


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
RESPONDING TO A CHANGING WORLD

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RESPONDING TO A CHANGING WORLD

by

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Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
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ABSTRACT

TITLE: Responding to A Changing World

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The changes in the world since the demise of the Soviet Union have significantly altered the environment in which the United States seeks to achieve its national objectives. While the threat to the survival of the U.S. has diminished, new and less predictable threats to other of the U.S.'s national interests have emerged. Airpower is uniquely suited to deal with the changing world; an examination of objectives, strategy, doctrine, force structure, and constraints and opportunities shows how airpower, and the Air Force, can contribute to safeguarding national interests in a changing world.

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INTRODUCTION

The last three years have seen more fundamental change in the state of the world than most of us have experienced in our professional lifetimes. These changes affect us as citizens of the United States and the world, but most directly as members of the military, because the whole rationale for our existence is to provide a tool to exert influence--in combination with political and economic tools--for the imposition of our national will. The changes in the world have changed the perceptions of our citizens, our Congress, and the military itself, of the type and composition of the tools needed. The military will change to reflect the political and economic realities of the world; the more we can anticipate these changes and the perceptions driving them, the better chance we have to exercise our professional judgement to influence the direction the post-Cold War military.

For over forty years the world political sphere revolved around the bipolar balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite the potential for mass destruction, this bipolarity produced a degree of stability as each principal developed a guarded understanding of the other's *modus operandi* and other nations lined up in one camp or the other. As Dennis Drew put it,

The Soviets were very good enemies. Although they possessed threatening military power, were troublesome, often brutish, and always anxious to take advantage, they were also, in fact, conservative and usually predictable. They certainly gave the appearance of knowing and understanding the unwritten rules of international power politics ... In retrospect, there was a comforting degree of certainty in a bipolar world in which both sides had much at stake.¹

Although no reasonable person would want to return to the Cold War balance of terror, the bipolar stability produced a bounded world in which the

upper end of the threat was clearly defined and provided a planning target for our defense establishment as well as a distinct encouragement for the political and public support needed to maintain that target force.

Much has changed. We now face an environment which, while presenting less possibility of a catastrophic nuclear conflict, promises a wide range of conflicts against a wide variety of enemies, in which it may be less clear than previously whether and how we should become involved. This more uncertain political environment also denies us a "worst-case" planning ceiling, or at least a clear consensus on the worst case, and changes the odds as defense competes with other national priorities for a share of an America's resources.

In this paper I will attempt to present my perspectives as Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force on the challenges of a changing world and on the role of airpower and the Air Force. Specifically I will consider:

- The transformations which have changed the world.
- Our national and military objectives.
- The threats to the attainment of those objectives.
- The role of air power in general and the Air Force in particular, with a look at our doctrine, forces, and the constraints we face.
- What threats we should be concerned about, now that the specter of global communism is gone.

CHAPTER I

WORLD TRANSFORMATIONS

Several major transformations have changed the world political environment. While the most dramatic is the fall of the Soviet Union as a political and military force, others will also have an important effect on our future strategy. To provide a starting point for a discussion of that strategy, the following list summarizes the major transformations.

Demise of the Soviet Union. The dissolution of the Soviet Union as a political entity most certainly represents a victory--economic, political, and military--for the United States, and will allow us to stand down from our 40 year old nuclear standoff. As Colonel Drew's introductory remark illustrates, however, it introduces a whole new set of variables into our national calculations. For example, despite the agreements of the various presidents of the republics, it is far from clear that the 27,000+ nuclear weapons possessed by the Soviet Union are under firm control, particularly in light of the difficulty of determining how to divide the military among the republics. It is also far from clear that the military is willing to be divided, presenting the possibility of an autonomous military as yet another actor in the power struggle. Further, the defense establishment is still producing modern offensive weapons systems--SS-24s and SS-25s, as well as long range strategic aircraft--which, although they may be only those items in the production pipeline, still represent a significant threat to the United States. In addition, the military hardware and know-how of the Soviet Union may be one of the most liquid of its assets, and the prospect of a "going out of business" sale at bargain prices must be eagerly anticipated by

Third World nations seeking to improve their military capability. The most serious pressure on the former Soviet states is, of course, economic, and the need for basic survival may drive them into actions which threaten world stability.

