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THE SMALL WARS MANUAL: PROLOGUE TO CURRENT OPERATIONS

by

Vicki T. Marsh

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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The principles of small wars deserve special consideration due to the increased likelihood of those types of wars and the Marines' early experience in Latin America. In particular, the principles contained in or derived from the Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual (SWM) are applicable to current forward presence operations, including the military's role in the war on drugs, although it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the merits of counternatcotics (CN) strategy and determine measures of effectiveness.

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Abstract of

THE SMALL WARS MANUAL: PROLOGUE TO CURRENT OPERATIONS

The principles of small wars deserve special consideration due to the increased likelihood of those types of wars and the Marines' early experience in Latin America. In particular, the principles contained in or derived from the Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual (SWM) are applicable to current forward presence operations, including the military's role in the war on drugs, although it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the merits of counternarcotics (CN) strategy and determine measures of effectiveness.

Latin America is where Marines got hands-on experience in conducting small wars. Now U.S. policy mandates the return of the military to the proving ground. The SWM remains relevant because Marines waged small wars in an "American context with all the problems and limitations inherent in that fact." Most of SWM's abiding principles appear intact, if in somewhat altered form, in current doctrinal publications, draft JCS Pub 3-07 and FM 100-20/AF Pamphlet 3-20.

An outgrowth of this study is specific recommendations to develop an adaptable regional plan incorporating principles from the SWM which views CN in the context of counterinsurgency (CI), and to use the NSC structure to strengthen inter-agency cooperation in current operations.

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INTRODUCTION

The principles of small wars deserve special consideration due to the increased likelihood of those types of wars and the Marines' early experience in Latin America. In particular, the principles contained in or derived from the Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual (SWM) are applicable to current forward presence operations, including the military's role in the war on drugs which is listed among such operations (although it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the merits of counternarcotics (CN) strategy and determine measures of effectiveness).[1] The U.S. Naval War College's current Syllabus Strategy and Policy states that the SWM "...does reflect the best in the understanding of the American services of how to approach counterinsurgency (CI) in classic "small wars."[2] Principles contained in the SWM's have applicability to CI and the war on drugs because they have been incorporated into various doctrinal pubs, and because they have withstood the test of time.

BACKGROUND

"History never looks like history when you are living through it."[3] But Adlai Stevenson got it right when he said, "We can chart our future clearly and wisely only when we know the path which has led to the present," in a speech at Richmond, VA on September 20, 1952. However well-documented and codified, the lessons of history are often overlooked for their relevance to current and future operations.

A history most relevant to current and future forward presence operations is the (SWM), published 52 years ago as an outgrowth of operations in various Central American countries from 1898 until 1934 under the aegis of the Monroe Doctrine.[4] Established in 1823, this doctrine proscribed European intervention in the affairs of Spanish-American states and closed future colonization to European countries. The SWM codified lessons learned from the experiences of Marines during the first three decades of this century, centering on how to protect U.S. interests, as well as American nationals and their property, in time of revolution.[5] Its nature is both descriptive and prescriptive.

Despite the passage of so much time since publication of the SWM, it remains relevant and pertinent especially since so few wars are declared. The U.S. Constitution stipulates that only the Congress may declare war, and it has done so only five times. The last time marked the U.S.' formal entry into World War II in 1941-42, when it declared war with Germany, Japan, Bulgaria, Hungary, and

Rumania.[6] However, as commander-in-chief the President of the U.S. is empowered to commit forces to military action without a declaration of war when situations do not warrant or permit time for such a declaration.[7] Evrn since the Vietnam (undeclared) War ended in 1975, the U.S. has committed its military forces in 25 contingency operations.[8]

Explanations abound as to why the lessons of history contained in the SWM were not applied to the Vietnam War. First among the major rationalizations is that the U.S. military was and continues to be fixated on big wars with their use of overwhelming firepower in which they are relatively unconstrained by politics. According to a Marine expert in small wars, "measures justifiable in a regular war, tactically sound, and probably the most efficient available, must frequently be eliminated from the plan of campaign as not being in accord with public policy in the existing situation."[9]

A second rationalization is that small wars are considered by some to be so unique in terms of origins and geographic setting that lessons learned from one cannot be transferred to another. Another author suggested that inherent contradictions in the SWM rendered it an "imperfect guide" to conducting small wars.[10] The most credible rationalization, however, is that the SWM "was tainted by the doctrine of dollar diplomacy, i.e., that American troops should be used to protect American interests abroad."[11] The originator of that same opinion, however, advances studying the SWM because it reflects the "American context" in which Marines gained their experience in fighting small wars, "with all the problems and limitations inherent in that fact."[12]

While some might question its utility as a ready reference work for operations in Vietnam, since then, or current and future operations, its principles have endured and should be considered prospective. In the post-Vietnam era with its relative frequency of contingency and other operations, regional conflicts will probably become the norm. The world is no longer bi-polar since the demise of the Soviet Union as a superpower and as a balancing influence, and will be uni-polar in that the U.S. is the most dominant power. Hence, the U.S. may become a focal point to rally against as it pursues securing its interests, as in the U.S. stance on CN, "the international drug trade is a major threat to our national security,"[13] and DoD's charter "to help lead the attack on the supply of illegal drugs from abroad."[14] National interests return the U.S. military to the scene of century-old small wars in the western hemisphere, Latin America. Historically,

Latin America has provided fertile soil for insurgencies, and this is where Marines learned through trial by ordeal the lessons in prosecuting small wars.

