U.S. Army Command and Control at the Operational Level: Where Do We Go From Here?
Abstract
During Operation DESERT STORM, Third U.S. Army was tasked to perform the roles of Army component command for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), theater army for all U.S. Army forces in the Persian Gulf theater, and field army headquarters for multicorps operations. The question that faced the commander- in-chief (CINC) and the Army component command was how to organize the Army chain of command to fulfill these requirements. This monograph seeks to answer one aspect of the problem: to determine whether or not the Army component commander should establish a field army headquarters in a theater of operations. The study concludes that the decision to use a field army and if so, when, is guided by a series of factors: of commanders, ability and experience of senior leaders, and span of responsibility. Furthermore, principles such as unity of command and simplicity and factors such as mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time (METT-T) provide proven readily available considerations the CINC and Army component commander can use to determine whether or not a field army should be established in a theater of operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 15, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA254060
Entities
People
- Christopher Tucker
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College