Peacemaking: The Effectiveness of British Strategy in Northern Ireland, 1969-1972
Abstract
Peacemaking is the use of national power to separate belligerents and compel a peaceful settlement of a conflict. This study examines peacemaking using the British experience in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1972 as a case study. This study examines why British strategy failed to bring peace to Northern Ireland, proposes what Britain should have done, and identifies lessons for future planners of peacemaking operations. This study uses an analytical model synthesized from three existing models to structure the investigation. It identifies the problem and the strategy, and uses the U.S. military's doctrinal imperatives for low intensity conflict to analyze them. This study concludes that the military successfully separated the violent sects and created an opportunity, but the British government failed to seize it and adequately address the problems. Britain was drawn into the conflict by forfeiting its neutrality, thereby losing legitimacy as a peacemaker. Among the lessons drawn by the study is that peacemaking is not primarily a military operation, but a political and social endeavor enabled by use of the military. Northern Ireland, Ulster, Ireland, Great Britain, LIC, Low Intensity Conflict, IRA, Irish Republican Army, Peacemaking Operations, Contingency Operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 05, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA255118
Entities
People
- Daniel M. Wilson Jr
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College