


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TRADOC SPECIAL HISTORICAL STUDY

THE ARMY: WORLD WAR II TO KOREA

By

Dr. Anne W. Chapman

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Office of the Command Historian
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia

5 October 1992

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298

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 5 OCTOBER 1992		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED FINAL					
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Army: World War II to Korea.				5. FUNDING NUMBERS					
6. AUTHOR(S) Anne W. Chapman									
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) OFFICE OF THE COMMAND HISTORIAN UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651-5000				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER					
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER					
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES TRADOC Special Historical Study.									
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE					
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)									
Accession For NTIS CRA&I ☒ DTIC TAB ☐ Unannounced ☐ Justification _____ By _____ Distribution/ _____ Availability Codes <table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td>Dist</td> <td>Avail and/or Special</td> </tr> <tr> <td>A-1</td> <td></td> </tr> </table> DTIC SECURITY INCLUDED						Dist	Avail and/or Special	A-1	
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14. SUBJECT TERMS				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 26					
				16. PRICE CODE					
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED		18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED		19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT					
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT									

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THE ARMY: WORLD WAR II TO KOREA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Army activities in the period between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Korean conflict in the summer of 1950, took place against a background of public and military pressure for rapid redeployment of troops and a focus on enjoying a period of peace and prosperity. It was generally believed that another war would not be a concern for the United States in the foreseeable future. However, should war come, conventional wisdom held that it would be total war, with dependence on air power and the atomic bomb. Many observers felt the Army was almost irrelevant.

The period 1945-1950 can be divided into two phases--demobilization and post-war planning. Demobilization ended in mid-1947 with the end of the draft and the release of the last draftees. Post-war planning initially turned inward in an effort to restructure the Army as a small peacetime force. After 1948, attention increasingly turned to the tensions accompanying the deterioration of U.S. and Soviet relations. However, an economy-minded Congress and Defense Department severely limited the Army's ability to react to the need for new or continued programs or to the challenges of the Cold War. The result was an Army ill-prepared for the demands of the Korean War. Task Force Smith, a unit of approximately 400 men thrown into action against North Korean forces, suffered more than 150 casualties owing to inadequate training and equipment.

Training for inductees/recruits in the 1945-1950 period focused on providing a steady stream of replacements for occupation troops in Germany, Japan, and Austria, not on preparing for war. The eight-week training period was not sufficient to provide well-trained troops. In contradiction of the maxim that the United States has always prepared to fight the last war it had won, the nation was not preparing to fight any war--the last or the next. Plans for a 4 million man peacetime army rapidly gave way to one of 1.5 million--a strength which was never achieved.

Rather than focusing on training recruits and inductees to serve as replacements, the Army placed great emphasis on the development of a superior post-war school system, which many senior leaders believed had saved the Army during the rapid expansion for World War II. New peacetime curricula were developed for the service schools and the Command and General Staff College. A movement to reestablish the Army War College came to fruition in 1950. The establishment of the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces Staff College reflected an increased concern for joint training. However, the emphasis on schools produced a disproportionately

large school population that resulted in many understrength units.

The effort to develop and procure weapons and equipment did not fare quite as well as the school system. Most of the Army's equipment remained World War II vintage, and much of it was in worn condition. Units attempting field exercises found themselves without vehicles, radios, and other essential equipment. In the face of a lack of public support and declining defense budgets, the Army was hard-pressed to find a remedy.

In sum, on the eve of the Korean conflict the Army was the largest standing ground force in United States peacetime history. But it was ill-equipped and focused on occupation duty. Task Force Smith dramatically revealed the consequences of that type of emphasis.

THE ARMY: WORLD WAR II TO KOREA

Overview

After the Japanese surrender, the United States Army experienced a period of demobilization that lasted until mid-1947. After that time until 1950, a modest buildup and a reshaping occurred in response to the increasing tensions of the Cold War. During the period of demobilization, the U.S. did not return to its prewar isolationism. The balance of power in Europe and Asia had vanished, and the protection of oceans had been eliminated by advances in air transportation and weaponry. The immediate post-war task was to disassemble the great war machine and, at the same time, maintain occupation troops in conquered and liberated territories. Throughout the 1945-1950 period, the trend in American peacetime military thinking was the traditional U.S. reliance on mobilization in the event of war, rather than on armed preparedness to prevent war.¹

