, and the extra step of providing education on the military at journalism schools is also appropriate.

I am a police officer in civilian life. Students at the college in our area have instruction in the criminal justice system, including two or three nights of observation with a police crew. The justification is that reporters routinely cover crime stories.

Well, they sometimes cover war stories, too.

**CPT John R. Kachenmeister, USAR,
300th Military Police Prisoner of War Command,
Inkster, Michigan**

Marshall Plan Revisited?

A large army does not automatically mean an effective army. The Chinese have the world's largest army but certainly not the world's most effective army. If a nation lacks the economy to provide a large army with modern weapons and support (education, maintenance, training and subsistence), then its army will be impotent against a smaller but better-supported army. To produce a top-rate modern army, a nation must be wealthy, have a strong economy and be willing to divert a sizable portion of its wealth to the development and sustainment of that army.

Providing unlimited economic development and technology to the other large nations of the world threatens to drain our own economy and create potent enemies. With assistance, these nations can build economies that will support a large military, well equipped with modern weaponry. It is for this reason that our foreign policy must constantly address foreign aid. What we give, how much we give and to whom we give must be carefully thought out.

There is an additional foreign policy factor we must consider. Not only must we be careful not to build foreign economies for fear of building

formidable military foes, we must also be concerned because strong economies consume scarce world resources. The stronger and larger the economy, the more a foreign nation competes against us for world resources and products. Much of our foreign policy must focus on controlling scarce world resources.

The recent shift in Soviet strategy suggests the Soviet Union intends to openly compete for world resources. At the same time, it is proactively seeking assistance in building an economy that will eventually threaten to support one of the world's largest and most potent armies.

The downsizing of our own Army is a temporary measure, intended to show the world our military is built for defense, not offense, and to placate the public whom we convinced that the Soviets were our sole threat. To counter this temporary reduction, we will increase our most aggressive military units. As General Carl E. Vuono stated in June 1991:

"Because of the absence of warning time for the conflicts in this decade and beyond, the Army will

maintain a force within the United States of armored, light infantry, airborne and air assault divisions, and special operations forces from the active component, poised in readiness to deploy and fight. These divisions will be reinforced by additional active divisions rounded out by combat brigades from the reserve components. For more protracted conflicts, we will mobilize and deploy our National Guard divisions throughout the United States."

To implement foreign policy, a nation must have the ability to project military power.

We are heading toward a smaller Army with a more aggressive role. This will require well-educated, well-trained and aggressive soldiers. We can reduce our size, our bases and other costs, but freedom is not free. Vuono was correct in his summation, "The future is bright with promise, and the Army stands at the forefront of our nation's defense. Our task—your task now—is to sustain the Army that America will need in this decade and into the third millennium."

CPT Ron Weigelt, USA, Federal Way, Washington

MR BOOK REVIEWS

EBB AND FLOW: November 1950–July 1951, United States Army in the Korean War by Billy C. Mossman. 551 pages. Center of Military History, US Army, Washington, DC. 1990. \$31.00 clothbound. \$28.00 paperback.

At long last, 30 years after the publication of the first volume in the US Army Historical Series on the Korean War, Billy C. Mossman's *Ebb and Flow* finishes the coverage of combat operations in that conflict. No explanation is given for the enormous gap in publication time; Roy E. Appleman's *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (June–November 1950) was published in 1961, while Walter G. Hermes' *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (July 1951–July 1953) came out in 1966. Even more bizarre than the unexplained, belated appearance of Mossman's volume are the facts that he retired from the US Army Center of Military History in 1983, that the latest official title in his bibliography appeared in 1972 (the most recent unofficial one in 1969) and that Texas A&M University Press has recently published four thorough books covering Korean operations for the same period, written by retired Army historian Appleman.

This book, which focuses heavily on small-unit actions, begins with the abortive United Nations

Command offensive in late November 1950 and ends when the truce talks began in July 1951. The five major communist Chinese offensives, as well as the United Nations' counterthrusts, are delineated with commendable clarity, especially in view of the detail Mossman provides and the complexity of the operations. Some attention is devoted to issues above the tactical level; for example, the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, which gets far less space than that officer would have expected, and General James A. Van Fleet's charge that the armistice negotiations were initiated just as his Eighth Army had gained a decisive combat edge in the fighting, which is examined more fully than might be expected.

The differences between the approaches of Mossman and Appleman—an excellent subject, by the way, for a scholarly article—are numerous, notably regarding the combat performances of the 24th Infantry Regiment. In *Ebb and Flow*, the 24th is not described as a primarily black unit, but it is identified as such and bluntly criticized by Appleman.

