The Dual Track Decision and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty: The Role of the Cruise and Pershing II Missiles
Abstract
This study investigates the relationship between NATO's decision to approach the problem created by the intermediate-range nuclear force superiority of the Soviets and the eventual signing of the INF Treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union. The concept presented is that by adopting the dual track decision, (a track for negotiations and a simultaneous track for fielding U.S. INF missiles), the United States was eventually able to conduct arms negotiations from a position of strength. In this way a significant contribution to the INF Treaty negotiation process was made. The study examines the position of each principal prior to the dual track decision, examines the role each played in that decision, and looks at the actions taken following the implementation of the dual track decision. The study also presents the nuclear background of NATO, and also examines the INF negotiations in some detail. The conclusions provide the current status of the INF Treaty implementation and outlines some lessons which could be applied to future negotiations of this type. Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, INF Treaty, GLCM, PIT, Pershing II missiles, Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, Dual Track Decision, Nuclear arms negotiations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 05, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA258524
Entities
People
- Russell R. Sherrett
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College