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Tactical Doctrine and FM 100-5

A Monograph
by
Major Michael P. Coville
Infantry

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
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
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ABSTRACT

TACTICAL DOCTRINE AND FM 100-5

MAJ Michael P. Coville, USA, 46 pages.

This monograph will examine the presentation of tactical doctrine in FM 100-5.

The United States Army is currently revising FM 100-5, Operations, its "keystone warfighting manual." It is intended to serve as the "Army's principle tool of professional self-education in the science and art of war." The current FM 100-5 contains both operational and tactical doctrine. The revision will implement in doctrine a new operational concept called AirLand Operations.

It appears that the new edition of FM 100-5 will continue to reflect trends established during the revision of the two previous editions. If this course is maintained, the new edition will strengthen its focus on the operational level, expand its discussion of campaigns and address the use of forces in peacetime and crisis. As in other revisions, this will be accomplished at the expense of tactical doctrine. Unfortunately, it also seems likely that the new manual will be written without a full examination of the effects of the new operational concept on tactical doctrine.

These trends threaten the effective expression of tactical doctrine in FM 100-5. If followed to fruition the current path will result in the presentation of tactical doctrine that may not fulfill its two essential purposes. First, the tactical doctrine presented may not account for the changes in operational doctrine, thus producing a lack of doctrinal coherence between the two levels of war. Second, the tactical doctrine may be presented so tersely that it will not serve as an effective guide for the production of subordinate tactical doctrine. Published under these conditions, FM 100-5 would degrade rather than enhance the Army's warfighting capability.

The solution to this undesirable outcome is to conduct a full examination of the implications of the new operational concept on the tactical level of war prior to the publication of the new FM 100-5. This evaluation must rationally develop the linkage between the proposed operational concept and the requirements it generates at the tactical level. Existing concepts at the tactical level must then be reviewed for adequacy and revised where shortcomings exist. Finally, this revised tactical doctrine must be articulated clearly and in enough detail to support the coherent development of subordinate tactical doctrine.

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Introduction

Background

The U.S. Army¹ is currently confronting one of the most significant periods of change in its history. On the international scene, the Warsaw Pact no longer exists, and the Soviet Union, as we have known it, appears to be following quickly along a similar path. This long-held view of the threat which has been the focus of much of our military planning over the past four decades is being displaced by other threats. Today, we are faced with a multipolar world characterized by regional power centers, weapons proliferation, increased conflict in and among developing nations, increased instability due to unacceptable societal and economic conditions, and the continuing problems of drug trafficking and terrorism.² Regardless, this complex threat is not the only challenge confronting the Army.

The Army also faces significant change on the domestic scene. Changes in force structure and funding top the list. During the next few years the Army will undergo significant reductions in size. Concurrent with these reductions will be a changing focus from forward deployed forces to contingency forces. There will also be a renewed effort toward finding the proper balance between the active and reserve component. Moreover, while this is occurring, the Army can expect greater

competition for scarce national resources and a corresponding reduction in funds allocated to national defense.

Thus the Army today is faced with an emerging new world order, changing threats, and decreasing resources. In response to these dramatic changes, and in a continued attempt to remain forward looking, the Army is in the process of revising its doctrine. This revision is necessary for doctrine is the driving force behind the way an army fights and prepares to fight. Accordingly, as the Army perceives current and future changes in both its external and internal environment it adapts its doctrine to cope with these changes.

The most significant doctrinal revision currently in progress is the revision of the Army's "keystone warfighting manual," FM 100-5 Operations. This manual forms the cornerstone of Army doctrine at the operational and tactical levels of war. As such, FM 100-5 has a profound effect on the way the Army prepares for and conducts military operations. As can be expected, revision of the concepts expressed in FM 100-5 will set off tremors of change that will be felt throughout the Army.

In light of the consequence associated with the revision of FM 100-5, the following research question is addressed in this monograph.

Is the increasing emphasis on the operational level of war threatening the effective expression of tactical doctrine in FM 100-5?

This issue has its origin in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5, within which the operational level of war was formally included in Army doctrine. The operational level of war was introduced as the link between the already existing strategic and tactical levels of war. Since its inclusion in FM 100-5, emphasis on the operational level of war has been ever increasing.³ Guidance for the current revision of the manual appears to continue this trend. This research considers how far the pendulum of change has swung in the direction of the operational level of war, and the implications of this swing on tactical doctrine.

Methodology

To address the research question I first intend to investigate the importance of doctrine, specifically its meaning and purpose. The relationship between doctrine and the Army's preparation for and conduct of war will also be addressed. This discussion will provide the foundation for interpreting the significance of the Army's increasing focus at the operational level of war.

The next chapter of the monograph will examine the historical change of doctrinal focus as expressed in the current and previous two editions of FM 100-5. I will discuss how the operational level of war was introduced into Army doctrine and its relationship to the strategic and tactical levels of war. This section establishes how the focus of doctrine in FM 100-5

has changed over recent years and sets the historical background for investigation of the current situation.

