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Research Report


A STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FOR THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

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A STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FOR
THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

by

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SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
REQUIREMENT

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STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FOR
THE ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER

1. Strategic Direction. Recent dramatic events in Europe and the former Soviet Union have outmoded the United States' 40-year old grand strategy focused on containing communism. President George Bush outlined the United States' new role in the world in this way:

Within the broader community of nations, we see our own role clearly. We must not only protect our citizens and our interests but help create a new world in which our fundamental values not only survive but flourish. (38:v)

These fundamental values form the basis for the global components of U.S. national security strategy outlined below.

a. Major Components of National Security Strategy

(1) Global Components. The global components of U.S. national security strategy and their underlying aims are:

a. The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

b. A healthy and growing economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.

c. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

d. A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish. (38:3-4)

(2) Regional components. The United States pursues a policy of peaceful engagement and bilateral relationships in the Asia-Pacific region which entails:

(a) Maintaining the military alliances outlined in paragraph 1d. below.

(b) Actively promoting free and expanding markets in the region;

(c) Seeking to reduce the U.S.' \$41 billion trade imbalance with Japan by gaining full access to the Japanese market;

(d) Working to expand the U.S.- Japanese partnership to fields like refugee relief, non-proliferation, and the environment;

(e) Remaining committed to the continued economic growth and security of the Republic of Korea (ROK);

(f) Seeking appropriate contact and consultations with the People's Republic of China (PRC);

(g) Fostering constructive and peaceful interchange between Taiwan and the PRC;

(h) Seeking a resolution of the conflict in Cambodia under the auspices of the U.N.; and

(i) Promoting professionalism, support for civilian authority and respect for human rights in military-to-military relations.

b. Major Components of National Military Strategy

(1) Global components. The new defense strategy President Bush announced in August 1990 sees the major threat facing the U.S. as a major regional contingency in either Europe or the Pacific, rather than a short-warning, global war with the Russians. The goal of this new strategy remains to deter aggression against the U.S., its allies and interests. Should deterrence fail, our strategy seeks to defeat aggression on terms favorable to U.S. interests. The fundamental military capabilities necessary to do this are:

(a) Survivable and highly capable strategic offense and defense forces to deter war;

(b) Forward presence in key areas to promote regional stability and provide an initial capability for crisis response and escalation control;

(c) Conventional forces capable of effectively responding to short-notice regional crises and contingencies threatening U.S. interests; and

(d) Capacity to reconstitute a larger force structure if the nation once again is faced with the threat of a massive conflict. (11:5)

Our strategy demands we be able to move men and materiel to the scene of a crisis at a pace and in numbers sufficient to field an overwhelming force. To do this, we must assure our ability to use air and sea lanes and our access to space through maritime and aerospace superiority. (38:29) As a maritime nation dependent on the sea to preserve legitimate security and commercial ties, freedom of the seas is, and will remain, a vital U.S. interest.

U.S. military strategy continues to stress equitable, verifiable arms control agreements to reduce military threats, inject greater predictability into international relationships, and to channel force postures in more stabilizing directions. (11:5) Stopping the global proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as the missiles that deliver them, is a top priority.

Alliances and other partnerships with friendly nations are critical to our security interests. Alliances provide stability, deter aggression, and support the forward presence of U.S. forces. For these reasons, we have entered into various bi-lateral and multilateral treaties and alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. (40:11-1)

To help deter low-intensity conflicts and promote stability in the Third World, we support representative government, integrate security assistance efforts, and promote economic development. We do this through "peacetime engagement" -- a coordinated combination of political, economic and military actions aimed primarily at counteracting local violence and promoting nation-building. (11:5-6)

Powerful drug cartels threaten the economy, ecology, political process and social institutions of the regions in which they operate. The supply of illicit drugs to the United States from abroad, the

associated violence and international instability, and the use of illegal drugs within this country continue to pose a national security threat. As a result, the detection and countering of the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs is a high-priority national security mission of the Department of Defense. (43:85)

Our security in the future depends, as it has in the past, on our ability to quickly incorporate the latest technological advances into weapons systems in the field. Technology has historically been a comparative advantage for American forces; we have often relied on it to overcome numerical shortages and to reduce the risk to American lives. The spread of advanced technology weapons systems will surely erode the deterrent value of our forces -- and our competitive edge in warfare -- unless we act decisively now to maintain our technological superiority in the future. (38:30)

In a related vein, we must maintain sufficient industrial capacity in the United States to provide and sustain modern equipment to support a rapid expansion of our armed forces should the need occur.

(2) Regional components. The principal elements of our military strategy in the Asia-Pacific region have been forward deployed forces, overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements.

