



The Relationship Between War and Peacekeeping

A Monograph
by
Major Vicior M. Robertson III
Infantry



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School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
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
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
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ABSTRACT

The Relationship Between War and Peacekeeping,
by Victor M. Robertson III, USA.

This monograph seeks to answer the question of how the nature of a war affects the following peacekeeping operation. The paper uses the war between Egypt and Israel in October 1973 and the United Nations Emergency Force II as a case study. The analysis focuses on the political and military aims of the parties involved, the nature and inter-relationship of consent and cooperation, the operational design factors of lines of operation and base of support, and the impact of key terrain.

The topic is relevant because the United Nations has recently become involved in many peacekeeping missions. With the Soviet Union gone, the Security Council is acting to reduce violence around the world. The United States strongly supports UN peacekeeping operations financially and logistically. Therefore we should fully understand the nature of these operations.

This study formulates conclusions by examining current U.S. military doctrine, United Nations literature, and how the UN Emergency Force II practiced peacekeeping between Egypt and Israel. The study highlights aspects of peacekeeping that are not covered in available literature: the relationship of the belligerents' aims to their consent for the peacekeeping operation and their cooperation with the peacekeepers; the complexity of gaining a cease-fire; the affect of the belligerents' lines of operation and key terrain on the design of the buffer zone; and how the factors of operational design should influence the design of the peacekeeping operation.

This paper concludes that the peacekeeping force commander must understand the nature of the conflict before he can effectively execute the peacekeeping operation. The factors mentioned above should guide his analysis of the war.

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I. INTRODUCTION

When Clausewitz and Jomini wrote their theories of war neither of them envisioned nations, coalitions, or a United Nations using military force in peacekeeping operations. They believed that nations only used armed force to threaten an opponent or to fight in war. In his prescriptive style Jomini did not specifically define the nature of war. However the context of his writings reveals that to him war was a contest between opponents: one side wins and the other loses.¹

Clausewitz, being part philosopher, carefully defined the nature of war. He compared it to a pair of wrestlers, each trying by force to destroy the other's ability to resist. When one wrestler lost the ability to resist, the other could impose his will on the first. Physical force by an armed military is the means by which one side destroys the ability of the enemy to resist. "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."² That *will* is the political purpose of the war, not part of the war, and is the province of diplomats.

In contrast, the United Nations describes the purpose of armed military forces in peacekeeping as being the opposite of their purpose in Clausewitz's definition of war.

Peace-keeping . . . introduces to the military sphere the principle of non-violence. For the first time military forces are used internationally *not* to wage war, *not* to establish domination, and *not* to serve the interests of any Power or group of Powers, but rather to control and end conflict between peoples or communities.³

Whether the UN serves the interests of specific nations is debatable. The important point here is that regardless of the effects of peacekeeping, its

purpose is completely different from the traditional purpose of the use of force. The UN defines peacekeeping as an operation that involves military personnel, does not have enforcement powers, is based on consent and cooperation of the belligerents, and aims to restore international peace and security.⁴ Theoretically the peacekeeping force operates within the will of, and in the interests of, both belligerents. Its sole purpose is to prevent fighting.

The United States' military has a similar definition of peacekeeping. It is an operation conducted with the consent of the belligerents to maintain an existing negotiated truce and to ease diplomatic efforts to achieve and maintain peace.⁵ Thus, like the UN definition, U.S. doctrine recognizes the difference between using armed forces in peacekeeping and in classical war.

Because of the difference between classical war and peacekeeping, the armed forces should have sound theory to provide a foundation for peacekeeping doctrine. Theory is important because it is an analytical tool that educates the leader's mind and provides a reference point for decisions.⁶ Without a common reference point military leaders may interpret the doctrine in contradictory ways.

The peacekeeping theory in the doctrine of the U.S. military is incomplete. The theory focuses on the general nature of peacekeeping and presents concepts such as consent and cooperation in overly simple terms. It does not discuss how operational-level commanders should design peacekeeping operations. The manuals explain the logic of the campaign planning process, but they provide no theory of how operational design affects peacekeeping.

The U.S. military has two joint doctrine manuals that discuss peacekeeping operations: *Joint Publication 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (Test Pub, 18 October 1990), and *Joint Publication 3-07.3, JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations* (Final Draft, 15 November 1991).⁷ Neither manual provides guidance on how to develop the operational design of a peacekeeping operation. They also do not explain why establishing a peacekeeping operation is a complex process.

For example, *Joint Publication 3-07.3* treats separating the belligerents as a sequential process: negotiate a cease-fire; delineate the demarcation lines; interpose the peacekeeping force; supervise the belligerents' withdrawal; then establish the buffer zone. While doing these things, control the main roads, inspect the marked lines, and establish efficient communications.⁸ To one who has not studied a peacekeeping operation or participated in one, these instructions are deceptively simple. The degree of cooperation of the belligerents may help or hinder these tasks. Peacekeepers may have to accomplish the tasks in a different order. Some tasks may be impossible in chaotic battlefield situations where opponents are intermingled. Quasi cease-fires, neither war nor truce, may be the normal situation initially. This paper will further examine these problems.

The U.S. Army's doctrine does no better at explaining these concepts. In *FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, the Army's theory of peacekeeping identifies its general principles: consent, neutrality, balance, single-manager control, concurrent action, unqualified sponsor support, freedom of movement, and self-defense.⁹ This theory explains the *substance* of peacekeeping in a sterile manner. It

does not examine its complexities. Theory that explains the *form* of peacekeeping -- its operational design -- is also missing. Nor does Army doctrine explain how the substance relates to the form.

The Army has one manual that briefly discusses the concepts of operational design: *FM 100-7, The Army in Theater Operations*. This manual says that the elements and principles of operational art apply equally to operations in war, peacetime competition, and conflict (the term "conflict" refers to "low intensity conflict"). Some key concepts of operational design are center of gravity, decisive point, culminating point, lines of operation, and the relationship between ends, ways, and means.¹⁰ After mentioning the concepts, *FM 100-7* does not explain how these concepts apply to peacekeeping. The manual states that they do apply, but does not further address the subject.

Many questions remain unanswered. Some of them are: "How do the political and military aims of the belligerents affect their consent of the peacekeeping operation and their cooperation with the peacekeepers?"; "How does the operational commander assign areas of operation?"; "How does key terrain affect the design of the peacekeeping operation?"; "How does the operational commander select bases of support and lines of operation?"; "What is the relationship between the belligerents' lines of operation and the peacekeeping operation?"

These questions raise the overall question that this paper seeks to answer: how does the nature of the war affect the peacekeeping operation? This paper does not seek to explain how to plan a peacekeeping operation (though the paper touches on it). It seeks to illustrate how the nature of the war can affect the implementation of a cease-fire and the peacekeeping operation that follows it. The paper will

focus on operations that use armed military forces to maintain cease-fires in inter-state war.