Public Attitudes and Demobilization

After the unexpectedly prompt surrender of Japan, an articulate public, Congress, and the troops themselves, demanded a rapid demobilization that upset plans for an orderly drawdown. The Army responded by easing the eligibility requirements for release. Half of its eight million troops had been released by the end of 1945. In response to continuing pressure, the Army more than halved its remaining strength during the first six months of 1946.²

By July 1947, the Army, including the Air Forces, was reduced to 1,070,000 officers and men. Its 89 divisions had been reduced to 12. The American public, always suspicious of large standing armies, looked forward to an era of peace, tranquility, and prosperity: with little thought that war would occur again in the near future. The Army itself looked less to present and future dangers than to assimilating the lessons of the war just ended. As a result of a relatively high enlistment rate in 1946 and the expectation that Universal Military Training would be

1. Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Background Brief No. 40, March 1992, pp. 1-2. This briefing was extracted from James F. Schnabel, The U.S. Army in the Korean War - Policy and Direction: The First Year and Roy B. Appleman, The U.S. Army in the Korean War - South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1972).

2. Ibid., pp.1-2.

adopted, Congress and the President allowed the Selective Service Act to lapse. All draftees were out of the Army by 30 June 1947, thus ending the official period of demobilization. The U.S. Army remained an all-volunteer force until mid-1948.³

To a majority of Americans, including the government, the post-World War II Army seemed irrelevant. That attitude had its roots in a belief that air power and atomic weapons would deter or check any challenge to the United States. Only after the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in early 1948, followed closely by the Berlin Crisis and the fall of nationalist China in 1949, was interest in traditional forms of military response renewed. Even then, the possibility of military action short of war or of conflicts in which the bomb would not be relevant, was almost completely ignored.⁴

The Budget

Fluctuations in Army strength reflected the level of the defense budget. President Harry S. Truman, determined to balance the national budget, employed through FY 1950, a "remainder" method of dealing with defense appropriations. All other expenditures were subtracted from revenues before he recommended a military appropriation. The Army took a 30 percent reduction for FY 1950. Consequently, at the start of the Korean conflict, actual strength had shrunk to 591,000. Budget planning in the spring of 1950 looked to a reduction in authorized strength from 630,201 to 610,900. The proposed cut would have eliminated one of the Army's ten tactical divisions, specifically, one of four divisions in the Far East Command.⁵

Mission of the Active Forces

Perceiving no major threat to the United States, the Army focused on the provision of forces for occupation duty in Germany

3. (1) Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, enlarged edition, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 485-89. Maj. William W. Epley, "Demobilization and the Rebuilding of the Army, 1945-1950," [1991], p. 1. (2) The strength of the Army ground forces was 684,000 on 1 July 1947. A year later, Army strength had fallen to 536,000 and the number of divisions had been reduced to 10. By June 1949, strength had risen to 659,000, after Congress adopted the Selective Service Act of June 1948 in lieu of a Universal Military Training act.

4. Weigley, p. 501.

5. (1) Epley, p. 3. (2) AUSA Briefing, p. 2. (3) Schnabel, p. 45.

and Japan, for garrison of overseas U.S. bases, and for creation of a Strategic Striking Force (redesignated the General Reserve in November 1945) for use in national emergencies. The mission of the General Reserve was to prepare to reinforce occupation forces in Europe and Asia and to act as a combat force in either area if necessary. In addition, it was to maintain the security of the United States and its possessions. The General Reserve was also to be prepared to furnish a reinforced corps task force of two divisions to discharge missions assigned by the United Nations Security Council.⁶

As originally conceived, the General Reserve was composed of two Army corps made up of five divisions and support troops. By August 1946, the General Reserve had been redefined as a mobile force composed of two divisions. The personnel ceiling was set at 71,000, but long before mid 1947, the General Reserve's authorized strength was 20,000 under that figure. The actual strength did not even approximate that authorized.⁷

The National Guard and Reserve

Immediately after the close of hostilities in 1945, the U.S. Army had no reserve component. The National Guard divisions that had been mobilized were not recognizable as Guard units. Since they were filled out by individual replacements, they were indistinguishable from the Regular divisions and had few of their original personnel.⁸

By 1945, it was clear that both utility and expediency would require reestablishment of the Guard. In the demobilization period, the War Department attempted to establish a reserve structure and arrive at a reserve component policy. Although department planners believed many years of peace lay ahead and that a Universal Military Training program would provide "fill"

6. LTC Joseph Rockis, "Reorganization of Army Ground Forces during the Demobilization Period," AGF Demobilization Study #3, (Fort Monroe, VA, 1948) p. 47.