(3:5) Our forward deployed forces: ensure a rapid and flexible response capability; enable significant economy of force by reducing the number of U.S. units required; allow allies to share in defense costs; provide an effective logistics base; and demonstrate a visible U.S. commitment to the region to our allies and potential enemies. (3:7)

Adjustments to current U.S. force levels in the Pacific are

eing made in light of reduced tensions and improved capabilities of
ur allies as a result of political self-confidence and economic
rosperity. In February 1990, we announced our intent to begin a
hased withdrawal of U.S. forces in the region. The first phase,
asting one to three years, consists of removing 7,000 personnel
5,000 Army and 2,000 Air Force) from Korea; 5,000-6,000 Army troops
rom Japan; and all U.S. military personnel from the Philippines.
25:40; 24:12) Subsequent withdrawals will be made in the 3-10 year
imeframe as the situation warrants.

For the foreseeable future, we plan to maintain maritime forces
hroughout the region and land-based forces in Korea, Japan and
awaii. Our goal is to transition from a leading to a supporting
efense role in Korea. We anticipate little change in deployment
atterns in Japan.

As access to bases such as those in the Philippines is reduced,
ur continued forward presence in the region will depend on new
ccess agreements with nations in the region, as well as increased
lexibility and speed of response. Our forces will place a premium
n naval capabilities, backed by long-range air and ground forces
apable of providing deterrence and immediate crisis response.
38:31)

c. Other National Sources Foreign economic and security
ssistance is a vital instrument of American foreign policy. Our
oreign assistance program is focused on promoting and consolidating
emocratic values; promoting free market principles; promoting peace;
rotecting against transnational threats such as international ter-
orism, narcotics, AIDS and environmental degradation which threaten
ll peaceful nations; and meeting urgent human needs. (38:17)

Security assistance activities such as grant aid, foreign military sales, and the international military education and training program have been effective in the Pacific Command (PACOM). (31:15)

d. Alliance or Coalition Components. Seven of the U.S.'s ten mutual defense and security arrangements are in the Pacific region:

(1) The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Treaty. (Australia and the U.S. remain strong allies. Relations between New Zealand and the U.S. are strained because of New Zealand's barring of nuclear equipped or powered weapons systems.)

(2) The Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea.

(3) The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan. (Japan's only defense treaty.)

(4) The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines.

(5) The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (which remains in effect on a bilateral basis with Thailand.)

(6) The Compact of Free Association with the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

(7) The Compact of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia. (57:79)

Two regional organizations have important security dimensions. The Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), formed in 1967 by Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand and the Philippines, decided in January 1992 "to seek avenues to engage member states in new areas of cooperation in security matters" (4:24). For the most part, members are seeking this increased defense cooperation by strengthening the existing network of bilateral defense ties.

The Five Power Defence Arrangement, consisting of Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore, serves primarily to integrate air defenses of participating countries. The arrangement is twenty years old and the only remaining multilateral

security network in Southeast Asia. (45:8)

1. Theater Strategic Situation.

a. Characteristics of the Theater. PACOM's theater of operations covers half the world's surface, an area of more than 100 million square miles; 17 of the world's 24 time zones; and touches 40 countries and eight American territories. (57:74)

The theater can be broken into various sub-regions on the basis of history, geography, cultures and language. The area is frequently broken into four sub-regions when discussing security issues: Northeast Asia; Southeast Asia; South Asia; and the South Pacific. (56:1) Northeast Asia consists of China, North and South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. Southeast Asia consists of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, and the Philippines. South Asia is comprised of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Burma, Nepal and Bhutan. The South Pacific region consists of the Polynesian, Micronesian and Melanesian island chains. (34:293)

b. Intelligence Estimate. The region remains heavily armed with, seven of the world's largest military establishments (China, Russia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Vietnam and the U.S.) operating here. Three of these countries (U.S., China, and Russia) deploy nuclear weapons and major conventional forces in the area. In addition, the U.S. and the former Soviet Union have provided their clients and allies some of their most sophisticated conventional military systems.

The area shows tangible signs of tension reduction. The Vietnamese have withdrawn their forces from Cambodia and a peace accord was signed in October 1991. The two Korean governments are talking to each other about nuclear weapons inspections and other

ension reducing activities. China reduced its armed forces by one billion and the Soviets subsequently reduced their forces along the Sino-Soviet border in Mongolia and in Vietnam. (52:13) Although the final outcome of the fragmentation of the Soviet Union is still unknown, Russia recently announced an overall reduction in the size of its military forces and the intent to adopt a defensive military doctrine (50:1).

As a result of these changes, the potential for conflict is reverting to traditional forms: the continuing standoff on the Korean Peninsula; and civil wars and dissidence suppression/counter-insurgency operations in Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Territorial disputes continue on the Sino-Soviet border; between Japan and Russia in the Northern Territories; between Vietnam and China over the Paracel Islands; and over the Spratley Islands which are occupied by Vietnamese, Taiwanese, Chinese, Malaysian and Filipino forces. Resolution of these disputes appears to depend more on easing ethnic tensions and historic antagonisms than on diplomatic procedures.