The question is relevant to the U.S. military for several reasons. First, the international political situation increases the likelihood that the U.S. military will become more involved in peacekeeping. The collapse of bipolar political alignments has accelerated the pace of United Nations peacekeeping activity. Since the demise of the Soviet Union the Russians no longer use their veto on the Security Council to block UN efforts to resolve regional conflicts. The UN has conducted twenty five peacekeeping operations since 1948; twelve of these began since 1985; seven of them began in 1991 and '92. Eleven operations are active today.¹¹

To examine how concepts of operational design apply to peacekeeping I will use the concepts of base of operations, lines of operation, and key terrain. To the peacekeeper these are the most useful design concepts. From the modern theory of peacekeeping I will discuss the affect of the belligerents' aims on consent and cooperation (or lack of it). Together, these are the key concepts that affect the operational design of a peacekeeping operation.

As an example of how the concepts of operational design apply to peacekeeping, this paper will examine UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II). The United Nations created UNEF II to monitor the terms of the cease-fire between Egypt and Israel after the October War of 1973. UNEF II operated in the Sinai from 25 October 1973 to 24 July 1979.¹² It is an appropriate operation to study because it and the October War are well documented, because it was a classical peacekeeping operation, and because it occurred in an area where the United States has vital interests.

II. Theory, Peacekeeping, and the October War of 1973

The framers of the UN Charter intended the Security Council to be the strategic authority for UN military operations. The Council was supposed to control military operations with the help of the Military Staff Committee.¹³ Current practice does not conform to that intention. Though the Council does act as the strategic authority for UN military operations, it controls military operations through the Secretary-General, not the Military Staff Committee. For political reasons, the Staff Committee has not functioned at all. Perhaps that will change now that the Soviet Union is gone.¹⁴ For now, the Secretary-General provides the strategic military direction to UN peacekeeping forces.

With the consent of the Security Council, the Secretary-General appoints the peacekeeping force commander. The force commander is directly responsible to the Secretary-General. The force commander has full command authority over the operation except for disciplinary measures. Commanders of the national contingents are responsible for disciplining their soldiers. With this exception, the force commander retains all other prerogatives (and limitations) of command that are consistent with any other combined operation.¹⁵

Therefore, the force commander is the operational-level commander in UN peacekeeping operations. He is responsible for attaining the strategic goals of the Secretary General in his area of operation. The commanders of national contingents within his force are tactical commanders. Their decisions have an extraordinary effect on the success

of the force, but individually they do not accomplish the Secretary-General's strategic purpose.

When a peacekeeping force commander begins to analyse his mission his first question should be, "What is the nature of this conflict?" Clausewitz said this question is the first and most comprehensive of all questions for the operational commander. Wars vary with the motives of the participants and the situation that caused them.¹⁶ Therefore the peacekeeping force commander should understand the political and military aims of each side, and how the belligerents' operational design affected the result of the fighting.

When the commander of UNEF II, Lieutenant General Ensio G. Siilasvuo, examined the nature of the October War he faced a complex situation. On one level he had to examine the political and military aims of Egypt and Israel. On another level he had to understand the aims of the superpowers. The United States supported Israel, and the Soviet Union supported Egypt.

Israel's basic political aim was national survival. In the 1967 war Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and, in the process, humiliated Egypt. The Sinai enhanced Israel's ability to survive by giving Israel a defensible border and a buffer zone between itself and Egypt.¹⁷

To ensure national survival, Israel's strategic military aims in peacetime were to deter war. In this context Israel assumed a strategic and operational defense. If deterrence failed, in war Israel switched to the operational offensive but maintained the strategic defense. In the operational offense Israel wanted to destroy as much of the Arab force as possible to ensure Israeli military superiority for as long as possible.

This, in turn, would ensure a period of peace. Simultaneously Israel wanted to gain territory to use it as negotiating capital after the war.¹⁸

Egypt's primary political aim of the war, among other secondary purposes, was simply to break the political stalemate that developed after the cease-fire in August 1970. After the war Egypt could then use superpower influence in negotiations with Israel to regain the Sinai Peninsula.¹⁹ Dr. Henry Kissinger said,

Sadat achieved his fundamental objective of shaking belief in Israel's invincibility and Arab impotence, and thus transformed the psychological basis of the negotiating stalemate. . . . The shock would enable both sides, including Egypt, to show a flexibility that was impossible while Israel considered itself militarily supreme and Egypt was paralyzed by humiliation. . . . Sadat fought a war not to acquire territory but to restore Egypt's self-respect and thereby increase its diplomatic flexibility.²⁰

To break the stalemate Sadat defined very limited military aims. He told General Shazly, the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces, that he must capture only a small amount of terrain in the Sinai. Sadat said, "I want us to plan within our capabilities, nothing more. Cross the canal and hold even ten centimeters of Sinai. . . ." ²¹ He was exaggerating, but any small amount of terrain would be sufficient to improve Egypt's negotiating position.

Sadat knew that Egypt lacked the equipment to defeat Israel militarily. He started the war when he did because internal political pressures were building against him. The war would diffuse or eliminate political opposition. If the war went well the Soviets would prevent the UN from interfering. If the war went against Egypt, the Soviets would gain a cease-fire through the Security Council.²²

The Soviets viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict in terms of the larger struggle against U.S. imperialism. In this struggle the Soviet Union sought to gain a superior strategic correlation of forces over the United States. As part of this effort, they wanted to increase their own influence and reduce the influence of the U.S. in the Middle East. Then the Soviets could capitalize on the Middle East's great political, geographic, and economic potential. Dr. Kissinger believes that the Soviets had a dual aim: to increase their influence with the Arabs while maintaining detente by avoiding a confrontation with the United States.²³

As a result, the Soviets wanted close ties with Egypt and the other Arab nations. To strengthen these ties the Soviets supported Arab demands that Israel return all occupied Arab lands. Though the Soviets supported military action against Israel, they did not support the destruction of Israel.²⁴

While the United States' aims opposed some Soviets' aims, there were similarities that later caused the superpowers to cooperate to stop the fighting. The U.S. wanted to reduce Soviet influence and avoid a confrontation with the Soviets that would ruin detente. Also the U.S. was committed to assuring Israel's survival and security. As the situation developed, and the Arabs placed an oil embargo on the U.S. on October 20, the U.S. also wanted to end the oil embargo.²⁵ Thus, both superpowers wanted Israel to survive (though for different reasons), both wanted to gain influence with the Arabs, and both wanted to maintain detente.

As this paper will show, the interaction between the aims of these four nations created the strategic and operational environment for the peacekeepers. Israel's and Egypt's political and military objectives later

caused incidents that created a dangerous confrontation between the superpowers.

