

AIR WAR COLLEGE

(4)

Research Report

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE: INDIA


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STRATEGIC ESTIMATE; INDIA

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MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

16 April 1992

**Strategic Estimate
for
India**

1-Strategic Direction

Major Components of National Security Strategy:

Global Components

The global components of the United States' national security are defined by its national interests. These are delineated in the *National Security Strategy of the United States* as follows:

- The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
- A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
- Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
- A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.¹

To achieve these interests, the United States will pursue the following objectives which are applicable to the South Asian region:

- Deter aggression; failing that, repel or defeat military attack on favorable terms
- Pursue equitable and verifiable arms control agreements.
- Foster restraint in military spending and discourage military adventurism
- Prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies and resources to hostile countries or groups
- Promote a strong, prosperous and competitive U.S. economy
- Ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and space.

¹ Office of the President, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991, P. 3-4.

- Promote an open and expanding international economic system, based on market principles, with minimal distortions to trade and investment, stable currencies, and broadly respected rules for managing and resolving economic disputes
- Achieve cooperative solutions to key environmental challenges.
- Enlarge the commonwealth of nations that share commitment to democracy
- Establish a more balanced partnership with our allies
- Strengthen international institutions like the United Nations.
- Maintain stable regional military balances
- Promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes
- Support aid, trade, and investment policies that promote economic development and social and political progress.²

Major Components of National Security Strategy:

Regional Components

The regional components of U.S. strategy is stated in the *National Security Strategy of the United States*, viz:

In South Asia, as elsewhere, we strongly believe that security is best served by resolving disputes through negotiations rather than military pressure. The dangers of intermediate-range missile deployments and nuclear proliferation in the sub-continent persist, however, and this year we were unable to certify Pakistan's nuclear program under the Pressler Amendment. We will continue to encourage Indo-Pakistani rapprochement and the adoption of confidence-building measures and other concrete steps to moderate their military competition.³

Major Components of National Military Strategy:

Global Components

On 2 August 1990 President Bush announced a new regional defense strategy. It postulated that the massive, short-warning threat that could escalate to global war has been eliminated. However, it also recognized that regional, non-democratic powers might attempt to achieve hegemony in regions that are critical to U.S. interests and

² *National Security Strategy of the United States*, p. 3-4.

³ *National Security Strategy of the United States*, p. 10

that the threats from these powers could arise with little or no warning. Our goal in meeting these threats is to "ensure that other powers do not dominate critical regions of the world thereby preventing them from posing a serious global challenge."⁴

This regional defense strategy consists of four essential elements:

- Strategic nuclear deterrence and strategic nuclear defense.
- Forward presence,
- Crisis response, and
- Reconstitution.

Major Components of National Military Strategy:

Regional Components

The above-mentioned four essential elements of U.S. defense strategy have the following regional components:

Strategic nuclear deterrence and strategic nuclear defense : The *Annual Report to Congress* notes that other nations will use strategic nuclear weapons to play an essential role in their military strategies. As a result of this, defense against ballistic missiles also will assume greater importance in the future. The outcome of regional instabilities in South Asia could increase the risk of ballistic missile use. To meet this threat the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system is being developed to provide "limited defense on a global scale, defending the United States, forward deployed U.S. forces, and allies."⁵

Forward Presence : From the *Annual Report to Congress* and the *1991 Joint Military Net Assessment* (JMNA), one can infer that the interests of the United States

⁴ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress*, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1992, p. 6.

⁵ *Report of the Secretary of Defense*, p.7.

do not require the continual presence of U.S. military forces in South Asia. The JMNA argues, moreover, that "the United States cannot--nor should it--be everywhere at all times....U.S. presence will depend increasingly on periodic regional deployments, often for exercises combined with security assistance and civic action goals."⁶ During peacetime, therefore, we will demonstrate our engagement in the region "through visits, exercises, equipment prepositioning, and security and humanitarian assistance programs. Our purpose remains to deter aggression and assure friends of our commitment by being present and having the credible forces needed for crisis response."⁷

Crisis Response : The *1991 Joint Military Net Assessment* does not list India as a region of expected crises and threats to U.S. interests.⁸ Since we do not have a land-based presence in this region, "the capability for rapid movement of forces to remote areas is...an essential component of our national security."⁹ "We must be ready to deploy a broad array of capabilities, including heavy and light ground forces, air forces, naval and amphibious forces, space forces and special operations forces."¹⁰

Reconstitution : *National Military Strategy, 1992* implies that reconstitution is intended to provide a warfighting capability in the event of a global war.¹¹ Although the length of time required by any regional power to mount a global threat to the United States is increasing, in terms of South Asia, "the reconstitution concept requires that we take care to preserve the longest-lead elements of our security. This includes

⁶ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *1991 Joint Military Net Assessment*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1991, p. 4-6.

⁷ *Report of the Secretary of Defense*, p.8.

⁸ The *1991 JMNA* shows only five areas of crises and threats to U.S. interests. They are: Central America, Europe, the Persian Gulf, the Philippines, and Korea. *1991 Joint Military Net Assessment*, p. 9-1.

⁹ *Report of the Secretary of Defense*, p.9.

¹⁰ *Report of the Secretary of Defense*, p.9.