Mossman has done a solid job; however, his work could have been far better with more strongly

evaluative, analytical statements. There is not even a final chapter of conclusions. This book, though sound and detailed on the facts, is a good case in point to demonstrate why unofficial writings are needed and why official historians should pay more heed to them.

D. Clayton James, *Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia*

COMPANY COMMAND: The Bottom Line by John G. Meyer Jr. 235 pages. National Defense University Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. (Available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.) 1990. \$6.50.

Comments solicited from most of my battalion's current company commanders, the majority having less than one year in command, provide perhaps the best review of Colonel John G. Meyer's *Company Command: The Bottom Line*—they like it and think it is an extremely useful reference source reflecting advice and information they need to know in a single-source document.

I agree that it is a potentially valuable book, particularly for young officers looking ahead to their first command. On balance, it is a well-written, informative and enlightening effort, providing insights into some of the most critical challenges and potential problem areas facing young commanders. The vignettes and "Top Brass Says" quotations entice the reader and are particularly useful in bringing command issues into focus, particularly if a young leader takes time to reflect on the basis for the comments. Extensive facts and references are used to guide the new commander, yet it is not a dry recanting of US Army regulations or policies.

A particular strength of the book is its coverage of administrative and personnel policies. The areas of promotions, military justice and awards are generally tough for a new commander to grapple with, and Meyer does an exceptional job in walking an inexperienced commander through the various facets and associated potential problem areas.

Unfortunately, the book is entirely focused on peacetime operations; commanders would find it of little use in preparing for combat. Another significant problem is the short shrift given to planning and conducting training. With the ensuing build-down of the Army, it is an absolute requirement that commanders, at all levels, establish and maintain a "warrior focus." Meyer briefly discusses the importance of the tenets of US Army Field Manual (FM) 25-100, *Training the Force* and FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, but fails to appropriately highlight the criticality of individual and collective training. This section needs to be expanded and

amplified to be of significant value.

There is also a lack of discussion of the roles and relationships new commanders must establish with other members of their team. Extensive discussion is devoted to how to deal with the first sergeant. While this relationship is certainly critical, young commanders must also concentrate on developing subordinate leaders, such as the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants, and should assume a key role in leading, training, mentoring and coaching them. I would also suggest amplifying the discussion of relationships the company commander must establish and maintain with the battalion commander and battalion command sergeant major.

There are other suggestions for enhancing this book. Include a discussion of the respective command inspection programs found at virtually every organization; these programs certainly serve as a source of what is deemed important by the chain of command. I also feel it is a potential disservice to young commanders not to discuss, in greater detail, the importance of professional ethics and values and the role that commanders must take in shaping the character of their companies and their subordinate leaders. Finally, in an arena of ever-diminishing resources, commanders at all levels must focus on quality of life and soldiers' family care issues. Finally, new commanders often lack an understanding of how to effectively use the battalion and brigade staff; the book would be more useful if the discussion of key issues was broken out into traditional functional areas.

Other works that I would suggest to complement this book include Aubrey S. [Red] Newman's *Follow Me: The Human Element in Leadership*; US Army Field Manual 22-600-20, *The Army Non-commissioned Officer Guide*; Lieutenant General Arthur S. [Ace] Collins Jr.'s *Common Sense Training: A Working Philosophy for Leaders*; Charles B. MacDonald's *Company Commander*; Major General Perry M. Smith's *Taking Charge: A Practical Guide for Leaders*; and Colonel Dandridge [Mike] Malone's *Small Unit Leadership: A Commonsense Approach*.

Even with all my suggestions, I enjoyed the book and found it to be very beneficial. I would certainly recommend it as part of a burgeoning professional library to assist a new leader in preparing for the command of a company. It certainly does not have all the answers, but it is a valuable starting point. This book represents professional advice from a seasoned senior leader, which reflects an essential point—the best resource for a new company commander is a good battalion commander.

LTC Robert A. Fitton, USA,
Troop Support Battalion, Fort Dix, New Jersey

THE GOOD YEARS: MacArthur and Sutherland by Paul P. Rogers. 380 pages. Praeger Publishers, New York. 1990. \$49.95.

THE BITTER YEARS: MacArthur and Sutherland by Paul P. Rogers. 348 pages. Praeger Publishers, New York. 1990. \$49.95.

At one time or another, almost everyone has wished to be "a fly on the wall" when important decisions are made, able to overhear conversations and discern the motives of those who shape the course of history. Paul P. Rogers, who served for almost four years as clerk to both General Douglas MacArthur and his wartime chief of staff, Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, found himself in that enviable position from late 1941 until the spring of 1945.