The interaction of aims also had other major effects that emerge in the chronology of events. They enabled the UN Security Council to pass a cease-fire resolution. They hindered the UN's effort to gain the belligerents' consent to establish a peacekeeping operation. They impeded the effort to establish a lasting cease-fire. They also determined the degree of cooperation that each belligerent gave the peacekeepers. These facts emerged during the period 18 October to 28 October when Egypt, the Soviet Union, and the United States tried to stop the fighting. To understand the peacekeepers' situation one must understand the major events of the war that led to the deployment of UN Emergency Force II.

The Sinai campaign comprised the four major events shown in figures two, three, four, and six. On 6 October Egypt attacked across the canal near Qantara, Ismailia, Deversoir, Shallufa, and north of Suez city near Israel's Mafzeah strong point.²⁶ They seized a line six to eight miles east of the canal.²⁷ On 7-8 October General Adan's armor division and Mandler's armored brigade executed Israel's first counterattack against the Egyptian infantry.²⁸ On 14 October the Egyptians attacked with most of their armor on five main axes.²⁹

The five Egyptian axes represent natural lines of operation that both sides used repeatedly. These axes define the important east-west lines of operation in the northwest Sinai. Israel attacked on these same lines in the opposite direction in the '67 War (see figure 5).³⁰ "Lines of operation define the directional orientation of a force in relation to the enemy."³¹ They also connect the force with its base or bases of operation and to its operational objective.³²





Figure 1: from Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, p. 11.



Figure 2: from Griess, Atlas of the Israeli Arab Wars.



Israeli Attack on Egyptian Bridgeheads, 7 and 8 October

Figure 3: from Herzog, *Arab-Israeli Wars*, p. 252.





Figure 4: from Gawrych, Key to the Sinai. p. 4. Axes added by author.



Israeli Advance West of the Canal and Cease-Fire Line

Figure 6: from Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, p. 281.

The final event began on 15 October when the Israelis crossed the Suez Canal around Deversoir to trap Egypt's Third Army. Once across, they attacked with three armored divisions commanded by Adan, Sharon, and Magen. Adan and Magen attacked southward while Sharon attacked northward (see figure 6).³³ The divisions of Adan and Magen began to encircle Third Army.

Once the Israelis expanded their bridgehead to the south, events unfolded rapidly. The U.S. and the Soviet Union initiated the negotiations that eventually led to a superpower confrontation and a successful cease-fire. Israeli civilian and military leaders began a series of decisions and actions that led to repeated violations of the cease-fire as the Israelis sought to achieve their military aims. The Egyptians were politically active -- pressing the superpowers to use their influence to stop the fighting. Militarily they could only watch as the Israelis prepared to destroy Third Army.³⁴

By 18 October, the Soviets urgently wanted a cease-fire. By 19 October, President Sadat was desperate for a cease-fire. Both saw that Adan's and Magen's divisions were about to close the trap on Third Army.³⁵

On 19 October, the Israelis learned about the talks between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to agree on a cease-fire. Rather than welcome the cease-fire, Moshe Dayan, the Defense Minister, was concerned that the cease-fire would prevent Israel from achieving her political and military aims. He recommended to Golda Meir the line that their army must capture before the cease-fire. Dayan told her that the Israeli Defense Force must capture Mount Hermon in the north, and in the south should concentrate on attacking on the west bank of the canal.³⁶ In his memoirs

Dayan was probably somewhat circumspect about revealing too much about his advice to the Prime Minister. Considering that Israel's military aim was to seize territory and destroy Egyptian forces, he probably specified objectives in the southern front that would achieve that aim. This would explain why Israel later undermined the UN's attempts to establish a cease-fire.

Israeli tactical commanders understood and agreed with Dayan's last minute plans. General Adan thought that the logical thing to do before a cease-fire was to expand the area under one's control and to destroy the maximum number of enemy forces.³⁷

By 21 October, Adan was in the Geneifa Hills, twenty miles from Suez city, where he could close the trap on the Third Army.³⁸ That day Dayan visited Adan at his forward command post to discuss the pending cease-fire.³⁹ We do not know the content of the discussion, but from Dayan's conversation with Meir on the nineteenth, and from subsequent events, one can conclude that Dayan specified objectives that Adan should achieve before the cease-fire. By talking to the Prime Minister, to the Southern Front Commander, and to division commanders, Dayan ensured that all levels worked to achieve Israel's strategic goals. The close communication between leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels created a strong momentum to achieve the strategic aims. The fact that the Israelis had the initiative reinforced that momentum.

On the same day, after three days of talks, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to seek a cease-fire resolution in the Security Council. Kissinger said that on the twenty-first the Soviets were eager to conclude the agreement because they knew Egypt was in trouble on the battlefield.⁴⁰ Here the aims of the superpowers interacted to produce their

common goal of a cease-fire. Soviets sought to gain influence in the Middle East by preventing Israel from destroying Third Army. Kissinger thought the Arabs would negotiate more willingly after the war if they were not humiliated again by Third Army's destruction.⁴¹

Also on the twenty-first, President Nixon called Golda Meir to ask Israel to accept the UN call for a cease-fire.⁴² Early that day the Security Council met at the joint request of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to propose a cease-fire. The resolution passed.⁴³ At 7am on 22 October, the Israeli cabinet reluctantly decided to accept the cease-fire resolution. The cease-fire would begin on 22 October at 6:52pm.⁴⁴ At 10am, Dayan flew in to Adan's forward command post. He reviewed Adan's close air support and told him that he must reach the canal across from Zidon before the cease-fire (Zidon is at the southern end of the Great Bitter Lake; see figure 1).⁴⁵ Also that morning Dayan told General Bar Lev, commander of the Southern Front, that he should capture the mountainous area of Jebel Ataka -- the region southwest of Suez city -- to complete the encirclement of Third Army.⁴⁶ Dayan pushed the army south as fast as he could. Though Bar Lev did not seize the Ataka area that day, Dayan's intentions were clear. The momentum that Dayan created to seize territory and destroy enemy forces was about to confound the UN's peacekeeping efforts for several days.

Minutes before the cease-fire Adan's division reached his objective at Zidon. With great disappointment, Adan initially accepted the cease-fire. He had reason to doubt that the cease-fire would hold. After the cease-fire that night, a sniper killed one of his lieutenants and the Egyptians shelled his main division command post as it crossed the canal. Still

Southern Command prohibited further movement south. It looked like Third Army would get away.⁴⁷

As Adan's division consolidated its position at Zidon, the Israeli cabinet met. Dayan recorded that they decided that if the Egyptians failed to keep the cease-fire "the Israeli Defense Forces will repel them at the gate."⁴⁸ That phrase was a reference to Isaiah 28:6. By referring to that passage the cabinet indicated that they would fully support the armed forces if they resumed fighting because the enemy violated the cease-fire. Further the passage showed grim determination to fight to the end to save the nation. With the right pretext, the cabinet was ready to support continued fighting.