An appreciation of the meaning and origin of the term "small wars" is necessary for discussion and analysis. A long-standing definition of this term was coined by the small wars specialist Col C.E. Callwell of the British Army in the late nineteenth century as "campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerrilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field."[15] The Marines defined "small wars" as "operations undertaken under executive authority wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation" and noted that small wars can vary greatly in size and scope.[16]

While the SWM is arcane, it is also an exhaustive, detailed treatment of small wars in 15 chapters spanning 450 pages, and it deserves close scrutiny as the principles of small wars contained in it are neither explicit nor readily apparent to the casual reviewer. An understanding of the most enduring of these principles of small wars is essential to their application, and this paper will present their origins, their status as included in current doctrine, and their applicability to forward presence operations.

OVERVIEW OF ENDURING PRINCIPLES

Eight principles gleaned from the SWM are discussed as relating to current operations. Briefly, they are (1) ***primacy of politics***, (2) ***minimum force***, (3) ***adaptability***, (4) ***command unity of effort***, (5) ***cooperation***, (6) ***psychology***, (7) the ***media***, and (8) five ***phases*** of small wars. Summarizing the essence of them, as learned first hand by the Marines, is germane to further discussion.

The importance of Clausewitz's dictum on the ***primacy of politics*** is especially relevant as politics and diplomacy continue throughout small wars, whereas major wars result when a political solution to a conflict cannot be reached and the matter is turned over to the military to resolve by calibrating the use of force. A political constraint and reality of small wars is the military's goal of accomplishing the mission with the use of ***minimum force***, and minimum loss of life as well.

The need for ***adaptability*** in small wars is met through adaptive planning because the military force tends to operate independently. Because forces operated independently, the commander's ability to accurately assess the mission and communicate it, and his intent, to subordinate commanders pivotal in achieving ***command unity of effort***. Externally, ***cooperation*** which embraces civil-military relations, helps achieve unity of effort.

The Marines exhibited great prescience in recognizing that applications of ***psychology*** in conducting small wars are virtually unlimited. The Marines also quickly grasped the capability of the ***media*** to help or hinder efforts toward mission accomplishment in small wars. And lastly, five ***phases*** of small wars as identified by the Marines may not all be found in every situation, but actions taken in these phases contribute to the existing government's legitimacy.

PRINCIPLES OF "SMALL WARS"

While it is unclear if the authors of the SWM had read Clausewitz's monumental work, On War, their considerable experience in conducting small wars led them to a similar conclusion on the ***primacy of politics***, that "statesmen must define policy relative to international relationships and provide the military with the means to carry it into execution."[17] With such a basis, the military can devise operational plans to achieve strategic aims in close cooperation with statesmen.

Unlike general wars, the political component of national strategy remains in evidence throughout small wars and "exercises a constant and controlling influence over military operations."[18] Containment is the rationale for this influence.[19] In small wars, the military component is not used as a last resort, but as a complement to the political and economic components of strategy. Such interdependence and responsibility demands statesman-like qualities, including mutual respect and cooperation from military and civil leadership.[20]

The beginning of small wars was marked by the President, as commander in chief, committing U.S. Marines without action from the Congress.[21] Commitments were characterized by their suddenness and the absence of instructions other than for reporting. Solely applying military measures to a situation, however, might not engender a successful outcome because the basic causes might stem from political, social or economic origins. In such situations, the military assumed a secondary role. In acute situations requiring a political adjustment, the application of military measures should be judicious.[22]

Given the preeminence of political considerations in small wars, political authorities "ordinarily continue to exert considerable influence on the military campaign."[23] Political considerations may constrain not only the strategy but also the tactics. Over time, the State Department's influence was so pervasive that it often sized the force to be sent. This gave rise to the U.S. Marines being called State Department troops.[24] Lack of clear lines of authority between the military and the State Department created some difficulties.

The goal of small wars is "not to exert any physical force unless it becomes absolutely necessary, and then only to the minimum essential necessary to accomplish its purpose."[25] The principle of ***minimum force*** also encompasses a corresponding minimum loss of life. On those occasions which clearly warrant use of force, caution is advised against timidity or delay because they will be perceived as weakness, and that indecision could result in imposing stronger measures than would have been necessary at the outset.[26]

Small wars require the finest leadership because they are "conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions."[27] In the absence of specific instructions, the force commander should ferret out guidance by studying current foreign policies as these apply to military forces, and by studying the past U.S.

interventions and measures applied, including the use of force, short of war.[28] The force commander is warned that irregular troops may not abide by International Law and the Rules of Land Warfare, and consequently, commanders must know how to protect their units against practices exceeding legal limits.[29] This implies the inherent right of self-defense when hostile intent is demonstrated or hostile acts committed.