7. Ibid., p. 52.

8. Epley, p. 6. The author's account is based on a Secretary of the Army study, "Report Covering Present State of Readiness of the Various Reserve Components of the Armed Forces" enclosed with letter, James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, to President Truman, 14 December 1948.

for the reserves, the National Defense Act of 1920 required that the U.S. Army have ⁹as components the National Guard and the Organized Reserves.

The post-war National Guard troop basis called for twenty-seven infantry divisions, two armored divisions, and a variety of other units meant to provide a balanced force. For those willing to join the Organized Reserve, the War Department offered a terminal promotion to the next higher grade to those officers under the rank of colonel. However, Congress never appropriated enough funds to build that troop structure to strength.¹⁰

With the failure to adopt Universal Military Training and the budget constraints of 1947-1948, the overall troop basis was reduced to 18 divisions: 12 regular and 5 National Guard. The mission of the National Guard divisions was to provide a force capable of immediate combat on M-Day. Even this plan proved untenable. On 1 July 1947, National Guard strength stood at 86,500, and the Organized Reserve had 317,000 available for training.¹¹

Over the next three years, strengths of the reserve components fluctuated, with the Guard increasing in strength while the Organized Reserve decreased. In June 1950, 325,000 ground forces Guardsmen were serving in more than 4,500 units. By that time, the Organized Reserve had 186,00 personnel serving in activated units. An additional 391,000 officers and men were carried on the rolls of the Organized Reserve, but were not in active training units.¹²

Following passage of the National Security Act of 1947, a committee headed by Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray made a comprehensive study of the reserve components. The committee found that the reserve components would not be combat capable upon mobilization. The Gray Board Report recommended merger of the Guard and Reserve into one federal reserve force and a level of funding commensurate with their mission. Allocations did rise somewhat from FY 1948 through FY 1950, but funding for the reserves represented a very small portion of Army allocations. The buildup of the reserves was a slow process. One result of the lack of funding was that in June 1950, the National Guard had only 46 percent of equipment allocations. In addition,

9. Epley, pp. 6-7.

10. Weigley, p. 487.

11. Epley, p. 7.

12. Weigley, p. 487.

training was severely affected by undermanned regiments that were often the size of platoons.¹³

The Training Plan

The training system in place for the U.S. Army during the period under review was based on the "Redeployment" plan published in June 1945 as Army Ground Forces Memorandum # 1. That training program had been designed for the period following the defeat of Germany and before the defeat of Japan and looked to meeting the needs of an all-out effort against Japan. When the war ended before the plan could be put into effect, the Army adopted most of it--in Training Memorandum # 2--for peacetime use, omitting only subjects such as "Japanese tactics" that were specifically focused on the defeat of Japan. The need to obtain replacements quickly during demobilization resulted in a post-war training program that was less demanding than that of the war years and which tended to impede the combat readiness of newer Army members.¹⁴

Training Philosophy and Scheduling

The peacetime training program in the aftermath of the war was formally based on the principle that mobilization training should be regarded as an expansion of peacetime training and not as a "revolution." Training hours, standards, and methodology should be the same in peacetime as in war, even if the training tempo was slower. In practice, the reduction of basic training time from seventeen weeks to eight weeks and a limit of forty hours per week for training led most commanders to conclude that combat-ready soldiers could not be produced in so short a time. The eight-week time constraint did not allow for tactical training on battle courses or field bivouac training, both of which had been a part of the standard seventeen-week Army training program. The evidence is clear that the Army thought its mission was to provide adequate replacements to fulfill occupational commitments.¹⁵

13. Epley, p. 8.

14. (1) CPT Albert N. Garland and CPT Keith Sherman, "Training in the Army Ground Forces, 1 September 1945 - 10 March 1948" (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Section, Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, 1948), pp. 1, 17. (2) MAJ Bell I. Wiley, "Redeployment Training" (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Section - Army Ground Forces, 1946), pp. 1-2 (3) AUSA Briefing, p. 3.