General Adan made decisions that night that nearly guaranteed the cease-fire would not hold. He reasoned that Israel's leaders would welcome continued fighting so Israel could fully achieve its objectives. Adan wrote,

Third Army was falling apart. The division was still operating well. Was this really the moment to stop? Would there really be a cease-fire in effect on the twenty-third?

I could hardly believe it: I wanted to complete the encirclement of the Third Army come hell or high water -- but the order was just not forthcoming. It was only natural that the cease-fire was not being observed, given the complicated state of affairs in the field, and of course we were permitted to open fire in self-defense. But these exchanges of fire would go on for only so long before the situation was stabilized and quiet reigned on the battlefield. Was this what the high command wanted?

Was this not the time and were these not the circumstances in which certain decisions could be taken only on the battlefield? If I were to respond to fire against me not only with fire but with fire and maneuver, would all levels not welcome such a decision?⁴⁹

Adan decided that he would finish the encirclement of Third Army the next day. He notified Southern Command that because Egypt was not observing the cease-fire he would continue to fight. Southern Command provided an ambiguous response, but did not clearly object. Adan intended to clear the area he had captured and use any fire as a reason to continue the attack south.⁵⁰

The Egyptians obliged Adan with tank fire at 6:30am on 23 October. His subordinate radioed for instructions. Adan yelled, "Don't make me an armistice here -- fire back and go into action!" Combat resumed as Adan moved his division south.⁵¹

Later events show that, true to its word, the Israeli cabinet supported the continued fighting. At 10:20am General Gonen, Southern Command's deputy commander, ordered Magen's division to help Adan encircle Third Army. By an hour after dark Adan's division ringed Suez city and completely encircled Third Army. Gonen then ordered Magen to continue to the south to capture the port at Adabiya (see figure 6). At midnight Adan ordered his division to prepare for another day of combat.⁵²

This sequence of events shows how the initiative of a tactical-level commander in a belligerent force can destroy a UN cease-fire. General Adan set in motion a series of events that not only frustrated the UN peacekeeping force, but had global repercussions. This also illustrates why peacekeepers must be on the battlefield when the cease-fire goes into effect. Without their calming influence, it is too easy for the belligerents to resume fighting. Peacekeepers calm the situation partly because they are there to observe the actions of the belligerents. They make it difficult

for one side to make exaggerated claims that they had to resume fighting because the other side violated the cease-fire.

While Adan prepared for another day of combat, at midnight on 23 October General Siilasvuo called Dayan from Cairo to say he wanted to deploy observers at the Egyptian front to observe the cease-fire. Dayan replied that "first there had to be a genuine cease-fire." Dayan suggested a cease-fire for 7am on 24 October on the condition that Egypt halted all fighting at that hour.⁵³

Dayan's sincerity in wanting a cease-fire is suspect because one hour and thirty minutes later Southern Command ordered Adan to capture Suez city. Knowing that a cease-fire would occur at 7am, Adan set the attack time for dawn:

so that when the cease-fire did become effective, we would already be engaged, and it would take time -- perhaps even some hours -- until the troops could hold their fire after completing the mop up of the areas under their control. By then we would be holding all or most of the city.⁵⁴

Again Adan planned to undermine the cease-fire. He did it with the approval of his entire chain of command. At 6am Dayan landed at Adan's command post. Dayan told Adan that UN observers were on their way to the front.⁵⁵ This appeared to be a warning. We do not know what else the two men discussed. It is reasonable to conclude that Dayan wanted to check the progress of the fight, and spur Adan to capture Suez city before the peacekeepers arrived.

Perhaps neither Adan nor Dayan knew that on that day their actions caused Brezhnev to warn President Nixon that the Soviets were ready to intervene unilaterally to stop the war. The United States stated that it would oppose Soviet troops landing in the Middle East. Both countries

put their airborne divisions on alert.⁵⁶ Adan and Magen's tactical battles were about to cause a superpower confrontation. The UN peacekeepers were powerless to prevent it because Dayan had prevented them from arriving earlier. Consequently, Israel intentionally undermined two cease-fires and made it impossible for the peacekeepers to deploy.

On 22 October Israel gave the Secretary-General *consent* to deploy peacekeepers once the cease-fire came into effect. Consent is relatively easy to get. It requires a simple declaration by a belligerent.

Cooperation is more difficult to get. The degree of cooperation the peacekeepers get is the true measure of consent. Israel consented under pressure from the United States. Since Israel did not give its consent willingly it simply withheld cooperation. This way Israel avoided the political cost of withholding consent but retained the ability to continue fighting.

Fighting in Suez city on 24 October continued all day. The Israelis took heavy losses and did not gain complete control of the city. Late that night Adan wrote that Sasson, Granit, and Sharon were already observing the UN cease-fire, and that now he and Magen would also join the cease-fire.⁵⁷

Until 25 October Adan intentionally foiled the cease-fire attempts because he knew that the Soviets were trying to keep Egypt from being humiliated and destroyed.⁵⁸ By preventing Third Army's destruction, the UN prevented Israel from achieving part of its strategic aim. Israel could not destroy enough equipment and personnel to hobble Egypt's army for a meaningful period of time. With good cause, the Israelis viewed the cease-fire as an intervention that served the interests of Egypt. In a coincidence of history, it also served the interests of the United States and

the Soviet Union. Adan was bitter because the superpowers had intervened on behalf of Israel's enemy.⁵⁹

The UN observers arrived the morning of 25 October to a joyous reception by Egyptian soldiers.⁶⁰ Their arrival signaled the end of the war. When the Security Council convened that day they demanded that the belligerents return to the positions they occupied on 22 October. They also decided to establish immediately the UN Emergency Force II. Because the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were deeply involved with the war, the five permanent members of the Council were excluded from sending troops to the peacekeeping force.⁶¹ Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. immediately provided airlift to participating peacekeeping forces.⁶²

Back on the battlefield, General Siilasvuo tried to gain Israel's agreement to allow a supply convoy to reach Third Army. Israel refused to allow the convoys through until Egypt returned all Israeli prisoners of war. So on 26 October the Third Army tried to break out of the encirclement. They failed and took heavy casualties. To convince Israel to allow supplies through, the U.S. had to present Israel with an ultimatum: allow supplies to reach Third Army, or face a crisis in relations with the United States.⁶³ Reluctantly the Israeli cabinet acquiesced.⁶⁴ Again, under pressure, Israel consented, but Israel did not cooperate. On his own, Adan decided to stop the convoys. He wrote,