¹¹ Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, *National Military Strategy*, 1992, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992, p.7.

our alliance structures, forward deployments, and access arrangements..."¹²

Major Components of National Military Strategy:

Alliance or Coalition Components

There are no alliances which actively affect India or South Asia. However, India did view the Baghdad (later the CENTO) Pact and the SEATO Pact as inimical to its stated policy of nonalignment. Despite its hopes in nonalignment, India was not able to stop the region from being caught in the Great Powers' conflict. In 1954 the U.S. and Pakistan drew up a military pact; in 1955 Pakistan became a member of SEATO, and in 1955 Pakistan became a member of the Baghdad (later CENTO) Pact. India, fearing the western powers were aligning with its age-old enemy, moved closer to the Soviet Union, particularly as the Soviets became more supportive of India's nonalignment policy.

2-Theater Strategic Situation

Characteristics of the Theater (AOR)

[See Factbox below for basic data on India]¹³

Topography:

India has three main topographic regions; the Himalayan mountain system, on the north; the Northern Plains, drained by the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra rivers in north-central India; and Peninsular India, in the south.

The Himalayas form parts of India's borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tibet in the west and with Nepal, Bhutan, and Tibet in the east. The region is topographically complex and divided into prominent elongated valleys and mountain ranges. The highest mountains are in the Karakoram Range, where more than 30 other peaks rise above 7,300 m (24,000 ft). South of the Karakoram are the Great Himalayas, a

¹² Report of the Secretary of Defense, p.9.

¹³ *Grolier's Academic American Encyclopedia*, Grolier Electronic Publishing, 1992. Electronically downloaded from CompuServe Information Service.

range with extensive areas over 5,500 m (18,000 ft); sandwiched between the two major ranges is the narrow valley of the Upper Indus River. Southwest of the Great Himalayas and between them and the lower front ranges of the mountain system is the 160-km (100-mi) long Vale of Kashmir, which is located on the upper Jhelum River and focuses on the town of Srinagar. To the east, the mountains form most of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.

The Northern Plains are part of a vast lowland extending across the subcontinent from Pakistan in the west to Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) in the east. The plains are bordered on the north by the foothills of the Himalayas; south of the Brahmaputra basin are the Khasi Hills and Shillong Plateau; and south of the Indo-Gangetic Plain rise the uplands of Peninsular India. In India, this lowland has a length of about 1,600 km (1,000 mi) from east to west and a width of about 320 km (200 mi). It is drained in the west by the Beas and Sutlej rivers, which are tributaries of the Indus; in the east by the Brahmaputra; and in the rest of India by the Ganges and its many tributaries and distributaries. The Northern Plains are floored by alluvial deposits derived mainly from the Himalayas and deposited over the lowland by the major rivers.

Peninsular India is geologically the oldest part of India. Ancient crystalline and metamorphic rocks underlie most of the region, but basaltic lavas (igneous rocks) cover parts of the Deccan Plateau. Topographically, the surface of the peninsula is tilted down toward the east and north, forming a belt of prominent uplands along the western edge. These uplands, reaching more than 2,500 m (8,200 ft), include the Western Ghats and the Nilgiri Hills. The northern edge of the peninsula, although lower, is also prominent and rises south of the Northern Plains to form the Aravalli Range in the west and the jungle-covered Chota Nagpur Plateau in the east. Only a very narrow coastal plain lies between the Western Ghats and the Arabian Sea; more extensive plains, including the deltas of the Cauveri, Krishna, Mahanadi, and Damodar rivers, line the east coast. ¹⁴

Climatology

The Rajasthan Desert in northwestern India has a semiarid climate, but the majority of India has a tropical monsoonal climate associated with a wind reversal between summer and winter.

In summer low-pressure areas develop over the subcontinent as the land heats up, and summer monsoon winds are drawn onto the land from the surrounding seas. These moisture-laden winds release heavy rainfall when they reach the coast or are forced to rise over mountains; summers (mid-June to mid-September) are accordingly wet and hot, with temperatures between 27 deg and 32 deg C (81 deg and 90 deg F).

In winter high pressures build over the land; winds then blow predominantly from the land to the sea, and winter in India (mid-December to mid-March) is predominantly dry and cool, with temperatures averaging 21 deg C (70 deg F).

Two transitional seasons occur before and after the summer rains. A hot and dry pre-monsoonal season lasts from mid-March to mid-June and is associated with temperatures between 38 deg and 43 deg C (100 deg and 110 deg F). A transitional post monsoonal season occurs as the monsoons retreat (mid-September to mid-December) and is associated with light and sporadic rainfall and temperatures around 25 deg C.

Cooler, more temperate conditions prevail in the Himalayas and decrease with altitude. Precipitation ranges from almost zero in the Thar desert to 10,870 mm (428 in)

¹⁴ *Grolier's Academic American Encyclopedia*, CompuServe Information Service

annually in the Shillong Plateau, which is one of the wettest places in the world. Rainfall is generally heaviest in coastal and highland areas and diminishes inland. Amounts vary widely from year to year, especially in inland areas, and dry years often cause widespread crop failures. Crop damage may also occur on a smaller scale in parts of eastern India when "nor-westerns" and Bay of Bengal cyclones strike the land, most often in May and early June, in the form of tornadoes, whirlwinds, hailstorms, and heavy downpours.¹⁵

Factbox: India Overview

TITLE: India

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of India (Bharat)

LAND. Area: 3,287,590 sq km (1,269,345 sq mi). Capital: New Delhi (1991 metropolitan area est. pop., 8,380,000). Largest city: Bombay (1991 prelim. pop., metropolitan area, 12,570,000). Elevations: highest--Nanda Devi, 7,817 m (25,645 ft); lowest--sea level, along the coasts.