15. Garland and Sherman, pp. 1, 8.

Curriculum -- Enlisted Training

The program of instruction carried over from the Redeployment Plan was not directed against the defeat of any specific enemy. It included:

- Military discipline and appearance
- Maintenance of arms, vehicles, equipment, ammunition and clothing
- Maintenance of health
- Training of NCOs in leadership
- Chemical warfare training
- Map and aerial photograph reading
- Natural and artificial camouflage
- Small unit training
- Operation of small task forces of combined ground, air, and service units¹⁶

To prepare soldiers to serve as occupation troops, a program of training in civil affairs, civil government, and suppression of civil disturbances was added. Training with live ammunition in combat courses was dropped. A great emphasis was placed on "information and education" training to familiarize all personnel with those sections of the United States, U.S. possessions, and occupied areas where Army Ground Forces units were serving. The training included geography, history, and economy. The short duration of the training period placed the burden of any additional training on the occupation forces.¹⁷

Replacement Training

Training of replacements was conducted at a number of installations that varied from sixteen in August 1945 to four by mid-1947. In the immediate post-war period, responsibility for replacement training lay with a command separate from the AGF and known as the Replacement and School Command (R&SC). In November 1946, the R&SC was eliminated, and the replacement centers were placed directly under Headquarters, AGF. All reception centers were discontinued, with their functions going to the replacement training centers (RTC's) under AGF. On 1 January 1947, the RTCs were assigned to the numbered armies. AGF retained planning and

16. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

17. Ibid., pp. 2, 5.

policy-making responsibility until March 1948, when the command was replaced by a new organization termed the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF).¹⁸

In an effort to "normalize" the RTCs, AGF issued instructions that each center would consist of training regiments composed of four training battalions of four training companies with 200 trainees each. The War Department ordered that all training at the RTCs would be basic military recruit training. The training program was thus, for all intents and purposes, stripped of branch training. The eight weeks allowed for training was only long enough to teach the basic rudiments of soldiering. Not until the summer of 1950 did the Department of the Army authorize branch-material training in the basic training cycle.¹⁹

Training Methodology

Training methodology for recruits encompassed two systems. In the committee system, instructors were grouped into committees, and each committee provided instruction in a single subject to an entire unit cycling through. Under the company system, the company cadre gave the instruction in all subjects. When inspections revealed the organization for instruction to be as varied as the total number of RTCs, AGF outlined which type of instruction would be given using one or the other method. Company cadre would instruct in the care and cleaning of individual clothing and equipment; drill; inspections; interior guard duty; marches and bivouacs; military courtesy and discipline; military organization and chain of command; and physical training. All other subjects would be taught by the committee method.²⁰

In May 1947, a four-week leader's course was added after basic training. At the same time, basic training was extended

18. (1) Ibid., pp. 12, 24-25. Trainee capability dropped from 290,000 on 1 September 1945 to 33,400 on 1 October 1946. (2) Jean R. Moenk, A History of Command and Control of Army Forces in the Continental United States, 1919 - 1972 (Historical Office, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces, Headquarters, United States Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, VA, 15 August 1972), pp. 27-29. OCAFF was not a command headquarters but a staff office that reported directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army.

19. (1) Garland and Sherman, pp. 16-17. (2) Annual History, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, 1 January - 31 December, 1949, Vol. I, Chap. 6, p. 7.

20. Garland and Sherman, p. 26-27.

from eight weeks to thirteen weeks. The following year, the Army added one more week.²¹

Training Problems and Detractors

Personnel turnover was extremely high during the demobilization, as divisions came to function as demobilization centers. That was especially true of units stationed in the United States since Army units on occupation duty had higher replacement priority. Training suffered as large numbers of personnel were discharged and men were shifted from one unit to another, a situation that at times approached chaos. Morale was low. Men about to be separated from the Army, and many who were already separated from their former units, had little enthusiasm for military training, preferring instead to receive vocational training. A large proportion of the men lost under readjustment policies were key specialists and NCOs. One student of the Army during this period, writing in 1946, observed that "to make matters worse, newcomers usually were greatly inferior in training, experience, and leadership to the men whom they replaced."²²

During the period when divisions were chiefly stationed on occupation duty, the administrative chores of occupation tended to interfere with follow-on training for replacements. It must be remembered that replacements were received on an individual basis; there was no provision for unit replacement. Peacetime training after WW II and before the Korean War especially lacked combat simulation, such as the large-scale maneuvers of 1940 and 1941. Such training would have posed dangers unacceptable to postwar public opinion. In addition, the four divisions in Japan lacked land enough for extensive training exercises. The drive for economy discouraged any programs likely to be expensive. Nor was there sufficient equipment for training. No unit had its wartime complement of weapons, and the weapons and equipment on hand were largely worn leftovers from the war.²³

21. (1) Ibid., p. 31. (2) Epley, p. 2.