Adaptability, in particular, addresses the need for developing the "campaign plan and strategy" to fit the situation and the people.[30] Campaign and operation plans set military objectives, which flow from the political objective(s). Generally, the former sets forth an employment concept for the military force and methods of conducting the campaign. The campaign plan also addresses the authority and responsibilities of the military force. In short, it provides a general outline of means and ends. The operation plan provides details on "tactical employment of the force," logistics, communications and even non-military measures, e.g., the supervision of elections. Plans should be simple and flexible, yet complete, yet with due caution against prolonged operations and launching a campaign without adequately preparing for it. Both can be overcome by accurately assessing the situation beforehand.[31]

The necessary ***command unity of effort*** can be created by the commander, who should derive his mission "from the general intent of higher authority, or even from foreign policy," by conveying the mission and any subsequent modifications to subordinate commanders, along with his intent so that their decisions would conform.[32] The most frequent mission was establishing and maintaining law and order by supporting or replacing the civilian government in countries or areas where U.S. interests were jeopardized. However, the mission should be accomplished with a view towards war termination, as the means employed should "leave no aftermath of bitterness or render the return to peace unnecessarily difficult."[33] Given the vagueness of small wars and widely dispersed units, the commander should issue letters of instruction (LOI's) to subordinate commanders, planning for both success and setbacks by indicating in general terms what to do in either case, leaving subordinate commanders to determine the details of execution.[34]

Advancing unity of effort through ***cooperation*** and coordination among the various agencies involved in an intervention greatly facilitates achieving common goal. A plan of action should address the military force's contribution to complement the economic and social solutions to a country's basic problem(s). Such a plan should also cover contributions from local government and the civilian populace.

Developing those plans as far in advance as possible is urged, followed by modifying them after conferring with the State Department upon arrival in the theater of operations.[35] While the State Department has value as a facilitator in establishing relations with the host government and as a repository of general information on the country, a "principal obstacle", however, is the lack of clearly cut lines between the State Department and military authorities.[36]

Much credence should be placed in the application of *psychology* to small wars. The first application is developing a military force having both a peaceful and warrior-like character so that it can respond accordingly to situations presented, but yet always strive to accomplish its mission without firing a shot.[37] As Sun Tzu said, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."[38] A second application is an intensive study of all aspects of the national character and the existing problem(s) which might precipitate the presence of U.S. military force.[39] This would facilitate foreknowledge of the war in which the force may be involved per Clausewitz: "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature."[40]

A study should also include the opposition's leader, who enjoys many natural advantages, e.g., acclimatization plus knowledge of terrain and the people. Although an opponent may have the latest technological weaponry, knowledge of the human character directing their use is of the utmost importance.[41] "Any profound understanding of a revolution, a sudden change in beliefs, ideas or doctrine, necessitates knowledge of the mental soil in which ideas that direct its course have to germinate."[42] Another essential application of psychology is knowledge of crowd behavior, because individual members seem to draw strength from the group which voids personal responsibility for actions. The control measures must prevent its formation and the development of a hero, if possible, with special consideration against underestimating irregulars who may have received modern education and training.[43]

Closely akin to the power of psychology is that of the *media* to influence. To assure favorable press relations, early establishment of policy for handling the press is urged to include reception, information to be provided and the means for providing it.[44] Whereas some favor restricting publicity to the absolute minimum, providing specific information demanded by press representatives is advocated

unless it is classified or would jeopardize the mission.[45] Use of all available means to communicate our government's aims to the people is advocated, recognizing the media's value both at home and abroad, and the "ordinary characteristic of small wars... the antagonistic propaganda against the campaign or operations in the U.S. press or legislature."[46]

Typecasting wars, especially small wars, is difficult. But nonetheless, five *phases* of small wars, one or more of which may be present depending on the situation, can be identified.[47] Phase one is the initial demonstration or landing with the common feature of U.S. forces "dribbling in" because the U.S. is not at war and wants to attain its objectives with minimum forces to maintain cordial relations.[48] During phase two, reinforcements arrive and field operations begin and the theater of operations is divided into areas and forces assigned for each. If required, a native military and police force are organized.[49] Phase three measures, applied in varying degrees depending on the outcome of phase two, include assuming control of executive agencies, and cooperating with the legislative and judicial agencies. These measures may encompass obtaining reinforcements as well as indigenous military forces, which should be used early on to facilitate local indigenous agencies discharging their responsibilities for restoring law and order.[50] Phase four assumes a favorable outcome for phase three and marks the gradual return of police functions to their rightful indigenous agencies while protecting the Marines against the assumption of powers beyond those specified by proper authorities. In this context, Marines served as a reserve for indigenous military forces and were used in emergency situations.[51] Phase five is withdrawal from the theater of operations when directed by higher authority, which normally occurs when order is restored or indigenous agencies have the situation under control.[52] Thus, successful completion of these phases culminates in local legitimacy, as viewed through the lens of U.S. national interests and will, which is also reflected in current doctrine:

> Legitimacy is the willing acceptance of the right of a government to govern or of a group or agency to make and enforce decisions. It is not tangible or easily quantifiable. Popular votes do not always confer or reflect real legitimacy. Legitimacy derives from the perception that authority is genuine and effective and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes. No group or force can create legitimacy for itself, but it can encourage and sustain legitimacy by its actions. Legitimacy is the central concern of all parties directly involved in a conflict. It is also important to other parties who may be involved even indirectly.[53]

PRINCIPLES OF "SMALL WARS" IN CURRENT DOCTRINE

Since the SWM was written, terms and relationships have been refined and defined. For example, low intensity conflict (LIC) has largely replaced the term "small wars" and a common definition for LIC has been agreed upon by two of the four military services: "LIC is a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states."[54] Moreover, a draft joint pub, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, (JCS Pub 3-07), is under development. This draft pub addresses the use of combat forces in a LIC situation as a last resort and when vital U.S. national interests or U.S. citizens' well-being cannot otherwise be protected.[55] This draft joint pub gives the SWM as a source document.