He was not an important personage in the war—

he is not even mentioned in MacArthur's reminiscences or in William R. Manchester's *American Caesar* and is relegated to a footnote in D. Clayton James' multivolume *The Years of MacArthur*. Nevertheless, he was present during the evacuation of Corregidor Island in the Philippines (he was the only enlisted man to accompany MacArthur's party), the months of planning for the liberation of the Philippines and the long campaign to move Allied forces against Japanese strongholds in the southwest Pacific.

In this two-volume memoir, Rogers uses his intimate knowledge of the relationship between MacArthur and Sutherland as a touchstone for describing the operations in the southwest Pacific from Pearl Harbor to the Japanese surrender in August

PASS IN REVIEW

THE SUPERPOWERS AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL:

Rhetoric and Reality by Dennis Menos. 179 pages. Praeger Publishers, New York. 1990. \$39.95.

This well-timed book begins in the late 1940s. It details US and Soviet efforts to agree on actions to control nuclear weapons. It includes discussions, treaties, policies and summits in which Mikhail Gorbachev participated, right up to the current surprising collapse of communism. The shocking possibility that part of the Soviet stockpile may fall into the hands of participants in a civil war now requires us to restudy our positions based on our past negotiations. Dennis Menos shows remarkable objectivity in describing the philosophy behind the actions and politics of the superpowers. Though not for casual reading, it can be valuable to people in the nuclear or negotiating arenas. —COL Mark H. Terrel, USA, Retired, Corvallis, Oregon

TERRORISM: Pragmatic International Deterrence and Cooperation

by Richard Allan. 71 pages. Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, CO. 1991. \$12.85.

This pamphlet is without merit. Every sentence violates the rules of grammar and syntax. An example from page 16: "This is true whether the violence is a result of a holy war in some far-off country that spills over into the territory of other countries, or is the result of the vengeance of a South American drug lord exploding in Florida or Texas." I hope no drug lord explodes in Kansas. Subjects are intermixed without logic or purpose, and even the footnotes fail to relate to the text to which they refer. The cover price is \$12.85. Now, that is terrorism! —LTC John B. Hunt, USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

ENLISTED SOLDIER'S GUIDE

by Dennis D. Perez, revised 2d edition by John Warsinske. 224 pages. Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, PA. 1990. \$12.95.

This is a fine reference book for all new soldiers, officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Easy to read and understand, it clearly presents "need to know" subjects and helps new soldiers understand the US Army and how they are an integral part of it. Subjects covered include Army tradition, basic and military occupational specialty training, the NCO evaluation system, pay and benefits, duty assignments, uniforms, code of conduct, chain of command and useful acronyms. The guide turns the often complex wording found in regulations and policies into everyday language and terms, and allows easy access to needed information. —MSG Nicholas M. DiGiorgi, USAR, 76th Division (Training), West Hartford, Connecticut

1945. More detailed accounts of the major campaigns can be found elsewhere. What makes Rogers' work worth reading are the firsthand portraits he paints of the major figures who planned the grand strategy for eliminating the Japanese threat in the Pacific. As chief stenographer for both MacArthur and Sutherland, he had daily contact with these men and the generals and admirals with whom they plotted.

Rogers is clearly concerned with explaining why MacArthur and Sutherland, who spoke with one voice in the early years of the war, had such a serious falling-out near the war's end. With the care of a lifelong scholar (Rogers became a professor of economics after World War II), the author delves deeply into his own memory and the myriad of documents available

in archives around the country to help make sense of that relationship. As he makes clear, in the critical times before and after MacArthur's evacuation from the Philippines, the two generals shared responsibility for managing military affairs in MacArthur's command: MacArthur was the political thinker and grand strategist while Sutherland handled the day-to-day operations, and no one questioned the authority of the chief of staff when he issued directives.

For years, Sutherland was also MacArthur's voice abroad, representing him at meetings with higher-ups in Hawaii and in Washington, DC. Presumably, it was his heavy involvement in virtually every aspect of command decision making that prompted Sutherland to develop visions of succeeding MacArthur in the midst of the drive to free the

LANDING ZONES: Southern Veterans Remember Vietnam by James R. Wilson. 260 pages. Duke University Press, Durham, NC. 1990. \$21.95.