PEOPLE. Population (1991 preliminary census): 843,930,861; density: 267 persons per sq km (692 per sq mi). Distribution (1989 est.): 26% urban, 74% rural. Annual growth (1989): 2.2% Official language: Hindi. Major religions: Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, Buddhism, Jainism.

ECONOMY. GNP (1988): \$254.8 billion; \$306 per capita. Labor distribution (1988): commerce and services--14%; manufacturing--20%; agriculture--52%; construction--7%; government and public authorities--7%. Foreign trade (1989 est.): imports--\$21.32 billion; exports--\$16.49 billion; principal trade partners--United States, Japan, USSR, Germany, United Kingdom. Currency: 1 rupee = 100 piasres.

GOVERNMENT. Type: republic. Government leaders (1992): Ramaswami Venkataraman--president; P. V. Narasimha Rao--prime minister. Legislature: Parliament. Political subdivisions: 25 states, 7 union territories.

EDUCATION AND HEALTH. Literacy (1989): 34% of adult population. Universities (1987): 135. Hospital beds (1989): 379,545. Physicians (1989): 57,702. Life expectancy (1989): women--58; men--57. Infant mortality (1989): 91 per 1,000 live births.

COMMUNICATIONS. Railroads (1987). 61,810 km (38,407 mi) total. Roads (1986): 1,633,300 km (1,014,885 mi) total. Major ports: 11. Major airfields: 4.

¹⁵ *Grolier's Academic American Encyclopedia*, Compuserve Information Service

Political Factors:

The constitution of 1950 provides for a federal system with a parliamentary form of government. Sovereignty is shared between the central government and the states, but the national government is given far greater powers.

The office of president is largely ceremonial, with real authority vested in a prime minister and council of ministers responsible to Parliament. The president, however, has constitutional authority to impose president's rule should a state government appear unable to maintain order and to declare a national state of emergency and supersede parliamentary rule. President's rule was invoked in a number of states in the 1970s and 1980s, and emergency national rule was imposed in 1975 at the urging of then prime minister Indira Gandhi.

Parliament consists of two houses, the Rajya Sabha (Council of States) and the Lok Sabha (House of the People). Real power resides in the Lok Sabha, whose members are elected directly by all eligible voters and sits for 5 years unless dissolved earlier.

The Indian National Congress, the party most identified with the Indian Nationalist movement, has remained in control of the central government for all but three of the years since independence. Despite two major party splits in 1969 and 1978, both led by Indira Gandhi, and many victories by various state and local parties in regional elections, the Congress party has maintained almost unbroken power on the national level. In addition, one family has provided India's prime ministers for all but 5 years between 1947 and 1989. Rising discontent with India's leadership, however, caused the Congress party to lose its parliamentary majority in the November 1989 elections.

The National Front, led by V. P. Singh, formed a minority government, but resigned from office in November 1990 following a vote of no confidence in the parliament. Chandra Shekhar became India's eight prime minister on Nov. 10, 1990, but he resigned on Mar. 6, 1991. Following general elections held from May 20 to June 15, 1991, in which a plurality was won by the Congress party, P. V. Narasimha Rao became prime minister.

State government resembles the federal system. The governor of each state is appointed by the president. A chief minister and council of the state hold executive authority and are responsible to an elected state legislative assembly. ¹⁶

Intelligence Estimate

Selected Sources of Conflict

1. Ethnic Groups Seeking Greater Autonomy:

In 1982, Zail Singh was elected president, the first Sikh to serve in that office. His election occurred at a time when Sikhs were calling for more autonomy in Punjab and radical Sikh youths were resorting to violence in an attempt to win a separate Sikh state (Khalistan). Several years of Sikh violence culminated in the invasion of the Golden Temple at Amritsar by Indian troops in June 1984 and the assassination of Gandhi by her own Sikh bodyguards on Oct. 31, 1984....The violence continued even after the central government imposed harsh police measures and dismissed the elected Sikh state government in Punjab in 1987.

Ethnic groups in other parts of India also called for greater autonomy. Despite the

¹⁶ *Grolier's Academic American Encyclopedia*, CompuServe Information Service

central government's acquiescence in creating the new ethnic states of Nagaland and Mizoram in the northeast and a 1988 peace accord with rebels in Tripura, demands for greater cultural and ethnic political power persisted in that area. The Gurkhas of the Darjeeling district won local autonomy in 1988. Tribal peoples in northeastern India were agitating for the creation of a new state of "Jharkaland," and their protest was having repercussions in Bihar, Orissa, and West Bengal. Citizens of Tamil Nadu also called for more autonomy, while tribal groups in Assam fought migrants from Bangladesh and an often violent economic struggle between landlords and lower castes has been building for years in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. Political parties based on "Sons of the Soil" principles are increasingly calling for economic advantages for indigenous groups, and in general the nationalistic feeling of the independence movement seemed to be eroding and giving way to communal, religious, and caste divisions. Nevertheless, most Indians continued to support the integrity of the nation and to rely on democratic means to come to grips with the issues confronting them.¹⁷

