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RESETTLEMENT, REGROUPMENT, RECONCENTRATION:
DELIBERATE GOVERNMENT-DIRECTED POPULATION RELOCATION
IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.A., The Citadel, Charleston, S.C., 1975

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Deliberate Government-Directed Population Relocation
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ABSTRACT

RESETTLEMENT, REGROUPMENT, RECONCENTRATION: DELIBERATE GOVERNMENT-DIRECTED POPULATION RELOCATION IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS by Major Kalev I. Sepp, U.S. Army, 135 pages.

This study identifies a gap in current (1992) U.S. Army doctrine regarding compulsory population relocation as a counter-insurgency measure, and suggests a format for its consideration and inclusion in internal conflict. To determine the viability of government-directed population resettlement, nine twentieth-century case studies are analyzed and compared: the Boer War; Philippine Insurgency; Greek Civil War; Hukbalahap Rebellion; Malayan Emergency; Kenyan Emergency; Algerian Insurrection; Second Indochina War (the Diem years); and Portuguese Colonial Wars in Africa. This study determines that properly conducted population resettlement has proven effective in combatting insurgents, and may be critical to success in future guerrilla wars. Any such project requires careful planning throughout Assessment, Decision, Execution, and Recovery stages. This study concludes that U.S. military personnel advising an allied nation fighting an insurgency must consider population resettlement as a possible element of a unified and integrated national counter-insurgency plan.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A ruling national government threatened with violent overthrow by an armed indigenous force may defend itself through the conduct of a counter-insurgency campaign. There exists a wide range of historical examples of strategies, tactics and techniques, and well-known theories and doctrine available for emulation and implementation.

In popular insurgencies, it has become a widely-accepted tenet that the insurgents¹ require at least the passive support of the native population in order to survive and develop. Mao Zedong's observation that "[The people] may be likened to water and [the guerrillas] to the fish who inhabit it,"² is often cited. Mao's own success in the Chinese Civil War lends strong credence to this view. Civil populations, as the potential or actual source of logistic, personnel, intelligence, and moral support for anti-government insurgents, have been formally acknowledged as the "center of gravity" on which to concentrate the national effort to defeat the insurgency.

It logically follows that separation of the insurgents from the population is an important, if not essential, mechanism to aid in their defeat. This line of thought has produced, among a number of other active measures, a historical series of

¹Also variously termed guerrillas, insurrectionists, revolutionaries, rebels, partisans, bandits, and terrorists.

²Mao Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1992), p. 113.

deliberate government-directed displacements and resettlements of large segments of a national population. Attempts of this nature have been made in numerous conflicts since Biblical times, with widely varying degrees of calculation in planning and efficiency in execution.

The objectives and methods of these forced relocations have varied from conflict to conflict, and have been affected by the nature of the insurgency, the society and its culture, the national leadership, the effectiveness of the overall counter-insurgency program and numerous other factors. The repetitive employment of this counter-insurgent technique indicates recognition of the potential of its operational success, but may only be rooted in the general acceptance of the obvious insurgent-population relationship, as expressed in Mao's famous dictum.

For the past five decades, insurgent operations aimed at the over-turning of established governments have been underway on the Asian, African, European, and South American continents. In President George Bush's 1991 *National Security Strategy of the United States*, he states: "We seek to . . . aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking."³ This mission is focused by the U.S. Department of Defense *Joint Publication 1*, which refers to ". . . certain types of campaigns . . . devoted to assisting in the internal defense of a foreign ally against an insurgency."⁴ This indicates the continued involvement of U.S. advisory personnel

³The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States 1991* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1991), p. 4; and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy 1992* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 29 January 1992), p. 5.

⁴U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 11 November 1991), p. 56.

in threatened friendly countries, and the schooling of the leadership of those nations at U.S. government institutions and military schools.

Civil and military planners have generally recognized the importance of denying insurgents access to the native populace. While engaged in the formulation of coherent counter-insurgency campaigns, they have in the past and will likely continue in the future consider directing resettlement of segments of the national population to defeat the insurgent threat. It is not clear, however, if those planners and advisers have first asked several fundamental questions.

Problem Statement

The first question is central to the issue: Does government-directed population relocation help win counter-insurgencies?

This question must be placed in the context of the role the United States plays in these foreign conflicts. From the military perspective, these insurgencies and the efforts to combat them are doctrinally viewed as "Low-Intensity Conflict,"⁵ and within the United States Department of Defense, the United States Army has both the preponderance of units tailored to this conflict environment and the majority of manuals addressing the doctrine concerning this type of warfare. In this capacity, U.S. Army officers serve in the Department of Defense in U.S. embassies abroad, on high-level inter-service and Army staffs, and special units organized and equipped for conduct of Low-Intensity Conflict. These officers are called on for their estimates in planning campaigns and operations.

⁵U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, *FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: Departments of the Army and Air Force, 5 December 1990), p. 1-1.

In order to answer the first question, study of recent (twentieth-century) insurgencies is required. Presuming it is discovered that population resettlement has contributed to defeat of insurgent movements, a second question presents itself. That question is: Do existing historical examples reveal sufficient patterns of success or failure to permit the U.S. Army, in its role as adviser to allied foreign governments combatting insurgencies, to develop a definitive set of imperatives to permit thorough consideration of deliberate, government-directed population relocation and resettlement in support of counter-insurgency operations?

Significance of the Study

Normal military procedure in addressing a given problem calls for reference to existing doctrinal literature. Review of these materials, as I will demonstrate, reveals a "gap" in U.S. counter-insurgency literature. There is historical material that refers to past cases of population relocation, and this thesis intends to evaluate and synthesize the lessons of those cases. This will provide military planners and advisers some means of assessing and analyzing current and future insurgencies to determine the utility of government-directed resettlement in combatting an insurgent threat.

Methodological Overview

The format of this thesis will follow the pattern of a cross-sectional analysis. There is no single "best" historical case study available, and forced relocation has never been used in isolation as the sole response to an insurgency. Therefore, several twentieth-century counter-insurgencies that were marked by population resettlements have been selected, and the displacement operations highlighted, compared, and contrasted.

In each case, a series of questions have been applied to each conflict.

These are:

- When and where during the conflict did population relocation occur?
- Who directed the operation?
- What was the context in which the effort was directed?
- Why was it directed?
- What results were expected, both directly and indirectly?
- What results were actually achieved or caused?

Assumptions

In preparing this thesis, it is assumed that the full range of violent activities that fall into the scope of Low-Intensity Conflict -- insurgencies, revolutions, revolts, insurrections, rebellions, internal subversion, civil unrest -- will continue to persist as a normal condition of world affairs. In those future conflicts, population relocation will present itself as an option for inclusion in counter-insurgency campaigns. Further, it is likely that with the wide diplomatic presence the United States maintains abroad, U.S. civilian and military advisers will be involved in the host nation's decision-making process in designing such a program.

Limitations

There has been an uneven approach taken toward the planning, execution, and recording of resettlements in this century's counter-insurgency wars, and significant changes in popular sentiment toward treatment of non-combatants. Because of this, straightforward and objective comparisons are difficult at best. Judgmental and subjective evaluations and analyses are required, particularly due to the diversity in times and places of the selected case studies.

The time span for the case studies considered is limited to the twentieth century, although modern mass resistance movements can trace their origins to Napoleon's Peninsular Campaign of 1808-14. Only since about 1900, however, have almost all the insurgent conflicts involving Western nations seen the widespread presence of media representatives and neutral observers concerned with the welfare of nonbelligerent civilians. As important as the new technology these agencies possessed to transmit their stories and reports instantly, their mass audience exploited an unprecedented literacy and power to influence their governments' policies and actions.

Adequately documented and valid historical examples of deliberate population relocation do not exist in all cases, and in several instances, the bulk of available records and critical primary sources are not available in English. Examples are those from the German occupation of the Balkans during World War II, the Venezuelan Insurgency of 1964-68, and the on-going tribal revolts in northeast India. All the materials available are not necessarily useful or adequate for preparing case studies.

Primary sources are available for the larger conflicts, but the less spectacular and politically unpopular wars are simply less written about, and records are scarce, or included as small sections in more general reports. To pre-empt the obvious restrictions associated with the use of classified documents as references, none were utilized.

In reviewing the counter-insurgencies world-wide conducted since the turn of this century, it was judged desirable to employ multiple historical examples involving the same directing agency, colonial or foreign power, and/or national

government. This lends itself toward more viable comparisons and contrasts in doctrine, and more rational establishment of patterns and trends.

In this field, examples also exist for application of population relocation in a wide variety of societies and geographic situations. While a similar diversity of choice is also available in selection of the dominant power involved, nations with similar cultural mores, political sensibilities, and military organizations are preferred. In this case, the western European nations and the United States are most applicable.

Delimitations

This thesis will supplement current U.S. Army doctrine, not supplant or revise it. The results of the analysis of the selected case studies will be used to identify common qualities in population relocation operations. These will be expressed as "imperatives," for possible inclusion in future editions of civilian-military and counter-insurgency operational doctrine.

Definitions

"Low Intensity Conflict" (LIC) is defined by the United States military as:

politico-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments⁶

⁶U.S. Department of Defense, *JCS Test Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 10 January 1990), p. 1-7.

It includes the operational categories of: 1) Support for insurgencies and counter-insurgencies; 2) Combatting terrorism; 3) Peacekeeping operations; and 4) Peacetime contingency operations.⁷

Insurgency is defined as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict."⁸ Counter-insurgency is then "all military and other actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency."⁹

The doctrinal mission that involves U.S. government and military personnel in a friendly foreign nation's counter-insurgency effort is "Foreign Internal Defense" (FID). It calls for "the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."¹⁰ The imperative considerations in the planning and conduct of all operations in LIC are:

1) Political Dominance (the subordination of military decisions to political objectives.)

2) Unity of Effort (integration of all military and civilian governmental agencies in military, economic, political, and psychological initiatives.)

3) Adaptability (the skill and the will to alter organizations and/or methods to meet varying situations.)

⁷U.S. Army, *FM 100-20*, p. 1-6.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. Glossary-4.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 2-7.

¹⁰U.S. Department of Defense, *JCS Test Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, October 1990), p. Glossary-9.

4) Legitimacy (the popular acceptance of the government's power to make and enforce policies.)

5) Perseverance (the patient, persistent, relentless pursuit of stated governmental objectives, until success is achieved.)¹¹

To support published doctrine and ensure integration with a national-level counter-insurgency campaign, resettlement operations will have to be planned and executed in the light of these fundamental principles.

Within the scope of Foreign Internal Defense, Consolidation Operations are:

long-term population security operations conducted in territory that is generally under host nation government control. The people are unlikely to support the host nation government fully until the government provides sufficient long-term security to free its people from the fear of insurgent reprisals. Consolidation operations provide this security by -- (a) Isolating the insurgents from the civil population and resources. (b) Protecting the civil population from insurgent influence"12

A wide range of actions, preferably synchronized to maximize their effect, are possible to prosecute Consolidation Operations, and population relocation has historically been one of these.

¹¹U.S. Army, *FM 100-20*, p. 1-5 - 6.

¹²U.S. Army, *FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (Approved Final Draft)* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, April 1991), p. 3-7.

CHAPTER 2

SURVEY OF LITERATURE

A great deal has been written about insurgencies and "small wars" in this century, particularly since 1961, when the British successfully concluded a major anti-communist counter-insurgency in Malaya, and then-President John F. Kennedy publicly announced his personal interest in the subject. Despite this, U.S. Army doctrinal literature makes only passing references to forced resettlements, and makes no definitive statements on the matter.

Actions in support of "dislocated civilians" (incorporating refugees, displaced persons, stateless persons, evacuees, and war victims)¹³ are covered in several field manuals, notably *FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*, *FM 33-1, Psychological Operations*, and *FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations*. The areas of concern, however, fall under the headings of "humanitarian assistance" and "disaster relief." The existing doctrinal literature speaks only to actions taken in response to unexpected mass migrations (generally refugees from conflictive zones), and the temporary displacement of populations to remove them from a combat area in anticipation of a single short-term battle.

Similarly, the overarching document that prescribes how to prepare a strategy in support of an ally's counter-insurgency campaign, *Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense* acknowledges

¹³U.S. Army, *FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations (Coordinating Draft)* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, January 1991), p. C-2.

"In FID, the local population is the key . . . to successful operations."¹⁴ Many references are made to "population and resource control measures," but with no further elaboration or examples. Only the 1980 version of U.S. Marine Corps *FMFM 8-2, Counterinsurgency Operations* extends the definition to infer that population resettlement is an option in counter-insurgency:

805. POPULACE AND RESOURCE CONTROL Control measures are established as a joint civil/military effort and may include . . . [e]vacuation of areas, as required Under certain conditions, the rural population may be concentrated by relocation in protected villages. The potential loss in good will should be balanced carefully against the probable increase in security before deciding to relocate villages.¹⁵

No further detail or description is provided, nor an explanation of why only the rural populace is considered.

A review of literature concerning both historical precedents of population relocation in support of counter-insurgencies, and insurgent warfare in general, will illustrate the absence of a coherent effort to collate evidence to derive a viable doctrine.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, works by the Western world's two dominant military theoreticians had comments on insurgent warfare. Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*, originally printed in German in 1837 and translated into English in 1873, called it "people's war." Antoine Henri de Jomini revealed his

¹⁴U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Pub 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (Final Draft)* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 17 September 1991), p. D-11.

¹⁵U.S. Marine Corps, *FMFM 8-2, Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 29 January 1980), p. 82-83.

revulsion for the subject in his 1838 edition of *Art of War*, which had been translated from French into English in the United States in 1854. Neither discussed specific aspects of population control.

Heralded as the first modern treatment of low-intensity conflicts is *Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers*, written in 1896 and revised in 1899 and 1903 by Colonel C.E. Callwell of the British Army. The second revision incorporated the numerous lessons of the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902; yet Callwell made only a single reference in a single sentence to Lord Kitchener's sweeping depopulation of the South African veldt in the last year of the war. British histories published immediately after the war recount the horrors the Boers faced in the original "concentration camps," but tend to be apologetic of British actions. Later treatments of the conflict are more balanced. A 1905 U.S. War Department publication, *Selected Translations Pertaining To The Boer War*, included overviews of the lessons learned in the conflict by six German, Swiss, and French senior officers. Only small-unit tactics and combat are discussed, and no mention whatsoever is made of the British Army's role in the forced resettlement of Boer families.

Simultaneously, the United States was engaged in a colonial war of its own in the newly-conquered Philippine Islands. "Population reconcentration" was a relatively common counter-insurgency device during the Philippine Insurrection, but no definitive popular history appeared until John M. Gates' 1975 work *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1899-1902*, and later Brian Linn's authoritative *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902*, in 1989. Accounts published following the war are generally personal remembrances and government reports that do not specifically address the issue of "reconcentration."

In 1907, the *Annex to Hague Convention No. IV, embodying the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land* was instituted, mandating respect for the human rights of life and property. The year before, and again in 1929, the *Geneva Conventions* were reaffirmed. Article 49 concerned "mass forcible transfers" of people. Previous to this, the U.S. Army referred to its own Civil War-era *General Orders, Number 100*, first published in 1863, as its guide to soldierly conduct in wars and insurrections.

One of the classic treatises on revolutionary warfare and the relationship between the insurgent and the populace appeared in 1937, in Chinese. Mao Zedong's seminal *On Guerrilla Warfare* blends philosophy, political science, sociology, and military tactics and strategy. Referencing theories of partisan warfare expounded by Clausewitz, V.I. Lenin, and Sun Tsu, Mao developed his personal doctrine to fight a civil war in China. It was translated into English by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith II for publication in the *Marine Corps Gazette* in 1941. Despite Mao's remarkable triumph in China in 1949, *On Guerrilla Warfare* was not printed in hardcover in the United States until 1961.

Appearing in 1940, the U.S. Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual* (NAVMAL 28290) declared the Marines to be the "State Department's army." The emphasis was on small-unit organization and tactics, detailing items such as the proper clothing for soldiers fighting insurgents in tropical regions and the procedures for monitoring elections. In 455 pages of text, no mention is made of population control as part of that fight.

The massive and brutal deportations of peoples under Japanese and German control during the Second World War are excluded from consideration in this thesis. Occurring in the context of a world-wide general war, and characterized

by complete disregard for international law and basic human rights, these efforts fall in a separate category of study. Similarly, the notorious internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent in concentration camps in 1941-45 was not carried out to defeat or forestall an insurgency. Ostensibly, it was done to secure the U.S. Zone of the Interior against imagined Japanese rear-area combat operations.

The next major conflict to see government-directed resettlements as part of a calculated "anti-guerrilla" program was the Greek Civil War of 1944-49. Large-scale presence of United Nations monitoring personnel, coupled with observers' interest in the first post-World War II battle against expansion of the "new" communist enemy produced a number of reports, articles and books on population control measures implemented by the Greek government. William McNeill's *Greece, American Aid in Action, 1947-1956* and Edgar O'Ballance's *The Greek Civil War, 1944-1949* are chief among these, and address the relocation issue.

Before the Greek Civil War had ended, U.S. advisory personnel were involved in supporting the newly-independent Republic of the Philippines fight for its survival against the Hukbalahap Rebellion. After a stumbling start in 1946, a well-run counter-insurgency campaign was conducted until 1954 that featured population relocation as part of land reform. The story is told by several of the key personalities, including American Major General Edward Lansdale in his 1972 *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia*, and Filipino Colonel Napoleon D. Valeriano and American Lieutenant Colonel Charles T.R. Bohannon in their 1962 *Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience*.

As the tide turned against the insurgents in Greece in 1948, the British declared a state of emergency in Malaya to deal with a growing guerrilla war there. In a twelve-year-long campaign that completely eliminated the communist

opposition, population resettlement was a carefully developed and executed element of the overall British strategy, and a far cry from their efforts in the Boer War. The American scholar Lucian Pye wrote on the war in *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, Its Social and Political Meaning* in 1956, and *Lessons from the Malayan Struggle against Communism* in 1958. Sir Robert K.G. Thompson, an authority on revolutionary warfare, detailed the "new village" program in his 1966 *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam*. Anthony Short provided one of the most comprehensive and detailed accounts of the Emergency in his 1975 *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-60*.

Concurrently, the British dealt with the Mau Mau Revolt in Kenya from 1952 to 1960. The resettlements carried out, however, are referred to only incidentally in most writings that emphasize tactical and intelligence operations, and African culture and politics. The contemporary exception was Fred Majdalany's 1963 *State of Emergency: The Full Story of the Mau Mau*, as well as the later (1984) Anthony Clayton work, *Counterinsurgency in Kenya: A Study of Military Operations Against the Mau Mau, 1952-1960*. A view more sympathetic to the Mau Mau is Frank Furedi's 1990 *The Mau Mau War in Perspective*.

In 1954, France surrendered its colonial possessions in Southeast Asia after its defeat in Vietnam, and sent its military to suppress the Algerian Insurrection. Armed with hard-learned lessons of insurgent warfare in Asia, France's "new revolutionary army" employed large-scale "regroupment" of the native population in attempting to defeat the Algerian insurgents. This effort is recounted in Alistair Horne's 1977 *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, Peter Paret's 1964 *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a*

Political and Military Doctrine, and Roger Trinquier's 1964 textbook *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*.

As the French left Vietnam, the United States took over what was widely seen as a war to halt the advance of communism in that region. Mimicking the Malayan and Philippine models, deliberate resettlement to isolate the Viet Cong guerrillas was an early aspect of the counter-insurgency endeavor. Post-mortems appear in Bernard Fall's definitive 1966 work *The Two Viet-Nams*, the 1973 *Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971* by Colonel Francis J. Kelly, Andrew J. Krepnevich's 1986 study of *The Army and Vietnam*, and the 1989 *Lost Victory* by William Colby. The "strategic hamlet" effort is also recounted in Guenther Lewy's 1978 *America in Vietnam*, and Neil Sheehan's 1988 *A Bright Shining Lie*.

In her struggle to retain their colonial possessions in Africa, Portugal drew on American, British, and French experience through her NATO associations to apply resettlement operations to her African wars. Called "Portugal's Vietnam," in part because it was also fought from 1961 to 1974, and in the face of growing opposition at home, the counter-insurgent campaign fought in Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique saw the considered use of re-concentration of the population into strategic hamlets. Ian F.W. Beckett's 1985 *Armed Forces and Modern Counter-insurgency* and Al J. Venter's 1973 *Portugal's Guerrilla War* cover the "re-orderings" as part of general overviews. Brendan F. Jundanian's article, "Resettlement Programs: Counterinsurgency in Mozambique," in the July 1974 *Comparative Politics* is an extensively researched, definitive examination.