The ongoing revision of FM 100-5 is considered next. Current guidance is examined in relation to the operational and tactical levels of war, and is compared and contrasted with the trends established in the previous chapter. The expected focus of the new FM 100-5 is identified and the implications for tactical doctrine are discussed.

The final chapter presents the conclusions reached through the research, answers the research question, and provides recommendations regarding tactical doctrine and the new edition of FM 100-5.

Doctrines: A Conceptual Framework

Indeed, the evolution of tactical doctrine illustrates that the great value of doctrine is less the final answers it provides than the impetus it creates towards developing innovative and creative solutions for tactical problems of future battlefields.⁴

Defining Doctrine

"Doctrine" is a term that for far too long has conjured up confusion and frustration. In addition, it is a term that for far too many means "some kind of codified law enunciating immutable rules on how to fight wars,"⁵ or "a dusty book of commandments kept in an old trunk, in a deep, dark cellar, guarded by monks."⁶ Clearly, "doctrine" is a term that requires clarification.

While often vexing to the modern military professional, the concept of doctrine has been an enduring characteristic of military forces for centuries. Over 2000 years ago, in the first written work to record a reasoned concept of war, Sun Tzu listed doctrine as one of the five fundamentals of war.⁷ He considered it to be "organization, control, assignment of appropriate ranks to officers, regulation of supply routes, and the provision of principal items used by the army."⁸

Since that time the concept of doctrine has undergone much change. Significant alteration of the concept occurred when

standing armies were introduced in the late 17th century. These armies made it possible to use standardization to cope with the increasing complexity of war. The main instruments of standardization were drill manuals and published regulations. These instructed officers in what they were required to know to train, discipline, maneuver, and maintain their troops.⁹

Doctrine meant, in the most general terms, that which was taught or was laid down as true regarding military operations.¹⁰

The term "doctrine," however, was not included in the Dictionary of United States Army Terms, until 1950. The 1950 edition defined doctrine as the:

... compilation of principles and policies, applicable to a subject, which have been developed through experience or by theory, that represent the best available thought, and indicate and guide but do not bind in practice. Essentially doctrine is that which is taught...a truth, a fact, or a theory that can be defined by reason...which should be taught or accepted as basic truths.¹¹

While the "guiding hand" and "teaching" characteristics of doctrine remained central to its meaning, this Army definition added two important characteristics. First, theory as well as experience was now an acceptable basis for doctrine. Second, doctrine was to represent the "best available thought." The former recognized that rapid change in the specific character of war may outstrip available experience.¹² The latter reflected the intensified technological and bureaucratic complexity of

warfare. In other words, the Fredericks and Napoleons of the world would no longer be able to personally prescribe the doctrine of their armies.

The words have, of course, changed but the essence of the 1950 definition survives today in the definition provided by JCS PUB 1.

Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.¹³

This definition incorporates many of the traditional aspects of doctrine but is more general in nature. The current definition has three essential components, each of which to some extent represents the history of the definition of doctrine.

First, doctrine is fundamental principles (in practice this also includes fundamental concepts). Fundamental principles are derived from a synergy of two domains: experience and theory. Experience expressed as history provides the foundation of knowledge because it is the chronicle of human conflict. It provides the present a window through which one can analyze those actions that lead to either repeated success or to repeated failure. The intent is to distill numerous discreet experiences to a succinct statement of generalized wisdom. These statements are the kernels of knowledge that are guides to what worked best in the past. As such they are one piece of the puzzle that, when

completed, provides fundamental principles for present and future action.

History, however, as a sole basis for doctrine, has a serious shortcoming. How does it translate the wisdom of experience to a present or future context, and how does it account for situations for which there is no previous experience? This is the role theory plays in producing fundamental principles. Theory provides the framework for extending knowledge from the past into the future. Theory is a reasoned explanation of the linkage between interdependent phenomena and between those phenomena and their environment. As such, theory provides the mechanism for producing fundamental principles that are based upon the past but focused upon the future. Thus, fundamental principles are the synthesis of history and theory.

Secondly, it is of particular importance that doctrine is linked to "actions in support of national objectives." This implies that doctrine is not limited to combat. This broader view is critical during a time in which the military's role as an element of national power is expanding. Thus, doctrine applies across a broad spectrum of activities that include preparation for war, operations short of war, and war itself.

The final essential element is that doctrine is a guide for action and not a prescriptive set of rules. The varied circumstances of war defy the development of a rule of action that would have universal application. Doctrine provides guides

for action that under most circumstances provide the highest probability of success. It is through judgement that the practitioner confirms or denies the applicability of these guidelines based upon exigent circumstances. Clausewitz commented on this more than 150 years ago.

Principles, rules, regulations, and methods are, however, indispensable concepts to or for that part of the theory that leads to positive doctrines.... None of these concepts can be dogmatically applied to every situation, but a commander must always bear them in mind so as not to lose the benefit of the truth they contain in cases where they do apply.¹⁴

In summary, the definition of doctrine has changed over time, but the current definition retains traditional concepts as well as entertaining newer notions. Doctrine is based upon a synergy of history and theory, supports national goals, and provides a guide for action. It provides a linkage between the wisdom of the past, the practical requirements of the present, and the expected requirements of the future.