2. India-Pakistan Wars:

India and Pakistan have fought three major wars with each other since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The first conflict was over Kashmir in 1947-49. With independence and partition, the subcontinent's numerous princely states faced the choice of joining either Hindu India or Muslim Pakistan. Contiguous to both India and West Pakistan, Kashmir was ruled by a Hindu prince, but the majority of its population was Muslim. In 1947, Pakistani tribesmen invaded the state in support of an uprising by Muslim peasants. The maharaja fled to Delhi, where he signed papers giving Kashmir to India. Indian troops were then flown in to defend the former princely state, bringing the Pakistani army into the fray. Fighting continued in Kashmir until a United Nations commission arranged a truce in January 1949. Kashmir was then divided along the cease-fire line, with India holding about two-thirds and Pakistan the remainder. India referred the case to the UN Security Council, which has heard conflicting claims intermittently ever since; periodic fighting has broken the uneasy peace.

In April 1965 sharp fighting broke out in the Rann of Kutch, on the border between West Pakistan and India, and later spread to Kashmir and to the Punjab. India charged that Pakistani infiltrators were again invading Kashmir while Pakistan claimed that the invaders were Kashmiri freedom fighters. India seized army posts on the Pakistan side of their common border in Kashmir; Pakistan countered with tanks secured as military aid from the United States; and India dispatched planes to destroy the tanks. When Pakistan unleashed its air force--trained by the United States--and each side launched a large-scale land invasion of the other's territory. In September 1965, the United Nations again intervened to bring about a cease-fire. Direct confrontation between the troops ended in January 1966, shortly after an agreement between India and Pakistan had been reached at Tashkent, USSR, through Soviet mediation.

Although neither the 1948 nor the 1965 war was conclusive, India demonstrated unquestioned military superiority over Pakistan in the third war, which took place in December 1971. At that time India intervened in the civil war that had erupted between West and East Pakistan, facilitating the secession of the latter, which became the independent state of Bangladesh. The Pakistani army and air force were severely

¹⁷ C. H. Deshpande, reviewed by Donald Johnson in *Grolier's Academic American Encyclopedia*, Compuserve Information Service

crippled in this war. Most defense analysts have since concluded that the truncated Pakistan no longer has the population base to support an army powerful enough to cope with the Indian armed forces, which number more than 1,000,000 (constituting one of the world's largest military forces).¹⁸

3. Tamil Terrorism in Sri Lanka: Since 1976 an extremist movement in Sri Lanka has demanded a separate Tamil nation--Eelam--in the northern part of the island, where the Tamils constitute a majority. Tamil terrorists have operated from bases in Tamil Nadu, 30 miles across the narrow Palk Strait. Their intent has been to provoke a Sri Lankan military over-response in order to polarize the Tamil and Singhalese communities and convince the Tamils they can find security only in a separate and independent nation.

On July 29, 1987, Sri Lanka and India signed an accord promising greater autonomy to the Tamils....India sent a peacekeeping force to Sri Lanka to guarantee Tamil compliance with the accord. This sparked protests among Singhalese who feared domination by India and involved Indian troops in direct combat with Tamil guerrillas, many of whom--including the largest group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam--rejected the accord.

The last Indian troops withdrew from Sri Lanka on Mar. 24, 1990, but the 13-month-long cease-fire broke down on June 11, and the 7-year-old war between the government and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam resumed.¹⁹

4. Relations with China: India-China relations have been essentially antagonistic, particularly since China's defeat of India in the border war of 1962. Although relations showed some improvement in the late 1980s and early 1990s, India still regards China as a continuing threat, with the power, motives, and opportunities to challenge Indian security.

India's testing of a nuclear device in 1974 was directly related to the threat India saw in the Chinese nuclear threat. This perceived threat from China also influenced India's decision not to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and not to support a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia. At the same time, India's nuclear capability

¹⁸ Marcus Franda and Vonetta J. Franda in *Grollier's Academic American Encyclopedia*, CompuServe Information Service

¹⁹ John E. MacDonald in *Grollier's Academic American Encyclopedia*, CompuServe Information Service

has driven Pakistan to conduct its own nuclear weapons testing program, which has raised the potential destruction level in the continuing conflict in the Kashmir.

The strategic linkage between China and Pakistan has been a concern to India since 1963. One such concern has been the Karakoram highway, jointly built by Pakistan and China through the Pakistani-occupied area of Jammu and Kashmir. This was built to promote trade between the two countries, and although trade has not increased, India views the highway as a means for China to increase its leverage to intervene in a future crisis in the region.

In 1985, the entry of China's warships into the Bay of Bengal was seen as show of force by India; however, since that time relations have improved. In 1988, Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing and a foreign secretary-level joint working group was established to deal with the border issue. In 1991, Li Peng visited New Delhi and both countries decided to resume overland trade.