An unparalleled account of war's human dimension and the legacies the Vietnam War participants inherited, this book relates the essence of the Vietnam conflict—"not one war but a thousand little nasty wars." Twenty-four veterans from 11 southeastern states—ranging from General William Westmoreland to a Marine private, from an Army nurse to a prisoner of war—relate in gripping detail the emotions they encountered in Vietnam and the reception they received by Americans in the years following their return. Without doubt, each narrative will create a greater appreciation for those who endure the pains of war.—**1LT Mark E. Green, USA, 15th Infantry Regiment, Fort Knox, Kentucky**

JOB SEARCH: Marketing Your Military Experience in the 1990s by David G. Henderson. 175 pages. Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, PA. 1991. \$14.95.

With the prospect of significant Armed Forces personnel reductions, new veterans will need help on how to find a job in the "civilian world." This book is an excellent source of basic information. The author succinctly outlines the process of finding a job—defining interests, preparing a résumé, the job search, the job market, sources of information on jobs, the interview and salary. Samples of résumés and cover letters, examples of how to determine salary requirements, a listing of military-oriented organizations and a reading list are all included.—**COL James D. Blundell, USA, Retired, Arlington, Virginia**

HOW PRESIDENTS TEST REALITY: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965 by John P. Burke and Fred I. Greenstein. 331 pages. Russell Sage Foundation, New York. 1989. \$29.95.

Two major presidential decisions on Vietnam, illustrating how presidents test reality, are examined in this book—President Dwight D. Eisenhower's decision not to intervene at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and President Lyndon B. Johnson's decision to commit large-scale US forces in 1965. The presidents' advisory systems, the presidents themselves and the political environments are the framework used for looking at their decisions. Well written and researched, it is for readers who have a deep interest in decision making at our government's highest level.—**LTC John A. Hardaway, USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas**

Philippines. Rogers knows that the thought crossed Sutherland's mind because the chief of staff said as much to him one evening. Thus, what might be speculation by a historian is an eyewitness account in Rogers' memoir.

Rogers makes it clear that, as the months of fighting stretched out, the chief of staff began to act in ways that made MacArthur testy. Perhaps frustrated that he saw others less capable than himself achieving greater glory, Sutherland began to resent his close relationship with MacArthur since it seemed to be preventing him from higher command. Coupled with this frustration was Sutherland's unfortunate affair with an Australian woman for whom he had wrangled a commission in the US Army, and whom he placed in key assignments within MacArthur's command so he could be near her. The morale problems created by this situation grew to such proportion that even the easygoing MacArthur (or so he is perceived by Rogers) was finally forced to take action to terminate the preferential treatment she received. Sutherland never recovered from the rebuff suffered when MacArthur ordered her back to Australia.

One does not expect to read about a love story in memoirs of war, but Rogers' account reminds us that even generals are human, subject to the same feelings of loneliness and frustration as other soldiers. It is apparent, too, that Rogers had a great deal of respect for both men and that he was personally affected by the growing rift between them. His volumes are, in a sense, an attempt to make it clear for himself, as well as for others, what it was about each man that made him rise to the heights each reached. Viewed as such, *The Good Years* and *The Bitter Years* make interesting reading for those who want to understand something about the pressures and responsibilities of high command.

LTC Laurence W. Mazzeno, USA, Retired,
Grand Junction, Colorado

THE AGE OF BATTLES: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo. Russell F. Weigley. 579 pages. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN. 1991. \$35.00 clothbound.

Any book by Professor Russell F. Weigley is important to the student of military history. More than any other academic historian, Weigley has restored "battle" to military history without abandoning the "New Military History's" interest in the social, political and economic context. His *American Way of War* and *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* may be the classic studies of the US operational styles, if such exist, and his *History of the United States Army* stands alone as the institutional history of the US Army.

Weigley's new book is something entirely different. In it, the author sets out to examine the European "age of battles," that period when the decisive battle was supposed to dominate continental warfare and make war a cost-effective instrument of policy. Weigley challenges this point of view, noting that the famous decisive battles of the period were seldom decisive in terms of war termination. The battle of Blenheim, for example, preceded the end of the War of Spanish Succession by 10 years. Countries seem always to have had more resilience than anticipated.

The author pursues four other themes. These are: the rise of professionalism, to which Weigley, next after Samuel Huntington, gives a more or less narrow professional education definition; the means available to the professional officer for exercising command; the means of achieving tactical decisiveness in battle; and the matter of limitations on violence in war through restraints of international law and custom, which he defines almost exclusively as sparing noncombatants the hardships of war.

This book is of somewhat uneven quality. Weigley's observations are often excellent. For example, when discussing Gustavus II Adolphus and Albrecht von Wallenstein, he points out the frequent defect of many students of war who overemphasize the importance to great captains, preeminently warriors, of professional education, study and thought. This is at the expense of recognizing their nature as fighters—men who seek the competition of combat. Weigley also says rather more about 17th- and 18th-century naval war than one is accustomed to finding in a survey of classical warfare, and that is one of the book's great strengths (Weigley is more often associated with terrestrial combat). And that brings us to the point of what sort of a book this is.