Over this same 50-year period since the SWM was published, the one constant has been the *primacy of politics*. The first page of Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, quotes Clausewitz: "The political object--the original motive for the war-will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires."[56] The draft joint pub reaffirms the primacy of the "political instrument" by indicating that the ultimate military objective in a LIC situation is attaining political objectives without resorting to war and that political objectives drive military decisions at all levels of war.[57]

Some of the same guidance on *minimum force* in the SWM exists today; however, attempts to clarify the use of minimum force are continuous. The initial draft of JCS Pub 3-07 states that attaining political objectives without resorting to war is the fundamental objective in LIC.[58] Hence, minimum essential force remains valid as the guideline. Similar to the SWM, JCS Pub 3-07 urges commanders and staff officers to grasp the political objectives because they affect military operations. Because the goal in LIC is neutralizing enemy capabilities rather than destroying them, this engenders constraints on weaponry and the level of violence which take the form of rules of engagement (ROE). To aid the on-scene commander, ROE should be clearly stated before military forces are committed and reevaluated as the situation develops.[59] JCS Pub 3-07 sums it best by stating that "the primacy of political considerations of the LIC environment is the single most important difference between LIC and war.[60]

Moreover, the political objectives may even require accepting unorthodox or non-traditional courses of action.[61] ***Adaptability*** is listed as a principle in JCS Pub 3-07 and as a LIC imperative in FM 100-20/AF 3-20. Its meaning is relatively unchanged since publication of the SWM, but the current focus is on "mission analysis, comprehensive intelligence, and regional expertise," then using innovation to meet different situations.[62] The ambiguity of the LIC environment increases the difficulty of mission analysis.

Moreover, global dynamics may alter the national or regional goals increasing the difficulty of assessing the mission. FM 100-20/AF Pamphlet 3-20 underscores the importance of ***command unity of effort*** whereby the commander communicates his vision and intent to subordinate commanders in the LIC environment and states that "vision must include political and psychological end states, as well as military objectives."[63] This implies that the military has some additional responsibilities for conflict termination.

Both the draft JCS Pub 3-07 and FM 100-20/AF Pamphlet 3-20 cite unity of effort through ***cooperation*** as an imperative in LIC. The focus is on integrating the military actions with political and economic initiatives of other government agencies. This is easier said than done because no entity coordinates the implementation of the four instruments of national power: political, economic, military, and informational. Strategy and policy coordination is supposed to occur at the National Security Council's Board for LIC and at the theater and country level between the appropriate unified command's commander in chief (CINC) and the country's ambassador.[64] Yet, as General Stiner, CINC U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), clearly indicates, more must be done. He remarked that the absence of a central agency, to coordinate the 71 governmental agencies in Washington, DC who provide various types of assistance, impedes the U.S.' capability to respond effectively to situations in a coordinated manner.[65]

Where the SWM raised the issue of blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the military, the issue has since been clarified: The ambassador normally is the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission to a country. As such, and in keeping with the primacy of politics, the ambassador assures unity of effort through cooperation by coordinating all in-country activities. The chief of the security assistance office (SAO), provides a vital link between the unified CINC and the ambassador. The head of the SAO responds to the ambassador on all diplomatic matters including security assistance and reports to the CINC on non-diplomatic matters.[66]

Today, one of the aforesaid national instruments of power, the informational, is divided into two areas: ***psychology*** and public affairs. General Stiner and the SWM share admiration for the power of psychology especially as it applies to small wars or LIC. General Stiner contends that it is the greatest weapon known to mankind, if it is used.[67] In LIC, both sides use the informational instrument in varying degrees to their own advantage, and the side who best wields it stands to gain advantage over the other side. The CINCSOC assists unified commanders in developing Foreign Internal Defense (FID) programs and supporting forces for their areas of responsibility (AOR).[68] The FM 100-10/AF Pamphlet 3-20 defines FID as the participation by civilian and military agencies in any of the action programs another government takes to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The CINCSOC fills a large void by providing resident cultural and language specialists, as well as trained psychological operations personnel. The FM 100-20/AF pamphlet 3-20 declares that the "success of an operation depends on the commander's awareness of the psychological and political implications of his unit's actions.[69]

The flip side of the informational instrument is public affairs or the ***media***. Today's military has relearned the previous hard lessons of the Marines espoused in the SWM: That the U.S. is, if fact, a "mediacracy."[70] In 1975, the political theorist Kevin Phillips invented that term to describe the liberal press' power as rule by the media. Since then, its meaning has expanded to include rule by those with the expertise and the means to exploit the media.[71] The U.S.' status as a superpower precludes it, however, from simply adhering to Mark Twain's precept, "to do good is noble. To tell others to do good is also noble and a lot less trouble."[72]

Due to LIC's murky environment, having media-savvy military leaders is even more important. Military leaders ought to practice a time-tested technique of military instruction when dealing with media members, i.e., tell them what you are going to tell them, tell them, and then tell them what you have told them--by using understandable terms, and explaining terms that are not readily translatable in greater detail. This requires commitment and patience on the part of the military, but the experience of military members in El Salvador proved that: "Among other things, therefore, a war-winning strategy is one that vies

successfully with the guerrillas to affect the media's depiction of the struggle by providing the facts necessary to understand the problem."[73]

While the five *phases* of small wars addressed in the SWM do not appear as such in today's doctrinal pubs, attempts to superimpose phases on insurgencies and CI continue to persist because of a basic need to bring order to seemingly disorderly processes. The goal behind the phasing, legitimacy, has survived and gained renewed importance due largely to the U.S.' negative experience in Vietnam, where the U.S.' stated policy objective was an independent South Vietnam. Such an objective could not be attained given the successive corrupt political regimes with which the U.S. had to work. Despite the attempts at defining legitimacy in doctrinal pubs, it remains elusive on the one hand, yet the kind of thing one recognizes when seen in practice on the other.

