The Air Force and Low Intensity Conflict
Abstract
Low intensity conflict (LIC) is a modern term for an old battlefield. It is vague, poorly understood and, in many instances confused with special operations. Many military personnel ignore or fail to comprehend the broad ideas encompassed by LIC, and the overriding political characteristic of this conflict. The involvement of the Air Force in LIC, or Special Air Warfare as it was known, has had many peaks and valleys. There were boom years during the Vietnam conflict, and almost complete inactivation in the years that followed. Tragically it took a failed rescue attempt in the Iranian desert to create renewed interest in this vital capability. Today the Air Force is experiencing a resurgence in LIC training and operations. Still, it directs its efforts mainly at direct action operations to the detriment of indirect action operations. This uneven emphasis in training is due to a lack of education and poor understanding of the low intensity environment. The average Air Force member has a view of conflict that conforms with direct actions, clear objectives, firepower and a tendency to concentrate on the big war. He has a poor grasp of the complex and overtly political LIC environment which encompasses joint, interagency and combined operations. To complicate matters, there is a lack of explicit LIC doctrine and strategy to guide how the Air force should organize, train and employ its forces in LIC.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA258350
Entities
People
- Enrique A. Oti Ii
Organizations
- Air War College