The greatest immediate threat to regional security, however, is North Korea's nuclear weapons development program. The U.S. estimates the Koreans will have a nuclear device (non deliverable due to size) by 1994 and a nuclear weapon possibly deliverable by the CUD-C by the mid-to-late 1990s. (30:102) There is a growing consensus that the North Korean nuclear weapons program should be halted. In the past year, the U.S., Japan, South Korea and the former Soviet Union have all called on North Korea to allow full inspection of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Towards this end, the U.S. agreed on its part

make the Korean Peninsula nuclear free. This may have broken the stalemate. In March 1992, North and South Korea agreed to allow mutual inspections of their nuclear facilities by June 1992 and created a joint commission to draw up plans for banning nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula. (33:14A) In addition, the head of the North Korean delegation to the IAEA said his country would allow IAEA inspections to begin in June. (33:14A)

In 1985, fifteen South Pacific states signed the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZT), creating a formally declared nuclear free zone. The treaty forbids members to acquire or test nuclear weapons. Transit of nuclear weapons is not prohibited, although each member is permitted to determine its own policy regarding transit by ships which may be nuclear armed. The former Soviet Union and China signed protocols not to use, test, or base nuclear weapons in the zone. The U.S. declared it will follow the intent of the SPNFZT protocols, but declined to sign them. (19:9)

The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the missiles to deliver them by Third World nations is a growing concern. By the year 2000, as many as nine developing countries could have nuclear weapons, up to 30 could have chemical weapons, and many could possess a biological weapons capability. (44:65) Nations taking steps to develop nuclear weapons or who have acquired them include: Israel, Libya, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Taiwan, South Africa and India. In addition, it is widely known the U.S., France, Britain, China and the Commonwealth of Independent States have nuclear weapons. The concern about proliferation is exacerbated by fears that Soviet nuclear weapons experts may sell their services to the highest bidder in the

ftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Third World ballistic missile system capabilities are spreading and growing, as well. By the year 2000, 20 nations will have their own ballistic rockets and launchers. (27:65; 35:24) Half of these governments will have missiles with a range of 5,000 miles or more. (15:16)

c. Global Implications.

(1) Conditions and circumstances. A key task for the future will be maintaining regional balances and resolving social, economic and territorial disputes before they erupt into armed conflict. The Asian-Pacific region is home to some of the world's most economically and politically dynamic societies. The region also includes some of the last traditional communist regimes on the face of the earth. Although superpower tensions are diminishing, traditional regional ethnic unrest may rise.

Donald Zagoria described four post-Cold War international trends which are visible in the area. (58)

First is a transformation in political alignments. The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are, perhaps, the most convincing evidence of this trend. The Asian-Pacific has been similarly affected. The former Soviet Union established formal ties with South Korea, while cooling relations with Vietnam and North Korea. It also began new dialogues with China and Japan. China opened a trade office with South Korea and began formal ties with Indonesia and Singapore. Most dramatically, the former Soviet Union played a major role in the Gulf War by agreeing not to view the conflict as a confrontation between superpower interests or client states.

The second trend is the increasing tendency to see economic

power as a determinant of military power. Related to this is the fact that trade, not territorial expansion or military might, is becoming accepted as the key to international wealth and power. The economic structure of the area continues to move toward market systems; reflecting vibrant economic performance in South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Taiwan. Clearly, recognition of Japan's economic superpower status is at the center of this realization. Japan is beginning to flex its muscles as an economic superpower. Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa's comments during the January 1992 summit of world leaders are an example. During the meeting Miyazawa said Japan should have a say in future U.N. peacekeeping activities, or he couldn't guarantee Japan would finance them. (2:14A) I'm sure the leaders of the cashed-strapped U.N. got his message.

The third trend has been the downgrading of ideology in international affairs. Throughout the region, second- and third-generation postrevolutionary leaders are placing a higher premium on economic development and pragmatic foreign policies than on ideology. Most recent and striking was Russian President Boris Yeltsin's appeal for economic aid at the recent world leaders summit: "This is the last opportunity to defend democracy, the world has to know that." (2:1A)

The fourth trend is a result of the spectacular collapse of communism. It seems likely now that communism will either disappear completely by the 21st century, or as in Eastern Europe, be so radically transformed in the direction of capitalism that it will be unrecognizable. At the same time, the politics of countries in the region continue to evolve toward multiparty practices and increased freedom. (58)

(2) Influences. The following factors may influence how one or more of the nations in this area act or react to world events:

(a) Japanese occupation of the region during World War II continues to have a profound affect on the region; both in terms of anti-militarism in Japan and fear of Japanese expansionism in the rest of the area.

(b) The lack of a widely agreed upon threat, a history of bilateral versus multilateral security agreements, and the proliferation of arms in the region makes comprehensive regional arms control agreements unlikely.