Defining doctrine, however, is only a stepping stone to the more important issue of how it is used. Only by considering doctrine's role within the Army can one expect to understand its significance.

Role of Doctrine

For much of the history of the United States, doctrine has been singularly concerned with insuring a common approach to and

understanding of warfare. A common understanding of war is expected to increase the efficiency of an army. It facilitates coordination of the myriad military activities of war. It also assists commanders, officers, and soldiers in fighting through the fog and friction of war.

... a governing idea to which every situation may be referred and from which there may be derived a sound course of action.

The object of military doctrine is to furnish a basis for prompt and harmonious conduct by subordinate commanders of a large military force, in accordance with the intentions of the commander-in-chief, but without the necessity for referring each decision to superior authority before action is taken.

... to provide a foundation for mutual understanding.¹³

--1915--

The individuality of the leaders and differences in their views, which appear conspicuously in war, will always cause friction; and its effects can be overcome in part only by the inculcation of a uniform doctrine for the conduct of war.¹⁴

--1955--

Doctrine provided a common lexicon and a template for military action. Military forces with a common understanding of how to lead, fight, and conduct support activities could work in harmony on the battlefield. Doctrine found its greatest expression in training and military education, for doctrine served no purpose if it was not uniformly known and understood.

By 1976, however, doctrine was expected to accomplish much more than commonality of thought and action. Futurism had begun to take hold within the Army and future concepts began to figure

prominently in the development of doctrine.¹⁷ Consequently, doctrine's role in guiding military activities expanded beyond training and military education. The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 indicated the extent of what was now expected of doctrine.

This manual sets forth the basic concepts of U.S. Army doctrine. These concepts form the foundation for what is taught in our service schools, and the guide for training and combat developments throughout the Army.¹⁸

Doctrine now had the additional mission of serving as a guide for the combat development process. Specifically, it was expected to illuminate future requirements and provide impetus for decisions on what equipment would or would not be needed for future war. Army doctrine was rapidly disproving the old adage that armies prepare to fight the last war.

By 1986 the role of doctrine had grown even larger. The introduction of the Concept Based Requirements System strengthened the relationship between doctrine, training, and force development. This system formally established concepts (doctrine) as the centerpiece for preparation for future war.¹⁹

The 1986 edition of FM 100-5 expressed the relationship in these words.

It furnishes the authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrines, force design, national acquisition, professional education and individual and unit training.²⁰

Tactics, techniques, procedures, organization, support structure, equipment, and training must all derive from it (doctrine).²¹

An era emerged where future concepts were a significant source of innovation in doctrine. Doctrine absorbed these concepts and as a result became not just how to fight now but how to fight in the future. Doctrine's most current role is its explicit use as an "engine of change" for the Army. The Army's senior leadership, civilian and military, expect doctrine to be the guiding force for transition of the Army to the future.²²




Figure 1. Role of Doctrine.

In summary, the role of doctrine has significantly expanded since the pre-1976 time frame. Its current role is graphically depicted in Figure 1. Given what doctrine is expected to accomplish, it is easy to understand the importance of getting it right.

Getting Doctrine Right

Real appreciation of the importance of getting doctrine right is gained from considering the impact of getting doctrine wrong. Cohen and Gooch, in their book Military Misfortunes, list failure of doctrine as one of the three ways military forces fail.²³ This position is easily supported by a brief look into history. The failures of the Russians in 1914 at Tannenberg, the French in 1940 at Sedan, the Israelis in 1973 at the Suez, and the Americans during the Vietnam War all find root in doctrinal failure. With these events as testimony to the impact of doctrinal failure, it is apparent that those who fail to produce correct doctrine court disaster.

Given that producing correct doctrine is of such consequence, the question whether correct doctrine can be produced begs consideration. The answer is that it is extremely difficult to do so during peacetime. Two theoretical considerations combine to thwart the effort to produce correct doctrine in times of peace. First consider that doctrine is written to address a time frame that begins upon doctrine publication and extends an indefinite period into the future. Second, consider that the nature of warfare continues to change throughout the period over which the doctrine is meant to apply. Therefore, even if doctrine was perfectly valid for some point of time within this application period, it would not be so on either

side of that point. Considering these factors alone, doctrine will rarely, if ever, be correct.

The effect of these factors may be diminished in two ways. The first is to rapidly and frequently update doctrine. The intent would be to shorten the time frame of applicability, thereby increasing the relative level of doctrinal validity. The more rapidly change occurs the more rapidly doctrine would have to be updated. Consequently, with doctrine's usefulness tied to uniformity of understanding, the Army would be required to re-educate and retrain at the pace that doctrine was changing. Using this approach in a time of rapid social, technological, and political change might require updates as frequent as every two years. Given the challenges associated with the current rate of doctrinal change, however, rapid doctrine change appears to be an unworkable solution.