The Age of Battles is a general survey for the non-specialist. Of the 579 pages (including index), fully 300 deal with the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic period. As a stand-alone volume, the book is hard to recommend. As the first volume of a two- or three-volume work, it would provide the foundation for a first-term course in modern military history that would have a follow-on second term to carry the student from 1815 to the present.

Like all surveys, the book has some weaknesses of proportion. For a book with a major theme emphasizing military education as the main pillar of professionalism (whatever the warning mentioned above), the discussion of the rise of military theory in the 18th and early 19th centuries seems rather spare. The maps are too few, often confusing or misleading, often badly placed and in need of

proofing (one lists a commander whose passing before the battle the author regrets on the page opposite). The text itself is flawed, with enough misspellings to distract the reader. Indiana University Press did not do a good job for one of its most distinguished authors. In short, \$35.00 will be a bit dear for most readers. I would recommend waiting for the paperback or the second volume.

COL Richard M. Swain, USA, *Desert Storm History Project, USACGSC*

FIGHTING FOR PEACE: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon by Caspar Weinberger. 460 pages. Warner Books, Inc., New York. 1990. \$24.95.

It is generally accepted as "fact" that, sooner or later, anyone employed by the government in Washington, DC, will write his or her memoirs. While this fact is an exaggeration, there is no dearth of biographies or autobiographies from, or about, those who have served an administration within the "Beltway." Unfortunately, many are self-serving and frothy, with few being substantive enough to stand the test of time.

Caspar Weinberger's story does not appear to have caused a run on the book stores, but it does, in fact, fall in the category of a substantive work for professional soldiers. Any serious student of the history of the major issues concerning the Department of Defense during the 1980s should use this book as a reference. This is a book by a man of intellect and integrity who writes with obvious honesty and conviction. Readers of persuasions other than those of Weinberger may not agree with him, but they owe themselves and their adherents a delineation of his views rather than what they imagine them to be for their own purposes.

Weinberger covers all the bases of his seven years in the Pentagon, from the transition from the Carter years through most of the Reagan years. Those who think the art of war is just physical combat will enjoy the stories of Grenada, Lebanon, Libya, the Falklands and the Persian Gulf oil escort convoys. For the geopolitically inclined, all those already mentioned will be satisfying, as will the stories of the defense relationships such as those between the United States and Japan or about the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

Weinberger makes clear his disenchantment with several personages and institutions involved in the fascinating game of government, particularly those to whom he believes actual exposure to the experiences of dealing with a den of cub scouts, a rowboat or a kite would probably cause physical, as well as mental, terror. His 28 November 1984

speech on "The Uses of Military Power" presented to the National Press Club is a masterful exposition that should be studied by all strategists. There are those who disagree with his thesis, but even in honest disagreement, his thesis cannot be disregarded.

This is not a book that will lead any liberal hit parade nor will it bring joy to those "experts" in defense matters who have never had the responsibility but always have the answers even without, first, phrasing the questions. There is no question, however, that the serious practitioner of the military profession will find this book of great practical value.

LTG Richard G. Trefry, USA, *Retired, Clifton, Virginia*

FIGHTING FOR AIR: In the Trenches with Television News by Liz Trotta. 395 pages. Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York. 1991. \$22.95.

Liz Trotta will not advance military-media relations with her scathing view of television news. Instead of the glitter and the glamour associated with television, Trotta documents how shallow, crass and commercial television news has become since the early 1960s. Television journalism could not fare worse.

As a veteran television correspondent covering stories worldwide for NBC and CBS from 1965 until 1985, Trotta sheds a great deal of light on how the networks work. In this knife-fight treatment, she savages television's top men for mishandling the news over two decades and exposes the sleaziness of television news. It is all there—"breakfast blondes" chosen for network jobs because of their looks; world-class sexists; incompetent and unethical journalists who are not qualified to cover their stories; and the intrusion of the "personality" over the great journalists of television's early days.

Despite her bitterness, she shows high regard for television's potential and identifies excellent journalism where she observed it. Especially interesting in light of the controversy he stirred up while reporting for CNN from Baghdad, Iraq, during Operation *Desert Storm* is the special praise and lengthy coverage of Peter Arnett, whom Trotta first met in Vietnam. She describes the 1965 Pulitzer Prize-winning Associated Press (AP) reporter as the unelected but undisputed dean of the Saigon press corps.