In the long run, Russia and the other ex-Soviet states represent an area rich in population and resources, with a significant industrial base and technical know-how. Although it may not be for many years, once the difficult adjustment to a market economy is made, they may be worldwide economic competitors.

The New Europe. The reunification of Germany and the relaxation of Soviet influence have changed the political landscape of Europe. While the threats that necessitated the United States as a guarantor of peace may have lessened, the emergence of the East European nations as nationalistic, competitive entities and the increasing economic power of Western Europe may produce new pressures. The lack of a common enemy may decrease the interdependence that was a feature of western Europe, while the absence of Soviet domination has already renewed historic conflicts in Eastern Europe. The reunification of Germany reestablishes the basis for what has historically been one of the most aggressive nations on the continent, with a modern military, a strong economy, and a nationalistic spirit. While the NATO alliance continues to be strong with the full commitment of its members, the establishment of a Franco-German brigade within the Western European Union (WEU) and outside of NATO is indicative of new power alignments on the continent.¹ The role of NATO and the United States and their relationship to the WEU is unclear.

Emergence of Japan. The emergence of Japan as a powerful economic force predates the fall of the Soviet Union, but the perceived importance of this issue has increased as the threat of nuclear war decreased. Today, more Americans

regard the economic differences with Japan as the most serious threat to the United States than nuclear war. Like Germany, Japan has historically been an aggressor nation. Today we see the Japan as an economic threat, but she also has a modern self-defense force and, more importantly, the world's best technological base. Japan has also traditionally taken the long view, and it is difficult not to believe that the prospect of an eventual confrontation with the United States has not entered their planning.

The Middle East. Perhaps the largest surprise, and disappointment, in the Middle East is the lack of a significant transformation following the Gulf War. We are still faced with the prospect of aggressive Iran and Iraq, rebuilding from their wars and taking advantage of the availability of Soviet hardware and know-how, as are Syria and Lybia. We still face a no-win situation in our sponsorship of Israel, unable to reconcile our long-standing political and moral commitment to Israel with the claims of the Palestinians which polarize the Arab world. And we still are confronted with the burden of protecting the world's oil supply from 6000 miles away, without a forward base in the region.

East Asia. East Asia is an area of significant challenge and importance. While North Korea is apparently moving toward a more moderate stance, it remains one of the areas most likely to involve us in military action with nuclear potential. China plans to increase its military budget 12 percent next year, and Vietnam and India maintain formidable military forces.¹ Other traditional interests and commitments continue, but the loss of bases in the Philippines may make them more difficult to carry out. Our long-term relationship with Japan, a pro-western source of stability in the region, may be affected by the economic problems between our countries.

Western Hemisphere. We have established that we intend to support pro-

democratic governments in the western hemisphere; the lack of a worldwide central communist threat will not change that commitment. More pressing threats to our social and economic structure, however, are the issues of illegal immigration and drugs. Our nation will eventually have to decide what to do about these problems, and what national resources to apply against them.

Social, Economic, and Political Transformations. In addition to these regionally-oriented transformations, several more affect all areas of the world. In general, historical rivalries may flare as the constraining alliances and sponsorships of the bipolar world weaken. New democracies may flourish, but, as the example of the East European states demonstrates, this growth is not likely to be easy. New agendas such as Iraq's quest for a new oil-rich province may emerge. Finally, the information and technology revolution brings a knowledge of the outside world to previously isolated regions, emphasizing the distance between the haves and have-nots and stimulating the desire to have.

CHAPTER II

THE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES-STRATEGY FRAMEWORK

I want to summarize in this chapter our national objectives, military objectives, and national security strategy concepts because they provide a framework within which to analyze and build airpower and Air Force concepts in a changing world.