22. (1) Garland and Sherman, pp. 3, 9. (2) Epley, p. 2. (3) Quotation is from MAJ Bell I. Wiley, "Redeployment Training," p. 11.

23. (1) Weigley, pp. 503-04 (2) AUSA Briefing, p. 4. (3) Epley, p. 5.

Officer Basic and Advanced Training

With the surrender of Japan came the end of the wartime mission of Army Ground Forces' schools. Classes scheduled to begin in December 1945 were cancelled pending the adoption of an interim program designed to serve the Army until a more permanent institutional structure could be established. The AGF planned to have a new postwar school system in place by 1 September 1946. Many senior Army officials believed that it had been a strong school system that had enabled the Army to cope with the great expansion of World War II.²⁴

Under the interim plan, all schools offered courses for officers and noncommissioned officers. Officers' courses were of 18 1/2 weeks duration and were open to officers below the grade of lieutenant colonel whose military schooling had been limited to a basic branch course or less. The curriculum of the officer course at the Armor School was one example of the type of course offered during this period (Appendix A). The mission of all the service schools was to prepare officers for duty as company or battalion commanders. The training capacity of the AGF service schools for the interim period was set at a total of 11,010, with the largest allocations going to the Infantry and Armor Schools. A special feature of the interim AGF schools was special courses for former prisoners of war. Such courses were designed to bring officers of general or field grade up to date on the latest developments in weapons, vehicles, equipment, and doctrine.²⁵

The interim period came to a close with the publication of courses of instruction for the school term beginning in September 1946. By May 1947, a post-war program was firmly in place (Appendix B). Planning by the War Department and the AGF was based on the premise that formal education, including at least the Command and General Staff College, should be completed early in an officer's career. That approach, it was hoped, would prevent the situation that had existed at the outbreak of World War II. In 1941, many officers had already reached retirement age or were over age in grade since they did not customarily complete their military education until age fifty.²⁶

The AGF School System, after 1947, featured a "branch immaterial" course of 17 weeks (OBC), to be offered at a Ground

24. LTC Joseph Rockis, "The Army Ground Forces Educational System," AGF Demobilization Study # 7, (Fort Monroe, VA, [1948?], pp.1-5.

25. Ibid., pp. 6-10.

26. Ibid., p. 11.

General School to each newly commissioned officer. Upon completion of that course he was assigned to troops of his own branch for a year, followed by one-year tours of duty with troops of two branches other than his own. The officer would then return to his branch school for a course of approximately seventeen weeks in the techniques of his own branch. After OCAFF replaced the AGF in 1948, the sequence was changed. Each new second lieutenant was assigned directly to two years duty with troops. Preceding his entry upon that assignment, he went to his branch school for an orientation course of from 4 to 12 weeks. After the two-year period of troop duty that followed, he returned to attend the Company Officer's Course at his branch school. After a second tour of duty with troops, the officer attended the Advanced Officers' Course. The Officer Basic Course at the Ground General School was discontinued after December 1949.²⁷

The numbers of soldiers in resident schooling reflected the emphasis the Army placed on institutional training. In FY 1948, 80,000 soldiers, or 15 percent of total strength, were enrolled in resident schools. That number rose to 19 percent (125,000) in FY 1949. With General Reserve divisions up to 30 percent understrength, the high proportion enrolled in the schools represented a considerable risk. Given the perceived unlikelihood of war in the near future, Army leaders believed it a risk important enough to take.²⁸

Noncommissioned Officer Training

During the immediate post-war period, a new course established at each Army service school was the basic noncommissioned officers' course, which was generally of fourteen weeks duration. In addition, various other courses peculiar to the needs of the branches were offered for NCOs. The NCO courses were limited to selected enlisted personnel with "the character, intelligence, and alertness sufficient to indicate ability to be trained as leaders." The POI of the Infantry Noncommissioned Officers' Course (Appendix C) illustrates the type of instruction offered to NCOs.²⁹

Military Education for the "Civilian" Component

27. (1) Ibid., p. 15. (2) Annual History, 1949, vol I, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, pp. 17, 20.

