Generating The Force: The Roundout Brigade
Abstract
The purpose of this monograph is to determine if the downsized United States Army should retain the current roundout brigade concept. Under the roundout concept, a National Guard maneuver brigade, when mobilized, is assigned to a two brigade Active Component division to form a fully structured three brigade division. The non-deployment of three National Guard roundout brigades mobilized during Operation Desert Shield in 1990 generated considerable criticism and controversy, not only about the practicality of the roundout concept, but the Army's overall relationship with the National Guard. This study examines the evolution of roundout units from Napoleon's Army of the French Republic to the proposed force structure for the U.S. Army in 1995. To determine if the Army should retain the current roundout program, this study analyzes the roundout brigade concept against six criteria: cost, force capability, training, personnel availability, political implications and roundout alternatives. The Congress, the States, and the National Guard Bureau all advocate the continuance of roundout. From a financial, political and capabilities standpoint, it is best for the Army to continue the brigade roundout program. The roundout program provides a conventional deterrent as well as a larger foundation for active Army commanders and staff officers to develop and maintain command and staff experience at the division level. Roundout will maintain Active Army influence and control over those National Guard Brigades. The roundout relationship also increases the budgetary resources devoted to the Total Army.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 20, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA254062
Entities
People
- Robert N. Townsend
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College