U.S. national objectives are laid out in the 1991 *National Security Strategy of the United States* (NSS):¹

- The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
- A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
- Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
- A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.

Fig 1. U.S. National Objectives

These national objectives provide guidelines for the employment of all national resources--political, economic, and military--toward their accomplishment.

Specific supporting **military objectives**, shown in Figure 2, are identified in the 1991 *Joint Net Military Assessment* (JNMA).¹ To accomplish these objectives, using military resources, we have also laid out a set of "national security strategy concepts"--broad principles which guide the employment of U.S. military forces and the development of more specific strategies and their associated force structures by the various components of our military structure

- Deter or defeat aggression, in concert with allies
- Ensure global access and influence
- Promote regional stability and influence
- Staunch the flow of illegal drugs
- Combat terrorism

Fig 2. U.S. Military Objectives

strategy concepts. These principles are "based on the premise that America will continue to serve a unique leadership responsibility for preserving global peace and stability", but which shift emphasis from containment of worldwide Soviet aggression to a more modest capability which recognizes limiting fiscal constraints.¹

- Primary*
- Nuclear deterrence
 - Forward presence
 - Crisis response through power projection
 - Reconstitution
- Secondary*
- Collective security
 - Maritime and aerospace superiority
 - Security assistance
 - Arms control
 - Technological superiority
- Supporting*
- Peacetime engagement
 - Timely response
 - Measured response options
 - Warning time and political authority

Fig 3. U.S. Military Strategy Concepts

(figure 3). Although it may be premature to discuss strategy before we consider threats, I want to summarize in one place all the relevant national guidance which affects the planning for the future, and so list these

The first four of these principles are the primary ones usually cited (by the NSS, for instance) as our "security strategy", and they are important because they define the force structure; however the secondary principles also play a significant direct part in our military strategy in that they define additional

missions performed by the military establishment. The supporting principles are

also important because they emphasize the nature of the changing world--one in which political and military leaders will be faced with a wide range of challenges requiring a wide range of options. Peacetime engagement, for instance, includes counternarcotics and counterterrorism activities not addressed elsewhere. Warning time will also be more important because of the time required to execute a strategy of power projection against worldwide threats.

This presentation defines, then, intentionally or unintentionally, a hierarchy of strategy elements. While most of our strategy documents (including the *NSS* and apparently the forthcoming *National Military Strategy*) cite the first four as "the four pillars of U.S. military strategy", I believe we must not neglect the remaining elements because they commit us to maintaining the capability to execute the accompanying missions.

With this framework of national guidance established, I want to look next at the specific threats which face us, and then move on to airpower in general and the Air Force in particular, to see how well we incorporate national goals and strategic principles into service goals, doctrine, and force structure, and to see what constraints and opportunities lie ahead.

CHAPTER III

THREATS

Chapter II identifies national objectives and the military objectives which derive from national objectives. What type threats might arise which threaten the attainment of these objectives? In this chapter I will look at possible areas of conflict, and at the end of the paper present a framework to determine which threaten our national interests (objectives) sufficiently to warrant our involvement. Although it may seem premature to consider force structure prior to discussing what threats we should react to, our force structure is based on threat *capability*, independent of the political question of which threats to react to.

Use of Nuclear Weapons. While the threat of physical destruction of the United States by the Soviet Union appears to be gone, the potential for loss of life and damage to the environment from any nuclear exchange, whether or not targeted against the U.S., is so high as to make it a threat to survival. By the year 2000, 15 nations will have the ability to build ballistic missiles, eight of which could have nuclear weapons.¹ Many scenarios short of general war can be conceived in which nuclear weapons might be used; Robert Art lists five reasons why these the spread of nuclear weapons presents new problems:¹

- New nuclear forces are not likely to be as secure from preemptive attack as those of mature states, increasing the temptation for preemptive strikes.
- Command and control arrangements in new nuclear states are not likely to be state-of-the-art, increasing the potential for unauthorized or accidental use.

