The Role of the Media in The Operational Deception Plan for Operation Desert Storm
Abstract
This monograph examines the operational deception plan used in Operation Desert Storm from 17 January to 28 February 1991 in relation to U.S. Army deception doctrine. Using the deception plan from Operation Overlord in World War II to illustrate the deception framework, the monograph analyzes the operational deception plan from Operation Desert Storm. The author contends that the deception plan was successful because it synchronized air, naval, and ground unit efforts toward deceiving the enemy. General Schwarzkopf, commander of Central Command, credited the deception plan with helping establish the conditions for success by keeping the Iraqi forces focused on the wrong locations for the ground campaign.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA258285
Entities
People
- Douglas L. Tystad
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College