Robert B. Asprey's anthology, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, published in 1975, stands out as one of the best of the historical reviews of revolutionary war through the ages. Nonetheless, neither it nor many other similar

volumes on the same subject provide a collective review of instances of forced resettlements in answer to the Problem Statement presented above. Only Maynard W. Dow's 1966 *Nation Building in Southeast Asia* carefully studies and compares population relocation in post-World War Malaya, South Vietnam, and the Philippines. His research and analyses provide a valuable historical reference and a model for future assessments.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

In the context of the Problem Statement, the choice of historical case studies in a cross-sectional analysis is evident. In the process of determining the appropriateness of population resettlement in some future situation, any attempt to develop a projection or a model to estimate the eventual outcome of the action would require some form of historical data as a base. In the unstable and/or underdeveloped environments where an insurgency is most likely to occur, it may be impossible to collect enough data of acceptable reliability applicable to the local situation to construct a workable model. Reference to historical cases where similar conditions and elements existed may permit the interpolation necessary to develop sound analyses and make informed decisions.

The particular case studies chosen -- the Boer War, the Philippine Insurrection, the Greek Civil War, the Malayan and Kenyan Emergencies, the Hukbalahap Rebellion, the Algerian Insurrection, the Vietnam War, and the Portuguese Colonial Wars -- are relevant to this thesis for their relative recency and availability of information. Some cases are too recent, and even ongoing, and evidence to permit complete evaluations of those resettlement programs is not yet forthcoming. The conflicts in El Salvador, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Iraq and the Israeli occupation of Gaza/The West Bank/Golan are instances. Other cases lack sufficient and/or balanced documentation, and require further specific research.

The Venezuelan Insurgency, the Iranian Revolution, and the Maji Maji Rising are samples.

Because there are clear examples of both successful and unsuccessful utilization of resettlement as a counter-insurgency technique, it may now be hypothesized that this thesis will not find that government-directed population relocation should always -- or conversely, should never -- be included in counter-insurgency programs. If compared to other tactics and techniques that appear in existing military doctrine, the eventual conclusion should find that like any other "tool," it should be studied and considered before application, but neither instituted nor discarded arbitrarily.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDIES

The Second Anglo-Boer War

1899 - 1902

The Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, known today simply as the Boer War, brought the infamous term "concentration camp" into the international lexicon.¹⁶ Compulsory population resettlements were not new in British military operations, but the new century heralded a significant turn in the candor and immediacy of newspaper reporting, with corresponding changes in English public and political opinion about the actions of their army and its leaders.

Following the British annexation of Upper Burma into their Indian Empire in 1885, a royalist Burmese resistance movement arose, fighting for a return to independence. The British conducted large-scale village relocations as part of their "pacification" effort to isolate and defeat these guerrillas.¹⁷ The British press

¹⁶The origin of the term "concentration camp" is unclear. Eversley Belfield, in *The Boer War* (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1975), p. 141, claims it was a standing official British military term. Christiaan De Wet wrote in his *Three Years' War* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903), p. 192, that the British Army called them "Refugee Camps." Thomas Parkenham's *The Boer War* (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 535, relates: "[Members of Parliament] C.P. Scott and John Ellis . . . first used in March [1901] an ominous phrase, 'concentration camps,' taking it from the notorious *reconcentrado* camps, set up by the Spanish to deal with Cuban guerrillas." (The Cuban incident occurred only five years earlier, in 1896, and had resulted in widespread death of internees due to disease and malnutrition.) If this is true, however, it seems odd that the glowing biographies of Kitchener later published incorporated that deprecatory term.

¹⁷Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1975), vol. 1 (1975), p. 226-229.

paid little attention to these forced migrations at the time, in large part because the natives were Asian (that is, non-white and non-Christian). The same methods applied fifteen years later against a God-fearing population of European descent in South Africa received much different treatment in the media.

The First Anglo-Boer War of 1881 between the independence-seeking *burghers*, descendents of the original Dutch settlers of South Africa, and their colonial British rulers set the stage for the second and far more serious break-away attempt less than two decades later. Rising tensions and armed clashes resulted in a general Boer uprising in the Transvaal led by their President, Paul Kruger, in 1899. Far-flung British garrisons were invested by the tough and capable Boer militia, and British relief columns led by Sir Redvers Buller were beaten by a combination of determined Boer resistance, supply lines hundreds of miles long, and their own ineptitude at this type of fluid, non-linear combat.

Buller was quickly replaced as Commander-in-Chief in South Africa by Field Marshal Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts, whose "First Proclamation" was an offer of amnesty for all Boer commandos, less their leaders.¹⁸ By the summer of 1900, Roberts had captured the rebel Boer capital of Pretoria, extended his control into the towns scattered throughout the region, and declared that final victory was at hand. This was not at all the case, as the Boer commandos, undisturbed by the loss of their formal seat of government, turned to guerrilla warfare to enervate the occupying British forces.

Even as Roberts turned over his 240,000-man force to his Chief of Staff, Major General Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener, the 70,000-man Boer army,

¹⁸Parknham, *The Boer War*, p. 617.

revitalized by new young leaders Louis Botha and Christiaan De Wet, struck back. They conducted wide-spread raids across the Transvaal, Orange Free State, and Cape Colony against the tenuous British supply lines and small isolated outposts. Kitchener stabilized his situation by re-organizing his forces on the "mounted infantryman" concept, and launching local offensives throughout South Africa.

When a tentative peace arranged between Botha and Kitchener in early 1901 was rejected out-of-hand by Sir Arthur Milner, the colonial Governor of South Africa, Kitchener moved to attain a decisive military advantage over the Boers. To secure his lines of communications, he established the "blockhouse system," supplemented by sweeping "drives" by mobile, fast-moving forces. Kitchener also sought to make the *veldt* (open countryside) unlivable, in order to deny the Boer guerrillas their logistical support base.

In September of 1900, just before Kitchener had taken command, Major General J.G. Maxwell, military governor of the Transvaal, established two small camps for Boer *burghers* "who voluntarily surrender." An earlier dispatch that month from Roberts indicated there had been isolated cases of Boer families seeking British protection, apparently from recruitment into the Boer Army.¹⁹ Roberts had concurrently authorized limited and tightly restricted destruction of Boer property, and the subsequent support of Boers resultantly made homeless.²⁰ Kitchener amplified that order in a memorandum to his general officers, dated December 21, 1900:

¹⁹Byron Farwell, *The Great Anglo-Boer War* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), p. 393.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 352; De Wet, *Three Years' War*, p. 192.

The General Commanding in Chief is desirous that all possible means shall be taken to stop the present guerilla warfare. Of the various measures suggested for the accomplishment of this object, one which has been strongly recommended, and has lately been successfully tried on a small scale is the removal of all men, women and children, and natives from the Districts which the enemy's bands persistently occupy. This course has been pointed out by surrendered Burghers, who are anxious to finish the war, as the most effective method of limiting the endurance of the Guerillas, as the men and women left on farms, if disloyal, willingly supply Burghers, if loyal, dare not refuse to do so 'It is not intended to clear Kaffir locations, but only such Kaffirs and their stock as are on Boer farms.²¹

Kitchener simultaneously instituted a "scorched earth" policy, and published a public proclamation, aimed at the Boer insurgents:

It is hereby notified to all Burghers that if, after this date, they voluntarily surrender they will be allowed to live with their Families in Government Laagers until such time as the Guerilla Warfare now being carried on will admit of their returning safely to their homes. All stock and property brought in at the time of surrender of such Burghers will be respected, and paid for if requisitioned by Military Authorities.²²

Neither Kitchener nor his staff, however, anticipated the impact of his own order, particularly the scale of the logistic and administrative effort that would be required to support these *ad hoc* detention centers. The two original "burgher camps" became forty-six camps in just ten months, interning almost 118,000 Boers

²¹Erskine Childers, ed., *The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902* (London: Simpson, Low, Marston and Co., 1907), vol. 5 (1907), p. 86.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 87.

and 43,000 Kaffirs (African natives), overwhelmingly women and children. Camps held as many as 7,400 and as few as eight persons; there were also separate camps for certain native tribes.²³

The unhealthy conditions that quickly resulted from overcrowding and inadequate facilities and support were manifested in alarmingly large numbers of deaths from disease and starvation, shocking the English press and public. Although the internees had been categorized (and hence separated) by Kitchener's order either as non-combatant refugees or families of *burghers* "on commando" (fighting the British), camp death rates were dependent on local British administration.²⁴

These grim statistics were brought to the direct attention of the British government and public by Miss Emily Hobhouse, a private citizen who had traveled through South Africa from January to April 1901 to accompany and oversee distribution of relief supplies donated to the Boer internees.²⁵ Her report on the abysmal camp conditions, and particularly the extraordinarily high death rate among women and children (approaching 30%), brought England's participation in the war into question at the national level. Hobhouse's visit was shortly followed by the inspection tour of the Commission of Ladies, appointed by the War Office and led by Mrs. Millicent Fawcett.²⁶ Their efforts to institute reforms in camp organization and administration that summer finally saw the "plague-high" death rate (that

²³Philip Magnus, *Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist* (New York, E.P. Dutton and Co., 1959), p. 179; Farwell, *The Great Anglo-Boer War*, p. 397.

²⁴Childers, ed., *The Times History*, vol. 5, p. 86.

²⁵Parkenham, *The Boer War*, p. 534. The parallel to the donation of funds and materials by American citizens to North Vietnam during the U.S. government's involvement in the war in South Vietnam is striking.

²⁶Childers, ed., *The Times History*, vol. 5, p. 253.

peaked at 344 per 1000 in October 1901) brought down to pre-war levels.²⁷ Nonetheless, in December 1901, only a year after issuing the order to depopulate the *veldt*, Kitchener directed a halt to further internments. During his stay in South Africa, he never visited any of his "concentration camps."

The effect of the internment of their families on the Boers had been intended by Kitchener to undermine their will to resist and deprive them of their base of logistic support. No evidence exists to suggest Kitchener arrived at this conclusion through careful study or staff consultation. As pioneers in a harsh land, the Boers had a reputation for hardiness and endurance, and should have been recognized as virtually independent of supply centers of the sort the British required.²⁸ The plan met none of its goals, became counterproductive, and conversely created a new series of problems for the British Army in South Africa.

In terms of supplies, the Boer Army suffered from lack of certain materials (clothing chief among them), but remained adequately provisioned to the end of the war in May of 1902. The native *kraals* (the "Kaffir locations" excluded from resettlement or destruction by Kitchener's original order) were reliable sources of replenishment for the mobile Boer guerrillas. The logistics burden instead fell to the British, who after stopping short of genocide to bring Boers from the wasted *veldt* into detainment camps, were forced to divert resources to correct the deficiencies that were killing the inmates.

As for the intentioned attack on Boer morale, the establishment of the camps served to incense rather than dismay the *burghers*. Many of their families

²⁷Parkenham, *The Boer War*, p. 548.

²⁸Rayne Kruger, *Good-Bye Dolly Gray: The Story of the Boer War* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1960), p. 402.

abandoned their homes "to avoid being sent to the concentration camps . . . their terror was increased tenfold when the news came that many a woman and child had found an untimely grave in these camps."²⁹ A number of British military reports indicate that the Boers found their mobility enhanced by the removal of their families from the battlefield.

In any case, the camps failed to achieve any military objective, and became a crushing political liability, debated almost daily in the English Parliament and newspapers. The war's casualties speak for themselves: While some 4,000-7,000 *burghers* fell in combat in three years' of fighting, somewhere between 18,000 and 28,000 Boer non-combatants died in the British "concentration camps" in only eighteen months' time.³⁰ This railed against the English self-image as the world's exemplar of civility and justice.

The final consequence of Kitchener's order to depopulate the *veldt* was the task of re-populating it, the primary post-war mission of Governor Milner. Repatriation of the camp inmates and former prisoners-of-war to their devastated farms and replacement of their slaughtered herds was necessary to re-establish the economic viability of South Africa. While waiting for shipments of building materials, wagons, farm implements, livestock, and draught animals to arrive, the "concentration camps" were maintained for nine months after the cessation of hostilities on May 31, 1902.

For all this, when Colonel C.E. Callwell updated his classic *Small Wars* in 1903 to incorporate the lessons learned from the Second Anglo-Boer War, he

²⁹De Wet, *Three Years' War*, p. 280.

³⁰Parkenham, *The Boer War*, p. 607; Belfield, *The Boer War*, p. 168.

devoted exactly one sentence to the issue of population relocation during anti-guerrilla operations, acknowledging in those few words only that it had occurred.

The Philippine Insurrection

1899 - 1902

The Philippine Islands, a colony of Spain since 1565, were conquered and occupied by the United States in May of 1898 during the Spanish-American War. Native *insurrectos* (insurrectionists) led by Don Emilio Aguinaldo saw an opportunity to gain the self-determination they had struggled for against Spain. They returned from exile in the outlying islands and from Hong Kong, and declared independence.

This action was ignored by the U.S. occupation forces, and in November 1898 the Treaty of Paris was signed by the United States and Spain. In exchange for a payment of \$20,000,000, Spain ceded the Philippines and Guam to the United States. The news galvanized the Filipino separatists, and the Filipino army openly began to expand and prepare for revolt. Finally, in February of 1899, an exchange of gunfire between U.S. sentries and Filipino troops heralded the beginning of armed rebellion against the American occupation.³¹

Aguinaldo was aware of the considerable resistance in the U.S. Congress and the general public to President William McKinley's annexation of the Philippines. After suffering sharp defeats attempting to fight in accordance with accepted conventional tactics, he ordered his military commander, Lieutenant General Antonio Luna, to disperse their forces into the mountainous interiors of the main islands of the archipelago and conduct guerrilla warfare. Aguinaldo hoped to

³¹Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, vol. 1, p. 204.

forestall any decisive U.S. gains until the American presidential elections in 1900, when a Democratic party victory would likely mean recognition of Filipino independence.

McKinley also recognized the Philippines as a possible political liability unless he brought the situation there under firm control. Major General Elwell Otis, the commander of U.S. forces in the Philippines, continuously made self-deceptive reports to the President that the rebellion was over, while American newspaper correspondents told the opposite story to their nation-wide readership. Seeking to remedy the situation, McKinley relieved Otis in May 1900 and replaced him with General Arthur MacArthur.

MacArthur's initial attempts to revitalize the anti-insurgent effort, including an offer of amnesty, yielded poor results. He decided to limit operations (and hence publicity of further possible failures) until after the November 1900 elections, which in the event retained McKinley in the White House and a Republican majority in Congress.³²

The Republican political victory in the United States was correctly judged by MacArthur to be a powerful blow to insurgent morale, and he sought to exploit it with a vigorous new counter-insurgency campaign, keyed to several provisions of the U.S. Army's General Order (G.O.) 100.³³ Written during the American Civil War, this military code of law clearly established the legal status of the *insurrectos*:

[P]ersons residing within an occupied place who do things inimical to the interests of the occupying army are known as war rebels, or war

³²Brian M. Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 22.

³³*Ibid.*, p. 23.

traitors, according to the nature of their overt acts, and are punishable at the discretion of the tribunals of the occupying army [M]en who participate in hostilities without being part of a regularly-organized force, and without sharing continuously in its operations, but who do so with intermittent returns to their homes and avocation, divest themselves of the character of soldiers, and if captured are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war.³⁴

In a special proclamation issued on December 20, 1900, MacArthur urged his subordinate commanders to enforce and comply strictly with the applicable passages from G.O. 100. He coupled this to sweeping improvements in intelligence collection and operations, local media censorship, police and judicial cooperation, road building, weapons confiscations, and decentralization of authority to enhance district commanders' ability to respond to the special situations in their areas of responsibility.

A critical aspect of G.O. 100 emphasized by MacArthur was the U.S. Army's responsibility to protect those natives who accepted the American occupation government.³⁵ The order stated: "Common justice and plain expediency require that the military commander protect the manifestly loyal citizens, in revolted territories, against the hardships of war as much as the common misfortune of all war admits."³⁶ This element of the new counter-insurgency policy would eventually

³⁴John M. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The U.S. Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 206-207.

³⁵Linn, *The Philippine War*, p. 23.

³⁶U.S. War Department, *General Orders, Number 100, April 24, 1863* (Washington, D.C.: The Adjutant General's Office, 24 April 1863), Para. 156.

lead to the establishment of "protected zones" for non-combatants in several of the U.S. military districts in the Philippines.³⁷

The most comprehensive and controversial of these programs was carried out by Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, commanding the Third Separate Brigade, in the Second District of the Department of Southern Luzon.³⁸ His response was driven by the events that followed a change in the U.S. command organization. MacArthur was replaced in July 1900 by Major General Adna R. Chaffee, due to personality differences with the newly-appointed civil governor William H. Taft.

Chaffee erroneously determined that the insurgents were essentially defeated, particularly since Aquinaldo had been captured in March 1901. His casual approach to the situation allowed the Filipino *insurrectos* to hand him several stunning military reversals, prompting a barrage of criticism from the American print media and a congressional investigation. Bell and his fellow brigade commanders were ordered to act decisively in order to conclude the war as quickly as possible.

Separation of the population from the *insurrectos* was not a new practice in the Philippine war, but Bell's employment of that counter-insurgent tactic was unique for its unprecedented scope, success, and unforeseen devastation of the internees. In his Telegraphic Circular Number Two, transmitted on 8 December 1901, Bell ordered inhabitants of outlying areas in his district to be "re-concentrated" into towns under U.S. Army control.³⁹

³⁷Linn, *The Philippine War*, p. 154.

³⁸Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, p. 258.

³⁹Linn, *The Philippine War*, p. 154.

Like Kitchener in South Africa, Bell issued directives to his subordinates to ensure adequate care for the "reconcentrated" populace, including construction of schools and storehouses, allowance for provisions, food price controls, public works projects, and vaccination programs. Like his British counterparts half a world away, everything of value outside the U.S. controlled "protective zones," particularly crops and farm animals, was confiscated or destroyed to deny their use to the guerrilla *insurrectos*. This was in accordance with the tenets of G.O. 100: "War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy."⁴⁰

The scale of the "reconcentration" plan had been underestimated, however, and 300,000 native *reconcentrados* found themselves forced to live in overcrowded and unsanitary camps. Food shortages, poor morale, bad hygiene and disease ravaged the internees, culminating in a cholera epidemic in 1902. At least 11,000 Filipino non-combatants died in Bell's "reconcentration camps,"⁴¹ and possibly as many as 40,000 others died in like camps throughout the various military districts, primarily from disease.⁴²

The "reconcentration" effort immediately produced the originally intended results of seriously hindering guerrilla activities. A garrison commander reported that the program served "to break up the heretofore rapid means of (insurgent) communication."⁴³ Bell noted "[p]eople had no sooner entered zones of

⁴⁰U.S. War Department, *G.O. 100*, Para. 17.

⁴¹Linn, *The Philippine War*, p. 155.

⁴²Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, vol. 1, p. 212.

⁴³Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, p. 210.

protection than the Insurgents became greatly alarmed and aroused and the result was felt by increased activity and resentment on their part." By April 1902, Bell reported that the *insurrectos* " . . . indicated great want and suffering and a number were so sick when captured as to need medical attention."⁴⁴ Aggressive U.S. Army patrolling, vicious reprisals, a pass system that controlled all civilian movement, and Bell's own dynamic leadership were combined with the camp system to produce an integrated and successful campaign. Bell was able to report without exaggeration that by January 1902, the insurgency in south-west Luzon had been crushed and his district was thoroughly "pacified."⁴⁵

Bell's "population reconcentration" policy raised a storm of controversy in the American press, where anti-imperialist editors compared him to the Spanish General Valeriano Weyler, who had earned the sobriquet "Butcher" Weyler for his brutal administration of *reconcentrado* camps in Cuba during the unsuccessful rebellion against Spanish rule in 1896.⁴⁶ At almost the same instant, Kitchener was enduring the same harsh comparison with Weyler in British Parliament for his Boer "concentration camp" policy. Nonetheless, it was clear the population reconcentration had decidedly weakened the *insurrectos* in Bell's district and in combination with other tactics, significantly contributed to their defeat.

Fortunately, the guerrillas were subjugated before the negative aspects of the camps could backfire on the Americans. Governor Taft began to redress the damages of "reconcentration" in 1902, even though fighting continued throughout

⁴⁴William T. Sexton, *Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism* (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1939), p. 282.

⁴⁵Leon Wolff, *Little Brown Brother* (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc. 1961), p. 358-359.

⁴⁶Linn, *The Philippine War*, p. 155.

the archipelago until 1913. He de-militarized his occupation government, invigorated the native constabulary, instituted land reform⁴⁷ and established a nation-wide education system.⁴⁸

Although the Philippine Insurrection was dominated by the U.S. Army, it was left to the U.S. Marine Corps to record the "lessons learned" from that campaign as well as subsequent expeditions in Central America in its counter-insurgency handbook, the *Small Wars Manual*. A considerable volume that details subjects from host nation police organization, to ambassadorial authority, to the best weapons and clothing for the tropics, it makes no mention of "population reconcentration."⁴⁹ The lack of strong popular support in the United States for the Philippine Campaign, in large part due to the disagreeable nature of anti-guerrilla operations that included forced population resettlement, made the war -- and its hard-learned lessons -- best forgotten. The outbreak of World War I in 1914 drew the U.S. Army's complete attention and energies away from the Philippines to Europe, and the coming conventional war.