Another approach would be to build flexibility into the doctrine. Rather than being perfectly valid at any one point of time, the intent would be to be close to right at every point within the time period addressed. This generally would require compromise in some areas to achieve broader applicability in others. A balanced doctrine is the key, one which accommodates change through the period considered, and mitigates the effect of incorrect assumptions about the future nature of war. Michael Howard, noted historian, considering this same issue, concluded that this was not only a possible approach but was the best that

could be done. He stated that the essential mission of military science during peacetime is to produce doctrine that is not "too badly wrong."²⁴

A Conceptual Framework

Recognizing the need to be not "too badly wrong," the following model is presented to assist in understanding doctrine. It will assist in visualizing the importance of doctrine and its connections with the past and future.

The model is depicted in Figure 2.²⁵ The left hand side of the model depicts the progress of doctrine through multiple revisions. Each node represents a specific version of Army doctrine. The right hand side depicts the progress of reality, doctrine's target. Each node on this side represents the state of reality, regarding warfare, at the production of a particular revision of doctrine.

Input to a particular revision includes external and internal pressures, interpretations of past experience (history), and assumptions about the future state of warfare. External and internal pressures include internal organizational pressure, external political and bureaucratic pressure, concern for allies, institutional pressure, etc. These pressures bias the production of appropriate doctrine.

The second input, past reality (history), has a strong influence on changing doctrine. It acts as a stabilizer of

doctrine, a variable that enhances the enduring quality of doctrine, reducing the revolutionary character of doctrine and enhancing its evolutionary character. The past, however, is seen through a lens of cognitive bias. As the past is interpreted, the interpretation is colored by the interpreter's cultural, institutional, and intellectual heritage. Nothing from the past is seen clearly, this is especially true for something as complex as war.

The final input is assumptions about the nature of warfare in the future. Doctrine is developed to apply to a future state of affairs. Knowledge about this future situation is sketchy at best. Therefore, assumptions must be made to fill the void left by unavailable fact. Assumptions are required regarding friendly status, enemy conditions, technological advances, and the international environment. The enduring validity of doctrine is directly dependent upon the accurateness of these assumptions and the time period over which they are valid.

The output of a particular revision is doctrine that provides guidance on how to conduct and think about warfare during the applicable time frame. Once this doctrine is issued, vigilance must be maintained over all variables upon which the doctrine was predicated. Change in these variables may effect the validity of the doctrine. When evidence exists that these variables are changing or about to change to a degree that

threatens doctrinal validity, a new revision process should be initiated.

In summary, this model provides a general framework for understanding the process of doctrinal change. With this framework as a background, the revisions of FM 100-5 may be better understood.




Figure 2. A Conceptual Framework of Doctrinal Change,

The Changing Focus in FM 100-5: 1976-1986

We find ourselves constantly in a dilemma as to whether too much detail has been presented or whether we have become so terse that the meaning [of doctrine] is clouded and darkness descends upon the reader.²⁴

FM 100-5: 1976

The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was chosen as the starting point for historical consideration because it was the first edition in which doctrine was expected to be a significant agent of change. Prior to this edition significant doctrinal evolution usually occurred in tandem with large organizational adjustments. The 1976 edition, however, announced dramatic doctrinal changes without similar adjustments in organization. This was because General William E. Depuy developed this edition to change the thinking not the organization of the Army.²⁷

The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was a "capstone" manual for an entire set of subordinate doctrinal manuals that together constituted a complete replacement of the Army's existing tactical doctrine. It was meant to effect a break with the past, reorienting the Army from Vietnam to Europe and preparing the Army to win its next war, not its last.²⁸

General Depuy had strong opinions about the doctrine necessary to achieve this aim and consequently, centralized the writing of the 1976 edition at the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) level. He was not overly interested in contributions

from the field because he believed a radical departure from the then-present way of doing business was required. He had undertaken a number of initiatives to consolidate his control over doctrine and was going to exercise this power in the revision of FM 100-5.²⁹

The original concept paper was written at TRADOC headquarters under the personal guidance of General Depuy. As time passed, General Depuy recognized the need for expanded support for the new concept. In October of 1974 he presented his concept at a joint Forces Command-TRADOC conference on tactics. The conference was carefully orchestrated to lead the attendees to specific conclusions about tactical techniques in modern, mid-intensity warfare. The concept met little resistance and General Depuy characterized the situation at the end of the conference as "a consensus."³⁰