"A born reporter—tough romantic, innately fair, with a spongelike mind, taking it all in with the laugh of a pirate and the courage of a saint," she says. "Arnett looked like a bull pawing the ground when he set out on an assignment . . . He traveled with an amazing [AP] photographer, Horst Faas,

another raging bull, who wound up with two Pulitzers. What a team: the doughty New Zealander and the indefatigable Hun, covering the war day by terrifying day for nine years, logging more combat hours than any Marine battalion in-country."

Trotta earned Emmies and Overseas Press Awards for her work, breaking ground on the airwaves. She was television's first female correspondent in Vietnam, and she covered epic stories in South Vietnam, Hanoi, Israel, Belfast and Tehran; the George S. McGovern, Eugene J. McCarthy and George Bush political campaigns; Edward M. Kennedy's accident at Chappaquidick Island; and the Claus von Bulow and Jean Harris murder trials.

During her career she was buffeted by sexists, incompetents and self-serving egomaniacs, and she does not pull any punches in naming them. Most damaging is Trotta's description of how network executives assign journalists to major stories—not on competence but on "Q-ratings," looks and other nonmerit factors. It is an experience to ride the roller coaster with her as she is promoted to the network level and then demoted to local stations, fired, transferred and, finally, put out to pasture when they noticed "she was over 40 and wasn't blonde."

Trotta, a veteran Vietnam War correspondent who never got over it, gives a foxhole view of the Vietnam and other wars. Surprisingly, she is a political conservative who says we could and should have won the war, and she describes how. This book should be read for its excellent documentation of the Vietnam War's television coverage. Perhaps no other television reporter has written in such detail about how the Vietnam War was covered by the networks.

But do not read Trotta for an in-depth look at policies or politics. Her book is "anecdotal," to borrow the Operation *Desert Storm* expression, not analytical. There is wonderful material here for media bashers and media groupies alike.

LTC John Head, *Public Affairs Officer,*
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

RIDE AT A GALLOP by Benjamin S. Silver. 404 pages. Davis Brothers Publishing Co., Waco, TX. 1990. \$25.00.

In the early 1960s, an event took place that served to drag Army aviation, kicking and screaming, into the mainstream of a recalcitrant US Army. *Ride at a Gallop* is Benjamin S. Silver's account of his involvement in that event and is clearly the most comprehensive account to date. Focusing on January 1963 to December 1965, Sil-

ver describes the creation and testing of the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) (11th Army Air Defense) and the subsequent deployment of the organization into successful combat operations in Vietnam as the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (1st Air Cavalry).

Silver's narrative includes the evolution, development and testing of the air assault division, of various subordinate division elements and of his own 228th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion. He describes the two organizations closely involved with the test process—the 10th Air Transport Brigade (that provided both fixed- and rotary-wing aviation support to the test process) and the Test, Evaluation and Control Group (that relieved division personnel from the myriad of administrative details involved in the testing processes).

The reader should recognize that the unit structures created, the tactical concepts involved and even the test procedures used represented significant departures from previous operations. Silver cites the high priority accorded to the project throughout the test period, noting it clearly enhanced the test and evaluation process. He also acknowledges the controversy surrounding the project as senior US Air Force officials asserted that Army experiments duplicated the Air Force's programs.

Silver recounts his efforts and frustrations in converting the 228th's newly developed CH47A Chinook helicopters from a collection of static mechanical nightmares into the reliable workhorses of the 1st Air Cavalry during combat operations. He describes the inadequacy of the test units' original organizational documents and the numerous revisions made to those documents. A major part of the change process was ensuring that every piece of equipment in the division was transportable by Army aircraft (the significant exception—two 5-ton wreckers).

Silver's considerable recollections are augmented with significant research. Although sometimes offering more detail than the reader might want and flights of nostalgia that might be considered gratuitous, the book is good history and provides some very solid lessons regarding the techniques to bring new concepts, organizations and equipment into the Army. For the aviator, it provides valuable insights concerning the qualification and competence of aviators and aircrews. And, finally, it provides a clear example of the trials and tribulations involved, and the patience needed to bring a complex piece of new equipment into the Army.

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THE MAN WHO CHANGED THE WORLD: The Lives of Mikhail S. Gorbachev by Gail Sheehy. 401 pages. HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., New York. 1990. \$22.95.

When a reporter once asked Leonard Bernstein's father what the famous conductor was like as a child, the father admitted that he had been concerned that his son paid too little attention to sports and was always practicing the piano. But then he added, "How was I supposed to know he was 'Leonard Bernstein'?" This is the case with Gail Sheehy's new biography of Mikhail Gorbachev, based extensively on scores of interviews. Recollections decades later are always somewhat suspect and should be placed in their proper perspective. After all, "Who knew he would become 'Mikhail Gorbachev'?"