- Many new nuclear states do not have governments as secure as those of the more mature nuclear powers, making it easier for weapons to fall into the control of sub-national or terrorist groups.
- Many Third World would-be nuclear states are involved in implacable regional confrontations in which reason and restraint have been far less prevalent than they have been in U.S.-Soviet relations.
- Nuclear terrorists are not deterrable, only suicidal.

Conventional War.¹ The possibility of major conventional wars which would warrant our involvement seems remote. The former Soviet states are not now capable of sustaining a major conventional war, and, even if there were motive, the possession of nuclear weapons by the principal Western European nations would prevent war among them. In East Asia, with the exception of Korea, little incentive for a major conventional war exists, and American presence, although waning, still provides regional security. In Southwest Asia, the potential is higher, and U.S. (and world) interests in the stability of the region and the survival of Israel increase the likelihood of U.S. involvement. Confrontations in this area are also less likely to be susceptible to negotiation because of the historic, insoluble religious and ethnic differences and the difficulty of reaching a common ground of understanding. Korea and Israel are two unique cases in which we would likely intervene in the event of a war, despite the lack of great-power status of the belligerent, because of our historic ties with these countries.¹⁰ A more pragmatic reason is, of course, the potential use of nuclear weapons by Israel or North Korea should either be faced with military defeat.

Economic Threat. Denial of access to Persian Gulf oil is the primary economic threat to which we might have to react in the near future, and probably would involve action against one or more of the countries which contain or border the oil fields or control access to the Persian Gulf. Other economic threats might involve closure of key sea lines of communication in the

Mediterranean or Middle East.

Terrorism. The release of the Middle East hostages and the reduction of terrorist incidents in the Middle East brings hope that this threat may have subsided; however, the myriad of problems, multiplicity of ethnic and religious groups, and fervor inspired by religious fundamentalism will always make terrorism a weapons for those without the political and military power to otherwise address their grievances, in the Middle East or elsewhere. In central and South America, terrorism will continue to be a tool of the drug industry.

Drugs and Illegal Immigration. America will eventually have to decide what to do about illegal drugs. One option is to make them legal and tax their sale, which would help our economy. Another option is to get serious about stopping their importation, a task which will involve the military. Likewise, we will eventually have to decide whether illegal immigration is a serious enough threat to our economy to warrant involvement by the military. In both cases the role of the military will be border security, a non-traditional role (except at the strategic level).

Developing Regional Threats. Regional developments short of major war or obvious economic threat may present situations where we may need to maintain a presence to protect traditional U.S. interests and maintain regional stability. One example is the Pacific, where, as outlined in a recent *U.S. News & World Report* article, one U.S. objective has been "discouraging any destabilizing development of a power projection capability" by Japan.¹¹ The military capabilities of China and Vietnam and the everpresent menace of North Korea are other regional examples of threats which might become more active in the absence of U.S. presence.

These threats define the environment for which we must plan in developing

our military. As always, we should plan, if able, against capabilities rather than intentions; if anything, intentions are even harder to judge today. That said, the question of which threats might endanger our national interests sufficiently that we would use military force against them is a question worth considering, and I will do that in Chapter VI.

CHAPTER V

AIRPOWER AND THE AIR FORCE

Airpower is a key factor in our ability to maintain national strength and accomplish national and military objectives. As Secretary Rice said in his *Global Reach-Global Power* White Paper, "the strengths of the Air Force rest upon its inherent characteristics of speed, range, flexibility, precision, and lethality--characteristics which are directly relevant to the national interest in the future."¹² To exploit those characteristics, we must develop service objectives which support national objectives; coherent doctrine to guide the development of organization, forces, and training; and an appreciation of the constraints and opportunities facing us.

Objectives. In *Global Reach-Global Power*, Secretary Rice delineated U.S Air Force objectives and their associated force structure elements .¹¹

Figure 4 shows these objectives, and Figure 5 shows how they support national military objectives, which in turn support overall national objectives.