28. Epley, p. 9.

29. AGF Demobilization Study # 7, p. 5, 7.

Military Education for the "Civilian" Component

During this period, military education for the "civilian" component was made available through several means. They included extension courses; specialist courses conducted locally for two weeks annually over three consecutive years; short periods of instruction at Army schools; and a combination of extension and specialist courses.³⁰

The Command and General Staff College

In February 1946, a War Department Military Education Board (Gerow Board) issued a report that was highly critical of the officer training system. In response to that report, Army and Fort Leavenworth officials launched a reform movement at the Command and General Staff College (Command and General Staff School before 1947) that lasted from 1946 until 1950. They developed a ten-month course, eliminated the large classes, and abolished specialization. They also sought to conduct practical exercises and to incorporate the nuclear battlefield into the curriculum.³¹

The CGSC course included 30 weeks of common instruction followed by specialist instruction in one of four staff areas. The focus was on all field forces within the framework of the army group. The program of instruction looked to preparing officers for duty as commanders and staff officers at division and above. Specialist instruction focused on general staff duty at theater army, army group, and Zone of the Interior levels. An Associate Course of three months duration and an extension course were designed for Army Reserve and National Guard officers. The latter course paralleled the regular course in content, but not in scope or depth.³²

From 1946 on, CGSC commanders and faculty paid special attention to developments in technology and the impact on tactics, doctrine, and organization. Senior Army leaders recognized that new weapons had to be incorporated into operations planning more quickly than had been done with the tank and machine gun.

30. Ibid., pp. 12, 41.

31. Boyd L. Dastrup, The US Army Command and General Staff College: A Centennial History (Leavenworth, KS: J. H. Johnson III and Sunflower University Press, 1982), p. 90. LTG Leonard T. Gerow was commandant of the CGSC, 1945-1948.

32. Ibid., pp. 90-91.

After the passage of the National Defense Act of 1947, college leaders revamped their courses by dropping classes and exercises related to air tactics and air staff functions.³³

In 1948, following a study of the CGSC to find ways to make it more efficient and competitive, a number of changes were made to the organization and course of study. The 500-member classes--a holdover from the war years--were broken into twelve sections of forty students each. The school year was divided into six phases. In 1949, as the result of yet another study, under the Eddy Board, the specialized portion of the course came under strong criticism. The board concluded that the CGSG was not meeting the needs of the Army because it was producing specialists at the theater army level and above where generalists were needed. It did not spend enough time on the tactical principles at division and corps levels. One student of the subject suggested that the problems at the CGSC were the result of holding on to the "old and wornout tactics and course work of World War II."³⁴

In 1950, college officials abolished the ten-week specialization phase and the old college organization. They created five departments: intelligence; logistics and armored operations; ground operations; airborne and amphibious operations; and personnel. The new curriculum, (Appendix D), included instruction in atomic warfare and the coordinated employment of ground, air, and naval forces. Army and Fort Leavenworth authorities also established an Allied Officer's Program to strengthen American allies' military skills.³⁵

The Army War College

In the period before U.S. entry in World War II, General Staff Plans had drastically curtailed the Army school system. The Army War College in Washington, D.C. was a victim of that policy, closing in June 1940. During the war, the consequent interruption of the supply of officers trained for high staff and command responsibilities became an embarrassment to the Army.³⁶

As the Army revised its post-war system of officer education, the belief had arisen that discontinuance of the War College

33. Ibid., p.91

34. Ibid., p. 93.

35. Ibid., p. 93-94.

36. Weigley, pp. 428-29.

might have created a serious gap in the school structure. One of the recommendations of the Eddy Board had been that the Army War College be reestablished at Fort Leavenworth as the advanced course of the CGSC. The War College would replace the specialized phase of the regular course, but instead of being a ten-week course, the War College Course would last for ten months. In August 1950, the Army War College was established at Fort Leavenworth and once again became the capstone of the Army's training program. In 1951, the college was moved to a permanent site at Carlisle Barracks, PA.³⁷

The Joint Service Schools

Between World War II and the Korean War, three joint service schools were established for interservice training. In 1946, War Department officials established the Armed Forces Staff College, the National War College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces to form the interservice apex of the military school systems. All those institutions were open to specially selected officers with 10 to 20 years of service in any of the nation's armed services.³⁸