Global Implications:

Conditions

India has the world's fourth largest armed force and is emerging as the leading military power in the South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. As such its policies and actions will be key to regional peace and stability. As the world most populous democracy and a leader in the Nonaligned Movement, India's influence is already felt far beyond the South Asia region. India has adhered to U.N. sanctions against Iraq and suffered greatly from lost Gulf oil and worker remittances. At the same time, India is experiencing increasing difficulty in obtaining foreign development assistance.²⁰

Global Implications:

Circumstances

India no longer seeks a major global role. The superpowers do not seek her mediation as they did in the early days of the Cold War. India seems to be reconciled to

²⁰ United States Department of State and Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance, Fiscal Year 1992*, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991, p. 176.

the fact that she has not been effective in creating a united front of Third World countries. At the same time India

seems determined to achieve a dominant position in the Indian Ocean region commensurate with its overwhelming preponderance in population, resources, and economic strength. India is building what will be a potent power-projection force by the end of this century, backed up by carrier air power, and increasingly effective surface and submarine forces. In missile and space developments, India is expected to be able to produce ballistic missiles by the mid-1990's.²¹

Experience in three wars has made India highly security conscious. She is convinced that her security must be built on a foundation other than the international good will she chased for more than two decades. India has developed one of the largest, most fully developed ordnance industries of any developing country and is an exporter of military supplies and equipment to Iran, Iraq, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and even the Soviet Union.

Global Implications:

Influences

The Soviet Union's links with India developed after the United States entered an arms pact with Pakistan in 1954 and included Pakistan into SEATO and the Baghdad Pacts. Today, however, India's current leaders are as unclear as the rest of the world on how to deal with the new realities in the Soviet Union. A genuinely democratic Commonwealth of Independent States with a multiparty system would eliminate one of the anxieties Indians have had about close relations with a totalitarian regime. At the same time, India could become attractive to the Soviet leaders as a country that has managed to combine bureaucratic socialism, a mixed economy, a genuine multiparty democracy, a free press, and unity-in-diversity. The CIS may gain greater influence as it searches for hard currency in exchange for its considerable surplus of defense equipment. India's number one ranking among all countries in the world as a arms recipient suggests a natural convergence of interest between the capitals of the CIS

²¹Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, FY 1990, Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1989, p.26.

and New Delhi in this area.

Indian-U.S. relations have continued to grow since 1981, especially in the fields of commerce and transfer of high technology.

In line with its policies of diversifying its foreign arms and equipment sources and achieving self-reliance in arms production, India has purchased U.S. military equipment and sought transfers of U.S. military technology.

The United States has used the increasing active high-level dialogue resulting from closer relations to promote regional stability and to increase Indo-U.S. cooperation without detriment to Pakistani-U.S. cooperation. Our discussions have included such contentious issues as nuclear and missile proliferation; Indian trade barriers and protection of intellectual property rights; U.S. relations with Pakistan; India's relations with its South Asian neighbors; and, human rights abuses, particularly in Kashmir and Punjab.²²

Logistics Estimate

The basic logistics support systems required for receipt and onward movement of incoming personnel and supplies are available throughout the country. Air, sea, and rail lines of communication are extensive; the rail system is the third-largest in the world.

Strategic air and sea lift will be required if a significant logistical requirement exists. There are no prepositioned war reserve stocks in South Asia; however, a Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron stationed at Diego Garcia in support of USCENTCOM could, if released, alleviate some of the logistics problems.

Command, Control, and Communications Estimate

Indigenous C3 networks would require augmentation to support wartime demands. This augmentation would be in the form of USPACECOM command and control system and the Theater Mission Essential Communication System (TMECS).

²² *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance*, p. 176.

Personnel Estimate

India's total active armed forces totals 1,265,000. Additionally, there are 300,000 army reserves and 160,000 in the Territorial Army. [See the Factbox for India's military force structure.²³]

Factbox: India's Military		
The Army	The Navy	The Air Force
1,100,000 active 300,000 Reserves 160,000 Territ. Army Divisions 2 armored 1 mechanized 21 infantry 11 mountain Brigades/Regiments 8 independent armor 9 independent infantry 1 mountain 1 airborne commando 5 independent artillery 5 air defense 4 engineer EQUIPMENT 3,100 main battle tanks 800 light tanks 4,000 towed artillery 180 SP artillery 800 APCs 9 helo squadrons	55,000 active includes 5,000 naval air 1,000 marines EQUIPMENT: 17 submarines 2 aircraft carriers 5 destroyers 21 frigates 13 corvettes 9 missile craft 4 offshore patrol 14 inshore patrol 22 minesweepers 9 amphibious craft 20 support/misc. NAF has attack, SAR anti-sub, comm, and training acft.	110,000 active Squadrons 1 bomber 26 fighter/ground attack 17 fighter 8 maritime attack 2 attack helo 3 recce 12 transport 11 transport helo Misc training & VIP aircraft 30 SAM battalions

3-Strategic Concepts

At the most general level, United States regional goals in India and South Asia entail

²³ Factbox compiled from data from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1991-1992*, London: Brassey's Publishing, 1992, p. 161-163.

the promotion of regional security and stability.

Military Dimensions:

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological

The United States should discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and strike to ensure that missile technology is channeled towards the peaceful uses rather than weapons delivery platforms. Towards these goals, the U.S. can pursue a three-tiered nonproliferation strategy. This strategy would include: strengthening existing arrangements, expanding the membership of multilateral regimes directed against proliferation, and pursuing new initiatives, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Military Dimensions:

Space

The U.S. should encourage India to pursue peaceful applications of its satellite technology.

Military Dimensions:

Conventional

"In line with [India's] policies of diversifying its foreign arms and equipment sources and achieving self-reliance in arms production, India has purchased U.S. military equipment and sought transfers of U.S. military technology. [The United States] has used the increasingly active high-level dialogue from closer relations to promote regional stability and to increase Indo-U.S. cooperation without detriment to Pakistani-U.S. cooperation."²⁴

Military Dimensions:

Low-Intensity Conflict

The U.S. should encourage India to pursue a viable human rights policy in dealing

²⁴ *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance*, p. 176.

with the instability both in Punjab and Kashmir. We should discourage Pakistan's efforts to export terrorists/insurgents into the Kashmir. The U.S. should encourage bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan to prevent further escalation of the violence between those two countries.