Sheehy is a contributing political editor for *Vanity Fair*, author of the best seller, *Passages*, and an award-winning journalist specializing in character studies of Western political leaders. Her interest in the Soviet Union began during a month-long exchange in 1972, but it remains the fascination of an outsider not of a scholar or linguist. The wealth of personal information gleaned makes this an extremely readable book. Yet, the sketchiness of citations and lack of comprehensive footnotes make the reader wonder what he is missing. Key personnel who knew Gorbachev are now dead or refused to be interviewed.

The most fascinating part of the book describes Gorbachev's childhood. He survived the terrors of famine and collectivization, and was torn by the contradictions of two grandfathers, both originally peasant landowners—one disappeared into the Gulag during "kulak mania," and the other collaborated with the system to enforce collectivization.

Sheehy defines Gorbachev's six "lives" as Country Cossack, 1931 to 1949; First-Generation Apparatchik, 1950 to 1977; Disciple of Doublethink, 1978 to 1984; The Great Persuader, 1985 to 1989; Dictator for Democracy, 1989 to 1990; and Red Star Falling, Spring 1990. She argues that Gorbachev is a product of the repressive Stalinist system in which he grew up; he "was aware of it, he quarreled with it, but he did not choose to fight it and risk ending up in the Gulag." Instead, he used his talents of surprise, compromise and improvisation to attempt to save the socialist system he accepted.

Gorbachev possesses two contradictory beliefs: first, that he is only a "cork on the river of history," most of the time simply swept on the surface by powerful forces and dark currents more complex than he will ever understand and, second, that "everything he does matters" and every action he takes

can result in change. Gorbachev increasingly was convinced he could control events, but in reality, he became the victim of his own reforms, swept up in events beyond his control and consequences he never anticipated.

The Man Who Changed the World is not the definitive biography of Gorbachev but is well worth reading. It is a provocative, if not completely satisfying, portrait of the man who has indeed changed the world. It raises more questions than it answers, but then, that is what the word "provocative" is all about.

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THE RAPE OF SERBIA: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943-1944 by Michael Lees. 384 pages. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., New York. 1990. \$29.95.

In 1943, a young British liaison officer, Michael Lees, was dropped behind German lines into mountainous Serbia in northern Yugoslavia. His mission was to coordinate Allied-supported sabotage operations by the Cerniks, the pro-Western, loyalist resistance forces under the command of General Draza Mihailovic, minister of defense for the exiled government. However, the plane loads of supplies needed to blow up bridges and railroad tracks never materialized in anything close to the numbers promised. The young, eager Lees chafed at the inexplicable cancellation of actions previously endorsed by his superiors at the secret Special Operations Executive (SOE) in Cairo, Egypt.

Now, 47 years later, Lees' *The Rape of Serbia* reveals the forces behind both the scuttling of his efforts and those of other British liaison officers operating under Mihailovic, and Winston Churchill's decision to abandon the royalist forces in favor of the communist partisan leader, Marshal Tito. Lees' bitterness and anger at the injustice of this policy shift and its tragic consequences give a sharp edge to his meticulously developed and carefully documented indictment (based on personal experience and three years' research into recently declassified military and diplomatic records). It is a grim tale.

Churchill, he finds, was deliberately hoodwinked by a campaign of lies and deception orchestrated by communist moles within the Cairo branch of the SOE. The office staff that coordinated aid to the various anti-German resistance forces in Yugoslavia included known communists, as well as those working covertly to bring Tito to power. In addition, Churchill was badly advised by the army officers he

sent to evaluate Tito. They were themselves taken in by the communist partisan leader's charismatic personality and public relations expertise, endorsing him enthusiastically. Lees also implicates communist sympathizers in key places, including the British media.

These combined influences led Churchill to abandon the loyalist Cetniks in Tito's favor. So convincingly and completely do the documents Lees unearthed refute what he calls the "received wisdom" on the Allied swing to Tito, Lees speculates their release may have been accidental. The official British version of the events has not yet changed despite incontrovertible evidence to the contrary.

Tito's new legitimacy permitted him to pursue his single-minded campaign to take over all of Yugoslavia. He used Allied arms to wage civil war against the Cetnik forces rather than against the occupying army. Mihailovic, branded unfairly as an unwilling fighter and a collaborator, was eventually executed in the general slaughter of Serbians following Tito's victory.