Development of Arms and Equipment - General

Just as the reduced defense budget affected the training of replacements, it also had an effect on materiel development and procurement. While research projects held promise of many desirable improvements in weapons and other equipment, it was often impossible to complete development and production. In addition, within the Army's existing stocks of supplies and equipment there were shortages, imbalances, and obsolescence. Shortages of capable maintenance troops and maintenance facilities resulted in a widespread deterioration of equipment. Several types of ammunition were in woefully short supply. Severe shortages existed in replacement parts and assemblies. Those shortages, like the shortages in manpower, slowed the rebuilding process.³⁹

37. OCAFF Annual History, 1949, pp. 11-16.

38. (1) Dastrup, p. 90. (2) Weigley, p. 551.

39. (1) AUSA Briefing, p. 2. (2) Memorandum with enclosure, BG James L. Collins, Jr., Chief of Military History, to Chief of Legislative Liaison through the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 24 August 1970, subj: The Price the United States Paid for Being Unprepared for the Korean War (Mr. B. C. Mossman was author of the enclosed paper).

Research and Development

Such research and development as did take place centered on guided missile research and atomic energy programs. The Army Ground Forces saw great potential in the use of atomic weapons for tactical purposes and guided missiles as an extension of artillery. The rationale was that those weapons could act as a deterrent to potential enemies. There was some development of more conventional, tactical weapons, but they clearly received lower priority. Among the new items were a heavy tank, artillery weapons, and a new model of a tactical truck. However, most attention centered on the improvement, or "upgrade" of existing equipment.⁴⁰

Procurement

During the five years preceding the Korean War, the United States Army did not have a "modernization" program as we know it today. The term procurement meant both the purchase of older equipment and the fielding of newer equipment. Army leaders, however, were acutely aware of the need for equipping units with modern weapons. General Dwight D. Eisenhower warned on more than one occasion that the U.S. was in danger of losing its technological edge.⁴¹

In 1950, the Army remained equipped mostly with World War II weapons and equipment. Severely constrained defense budgets and the occupation mission, which cost more than \$2 billion annually, left little money for research, development, and procurement of modern equipment. The huge excesses of World War II equipment still on hand made it difficult to convince Congress to authorize new program spending. Several weapons systems had been developed and fielded late in World War II but had not been procured in large quantities. For example, although the M26 Pershing tank had been fielded, most armor units remained equipped with M4 Sherman tanks.⁴²

In FY 1948 and 1949, the Army spent much of its procurement funds on aid programs under the Marshall Plan. Some funds were specifically diverted to Marshall Plan programs. The Army actu-

40. (1) Epley, p. 9. (2) LTC Joseph Pockis, "Development of Arms and ment for AGF, 1 September 1945 - 10 March 1948, AGF Demobilization St Vlll (Fort Monroe, VA, 1948), pp. 9, 14-16.

41. Epley, p. 10, citing Eisenhower's "Final Report of the Chief of Staff" (Department of the Army Publication, 7 February 1948), p. 15.

42. Epley, p. 10.

ally got into the business of producing nitrogenous fertilizer for occupied areas. These occupation requirements were met at the expense of modern items of equipment. All the Army could do was to set priorities for procurement of newer equipment in the event of emergencies. There was no systematic procurement strategy.⁴³

Conclusion

It should not be concluded that the U.S. Army's general unpreparedness for the Korean conflict was entirely the result of shrinking defense budgets or a lack of leadership. Army budgets from 1946 to 1950 were the highest in peacetime history. Actual strength of the Army was the largest ever maintained in peacetime. With regard to leadership, outstanding officers--Generals Eisenhower, Omar N. Bradley, and J. Lawton Collins--were successive Chiefs of Staff. The Army's unpreparedness in the summer of 1950 was, rather, the result of a complex combination of things: a public attitude that looked to peace in the future and to air and sea power for protection against any aggressors; the problems of demobilization and the demands of the occupation mission; and the deferral of the complete rebuilding of the Army that was necessary after V-J Day.⁴⁴

For all intents and purposes, the Army did not begin to rebuild until 1948. Even then, the occupation mission held top priority. Training was low among overall Army priorities. Although a new threat was developing, a peacetime atmosphere prevailed. Two years were not enough to produce a well-trained and ready combat force. While the Army had begun to exploit missile and nuclear technology, the development effort would take years and did not influence the war in Korea. Perhaps the Army's most successful efforts in the post-war years was the revamping of the school system. That achievement, however, was at a high cost in personnel turnover and unit strengths. With so much of the total strength attending school, building a combat ready force was difficult.⁴⁵