The Greek Civil War

1944 - 1949

As the German *Wehrmacht* forces retreated from Greece in 1944, Greek communist guerrillas made their first attempt to seize governmental control by force

⁴⁷Taft pressured the Vatican to sell 410,000 acres of church land in the Philippines to the United States for \$7,000,000. Taft then oversaw its resale to landless Filipinos. Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, vol. 1, p. 212.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 212.

⁴⁹U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (NAVMAL 28290) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940).

of arms. Arrival of the British III Corps defeated the insurrection in the hard-fought Battle of Athens in December 1944, and ensured the re-installation of the pre-war monarchist government.

The *Kommunistikon Komma Ellados* (Communist Party of Greece, or KKE) had been outlawed and driven underground in 1936, but emerged after the Nazi German occupation in 1940 at the head of the *Ellinikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon* (National Liberation Front, or EAM). The military wing of the EAM was the 40,000 man *Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos* (National People's Liberation Army, or ELAS), and was known by the British and American advisors who observed its operations to be the largest, best-organized and most effective of the Greek resistance movements.⁵⁰

After its defeat in Athens, the EAM/ELAS accepted negotiations and a truce with the Greek Royal government, but retained its weapons and its wartime organization. When it became apparent that the national plebiscite set for March 1946 would maintain King George II and the monarchist government in power, the KKE declared the election invalid and refused to participate. Returning to their old bases in the rugged mountains that cover two-thirds of Greece, ELAS resumed combat operations.⁵¹ As former ELAS guerrillas rejoined their old units, their ranks grew from 2,500 to 14,300 a year later, and eventually averaged 20,000-23,000 until the final battles of the civil war in 1949.⁵²

⁵⁰Bickham Sweet-Escott, *Greece: A Political and Economic Survey 1939-1953* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 21-22.

⁵¹Although the communist rebel army re-named itself the "Democratic Army of Greece," it was referred to by its original title, ELAS, throughout the war and to the present day.

⁵²J.C. Murray, "The Anti-Bandit War," in *The Guerrilla -- and How to Fight Him*, ed. T.N. Greene (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1962), p. 73.

The dynamic and skillful General Markos Vafiadis became the commander of ELAS, and operations quickly increased in scale and frequency. Underground auxiliary organizations that claimed a membership of 500,000 sympathizers were raised in towns and cities throughout Greece, and special teams of "enforcers" carried out selective acts of terrorism, primarily kidnappings and assassinations. ELAS tactics were essentially the same they had employed against the German occupation forces during World War II: demolition of bridges and trains, mining of roads, and bombing of utilities, telephone lines, and government offices.⁵³

The initial Greek government response was inappropriate, poorly planned and ill-coordinated. Brutal and indiscriminate reprisals, often conducted by anti-communist vigilante groups, created more guerrillas than were eliminated. Self-serving politicians forced army units to be tied down defending their home towns and businesses, giving ELAS a free reign outside major population areas. The army units themselves were generally led by over-aged and incompetent officers who had spent the past war safely in exile.

An overly-centralized command structure required field units to request permission to take any action directly from the Army General Staff in Athens, which in turn had to gain approval from the factionalized and indecisive National Defense Council.⁵⁴ Only British aid and guerrilla mistakes kept the Greek government from defeat, but by February 1947 the British could no longer afford the cost of the war.

⁵³Edward R. Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War in Greece, 1946-1949: A Case Study," *Military Review* XXXVII/3 (June 1957): p. 18.

⁵⁴Steven Bucci, "The Greek Civil War: What We Failed To Learn," *Special Warfare* (Summer 1989): p. 50-51.

They warned the United States that regardless of U.S. action or inaction, Britain was withdrawing from Greece.

U.S. President Harry S. Truman addressed Congress in March 1947 to request a special US\$400,000,000 aid package for Greece and Turkey to deter what was seen as Russian-sponsored communist expansion. He declared: "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure."⁵⁵ Greece became the first test of that declaration. For Greece, the "Truman Doctrine" meant a flood of U.S. military aid and the arrival of the 250-man Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG), chartered to work with the Greeks to develop a unified national counter-insurgency strategy.

The central focus of the American effort was the reorganization, re-training, and re-equipping of the Greek National Army (GNA). In only a year, it grew from 75,000 to 200,000 men, and went over to a general offensive, leaving defense of static positions to local security forces and the Greek National Guard. The Greeks employed close air support from U.S.-supplied fighter-bombers extensively, and made a continuing effort to interdict the ELAS supply lines running from secure bases inside Albania and Yugoslavia into Greece.

The arrival of Lieutenant General James Van Fleet in February 1948 energized both the Americans and Greeks. Assigned as the new chief of JUSMAPG at the prompting of U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, his reputation for competence and drive was validated in Greece. Commenting on the decision to send aid and advisors rather than committing U.S. troop units, Army

⁵⁵Robert K.G. Thompson, "When Greek Meets Greek," chap. in *War in Peace: Conventional and Guerrilla Warfare Since 1945* (New York: Harmony Books, 1982), p. 17.

Chief of Staff General Omar N. Bradley wrote that "Van Fleet was worth two American divisions" in Greece.⁵⁶

Van Fleet followed the course already set by JUSMAPG planners, emphasizing decisive military operations as the solution to the insurgency. He fostered an excellent working relationship with Marshal Alexander Papagos, the new head of the Greek armed forces, who, like Van Fleet, was a professional and efficient soldier. By June 1948 the two leaders were jointly overseeing unprecedented assaults into the ELAS-held Grammos and Vitsi mountain ranges, once considered unassailable.⁵⁷

Markos countered this challenge with a brilliant flexible defense, and the results of these large-scale offensives were less than satisfactory. Efforts at improvement of the army continued, including formation of specially-trained "commando" units, which operated deep inside ELAS strongholds raiding, ambushing, and gathering intelligence. U.S. military aid also doubled from US\$150 million in 1947 to US\$300 million in 1948.

The communists inflicted some of their greatest problems on themselves. To meet manpower requirements, unwilling peasants were impressed into ELAS service, under threat of death for their family members if they should desert.⁵⁸ ELAS atrocities and crimes became more widespread, turning public opinion against them. In a devoutly Christian nation, the KKE assassinated priests,

⁵⁶Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 475.

⁵⁷Asprey, *War In The Shadows*, vol. 2, p. 741.

⁵⁸The KKE did not hesitate to enforce this threat, remorselessly murdering women, children, and the aged. Bucci, "What We Failed To Learn," p. 51.

alienating the Greek Orthodox Church and its constituents. Most notable of these counter-productive travesties was the KKE's mass kidnapping of 30,000 children into ELAS Yugoslavian base camps for "indoctrination" and blackmail of their families.⁵⁹

There was also a major shift in ELAS strategy following the summer 1948 battles. The KKE central committee determined that their attacks on the economic and political infrastructure had been ineffective, and that the Greek National Army was the real "center of gravity" in the war. To best accomplish its rapid destruction, ELAS abandoned irregular warfare tactics and reorganized along conventional military lines. Their guerrilla bands of 50-100 men were re-formed into brigades, divisions, and corps.⁶⁰ They did not gain any logistical advantages, however, and were still reliant on the populations of the mountain towns to support them with food and shelter.

Personality and strategy differences strained the relationship between Markos, who was allied to Yugoslavia's *generalissimo* Marshal Josip Broz Tito, and KKE First Secretary Nikos Zachariadis, who sided with Russia's Premier Josef Stalin.⁶¹ This led to Markos' relief from command, with Zachariadis assuming leadership of both the political party and the field army. With the KKE now in the Stalinist camp, Tito (who had been ostracized by Stalin) reacted by reducing aid and in July 1949, closed the Greco-Yugoslav border to ELAS. Deprived of their primary

⁵⁹Todd Griffin, "Counter-Insurgency: Myth and Reality in Greece," in *Containment and Revolution*, David Horowitz, ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 176.

⁶⁰Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War in Greece," p. 21.

⁶¹Richard J. Barnett, *Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World* (New York: World Publishing, 1968), p. 126.

sanctuary and base of operations, the communist insurgents became completely dependent on the native Greek population for their survival.⁶² Recognizing this, Van Fleet and Papagos devised a campaign to isolate ELAS from their last source of support.

Focusing their efforts on the traditional guerrilla strongholds in the mountains along the northern frontier, the GNA set out to create a "no-man's-land"⁶³ devoid of the indigenous peasants who provided ELAS with their intelligence, recruits, and sustenance. Beginning in February 1949, the GNA carried out the systematic relocation of complete mountain villages to camps in the lowlands, usually in or near major towns and cities.⁶⁴ The ELAS response confirmed the validity of the forced resettlement plan. One guerrilla leader stated, "The greatest difficulty which our troops faced . . . was hunger, as a result of the evacuation of the peasants and their concentration in the towns."⁶⁵

The financial cost of the resettlement effort was a significant burden on the Greek government and its weak economy. Since the Greek and U.S. military leadership had the end of the rebellion in sight, the depopulation of the mountains was intended to be both temporary and brief. It was not meant to improve the economic or social condition of the natives; only to displace them from ELAS contact long enough to accelerate the defeat of the guerrillas. The concurrent

⁶²Albania was still open to ELAS, but could provide little material assistance.

⁶³D. George Kousoulas, *Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 259.

⁶⁴Edgar O'Ballance, *The Greek Civil War, 1944-1949*. (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1966), p. 214-215.

⁶⁵Kousoula, *Revolution and Defeat*, p. 259.

military effort to wipe out ELAS was swift and decisive. The second offensive into the Grammos and Vitsi escarpments in July 1949 succeeded in trapping the communist rebels. On Zakhariadis' orders, the ELAS tried to hold their ground instead of avoiding engagement and escaping, and by late August the ELAS had been annihilated.

The overcrowded "evacuee camps" in the major provincial towns might have become a target for KKE propaganda and subversion and a source of embarrassment in the world press had the fighting continued. Under tremendous pressure from the resurgent GNA, the surviving ELAS field commanders declared a unilateral cease-fire on 16 October 1949. Although sporadic fighting continued through 1950, the Greek Civil War was essentially over.

The problem remained for the Greek government to re-populate the devastated guerrilla zones. Twenty-two percent of the national budget, most of it U.S. aid, was committed to relief efforts in 1949. As the "evacuees" were returned to their villages, government-sponsored projects repaired and rebuilt their homes, schools, utilities, and churches, and in some cases replaced livestock and vocational equipment. The re-establishment of these generally economically unviable communities was questioned, but the only alternative was to maintain the prohibitively expensive evacuee camps. This was unacceptable, and by early 1950, the re-population effort was complete.⁶⁶

The forced resettlement of a few thousand Greek villagers, while clearly supportive of the overall counter-insurgency effort, cannot be viewed as a decisive or critical act in the Greek Civil War. The KKE was clearly losing, as superior

⁶⁶William McNeill, *Greece: American Aid in Action, 1947-1956*. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1957), p. 48-49.

GNA military strength and government political successes combined with the KKE's own gross miscalculations, abuses, and infighting to make a communist takeover impossible. While the depopulation of their areas of operation crippled ELAS logistics, their alienation of the Greek population and Tito's termination of support had done far more damage.

The short-term, limited evacuation of a relatively small segment of the Greek population, carried out at a time when victory was at hand, hastened the end of the war. The employment of the technique of forced resettlement constituted acknowledgement and understanding on the part of the Greek government and its U.S. advisors that the guerrilla drew strength from the people, and separation of the two made the guerrilla more vulnerable to defeat. This newly re-learned lesson would become the central theme and core program of future U.S.-sponsored counter-insurgencies.

Another impression was made on the American senior defense leadership that ignored the singularly flawed nature of the KKE and ELAS. The ELAS had made the egregious error of attempting to meet the GNA on its own terms, instead of exploiting the inherent strengths of an irregular force operating in difficult terrain. American post-conflict analysis over-simplified the character of the enemy, inferring all future "guerrilla" opponents would resemble ELAS -- smaller and less-well-equipped imitations of the conventional units of the U.S. Army. Their conclusion was that military-oriented and military-dominated counter-insurgency operations could overcome them.⁶⁷ This assumption was fundamentally incorrect, and held the potential for disaster in future insurgent wars.

⁶⁷The strongest example of this was "Operation REDLAND," written in May 1954 by Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel's U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Saigon, Vietnam. Following the French defeat at Dienbienphu, O'Daniel prepared REDLAND to support a major

The Hukbalahap Rebellion

1946 - 1954

When World War II ended in August 1945, peace did not return with the United States occupation forces to the Philippine Island territory. A powerful and dangerous insurgent force was operating in the highlands of Luzon, uncomfortably close to Manila, the capital -- the "Huks."⁶⁸

The Huks had been one of the many long-standing indigenous insurrectionist gangs that coalesced into guerrilla units following the Imperial Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines in 1941. Luis Taruc, a native Filipino of peasant stock, helped organize and later lead this mixed band of communists, socialists, intellectuals, politicians, and military men. They took the Tagalog-language name, *Hukbo Na Bayan Laban Sa Hapon* (literally, the People's Army [To Fight] Against Japan), referred to by its shortened title of "Hukbalahap."⁶⁹

General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the U.S. Army's Far Eastern Forces and son of Arthur MacArthur, military governor of the Philippines

offensive against the Viet Minh in South Vietnam. The plan called for the re-organization of the South Vietnamese Army into a force of nine American-style divisions, using conventional American training, equipment, and doctrine. No attempt was made to coordinate with the civil government to integrate REDLAND into an overarching national counter-insurgency strategy. REDLAND was based on Van Fleet's 1949 JUSMAPG plan for upgrading the Greek Army. Van Fleet was advised of REDLAND, and endorsed it without ever visiting Vietnam. Ronald H. Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years of the U.S. Army in Vietnam 1941-1960* (New York: The Free Press, 1985), p. 221-222.

⁶⁸Pronounced like "hooks."

⁶⁹Kenneth M. Hammer, "Huks in the Philippines," in *Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961*, ed. Franklin M. Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 177-178.

during the previous insurrection, did not supply arms to the Huks because of their communist sympathies. In return, the Huks refused to join or cooperate with the Allied forces or their sponsored guerrilla units.⁷⁰ At the end of the war, commonwealth government relations with the independent Huks deteriorated even farther, when they were shunned at demobilization negotiations and not granted occupation-period "back pay" given to other Filipino guerrillas.

The post-war Philippine leadership might have staved off an insurrection in 1946 by absorbing the Huk minority into the newly-created government through inclusion in the legislature. Instead, after their legitimate election to the Philippine national congress, Taruc and his deputy were arrested and jailed on trumped-up charges of wartime crimes.

Taruc was eventually released, and he and the Huks literally fled to the hills, arming themselves with weapons they had cached at the end of World War II. They reverted to their wartime organization, established an underground "politburo" in Manila, and reactivated their potent auxiliary force, re-named the *Pambansang Kaisahan Ng Mga Magbubukid* (National Peasant Union, or PKM).⁷¹ It soon claimed 500,000 members supporting the 20,000 armed Huks.⁷²

The PKM posed a serious threat to the traditional landowners who had exploited the tenured peasantry since before the Spanish colonization. The Huks

⁷⁰Hammer, "Huks in the Philippines," p. 178.

⁷¹Frederica M. Bunge, *Philippines: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 104.

⁷²Hammer, "Huks in the Philippines," p. 206.

seized on this deep-seated peasant grievance that had been the cause of their dissent before World War II, and held as their chief aim "land for the landless."⁷³

Manila's reaction was President Manuel Roxas' "mailed fist" policy. The peasant population was caught between the government's inept and brutal repression reminiscent of the Japanese occupation, and Huk intimidation-through-terror, which generally benefitted the Huks.⁷⁴ Between 1946 and 1950, most of central Luzon fell under their control, and even became known as "Huklandia."⁷⁵

The inappropriate and ineffective support the U.S. was providing changed shortly after the North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950, when the communist threat in Asia suddenly appeared very real and potent. Aid was immediately tripled, the Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) - Philippines was strengthened, and Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, U.S. Air Force, was sent by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in August 1950⁷⁶ to advise and assist the new Philippine Secretary of National Defense, Ramon Magsaysay, who had been appointed at the insistence of the U.S. Ambassador.⁷⁷

⁷³Benedict J. Kirkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 52-53; and Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, vol. 2, p. 748.

⁷⁴Boyd T. Bashore, "Dual Strategy for Limited War," *Military Review* (May 1960): p. 93.

⁷⁵The Huks took on a new title during this hubris, re-designating themselves the *Hukbo Ng Mapagpalaya Sa Bayan* (People's Liberation Army, or HMB). Bunge, *Country Study*, p. 104.

⁷⁶Stephen R. Shalom, *The United States and the Philippines* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1981), p. 76.

⁷⁷Claude A. Buss, *The United States and the Philippines* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), p. 30.

Magsaysay and Lansdale made an excellent team. In a series of informal discussions about the poor socio-economic situation of the Filipino peasantry that fostered support of the Huk movement, they developed a package of counter-measures.⁷⁸ These were primarily keyed to a sophisticated psychological warfare campaign that identified different target audiences, particularly the Huks' part-time (soft-core) supporters, who could be proselytized to the government side.⁷⁹

There were many facets to the overall effort. The military was professionalized; bounties were placed on Huk leaders; rewards were given for firearms surrendered; "free-fire" zones were eliminated; Philippine Army Judge Advocate lawyers were assigned to provide free counsel for peasants in land court cases against wealthy landlords; and "ten-centavo telegrams" could be sent by any citizen to express grievances directly to government ministers.⁸⁰

The most remarkable of these new concepts was the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), taking its name from a subdivision of the pre-war Philippine Army Corps of Engineers.⁸¹ In Malaya at this time, the British colonial government had conducted population resettlements to move the people away from the communist guerrillas; EDCOR would attempt to resettle the guerrillas away from their popular base of support. Rather than punishing Huk rebels, the Philippine government would offer "rehabilitation."

⁷⁸Edward G. Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 50-51.

⁷⁹Tomas C. Tirona, "The Philippine Anti-Communist Campaign," *Air University Quarterly Review* (Summer 1954): p. 8-9.

⁸⁰Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, p. 48.

⁸¹Maynard W. Dow, *Nation Building in Southeast Asia* (Boulder, Colorado: Pruett Press, 1966), p. 98.

Designed to answer peasant grievances about inequality in land distribution, EDCOR usurped the Huks' slogan, "land for the landless," in direct competition with the Huk political agenda.⁸² The EDCOR plan, formally instituted by Magsaysay on 15 December 1950, offered Huk guerrillas an incentive to surrender: Fifteen to twenty-five acres of free land on the major island of Mindanao (well away from the war), a house, a caraboa (water buffalo), seed, farm implements, police protection, education, medical aid, electricity, and free transportation to the site.⁸³

The first EDCOR camp was about 4,000 acres of government-acquired land in virgin jungle. It was rapidly prepared by Philippine Army surveyors and engineers with U.S. material support, clearing land and building roads, a dozen homes, and a community hall, church, school and sawmill. Opened in May 1951, the site was made a showcase, and was a tremendous success not only with the first fifty-six Huk converts, but with the Philippine media as well.⁸⁴ It also had the desired psychological effect of completely enervating the Huk propaganda claim of government resistance to land reform, and demonstrated to the peasantry that the government was responsive to their foremost concern.⁸⁵

⁸²Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T.R. Bohannon, *Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience* (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1962), p. 221-222.

⁸³Robert R. Smith, "The Philippines: 1946-1954," in *Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1965), vol. 1, *The Experience in Asia*, p. 500-501.

⁸⁴Colonel Lansdale realized after the first camp was established that the Huks could subvert EDCOR by deliberately surrendering and relocating to "expand their movement into Mindanao." Fortunately, this never occurred. If the Huks had attempted such an operation, they would have found themselves "foreigners" on Mindanao, where the natives spoke a unique dialect and followed different customs. Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, p. 54.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, p. 56.

Huk counter-propaganda claiming the EDCOR resettlement was a modern-day "reconcentration camp" failed in the face of media reports and persistent rumors to the contrary.⁸⁶ EDCOR was so strongly touted as a success throughout Asia that British officials visiting from Malaya in 1951 expected to see a massive, nation-wide program instead of a single village peopled by a few dozen families. Eventually, two more EDCOR camps were built on Mindanao, and in 1953, in an intentionally dramatic move, an EDCOR resettlement camp was established on Luzon in San Luis, the home town of Taruc, the Huk *Supremo* (supreme commander). At this point, the Huks openly acknowledged the loss of their "mass base," and Taruc surrendered a year later in May 1954, effectively ending the Huk rebellion.

A study of the numbers of re-located Huks shows that the popular perception of the success of EDCOR was far out of proportion to the actual resources committed and "converts" resettled. At their peak, the EDCOR farms had a population of only 5,175,⁸⁷ constituting 950 to 1,200 families.⁸⁸ No more than 250 of these families had been Huk supporters, the rest being landless peasants and former Philippine Army soldiers. This is significant when compared to the total number of surrendered Huks -- 9,458 -- in the 1950-55 period. Carefully planned media management and psychological warfare operations (hidden behind the

⁸⁶Lawrence M. Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 91.