- Sustain Deterrence - Nuclear Forces
- Provide Versatile Combat Force - Theater operations and power projection
- Supply Rapid Global Mobility - Airlift and tankers
- Control the High Ground - Space and C'I systems
- Build U.S. Influence - Strengthen security partners and relationships

Fig 4. Air Force Objectives

Several observations can be made from this analysis.

First, peacetime collective security and wartime coalitions will be prime tools for the maintenance of healthy relations with our allies and other friendly

nations. Second, the range of tasks for conventional forces is huge, from major

<i>U.S. National Objectives</i>	<i>Supporting U.S. Military Objectives</i>	<i>Supporting U.S. Air Force Objectives and Forces</i>
Survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation	Deter or defeat aggression...	Sustain deterrence with nuclear forces
		Control the high ground with space and C'I
A healthy and growing U.S. economy	Ensure global access and influence	Build U.S. influence by strengthening security partners and relationships
Healthy, cooperative relations with allies and friendly nations	...in concert with allies	
A stable and secure world where freedom, human rights, and democratic influences flourish	Promote regional stability and influence	Supply global mobility with tankers and airlift, and provide versatile combat forces for theater ops and power projection
	Combat terrorism	
	Staunch the flow of illegal drugs	

Fig 5. National, Military, and Air Force Objectives

conventional war, to anti-terrorism and anti-drug operations. Third, although in the text of his paper Secretary Rice articulates Air Force's commitment to combatting terrorism and drugs, this commitment is not clearly spelled as an objective, as it is in the case of our national military objectives. Rather it falls in the broad category of providing "versatile combat forces", a situation which may cause misunderstanding of our priorities and lead to neglect in the development of doctrine and forces. If we as a service are committed to support national military objectives, we should be more explicit in our statement of our service objectives.

Doctrine. Doctrine describes missions and tasks, guides concepts for employment, weapons development and force planning, provides a foundation for training, and provides a basis for Air Force contribution to joint and combined doctrine development.¹⁴ In short, it describes "how we do things"--train, equip, and employ to execute our strategy, both independently and in concert with other forces. The new AFM 1-1 attempts to provide this direction. In my view, there are three important themes which run through this document. The first is the awareness that airpower has finally achieved a match between technology and potential. The fortunate coincidence of technology and circumstances in the Gulf War allowed us to demonstrate the capability that airmen had prematurely promised: that airpower can strike directly and precisely at the enemy's center of gravity and effectively win a war.

A second theme is the importance of maintaining an "airman's view" of airpower. An airman's view recognizes that the best use is made of airpower when it most effectively exploits its strengths and minimizes its weaknesses. The principles of mass and maneuver, offensive, surprise, objective, security, simplicity, economy of force, and unity of command are well understood; airmen recognize that application of these principles is not just "nice to do", it is imperative. By their nature, lacking persistence and (usually) numbers, air forces *must* mass and maneuver and use surprise and economy of force to achieve local superiority. The same shortcomings transform lack of offensive into defensive, and lack of unity of command can eliminate air power's inherent flexibility and simplicity. The "airman's view" is also free of the doctrinal constraints of aviators from sea and land--fleet defense and support of troops--which limit the exploitation of airpower's inherent strengths.

Finally, the inherent qualities of airpower make it a close match with the

characteristics required of military forces in the changing world. Congressman Les Aspin listed six such characteristics: decisive attacks on key nodes, direct involvement, high-medium-low tech mix, power projection, U.S.-based, and self reliant.¹⁵ A description of a force with these characteristics might be that "it is able to independently operate from U.S. territory and, using appropriate weapons and tactics, strike directly at key enemy centers of gravity". If this is not intuitively descriptive of the Air Force, a reading of AFM 1-1, chapter 2, should clarify the relationship.