PRINCIPLES OF "SMALL WARS" IN CURRENT OPERATIONS

Examining the Strategic Objective, and

Answering three crucial questions about the Operational Art

The U.S.' national military strategy suggests that forward presence operations represent a way of staying engaged abroad and that the U.S. military may be called upon to "... execute less traditional operations ..." including its latest role in the war on drugs.[74] In applying the SWM's enduring principles of small wars to a current forward present operation, CN in the Andean region of South America, the strategic objective must be examined. Then, three questions are used as a framework for analysis: (1) What conditions must be produced to achieve the strategic goal, (2) What sequence of actions will most likely result in the desired conditions, and (3) How should resources be applied to produce that sequence of events?

Examining the Strategic Objective

The strategic objective was derived from the 1989 Defense Authorization Act which gave DoD the lead among the federal agencies for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the U.S.[75] A subset of the strategic objective is stemming the flow of cocaine from its primary sources in Bolivia, Columbia and Peru, all part of Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) AOR. The rationale is that a reduced supply of cocaine will render the habit so expensive that the demand will decrease. Thus, DoD's contribution to attaining this strategic objective devolves, in part, on USSOUTHCOM. Complicating strategic objective attainment is terrorism, which is conducted by narcotraffickers and the presence of well-entrenched insurgents such as member of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru. The USSOUTHCOM faces a formidable challenge because it must not only help combat terrorism spawned by both of these groups who vie for popular support, but should also simultaneously conduct interlinking CN and CI operations. This situation is not uncommon in LIC operations as they often interrelate and overlap.[76] In reality, effective responses must address the various LIC operations collectively, as an integrated whole rather than individually, and doing so further complicates the process.

The regional focus is primarily on the three countries forming the Andean region, about one-third the size of continental U.S., comprised of Bolivia, Columbia, and Peru. This region grows most of the world's cocaine. The democratic experience in this region is short-lived with Colombia having the oldest democracy (1947). Both Bolivia and Peru have had democratic forms of government for little over a decade. In that time, these democracies "have experienced the worst economic crises in their histories."[77]

"What conditions must be produced to achieve the strategic objective?"

Inherent in answering this question is the understanding that producing these conditions and their subsequent effectiveness hinge on a secure, stable environment. The question itself contains many aspects, and the military condition is only a supporting one. The first condition that must be produced to achieve the strategic objective is economic. The region needs equally profitable alternative legal crops to export. This poses a daunting challenge because Coca remains Columbia's leading export; in Bolivia, it "generates as much foreign exchange as all other exports combined;" and in Peru, coca is "the most important export" yielding nearly $1 billion annually or about "one-third of all other exports combined."[78] Not only is coca more profitable to grow than legal crops, but the market comes to the growers. Raising alternative legal crops would require building roads to distant markets and providing the means of transportation. Only two per cent of the U.S.' 1991 $60 million aid package to Peru was earmarked for long-term alternative crop development. Most of the funds went for balance-of-payments support or debt-servicing.[79] This region is also in arrears on paying back its foreign debt and requires even greater levels of debt-servicing.

A second condition that must be produced to achieve the strategic objective relates to politics. The existing governments must have the "political will ...to make our war their war."[80] Their regional perception seems to support curbing narcoterrorism because it affects internal stability, but views narcotrafficking itself as an international problem which their regional governments' are powerless to eliminate.[81] Moreover, these governments must be perceived as legitimate through their actions by their respective populaces. This includes ensuring that their judiciaries are honest and efficient. Governments must be able to maintain order and stability without resorting to repressive actions and must also provide various social services. Frequently, the regions' militaries and law enforcement agencies have an adversarial relationship which undermines the CN strategy. But the regions military and law enforcement

agencies are currently perceived as corrupt from the drug trade.[82] The Bolivian and Peruvian militaries are infamous for their repression of human rights.

Achieving the strategic objective requires a third condition of training and equipping the regions' militaries to a level of competence to meet threats posed by narcotraffickers who have mercenary armies of their own, and by insurgents as well. Counterinsurgency is the Colombian and Peruvian militaries' primary mission.[83] Bolivia does not share a CI problem, but it does have a terrorist organization which targets Americans.[84]

Lastly, improved social conditions could also be used to help achieve the strategic objective. Providing medical assistance to victims of Peru's cholera epidemic and inoculating the populaces is an example of cutting through bureaucratic layers and directly benefitting those in need or at risk. Recent U.S. economic and military aid legislation packages stipulated that international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have open access to all prison cells because it has been determined most human rights' abuses occur shortly after arrest.[85]

"What sequence of events will most likely result in the desired conditions?"