Military Dimensions:

Logistics

India has

one of the Third World's largest military-industrial research complexes, consisting of 33 ordnance factories, 9 public sector undertakings, and 34 major R&D organizations—all owned and run by the Defense Ministry....Besides being self sufficient in the production of a variety of small arms, medium artillery, and ammunition, this complex has designed and built aircraft, helicopters, sophisticated jet fighters, frigates, tanks, armored personnel carriers, missiles, and advanced electronic equipment.²⁵

The U.S. should seek long-term assurances for U.S. landing rights and port access in India. These landing rights were invaluable during Desert Shield/ Desert Storm and may be necessary in securing access to the Arabian Gulf region.

Military Dimensions:

Security Assistance

The U.S. should support an expanded International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. This can "provide management, technical and research training, with emphasis on mid- and senior-level professional military education as part of India's goal of developing a modern defense structure. IMET builds on the Indian armed forces' tradition of respect for democracy and civilian control of the military."²⁶

Diplomatic Dimensions:

The U.S. should emphasize diplomacy to resolve disputes rather than military action.

²⁵ Akhtar Majeed, "Indian Security Perspectives in the 1990s," *Asian Survey*, November 1990, p. 1087.

²⁶ *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance*, p. 176.

To encourage Indo-Pakistan rapprochement, the U.S. should pursue a strategy to reduce regional tensions between India and Pakistan, while, at the same time, expanding ties with both to foster stability in South Asia.

Economic Dimensions:

The U.S. "became India's major trading partner in 1983-84, surpassing the Soviet Union....The two-way trade between India and the U.S. stood at nearly US\$7 billion per year by 1990."²⁷ Acknowledging this, the U.S. should pursue a strategy that expands and strengthens India's market economy while seeking means to open Indian markets and expand trade. At the same time, we should foster economic reforms in India as well as negotiating policies to ease India's restrictions on foreign investment.

Sociopsychological Dimensions:

"India is a secular republic governed by officials chosen in regular multiparty elections at national and state levels. Its democracy is bolstered by legal safeguards for the rights of individuals, a vigorous free press, an independent judiciary, and action-oriented voluntary associations."²⁸ It is in the interests of the U.S. to support a nation with those ethical and spiritual values which have established a stronghold in the defense of democratic ideals.

4-Specific Courses of Action

This section will not consider enemy courses of action, as such. Rather, it will examine courses of action in a deliberate process. [See chart, next page]. First it will posit several determinants that characterize the region. From these, various power arrangements can be drawn, and from these, specific alternative futures can be considered.

²⁷ S.D. Muni, "India and the Post-Cold War World: Opportunities and Challenges, *Asian Survey*, September 1991, p. 866

²⁸ *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance*, p. 176.

Determinants of Future Realities in South Asia

- U.S. forces will be cut to at least as low as the base force, if not lower.
- Traditional national and intrastate rivalries, previously held in check by the Cold War superpowers, will continue to escalate in violence and scope.
- The Former Soviet Union's power will continue to decline in South Asia.
- The United States will continue its trend of conducting more trade and investment in Asia than in Europe.
- Most South Asian countries will not welcome Japanese military power of any kind unless it is clear that the U.S. will not allow Japan to dominate the region.

**Can Lead to these Five
Potential Power Arrangements**

- Rise of India as a South Asian power
- Stalemate between South Asian nations
- Rise of Japan as an Asian power
- Rise of Religious/Ethnic Powers (including pan-Islamic fundamentalism)
- Pax Americana in South Asia

**Can Lead to These
Alternative Futures**

- Indo-Pakistan War
- Dominance of India in the Indian Ocean
- Trade Wars
- South Asian Free Trade Area
- Increasing Insurgencies
- Increasing Arms Buildup
- Accompanied by an economic slide to chaos

In developing courses of action for the United States in furthering its relations with India, the following determinants were considered to be the fundamental future realities in South Asia:

1. U.S. forces will be cut to at least as low as the base force, if not lower.
2. Traditional national and intrastate rivalries, previously held in check by the Cold War superpowers, will continue to escalate in violence and scope.
3. The Former Soviet Union's power will continue to decline in South Asia.
4. The United States will continue its trend of conducting greater trade and investment in Asia than in Europe.
5. Most South Asian countries will not welcome Japanese military power of any kind unless it is clear that the U.S. will not allow Japan to dominate the region.

Given these fundamental determinants, there are at least five major patterns of power relationships that could be derived:

• First, the rise of India as a the predominate power in South Asia. India is in a dominant geostrategic position to assume this power. "India accounts for 73.4% of the territory, 76.5% of the population, and 97.2% of the gross national product [of South Asia], and a similar situation exists in the military field."²⁹ Two significant symbols of India's military might are, first, the growth of Indian naval power, and, secondly, India's development of the two-stage Agni medium-range ballistic missile. With 750 million people, the world's fourth largest army, and a well-developed military-industrial complex, India is in a position to gain a hegemonic influence in the region.