Lees combines scholarship and passion to throw important light on a tragic wartime action that Churchill himself is reported to have admitted in later years was his "biggest mistake in the war."

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THE WAR OF 1812: A Forgotten Conflict by Donald R. Hickey. 457 pages. University of Illinois Press, Champaign, IL. 1989. \$32.50 clothbound. \$14.95 paperback.

What does the average historian, even of the US military experience, really remember about the war of 1812: the Battle of New Orleans, victory on Lake Erie, the *Constitution* winning over the *Guerrière*? Characterized by political confusion, military mismanagement, tactical defeat and, ultimately, strategic stalemate, the War of 1812 is a forgotten war since there are few victorious moments and little pleasant to remember about it.

But defeat can serve as the best stimulus to reform; we can and often do learn more from our mistakes and defeats than from our victories. (This is a particularly important warning to post in the wake of the euphoria over Operation *Desert Storm*.) The confusion of the War of 1812 spurred the US Army and the nation to create the small, yet highly effective, professional force that fought to victory in the Mexican War. Similarly, the ill-preparedness during the first months of the other, until recently, forgotten war—the Korean War—led to the insti-

tution of specific tactical and training reforms that built up our conventional forces to a high peak (before blunting that spearhead in the jungles of Vietnam).

Setting the political stage, Hickey discusses the struggle between the Republicans and the Federalists that contributed to the start of the war. The real, if overstated, grievances with Great Britain precipitated the conflict and led to war despite the woeful state of US preparedness. The lesson of ill-preparedness for war is one which America somehow finds necessary to relearn every other generation. In 1812, the US military establishment, especially the Army, could truthfully be characterized as pitiful.

Military unpreparedness, uncertain national leadership, poorly conceived military and political goals, and regional divisiveness led to an unpopular and unsuccessfully prosecuted war. Only the cleverness of US diplomacy, matched with the critical fact that the majority of Britain's assets, best troops and diplomats were concerned with winding up the Napoleonic struggle, allowed the United States to escape with claims of victory or, at least, no defeat.

Blending discussions of political infighting and desperate fiscal experiences with military "bungling and mismanagement," Hickey has provided the best study to date of this conflict. I recommend this book to the first-time reader of early US military history or to the specialist in the field because of its accuracy, thoroughness and balanced approach in discussing all elements of national power that go into making war—national will, political goals, financial resources, bureaucratic organizations and skills, local military and political leaders, and well-trained men. The War of 1812 should serve as another example of what happens when any elements of the equation are missing.

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Bio Errors

In the July 1991 issue of *Military Review*, the biographical sketch on page 63 should have stated that Mark Edmond Clark had been associated with Mobil (not Mobile) Oil Corporation.

In the September issue, we stated on page 51 that Colonel Peter C. Langenus serves at Fort Totten, New York. Our apologies to all at Fort Totten.



October 1941

Fifty years ago this month World War II was on the threshold of becoming a global war. The United States had already realized that it was only a matter of time before it too would become a combatant. So the US military machine continued its steady growth, with the activation of four Infantry and one Armored divisions at various posts and camps across the country.

The *Battle of Britain* subsided with the opening of the 1,000 mile Russian front in June. Enormous damage had been sustained during the raids on Great Britain. One out of every five homes had been damaged or destroyed, factories damaged, and transportation, gas and water systems disrupted.

The United States assumed protection of all shipments from US ports to Great Britain as far as Iceland in September. On 17 October, the destroyer USS *Kearny* was torpedoed off the coast of Iceland, but reached port. On 1 October the destroyer USS *Reuben James* was torpedoed in the Atlantic and sank.

The German army and its allies on the Russian front by October had entered the Crimea on the southern end of the front and had begun the siege of Moscow in the north, forcing the Soviet government to transfer its headquarters to Kuibyshev. In Moscow, on 1 October 1941, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the First Soviet Protocol. Under this agreement, Great Britain and the United States would provide the Soviet Union with materials essential to the Russian war effort for nine months.

The war in Asia was already more than ten years old. After Japanese troops occupied the southern half of Indochina in July 1941, the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands proclaimed an embargo on all shipments of oil, scrap iron, steel and other raw materials to Japan. This was viewed by the Japanese as an American ultimatum to Japan, which faced economic strangulation as soon as its reserve of raw materials was exhausted. On 7 October, Prince Fumumaro Konoye resigned as Japanese premier and was replaced by General Hideki Tojo.

The United States continued to supply Great Britain and the Soviet Union with much needed supplies under the *Lend-Lease* program, while waiting for a compelling reason to enter the war. By October 1941, the wait was about to be a long one.