The answer to this question should contain the sequence of events that would probably engender the desired conditions set forth in an adaptable regional plan. The plan should recognize the that military measures should complement political and economic measures. This is in keeping with the SWM which states that in small wars the military frequently plays a supporting role, thereby reflecting the ***primacy of politics***. Moreover, the SWM advocates such a "plan of action" in which the military measures blend with political, economic, and social measures.[86]

The plan must consider both CN and CI, and measures of effectiveness should be determined for each. Planning for only CN is seeing the threat for what the U.S. would like it to be, rather than what it is. It must be observed that to do otherwise would violate the Clausewitzian maxim of knowing the kind of war you're getting into before you become embroiled.[87]

The U.S. appears to have embarked upon the drug war in the Andean region of SOUTHCOM's AOR without fully knowing the kind of war in which it was involved. Omitting a concurrent focus on CI could preclude achieving the strategic objective of stemming the flow of drugs at its source. If unchecked,

insurgents could take over existing governments with the cooperation of the drug cartels. Insurgents and narcotraffickers are already in league, e.g., the Shining Path in Peru controls some of the airways the drug cartels use to pick up coca and charges them accordingly for their use.[88] In some places, the cartels are providing social services, e.g., schools and hospitals which the government ordinarily provides. Conceivably, further accommodations between the insurgency movement and cartels could be made. For example, while still providing the funding, the cartels could turn over the daily operations of such service agencies to the Shining Path in exchange for free use of the airways. Taken to the logical extreme, an unholy alliance between the insurgents and the drug cartels could give them both a semblance of legitimacy in the eyes of the populace, particularly if narcoterrorism were to cease.

A divergent view holds that an alliance between the drug cartels and the insurgents is a myth and that the two groups, insurgents and traffickers, have opposing agendas: "Guerrillas want to overthrow the system while traffickers want to profit from it" although evidence to support this view is lacking.[89] Credit is given, however, for exposing alleged linkages between drug traffickers and insurgents which would make it difficult for Congress to deny U.S. allies the requisite support to fight guerrillas, to Colonel Waghelstein's 1987 piece in a Military Review.[90]

These differing views reflect the adage that where one sits determines what one sees. Lacking surety as to which of the two views is correct, the plan must be prudent and adopt a hedging approach. The plan must fully consider that CN in this volatile region is viewed in the context of CI. Although this approach entails more expense, it embraces the principle of *adaptability*, another time-tested SWM tenet. The regional plan must be tailored to fit the situation in the Andean region. The conditions described above to achieve the strategic objective require a long-term commitment, which runs counter to American ways of doing things, especially the American military's way.

The military aspect of the plan will be addressed first, because regional militaries capable of meeting insurgents and narcotraffickers are essential to providing a more stable, secure environment. Hence, they are necessary to produce the aforementioned desired conditions. Unlike the SWM's authors, CINCSOUTHCOM can readily derive his CN mission from the national military strategy and disseminate it to his subordinate commanders, assuring *command unity of effort*. The SWM recommends reviewing all

policy to help determine the commander's mission. The CINCSOUTHCOM is able to stay abreast of all potential CN legislation and policies emanating from Washington, DC through his J-5 directorate and staff judge advocates. They normally conduct such reviews and provide the CINC a means of detecting subtle policy shifts.

Training and equipping regional militaries to meet a dual threat should be accomplished first, because the U.S. will then be paying heed to what regional governments and militaries view as their top priority--the insurgencies. When the affected countries see that the U.S. recognizes their internal problems and will help address them, they will be more inclined to cooperate with the U.S. to achieve its strategic objective which they perceive as an international problem. They might also come to view the U.S. as less heavy-handed.

At SOUTHCOM's request, mobile training teams (MTT) would continue to be sent into its AOR. In addition to the training provided by MTT's, the regional plan should include developing a foreign internal defense (FID) plan and augmentation forces (FIDAF) to provide the requisite U.S. military support to the host nation's CI efforts, giving evidence of adhering to the principle of ***cooperation***. They would also help with CN because the FIDAF would include civil affairs and psychological operations personnel. Special Operations Forces (SOF) would be useful because of their linquistical skills, but more importantly because of their regional and cultural expertise. Also SOF are less visible than their conventional military counterparts and, hence, more acceptable to host nations who want to minimize the presence of foreign military personnel.

The authors of the SWM had far greater latitude than today's military forces in the applying the use of force. The aim in small wars was to achieve the objective without the use of force at all, but failing that with the use of minimum force and a corresponding minimum loss of life. Generally," peacetime training and operations apply rules of engagement based upon the inherent right of self defense, not law enforcement concepts."[91] Attempts to get legislation authorizing the use of force against airborne narcotraffickers have been unsuccessful.[92] Consequently, the regional plan must consider that DoD's role in CN is support, not interdiction, and minimize the risk of a confrontation between U.S. military forces and armed drug traffickers. The plan should also reflect the use of ***minimum force***. This can be

accomplished through minimum presence of military forces, the appropriate mix of forces sent, trainers and advisors augmented by SOF with nation-building capabilities.

With the military assistance underway, the political and economic aspects of the plan can be addressed because they go hand-in-hand. Strengthening the regional governments' political will to make the drug war their war can be done not only through the economic aid packages, but by keeping the pressure on the Andean region's governments internationally through the United Nations, and regionally through the Organization of American States, whose general assembly meets annually.

