Forcible Entry in a Major Regional Contingency: The Operational Planner's Worst Nightmare?
Abstract
This monograph examines the capability of contemporary operational planners to successfully plan and execute a large-scale forcible entry operation in response to a major regional contingency. The relationship of a forcible entry in achieving a campaign's or major operation's objectives is examined in light of the finite forcible entry capability found in current force structures and transportation assets. The monograph uses the Operational Operating Systems outlined in TRADOC Pam 11-9, "Blueprint of the Battlefield," to examine the historical forcible entry operations conducted at Crete in 1941 and at Inchon in 1950. From this analysis a theoretical framework for forcible entry operations is developed and compared to current U.S. forcible entry capabilities. The monograph concludes that a successful large-scale forcible entry will be a function of an operational planner's ability to capitalize on the complementary capabilities of all available forces and operating systems. Combat power in a contingency region is found to be a function of the successful orchestration of all of the Operational Operating Systems. Shortages in one system may be offset by increasing the strength of another system.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 03, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA255309
Entities
People
- Michael P. Marletto
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College