When the Korean War began, the deployment of forces had to be improvised. The first units to enter combat were drawn from the four divisions in the Far East Command. Each of those divisions was under strength by 7,000 men; each lacked 3 infantry battalions, 6 tank companies, 3 field artillery batteries, and

43. Ibid., p. 10.

44. Ibid., p. 11.

45. (1) Ibid., p. 11. (2) Rockis, AGF Demobilization Study # 7, passim.

three anti-aircraft batteries. Communications were poor, owing in part to a shortage of telephone wire and outdated batteries for radios. Maps proved unreliable. Antitank ammunition was extremely limited. All those shortcomings added up to high losses in men and equipment. Ordered into action against advancing North Korean forces in early July 1950, Task Force Smith, a unit of approximately 400 men that had been hastily assembled from elements of the 24th Infantry Division, suffered heavy losses owing to neglect of training and equipment. The task force suffered 150 casualties before air action and ground reinforcements stabilized the crisis.⁴⁶

Several similarities can be identified in the situation that existed for the United States Army between World War II and the Korean War and today's climate of drawdown and shrinking defense budgets. Perhaps the most obvious is the perception that no large scale threat to national security still exists, and that without that threat, a smaller Army is justified. There was then and there may be now a public consensus that the United States does not need to prepare for a large and lengthy ground war.

A concern about the role and training of the reserve components has characterized both periods. During 1945-1950, the Army was unable to solve the problem of training the reserves, in only a few training days a year, to the same standard as active duty troops. The Army today is still seeking answers to that dilemma.

In 1945, the United States may have had the best Army in the world. In 1992 the nation has the best trained and equipped army in its history. What happened to the Army between the surrender of the Japanese and the disaster of Task Force Smith may offer some insights for 1990s.

46. (1) Talking Paper, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 24 August 1970, subj: The Price of Unpreparedness. (2) Appleman, pp. 61, 75.

APPENDIX A


Officers' Course Curriculum Armor School 1 January - 7 June 1946

Agencies and Means of Signal Communication
Wheeled and Tracked Vehicles Common to Armored Units
Army Maintenance System
Combat Leadership
Methods of Instruction
Combat Intelligence
Tactics and Technique of Light, Medium, and Heavy Tanks armed
with 75-mm., 76-mm., and 90-mm. guns
Tactics and Technique of the Armored Platoon, Company, and
Battalion
Air-Ground Liaison and Cooperation
Coordination of Tactics and the Effect of Modern Means and
Methods thereon
Tactics and Technique of Small Arms to include .50-caliber Guns

Source: Joseph Rockis, "The Army Ground Forces Educational
System," AGF Demobilization Study # 7, 1948, p. 6.

APPENDIX B

SCHOOL SYSTEM FOR OFFICERS OF THE ARMY



APPENDIX C

Noncommissioned Officers' Curriculum Infantry School 1 January - 7 June 1946

Mechanical Training
Marksmanship
Field Firing of Infantry Weapons
Tactical Training of the Individual Soldier
Night Vision
Tactical Training of the Infantry Squad, Section, and Platoon
Combat Intelligence
Field Engineering
Map and Air Photograph Reading
Preparation of Small Unit Problems
Air-Ground Cooperation
Methods of Instruction
Leadership
Supply Discipline
General Administrative Duties
Foot Marches
Bivouacs
Hygiene and Sanitation
Physical Training
Orientation

Source: LTC Joseph Rockis, "The Army Ground Forces Educational System," 1948, p. 7.

APPENDIX D

Command and General Staff College Curriculum 1 December 1947

Principles of War
Duties of the Commander and General Staff Officer of the Division
Corps and Army
Leadership
The Lessons of War
Modern Developments in Technology
The Employment of Field Forces
Efficient Personnel Management
Intelligence
Supply
Transportation Support of Fighting Forces
Coordinated Employment of Army, Air, and Naval Forces
Atomic Warfare
The Offense
The Defense
Partisan Warfare
Dangers of Radiation
The Soviet Military System

Source: Boyd L. Dastrup, The Command and General Staff College:
A Centennial History (Leavenworth KS: J.H. Johnson III and
Sunflower University Press, 1982), p. 94.

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