⁸⁷Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, p. 59.

⁸⁸Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion*, p. 239; and Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection*, p. 92.

benign title of the "Civil Affairs Office"),⁸⁹ tied to a well-thought-out, well-run project, "gave people hope that the government could do things for them, which they were trying to get by violence and by the risk of their lives."⁹⁰

As late as 1959, almost five years after serious combat had died down in the Philippines, the original EDCOR project was still running, as the re-settled farmers worked off their small debts to the government for the materials they had received. There had been no expansion of the program; Colonel Lansdale's efforts were largely overshadowed by the Korean War. In 1954, he was sent by the CIA to Vietnam, where he would try to replicate the success he enjoyed in the Philippines.

The Malayan Emergency

1948 - 1960

The Imperial Japanese Army invaded the British colony of Malaya in December 1941, completing its conquest of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore in two months. The Allied Southeast Asia Command was forced into a wartime coalition with the only underground organization capable of conducting resistance activities -- the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The 1,900,000 Chinese immigrants who had been the MCP's base of support since the 1920's continued to provide assistance throughout the war to the armed guerrillas, the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA).⁹¹

⁸⁹Uldarico S. Baclagon, *Lessons from the Huk Campaign in the Philippines* (Manila: M. Colcol, 1956), p. 180.

⁹⁰Kirkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion*, p. 239.

⁹¹Paul A. Jureidini, et al, *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1962), p. 66. Some sources refer to this force as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU).

Although the British had lent advisors and logistical aid to the MCP, a firm mutual trust never developed, aggravated by MPAJA emphasis on fighting rival political factions instead of the Japanese.⁹² At war's end, the British managed to demobilize the MPAJA, but for its wartime service, the MCP was recognized as a legal political party.⁹³ During the next three years, the MCP extended its influence into ethnic Chinese student and labor groups. At the same time, race riots between native Malays, Chinese, and Indians (representing 50%, 38%, and 10% of the population, respectively) became common, as tensions grew over the issue of Malay nationalism and independence.⁹⁴

The summer of 1948 was a turning point in Southeast Asian political history. The Chinese and Greek Civil Wars were raging, and an "international communist youth conference" was held in Calcutta, India. In the wake of this meeting, armed insurrections began in Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaya, openly led by those countries' respective communist parties. In Malaya, Ch'en P'ing became head of the MCP after his predecessor mysteriously disappeared, and re-established the old MPAJA as the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), with 4,500 armed combatants.⁹⁵

⁹²The MPAJA preoccupation with so-called "traitor-killing" closely paralleled the methods of the communist *Hukbalahap* (People's Army [To Fight] Against Japan) in the Philippines during World War II.

⁹³Robert K.G. Thompson, "Emergency in Malaya", chap. in *War in Peace*, p. 81-82.

⁹⁴Religion was a cause of friction, as well. The Malays were generally Muslim; the Chinese held Confucianist and Buddhist beliefs.

⁹⁵The title is misleading, as the Malayan Races Liberation Army was 95% ethnic Chinese. Jureidini, *Casebook*, p. 74.

The MCP central committee felt that the opportunity had presented itself to throw off British colonial rule and create a communist "people's democracy" with the MCP at its head. The guerrilla warfare waged by the MRLA to achieve this was characterized by small raids, ambushes, kidnappings, bombings, assassinations, and robberies directed against government officials, police stations, and prominent businessmen and their estates. With less discrimination, they also threw grenades into movie theaters and attacked busses, killing and injuring non-combatants.⁹⁶ While the MRLA grew to a strength of 10,000, terrorist actions against political and economic targets failed to help widen the MCP's base of popular support.⁹⁷

In response, the British Home Government in June 1948 declared Malaya to be in a "State of Emergency." Several strong counter-insurgency measures were taken by the British Federation government. In 1948, "Emergency Resolution 17" permitted police detention of any suspected insurgents or sympathizers without trial for as long as a year, and could result in exile.⁹⁸ Police forces were greatly expanded, intelligence operations intensified, and British Commonwealth military units made themselves equal, and later superior, to the MRLA in jungle warfare skills. Permission was obtained in 1949 from the Royal Thai government allowing "hot pursuit" of fleeing MRLA guerrillas up to ten miles into Thailand.⁹⁹ British

⁹⁶As part of the coordinated government campaign to deny any vestige of legitimacy to the MRLA guerrillas, they were officially referred to as "Communist Terrorists" (CT's), rather than "bandits," as they had been called by the Japanese.

⁹⁷Robert K.G. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1966), p. 25.

⁹⁸Surprisingly, Malay and British media reaction to this severe infringement on "human rights" was silence.

⁹⁹U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, *Operations in Low Intensity Conflict - C6000* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), p. 250.

understanding of the MCP pattern of operations, gained during their World War II association, led to formulation of the "Briggs Plan" in June 1950.

Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs had been appointed Director of Operations in Malaya in March 1949, and set out to develop a counter-insurgency concept that fully integrated the civil and military efforts into a single national strategy. The central objective of his plan was separation of the MCP rebels from the civil populace, and hence their primary source of intelligence and -- most importantly -- food. The rugged terrain of the Malayan Peninsula did not lend itself to agricultural development, and two-thirds of the country's rice requirement had to be imported.

The keystone of the separation scheme was the forced resettlement of about a half-million Malayan Chinese squatters whose jungle gardens were the "logistic bases" of the MRLA, as they had been for the MPAJA during World War II. The squatter communities (distinct from the long-standing Malay *kampongs*) had grown up during the Japanese occupation, when the closing of the large tin mines and rubber plantations caused hundreds of thousands of natives to seek survival through subsistence farming on the edge of the dense jungle that covered four-fifths of Malaya.¹⁰⁰

Briggs established some 500 "New Villages" of two types. Laborers (miners and plantation workers) were to live in dormitory camps, which usually were added as suburbs to existing towns. Farmers were sent to agricultural villages, over half of which were entirely new and meant to be self-supporting. To this end, extraordinarily detailed planning went into the New Village effort, and pilot

¹⁰⁰Thompson, "Emergency in Malaya," p. 86.

programs were run by the responsible government agencies to test procedures and policies.¹⁰¹

The actual movement of the squatters from their old communities was also carefully conducted by the British. Before dawn, a given village would be surrounded by government security forces. Police would rouse and gather the inhabitants, and Chinese Affairs Office personnel would explain what was about to happen. The advantages of the New Village were described, and assistance provided in packing the squatters' belongings for transport.¹⁰² The concurrent psychological campaign was a point of emphasis in the government agencies, to excellent effect. A correspondent wrote:

In Perak a group of resettled people were so grateful for the way they had been treated by the husky Coldstream Guards that they asked for and received permission to name their [new] village *Kampong Coldstream*.¹⁰³

While permanent villages were being constructed, the displaced persons were cared for in "tent cities," and received a fair stipend for their period of unemployment.

Their new communities included four acres of land for each farm family, animal pens, clinics, schools, police stations, utilities and sanitation facilities. The resettled families received building materials for their own homes, which they were required to construct themselves. Most importantly, the families received the title

¹⁰¹The original term for the relocation sites was "resettlement areas," but the British administration soon settled on the more positive name "New Villages." Dow, *Nation Building*, p. 30.

¹⁰²Noel Barber, *War of the Running Dogs: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1971), p. 101-103.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, p. 104.

to their home and farmland, making them legitimate landowners.¹⁰⁴ In response to MCP propaganda claims that the barbed wire-enclosed New Villages were actually "concentration camps," the government quickly replaced the barbed wire with less offensive (but equally effective) chain-link fencing.¹⁰⁵

The intent of locking in MCP sympathizers and shutting out the 50,000-member *Min Yuen* (MCP's underground movement) was fairly realized. While self-defense units, Police Special Branch undercover detectives, informers, and identity card systems made infiltration difficult, contact between New Village inhabitants and the MCP was never completely broken. The MCP claimed it was actually easier to collect taxes with their taxpaying population so conveniently grouped.¹⁰⁶

This did not improve the guerrillas' deteriorating situation in regards to food supplies. With the old squatter gardens gone, and tight government controls placed on food and medicine (labeled "Operation Starvation"), the MRLA was forced to come to the New Villages to obtain vital supplies.¹⁰⁷ The British military organization could now concentrate its forces around the villages and lay ambushes that took an increasing toll of the insurgents' combatant strength.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴In practice, this was not as positive as it might appear. Granting of land titles was subject to existing (and complicated) Federation laws, and legal squabbles went on for years. Nonetheless, the psychological and propaganda advantage was gained. Anthony Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960* (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1975), p. 395.

¹⁰⁵Barber, *Running Dogs*, p. 105.

¹⁰⁶Short, *Communist Insurrection*, p. 392.

¹⁰⁷Barber, *Running Dogs*, p. 109. While sustenance could be found in the jungle, it did not provide the CT's with a healthy and balanced diet, and the necessary hunting and gathering consumed a major portion of their time.

¹⁰⁸Lucian W. Pye, *Lessons from the Malayan Struggle Against Communism* (Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies, 1957), p. 51-52.

A much smaller program run in parallel with the New Village effort was the "Jungle Fort" system. Fourteen of these forts were established in the remote Malayan highlands for the same purpose as the New Villages -- to separate the population from the MRLA guerrillas. In this case, however, the local inhabitants were the *orang asli* (Malayan aborigines), and forced resettlement was not employed. The objective was to extend the positive aspects of government influence and protection to the *orang asli* in order to win their allegiance, and hence support, away from the communists.

Manned by small detachments of the British Special Air Service Regiment, each fort had a headquarters, barracks, public clinic, school, and trading post enclosed in a defensive perimeter, with a short airstrip nearby. The project was successful. A senior member of the staff of the Director of Operations wrote in 1956:

The aborigines never did abandon their traditional way of life -- the whole idea was to attract them to live within range of the fort. This they did It was an elementary example of bringing the basic essentials to a remote people within the environment of their own way of life, and it worked.¹⁰⁹

With the opportunity for an MCP victory forestalled, General Sir Gerald Templer arrived in January 1952 to replace both the exhausted Briggs and the late High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney, who had been assassinated in an MRLA road ambush. This combined civil and military leadership in a single authority.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹Dow, *Nation Building*, p. 80, 83.

¹¹⁰Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1971), p. 57.

Refining and expanding Briggs' integrated national strategy, Templer was able to reinforce successes against the starving guerrillas with political victories that completely undermined the MCP's insurrectionist platform. He encouraged creation of the Alliance Party, which unified loyal ethnic Chinese, Indians, and Malays into a cohesive and capable political organization.¹¹¹

The trend became irreversible; by 1955, Ch'en P'ing was calling for a negotiated settlement, and in August 1957 Britain granted the Malayan Federation status as an independent member of the British Commonwealth. MRLA strength continued to dwindle through battle losses, desertions, and arrests to a few dozen ineffective hold-outs, and on 12 July 1960, the "State of Emergency" was lifted.

The twelve-year-long counter-insurgency campaign was not without its failures, such as the fruitless attempt to conscript ethnic Chinese into the Federation Security Forces. The overall effort was successful, in large part due to the population and resource controls effected by the New Village program. With their ties to the people essentially severed, and no sanctuaries or outside support available, the MCP was bound to be defeated.

The success of the New Villages in and of themselves was due to the thorough, methodical British approach, and protection of the villages from MRLA attack by substantial security forces (at their best strength, 10,000 MRLA guerrillas faced 39,000 Commonwealth and Malay soldiers, along with 40,000 armed police and about 250,000 Home Guard auxiliaries).¹¹² The Korean War's effect of limiting the number of British troops available for Malayan service spurred a reliance on

¹¹¹Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, p. 45.

¹¹²Richard L. Clutterbuck, "Communist Defeat in Malaya: A Case Study," *Military Review*, XVIII/9 (September 1963): p. 64.

indigenous police forces that also made a positive contribution to the outcome of the resettlements.

It was of significant consequence that during the critical first years of the Briggs Plan, the Korean War also drove up tin and rubber world market prices up, buoying the Malayan economy and helping finance the massive resettlements. Testimony to the careful planning and execution of the program was the continued existence of almost all of the camps as communities in their own right. Many towns in present-day Malaysia had their beginnings as New Villages during the Emergency.¹¹³ Eleven of the Jungle Forts continued to be maintained after the Emergency, renamed "Administrative Posts," but still supporting schools, health services, and trade for the *orang asli*.¹¹⁴

These unique circumstances -- overwhelming numerical strength, efficient and fair government and police administrators, no external support for the insurgents, restricted internal resources, and concentration of the insurgents in a single identifiable ethnic group -- do not detract from the British victory in Malaya. The leadership there correctly matched their plan to the geographic, social, and political environment. Enthusiastic British and American supporters of the "Malayan example" as the model for all future counter-insurgency campaigns, Robert K.G. Thompson chief among them, would later fail to consider those unique aspects when attempting to transfer the resettlement concept. The mounting insurgency in Vietnam would prove a significantly different case in the application of the strategy and techniques of population relocation.

¹¹³Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, p. 48.

¹¹⁴Dow, *Nation Building*, p. 83.

The Kenyan Emergency

(The Mau Mau Revolt)

1952 - 1960

Wide-spread service of African colonial troops in British Commonwealth military units during World War II precipitated nationalist movements for independence after the war. In the social and economic culture in pre-war Africa, black natives were "second-class" citizens who enjoyed few benefits from British rule. Duty in the British Army brought enhanced physical well-being, a sense of being important members of the British Empire, and exposure to Western meritocracy. This was reinforced by the final Allied victory in 1945.

On return to their African homelands, however, they were disillusioned by the expectancy of the white-dominated British colonial governments that they return to their subordinate pre-war status as *ahoi* (landless tenants). In Kenya in particular, these black native veterans observed growing prosperity among the white European settlers, while from 1945 to 1951, their own standard of living fell by 40%.¹¹⁵ This was in large part due to a deliberate effort to absorb the numerous small native farms into large white-owned plantations, while increasing work loads on black laborers and simultaneously raising prices on commodities and foodstuffs required by the natives.

The Kikuyu tribe of central Kenya (Central Province in the colonial government organization) felt this worsening inequity most sharply. Numbering about one and a half million and located mostly in their traditional tribal lands in the rugged and forested Aberdares mountains, the Kikuyu became virtually the

¹¹⁵H.P. Willmott, "Kenya in Revolt," in *War in Peace*, p. 108.

exclusive recruiting base for the insurgent movement known as the "Mau Mau."¹¹⁶ The insurgency was sparked by the greed and racism of the white settlers and inspired in part by the clandestine "Forty Group," a secretive organization of radicalized Kikuyu British Army veterans based in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital.¹¹⁷ Kikuyu support of the insurrection was not unanimous. Tribal elders resented the usurpation of their traditional powers by the young rebels, and Kikuyu Christians opposed the return to tribalistic militancy. The neighboring Embu and Meru tribes lent almost no assistance whatsoever.¹¹⁸

The Mau Mau movement grew to a strength of approximately 12,500 armed members, who began a general campaign of violence in 1952. This manifested itself primarily in the form of the murder and mutilation of white settlers and government officials, polarizing the white farming community. Native blacks were also targeted, and Senior Kikuyu Chief Waruhiu, openly loyal to the British government, was assassinated. This prompted the British to declare a "State of Emergency" on 20 October the same year.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶The origin of the term "Mau Mau" is uncertain. A 5 October 1948 Kenyan government police report mentions, without amplification, the existence of "the Mau Mau association . . . probably connected with the KCA [Kikuyu Central Association]." Frank Furedi, *The Mau Mau War in Perspective* (London: James Currey, 1989), p. 125. It became the official British name for the Kikuyu-based insurgent movement, although the insurgents claim to have referred to themselves only as the *Kiama Kia Muingi* (Land Freedom Army). Anthony Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya 1952-60: A Study of Military Operations Against Mau Mau* (Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 1976), p. 2.

¹¹⁷Furedi, *Mau Mau War in Perspective*, p. 109-110.

¹¹⁸Wilmott, "Revolt in Kenya," p. 109.

¹¹⁹Arthur Campbell, *Guerillas: A History and Analysis* (New York: John Day, 1967), p. 216-217.

The successful handling of the Emergency in Malaya provided a model for the national counter-insurgency strategy in Kenya. The colonial government stressed civil, military, and police coordination, and took strong action to address legitimate native grievances. It set and enforced a minimum wage, eliminated separate pay scales and job promotion schedules for whites and blacks, and lifted race barriers to civil service positions. Agrarian reforms permitted tribal co-operatives and did away with restrictions on native farm production of cash crops previously seen as being competitive with the white-owned farms. Politically, the number of black representatives in the Kenyan Legislative Council was made to equal that of whites, and later became the majority.¹²⁰

Compared to the 42,000 Commonwealth soldiers sent to Malaya, the British Kenyan contingent of only 11,000 -- five battalions aided by another six of native troops (the King's African Rifles) -- was small. The emphasis on law enforcement (martial law was never declared), coupled with proven anti-guerrilla techniques, including wide-ranging "cordon and search" operations (compared to "grouse hunts," but also reminiscent of the "drives" of the Boer War) and strict population control measures, precluded the need for reinforcements.

One key Malayan program duplicated in Kenya to isolate the insurgents from their "mass base" was forced population resettlement. This began first as an effort to re-group black laborers employed by white settlers from their scattered homes into defensible camps, guarded by the natives themselves against Mau Mau intimidation. By late 1953, the military Commander-in-Chief of East Africa, General Sir George Erskine, with the concurrence of the Governor of Kenya,

¹²⁰Willmott, "Kenya in Revolt," p. 109.

forcibly evacuated Kikuyu tribal members out of the Aberdares highlands into brand new settlements, using the Malayan "Briggs Plan" as its example.¹²¹ This process became known as "villagization," and after a difficult start, yielded good results for the British.

The Kikuyu resisted villagization not only because they were being removed from their tribal homelands, but because communal living above the family level, usually a collection of only three to five huts, was alien to their culture as well.¹²² During its initial period of implementation, villagization -- carried out and enforced by British military units -- spurred many Kikuyu to join or support the Mau Mau.

The new villages were built according to a common plan, under close government supervision. The displaced natives had to construct their new homes with locally-available materials and prepare village defenses, which was an acceptable approach in the resettlement areas chosen by the government.¹²³ They also provided their own security by joining the Tribal Police and Kikuyu Home Guard volunteers.¹²⁴ Eventually, the incorporation of schools, clinics, churches and

¹²¹Dow, *Nation Building*, p. 30.

¹²²Fred Majdalany, *State of Emergency: The Full Story of Mau Mau* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p. 209-210.

¹²³*Ibid.*, p. 210-211. Each new village cost the colonial government a mere 50 pounds sterling (about US\$120).

¹²⁴General Erskine felt the village self-defense forces were critical, saying: "It would have been impossible to have achieved villages without the Home Guard." In the second half of 1954, he committed over half of his regular military forces to raising and training Home Guard units in camps and rural areas. Led by whites, the Guard often included former Mau Mau combatants. Otto Heilbrunn, *Partisan Warfare* (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1962), p. 154; and Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, p. 135.

government welfare projects into the villages helped speed the program along. When villagization was considered complete in late 1954, about 1,000,000 Kikuyu -- two-thirds of the entire tribe -- had been resettled.¹²⁵

To complement the villagization plan to isolate the Mau Mau guerrillas, a "food denial" program was initiated, and military engineers constructed a mile-wide, fifty-mile-long booby-trapped barrier strip between the Aberdares mountains and Nairobi, from where the Mau Mau drew much of their material support. The Mau Mau were forced to move out of their forested tribal lands to gather food, and the British security forces were able to anticipate what sources they would seek out. The British laid ambushes for them, capturing and killing the rebels in increasing numbers. The Mau Mau were losing their war for independence.

Although the State of Emergency was not lifted until 12 January 1960, the worst of the fighting ended with the capture, trial, and execution of Mau Mau commander Dedan Kimathi in October 1956. This allowed the government to follow up on a 1955 pilot program aimed at relieving the economic distress caused by the displacement of the huge labor force the Kikuyu provided away from the farmlands around the Aberdares region. The "Return of Kikuyu" scheme used the screening camps, established in Kikuyu territory by the British security forces to process and interrogate Mau Mau suspects, as employment centers where control of the populace could still be maintained.¹²⁶ This reconstitution effort was successful in bolstering the area's economy and re-establishing normalcy in Kenya.

¹²⁵Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Walker and Co., 1967), p. 100.

¹²⁶Furedi, *Mau Mau War in Perspective*, p. 156-157.

