The Operational Operating Systems as an Analytical Tool: A Look at the 1862 Peninsula Campaign.
Abstract
Few checklists exist for the operational level of war. One of the reasons Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9, Blueprint of the Battlefield, was the intent of assisting in filling this void. The Blueprint introduces the concept of the Operational Operating Systems (OOS) as an operational checklist. The OOS are the major functions performed by joint and combined operational forces for successfully executing campaigns, but are the OOS alone enough for operational success? The purpose of this monograph was to determine whether or not the Blueprint is capable of fulfilling one of its intended purposes. Using the OOS as intended by the authors of the TRADOC Pam, the monograph analyzes the 1862 Peninsula Campaign of the American Civil War. Subsequently, the monograph analyzes the impact (on the same campaign) of three theoretical concepts not addressed by the OOS: friction, genius, and moral domain. The major finding of this monograph is that the OOS alone are not sufficient to provide a complete analysis of a campaign or major operation. As a minimum the theoretical concepts of friction, genius, and the moral domain need to be considered. The author recommends incorporation of these three concepts into TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9.Peninsula campaign, Robert E. Lee, Friction, George McClellan, Genius, Operational operating systems.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 20, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA255149
Entities
People
- David B. Flanigan
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College