AFM 1-1 is not a comprehensive document, however, and it sets a trap for the unwary. Although it speaks extensively to the roles and missions for which air power is well suited, it lacks a discussion of those missions which we might be tasked, but for which the airpower is less well suited. One example is anti-drug operations, which, as I mentioned earlier, is not an explicit Air Force objective, even though the SECAF includes it, along with special operations, as part of low-intensity conflict, which he says we have the capacity to perform. The only mention of this role in 1-1, however, is a passing reference as one of the "military activities short of war". There is no discussion of "how we do things"--train, equip, or employ--with regard to these activities. Other examples might include control of illegal immigration or peace-keeping operations. We do not want to be placed into the position, like the Marines in Beirut, of being tasked to do a mission without some corporate forethought on how, or whether, we can do it. In addition to describing the traditional roles of airpower, our doctrine should talk about the roles for which airpower may be ill-suited.

Forces and Constraints. The statement of Air Force objectives at the beginning of this chapter lays out the types of forces we need to execute that strategy: nuclear forces, conventional combat forces, support forces to provide

mobility, and space and C'I forces. I will not discuss nuclear forces here since I believe we will have for the foreseeable future sufficient nuclear capability to deal with any conceivable deterable threat. Before I discuss the remainder of our forces I want to briefly mention some constraints on the acquisition and employment of forces.

▪ *Political and economic constraints.* I have already discussed at length the lack of political will for defense spending which is likely to result from the lack of an identifiable, lethal threat to national security; the economic decline produces a synergetic effect which multiplies this bias.

▪ *Organizational constraints.* Although we are committed to the "total force" and our Air Reserve Components (ARC) have maintained a degree of readiness and effectiveness comparable to our active units, we need to maintain a credible active force which can react without delay and which is unaffected by the economic and political considerations of mobilization of the reserve components. Within the conventional tactical force we presently envision an active/ARC mix of 15.25/11.25 tactical fighter wing equivalents (TFWE); we must resist pressure to make further cuts exclusively within the active side of the organization in the interests of economy or in response to political constituency.

▪ *Personnel constraints.* We are becoming a smaller force, and one way of decreasing the size of the officer force is through the limiting of accessions. A side effect of that policy is the virtual exclusion of non-Air Force Academy graduates from Undergraduate Pilot Training. Since our general officer force consists almost exclusively (except for specialties) of pilots, this policy has implications for the senior leadership of the twenty-first century. The lack of diversity in this group may not necessarily be bad, but it will certainly be different from the structure that produced the mavericks who overturned the

doctrine of the Army Air Corps.

- *Industrial constraints.* Maintenance of a sufficient industrial base to support modernization and reconstitution must be a key concern. Since this is an issue closely tied to the economy, we may not have the deciding vote, but we must plan with the effect on the industrial base in mind.

- *Doctrinal constraints.* Our service doctrine represents our view of the best way to employ air power in support of national objectives. A less charitable view might say that its purpose is to *justify* air power, in much the way that we felt that the doctrine of jointness was used in the past to *justify* joint operations. We must be aware of this appearance and also aware of the pressures that other services will feel to doctrinally justify their expertise in an era of declining resources. We must not allow self-serving doctrine to cloud the question of force acquisition.

- *Geopolitical constraints.* The new world is a less friendly place to U.S. forces. U.S. access to overseas bases, as well as our ability to support them, is shrinking, with significant effect on our ability to project power. This constraint already affects our ability to accomplish some objectives, and may eventually mean that we need to assess whether it is possible to accomplish them at all.

- *Information constraints.* Many of these constraints reduce our ability to react quickly; consequently, we must rely more on advance warning, especially if any sizeable reaction will be needed. Warning depends on information and interpretation, and any reduction (or lack of improvement) of our capabilities in these areas will act as a *force divider*.

With these constraints in mind, what are the implications for our conventional, mobility, and space/C³I forces?