(c) Growing U.S. concern about its trade imbalance and a perception of unfair trade practices, may lead to tensions between the U.S. and countries in the area, particularly Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

(d) Political uncertainties are growing in anticipation of the major changes in generational leadership that will occur in China, North Korea, Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia.

e. Logistics Estimate. The ability to project our power will underpin our strategy more than ever. We must be able to deploy substantial forces and sustain them in parts of the region where prepositioning of equipment will not always be feasible, where adequate bases may not be available (at least before a crisis) and where there is a less well-developed industrial base and infrastructure to support our forces once they have arrived. As our overall force levels draw down in the theater, sustaining and expanding our investment in airlift, sealift, and -- where possible -- prepositioning will become more important. (38:29)

f. Command, Control, and Communications Estimate. The smaller, highly mobile U.S. forces envisioned for the 1990s will require robust and flexible command, control and communications (C3) systems that are as mobile as the forces they support. As Desert Storm demonstrated, this requirement will increasingly be met by satellite communications. Current C3 systems are adequate to support operations to counter terrorism, insurgencies, narcotics trafficking, and major crises. C3 systems may rely on augmentation by commercial and, to a lesser degree, allied communications to support U.S. Forces. Command, control and communications systems will be vulnerable to a wide array of threats including physical attack, jamming, exploitation, deception, and nuclear effects.

g. Personnel Estimate. The U.S. Pacific Command contained approximately 383,000 men and women as of March 1, 1991. In accord with the Secretary of Defense's "base force" concept, one Army division and one or two Air Force fighter wings will be deployed in South Korea; and one or two Air Force fighter wings, one carrier battle group, one Marine Amphibious Ready Group, and one Marine Expeditionary Force will be deployed in Japan. Reinforcements consist of an Army division and Air Force fighter wing in Hawaii, an Air Force fighter wing in Alaska, and five Navy carrier battle groups homeported in the U.S. (22:19)

3. Strategic Concepts.

a. Military Dimensions.

(1) Nuclear, chemical and biological. The U.S. seeks to deter nuclear conflict. Should a nuclear attack occur, however, the United States must and will attempt to control escalation and deny the aggressor its wartime goals. Therefore, the U.S. must maintain

the ability to respond appropriately to any level of aggression. (43:51) The U.S. has no offensive biological warfare capabilities. Defensive biological warfare capabilities include personal protective equipment and a strong medical system. U.S. offensive chemical warfare capability centers on binary chemical artillery shells. The U.S. halted production of these weapons and is in the process of drawing down its binary weapons production capability. Until a global, verifiable chemical warfare ban is concluded, U.S. forces will maintain a modest retaliatory chemical warfare capability and a robust chemical warfare defensive program. U.S. chemical warfare defensive capabilities are limited, but effective. (40:11-14, 11-15)

(2) ' Space. Space forces provide capabilities such as precise positioning, reliable communications, warning, and timely surveillance to U.S. forces on a worldwide basis. During peacetime and wartime operations, space forces provide or significantly enhance the ability of decision makers and tactical commanders to exercise command and control over their forces, to communicate with on-scene commanders, and to carry out thousands of routine tasks that would otherwise be enormously expensive or impossible. (43:74-75) U.S. Space Command, through Air Force Space Command, is responsible for providing precise time and navigation, warning, and surveillance support to U.S. forces worldwide.

(3) Conventional. U.S. national military strategy at the broadest level rests on three interrelated principles: deterrence, forward presence, and coalition warfare. It would be prohibitively expensive, if not impossible, for the U.S. to maintain a numerically superior level of military presence in the Pacific theater. The nature of this maritime region and the most likely threats we face,

therefore, require air and naval forces backed by highly mobile and flexible ground forces and the airlift and fast sealift to deploy them. Our strategy also requires a strong amphibious capability and a rapid, CONUS-based reinforcement capability.

(4) Low-intensity conflict. The global spread of sophisticated military and dual-use technologies will enable a growing number of regional powers to arm themselves with capabilities that in the past were reserved only for the superpowers. (44:5) The U.S. must be able to counter these threats with selectivity, flexibility and the prospect of a favorable outcome. To do this, U.S. forces must be trained and equipped to respond to terrorism, drug trafficking and insurgencies, as well as peacekeeping and noncombatant evacuation operations. (44:12-13) Success in this area will depend on maintaining a strong alliance structure; technological superiority; and specially tailored military capabilities which can be used in conjunction with other elements of national power. (44:6)

(5) Logistics. Logistic functions should be performed as routinely as possible throughout the entire spectrum of operations. To the maximum extent possible, logistic functions should utilize existing policies and procedures of the military departments. (54:3-57,3-58) Implementation and execution of logistic functions remain the responsibility of the services and the service component commander. Furthermore, each of the services is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces in the PACOM area, except when logistic support is otherwise provided for by agreements or assignments concerning common servicing, joint servicing, or cross servicing. (40:11-19)