General Depuy acted immediately to exploit this apparent consensus and tasked the Combined Arms Center (CAC) to revise the 1968 edition of FM 100-5. CAC, specifically the Department of Tactics (DTAC) of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), had proponency for FM 100-5. The CAC commander, Major General Cushman, held different views on tactics and on the purpose of doctrine. This difference in views led to a December draft that, while using the thoughts and language that Depuy used in his concept paper, had a character and conclusion that were unacceptable to General Depuy. General Depuy rejected this draft

and transferred responsibility for the revision to Headquarters, TRADOC.³¹

In the final analysis it was General Depuy who authored the 1976 manual. In a conference with Army branch school commandants in April of 1975, General Depuy assigned each chapter to a small committee led by a general officer. His guidance was that the manual was to be "coherent...simple and direct" and was "to concentrate on principles that are going to help our commanders at company, battalion, brigade, and division level to win."³² At the end of the conference, General Depuy had all the draft chapters collected and taken back to TRADOC headquarters for completion under his supervision.³³

The significance in understanding who wrote FM 100-5 lies in the focus and character that an author, or group of authors, bring to the document. General Depuy's focus was highlighted by what he expected the manual to do. As stated earlier, he wanted to use this doctrinal revision to change the tactical thinking of the Army. Additional evidence is found in his repeated guidance to focus at the division-and-below level. Even though General Depuy had moved proponentcy for FM 100-5 up three levels of command, from DTAC, to CAC, to Headquarters TRADOC, he was committed to focusing the manual at the tactical level.

Only a cursory review of the manual is required to recognize General Dupuy's success in doing this. At that time, Army doctrine recognized only two levels of war: the strategic level

and the tactical level. While a smattering of references to strategic "this or that" appeared within the manual, it only informed the reader of those assets at the strategic level that supported tactical operations.³⁴ The vast majority of the manual addressed tactical considerations. This focus at the tactical level corresponded to General Depuy's perceived need to retrain the Army in tactics appropriate to the new battlefield--Europe.³⁵

With its distinctly tactical perspective the 1976 edition, however, marked a change in the level of detail addressed in field manuals. The Army was transitioning to field manuals that would specifically tell the Army "how to fight." This edition went further than any of its antecedents in providing detailed guidance to commanders and soldiers.³⁶ Tank commanders, for example, were instructed to avoid duels with antitank guided missiles beyond 2000 meters and artillerymen were told to use delayed action fuzes in urban areas.³⁷ The 1976 edition provided a very detailed description of tactical doctrine.

In summary, the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was almost exclusively focused at the tactical level, provided a great amount of detail in its tactical doctrine, and was produced by a process centralized at TRADOC headquarters. Each of these characteristics added to the distinctive quality of the new manual and had a significant impact on the next revision of FM 100-5.

FM 100-5, 1982

On 1 July 1977, General Don Starry replaced General Depuy as the commander of TRADOC. General Starry, while commanding the U.S. Army Armor Center from 1973-1976, was closely involved in the doctrinal development of the 1976 edition of FM 100-5. He had observed General Depuy centralize the doctrine development process and had seen the subsequent controversy over the 1976 edition. While he personally supported the 1976 doctrine, he recognized the futility of developing a doctrine that the Army would not implement. In General Starry's mind, the Army's rejection of the 1976 doctrine was in large part due to this centralization of the doctrinal development process.³⁸

General Starry felt that Army schools had undercut the doctrine and had done so because they lacked confidence in it.³⁹ This lack of confidence existed because, as outsiders to the development process, the schools lacked a sense of ownership or loyalty to the doctrine. General Starry was not going to let this happen again.

In 1979, as General Meyers, Chief of Staff of the Army, suggested the revision of FM 100-5, General Starry had already begun shifting doctrinal responsibility back to the schools.⁴⁰

General Starry's position was that "it is necessary for those who teach doctrine on the platform to be essentially the same ones who are explaining it in the field manuals."⁴¹ Consequently, in

the spring of 1980 General Starry returned proponentcy for FM 100-5 to DTAC.⁴²

Additionally, General Starry established the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine (ODCSDOC). He believed that "operational concepts" should dominate the doctrine development process and charged the new office with developing and promoting the Army's operational concepts.⁴³ This office became the spokesman for the new concept upon which the revised doctrine would be based. With the formation of special briefing teams, ODCSDOC aggressively pursued an Army wide consensus regarding the new concept.

Once the new concept had a wide base of support within the Army, DTAC began writing the 1982 edition of FM 100-5. When the first draft was completed it was liberally distributed to the field--as low as battalion level.⁴⁴ In contrast with General Depuy, General Starry wanted early feedback from the field.⁴⁵

This staffing process resulted in a number of changes to the doctrine but the ideas that were finally included had a broad base of support. General Starry successfully avoided the controversy that followed the release of the 1976 edition.

These changes in process, in their own right, had an effect on the doctrine produced. The systems analysis perspective, so apparent in the 1976 edition, was significantly reduced. More importantly, there was an increase in the weight of both field

and branch input.⁴⁴ The new process had sought support for the new doctrine and had effectively built consensus. Consensus, however, exacted a high price.

The price of consensus was compromise. Each party had a view that required accommodation. The result was a watering down of TRADOC's best estimate of how to fight.⁴⁵ A specific, focused and well integrated description of how to fight had been replaced by a description with enough ambiguity to allow the field, the branches, TRADOC, and Leavenworth to attain and maintain a doctrinal consensus.