- *Conventional combat forces.* The "base force" concept takes us down

to 26.5 TFWE. The administration position is that this represents the minimum force structure we can accept without substantial risk to our ability to react to worldwide threats. In reality, 26.5 TFWE represents the most optimistic force structure; the final minimum is likely to be much lower. Lower force structure will affect capability (perhaps with a more than proportionate effect on readiness because of the organizational constraint discussed above) and also the technological and industrial base. While we must continue to push for next-generation systems, we need to realize that the defense procurement budget through 1995, even if uncut, is sufficient to maintain our existing force structure only with systems costing the same as our present systems. If we share proportionately in the shortfall, we will be faced with deciding between force structure and capability. We need a backup plan.

The air force has traditionally emphasized technological superiority over numerical superiority. The arguments are both logical and emotional, but we must now reassess them. The most important concept is that technological superiority is relative; for years, our advances in aircraft technology were matched on a regular basis by the Soviets, and we maintained relative superiority (offsetting numerical inferiority) only through intensive development and procurement programs. Today, that competition is ended, and there are few, if any, serious competitors. If we are going to be faced with quality versus force structure decisions, we should consider carefully where we need to spend the money for new generations of weapons. The F-15, for example, with upgraded weapons and avionics, would be far superior to any foreseeable air-to-air threat, even without the stealth and supercruise qualities of the ATF. In similar fashion, although the decision is years away, a stealthy replacement for the F-16 may not be necessary since the type of air defense system the F-117 and B-2 were

designed for is much less likely. Although not applicable to all our weapons systems today, the point is that it may be possible to maintain relative technological superiority while avoiding the cost of new-generation systems. Additionally, the increased numerical production should help maintain the industrial base and preserve some capacity for reconstitution.

- *Airlift.* Although it was no surprise, the Gulf War demonstrated our airlift shortfall and our dependence of the Civil reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), while simultaneously reducing the attractiveness of the CRAF to the airlines. Given our strategy of power projection and the geopolitical constraints, airlift is a critical part of our force structure. Although the C-17 will help, the reduction of the buy to 120 aircraft will still result in a shortfall from our projection of lift required. Again recognizing the need for balancing force structure versus modernization, we should reconsider alternatives of life extension programs for the C-141 and reopening the C-5 line, as well as increased production of the C-130 for tactical airlift to free the C-17 for inter-theater lift. As in the case of combat forces, increased production should help maintain the industrial base.

- *Space and C³I.* One of our most precious commodities in the changing world will be information. We will need information to verify arms control, judge intentions, and, most of all, provide warning time. With fewer forces available and more dependence on coalitions, more warning time will be necessary, both so we can act before a crisis flares out of control and so we can assemble appropriate forces if early intervention fails. Space systems can provide part of that information, along with other forms of intelligence-gathering. We in the Air Force must also support the GPALS system since it provides the only protection against the most likely form of nuclear strike, otherwise nondetectable: the accidental or terrorist strike.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

It is relatively easy to identify possible threats to peace and stability around the world; it is less easy to say to which of those threats the U.S. should respond, militarily if necessary, and this question is at the heart of the problem of determining America's response to a changing world. The concept of a monolithic communism driving each regional conflict is dead, and with it died the rationale and support for U.S. response to every conflict. Donald Neuchterlein frames this dilemma in the form of this question: "Is the issue at hand so important to the well-being of the United States that the President must be prepared to use force if all other efforts fail to resolve the problem?" and provides a construct for analyzing issues.¹⁶ He suggests that each issue be analyzed in terms of the intensity with which it threatens basic U.S. interests as described in Chapter II, and describes the following hierarchy of intensities:

- *Survival*, when the very existence of a country is in jeopardy as the result of an overt military attack, or threat of attack if an enemy's demands are rejected.
- *Vital*, when serious harm will likely result unless strong measures, including the use of conventional military forces, are employed to counter an antagonist's provocative action.
- *Major*, when a country's political, economic and social well-being may be adversely affected by external events or trends.
- *Peripheral*, when a nation's well-being is not adversely affected by events and trends abroad, although harm may be sustained by private U.S. companies with overseas operations.