I knew that even though the political level had given in to United States pressures and agreed to certain things, in practice the events on the battlefield had led to deviations from these agreements, and that the sides could do nothing but acquiesce to them. Thus it was that we had gone on after the 22 October cease-fire to complete the encirclement of the Third Army. And even after the political level had given its consent for the transfer of supplies to the Third Army, the convoys were held up for two more days without any of

the pressure getting to me. It was my own initiative that this was done: we sent the convoys back because the Egyptians were still engaging in sporadic shooting, and we informed them that as long as the fire did not stop completely, we would not allow the convoys to go through.⁶⁵

A pattern has emerged in the interaction between Israel's leaders and the UN. For the peacekeepers to gain consent the belligerents' strategic level must make that decision. Gaining cooperation requires appropriate decisions and actions by operational and tactical leaders. If leaders at the strategic level truly want the peacekeepers to deploy, they will issue appropriate instructions to the operational level commanders, and they will ensure the operational commander cooperates. In turn, the operational commander will ensure that the tactical commanders cooperate. If the chain of command is in control, and if the strategic level wants to cooperate, consent becomes cooperation at the operational level. If the strategic level does not want to cooperate with the peacekeepers, then the operational commander never translates consent into cooperation. In the latter case, the result is incidents of violence at the tactical level that could destroy or prevent the cease-fire.

Another pattern that emerged is that consent exists or it does not, while cooperation varies by degrees and fluctuates over time and space according to the situation. Belligerents will cooperate the most when they believe the cease-fire is in their best interests. Conversely, they will cooperate less if they believe the cease-fire is not in their interests.

In this case, the Israeli army north of Deversoir, the divisions of Sharon, Granit, and Sasson, cooperated with the cease-fire before Adan and Magen.⁶⁶ At those places on the battlefield the Israeli Defense Force

had already accomplished its objectives. Simultaneously, Adan and Magen continued to fight because they had not yet encircled Third Army.

After 25 October, the Israeli Defense Force cooperated to the point that they did not maneuver to destroy the Third Army. However, they withheld some cooperation by refusing to allow supplies to reach Third Army even after Israel officially consented. Given the close communication between Adan and Dayan during the war, is it possible that Dayan did not know that Adan was preventing supplies from reaching the trapped Egyptians? It is highly likely that Dayan did know. Thus, Adan's actions were not those of a rogue general. Rather his were bold actions that the Israeli leadership implicitly, or perhaps explicitly, condoned while denying knowledge of them.

Once the supplies began to flow to Third Army, the next step for UNEF II was to separate the belligerents and establish a buffer zone. The buffer zone is a natural way of separating the opposing forces to prevent violence from beginning again accidentally. Consequently, much of the United States' joint doctrine discusses the tactics of establishing and manning the zone. However the doctrine does not address important operational-level issues.

The critical operational design issues are where the zone should be, and where the force commander should place his troops in the zone. The first issue will be decided at negotiations between the belligerents. The commander will decide the second issue.

Ideally the commander will influence the placement and shape of the buffer zone during the negotiating process. He can do that effectively if he proposes a course of action that genuinely is a compromise between the best interests of the belligerents.



SECOND UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF II)
Deployment as of July 1979




Figure 7: from Blue Helmets, p. 457.

Usually negotiators place the zone near the line of contact that existed between opposing forces when the cease-fire took effect. After the October War, negotiations moved the zone east of the canal (see figure 7).⁶⁷

The location of the zone represented a compromise between Israel and Egypt. Though their bargaining positions were complex and evolved, essentially both sides wanted part of the Sinai. One of the most difficult points to agree on was who should control the Giddi and Mitla Passes. Israel wanted to control the passes themselves. Egypt wanted the UN to control the passes.⁶⁸ A combination of political, economic, and military factors determined the result of the negotiations. It was not a coincidence that the western edge of the UN buffer zone nearly matched the farthest extent of the Egyptian attack east of the Suez. Allowing Egypt to keep the ground that they initially gained allowed them to claim a victory. It also gave them enough distance and a major obstacle, the canal, between the Israelis and the Nile that they could prevent the Israelis from destroying their nation. Likewise, the zone gave the Israelis enough operational depth that they could prevent Egypt from attacking into their territory.

To prevent surprise attacks and accidental violence, the buffer zone must lay across all the lines of operation that each side could use to attack the other. Ideally this includes air and sea lines of operation. The commander should observe likely sites of amphibious landings if they exist in his mission area. These are places where sea and ground lines of operation meet. Notice that the lines of operation between Israel and Egypt link the two nations (see figure 5). This is often the case. As a minimum, the lines of operation link each side's base of operations.

Because of this, the greatest violence occurs on the lines of operation. If the buffer zone does not lay across all the ground lines of operation, then the operational design of the zone is faulty and may allow accidents to escalate into battle.

The incidents that occurred between 4 November 1973 and 18 January 1974 support this statement. During that period Israel and Egypt negotiated through the shuttle diplomacy of Dr. Kissinger and at talks in Geneva to reach agreement on how to separate the forces. On 18 January, they signed the Disengagement Agreement.⁶⁹ Until then, the forces were positioned so close to each other that incidents occurred easily and frequently. Reports to the Security Council indicate that from 28 October to 4 November there were few violent incidents.⁷⁰ Sometime soon after that the violence between the opposing forces escalated.

Dayan reported that up to 18 January 1974 Egypt initiated 452 incidents. During these incidents, fifteen Israelis died and sixty-five were wounded. Israel captured sixty-eight prisoners including eight officers.⁷¹ Whether Egypt really initiated all the incidents is questionable. Actually it probably was and is impossible to place blame for the incidents. Each side felt righteous in its cause and justified in its actions. However, the magnitude of the violence is surprising considering that a cease-fire was supposed to be in effect. According to Dayan the cease-fire existed only on paper; the war could have continued any time.⁷² UN documents support his observation. As of 11 January 1974 the UN reported that the situation was dangerous:

The present situation in the sector, with troops of both parties deployed in close confrontation west and east of the Suez Canal, is unstable and potentially explosive. Moreover, the closeness of the

confrontation, frequent firing incidents, some of them involving protracted artillery and tank fire exchanges, fortification activities and numerous minefields have so far made it difficult for UNEF to interpose its troops effectively between the two armies. It is hoped that a successful outcome of the military talks in Geneva will lead to a substantial measure of disengagement, and also facilitate the task of UNEF.⁷³

Israel complained about the incidents to Dr. Kissinger, to General Siilasvuo, and at military meetings between the two sides that occurred at kilometer marker 101 on the road between Suez city and Cairo. General Siilasvuo brought Egypt's answer to the Israelis. Egypt intended to continue the artillery barrages until Israel stopped fortifying their positions west of the canal. Israel was unwilling to do that. Instead, Israeli forces counter-fired every Egyptian shot and, after each incident, delayed supplies to Third Army for a few hours as a warning.⁷⁴

The Disengagement Agreement finally ended the violence and allowed the UN forces to fulfill their purpose. Once the buffer zone of UNEF II was established there were no significant incidents.⁷⁵ The zone of UNEF II did lay across all the ground lines of operation in the Sinai. Its design covered the Mediterranean coastline with four observation posts. It also covered the coast of the Gulf of Suez down to the bay of Al Bala-im, just north of Abu Darbah. I discovered no mention of attempts by UNEF II to monitor air and sea lines of operation. In this case, no problems occurred in the air or at sea.