The plan must effect an SWM tenet which stresses the importance of ***psychology***, in particular, as it applies to understanding the national character, the problem which precipitates the presence of the U.S. military force, and a thorough study of the opposition's leadership. Although the drug cartels and the insurgents may have some advanced technological weapons, their employment is still directed by human leadership whose character can be studied and behavior gauged. Combatting drugs is a problem with universal appeal because if unchecked, drug traffickers and drug-related violence threaten to destabilize societies. But the magnitude of that threat, combatting drugs has been overshadowed by the Gulf War and the implications inherent to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The SWM's authors were early proponents of establishing a policy for handling the press because they recognized its influence on public opinion, which, in turn, could help or hinder mission accomplishment. The lessons were repeated in our most recent small war in El Salvador as well as the Persian Gulf War. The *informational instrument, the media*, is like a musical instrument which must be kept in tune. The U.S. Information Service is primary in this regard as a key member of the ambassador's country team. Keeping the media tuned may become the job of any members associated with SOUTHCOM or the ambassador's country team if the Pentagon and the media industry can reach agreement on a final set of guidelines for battlefield coverage. Listed first among the proposed guidelines is "open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations."[93]

The regional plan must have an on-going, long-term media plan. Today's adaptive planning process contains examples of political flexible deterrent options which could be incorporated in a media plan, e.g., promote U.S. policy objectives through public policy statements and heighten public awareness

of the problem. The major difficulty in protracted conflicts like CN and CI is sustaining the media and the public's attention on the conflict, especially when their attention was focused on Desert Shield/Desert Storm, then on the economy, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The drug problem itself is one that cuts across socio-economic levels and should make it a great common concern. That fact, combined with U.S. efforts in combatting drugs at the source and in transit, make it a timely topic and should keep the drug issue in the forefront.

"How should resources be applied to produce that sequence of events?"

To answer this question directly, resources should be applied in a manner which is sufficient and proportional, just as the employment of military force should be. But again, saying how it ought to be done is easier than doing it. The lead for both CN and CI overseas belongs to the State Department, not DoD.[94] This lead, reflecting the inherent ***primacy of politics***, takes the form of ambassadors supported by their country teams. While the ambassadors represent the president, they receive policy guidance from the secretary of state. As they have responsibility for all U.S. activities in host nations, they not only clarify U.S. national drug policy and strategy, but also supervise its execution. In this case, implementation is difficult because unity of effort must be achieved through ***cooperation*** among multiple agencies and departments rather than between just two departments as described in the SWM.

The ambassadors' respective country teams are pivotal in achieving such unity.[95] Composed of representatives from various federal agencies, the country teams should be tailored to help produce the desired economic and social conditions for the region. The Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services should be represented, along with the Agency for International Development and the U.S. Information Agency, at least. Neither the CINC's staff nor the ambassador's country team can know the full array of assistance that could potentially be used to help produce the desired conditions which would facilitate the U.S. in achieving its strategic objective in the Andean region. This situation arises due to the absence of a coordinating agency/clearing house above the regional level needed to coordinate the inter-agency/inter-departmental effort. Agencies represented on country teams have stovepipe organizations with their parent agencies. Moreover, inter-agency/inter-departmental rivalry may impede getting the right support at the right time.

The lack of a central coordinating agency to identify federal agencies who may be able to provide the desired support, and the impediment of inter-agency rivalry in getting the job done are topics which have been addressed in several recent publications. In proposing solutions, one study proposed an ad hoc coordinating body between Washington and the ambassador, chief of the U.S. mission, and the regional CINC "with participants, structure, command, and procedures tailored to the particular situation."[96] A recent book which examines U.S. involvement in 60 selected small wars would seem to support the ad-hoc approach because of the unique features of LIC and the difficulty in applying lessons from one place to another, unless regions are similar.[97] While an ad hoc approach would represent a move in the right direction, its chief drawbacks are that when the LIC is over, those who benefitted from lessons learned may not be around to help out with the next one, and if after-action reports are written, they would tend to be read and filed. So, when the next LIC comes, the wheel gets reinvented. Therefore, an ad hoc approach would not serve U.S. interests best in the long term, for despite the uniqueness of events in LIC, "there are in human experience discernible patterns that are valid beyond each unique event and at the same time specific enough to be operationally useful."[98]

One doctrinal pub advocates addressing overseas CN operations in the context of the FID for effectiveness.[99] Another recent article advanced a proposal to wed CN and CI policy-making functions at the National Security Council (NSC) level because only the NSC could "compel major U.S. agency players to get their houses in order."[100] Evidence of in-fighting is a conflict between the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Department of State over access to limited helicopters. The former agency contended that priority for use should go to coca eradication operations and the latter wanted helicopters for training the Peruvian police and military personnel.[101] Such bickering works to the detriment of all involved, but is especially acute for the host nations. Lack of inter-agency cooperation undermines U.S. support and the negative example does not show host nations that U.S. government agencies are particularly adept at conflict resolution--the ultimate end of political and military means in the context of war.

But mechanisms already exist at the NSC level for merging CN and CI policy-making functions, as well as for supporting country teams, by identifying and coordinating inter-agency assistance in providing resources. The NSC has regional Policy Coordinating Committees (PCC), and two functional PCC's to

address CN and combatting terrorism as global issues.[102] Assistant secretaries from the State Department's regional bureaus normally chair PCC's whose focus is on broad issues.[103] The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for SO/LIC could attend or provide representatives to the regional PCC's, and to the functional PCC's as well. While this process would not address supporting country teams by identifying additional resources from federal agencies not represented in country, it would help provide coherent policy planning in existing forums. Coordinating Sub-groups (CSG's) normally do the groundwork on the broad issues brought before the PCC's and the Deputies Committee.[104] Membership of the CSG's is at the Director level.[105] A Coordinating Sub-Group for Narcotics (CSGN) is in place.[106] The CSG's augmented by ASD/SOLIC representation could also be tasked to identify resources from federal agencies to support country teams. Using existing mechanisms within the NSC framework would also provide a means for settling inter-agency conflicts by referring them up the chain until they are resolved.