It is difficult to determine what effect the free press had on the overall resettlement program, although it is apparent the program caused resentment and hardship in the affected native population. It is possible that the general war in Korea and the much larger and more threatening insurgency in Malaya (due to its overt communist affiliation) drew the media's attention away from Kenya. It is also likely that the press tacitly sided with the white settlers, who helped document the ghastly Mau Mau torture-murders of their fellows in widely-publicized photographs. This "trademark" of rebel operations cost the Mau Mau whatever international support they might have garnered as an anti-colonial independence movement. The media and British Parliament did, however, direct considerable attention at the Kenyan police "detainee camps," where Mau Mau suspects were sometimes badly mistreated. These investigations were consistent with the British emphasis on compliance with the law to overcome the guerrillas.

The white civilian community often interfered with the government's efforts to end the war by negotiation, at one point recommending that the government "step aside" and let them conduct their own anti-Mau Mau campaign without restraint. Despite this hubris, it must be noted that only thirty-two white settlers were killed during the Emergency, as compared to 11,503 insurgents, not counting 1,015 executed for capital crimes. The Mau Mau killed 1,817 black non-combatants who had been loyal to the government.¹²⁷

The contribution of villagization to the destruction of the Mau Mau is clearly positive and significant. From its beginning, the revolt was not thought to have much chance for success, owing to its limited base of support, isolation to a

¹²⁷The British and Kenyan Security Forces suffered 524 black, 63 white, and 3 Asian troops killed in combat. Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Operations*, p. 104.

single geographic area, and exclusive nature of its membership (confined to a single, identifiable tribe). Nonetheless, the calculated implementation of a controlled depopulation program, with an equally strict re-population plan, integrated into a coordinated national strategy, accelerated the Mau Mau defeat and strengthened British credibility in counter-insurgent warfare.

The British, however, were politically and culturally inclined to combine the concept of resettlement with meticulous planning, execution, and follow-through programs. This included Britain's eventual granting of independence to Kenya in 1963. Resettlement, like counter-insurgency, requires patient, methodical application. Governments like France or the Republic of Vietnam, less dedicated to the primacy of law than the British, would predictably experience less success in its practice.

The Algerian Insurrection

1954 - 1961

The French first invaded and conquered the Berbers along the "Barbary Coast" of Algeria in 1830. By about 1857 they completed the subjugation and annexation of most of the country, and by 1881 Algeria was considered "pacified" and made a protectorate. The rich northern agricultural regions were colonized by French Europeans known as *colons*.¹²⁸

An imbalance of wealth developed over the next several decades, unaltered by Algeria's incorporation as a province into Metropolitan France in 1870, undeterred by a campaign to "assimilate" Berbers into the French population, and

¹²⁸The common slang term for *colon* was *pied noir* ("black foot"), thought to be a reference to the original colonists' and French soldiers' black boots.

accelerated by France's "free colonization" policy in 1900.¹²⁹ By 1954, the *colons*, numbering just over one-tenth of a total population of 9,500,000, controlled forty percent of Algeria's arable land, and ninety percent of the industry.¹³⁰

French-educated Muslims and former Muslim officers of the French Army began to form nationalist groups in the 1920's, strongly opposed by the *colons*. In response to a bloody Muslim riot on 8 May 1945 ("V-E" Day), the European community, with the full support of the provincial government and police, conducted a violent repression that massacred some 4,000 Muslims in Algiers,¹³¹ and an estimated 20,000 nation-wide. Algeria was once again "pacified," but insurgent organizations continued their incipient organizational and planning activities.

In March 1954, a number of these groups met in Berne, Switzerland, and allied themselves into the *Comite Revolutionnaire d'Unite et d'Action* (Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action, or CRUA), which shortly re-titled itself the *Front de Liberation Nationale* (National Liberation Front, or FLN). The occasion for the change in name was its declaration of open warfare against the ruling government on 1 November 1954.¹³²

The FLN was comprised of two elements. The External Delegation, based in Cairo and chaired by Mohammed Ben Bella, the leader of the FLN, was

¹²⁹Some accounts set this date as 1848, but the original declaration was repealed, and policies changed back and forth until 1870.

¹³⁰1951 per capita income for two-thirds of all Muslims was US\$45; for *colons* it was US\$240 - US\$3,000. Joan Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution* (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1960), p. 34.

¹³¹Jurcidini, *Casebook*, p. 237, Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, vol. 2, p. 908.

¹³²Thompson, *War in Peace*, p. 121.

responsible for political guidance and direction, weapons and material procurement, and foreign relations. The Internal Delegation based inside Algeria had no centralized leadership; command was shared among six *willaya* (district) chiefs. Poor coordination and lack of a unified effort was the predictable result.

In particular, the 2,000-3,000 FLN combatants found difficulty expanding their "mass base" and gaining support from the Muslim population. This exposed them to French counter-action and attendant high losses until 1956, when Ramdane Abbane re-organized the Internal Delegation into a military wing -- the *Armee de Liberation Nationale* (Army of National Liberation, or ALN) -- and a political wing -- the *Organisation Politico-Administrative* (Politico-Administrative Organization, or OPA).¹³³ The near-term result was a much more effective and successful insurgent force.

Although the 1954 FLN guerrilla offensive -- mostly attacks against remote *gendarmerie* (constabulary) posts -- was a surprise to the French government and military (as well as the general Muslim population), the response was strong and unrestrained. The force of 50,000 French soldiers in Algeria grew to 400,000 by 1956. More importantly, they were officered by a tough corps of veterans of World War II and the Indochina War. Their defeat in Vietnam led to an introspective self-analysis that produced both a doctrine for fighting a counter-insurgency and a stern determination not to lose again.

This new doctrine of *la guerre revolutionnaire* (revolutionary warfare) embodied a philosophy of combined military-political operations as well as specific anti-guerrilla tactics. These included *quadrillage* (gridding), securing an area by a

¹³³U.K. British Army Staff College, *Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Handbook* (Camberly, U.K.: British Army Staff College, 1985), p. E-2.

network of garrisons with defined areas of responsibility; *bouclage* (cordonning), encircling guerrilla bands; and *ratissage* (raking), sweeping through encircled and gridded areas, not unlike the British "drives" against the Boers.¹³⁴

Among these tactics was the policy of *regroupement* (regrouping) of large segments of the civilian population to isolate the guerrillas from their base of support, and permit the army to fight unhindered by non-combatants. The French experience in regrouping extended as far back as 1793, when during the French Revolution, the First Republic's Army of the West directed the removal "from the insurgent territory all inhabitants who had not taken up arms, because some, under the guise of neutrality, favor the rebels (counter-revolutionaries) while the others, although loyal to the Republic, also provide assistance which they cannot refuse in the face of compulsion." More recently, the French Union Forces fighting in post-World War II Indochina had regrouped 600,000 Cambodian peasants in scattered villages near the Vietnamese border into "fortified hamlets," successfully interfering with Vietminh infiltration through the inter-border region.¹³⁵

Initially, as the Algerian Insurrection began, *regroupements* of Muslims were conducted only as local area commanders deemed necessary. By 1957, the Governor-General of Algeria, Robert Lacoste, and his military commander, General Raoul Salan, formalized the policy of *resserrement des populations* (literally, contraction/restriction of populations). It called for removal of Muslims from areas of FLN influence into zones under French control, education of the regrouped civilians in their duties as citizens of metropolitan France, training in self-defense

¹³⁴Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, vol. 2, p. 921.

¹³⁵Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine* (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1964), p. 43.

against the FLN rebels, and development of the new camps into economically productive villages.¹³⁶

To execute and oversee this ambitious plan, General Salan turned to the *Section Administrative Specialisee* (Specialized Administrative Section, or SAS). Chartered in 1954 by Governor-General Jacques Soustelle to address the lack of a viable French presence in the *bled* (open countryside) and other remote areas of Algeria, the SAS had their roots in the civil-military *Bureaux Arabes* (Arab Bureaus) that operated in Algeria in 1844.¹³⁷ Beginning in September 1955, approximately 660 of the small SAS detachments were formed and deployed in towns and villages throughout the country.¹³⁸

Led by an Arabic-speaking lieutenant or captain (the early units often included veterans of Morocco and the Sahara), the two-to-three man detachments, each including a civilian, were meant to perform governmental administrative, judicial, and social welfare duties.¹³⁹ The SAS was augmented by the *Cinquieme Bureau* (Fifth Bureau), the Psychological Warfare branch of the French Army, and following the Battle of Algiers in 1957, the *Section Administratives Urbaines* (Urban Administrative Section, or SAU). Even with this assistance, the SAS was overwhelmed by the scope of their *regroupement* mission, as evidenced by the conditions in the Moslem resettlement camps.

¹³⁶Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare*, p. 43-44.

¹³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 46.

¹³⁸Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, vol. 2, p. 925.

¹³⁹At the SAS's peak in 1959, the corps counted only 1,287 officers, 661 non-commissioned officers, and 2,921 civilian specialists. Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare*, p. 50.

Only two years after the war had begun and within months of the Governor-General's declaration of *resserrement*, 485,000 Moslems had been re-located, far faster than well-intentioned plans for the French Army to build new schools, clinics, and adequate housing could possibly be effected.¹⁴⁰ Camp conditions were reported by a French newspaper correspondent:

Crammed together in unbroken wretchedness, this human flotsam lies tangled in an indiscernible state. There are 1,800 children living at Bessombourg Milk is given out twice a week: one pint per child No rations of soap for a year¹⁴¹

French liberal activist Germaine Tillion, earlier recruited to advise the government on Muslim welfare issues, compared the situation to the brutal British displacement of French Acadians in Canada in the 1700's.¹⁴² The French camps were described as "clusters of sheet-metal shacks"¹⁴³ and "barbed-wire encampments, which often looked horrible like concentration camps,"¹⁴⁴ where inmate deaths from cold and hunger became commonplace.

Numerous stories of SAS dedication to and sacrifice for their Muslim charges are documented. Nonetheless, their *kepis bleus* (blue kepis, the traditional

¹⁴⁰Edgar O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-1962* (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1967), p. 132.

¹⁴¹Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace* (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books Ltd., 1977), p. 221.

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 221.

¹⁴³John J. McCuen, *The Art of Revolutionary War: A Psycho-Political-Military Strategy of Counter-insurgency* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1966), p. 63.

¹⁴⁴Horne, *Savage War*, p. 220.

uniform headwear) were a physical reminder that the SAS still represented a colonial-minded regime that in spite of political declarations, viewed the Muslim as a second-class citizen.

The combined shortfalls in properly trained personnel for the SAS, and resources needed to build and maintain the camps in accordance with the ideal concept of *regroupement* resulted in the failure of the French government to meet its objective of protecting and mobilizing the population against the FLN. Further, the central issue of popular discontent -- inequitable wealth distribution -- could have been resolved by uniting *regroupement* with land reform, but this was never permitted by the *colons*. If anything, the removal of the Muslim Berbers from the context of their antiquated and isolationist tribal structure into the harsh, alien environment of the internment camps only served to inculcate a sense of nationalism in the populace.¹⁴⁵

Despite the "bad press" and lack of Muslim support, the French government in Algeria stuck with the *regroupement* program. Integrated into an energetic national counter-insurgency campaign that included extensive use of helicopters and sealing the border with Tunisia, it helped force the FLN to the verge of military defeat. This near-victory on the battlefield was in contrast to the almost complete loss of public support for the war in metropolitan France.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵Horne, *Savage War*, p. 221.

¹⁴⁶One indication of this was the official designation of the action in Algeria as a "maintenance of order," not a military campaign. Soldiers in Algeria were not eligible for wartime medals for heroism, despite 11,490 French combat deaths there.

International pressure brought on by French "excesses" in Algeria, including torture of prisoners, further negated this military advantage.¹⁴⁷

In the end, the contributions of population regrouping to military success in Algeria were made irrelevant by the FLN propaganda triumph in the world media. The newspaper stories of the cruel treatment of Muslims in the camps, and the shocking civilian death toll of at least 300,000, many of those from the deprivations of camp life, wiped out all the gains made in tactical anti-guerrilla operations in the field.¹⁴⁸ The forced resettlement of 1,800,000 Muslims -- over 20% of the total Muslim population of Algeria -- seems to have helped win a few battles, while contributing to the loss of the war.¹⁴⁹

Presented with a favorable military outcome tied to a political disaster in Algeria, France's Prime Minister, General Charles de Gaulle, took bold steps to terminate the conflict. He called for an "Algerian Algeria," overcame a French military mutiny during the peace negotiations, and on 19 March 1962 established a cease-fire that was soon followed by Algerian independence.

It was the end of sixteen years of colonial wars for France. The many lessons learned in counter-insurgency warfare, not the least of them concerning population *regroupement* and the paradox that "what was good militarily can be bad politically, and *vice versa*," were to be lost on the Americans.¹⁵⁰ As the United

¹⁴⁷In the United States, support in the U.S. Senate for Algerian independence from France was led by Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts.

¹⁴⁸Horne, *Savage War*, p. 538.

¹⁴⁹O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, p. 137, 200.

¹⁵⁰Horne, *Savage War*, p. 221. In a 1962 speech, U.S. Army Chief of Staff (and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) General Earle G. Wheeler announced, "It is fashionable in some quarters to say that the problems in southeast Asia are primarily political and economic, rather than

States became more deeply involved in the new Indochina war, the previous French experience there and in Algeria was discounted because it was perceived the French "lost" both times. Instead, the Americans would attempt to replicate in Vietnam the British counter-insurgency conducted in Malaya, focusing on the few similarities and ignoring the critical differences between the two countries and conflicts.

The Second Indochina War

(The Vietnam War)

The Diem Years, 1954 - 1963

Even before the French withdrew from their former colonies in Indochina after their defeat at Dienbienphu in 1954, the United States was advancing to take their place in what was perceived as the front line of defense against the advance of world communism. The Indochina conflict had been viewed as linked to the Korean war, and prompted increased U.S. support to France, as well as Formosa and the Philippines. A U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) had already been established in Saigon in 1950, and U.S. aid to the French leapt from US\$10,000,000 that year to US\$1,063,000,000 annually by the time of the Geneva Conference cease-fire four years later.¹⁵¹

The Geneva treaty divided Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel into a northern zone, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, and a southern zone, where American influence was strong. French neglect of any long-term effort to educate and train selected native Vietnamese in mid-and high-level public administration

military. I do not agree. The essence of the problem in Vietnam is military." Earle G. Wheeler, "The Design of Military Power," *Military Review*, XLIII/2 (February 1963): p. 20.

¹⁵¹Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 4. In 1954, the U.S. was footing 78% of the bill for France's war in Indochina.

became painfully evident when the French departed. The only non-communist Vietnamese deemed somewhat capable of national leadership was Ngo Dinh Diem, who was recalled from self-imposed exile at a seminary in the United States to become South Vietnam's prime minister. The incompetence and indifference of the technically unqualified government administrator, mostly appointed on the basis of political cronyism, widened the chasm that already existed between the rulers and the ruled in the new Republic of Vietnam.

The partition caused the migration of about 900,000 mostly Catholic Vietnamese Northerners to the south where Diem, a Catholic himself, was in charge.¹⁵² Although 80,000 to 100,000 Viet Minh troops and supporters relocated to the north, several thousand Viet Minh remained behind to establish a clandestine political and military infrastructure for a future insurgency. Further, the immigrants to the north with family ties in the south were subsequently re-trained and sent back to join the "stay-behind" cadres in their work.

Despite harsh punitive measures in the south, the Viet Minh survived and benefitted from Diem's indiscriminate repression, as victims of the government's brutal policies joined the ranks of the opposition. The armed Viet Minh insurgents, now labeled Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communists, or VC) by the South Vietnamese government, numbered about 5,000 by 1959.¹⁵³

The rapid withdrawal of the French from Vietnam, in large part driven by the need for resources to combat a new colonial insurgency in French Algeria, left the United States fully in charge of the situation there by early 1956. The U.S.

¹⁵²William E. Colby, *Lost Victories* (Chicago: Contemporary Books, Inc., 1989), p. 93.

¹⁵³U.S. Center of Military History, *American Military History* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1989), p. 627.

MAAG undertook in earnest the training of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), keying on Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' insistence that the first step in ensuring a stable South Vietnamese government was the establishment of a strong, modern army. This attitude was reflected in the disproportionate share of military aid (as opposed to economic support) sent to South Vietnam from 1955 to 1961 -- over seventy-eight percent of the total assistance package.¹⁵⁴ The U.S. MAAG, supposedly constrained by the Geneva Accords to 342 personnel, became 692 strong by 1956.¹⁵⁵ That number climbed to 875 in 1960, and only two years later, vaulted to 11,326 military personnel.¹⁵⁶

This influx included Colonel Edward G. Lansdale who arrived in 1954, fresh from the successful counterinsurgency against the Hukbalahap insurrectionists in the Philippines.¹⁵⁷ Seeking to re-create the close relationship he had enjoyed there with Minister of Defense Ramon Magsaysay,¹⁵⁸ Lansdale immediately ingratiated himself with South Vietnamese Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem by discovering and thwarting a coup against him. Diem quickly accepted the colonel as a trusted personal adviser, and Lansdale moved to repeat his previous success in the

¹⁵⁴George C. Herring, *America's Longest War* (New York: Newberry Awards Records, Inc., 1979), p. 57.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 57.

¹⁵⁶Lewy, *American in Vietnam*, p. 24.

¹⁵⁷Several of Lansdale's fellow veterans of the Hukbalahap Rebellion joined him in Vietnam. Notable among them was Lieutenant Colonel Charles T.R. Bohannon, co-author of the 1962 *Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience*, who advised the U.S. Operations Mission's Rural Affairs Section in Saigon.

¹⁵⁸In the Philippines government, the Minister of Defense was (and still is) second in order of succession behind the President.

Philippines. Among his suggestions was an integrated "pacification program."¹⁵⁹ Lansdale soon noted that quite unlike Magsaysay, Diem lacked an understanding of his own nation's people, and took a flawed approach to instilling government influence in the countryside. Diem displaced the existing village-level leaders, selected by a traditional system of self-government, with non-native political appointees, serving to alienate the local populace from the government.¹⁶⁰

In 1959, several years after Lansdale's departure, Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu launched two nearly concurrent multi-purpose population resettlement efforts. Nhu had visited Malaya and become aware of the British "New Village" resettlements, and conceived his own versions. The first project was the "Agglomeration Center Plan," aimed at concentrating Viet Cong families into *Qui Khu* villages (where they could be controlled), and loyal government families into *Qui Ap* villages (where they could be protected). No consideration was given to any social or economic ramifications of the directed resettlements; moreover, it was left to local officials to determine what criteria determined who was pro-government and who was Viet Cong. This lent itself to abuses and led to a rapid failure.¹⁶¹

The second project was planned and developed in 1959 while the Agglomeration Center scheme was still being attempted. Called in Vietnamese *Khu Tru Mat* (literally, Prosperous Dense Center; sometimes rendered as Closer Settlement Area) and in French *Agrovilles* (roughly, Rural City, a term previously

¹⁵⁹Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, p. 216.

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*, p. 356.

¹⁶¹Joseph J. Zasloff, "Rural Resettlement in South Viet Nam: The Agrovillage Program," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXV/4 (Winter 1962-63): p. 329-331.

used by the French during their failed pacification programs). It was officially launched by ministerial decree on 26 February 1960.¹⁶²

Diem told his subordinates: "The *agroville* [has] two purposes: first, to bring government benefits to the people, and second, to provide a strategic barrier on the Cambodian border to prevent communist infiltration."¹⁶³ Under this guise, Nhu directed subordinate province chiefs to collect and relocate "politically unreliable" families. The twenty-three new *agrovilles* soon had a population of about 43,000 re-settled peasant farmers.¹⁶⁴

As peasants were resettled into the *agrovilles*, limited construction was begun on clinics, schools, and market centers, but the entire project quickly and completely failed. Communal duties were viewed as forced labor, and the seemingly benevolent opportunity provided to purchase an exemption from such work (equalling about a week's wages) was seen as another government tax.¹⁶⁵ Besides poor planning and improper site location of the new settlements (despite the intended goal of "increased efficiency") and interference from the Viet Cong, no psychological operations campaign preceded or accompanied the program, and the population gave no support to the project.¹⁶⁶ Plans to re-locate 150,000 additional

¹⁶²Dow, *Nation Building*, p. 154.

¹⁶³Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 53. Diem or Nhu may have recalled the French *regroupement* of scattered peasant villages in Cambodia to bar Viet Minh infiltration only ten years earlier. Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare*, p. 43.

¹⁶⁴Dennis J. Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 261-262.

¹⁶⁵Race, *Long An*, p. 69.

¹⁶⁶Colby, *Lost Victory*, p. 70-71.

peasants were cancelled. Nhu later claimed he had disapproved of the *agroville* concept.¹⁶⁷

To preempt Viet Cong incursion into and control of the Vietnamese highland tribes,¹⁶⁸ in 1961 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representatives on the U.S. Mission in Saigon recommended a village self-defense scheme. Started in December 1961 in the community of Buon Enao, which was peopled by the semi-nomadic Rhade tribe, the project proposed to develop "Citizens' Irregular Defense Groups"¹⁶⁹ (CIDG's) from the village level up.