To control adequately all the ground lines of operation the UNEF II force commander concentrated his static observation posts and checkpoints on the lines and economized between the lines of operation (see figure 7). UNEF II outposts and checkpoints covered nearly every road that enters and exits the buffer zone. The observation posts and

checkpoints of the UNEF II were concentrated on the west side of the zone, and on the roads that crossed the zone from east to west and north to south. They were concentrated in the west because many secondary roads entered the zone from the west side. This shows that by identifying the lines of operation the commander can concentrate his troops where violent conflict is most likely.

With this analysis, the commander can rationally allocate terrain to his sub-units. The commander of UNEF II assigned areas of operation to his national contingents so that no contingent had more than its share of routes. The Swedish battalion covered the northern axis through Rumani and the central axis through Bir Gafgafa. The battalion from Ghana covered the southern axes through the Giddi and Mitla Passes. The other battalions covered larger sectors along the Gulf of Suez (see figure 7).⁷⁶

There are several ways the force commander could observe air and sea lines of operation. One way would be to patrol the likely routes the naval and air forces would use. An alternative or adjunctive method would be to place unarmed observers at the naval and air bases. This would be an inexpensive way to observe the activities of each side's air and naval forces.

Belligerents may not consent to these activities. They may think they are too intrusive and that they threaten the nation's operational security. Belligerents simply may prefer to keep an eye on the enemy's air force and navy themselves. In this case the force commander must be aware of the danger of accidental violence in the air and at sea. With his superior, he should work out emergency procedures to prevent such accidents from escalating into fighting.

The force commander should also ensure that peacekeepers control all key terrain in his buffer zone. Key terrain is a place or area that provides a significant advantage to the force that controls it.⁷⁷ UNEF II's most dense concentration of outposts and checkpoints was around the Giddi and Mitla Passes. Giddi and Mitla Passes are probably the two most important pieces of key terrain in the Sinai. These passes are the only land routes from the eastern Sinai to the Suez Canal, and vice versa, that lead through the brutal terrain of the mountains that runs from south of Bir Gafgafa south to Sharm el Sheikh. Giddi and Mitla Passes have been the scenes of important battles or have been objectives in every war that Israel and Egypt have fought in the Sinai.⁷⁸ Other key terrain UNEF II controlled included virtually every road intersection in the UN buffer zone.

Once the commander has identified the operational design factors that apply, he can design his own operation to regulate the cease-fire. To the extent that the political negotiations allow, he must carefully arrange the characteristics of his operation to ensure military and political effectiveness. Military effectiveness enhances the conduct of his tactical operations. Political effectiveness preserves the consent of the belligerents.

The peacekeeping force maintains consent by being impartial. Impartiality enables the peacekeepers to use consent to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the belligerents and to gain their cooperation.

As the October War shows, official consent by the government does not automatically grant cooperation. Legitimacy gains cooperation and provides the peacekeeper the authority to settle disputes that threaten the peace.

When designing his own operation the commander's first concern is probably his own base of support. For instance, when UNEF II began, the force commander, General Siilasvuo, established his logistical base in Cairo *before* he brought in the majority of his force.⁷⁹

The nature of peacekeeping often prevents the logistical base from being secure. The base's security depends on the cooperation of the belligerents. Therefore the commander may want to split his base and have a support base on each side of the buffer zone. If one belligerent stops cooperating then the peacekeeping force will have another base that can continue to support the force. In UNEF II the base was consolidated in Cairo. Polish and Canadian logistical units supported the force from there.⁸⁰ In this case the consolidated base did not cause problems. Egypt fully cooperated with the peacekeepers. This fortunate circumstance may not always exist. As this paper discussed, cooperation varies by degrees. One subtle way to harass peacekeepers would be to cause problems with their base of support.

In peacekeeping missions splitting the base of operations may achieve political effectiveness while it sacrifices a degree of military effectiveness. It helps to achieve political effectiveness because placing support activities on both sides reduces the chance that either side will feel slighted. Splitting the base sacrifices military effectiveness because the split base is more difficult to manage. If the commander must choose between military and political effectiveness, he must emphasize political effectiveness because he must preserve consent.

When looking at his *own* lines of operation the commander looks for routes that give him mobility within his zone. The UNEF II buffer zone contained one of the two primary north-south lines of operation in the

northwest Sinai, a road the Israelis call Lateral Road. Lateral Road ran the entire length of the UNEF II buffer zone.⁸¹ It ensured the lateral mobility of the peacekeeping force. By staying in the buffer zone the road reduced the chance that a belligerent could interfere with the peacekeeping operation. Also, staying in the buffer zone reduced the chance that charges of favoritism would surface. To the extent that the peacekeepers must operate outside the zone in one belligerent's area, they should also plan to operate an equal amount in the other side's area.

III. Conclusion

This paper used a United Nations peacekeeping operation as an example. Nearly all the same concepts apply to multilateral and unilateral peacekeeping operations. The operational commander is the overall commander of the peacekeeping force. For example, in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), a multilateral operation, the Protocol between Israel and Egypt establishes an organization that mirrors UN operations. The belligerents appoint a Director-General who directs the MFO. With the consent of the signatories, the Director-General appoints a Commander. The Commander has daily command of the operation.⁸² He is the operational commander.

Unilateral operations by the United States will be conducted according to U.S. joint doctrine. In that case the identity of the operational commander depends on the design of the theater. He could be a Combatant Commander personally leading an operation in his area of responsibility, or he could be the commander of a Joint Task Force working under a Combatant Commander. In any case, the operational commander is the overall commander in direct command and control of the peacekeeping force.

Since the operational-level peacekeeping force commander links strategic objectives to tactical operations, he must fully understand the strategic situation. He should understand the strategic and operational aims of each side. This will allow him to understand the reason behind events on the battlefield. He can then intelligently discuss issues with strategic and operational-level leaders of the belligerents. He will also be

able to give better advice to the Secretary-General, Director-General, or other civilian executive.

The civilian executive's first strategic concern is gaining the consent of the belligerents for the peacekeeping operation. He may negotiate directly with the belligerents or he may work through a third party.