(6) Security Assistance. The security assistance program assists allies and friends and protects mutual interests; promotes peace and stability; helps maintain U.S. defense alliances; aids U.S. friends and allies to defend themselves against external aggression, internal subversion, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking; supports democratically elected governments and helps advance democratic values; and helps wage the fight against illegal drugs. (43:10) In FY 1992, for example, the security assistance funding was programmed to provide: \$20 million in direct assistance to Cambodia and an additional \$5 million for leadership training, human rights education and medical aid projects for the Cambodian Resistance (14:105); \$2.3 million for professional military education, management training and technical training to support the Indonesian F-16 program (14:177-79); and \$2.5 million to assist the Royal Thai Army in aiding more than 300,000 refugees when an elected government was restored in Thailand. (14:283)

(7) Host-nation support. We expect increasing assistance from our allies in the area of cost sharing. In the Republic of Korea (ROK), we seek the beginning of a ROK-funded relocation of U.S. forces out of Seoul and an increase in Korea's share of the costs associated with maintaining U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula. We also seek increased financial support of U.S. forces operating from Japan. In addition, we continue to stress the importance of maintaining system interoperability in our weapons systems by encouraging maximum procurement from the U.S., increasing technology flowback, discouraging the development of non-complementary systems, increased political-military dialogue, and a revitalized security consultative process. (3:10)

b. Diplomatic Dimensions. The U.S. is committed to maintaining a visible, credible presence in the Asia-Pacific region through forward deployed forces and bilateral security arrangements. (28:1A) The Bush Administration has identified "six keys to promoting lasting peace" in the region: progressive trade liberalization; a shared commitment to democracy and human rights; educational and scientific innovation; respect for the environment; an appreciation for our distinct cultural heritages; and security cooperation. (6:841) DoD supports these goals through peacekeeping operations, disaster relief, nation-building assistance, humanitarian assistance, military-to-military contacts and the security assistance program. In each instance, the effectiveness of DoD's contribution hinges on clearly translating foreign policy objectives into clear, operational military tasks. (44:13)

c. Economic Dimensions. The United States is committed to a strategy which expands and strengthens market economies around the world. This requires international efforts to open markets and expand trade; to strengthen cooperation among major industrial countries and with international financial institutions; and to apply imaginative solutions to the problems of developing countries. (38:19) The U.S. seeks a leadership role in the Pacific because our military presence here sets the stage of our economic involvement in the region. With a total two-way transPacific trade exceeding \$320 billion annually, almost 50% more than our transAtlantic trade, it is clearly in our own best interests to help preserve peace and stability in the region. (3:5)

d. Sociopsychological Dimensions. The Sociopsychological aspect of national strategy deals with the combined psychological effects of diplomatic, political, economic, ideological, and military activities. Psychological operations (PSYOP) is one of the forms of activity used by military commanders to influence the attitudes and behavior of foreign groups in a manner favorable to the achievement of U.S. national objectives. As with other military operations, PSYOP may be used independently or as an integral part of other operations on a theaterwide basis to attain mission objectives. (54:4-28,4-29)

e. Other Dimensions. N/A

4. Specific Courses of Action. The 1990s will be a decade of transition for the Asia-Pacific region, as it will be for the rest of the world. I'll begin this section with several courses of action the U.S. should pursue which affect most or all of the nations in the region. I'll then outline a series of specific courses of action for Japan and Korea based on the first-hand experience I gained from my February 1992 trip to these countries and independent research.

a. Multilateral Courses of Action. The following courses of action have regional or multi-national dimensions.

(1) Arms control. The U.S. must continue its efforts to ban chemical weapons on a global basis; encourage follow-on and increased arms control agreements at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Review Conference scheduled for this spring; encourage wider participation in the confidence and security-building measures agreed to in Vienna in 1990; encourage adherence (North Korea) and wider participation in the Nuclear Non

Proliferation Treaty (India) (44:12); and continue its 1991 initiative to facilitate consultation on sales of conventional weaponry that "increases tension or aggravates armed conflict".