Although Neuchterlein uses a matrix of national interest versus intensity

Analysis of Threats to National Interests				
<i>Threat</i>	Survival of U.S	National Interest Economic Well-Being	Healthy Relations w/Allies	Secure & Stable World
Nuclear War	S	S		S
Conventional War				
▪ W. Europe		V	M	V
▪ E. Europe		M	M	M
▪ E. Asia		M	M	M
▪ Middle East		V		V
▪ Other		M/P	M/P	M/P
Economic Threat				
▪ Middle East		V		M
▪ E. Asia		M	M	M
▪ Other		P	P/M	P
Terrorism			M	M
Drugs		M/P	P/M	
Illegal Immigration		M/P	P/M	
Regional Threats			M/V	
S=Survival	V=Vital	M=Major	P=Peripheral	

Fig 6. Threats to National Interests

to analyze developing situations, his criteria suggest that military action is warranted when the intensity with which U.S. objectives are threatened is either *survival* or *vital*. Using this construct, then, the question when analyzing developing situations becomes one of determining when serious harm will result to one or more of the United States' four basic national interests.

Figure 6 shows one example of an analysis of the threats outlined in

Chapter I. Based on this analysis, the threats which warrant U.S. military action are nuclear war, conventional war in Western Europe or the Middle East, economic threats in the Middle East, and some regional threats, depending on the specific circumstances (for instance, threats to Korea and Israel and western hemispheric threats to democratic governments). This analysis is mine; however, the same methodology could be used by others to form the basis for planning.

Neuchterlein also suggests that this methodology can be applied to other countries' interests, so that for any situation, we can predict when simultaneous threats at the survival or vital level might lead to military conflict. It might also be useful in determining the probability of forming successful coalitions. Based on the precedent set in the Gulf War, major military action in the changing world will likely depend on cooperative effort, whether simply by ratification in bodies such as UN, or in actual military coalition. Generation of sufficient military capability is one reason, but political legitimacy or overseas basing may also be factors just as important. Convincing other nations to cooperate may be a matter of convincing them that their vital interests are also threatened, and this construct may be useful from that standpoint.

The world is changing; the capabilities of airpower offer the tools our leaders need to cope with the uncertainties of the changing world. We have the opportunity to help keep the smaller Air Force of the 21st century an efficient, effective instrument of national policy, but we will be competing with other national priorities for the resources needed to maintain the force. We must do our best to demonstrate airpower's capabilities and argue intelligently for those resources. The key will be an appreciation of just what those capabilities are, and modern doctrine and leadership to make the most of them. The future of airpower and the nation depend of our success.

NOTES

1. Dennis M. Drew, "The Airpower Imperative: Hard Truths for an Uncertain World", *Strategic Review*, 19, No. 2 (Spring 1991): 24.
2. Benjamin F. Schemmer, "The Franco-German Independent Force: Weinberger, Train, and Bush Said It Best", *Armed Forces Journal International* (December 1991): 5.
3. "The Long Goodbye in Asia", *U.S. News and World Report*, Jan 13, 1992, p. 37.
4. U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991): 3-4.
5. *The 1991 Joint Net Military Assessment* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991): 2-2.
6. Ibid. p. 2-3.
7. Cheney, Richard, "U.S. Defense Strategy in an Era of Uncertainty", *The Early Bird*, Jan 8, 1992.
8. Robert A. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War", *International Security* 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991). Reprinted in *National Security Decision Making, Book 2*, p. 183.
9. Ibid. p. 190-191.
10. Ibid. p. 191.
11. "The Long Goodbye in Asia", p. 37.
12. Hon Donald B. Rice, "The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach-Global Power", (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1990): 3.
13. Ibid. p.3.
14. Air War College lecture, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, December 1991.
15. Les Aspin, "National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for US Military Forces", speech before the *Atlantic Council of the United States*, January 6, 1992.
16. Donald E. Nuechterlein, "National Interests and National Strategy: The Need for Priority", in *Understanding U.S. Strategy: A Reader*, ed. Terry L. Haynes (Washington D.C.: National University Press, 1983), pp. 35-63.

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