What To Do, What To Do? Determining a Course of Action at the Operational Level of War
Abstract
This monograph examines the adequacy of doctrinal decision making procedures for the operational level of war. These doctrinal procedures are found in emerging joint doctrine. For these procedures to be adequate, they should: provide a rigorous organization of thought and action; create and common, joint approach to decision-making; save valuable planning time; and increase probability of success on the battlefield. The focus of research is on the actions taken from receipt or recognition of a mission to the commander's selection of a course of action. To examine the question of whether an adequate process currently exists, I first briefly describe the tactical decision-making process, emphasizing its techniques for tying tactical concepts into a systematic analysis framework. I then survey both Army and Joint Staff manuals concerned with operational decision-making to determine if a process exists, and how that process compares to the tactical process relative to the adequacy criteria. From these comparisons, I conclude that while a systematic analysis model for operational decision-making exists in emerging joint doctrine, the operational decision making model does not adequately integrate operational concepts for consideration by staff and commanders. T recommend a format based on the tactical process.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 18, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA254126
Entities
People
- Patrick A. Stallings
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College