(21:8) DISCUSSION: Conventional weapons sales are booming in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in Thailand, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. Washington Post correspondent Jeffrey Smith attributes the arms buildup to: fears of future instability in China, North Korea, and Myanmar; declining prices for advanced weapons and an increase in supply as a result of reduced tensions in Europe; and regional fears about a power vacuum created by announced reductions of US forces in Japan and Korea. (51:1) The U.S. finds itself on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the demand for weapons is good news for American defense contractors who last year sold roughly \$3.2 billion in arms to the region and are hoping for strong sales this year. On the other hand, President Bush called for restraint in international arms sales last Fall in recognition of the fact the world's five primary arms merchants-- the US, France, China, the former Soviet Union, and Britain-- sold billions of dollars worth of conventional weapons to Iraq prior to its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. At U.S. initiative, these five countries (who coincidentally also are the five permanent members of the UN Security Council) are in the midst of negotiations to exchange listings of weapons export contracts. The talks are stalled by China's refusal to disclose weapons contracts prior to shipment (presumably because of fears of interdiction) and by its insistence the sale of short range ballistic missiles should not be regulated any more stringently than fighter aircraft. (51:1,10,15.) The proliferation of dual use (military and civilian) space- and missile-

critical systems, components and technologies and the expected proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region add special urgency to the problem. (39:91; 27:65; 23:9)

(2). Increase Access to Overseas Facilities. The U.S. must continue negotiations to create a network of access agreements to Asian-Pacific ports, airfields, storage areas and repair facilities for use during contingency operations and periods of crisis. DISCUSSION: In November 1990, Singapore agreed to permit US naval ships to use repair facilities at its Sembawang Port and U.S. fighters to make month-long deployments to the Paya Lebar Airport. (45:8; 55:2) In January 1992, Malaysian Defense Minister Najib Razak said the U.S. Navy may be allowed to use Malaysia's Lumut naval base to maintain frigates and smaller warships. (1:25) Negotiations for similar access rights are going on with Thailand and Brunei; U.S. officials are hopeful they will produce accords. (46:31)

(3) Broaden ASEAN's Security Role. The United States should seek to expand military exchanges, combined training and exercises with ASEAN nations. In addition, the U.S. should seek ASEAN's support in limiting nuclear proliferation in the region. DISCUSSION: In January 1992, ASEAN members agreed to "seek avenues to engage member states in new areas of cooperation in security matters". (4:24) This was the first time ASEAN members have ever explicitly discussed security matters either among themselves or with non-member countries. (4:24) Most ASEAN nations favor U.S. presence in the region and are interested in increased cooperation with the U.S. (4:25) For these reasons, some are considering providing U.S. forces increased access (see above) to their ports and airfields. They may also be willing to increase the scope and complexity of

their participation in joint military exercises. Doing so, according to Admiral David E. Jeremiah, vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, would increase interoperability between the participating nations by helping to ensure they would "understand how to work together in the event that it was ever required." (46:32) ASEAN's stated desire to make the region nuclear free makes it extremely likely member nations will support efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the region.

(4) Continue to refuse to sign the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZT). The U.S. should continue to oppose the SPNFZ treaty and other attempts to make the region a nuclear free zone because of the restrictions it would put on the U.S.'s ability to effectively operate in the region. DISCUSSION: The U.S. agreed to make the Korean Peninsula nuclear free to encourage North Korea not to develop nuclear weapons and to encourage the Korean reunification process. The U.S. also said it will follow the intent of the SPNFZT even though the treaty does not provide for verification. (19:9) Additional limitations on U.S. nuclear-armed and/or powered ships or aircraft in the region would significantly hamper U.S. military and deterrent capability in the region.

(5) Naval arms control. The U.S. should continue to oppose naval arms control discussions in the Asian-Pacific. DISCUSSION: The U.S. continues to be a maritime power, dependent on its ability to use the seas and international waterways for access to overseas markets and to move its forces quickly and without restriction in support of U.S. interests worldwide. Because the U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific most likely to respond to a regional

contingency are naval forces, naval restrictions limit our ability to meet U.S. treaty obligations and to otherwise protect our national interests. (3:15)

b. Country Recommendations.

(1) Japan. U.S. and Japanese military and civilian officials are unambiguous in their belief the security relationship between the two countries is crucial to future peace, stability and prosperity in the region. (8:38) The following courses of action are in the U.S. national interest and support these goals.

(a) True Global Partnership. The U.S. should do all it can to treat Japan as an equal partner in international affairs and to draw Japan into positions of greater responsibility in the international system. DISCUSSION: Japan sees an increasing role for the United Nations in world affairs (16:10) and would like to be a part of it. Japanese military and civilian officials expressed hope the Japanese Diet would authorize an expanded role for the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) in UN peacekeeping activities in the future; Cambodia was mentioned specifically. (20,41) In addition, Japan has expressed growing interest in becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. (49:15) The U.S. should actively support this goal.