It deliberately excluded the U.S. MAAG and Republic of Vietnam government, instead involving the CIA (for oversight), the U.S. Agency for International Development (for material resources), and U.S. Army Special Forces (for paramilitary training).¹⁷⁰ This plan was unique for the absence of any provision for resettlement or relocation of the native population, resembling in that regard the Malayan Jungle Forts.¹⁷¹

Responding to the villagers' desires and requirements for improved medical and educational support, the CIDG program also trained and re-armed the Rhade, whose crossbows had been confiscated by the Vietnamese government in the

¹⁶⁷Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Vietnam*, p. 262.

¹⁶⁸Collectively referred to by the French term *montagnards* (highlanders).

¹⁶⁹The organization's title changed from "Citizens" to "Civilian Irregular Defense Groups" when it was later incorporated into the Strategic Hamlet Program.

¹⁷⁰A twelve-man U.S. Special Forces team arrived in Buon Enao on 12 February 1962, diverted from a planned mission to Laos. Initially, they wore only civilian clothes, and had no contact with regular ARVN units. Shelby Stanton, *Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1975* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1985), p. 41.

¹⁷¹Colby, *Lost Victory*, p. 89-91.

late 1950's. Their "legal" but ineffective bamboo spears were replaced with U.S. small arms. This pleased the Rhade, whose culture held weapons as important status symbols, and made self-defense against Viet Cong infiltration a reality. Attendant services included vocational training in farming, animal husbandry, blacksmithing, and carpentry. The Buon Enao experiment spread to forty other villages by April 1962, and was expanded to two hundred villages by October the same year. The CIDG effort was clearly succeeding.¹⁷²

The progress of the program was contingent on a measured, two-way effort. The villagers had to participate in self-help and self-defense training to receive aid and weapons, and the resources and benefits of the program had to be forthcoming before the villagers would swear loyalty to the South Vietnamese government. Patience, thoroughness, and implementation in a province where the Viet Cong were not well established were critical to the success of the experiment.

The forced resettlement concept was revived with the arrival of the six-man British Advisory Mission in September 1961. It was headed by the Federation of Malaya's Secretary of Defense, Robert K.G. Thompson, who had been invited by Diem to contribute his experience and expertise to the Vietnamese insurgency problem. Thompson found a receptive audience in Nhu for his idea of concentration of the rural population into defended villages to isolate the Viet Cong guerrillas from the peasant farmers who were their source of logistical support. On 3 February 1962, barely three months after Thompson's arrival, Nhu announced the ministerial decree that established the "Strategic Hamlet Program."¹⁷³

¹⁷²Francis J. Kelly, *U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 24-27.

¹⁷³Dow, *Nation Building*, p. 156. The origin of the term "strategic hamlet" is uncertain. Neither Sir Robert Thompson, Edward Lansdale, nor William Colby claim or suggest authorship. The

The program's goals were ambitious and historically unprecedented: In fourteen months, 14,000 of South Vietnam's estimated 16,000 hamlets were to be rebuilt into fortified Strategic Hamlets.¹⁷⁴ Thompson, whose own estimates considered only 11,000 Strategic Hamlets, projected minimal impact on the national population in terms of the distances they would be moved to new settlements:

[A]bout 50 per cent would require only minor regrouping, i.e. the relocation of only a few scattered houses nearer to the centre of the hamlet; . . . about 30 per cent would require major regrouping, i.e. about half the houses would have to be regrouped; . . . about 15 per cent would have to be completely regrouped, i.e. considerably more than half of the houses would have to be relocated; . . . the remaining 5 per cent might have to be moved to completely new sites [A]ny householder should [not] be relocated more than . . . a maximum of three miles. Only . . . the remaining 5 per cent . . . [will] entail loss of land.¹⁷⁵

The CIA's William Colby, an adviser to Nhu, differed with Thompson over several aspects of his suggested plan. General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, disliked the primacy of police forces, a major element of the Malayan war.¹⁷⁶ The U.S. MAAG chief thought the plan lacked "offensive

term appears in an essay, *Strategic Hamlets in South Viet-Nam*, written by Milton E. Osborne of Cornell University in 1956. It was used in the summer of 1961 in official reference to several villages in Vinh Long province turned into armed camps by another invention of Nhu's, the anti-communist "Republican Youth." In contrast to the Viet Cong-controlled *xa chien dau* (defensive villages), Nhu encouraged the supposedly counter-active *ap chien luoc* (strategic hamlet). Duncanson, *Government and Revolution*, p. 314-316.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., p. 316.

¹⁷⁵Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, p. 122.

¹⁷⁶Colby, *Lost Victory*, p. 98-99.

spirit."¹⁷⁷ Nonetheless, even though the Strategic Hamlet Program was drawn up without official U.S. input, the MAAG saw it as complementary to their own pacification plan, the "Geographically Phased National Level Operation Plan for Counterinsurgency" published in September 1961. Nhu's design also reflected the MAAG's optimistic assessment that the insurgency could be defeated in less than three years.¹⁷⁸ Thompson made a few modifications, and by January 1962 all parties approved of and lent their support to the overall campaign.

Although population resettlement and creation of new, secure communities was closely associated with the British victory over the communist insurgents in Malaya, the fundamental differences in the nature of the terrain and the scale of the problem seems to have impressed no one at the time, judging by contemporary literature. In Malaya, the Chinese squatter camps set up in jungle clearings were almost the sole source of food for the guerrillas; elimination of these small farms by removing the squatters caused starvation in the insurgent ranks. Further, the 500,000 squatters represented less than 6% of all Malayan inhabitants.¹⁷⁹

Vietnam, by contrast, was agriculturally rich, and food was relatively plentiful; shifting farmers around would not change this. The numbers Nhu proposed to move would effect, if not actually relocate, 88% of the rural populace of the country. This constituted a requirement to build new towns, schools, clinics,

¹⁷⁷Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 67.

¹⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁷⁹Bernald Fall, *The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis* (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1966), p. 376.

utilities, and a transportation network for 10,000,000 people in only fourteen months.¹⁸⁰

These dissimilarities, whether recognized or not, could still have been secondary considerations if the Strategic Hamlet Program provided the security to the natives they would require to spurn Viet Cong pressure for collaboration. This was not the case.

The execution of the Strategic Hamlet Program was flawed from its inception. As Thompson himself was later to criticize, Nhu's emphasis on the dominant role of his pet Republican Youth movement caused severe friction with hamlet elders, the traditional community leaders in Vietnam.¹⁸¹ The South Vietnamese government attempted to impose and demand political loyalty (as they had since the Geneva Accords) instead of building it at the grass-roots level, as the Buon Enao experiment was doing. Most critically, the fortification of villages could not separate the Viet Cong from the populace if the Viet Cong had already established their underground political infrastructure inside the villages -- as they had done in most cases. When this error was eventually realized, neither Diem nor Nhu took action to attack these Viet Cong cadres through special security measures. Combined with the unreasonably hasty Strategic Hamlet construction timetable, these oversights doomed the program.

¹⁸⁰This huge number was not a secret nor an oversight. In a speech to the South Vietnamese National Assembly on 1 October 1962, Diem declared "... by the end of 1962, 9,253,000 persons, or two-thirds of the population, will live [in strategic hamlets]." Fall, *Two Viet-Nams*, p. 376.

¹⁸¹Duncanson, *Government and Revolution*, p. 315. Nhu's experimental *Thanh Nien Cong Hoa* (Republican Youth) was "a uniformed organ for enrolling young men . . . for any purpose for which organization and discipline were required . . ." Their duties included determining and reporting the political persuasion of each family in their respective hamlets.

Restrictions and prerequisites recommended by Thompson, such as limits on hamlet distances from family lands and avoidance of Viet Cong strongholds, were disregarded by Nhu in his rush to stay on his impossible schedule. Diem and Nhu's American supporters only exacerbated an already bad situation. General Paul Harkins, commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command - Vietnam (MACV) issued statements corroborating Diem's reports alleging successful growth of the Strategic Hamlet Program as correct.¹⁸²

American media reports told a different story. A reporter from the *Wall Street Journal* compared a hamlet he visited to a "prison camp," prompting the South Vietnamese Government Information Office to brand journalists -- "particularly American journalists" -- as either wicked or naive.¹⁸³ A *Time* Magazine correspondent's story that the South Vietnamese government relocated 140 families into the Ben-Tuong hamlet "at gunpoint" was challenged and contested by MACV. One senior advisor, a colonel, touted the Strategic Hamlet Program as an "unprecedented success" and reported that the press, not the Viet Cong, was the "major problem area" in his corps tactical zone.¹⁸⁴

Colby surrendered the CIA experiments to the Strategic Hamlet Program against the advice of his staff, rationalizing that the Vietnamese-run Program "could become the much-needed fundamental strategy of the Diem Government to fight

¹⁸²Krepinevich, *Army and Vietnam*, p. 82. Harkins publicly stated, "I am an optimist, and I am not going to allow my staff to be pessimistic." Karnow, *Vietnam: A History*, p. 258.

¹⁸³Fall, *Two Viet-Nams*, p. 380.

¹⁸⁴Krepinevich, *Army in Vietnam*, p. 82. The American media championed several field advisers and staff officers who voiced dissent with the official MACV stance, but the Program continued unabated. See Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie* (New York: Random House, 1988) and David Halberstram, *The Making of a Quagmire* (New York: Random House, 1965).

the people's war it faced."¹⁸⁵ This marked the beginning of the collapse of the Buon Enao operation, as the U.S. Army Special Forces turned the villages over to their Vietnamese counterparts. The ethnic Vietnamese *Lac Luong Dac Biet* (Vietnamese Special Forces, or LLDB) thought of the *montagnards* as *moi* (savages). They disarmed the citizen militias and attempted to integrate the native mobile strike forces, once reinforcements for the now-weaponless village self-defense groups, into regular "low-land" Vietnamese Army units. A blunt report by the U.S. 5th Special Forces Group summarized: "By the end of 1963, the Buon Enao complex was disorganized and most of its effectiveness had been lost."¹⁸⁶

The Viet Cong response to the Strategic Hamlet Program indicates that they recognized the project's potential to disrupt and help defeat their operations. During the *agrovillage* effort, peasant farmers walking to their distant fields were intercepted and stopped by the Viet Cong, admonished, and ordered home.¹⁸⁷ Admonishment was later replaced with much harsher measures against the peasantry, and the Viet Cong made an "intense . . . effort to demonstrate in every conceivable way that [the Strategic Hamlet Program] . . . was unnecessary and detrimental."¹⁸⁸ Direct military attacks were made against the settlements, and by

¹⁸⁵Colby, *Lost Victory*, p. 101.

¹⁸⁶Kelly, *Special Forces*, p. 41-42. This event also marked a major change in the U.S. Special Forces role in Vietnam, from counter-insurgency under CIA direction, to support of conventional operations under MACV command, although Special Forces still maintained its close alliance with the indigenous populations.

¹⁸⁷Race, *Long An*, p. 173.

¹⁸⁸Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1966), p. 68.

early 1963, annihilation of the Strategic Hamlet Program was the Viet Cong's highest priority.¹⁸⁹

Another clear signal of the danger posed to the Viet Cong by a national network of well-run fortified villages is revealed in the efforts of a Viet Cong "mole" to deliberately de-rail the Program. Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao, Nhu's deputy in the Strategic Hamlet program, was actually a secret communist operative. He encouraged the overly-rapid schedule that he knew would lead the project to its self-destruction, with Nhu's complete and unwitting support.¹⁹⁰

Diem's overthrow and subsequent assassination along with his brother Nhu on 1 November 1963 brought the curtain down on the Strategic Hamlet Program. The new *junta* of generals who had carried out the coup had no illusions about the counterproductive nature of the project, and despite Colby's urgings, terminated all Vietnamese government support.¹⁹¹ MACV's subsequent attempts to resuscitate the Program under the title "New Life Hamlets" brought little positive result. The legacy of the fractured and failed Strategic Hamlet Program was 4,000,000 refugees, and the economic, military, and political problems they presented.

At the village level, where resettlement programs ultimately succeed or fail, classic errors were repeated to the demise of the overall effort. Promises not to move the peasantry away from sacred ancestral lands were broken, land reform was not initiated, and obvious basic material and moral requirements to demonstrate the

¹⁸⁹Gabriel Kolko, *Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), p. 133; Colby, *Lost Victory*, p. 102.

¹⁹⁰Stanly Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 257.

¹⁹¹Colby, *Lost Victory*, p. 103.

government's concern for its citizens' welfare were ignored. On a grander scale, the program was ill-conceived. Adapted from the Malayan model to a significantly dissimilar terrain, population, leadership, and enemy, the concept was inappropriate to the situation in South Vietnam.

Almost desperate to make progress against the Viet Cong guerrillas, the U.S. Mission ignored its own bank of experience from Greece and the Philippines. It did not seriously challenge the obviously weak plan or its improper execution, despite warnings from its own civilian and military staff and accusations from the American press that the program was a "sham."¹⁹² A 1964 U.S. Agency for International Development report reveals the Program's faults were actually widely recognized since its start:

From the very inception it was apparent that many of the provincial officials did not fully understand the concept and were so frightened by the pressures from the president and his brother that they would employ any measures from forced labor and confiscation to false reporting, to achieve the quantitative goals set.¹⁹³

Many analysts submit that a well-planned and resourced Strategic Hamlet project held the single greatest hope for defeat of the insurgency.¹⁹⁴ A telling encapsulation of the many causes for the failure of the attempted program was related by Thompson himself, who confronted Diem at one point over the establishment of several Strategic Hamlets in a province of little importance that

¹⁹²Herring, *America's Longest War*, p. 92.

¹⁹³Halberstram, *The Making of a Quagmire*, p. 186-187.

¹⁹⁴Robert K.G. Thompson, *No Exit From Vietnam* (New York: David McKay Company, 1969), p. 170.

would drain limited resources away from areas of higher priority. Diem did not address Thompson's concerns, but stood by his decision, ending the discussion simply: "It makes the Americans happy, and it does not worry either me or the Viet Cong."¹⁹⁵ That Diem made no mention of the "center of gravity" of the Program and the entire war -- the Vietnamese people -- indicates he was also ignorant of the Vietnamese proverb: "Royal decrees cannot pass over village rules."¹⁹⁶

The Portuguese Colonial War in Africa

1961 - 1975

Portugal was first among the European nations to establish colonies in Africa in the mid-fifteenth century and the last to withdraw in 1975. From their inception, these colonial holdings provided their exports to fund further Portuguese imperial expansion around the world and maintain Portugal's prestige and economic viability.

The Portuguese claimed that, in turn, they imported their European culture to help "civilize" Portuguese Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique. Yet in 1961, after almost five hundred years of colonial rule, not a single university existed¹⁹⁷ for a Portuguese African population of approximately 12,000,000.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, p. 129.

¹⁹⁶J.L. Finkle and Tran Van Dinh, *Provincial Government in Viet Nam, A Study of Vinh Long Province, Report No. 4, Local Administration Series* (Saigon: Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, August 1961), p. 78.

¹⁹⁷Antonio Henrique de Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 256.

¹⁹⁸Thomas H. Henriksen, "Lessons from Portugal's Counter-insurgency Operations in Africa," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies* (June 1978): p. 33.

Further indication of the resentment of the *indigenas* (black native-born inhabitants) toward Portuguese rule was the record of military expeditions sent from Lisbon to deal with local rebellions that colonial forces could not suppress -- seven to Angola alone, in 1820, 1836, 1860, 1873, 1902, 1914, and 1930.¹⁹⁹

In 1933, Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar (who was to remain in power until 1968) wrote the policy of "Racial Assimilation" into the new constitution, and in 1951 the colonies were given the status of "overseas provinces" with seats in the National Assembly in Lisbon.²⁰⁰ These actions were deceptive. Slavery, abolished in 1878, had actually been replaced by a system of low-wage "contract labor" that was equally repressive and actually became more extensive as the demand for export crops grew.²⁰¹

Salazar's 1933 constitution, rather than eliminating societal classes, actually created new ones. In order to attain the citizenship category of *assimilado* (assimilated African), and gain the right to vote and unrestricted travel, and be exempt from the pass card and "contract labor" systems, it was necessary to meet very stringent requirements. These included the ability to speak Portuguese, have income from a job, and be over 18 years of age and of "good character."²⁰² This was almost impossible for the majority of *indigenas*, and favored only a few *mestizos*

¹⁹⁹Douglas L. Wheeler, "The Portuguese Army in Angola," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* VII/3 (1969): p. 428.

²⁰⁰Ian F.W. Beckett, "Portuguese Africa," in *War in Peace*, p. 152.

²⁰¹*Ibid.*, p. 152.

²⁰²Donald J. Alberts, "Armed Struggle in Angola," in *Insurgency in the Modern World*, eds. Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 237.

(half-castes); by 1961, only 1% of all *indigenas* had gained *assimilado* status.²⁰³ At any rate, the *noa indigenas* (non-native white Europeans) and to a lesser extent the *mesticos* still enjoyed special privileges well above those of the *assimilados*.

Exacerbating this social stratification of "haves" and "have-nots" was the tide of nationalism that swept across Africa as World War II ended, as France, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Great Britain began to let go of their far-flung colonial possessions. The Philippines, India, Burma, Malaysia gained independence in the late 'forties; Guinea, Ghana, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, and Sudan in the 'fifties; and in 1960 alone, sixteen former African colonies and territories became sovereign nations. Notably, directly on Angola's eastern border, the Belgian Congo emerged as the free state of Zaire.²⁰⁴

These events had a serious impact in Portugal's "overseas provinces." Native "independence movements" and "freedom parties" formed in the late 'fifties, and armed revolt began in Angola in 1961, followed by Portuguese Guinea in 1963 and Mozambique in 1964. Rather than follow the lead of the other former imperial powers in Europe, Portugal sought to retain her colonial possessions for reasons of imagined international prestige and economic necessity.

On 15 March 1961, a revolt on the northern Angolan coffee plantations left several hundred *colonos* (white farmers) and some 7,000 *indigenas* dead at the hands of Bakongo rebels based out of the Congo (formerly Congo-Brazzaville).²⁰⁵ Insurgent Mbundu and Luandan *assimilados* in Angola formed the *Movimento*

²⁰³Beckett, "Portuguese Africa," p. 152.

²⁰⁴Regine Van Chi-Bonnardel, ed. *The Atlas of Africa* (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 52.

²⁰⁵Beckett, "Portuguese Africa," p. 153.

Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola or MPCA); the northern Bakongos were the "mass base" of the rebel *Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola* (National Front for the Liberation of Angola, or FNLA). In 1964, Jonas Savimbi broke with FNLA's chief, Holden Roberto, to lead the *Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola* (National Union for Total Angolan Independence, or UNITA), supported by the eastern Angolan Chokwes and southern Angolan Orimbundus.²⁰⁶

During a violent 1959 strike in Bissau, Portuguese Guinea, Portuguese police shot and killed fifty *indigenas*, which led to full-scale guerrilla war in January 1963. The *Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde* (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde, or PAIGC), drawing their rank-and-file personnel primarily from the Balante tribe, launched raids from sanctuaries in the neighboring Republic of Guinea, and later from Senegal.²⁰⁷ The Mandinkas and Moslem Fulas continued to support the Portuguese.

In northern Mozambique, a coalition of tribal groups, including the Makonde and Nyanja, was formed in 1962. The *Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique* (Mozambique Liberation Front, or FRELIMO) based itself initially in Tanzania and began raids from there on 25 September 1964, later extending their

²⁰⁶Ian F.W. Beckett, "The Portuguese Army: The Campaign in Mozambique, 1964-1974," chap. in *Armed Forces & Modern Counter-Insurgency*, eds. Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 138; and "Portuguese Africa," p. 153.

²⁰⁷Thomas H. Henricksen, "Portugal in Africa: Comparative Notes on Counterinsurgency," *Orbis* XXI/2 (Summer 1977), p. 396-397.

network of bases into Zambia.²⁰⁸ The Portuguese were able to count on the Moslem Macuas to help counter the insurgents.²⁰⁹

Portuguese reaction was strong, but not decisive. The metropolitan army had not fought a general conflict since World War I, and its garrison at the Portuguese colony of Goa had been quickly captured on 18 December 1961 by the Indian Army (following Prime Minister Salazar's refusal to recognize Indian sovereignty there). There were only 9,000 regular soldiers scattered throughout the African territories. Three years later, that number reached 130,000, and by the early 'seventies, 90% of Portugal's armed forces were in combat on the African continent.²¹⁰

To her North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, the Portuguese government rationalized that they were actively fighting part of the global battle to contain expansionist communism (the rebel groups had strong Soviet Russian and Chinese ties), and that the Cape Verde Islands off Portuguese Guinea supported NATO's control of the Atlantic sea lanes.²¹¹ In any event, NATO -- particularly the United States, France, and Great Britain -- actively aided Portugal's African colonial wars. The U.S. trained some 2,000 Portuguese military personnel by the wars' end, and the British and French gave the benefit of their

²⁰⁸Henricksen, "Comparative Notes," p. 397.