There was also divisiveness, and eventually compromise, on the tone of the manual. The Infantry school wanted to retain the tactical "how to fight" tone of the 1976 edition. The Artillery school supported this position, but wasn't going to fight about it as long as "deep attack" was in the doctrine. On the other hand, the Armor school, CAC, DTAC, the authors of the 1982 edition, and TRADOC argued that the new edition should only provide a framework to structure thought about war.⁴⁶ Moreover, General Starry and the chief author, LTC Wass de Czege, disagreed on where to place the emphasis within the tactical doctrine. General Starry advocated emphasizing the more concrete technical aspects of warfare, while LTC Wass de Czege favored emphasizing the more ambiguous human elements of warfare.⁴⁷

The result was a less detailed tactical doctrine. The Infantry school was no match for the confluence of forces that argued the opposing position. While doctrine had become more correctly centered on how soldiers, not systems, fight and win, there occurred a concurrent loss in detail explaining how they should go about winning. General Starry described the outcome later in this fashion. "We downplayed the tactical level in the '82 edition ... because of the controversy over the '76 edition ... and that was probably a mistake."⁵⁰

Even though diluted, the overall focus of the manual remained at the tactical level. This made sense when one considers that the proponentcy for the manual had returned to DTAC and that the branch schools, big players in the consensus building process, were largely focused at the tactical level. Additionally, a quick review of the manual provides ample evidence of tactical focus. For example, the intelligence chapter is titled "Tactical Intelligence," the logistics chapter begins "Commanders must plan tactics and logistics to insure that the tactical scheme of maneuver and fire support are logistically supportable," and the chapters describing offensive operations and the defense focus on tactical level units.

Nevertheless, while the general focus of the manual was at the tactical level, the 1982 edition also defined three levels of war. It defined the strategic level as the level at which the nation's armed forces are employed to secure the objectives of

national policy. At the operational level military resources are used to attain strategic goals within a theater of war. The tactical level was the level at which smaller units fought battles and engagements in support of operational objectives.⁵¹

The introduction of the three levels of war served two purposes. First, it explicitly allowed the Army to set aside the strategic level as "beyond the scope of this manual."⁵² Second, it formally introduced the operational level of war into Army doctrine. The introduction of the operational level was, however, a last minute addition to the manual.

LTC Henriques, one of the authors of the new manual had just come from working on FM 100-15, Corps Operations. With this background he advocated raising the manual's focus to a higher level than the tactical, division-and-below focus of the 1976 version. The ODCSDOC agreed with this position and wanted the operational level of war addressed in the 1982 edition. The Field Artillery School, in light of emerging deep operations and its relationship to the operational level, was frequently focused at higher levels anyway and strongly supported ODCSDOC's position.⁵³ Additionally, the Army War College, as well as the German officers that consulted on the manual, argued that the operational level was required.⁵⁴

General Starry, however, felt that the operational level of war would be better addressed in the corps manual. LTC Mass de

Czege, the manual's primary author, agreed with the concept but believed that the Army was not yet prepared to move up to the operational level. The Infantry School added weight to this position, arguing that the manual still addressed division and below forces and therefore should not include concepts inappropriate for those levels.⁵⁵ The issue was finally decided by General Starry. The first draft had no reference to the operational level of war.⁵⁶

A final draft, without reference to the operational level of war, was approved by the Army Chief of Staff in August of 1981. This, however, was the same month that General Starry departed TRADOC. He was succeeded by General Glenn K. Otis, rejected General Starry's position, and directed two significant changes to the manual, one of form and the other of substance. The first was the inclusion of the term AirLand Battle instead of the generic term "doctrine." The second was the decision to add the operational level of war to the manual.⁵⁷ With publication pressures mounting, LTC Wass de Czege had barely enough time to insert a discussion on the levels of war to the manual. Consequently, the levels of war were not well integrated into the 1982 manual.⁵⁸

Thus it came to pass that the operational level of war was included in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5. Its inclusion reflected the importance of Army-Air Force coordination in

AirLand Battle. It has been said that AirLand Battle was the operational level of war,³⁹ so in committing to AirLand Battle there was an implicit commitment to the operational level of war. This, however, was not widely recognized at the time.

In summary, the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 reflected a dilution of tactical doctrine, a reduction in doctrinal detail, and the introduction of another level of war that would compete with tactics for space in the Army's "keystone" manual. Concurrent with the growing recognition of the importance of joint operations, the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 generated an intellectual discourse with an "unprecedented emphasis on the operational level of war."⁴⁰ This intellectual search for meaning at the operational level of war would have a great impact on the next revision of FM 100-5.

