Blinding the Eyes of the Corps: Foresight at Last?
Abstract
This thesis juxtaposes the enabling attributes of tactical aerial reconnaissance with the myopic force structure policy which resulted in the demise of Marine aerial reconnaissance on the eve of the Persian Gulf War. Commencing with the debut of American photo reconnaissance aircraft in World War 1, and continuing through the present, the U.S. tactical aerial reconnaissance capability problematic development cycle of high emphasis during war and gross neglect during peacetime is documented. For the United States Marine Corps, this impact of this trend of dysfunctional command priorities during Desert Shield/Desert Storm contingency operations in Southwest Asia is elucidated and the misnomer of intelligence failure is revealed. Based on analysis of these events and the recurring intelligence requirements of combat, this thesis sets forth the requirement for continuous maintenance of a viable tactical aerial reconnaissance capability within the Marine Corps. Air intelligence, Aerial reconnaissance, Aerial photography, Intelligence, DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, Marine crops aviation, Marine corps intelligence, Military intelligence.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA256305
Entities
People
- Phillip C. Chudoba
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School