The Japanese are already playing a leadership role in international affairs. Japan pledged (and paid) a total of \$13 billion in support of the Gulf War, more than any other nation. (10:33) Japan devotes a larger percentage of its GNP to foreign aid than does the U.S. and 60% of that aid is devoted to other Asian nations. (5:6) They pledged \$2.5 billion in aid to Russia in October 1991 (10:37) and are evaluating participation in the \$24 billion aid

package being discussed by G-7 nations now. They pledged \$25 million in support of the UN's Cambodian peacekeeping effort (29) and were asked to consider contributing a total of \$1 billion. (49:15) Because of Japan's image as Samurai warriors in business suits, however, the Japanese rarely receive public appreciation for these efforts. Kent Calder sums the problem up in the context of Japan's contributions to finance the Gulf War:

Japan's huge contributions were going unrecognized, and Japan remained an outsider in a New World Order dominated once again by a revitalized trans-Atlantic alliance. The economic superpower Japan, as Yoichi Funabashi succinctly put it, had been exposed as "merely an automatic teller machine -- one that needed a kick before dispensing the cash." Not only that, but it seemed to the Japanese that few Americans seemed to admit that cash-dispensing was a legitimate function in world affairs, even as they demanded large amounts of cash to fulfill unilaterally determined objectives. (10:36)

The Japanese have a legitimate complaint. The U.S. should give substance to its policy of "global partnership" (9) and do all it can to ensure Japan's contributions to international peace receive the recognition they deserve.

(b) Support Northern Territories Return. The U.S. should actively support return of the Northern Territories to Japan. DISCUSSION: Toshi Ozawa of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) linked Japan's \$2.5 billion aid package to Russia to return of the Northern Islands and expressed hope further progress would be made during Russian President Boris Yeltsin's summer 1992 visit to Japan. (41) The U.S. should privately and publicly declare its support for the return of the islands to Japan and be willing to link its participation in the G-7 aid program for Russia to this action.

(c) Decrease U.S. Presence on Okinawa. The U.S.

should consolidate its military activities on Okinawa and return as much land to the Okinawans as soon as possible. DISCUSSION: The U.S. has 47 installations on the Island of Okinawa. (37) MOFA's Toshi Dzawa said there was strong sentiment to return facilities on Okinawa and limit night-landing and low-level flying by U.S. forces there. He added it was becoming increasingly difficult for the central government to put off these requests and indicated expectations were high that some facilities would be returned on May 20, 1992, the 20th anniversary of Okinawan reversion. (41) In its April 1990 report to Congress, DoD noted consolidation of its facilities on Okinawa were proceeding through the bilateral Facilities Adjustment Process and stated its aim was the return of "property to improve civil-military relations". (3:10-11) Contrary to USFJ expectations (37), the U.S. should get on with the process and do something meaningful for the May 20, 1992 anniversary.

(d) Japanese Participation in GPALS. The U.S. should actively campaign for significant Japanese participation in the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) program. DISCUSSION: Declines in the U.S. defense budget and an election year need to shore up the U.S. economy may put the \$41 billion GPALS program out of reach for the U.S. Major Japanese participation in GPALS could save the program and is plausible for five reasons. First, the Japanese have been participating in the SDI program since 1986 in areas such as superconductivity and magnetic field technology. Second, the GPALS program seems tailor-made for Japan's "defensive" constitution and foreign policy. In fact, Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) officials said Japan was studying the U.S. request for Japanese involvement in GPALS now. (20) Third, Japan's

aversion to nuclear attack and growing awareness of its vulnerability to ballistic missile attack from neighboring states (18) may increase Japanese interest in and support for the system. Fourth, Japan clearly has the human, technical and financial resources to devote to the project. Finally, according to Colonel Ed Hind of the U.S. Embassy in Japan's Defense Attache's Office, major participation in GPALS would avoid several of the stumbling blocks encountered in the FSX program; notably it would be a program both countries were actively interested in pursuing and it would be one which lent itself to sharing technology, since both countries have unique technological strengths needed to field the system.

(e) Encourage Japanese Force Improvements. The U.S. must continue to press the Japanese for force improvements which enhance their ability to perform agreed upon roles. DISCUSSION: The U.S. must continue to encourage Japan to increase its territorial defense capabilities and enhance its ability to defend its sea lanes to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles.(3:10) Although the current Japanese Five Year Defense Plan includes naval and air forces to perform this mission (53:6), the U.S. must ensure they do not fall by the way side as a result of defense cuts reflecting "the voice of the people". (20)

(2) Korea. General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified in March 1991 he believes the people of the Republic of Korea (ROK) "can do a lot more for their own defense". (42:77) The following courses of action reflect this belief, while protecting U.S. interests in the region.

(a) Transition the U.S. to a Supporting Role. U.S. forces should continue to identify military roles and missions

currently performed by the U.S. which can be assumed by ROK forces.