• The second possible pattern of power is a stalemate between the local powers in achieving predominance in South Asia. The collapse of the Former Soviet Union may have affected India's quest for hegemony in two significant ways. First, India lost its single source network for spare parts for its Soviet-made equipment. "India must now

²⁹ M.V. Bratersky and S.I. Lunyov, "India at the End of the Century: Transformation into an Asian Regional Power," *Asian Survey*, October 1990, p. 928.

deal with more than 3,000 suppliers scattered throughout the former Soviet Union, many of which are demanding payment in hard currency."³⁰ Secondly, the New Delhi governments have depended in the past for the Soviet Union's support in India's conflicts with its neighbors. "In this respect, the significant change that has taken place as a result of Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives is that the USSR may not like to be dragged in on the Indian side to any military or political disputes with Pakistan and China."³¹

• The third alternative pattern of power is in the rise of Japan as an Asian power, whose influence will extend to South Asia. It is "very difficult to imagine a scenario in which economic tension with the U.S. would lead to a Japanese decision to abandon Article Nine of its Constitution and develop a unilateral capability for military power projection in the region."³² However, "'Japan is engaged in a campaign of direct investment in Asia that is unprecedented in its scope and velocity,' said Chalmers Johnson, a Japan specialist at the University of California (San Diego)," ³³ and this investment may result in Japan's economic dominance of the region. There are those who argue that Japan's security concerns may spill over into the Indian Ocean as well. They note that "with more than 70 percent of its oil imports flowing through the Indian Ocean from the Gulf, Japanese strategists believe they should be more concerned with India's quest for naval preeminence in that part of the world."³⁴

• A fourth potential power arrangement in South Asia can proceed from the rise of

³⁰ Selig S. Harrison, "South Asia and the United States: A Chance for a Fresh Start,," *Current History*, March 1992, p. 100.

³¹ S. D. Muni, p. 868.

³² Michael J. Green, "Japan in Asia: The American Connection,," *Global Affairs*, Summer 1991, in *AWC Resident Studies Syllabus and Readings, International Security Studies, Book 2*, p. 259.

³³ Bruce Stokes, "Japan's Asian Edge," *National Journal*, 29 Jun 1991, in *AWC Resident Studies Syllabus and Readings, International Security Studies, Book 2*, p. 242.

³⁴ Tai Ming Cheung, "Command of the Seas," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 Jul 1989, p. 18.

pan-Islamic fundamentalism. One manifestation of this movement is visible in Pakistan, where Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif's

ruling coalition includes Islamic fundamentalist leaders who call for increased efforts to realize Zia's dream of a "strategic realignment" that would counter India through the establishment of a Pakistan-centered, pan-Islamic confederation embracing Afghanistan, some of the Central Asian republics, and Kashmir. As a practical matter, Islamabad will no doubt have to settle for limited influence along its borders in a Balkanized Afghanistan and a marginal role in Central Asia, where Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia will be the major players.³⁵

- Finally, a fifth power arrangement in South Asia could be the outcome of a global Pax Americana, in which the United States, as a unipolar military superpower, expands its presence in the Indian Ocean to ensure its access to Gulf oil and to moderate the saber-rattling from India and Pakistan.

As a result of these potential power arrangements, a number of alternative future outcomes can be postulated, to include:

- An Indo-Pakistan War, either in the near term ("before defense readiness is eroded and before the Kashmir situation deteriorates further"³⁶), or after a long period of arms build-ups.

- The dominance of India in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet naval presence is already negligible in the Indian Ocean, and India's interests in that body of water was stated succinctly by India Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral L. Ramdas, "We have nearly US\$50 billion of seaborne trade, 10 major ports, a huge exclusive economic zone, a big fishing industry, offshore oil and gas... These are our permanent interests...our assets which we intend to keep, and keep them from interference from anyone from outside."³⁷

- Trade Wars: These could result from unilateral decisions, such as the 1988 U.S. Omnibus Trade Act. Despite the sanctions threatened by the act "India refused to

³⁵ Selig S. Harrison, p. 101.

³⁶ Selig S. Harrison, p. 100

³⁷ Hamish McDonald, "Credible Force," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 19 Dec 1991, p. 31.

comply with American demands to open up its insurance and investment markets to foreign entrepreneurs and argued that such decisions must be resolved in multilateral forums....[I]n any case, India insisted that it would not negotiate under such threats of economic retaliation."³⁸

- Increasing insurgencies: India's problems are from inside (Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam) as well as from outside (the Tamils in Sri Lanka who are based in Tamil Nadu.)

On the other hand,

those regimes in South Asia which are authoritarian and military-dominated will feel the real impact of the wind of democracy. In this respect India will prove to be relatively more stable than its neighbors. However, India, too, will face increasing problems because of demands for greater autonomy and devolution of powers, based on ethnic identities and regional disparities.³⁹

- Increasing arms buildups, of which the escalation to a nuclear capability in India and in Pakistan is just one manifestation.

Courses of Action

Given these alternative future outcomes, the United States can pursue a number of alternatives, including:

- Support the deployment of the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) as a counter against India's and Pakistan's incipient nuclear threat.

- Continue to pursue a policy of parallelism towards India and Pakistan in order to gain a regional balance in South Asia

- Establish an agenda for strategic realignment in South Asia. Encourage Indian military growth to enable it to become a pillar of stability in the region, much like the same role played by Saudi Arabia in the Middle East.