Using mechanisms within the NSC is better than an ad-hoc approach for the following reasons. First, the NSC structure already addresses policy-making, which is half of the equation; the other half is implementation, and the policy-makers do not really know if the totality of their policies work unless those agencies involved in the implementation, which includes resource application, have a forum to address shortfalls and inter-agency conflicts. Second, the NSC can impel membership of agencies not currently represented to attend appropriate-level meetings. Third, it builds on the existing framework, rather than creating and staffing a new one. Fourth, the NSC serves as a repository for lessons learned, provides a measure of continuity, and retains expertise in-house. Finally and most importantly, the NSC composition lends itself to resolving inter-agency conflicts because they can be referred up through the Principals' Committee, agency heads, and to the NSC itself, if necessary. Few conflicts should reach the higher levels.

Adapting the NSC structure would help ensure coordinated, comprehensive regional plans which fuse military, political, economic and social measures. These measures should be synchronized, consistent within a framework of *phases*, like those described by the SWM, to engender the desired conditions. Using the NSC forums as described might preclude the "dribble-in" (phase one) escalating effect of

applying American military force, which the SWM depicted. The U.S. has tended to over apply the military instrument of power by sending in more and more military forces (phase two), rather than looking at a situation in its totality and determining how the other instruments of U.S. power, the political, economic, and the informational, might be applied more effectively to produce the desired conditions. This occurred most notably in Vietnam, and has colored the U.S. collective thinking in approaching every conflict since.

If the agencies involved do not act to correct the situation, they may have a legislative solution imposed upon them. The DoD can attest to the desirability of acting positively from its experience with the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. In that situation, the DoD hopefully learned that it is far better to work from within to resolve conflicts than to have an externally driven solution imposed. Such positive action would preclude the occurrence of a debacle which might embarrass the U.S. abroad. How the U.S. conducts CN operations overseas is highly visible internationally, and it would be a travesty if inter-agency battles over resources and turf were perceived as leading to the U.S.' failure to achieve its strategic objective.

PRINCIPLES OF "SMALL WARS" REDISCOVERED

The adage, "If you want a new idea, read an old book," holds merit particularly as it applies to the SWM's enduring principles and current forward presence operations, CN and CI, in CINCSOUTHCOM's AOR. Latin America is where Marines got hands-on experience in conducting small wars. Now U.S. policy mandates the return of the military to the proving ground. The SWM remains relevant because Marines waged small wars in an "American context with all the problems and limitations inherent in that fact."[107]

Most of SWM's abiding principles appear intact, if in somewhat altered form, in current doctrinal publications, draft JCS Pub 3-07 and FM 100-20/AF Pamphlet 3-20. The ***primacy of politics*** remains paramount in all wars, but exerts greater influence and control in small wars. The State Department has the lead in CN and CI overseas whereas DoD plays a supporting role. This primacy of politics manifests itself in DoD's mission of support which carries with it a restriction on the use of force, peacetime ROE and the inherent right of self-defense prevail.

The principle of ***adaptability*** remains timely because then as now, operational and strategic planning must consider not only the military measures applicable to the Andean region, but also how to integrate complementary military measures with political and economic measures to produce conditions necessary to achieve the strategic objective. Implicit in this concept of adaptability is the recognition that the military instrument may not be dominant. Counternarcotics must be addressed within the context of CI because the latter threatens to overthrow legitimate governments in Peru and Columbia through violent means. Current CN operations in SOUTHCOM are more constrained than the SWM's guideline use of ***minimum force*** and corresponding minimum loss of life.

The connectivity between CN and CI in this region makes ***command unit of effort*** and unity of effort through ***cooperation*** imperative. Lack of inter-agency coordination at the strategic level hampers developing and implementing a plan of appropriately blended military, political and economic measures to the Andean region. ***Psychology*** as addressed in the SWM assumes even greater proportions in CI, and the informational instrument of power, the ***media***, wields ever-increasing influence and shapes perceptions more than ever before. Continuous dialogue with the media must be maintained to help ensure that their

representatives receive correct information on events before reporting them to the public. Finally, using the NSC structure of CSG's and PCC's with few modifications could strengthen inter-agency cooperation, attune the national instruments of power to coordination by *phases*, and provide a mechanism for resolving inter-agency conflicts to accomplish national strategic objectives.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

for making the Principles of "Small Wars" work

As the principles of small wars have been described, linked to current doctrine and circumstances, two specific recommendations discussed in the body of this paper are summarized as follows:

One, that a comprehensive regional plan, tailored expressly for the situation in the Andean region, be developed and a thorough study of the opposition's leadership in the region be undertaken. The plan must be prudent and adopt a hedging approach with a view toward conducting interlinked CN and CI operations, and determine measures of effectiveness for each. The plan should provide for training and equipping regional militaries first to meet a dual threat, include developing a foreign internal defense (FID) plan and augmentation forces (FIDAF), and recognize that military measures must complement political and economic measures. Yet, the plan must explicitly describe DoD's role in CN as support, not interdiction, and minimize the risk of a confrontation between U.S. military forces and armed drug traffickers. Finally, an on-going, long-term media plan must be developed concurrently.

Given in this recommendation is the condition that existing governments must have the political will to wage the type of war required while striving achieve a secure, stable environment upon which the success of a regional plan depends. To secure this given, pressure must be maintained on these governments both regionally and internationally.

Two, that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for SO/LIC attend or provide representatives to the regional PCC's, and to the functional PCC's as well. The CSG's augmented by ASD/SOLIC representation should also be tasked to identify resources from federal agencies to support country teams, and country teams should be tailored to help produce the desired economic and social conditions for the region.

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