²⁰⁹Beckett, "Campaign in Mozambique," p. 139.

²¹⁰Eugene K. Keefe, *Area Handbook for Portugal* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 56.

²¹¹Beckett, "Campaign in Mozambique," p. 141.

experiences in counter-insurgent warfare in Malaya and Algeria, respectively.²¹² For their part, FRELIMO and MPLA guerrillas were trained at first in Algeria, and later Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union; later, the People's Republic of China, Cuba, Guinea and Nigeria provided significant aid to the rebel forces.²¹³

The Portuguese counter-insurgency campaign in all three colonies reflected study of recent guerrilla wars, and incorporated tactics such as small-unit patrolling, large-unit "sweeps," psychological warfare, and programs like "Africanization" of military units (including the creation of several all-*indigenas* formations) and extensive civil-military projects, notably road- and school-building, well-digging, and mass inoculations.

As the colonial wars began, Portuguese military governors almost immediately instituted a system of camps to relocate or resettle portions of the native population to facilitate counter-insurgency operations. These had been attempted on a very small scale before the revolt, starting in Mozambique in 1951, to develop unpopulated areas to improve the economy and relieve over-crowding elsewhere.²¹⁴ The first of these efforts was implemented in Angola, where hard fighting first broke out. The new Portuguese Governor-General there, Lieutenant Colonel Silvino Silverio Marques, authorized a pilot program in May 1962 called *reordenamento rural* (literally, rural rearrangement) to resettle refugees returning

²¹²Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 104-105. The authors also make the interesting claim on p. 104 that "The United States provided . . . B-52's [strategic heavy bombers]" to Portugal, although not necessarily for use in Africa.

²¹³Beckett, "Campaign in Mozambique," p. 140.

²¹⁴Brendan F. Jundanian, "Resettlement Programs: Counterinsurgency in Mozambique," *Comparative Politics* VI/4 (July 1974): p. 520-522.

from Zaire after fleeing the 1961 massacres. The army was ordered to build 150 new villages, each complete with a civic center, school, clinic, and store, while the refugees would be permitted to construct their new homes in their customary native fashion.²¹⁵

As the war widened, the Portuguese came to see population resettlement as essential to establishment of population control (to isolate the insurgents from their base of support) and stimulation of economic and social development (to counter-balance the deleterious effects of population flight from traditional agricultural areas).²¹⁶ A comprehensive, continental strategy agreed on among the three provincial commanders might have enhanced their efforts and conserved scarce resources. Although such a unified plan never appeared, certain common elements and aspects of population relocation emerged in the three colonies.

Three basic types of resettlement camps were utilized: The *reordenamento rural*, basically a refugee camp, located outside conflictive areas; the *aldeamento* (literally, division into villages), roughly equivalent to the Malayan "New Village" or Vietnamese "Strategic Hamlet," deliberately situated inside combat zones; and the *colonato* (literally, small colony) for metropolitan Portuguese settlers, located in designated areas to deter guerrilla encroachment. The *colonatos do militares desmobilizados* (settlements for former servicemen) was a variant of the *colonato*.²¹⁷

²¹⁵Wheeler, "Portuguese Army in Angola," p. 433-434.

²¹⁶Gerald J. Bender, "The Limits of Counterinsurgency: An African Case," *Comparative Politics* IV/3 (April 1972): p. 336-337.

²¹⁷Jundanian, "Resettlement Programs," p. 520.

In Angola, these various projects resettled 1,000,000 Angolan *indigenas* -- 20% of the colony's population -- in thirteen years of war. The program was often administered poorly, with arbitrary, unconsidered decisions -- such as Angolan commander-in-chief Air Force General Joao de Almeida Viana's mandate to "rearrange" the population of central Angola, where there had been no combat or guerrilla activity. As a result, the Ovimbundus, once neutral, gave their support to the UNITA rebels.²¹⁸

In Portuguese Guinea, the arrival of the charismatic and effective General Antonio de Spinoia in 1968 brought resettlement operations in the form of *aldeamentos* to the forefront. During re-consolidation of his forces, he closed a number of previously-established camps beyond the range of adequate military support,²¹⁹ which led to PAIGC claims that the withdrawal proved his "fortified hamlet" system was failing. Despite the risks and expense, Spinoia halted the closures just to counter the PAIGC propaganda.²²⁰

Spinoia used the *aldeamentos* as the basis for an intense civic-action effort -- his "hearts and minds" campaign -- that clearly alarmed and worried the PAIGC leadership. Amilcar Cabral, the PAIGC Secretary-General and chief, railed at his subordinates: "Some three days ago three schools were opened in Bissora. Spinoia was there . . . in the midst of our people . . . a grenade would kill Spinoia or would

²¹⁸Bender, "Limits of Counterinsurgency," p. 338.

²¹⁹The Portuguese armed forces, in contrast to the U.S. military, did not enjoy the advantages of numerous troop transport helicopters and close air support aircraft. Reaction forces marched, or moved by truck; their fire support was generally artillery of World War II vintage.

²²⁰Al J. Venter, *Portugal's Guerrilla War: The Campaign for Africa* (Capetown, South Africa: Citadel Press, 1973), p. 146.

stop him from calmly walking about"221 Before the war ended, 150,000 *indigenas* -- 30% of the total population of Portuguese Guinea -- had been resettled.²²²

Interdiction of FRELIMO guerrillas operating from bases in Tanzania and Zambia was the dominant factor in situating *aldeamentos* in northern Mozambique. The revolts in Angola and Portuguese Guinea had given the Portuguese colonial leadership the forewarning necessary to prepare contingency campaigns, which were quickly implemented when the revolt broke out in 1964. Despite sufficient time for preparation, inadequate planning resulted in poor placement of many of the 980 *aldeamentos* eventually constructed, and without the amenities necessary to support the relocated populace. In 1969, the dynamic and optimistic General Kaulza de Arriaga took command in Mozambique and initiated a massive "social-promotion" program to improve living and working conditions in the resettlement camps. He committed half of the 60,000 soldiers under his command to attendant construction projects, especially road-building.²²³ Along with the other elements of Arriaga's overall counter-insurgency campaign, 1,000,000 Africans -- 15% of Mozambique's population -- were finally resettled into *aldeamentos*.²²⁴

²²¹Amilcar Cabral, "Revolutionary War in Africa," in *The Guerrilla Reader: A Historical Anthology*, ed. Walter Laquer (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977), p. 241.

²²²Henriksen, "Lessons," p. 33.

²²³Beckett, "Campaign in Mozambique," p. 142, 156. Asphalted roads had the additional benefit of making the emplacement of FRELIMO anti-vehicular mines without detection almost impossible; road tarring became a major project in Guinea and Angola, as well.

²²⁴Henriksen, "Comparative Notes," p. 402.

A variation on government-directed population relocation efforts was the *colonato*, modeled on the para-military Israeli *kibbutz*. It aimed at establishing European Portuguese, both civilians and ex-servicemen, in selected areas to preclude possible expansion of guerrilla influence. Despite inducements such as free passage, farm implements, and land (sometimes appropriated from the *indigenas*), there were few volunteers from Portugal. Those who came, complained the official Mozambique Provincial Settlement Board in 1970, "... lack any training or instruction ... [and] are difficult if not impossible prospects for good citizens." The argument was made that scarce funds were wasted on importing these unproductive and unskilled "colonizers", and would be better spent on training unskilled natives, who were "already there."²²⁵ Ex-soldiers were difficult to attract because most wanted to return home to Portugal at the end of their tour of duty, where better opportunities for education and profitable employment existed. Also, the long-established Portuguese *colonos* were unsupportive and sometimes resentful of the military plan.²²⁶

The reactions of the indigenous African population to the resettlement projects variously offered and imposed on them was mixed. Some tribes feared guerrilla terrorism and found a measure of security in the "fortified hamlets," where they were often organized into militias to provide their own defense. Others, like the semi-nomadic southern Angolan Ovambos and Herreros, found their traditional lifestyle and culture disrupted by camp life.²²⁷ Most camps lacked the full range of

²²⁵Jundanian, "Resettlement Programs," p. 528-529.

²²⁶Wheeler, "Portuguese Army in Angola," p. 435-436.

²²⁷Beckett, "Campaign in Mozambique," p. 147.

facilities needed to make them attractive to the *indigenas*. Moreover, the intent of isolating the guerrillas from the population and their support was never realized. The rebels infiltrated and organized cells inside camps, and by one estimate, one-third of all food grown in *aldeamentos* in Mozambique was being smuggled out to supply FRELIMO guerrillas.²²⁸

These flaws in camp administration and security were exacerbated by a lack of high-level focus and direction. The Portuguese planners and executors of the resettlement schemes never resolved their argument over the central intent of the effort. The authorities remained divided throughout the war, unable to resolve whether population displacement was primarily done for population control, or for internal development. This was a major concern, since most exports from the Portuguese colonies had declined, impacting on Lisbon's financial ability to support the war.²²⁹

Despite these weaknesses in the resettlement programs, the African guerrillas were clearly hampered in their efforts by the *aldeamentos*. A Portuguese army situation report from Mozambique observed "[t]he enemy effort recently had been concentrated on impeding the grouping of further people into protected villages."²³⁰ As a counter-measure, the Angolan rebels set up their own "protected villages," called *kimbos*, to grow much-needed food. These failed, as they were easy

²²⁸Beckett, "Campaign in Mozambique," p. 147.

²²⁹The solitary economic bright spot was Angola, where coffee production (the leading crop) actually increased slightly during the war, despite the demographic turbulence. This was not enough to offset the overall decline in exportable goods production and attendant loss of revenue among the three Portuguese colonies. Bender, "Limits of Counterinsurgency," p. 338.

²³⁰Isaacman & Isaacman, "Mozambique," p. 101.

targets for aerial attack.²³¹ It is a fair assessment that the *aldeamentos* contributed to the achievement of military stalemate, forestalling a guerrilla victory.

In the end, the enormous drain on metropolitan Portuguese material, financial, and human resources forced the issue not in Africa, but in Portugal itself.²³² After thirteen years of fighting an exhausting guerrilla war, with no promise of a victory in Africa, the clandestine "Captains' Movement" that became the *Movimento das Forças Armadas* (Armed Forces Movement, or MFA) launched a military coup in Lisbon. On 25 April 1974, the "Day of the Red Carnations," the civilian Portuguese government was ousted, and a *junta* established that quickly ended the conflicts in the "overseas provinces," withdrew the Portuguese armed forces, and immediately reduced the army by eighty percent. Within two years, Guinea-Bissau (formerly Portuguese Guinea), Angola, and Mozambique were independent nations, and the *junta* stepped down to re-install democratic rule.

Much as the Korean conflict had overshadowed the concurrent U.S. supported counter-insurgency successfully fought in the Philippines, so did America's preoccupation with its war in Vietnam hide the lessons of the Portuguese colonial wars, where the regular military forces had never suffered a significant defeat in the field, yet failed to achieve a strategic victory.

²³¹Beckett, "Portuguese Africa," p. 154.

²³²By 1974, 13,000 metropolitan Portuguese had been killed in Africa, and Portugal was spending a crushing 45% of her national budget on "defense." Beckett, "Portuguese Africa," p. 153; and Al J. Venter, *Africa at War* (Greenwich, Connecticut: Devin-Adair, 1974), p. 75.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Analysis

The repetitive historical use of government-directed population relocation to support counter-insurgencies is a primary indicator that it is a viable technique in anti-guerrilla operations. In each of the nine cases surveyed, the decision-making organization or individual had some degree of foreknowledge of at least one previous instance of forced resettlement. In four of the case studies -- Kenya, Algeria, Diem's Vietnam, and Portuguese Colonial Africa -- the implementing agencies essentially copied a recent historical example or experience, the British success with the New Village project during the Malayan Emergency serving as the most-looked-to model. Even in the Greek Civil War, if General Van Fleet himself lacked any strong experience in the full range of counter-insurgent warfare, his Greek counterparts doubtless recalled the Nazi German efforts to depopulate contested areas in Greece to undermine local resistance movements.

Historical documentation reveals assessments made independent of this thesis concerning the efficacy of each case study's resettlement effort(s), whether or not they were successful, and to what degree. These assessments delineate the specific steps required in conducting such operations, including the initial phase of determining the nature of the guerrilla, his environment, and the cultural, demographic, and economic profile of the area of operations. In some cases, these

steps are deduced by their omittance; the failures to prepare adequate facilities for the displaced population in British South Africa, the American Philippine Territory, South Vietnam, French Algeria and Portuguese Mozambique are distinct examples. Some conflicting documentation on the effects of certain relocation programs can be found, particularly in the Kenyan and Portuguese African cases. These disparities only reflect the various authors' points of view regarding the nature of human conflict in general. Some are pragmatic, and comprehend the give-and-take nature of guerrilla warfare; others place individual self-determination above all other factors, including survival of the threatened government. This has been addressed in part in the "Review of Literature" in Chapter 2.

Documents from both the government and insurgent points of view in all nine case studies provide a unanimous opinion that resettlement in the very least posed a threat to the insurgents' operations. This "very least" instance was the case in Vietnam, where the Viet Cong were able to disrupt the Strategic Hamlet Program sufficiently to overcome its potential to defeat the communist insurgency. On the other end of the scale, the verdict of the British government officials in Malaya and Kenya was that the New Villages and villagization were, respectively, the single most important factors in the success of the anti-guerrilla effort. In the other case studies, the resettlements are all counted as positively and definitely contributing to the overall tactical-level fight against the rebel forces.

Conversely, the South Vietnamese Strategic Hamlet Program demonstrated that a poorly-conceived, ill-planned, and faultily-executed effort produces the inverse effect of strengthening the guerrilla movement *vis-a-vis* increased antipathy toward the government. In this respect, the South Vietnamese attempt at population relocation can be seen as precipitating the collapse of the

Diem regime and creating an irreversible inertia that culminated in a communist victory in 1975.

The more complicated analyses concern the cases where resettlement projects brought about tactical defeat of insurgents, rendering them incapable of overthrowing the established governments, but exposed those governments to such severe criticism in the world arena that the rebels won the final strategic victory. This is what happened in French Algeria and Portuguese Africa, with the added backlash creating military rebellions against the French and Portuguese home governments. The American Congress and British Parliament, spurred by graphic newspaper reporting about concentration camps, each came close to providing the Filipino *insurrectos* and South African *burghers* that same strategic success after their chances for victory by force of arms evaporated.

In none of the case studies was an unsuccessful resettlement plan overcome by other counter-balancing schemes to produce an ultimate government victory. The outstanding implication is that the separation and isolation of the guerrilla from the population he needs for support is so important that some form of resettlement, reconcentration, or regroupment must be considered even during anticipation of an insurgency, and will most likely require implementation in the actual event.

The precise techniques and procedures of such operations are crucial to success. In reviewing the case studies, four common stages emerge in each resettlement: Assessment, Decision, Execution, and Recovery. As previously stated, not all examples contained all these stages, but were thereby adjudged deficient in regards to the absence of one or more of these elements, or by the cursory treatment of a particular stage or stages.

A successful Assessment Stage included careful study and understanding of the political, economic, and cultural aspects of the population at large, and its sub-divisions, whether tribal, racial, geographic, linguistic, social, political, economic, or religious. When the governments concerned fully understood these factors -- most notably in the Philippines (in both case studies), Greece, Malaya, and Kenya -- subsequent assessments tended to be correct, particularly concerning the nature of the threatening insurgency. This provided the basis for comprehending insurgent war and how it can be waged and won. This in turn supported sound decision-making.

Sensitivity to the impression given by resettlement, particularly forced resettlement of a possibly unwilling indigenous population, to an attentive world-wide audience duly informed by members of the press, is another aspect of assessment. The British press exposed the depravities of Kitchener's concentration camps to the British home government and public, undermining the field commander's credibility. Similarly, press reports from the Philippines caused an American general to be brought to court-martial for his crimes against the *insurrectos*. "Bad press" about population relocation projects likewise hindered their associated counter-insurgency efforts in Algeria, South Vietnam, and Portuguese Africa. Conversely, media integration into the national anti-guerrilla strategy, exemplified by Lansdale's deft manipulation of the local and world press during the Hukbalahap Rebellion, can create and enhance a favorable image of relocation operations.

With the maturation of the United Nations and the proliferation of non-aligned international observer groups complementing a pervasive free press, legal considerations have become critical to assessment of the feasibility of resettlements.

Kitchener acted arrogantly, in the belief his orders in British South Africa were law. Post-conflict adjudications based on international law were sympathetic to Kitchener, and supported the apologist histories of the British administration of the concentration camps. One early legal opinion rendered in 1908 provided an indication that such casual regard for international covenants might encounter sharper criticism in the future, particularly if the insurgents attained status as a sovereign state, as the Boers had declared in the Transvaal and Orange Free State:

[I]t has always been an accepted principle of war that, if those who are normally noncombatants engage in hostilities, they cannot claim the privileges of noncombatants [To some number of Boer internees], however, there can be no question that they were [in] camps of concentration The conduct of these camps has . . . been severely criticised. In [most] cases the causes assigned for the burning [of farms] was . . . absolutely unjustifiable.²³³

During the Philippine Insurrection, U.S. forces considered the Islands to be conquered territory, subject to their self-regulatory General Orders Number 100. This was not contested, as the *insurrectos* failed to gain international recognition. One of Bell's contemporaries, however, was court-martialed for atrocities and murders committed under his orders, in violation of G.O. 100. The later case studies of forced resettlements were reconciled against the laws of the established government, most strictly enforced by the British during the Emergencies in Malaya and Kenya, not a major factor in developing nations like Greece in 1949, and essentially ignored by autocratic colonial and colonial-based regimes in French Algeria, Portuguese Africa, and Diem's South Vietnam. It appears in the case of the

²³³Percy Bordwell, *The Law of War between Belligerents* (Chicago: Callahan and Co., 1908), p. 148-153.

Strategic Hamlet Program, the U.S. Mission considered the plan an internal Vietnamese government action, similar enough to the Malayan model not to let international conventions disturb its implementation. This was a miscalculation.

The decision to move entire populations or portions thereof is significant because of the multifarious consequences which are at best extremely difficult to accurately predict. The two key concepts evinced in all the case studies were first, that any resettlement could only be part of a larger plan, and had to be combined with other efforts; and second, that relocation would provide the displaced citizens with two benefits: physical protection from the insurgents, and some measure of increased prosperity. Failure to provide these hindered the entire program, and hence the overall counterinsurgency plan. As stated before, a national-level strategy had to address the problems and causes of insurgency as a whole. When it did not, as in the Algerian Insurrection, the Second Indochina War, and the Portuguese Colonial Wars, the resettlement operations ultimately could not (and did not) make any difference in the outcome. The Boer War is arguably an exception, although Kitchener's peace treaty gave the rebel *burghers* more than they had politically before their revolt.

The Decision Stage also establishes which resettlement technique or combination of techniques will be employed. The case studies show a variety of means to prevent the guerrilla from interacting with the population. A majority of the populace can be moved a considerable distance from the insurgent base area with the intent of de-populating that area, as in South Africa, Greece, Malaya, Kenya, and Portuguese Africa. A movement of a large number of people over much shorter distances to concentrate a scattered populace into easily defensible, government-controlled sites was carried out during the Philippine and Algerian

Insurrections and the Malayan Emergency (the Jungle Fort project), and was the intention of the Strategic Hamlet Program in the Second Indochina War. This was also an aspect of that conflict's Buon Enao experiment, although the emphasis there was on avoidance of population relocation. It is also possible to import a friendly population from a secure area into an area threatened or controlled by insurgency to contest its expansion and simultaneously economically develop the region. The Portuguese attempt at this scheme in their African provinces was unsuccessful, but noteworthy. It was a powerful propaganda tool when selectively utilized by the Philippine government to establish a challenging presence in Huk territory. The Huk guerrillas, though, were in steep decline at the time of implementation.

More significantly, the Hukbalahap Rebellion generated a twist on the relocation concept -- resettling the insurgents (surrendered defectors) away from the contested population, inducing their surrender through promise of protection from guerrilla reprisals and increased prosperity.

As discussed in Chapter 1, refugee camps, including those sited to support deliberate resettlement projects, are not addressed in this thesis. *FM 41-10*, *FM 100-20*, and *FM 100-25* provide sufficient coverage of the topic of refugees. In accordance with the published principles of low-intensity conflict, refugees are considered in the development of the overall strategy.

The Execution Stage addresses the realization of the government's promise of "protection and prosperity" for the displaced persons. Transportation itself is not as important as the psychological preparation and ongoing assistance of the designated populace (in both military and marketing parlance, the "target audience"). Models of sophisticated and full-coordinated psychological operations

in support of relocation are the EDCOR project in the Philippines and the New Village resettlements in Malaya.