- Encourage India and Pakistan to declare South Asia as a Nuclear Free Zone.

- Declare the Indian subcontinent, in John Kenneth Galbraith's phrase, a

³⁸ Raju G. C. Thomas, U.S. Transfers of 'Dual-Use' Technologies to India," *Asian Survey*, September 1990, p. 838-839.

³⁹ K. Subrahmanyam, "Security in Pluralism," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 19 April 1990, p. 30.

"functioning anarchy;" withdraw from the area, leaving forces only at Diego Garcia and at the western Indian Ocean at the mouth of the Arabian Gulf.

Comparison of Courses of Action :

- GPALS is a treatment of the symptoms of the nuclear issue in South Asia but does not treat the disease. Much like the Arabs and the Israelis, who will never end their warring until they can arrive at a resolution of the Palestinian issue, India and Pakistan will not cease from fighting until they can resolve the Kashmir problem. Selig S. Harrison makes a forceful case in arguing one means of resolving this issue could follow a Trieste-type solution under which India and Pakistan would create two autonomous regions, surrender authority to these areas, except in defense, foreign affairs, and communications, and withdraw their forces from the region.⁴⁰

- Pursuing a course of parallelism in arming Pakistan and India, given the nuclear issue, will be very difficult, if not impossible. We should provide no further military assistance to Pakistan until the President can certify, under the provisions of the Pressler Amendment, that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon. The Administration argues that "U.S. assistance strengthens the case against nuclear weapons for Pakistan, primarily by helping to strengthen Pakistan's conventional force."⁴¹ On the other hand, Selig Harrison points out "the experience of the cold war decades shows that the United States cannot orchestrate the balance of power between India and Pakistan. American military involvement in the subcontinent fuels regional tensions and directly undermines the ability of the United States to act as a neutral mediator."⁴²

- Developing an agenda for strategic realignment with India while enhancing the

⁴⁰ Selig S. Harrison, p. 102.

⁴¹ *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance*, p. 241.

⁴² Selig S. Harrison, p. 104.

military capabilities of India does have some positive aspects. A stronger India could achieve a role which would parallel that which the British imperial policy had envisaged for the region. England saw India as fulfilling three roles: "(1) to keep the Russians out of Afghanistan; (2) to keep the Chinese out of Tibet; and (3) to keep the Indian Ocean free of external navies."⁴³ A stronger India could accomplish a similar buffer role against today's threats by (1) deterring Islamic fundamentalist/anti-democratic movements from spreading across Asia; (2) keeping the Chinese out of South Asia; and (3) keeping the Indian Ocean free of the Chinese navy. Although Pakistan may feel threatened by a stronger India, India has demonstrated no recent trends towards territorial expansion in Pakistan, despite its possessing an army strength 2.5 times greater than Pakistan, as well as possessing twice as many planes, 1.7 times as many tanks, and 1.6 times as much artillery.⁴⁴

- Declaring South Asia as a Nuclear Free Zone is a meaningless quest. As stated earlier in this monograph, India sees China—not Pakistan—as its primary nuclear threat, and India's nuclear potential is directed against that threat, not against the Pakistanis, who India could easily defeat conventionally.

- Finally, the United States should not withdraw totally from South Asia. We cannot turn our backs on a region that has one-fifth of the world's population, which if allowed to degenerate into chaos would produce an unprecedented outpouring of refugees to other parts of the world. At the same time, a presence in the region "is a way of ensuring that the U.S. can keep up pressure on India and Pakistan to halt their [nuclear] proliferation, and that a future Indo-Pakistan conflict does not spill over into attempts to put pressure on the West by threatening its lifeline of oil."⁴⁵

⁴³ Akhtar Najeed, *Indian Security Perspectives in the 1990s*, *Asian Review*, November 1990, p. 1085.

⁴⁴ Figures, not the conclusions, from M.V. Bratersky and S.I. Lunyov, p. 931.

⁴⁵ Anthony H. Cordesman, "America's Options in Asia: Partnership or Retreat," *Armed Forces Journal International*, February 1992, p. 1992.

5-Decisions

Realigning the United States into a stronger relationship with India offers the most efficacious means to best control the alternative futures discussed in the previous section. The results of actions taken thus far have been striking: closer cooperation in the United Nations, changes in economic policies, and greater congruity on the nuclear proliferation issues in South Asia. Continuing the work already accomplished should be done in accordance with the proposals made by the former commander of the U.S. Army in the Pacific, Lieutenant General Claude Kicklighter. The Kicklighter Proposals include:

- Visits by chiefs of staff on an annual basis;
- Setting up of an Indian/U.S. Army executive steering council;
- Regular staff talks between the two armies at the staff level;
- Reciprocal visits by other senior commanders;
- Combined training activities;
- U.S. and Indian Army participation in the Pacific Command's joint committee-level meeting program;
- Attendance and participation in regional conferences;
- Indian and U.S. Army Pacific co-hosting of the Pacific Armies Management Seminar in 1993;
- Collective training information exchange and cooperation.⁴⁶

The armed forces of India and the United States both share a tradition of respect for democracy and civilian control of the military. With that mutual understanding both military forces can expand on those shared traditions and continue to pursue additional confidence-building measures, which should, in turn, fashion greater trust between the two nations.

⁴⁶ Praful Bidwai, "India's Passage to Washington," *The Nation*, 20 Jan 1992, p. 48.

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