FM 100-5, 1986

The intellectual discourse that occurred between the 1982 and 1986 editions was the result of incomplete and ambiguous development of the doctrine in the 1982 edition. The ambiguity of the 1982 edition was such that many interpreted AirLand Battle doctrine as a strategy.⁴¹ Many others were unable to distinguish what was operational and what was tactical. Moreover, the 1982

edition did not fully described the operational level's vital role as the translator of strategic goals into tactical action.⁴²

Another point of confusion was the connection between levels of war and echelons of command. The 1982 edition said that the operational level belonged to "large unit operations," but did not define what "large units" were. It also said that the operational and tactical level of war were not clearly discernable at corps and division.⁴³ The situation was further confused when the AirLand Battle Study concluded that the corps was a tactical fighting echelon rather than an operational level planner.⁴⁴ Simply stated, the 1982 manual failed to sufficiently differentiate between tactical and operational level warfighting.⁴⁵

Much of the problem with the 1982 edition was a result of its attempt to describe in a tactically focused manual a doctrine that could only be fully articulated at the operational level of war. The resulting ambiguity in the 1982 edition generated a much different debate than the one experienced after the 1976 edition. This new debate focused on understanding and clarifying the doctrine rather than changing it.

This focus on understanding rather than changing considered with another factor made it unlikely that the 1986 revision would represent the radical doctrinal changes of the 1976 and 1982 editions. This other factor was that the same players were in

the game.⁴⁴ The CAC commander in 1982, General Richardson, was now the commander of TRADOC. He continued to believe that the 1982 edition was on target.⁴⁷ Colonel Wass de Czege and another principle author of the 1982 version, Lieutenant Colonel D. L. Holder, continued their deep involvement in the revision process. Finally, the principle author of the 1986 edition, Colonel Richard Sinnreich, worked on the 1982 version for the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill.⁴⁸

The intervening years, however, did hold significant change for the process of producing FM 100-5. Colonel Wass de Czege, as he further analyzed AirLand Battle, gained a full realization of the importance of the operational level of war.⁴⁹ For this and other reasons he advocated and eventually formed the School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). SAMS was dedicated to the study of military art and science at the operational level of war. The formation of this school coincident with the recognition that AirLand Battle could only be fully articulated at the operational level prompted a change in proponency for FM 100-5. Proponency for the manual was transferred from DTAC to SAMS on 6 September 1984.⁷⁰ This change institutionalized the focus of FM 100-5 at the operational level.

Colonel Wass de Czege's initial guidance for the revision of FM 100-5 clearly indicated the Army's commitment to AirLand

Battle doctrine and the growing emphasis on the operational level of war.

AirLand Battle doctrine has not changed. The next edition is to be a fuller articulation or explanation of that doctrine.

Include a fuller description of the operational level of war.

Be less specific about details which are subject to evolution and are better covered in other manuals. Design FM 100-5 to be the doctrinal foundation of theory, principles, and fundamentals concepts for all other US Army manuals dealing with warfighting at the tactical and operational levels.⁷¹

By July 1985 Wass de Czege confirmed the inadequacy of the 1982 treatment of the operational level and claimed that the Army had learned "a great deal more about a notion we introduced to U. S. doctrine for the first time in 1982--the operational level of war."⁷² There would be no ambiguity of focus in the new edition of FM 100-5--it would clearly be at the operational level.

In contrast to the 1982 edition's last minute addition of the levels of war, the 1986 edition used the levels of war as part of its fundamental structure. While strategy was still beyond the scope of the manual, the tactical and operational levels were integrated into each part of the manual. For example the chapter on planning and execution separately addressed each level of war. The chapters on the offense and defense addressed the operational level first and then considered tactical actions. The logistics chapter was expanded to consider operational

sustainment as well as tactical sustainment. Even the discussion on the levels of war was significantly expanded.

To make room for the expanded discussion of the operational level of war the new manual was streamlined in both format and scope. Much of what was eliminated in the new edition was tactical level doctrine. For example, the 1982 chapter on tactical intelligence and considerations for tactically encircled forces were discarded completely. Additionally, the manual's description of tactical doctrine for the offense and defense was reduced. Tactical doctrine was the billpayer for the renewed emphasis on the operational level of war.

In summary, the doctrinal focus of FM 100-5 had transitioned from the tactical to the operational level of war. Overall coverage of tactical doctrine was reduced, and the manual's operational focus was institutionalized with the transfer of proponentcy to SAMS.

Implications

The reduction of FM 100-5 coverage of tactical doctrine was somewhat mitigated by the publication of numerous subordinate tactical manuals. Much of the detail that was once covered in FM 100-5 were relegated to these subordinate manuals. These manuals, however, focused on specific echelons or functions rather than the broader, more conceptual view of tactical doctrine presented in FM 100-5.

This broader view is the glue that binds together the more specific doctrine presented in subordinate manuals. It provides the top level tactical doctrine that ensures that various subordinate tactical doctrine stays focused on a single path. This is necessary to ensure echelon and function based doctrine remain compatible and produce a unified effort on the battlefield. This requirement for the tactical doctrine in FM 100-5 to act as a guide for lower level doctrine was largely a result of doctrinal change during this period.