Related aspects of physical resettlement are very similar to the requirements of any new camp or settlement (such as for refugees) and are detailed in existing field manuals. This includes the procurement and distribution of resources for adequate housing, utilities, health and sanitation, education, transportation, communication, economic development, security and defense against military attacks by insurgents, all of which must be superior to their previous experience. Failure to afford these necessities to the displaced populace will in the least cause disgruntlement and antipathy toward the government; in the worst, as in the Boer concentration camps, the turn-of-the-century Filipino reconcentration centers and the French *regroupement* camps in Algeria, it can directly cause mass deaths and despair among the internees, and bolster the insurgent cause.

Regular soldiers will be needed to seek out and hunt down the elusive guerrillas; protection and police the new settlements must in large part rest with internally-raised self-defense units. In the same vein, if more than a few thousand people have been moved, the financial burden of their support will become intolerable to the host government unless they become economically productive or at least self-sustaining. In the cases of the Portuguese in Africa, the British in South Africa and Kenya, and the U.S. in Greece, this burden was accepted by the government (or its sponsor) with the understanding that the conflict would be favorably concluded before funds were depleted. This did not happen in Portugal's colonial wars, and it crushed the Portuguese economy and brought the nation to poverty.

Human resources are as important as material, and able administrators supported by competent civil servants and efficient police working at all levels are required to make resettlement work. When they were not available in sufficient numbers, like the dedicated but over-taxed French S.A.S. functionaries, or are generally corrupt and incapable like the political sycophants who were expected to manage the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam, the resettlement effort is threatened from within. Without strong administration, neither protection nor prosperity can be provided to the populace, and the government will lose the credibility it must have to counter the insurgency.

If it is possible, redress of grievances should be attained through political and economic reforms implemented by the resettlement itself. Peasant demands of "land for the landless" in the Philippines were answered by the EDCOR development on Mindanao that concurrently moved the complainants (the Huk guerrillas) away from the contested island of Luzon. Similarly, the Malayan New Villages gave the vagrant Chinese squatters legitimate title to arable land while displacing them from the MRLA rebels who relied on their food production for survival. Exacerbation of long-standing issues -- like the "second-class citizen" treatment afforded the Berber Muslims by the Algerian *colons* reinforced by their brutal treatment in *regroupement* camps -- is also a dangerous possibility during resettlement, and patently counter-productive.

The fourth phase of resettlement operations is the Recovery Stage, generally (but not necessarily) following conclusion of hostilities. When it is done as an afterthought, hastily-considered ideas such as Kitchener's scorched-earth policy can impose financial burdens and social hardships capable of generating a new insurgency. In Greece, lack of any post-war recovery plan for the resettled

mountain villagers meant return to the pre-war *status quo*; the same situation that helped foster the KKE uprising. Only massive U.S. relief forestalled a third Greek revolt in a single five-year span.

When recovery is considered in the planning of government-directed resettlements from the very inception of those plans, rapid transition from a state of civil war to normalcy and economic rebuilding can be readily accomplished. When well-planned, it is possible for recovery to begin before complete defeat of the insurgents and cessation of armed conflict. Kenya's "Resettlement of Kikuyu" reconstitution of the Aberdares farmlands was begun five years before the end of the Emergency, and in Malaya, restrictions such as curfews were lifted on a case-by-case basis as the New Villages met announced standards of security and order. Further, the continued existence of the New Villages as viable communities after the Emergency reflects the positive results of forward thinking and thorough planning for post-conflict recovery.

Conclusion

This thesis began with the acceptance of the assumption that "[c]ontrol of the masses . . . is the master weapon of *modern warfare*."²³⁴ The analysis of nine case studies of pertinent examples of forced resettlement during counter-insurgency campaigns in this century leads directly to the conclusion that it is a viable means of combatting guerrilla movements. Complete absence of any mention of population

²³⁴Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), p. 30.

relocation from U.S. Army field manuals focused on Low-Intensity Conflict is inexplicable.²³⁵

The exclusion of resettlement operations from official U.S. publications is not due to any contraventions of United States Codes or international law. The 1949 Geneva Conventions prescribe such actions, given specified constraints:

Article 49. Deportations, Transfers, Evacuations. Individual or mass forcible transfers . . . are prohibited, regardless of their motive.

Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities . . . have ceased.

The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure . . . that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that members of the same family are not separated

The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.²³⁶

Between 1974 and 1977, two Protocols to the 1949 Conventions were negotiated to more precisely address "armed conflict not of an international

²³⁵Since the most recent U.S. military experience with resettlement (the Strategic Hamlet Program) is directly tied to its involvement in the Vietnam War, it can be suggested that study of resettlements fell victim to a corporate (if uncalculated) post-war effort to "forget Vietnam" and everything associated with it. Colonel John D. Waghelstein points out that in 1977, only two years after the end of the war, study of low-intensity conflict at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College constituted only 40 hours in a 1,000-hour course. By 1979, it was further reduced to only 8 hours, and at the Infantry School at Ft. Benning, it was not taught at all. This may help account for the disappearance of resettlement from doctrinal material. John D. Waghelstein, *Counter Insurgency Doctrine: Post-Vietnam* (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 15 August 1984), p. 2-3.

²³⁶U.S. Army, *FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 18 July 1956), p. 144-145.

character."²³⁷ Protocol II supplemented the Third Article of each of the four 1949 Conventions:

Article 17 -- Prohibition of forced movement of civilians.

1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.²³⁸

Rather than excluding "forcible transfers" as an option available to a national government, the Conventions and their Protocols reinforce the necessity to provide enhanced security and improved living conditions to the general populace. Further, they offer a sequentially organized guide to procedures most likely to afford success in resettlements. This critical aspect of international law is addressed by the guerrilla warfare scholar Otto Heilbrunn:

Effective protection against guerrillas is also a basic requirement for success in reforming [converting] the people Sometimes resettlement will be necessary before the people can be induced to provide self-help. Sometimes self-help will not be available on any terms and resettlement will then be required to reduce the defense burden [R]esettlement is not a punitive measure applied in retaliation for some crime committed by the partisans or a warning for the future, but a purely protective measure to safeguard the people

²³⁷U.S. Army, *FM 100-20*, p. 2-16. The phrase is from the Preamble to Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

²³⁸U.S. Army, *DA Pam 27-1-1, Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1 September 1979), p. 98. The United States is a signatory of both Protocols.

against partisan attacks and to withdraw them from partisan influence.²³⁹

It is a conclusion of this thesis that a gap exists in U.S. doctrinal literature that ignores resettlement as an operational tool in counter-insurgency, and it is necessary to correct that deficiency. The gap improperly implies that forced resettlement is in some way unlawful, unethical, or contrary to successful prosecution of an anti-guerrilla campaign. This is incorrect. As the military theorists Peter Paret and John W. Shy have written,

[a] standard technique in denying the guerrilla his popular base is the resettlement of populations. Resettlement has been successful with the Chinese squatters in Malaya, and partially so with the Arabs in Algeria and the Boers in South Africa. But when calculating the military advantages of resettlement and planning the details of the program, full weight must be given to its political, economic, and social effects.²⁴⁰

It is not the intent of this conclusion to present a detailed "how-to" checklist for government-directed forced resettlement operations; rather, the intention is to propose a procedural architecture to aid in the analytical thought process that must, in any event, be adapted to each unique counter-insurgent war.

Properly planned and conducted resettlements can directly support a nation's Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) program, in accordance with the four interdependent functions described in *FM 100-20*. The relocation itself can be seen as part of the national effort to prevent or defeat an insurgency through (1)

²³⁹Heilbrunn, *Partisan Warfare*, p. 153.

²⁴⁰Peter Paret and John W. Shy, *Guerrillas in the 1960's* (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1962), p. 46.

Balanced Development in political, social, and economic projects; its integral program of (2) Security protects the populace from the insurgents and provides a safe environment for national development; (3) Neutralization of the insurgents is achieved through their physical and psychological separation from the populace; and the (4) Mobilization of manpower and resources promotes the government's legitimacy while denying those assets to the insurgents.²⁴¹

No more than any other action in a counter-insurgent war, resettlements cannot violate the established tenets of successful civil-military operations or the principles of Low-Intensity Conflict, as delineated and articulated in *FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations*, and *FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*. In accordance with the analysis presented in this thesis chapter, a separate and distinct outline must be followed to consider thoroughly the feasibility and reliably predict the impact of a deliberate "re-arrangement" of some segment of the general population.

The first step in the Assessment Stage must be careful review of the government's existing national strategy and specific objectives stated in the combined civil-military counter-insurgency campaign plan. Any recommendation for population resettlement must support and be fully integrated into the overarching concept to defeat the internal threat to the government.

If specific intelligence, civil affairs, and psychological operation estimates or similar documents are not available, it is necessary to prepare them. The formats in Appendices D, E, and F, of *Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, are suitable overall guides. Reliance should

²⁴¹U.S. Army, *FM 100-20*, p. 2-8 - 2-9.

only be placed on statistics provided by incontrovertible sources; caution must be exercised when considering any surveys or reports. The goal is to determine:

(1) In the context of the current situation, if physical relocation, concentration, re-arrangement or restriction of some number of the indigenous population will adversely affect insurgent operations;

(2) On what scale the resettlement will be implemented (no formulaic number is suggested here, but clearly the more people moved, the greater the disruption to the society and economy);

(3) If sufficient human, material and financial resources are available to conduct the entire resettlement effort (including a hard look at the administrative capability of the persons and the governmental system implementing and overseeing the program), addressing housing, feeding, health, education, religion, employment, politics, administration and security;²⁴²

(4) What resettlement model or combination of models to be used -- Briggs' New Village or Jungle Fort, Magsaysay's EDCOR, Thompson's Strategic Hamlet (as opposed to Nhu's inept variation or Spinola's under-resourced *aldeamento*), Van Fleet's short-term or Kitchener's long-term concentration camp (for the purpose of de-population), the Portuguese Immigrant/Ex-Serviceman's *colonato*, or the "non-resettlement" option of the Special Forces Buon Enao experiment;

²⁴²Appendix C of *FM 41-10* provides a thoughtful overview of the management of "Dislocated Civilians" (DC's) in wartime -- resettled persons fit this official U.S. description -- and presents useful points of consideration specifically about DC camps. Section 811, *Psychological Operations*, and Section 812, *Military Civic Action*, p. 90-98 of *FMFM 8-2* contain useful material in outline form. For a brief, colorful and eminently readable example of such a program in action, see Appendix 1, "Outline of a Civil Assistance Program" in Laos in 1961 by U.S. Army Colonel John T. Little, in Dow, *Nation Building*, p. 217-227.

(5) What other counter-insurgency measures can be directly incorporated into the program, considering everything from identity cards to counter-propaganda to national-level agrarian reform.²⁴³ The overriding concern throughout the process is to raise the level of protection and prosperity of the relocated population.

Selecting official names for the resettlements, the persons to be resettled, and the overall plan must be given careful attention, be suited to the local language and culture, and be closely tied to the supporting psychological operations program. These titles must be chosen and promulgated early, to preempt insurgent propagandists or naive news media personnel from "branding" the effort by using polarized, inappropriate, or deprecatory terms like "concentration camp," "refugees," or "resettlement at gunpoint."

Disrupting the socio-economic fabric of a native population holds the potential for counter-acting any benefits intended to be gained from resettlement. While displacement of urbanites is relatively easy if employment in the same or transferable skills is available at the receiving site, most rural populations are closely tied to their land, and their conservative nature resists even subtle changes in lifestyle.

The Decision Stage, when the national leadership chooses whether or not to conduct resettlement, and the shape resettlement might take, is aided by "wargaming." Wargaming of resettlement projects and proposals will help reveal the critical societal, economic, and political interrelationships that exist in the target region and among the populace. The wargaming must include all key governmental,

²⁴³See "Populace and Resources Control" in Appendix E of *FM 100-20*, p. E-22, and "Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned, Volume III. Intelligence, Logistics & Equipment," *Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Bulletin* No. 90-9 (October 1990): p. III-22 - 23.

military, and community representatives as well as the civil-military operations (CMO) "resettlement team" to anticipate and resolve the inevitable problems of a forced migration. Inclusion of technicians from appropriate fields -- for example, agronomists and experts in animal husbandry -- are likewise essential.

The planning and attendant wargaming must include the desired post-hostility situation, or "endstate." In formulating the Recovery Stage, return of displaced populations to original domiciles may or may not be supportive of maintenance of the national economy and political balance, and hence the peace. In any event, it is important to promote a self-supporting capability among the dislocated populace to prevent the emergence of "dependent societies" that can be the breeding grounds for new insurgencies. It would be ideal to conduct an experimental pilot program to refine and test concepts developed during wargaming.

To support the Execution Stage of the resettlement, impartial and unimpeachable third-party observers -- the United Nations (UN), the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent (ICRC) and Amnesty International are three examples -- must be invited and be present. With preparation and organization, press coverage of resettlements can enhance the adverse effect on the guerrilla, and hopefully complement government-sponsored psychological operations. There can be no manipulation of the press; the resettlement program itself must be legitimate and sound, and these attributes simply well displayed. Any attempts to censor or evade media and international observation can only detract from the resettlement effort.

If resettlement requires new construction, as much building work as possible should be done by the arriving displaced persons themselves; it may provide

an opportunity to impart new vocational skills. Security of the new sites may initially fall to regular government police and military forces, but as soon as possible, the site inhabitants must be trained and made to assume responsibility for their own self-defense against guerrilla intimidation and military attack. These civil defense units are essential to intelligence-gathering and efficient administration at the sites. The resultant inculcation of the spirit of law and order in turn allows the government to impose populace and resource controls (PRC) to increase the isolation of the guerrilla from his base of support. Screening of resettled persons also supports enhanced security.

The Recovery Stage must be carried out in essentially the same manner as the Execution Stage of the initial resettlement. It is not a simple lifting of conflict-period restrictions and "release of internees," but a controlled program to keep the new economy and post-conflict political situation in balance. The initiation of the Recovery Stage is not keyed to the cessation of hostilities, but to attainment of objectives set by the government. These goals should be a combination of socio-political, military and economic standards that the resettled populace has contributed toward attainment. The improved protection and prosperity that the displaced persons should have enjoyed as a result of their resettlement by the government must be maintained, or the peace may be jeopardized.

Historical evidence strongly suggests that forced resettlements at the direction of a government threatened by insurgency, when carefully planned, adequately resourced, and efficiently administered have contributed to defeat of the insurgents by physically and morally isolating them from the population they required for support. The most important objective achieved in the successful

examples was enhanced protection and prosperity for the resettled population. This is summarized by U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel John J. McCuen in *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War*:

When well organized by civic action teams and combined with effective self-defence, regroupment can create an environment in which guerrillas find it very difficult to live. It can facilitate civic and psychological action to counter-organize the population. It offers a medium to improve the living conditions of the people and effect administrative reforms. Since these are all major factors in counter-revolutionary warfare, regroupment can be a significant influence on its successful outcome.²⁴⁴

In future counter-insurgencies where United States personnel may be called on to advise the government of a friendly country as to possible courses of action to defeat the insurgents, population resettlement should be considered along with all other current doctrinal possibilities. Methodical compliance with a thorough plan adapted to local conditions, based on the model suggested in this thesis -- with the stages of Assessment, Decision, Execution, and Recovery -- and integrated into a comprehensive national counter-insurgency strategy, can speed the way to peace and build a stronger, more stable and productive nation.

²⁴⁴McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War*, p. 234.

TABLE 1

CONFLICT AND POPULATION ASSESSMENT

CONFLICT	RULING GOVERNMENT	OBJECTIVE OF INSURGENCY	TARGET OF RESETTLEMENT	POPULACE'S TIE TO THE LAND
SECOND ANGLO-BOER WAR (1899-1902)	South African British colonial government	Independence from British rule	Families of Boer <i>burghers</i> away "on commando"	Strong; personal farms
PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION (1899-1902)	U.S. territorial occupation forces government	Independence from U.S. rule	Entire <i>campesino</i> population	Moderate; agrarian society
GREEK CIVIL WAR (1944-1949)	Democratic constitutional monarchy	Installation of communist government	Grammos and Vitsi peasant population	Strong; traditional villages
HUKBALAHAP REBELLION (1946-1954)	Philippine democratic government	Installation of communist government	Huk defectors and their families	Moderate; agrarian society
MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948-1960)	Malayan British colonial government	Installation of communist government	Chinese squatters supporting MRLA	Weak; mixed agrarian-labor society
KENYAN EMERGENCY (1952-1960)	Kenyan British colonial government	Independence from British rule	Kikuyu tribe (Mau Mau)	Moderate; traditional tribal lands
ALGERIAN INSURRECTION (1954-1961)	French Algerian provincial government	Independence from French rule	General Muslim population	Moderate; traditional villages
SECOND INDOCHINA WAR (1954-1963)	S. Vietnamese democratic government	Unification and installation of communist gov't.	Entire peasant population	Strong; personal farms, traditional villages
PORTUGUESE AFRICAN COLONIAL WARS (1961-1975)	Portuguese provincial governments	Independence from Portuguese rule	General rural population	Moderate; semi-nomadic with tribal lands

TABLE 2

FEATURES OF RESETTLEMENT EFFORTS

CONFLICT	PURPOSE AND TYPE OF RESETTLEMENT	NO., % OF TOTAL POPULATION RESETTLED	IMPLEMENTING AGENCY	ASSOCIATED ANTI-INSURGENT MEASURES
SECOND ANGLO-BOER WAR (1899-1902)	Depopulation of <i>veldt</i> ; concentration camps	118,000	British Army	Scorched earth; blockhouse system; drives
PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION (1899-1902)	Population control; protected villages	300,000 in Bell's 2nd District, Dept. of Luzon	U.S. Army	Self-defense units; curfews; food denial; pass system
GREEK CIVIL WAR (1944-1949)	Depopulation of guerrilla mountain bases; concentration	Several thousand; est. 1%	Greek National Army	Food denial; large-unit combat operations
HUKBALAHAP REBELLION (1946-1954)	Removal of guerrillas; new villages	5,175; 0.1%	Economic Development Corps (EDCOR)	Psychological operations; redress of grievances
MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948-1960)	Depopulation of guerrilla jungle bases; new villages	500,000; 8%	Chinese Affairs Office; Security Forces	Self-defense units; Special Branch Police; food denial
KENYAN EMERGENCY (1952-1960)	Depopulation of guerrilla forest bases; new villages	1,000,000; 12%	Security Forces	Land reform; self-defense units; food denial; drives
ALGERIAN INSURRECTION (1954-1961)	Increased control of populace; concentration in protected areas	1,800,000; 20%	<i>Section Administrative Speciale</i> (SAS); <i>Se Bureau</i>	<i>Quadrillage</i> ; <i>ratissage</i> ; self-defense units; food denial
SECOND INDOCHINA WAR (1954-1963)	Increased control of populace; concentration in protected hamlets	10,000,000; 80%	Local provincial and district governments	Republican Youth; self-defense units; free-fire zones
PORTUGUESE AFRICAN COLONIAL WARS (1961-1975)	Increased control of populace; concentration in protected <i>aldeamentos</i>	Angola -- 1,000,000; 20% Guinea-Bissau -- 150,000; 30% Mozambique -- 1,000,000; 15%	Armed Forces	"Africanization" of military; self-defense units; identity cards; food denial

TABLE 3

IMPACT OF RESETTLEMENT ON COUNTER-INSURGENCY

CONFLICT	DID RULING GOVERNMENT WIN CONFLICT?	WHAT ROLE DID RESETTLEMENT PLAY IN NAT'L STRATEGY?	WHAT IMPACT DID RESETTLEMENT HAVE IN CONFLICT?
SECOND ANGLO-BOER WAR (1899-1902)	Yes (negotiated settlement)	Minor; implemented after British achieved overwhelming numerical superiority	Counterproductive; negligible impact on insurgents; U.K. public outraged
PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION (1899-1902)	Yes (military victory)	Major; seen as essential to denying support to guerrillas	Important part of overall campaign; conflict ended before U.S. public backlash
GREEK CIVIL WAR (1944-1949)	Yes (military victory)	Minor; implemented as part of final series of offensives	Hastened inevitable defeat of insurgents
HUKBALAHAP REBELLION (1946-1954)	Yes (political and military victory)	Major; sought to address peasant grievances regarding land reform	Gave moral and psychological initiative to government
MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948-1960)	Yes (political and military victory)	Critical; the key program in the counter-insurgency effort	Central to success of overall campaign
KENYAN EMERGENCY (1952-1960)	Yes (political and military victory)	Critical; built on Malayan model and likewise integrated into overall strategy	Crucial to isolation of insurgents
ALGERIAN INSURRECTION (1954-1961)	No (political defeat)	Major; part of new post-Indochina doctrine of <i>la guerre revolutionnaire</i>	Supported tactical military victory; precipitated strategic political defeat
SECOND INDOCHINA WAR (1954-1963)	No (political and military defeat)	Critical; perceived as the key program in the war effort	Flawed planning and execution caused major military, political, and economic setbacks for government
PORTUGUESE AFRICAN COLONIAL WARS (1961-1975)	No (political defeat)	Major; built primarily on Vietnamese Strategic Hamlet model	Helped force a military stalemate with insurgents

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