DISCUSSION: U.S. forces have begun the process of transitioning from a leading to a supporting role by transferring greater responsibility to the South Koreans for combined operations. A ROK General has been appointed to head the UN side of the Armistice commission; ROK troops assumed responsibility for guarding the Panmunjom armistice compound in October 1991 (26:23); and in March 1992 the U.S. and South Korea agreed to transfer the 279-mile Trans-Korea Pipeline from U.S. military to ROK military control. (32) If North Korea agrees to renounce its nuclear ambitions, or perhaps as an incentive to do so, the U.S. should seriously consider transferring the leadership of the UN Combined Forces Command to a Korean general. This act, perhaps more than any other, would visibly demonstrate U.S. intent to assume a supporting role on the Korean Peninsula. (7)

(b) Host Nation Support. The U.S. should continue to press Korea to assume a greater share of the costs of maintaining U.S. forces in Korea. DISCUSSION: The annual cost of maintaining U.S. forces in Korea is estimated to be \$20 billion. (7:477) (The cost of the 2nd Infantry Division alone is estimated to be \$2.4 billion a year.) The ROK pledged \$180 million this year to offset these costs, rising to \$450 million by 1995. (44:16; 5:8) The 1995 amount represents one-half of the won-based costs of maintaining U.S. forces in country. (48) In contrast, Japan currently pays \$3 billion annually and, by 1995, will pay 100 percent of the yen-based costs. (5:8) The South Koreans have agreed to pay \$3 billion to move U.S. forces out of Seoul (the value of the land is estimated at \$10 billion). (48) Clearly, though, there is much room for increased ROK contributions.

(c) Encourage Confidence Building Measures. The

U.S. should continue to encourage confidence building measures between North and South Korea. DISCUSSION: Richard Solomon, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, asserts the process of building confidence must be created by the Koreans themselves. At the same time he says the major powers can encourage and support the dialogue. (52:247) Three confidence building measures consistent with this approach come to mind. First, Japan, China, Russia and the U.S. can use their influence to encourage North Korea to pullback some/all of the 650,000 troops along the demilitarized zone (DMZ). (19:15) General Robert W. Riscassi, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, says the North Koreans have added 1,000 tanks and 6,000 artillery tubes and rocket launchers to their force structure during the last decade (47:36) and testified recently these troops are "still arrayed unequivocally for attack". (36:23) This amount of offensive military might within 35 miles of Seoul does little to inspire confidence among the South Koreans. Second, the ROK Ministry of National Unification states the forced separation of ten million Korean families is an important problem. (39) Encouraging the negotiation of some way for families to visit loved ones for even a brief period of time is a humanitarian gesture which would also inspire confidence in the negotiation process between the two Koreas. Finally, Russia, Japan, China, the U.S. and the two Koreas could all agree to notify each other of military exercises in advance and invite observers to attend. (24:22) This seemingly small measure would bring military forces of these nations into regular contact with each other and offer another avenue for dialogue.

(d) Halt the North Korean Nuclear Program. The U.S. should continue to aggressively seek North Korean compliance with the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and insist on IAEA inspections of known and suspected nuclear facilities. DISCUSSION: A major policy aim of the U.S. has been to halt the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The North and South Koreans agreed to mutual inspections by June 10th, which was seen as a major step forward. (33:14A) In addition, the North Koreans are expected to announce their willingness to allow IAEA inspections this month. (33:14A)

(e) U.S. Troop Cuts. The U.S. should continue its phased withdrawal of troops from Korea subject to diminution of the North Korean threat. DISCUSSION: DoD is pursuing a three-phased withdrawal of forces from the Asian-Pacific. The U.S. announced it would cut its forces in Korea to 36,000 by the end of 1992 and planned to cut an additional 6,000 people as part of phase two during 1993 and 1995. (13) Secretary Cheney put the second phase troop cuts on hold in November 1991 (13) and General Riscassi reiterated during recent Congressional testimony the U.S.'s intention not to remove additional troops until questions about the North Korean nuclear weapons program are answered. (36)

5. Decisions. This assessment presents a variety of reasons why the U.S. must continue its policies of peacetime engagement and forward presence in the Asian-Pacific region. President Bush acknowledged this during his January 1992 visit to Singapore when he said:

We will maintain a visible, credible presence in the Asia-Pacific region with our forward deployed forces, and through bilateral defense arrangements with nations of the region." (28:14A)

He added:

The United States does not maintain our security presence as some act of charity. Your security and your prosperity serve our interests because you can better help build a more stable, more prosperous world. (55:7)

Thus, a continued US presence in the region serves both our allies' and our own interests. Admiral Larson sums it up this way:

Two key factors are needed to maintain security and stability in the region: economic growth and U.S. presence. Economic growth will enable our friends to assume a larger responsibility for their defense. Our presence protects the sea lanes vital to expanding trade, reinforces our role as a honest broker to help avoid regional tensions and reduces the need for Asian countries to expand their military capability in ways which might be destabilizing. (31:4)

This does not mean, however, that US policy in the Asia-Pacific region must or should remain static. Adjustments to our bi-lateral agreements, force structure and national policies can be made. The simple truth is the United States can no longer do it all by itself. The courses of action outlined in this paper recognize this truth and offer a realistic way for the U.S. to protect its vital interests while acknowledging growth and transformations in the region.

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