The belligerents will either grant or deny their consent -- there really is no middle ground. If they grant consent, they may or may not grant cooperation. To be meaningful, consent at the strategic level for the peacekeeping operation must become cooperation at the operational and tactical levels. Cooperation, though, varies by degree and fluctuates over time and space according to the situation. Lack of cooperation increases the potential for violent incidents. Cooperation with the cease-fire is more likely if it is in the best interests of the belligerents. It is also more likely if the peacekeepers are on the scene when the cease-fire begins. A belligerent may not sincerely want a cease-fire if they deny permission for the peacekeepers to move forward so they can observe events when the cease-fire becomes effective.

The force commander should apply the classical theories of operational design in two ways. He should use them to analyse the operational design of the belligerents, and he should use them to design his own operation.

By combining the operational designs of the belligerents with a terrain analysis of the theater of operations, the force commander can draw conclusions about how the peacekeeping operation should be designed. He should then influence the design of the peacekeeping operation to regulate the lines of operation and the key terrain. The commander "influences" the design of the peacekeeping operation because the

belligerents determine the peacekeeping force's mandate and the design of the buffer zone during negotiations.

Establishing a buffer zone across all the lines of operation between the opponents is the single most effective method the force commander should use to regulate the cease-fire. If lines of operation did not link the belligerents to each other, then war simply could not occur. The peacekeepers cannot sever the lines of operation. However, with the consent of the belligerents, they can regulate them. This reduces the chance of accidental violence.

This study identified five guidelines for the design of the peacekeeping operation:

- The force commander must carefully arrange the design of his operation to ensure military and political effectiveness. Military effectiveness enhances the conduct of his tactical operations. Political effectiveness preserves the consent of the belligerents.**

- The peacekeeping force should regulate all key terrain in the buffer zone.**

- Since the security of the force's base of operations depends on the cooperation of the belligerents, the commander may want to split his base and have a support base on each side of the buffer zone. If one belligerent stops cooperating then the peacekeeping force will have another base that can continue to support the force. This measure also enhances the force's impartiality.**

- The buffer zone should have an internal line of operation that provides lateral mobility within the zone.**

- The force commander can use the key terrain and lines of operation in the buffer zone as criteria to allocate terrain to his national contingents or his subordinate units. The subordinate units' areas should contain only as many lines of operation and as much key terrain as they can regulate with their own forces. This concept provides the force commander justification to ask for more forces if he needs them.**

These guidelines emerged from my study of the October War and UNEF II. As chaotic as war is, this was a fairly simple situation to analyse. It involved a conventional interstate war between well established governments. The national boundaries were clear (even if not mutually recognized). Both governments consented to the peacekeeping operation. Lastly, the governments cooperated with the peacekeepers -- at least after 28 October when General Adan let supplies reach Third Army.

Not all peacekeeping situations will be as simple as this case. Between some countries in the world the national boundaries are unclear and unrecognized. There may be more than two belligerent parties. The conflict may be an intrastate insurgency. The peacekeepers may have to monitor elections or other civil processes. The official government that granted consent for the operation may not be the legitimate government or even the *defacto* government. Worst of all, the peacekeepers may receive no cooperation and be unable to exercise authority over the battling parties. Historically, the UN Operation in the Congo from 1960 to 1964 is one example of a complex peacekeeping operation.⁸³ The operation that recently began in Cambodia is another example of a complex operation.

This emphasizes why the first question the force commander asks must be, "What is the nature of this conflict?" Some guidelines above may not apply in complex situations, or they may apply in a different way. The commander must not try to apply the theories of operational design in the same way to every peacekeeping operation. Also, the effect of the belligerents' political and military aims at the strategic and operational levels will vary depending on how they interact with each

other. However, the reason and the way the belligerents fought each other will determine how the cease-fire should be implemented, and how the operation should be designed.

It has been said that peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it. Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job because traditionally soldiers fight wars for their nations to further the interests of their country. However, soldiers participate in peacekeeping because they have the military skills the mission requires. For instance, military leaders understand the concepts of operational design while most civilians do not.

Even so, peacekeeping is an uncomfortable mission for the U.S. Army. It places severe limitations on our use of firepower. It also requires tactical commanders to consider the political effects of their actions.

In fact, the purpose of many tactical actions will be to create a desired political effect (for instance, maintaining impartiality). Performing military tasks for political purposes is normal at the operational level throughout the continuum of conflict. At the tactical level, conducting operations to achieve a political effect is not normal for most American military officers. These political tactical operations will be common in peacekeeping and other military operations short of war. The United States will benefit if our military leaders at all echelons can manage the ambiguous situations that exist on the boundary between the political and the military realms. In all military operations there is at least one commander that stands astride that boundary. General A.J. Wilson, who commanded the UN peacekeeping operation in Cyprus, said, "There is no room in this field for officers with limited horizons. The day of the pure soldier -- at least in any position of responsibility -- is surely over."²⁴

ENDNOTES

¹Antoine Henri Jomini, *Summary of the Art of War*, edited by J. D. Hittle, in *Roots of Strategy, Book 2* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987).

²Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.

³United Nations, "United Nations Peacekeeping." (United Nations: Department of Public Information, DPI/1048, May 1990, 60M), 6.

⁴United Nations, *Blue Helmets* (United Nations: Department of Public Information, DPI/1065-40500, August 1990, 21M), 4 (hereafter cited as *Blue Helmets*). There is a debate within the UN regarding the definition of peacekeeping. One side believes that the traditional definition of peacekeeping is correct. The other side in the debate wants to broaden the definition to emphasize the non-military component of peacekeeping. Every peacekeeping operation involves many civilians who have skills in civil administration, police, or technical skills. Some modern peacekeeping missions involve thousands of civilians; 6,000 of the 22,000 peacekeepers going to Cambodia are civilian administrators, technicians, and police. The proposed new definition is: "United Nations field operations in which international personnel, civilian and/or military, are deployed with the consent of the parties and under UN command to help control and resolve actual or potential international conflicts or internal conflicts which have a clear international dimension." Some people in the UN now speak of "classical peacekeeping" and "modern peacekeeping." For details of this discussion see United Nations, "The Singapore Symposium: The Changing Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution and Peace-keeping, 13-15 March 1991," (United Nations: Department of Public Information, DPI/1141, September 1991, 7M), 20-26.

⁵Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 3-07.3, JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 November 1991 [Final Draft]), p. I-2. The reader should not confuse peacekeeping with peacemaking. Many United Nations publications refer to peacemaking as the diplomatic negotiations that resolve the root cause of the war. In the past U.S. Army doctrine defined peacemaking as

operations to impose peace without the consent of all the belligerents (see US Army, *FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 27 July 1988 [Final Draft]), pp. 4-20, 4-21, 5-16 to 5-18). *Joint Publication 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (Test Pub, October 1990) now calls peacemaking "truce-making" (p.IV-1, V-8).

⁶Clausewitz, 141.

⁷"JTTP" means *joint tactics, techniques, and procedures*.

⁸*Joint Pub 3-07.3*, p. V-4, V-5.

⁹*FM 100-20*, pp. 4-2 through 4-5.

¹⁰U.S. Army, *FM 100-7 (Final Draft), The Army in Theater Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 31 July 1990 [Draft]), p. 2-2.

¹¹"Active and Inactive United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations," briefing slides obtained from the United States Mission to the United Nations in New York in February 1992.

¹²*Blue Helmets*, 423, 424.

¹³Chuan Ku Min, ed., *A Comprehensive Handbook of the United Nations*, Vol 1 (New York: Monarch Press, 1978), 116.

¹⁴Robert R. Anderson (Military member of the United States Mission to the United Nations), 21 June 1991, subject: "United Nations Military Staff Committee: Moribund, The Reason Why," (letter in possession of Robert R. Anderson).

¹⁵*Blue Helmets*, 405-407.

¹⁶Clausewitz, 88, 89. Clausewitz said it is a "strategic" question. Since his time the definition of strategic has changed. The operational level is the modern equivalent of the classical strategic level.

¹⁷Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars* (New York: Vintage Books, January 1984), 195.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 227, 315-316.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 315. Secondary purposes: keep alive the Palestinian issue, enhance Arab unity, exchange ties with Soviets for ties with the U.S.. Also see Saad el Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez* (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), pp. 105, 176-177; and Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 747.

²⁰Kissinger, 459-460.

²¹Shazly, 106.

²²Herzog, 227, 229; Shazly, 179, 181.

²³Foy D. Kohler, Leon Goure, Mose L. Harvey, "The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War: The Implications for Detente," (Coral Gables, Florida: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974), 21-28; and Kissinger, 519.

²⁴Kohler, 30, 43-50, 54-55; Shazly, 100-101.

²⁵Kissinger, 467, 468; Shazly, 287; Walter Laquer, *Confrontation: The Middle East and World Politics* (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1974), 136-168; and Moshe Dayan, *Moshe Dayan: The Story of My Life* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1976), 557.

²⁶Herzog, 241-243; Shazly, 239; *Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Wars, The Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War*, the West Point Military History Series, ed. Thomas E. Griess (Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group Inc., 1986), map 12a. Each source has a slightly different account of the number and location of the bridges. The difference apparently results from when the writer counted the bridges, and whether the writer counted light bridges and/or heavy bridges Shazly indicates that they laid

ten heavy bridges, but that at times there were less due to accidents and Israeli bombing.

²⁷Herzog, 251.

²⁸Ibid., 252-254.

²⁹Ibid., 259, 261; Shazly, 247, 248.

³⁰George W. Gawrych, *Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, Command and General Staff College, 1990), 119.

³¹U.S. Army, *FM 100-5, Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 5 May 1986), 180.

³²Ibid., 180-181; Jomini, 472-474.

³³Herzog, 270,275.

³⁴Kissinger, 481-613.

³⁵Ibid., 539; Shazly, 281.

³⁶Dayan, 533.

³⁷Avraham (Bren) Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, (Presidio Press, 1980), 391.

³⁸Ibid, 363.

³⁹Ibid, 374.

⁴⁰Kissinger, 552-555.

⁴¹Ibid, 494-496, 503.

⁴²Dayan, 535.

⁴³*Blue Helmets*, 79.

⁴⁴Dayan, 535; Adan, 395; Max Harrelson, *Fires All Around the Horizon: The U.N.'s Uphill Battle to Preserve the Peace* (New York: Praeger, 1989), 232.

⁴⁵Adan, 386-387; Dayan, 537.

⁴⁶Dayan, 535.

⁴⁷Adan, 396-398.

⁴⁸Dayan, 539; *New International Version, Disciple's Study Bible*, (Nashville, TN: Holman Bible Publishers, 1988), Isaiah 28:6.

⁴⁹Adan, 399-401.

⁵⁰*Ibid*, 402

⁵¹Adan, 403,

⁵²*Ibid*, 404, 407-408.

⁵³Dayan, 537-538.

⁵⁴Adan, 409, 411.

⁵⁵*Ibid*, 412.

⁵⁶Kohler, 67.

⁵⁷Adan, 412-424.

⁵⁸*Ibid*, 400-425.

⁵⁹*Ibid*, 455.

⁶⁰*Ibid*, 425.

⁶¹Ibid, 425; *Blue Helmets*, 80.

⁶²*Blue Helmets*, 424.

⁶³Dayan, 544.

⁶⁴Istvan S. Pogany, *The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 131.

⁶⁵Adan, 456.

⁶⁶Ibid, 424.

⁶⁷*Blue Helmets*, 457.

⁶⁸Kissinger, 799-853. Israel proposed a buffer zone that placed the passes under Israeli control (see p. 801). Egypt proposed a zone that placed the passes under UN control (see p. 813). Initially, Israel's position prevailed (see p. 839). Subsequent negotiations in September 1975 altered the zone closer to Egypt's design (see *Blue Helmets*, 95). This is the buffer zone depicted in *Blue Helmets* on page 457, and in figure 7 of this monograph.

⁶⁹Kissinger, 747-853.

⁷⁰"Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force," (United Nations: Security Council, S/11056, 28 October 1973), 3 (hereafter cited as S/11056 with the Addition number if applicable); S/11056/Addition 1, p. 2.

⁷¹Dayan, 566-567.

⁷²Ibid, 567.

⁷³S/11056/Addition 7, p. 4.

⁷⁴Dayan, 567.

⁷⁵Ibid, 566; *Blue Helmets*, 94; S/11056/Addition 10, p. 1.

⁷⁶*Blue Helmets*, 457.

⁷⁷U.S. Army, *FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 21 October 1985), p. 1-40.

⁷⁸Herzog, 154. Giddi became an important pass after the '56 war because Egypt built a road through it to provide more flexible maneuver.

⁷⁹*Blue Helmets*, 84.

⁸⁰*Ibid*, 83-84, 92.

⁸¹Herzog, 252; Central Intelligence Agency, "Israel, and occupied territories," (No. 503499, January 1978 [543482]).

⁸²"Protocol for the Multinational Force and Observers," copy in possession Victor M. Robertson, pp. 1-2.

⁸³*Blue Helmets*, 213-359.

⁸⁴A.J. Wilson, "Some Principles for Peace-Keeping Operations- A Guide for Senior Officers," monograph No. 2, The Monograph Series, by the World Veterans Foundation, International Information Center on Peace-Keeping Operations, (Strasbourg: Impression Strasbourg, June 1967), 10.

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