This doctrinal change also generated a second role for the tactical doctrine presented in FM 100-5. The introduction of the operational level of war required that tactical doctrine be compatible with the new doctrine being generated at this level. The tactical doctrine in FM 100-5 had to be the bridge between lower level tactical doctrine and operational doctrine. This bridging role was necessary to ensure that doctrine produced at each level did not diverge. Divergence of doctrine would endanger the Army's ability to successfully conduct military operations.

In summary, the tactical doctrine in FM 100-5 serves two essential purposes. First it provides the linkage between operational level doctrine and the more specific tactical doctrine. Second, it guides the coherent development of subordinate doctrine.

The Current Revision

During the past few years a collection of studies, described together as AirLand Battle Future, produced the Army's newest operational concept.⁷³ This new concept, AirLand Operations, is expected to reshape Army doctrine, organization, training, and material development.⁷⁴ AirLand Operations has already sparked the current revision of FM 100-5. While it appears that the new edition will continue to reflect the trends of recent years, these trends are now poised to present problems for the future.

First consider the name change from "AirLand BAttle" to "AirLand Operations." The term "AirLand" has been retained, continuing the emphasis on Army-Air Force cooperation and coordination. However, the term "Battle," which the 1986 edition identified as an activity at the tactical level of war, has been replaced. The new term "Operations" is a clear reference to the operational level of war. Quite succinctly, the title of the new concept portends the focus of the next edition of FM 100-5.

Moreover, TRADOC PAM 525-5, the publication describing the new concept, clearly states that AirLand Operations is "the operational level umbrella concept."⁷⁵ The publication goes on to state specifically that "AirLand Operations focus is at the operational level."⁷⁶ As far as the tactical level goes, it only provides "insights for the development of tactical level concepts

and doctrine."⁷⁷ This clearly implies that a separate follow-on analysis at the tactical level is expected to yield tactical concepts that are compatible with this new operational concept. While some efforts have been made in this direction, this analysis has not been accomplished.⁷⁸ Consequently, as this new operational level concept is being transformed into doctrine, there does not exist a comparably developed tactical concept to support the production of new tactical doctrine in FM 100-5.

This puts the Army in the precarious position of producing operational doctrine with less than fully compatible tactical doctrine. While the doctrine produced could be fully coherent within each level of war, clear linkage between the levels would be weakened. In this sense, the tactical doctrine presented in the new FM 100-5 would not fulfil its mission of providing linkage between operational doctrine and more detailed tactical doctrine.

Thus far, the revision process has produced a precis, introducing the new FM 100-5, and a draft outline of the structure and content of the new edition. The precis indicates that the new FM 100-5 will reflect a broader view of doctrine than the 1986 edition. This broader view reflects the expanding role of the Army and the linkage of doctrine to "actions in support of national objectives." Consequently, the new manual will consider the application of forces under conditions of peacetime competition and crisis as well as under conditions of

war. Additionally, the new edition will expand its consideration of campaigns and extend intelligence preparation of the battlefield to intelligence preparation of the theater.⁷⁹ With this expansion at the operational level and current guidance to maintain the existing size of the manual, one can expect the coverage of tactical doctrine to be reduced once again.

This continued reduction of space allocated to tactical doctrine may threaten its ability to effectively guide the development of subordinate tactical doctrine. Tactical doctrine in FM 100-5 is the pinnacle of a hierarchy of tactical doctrine that reaches to the lowest levels of the Army. Appropriately detailed, effectively articulated tactical doctrine at this level is required to produce coherence and "commonality of thought" throughout this hierarchy.

If the next edition of FM 100-5 fails to present tactical doctrine in enough detail, the production of subordinate doctrine will suffer. Lower level tactical doctrine addressing various echelons and functions would lack unity of focus. Without unified focus, subordinate tactical doctrine may begin to drift apart. This divergence would impair the Army's ability to fight at the tactical level.

It should be apparent that FM 100-5's presentation of tactical doctrine significantly impacts the Army's warfighting capability. It is important, therefore, that the next edition of FM 100-5 presents appropriately detailed tactical doctrine that is linked to operational doctrine.

Conclusion

Currently, it appears that the new edition of FM 100-5 will continue to reflect trends established during the revision of the two previous editions. If this course is maintained, the new edition will strengthen its focus on the operational level, expand its discussion of campaigns and the use of forces in peacetime and crisis. Once again, this will be accomplished at the expense of tactical doctrine. Unfortunately, it also seems likely that the new manual will be written without a full examination of the effects of the new operational concept on tactical doctrine.

These trends threaten the effective expression of tactical doctrine in FM 100-5. If followed to fruition the current path will result in the presentation of tactical doctrine that may not fulfill its two essential purposes. First, the tactical doctrine presented may not account for the changes in operational doctrine, thus producing a lack of doctrinal coherence between the two levels of war. Second, the tactical doctrine may be presented so tersely that it will not serve as an effective guide for the production of subordinate tactical doctrine. Published under these conditions, FM 100-5 would degrade rather than enhance the Army's warfighting capability.

To avoid this undesirable outcome, the current revision process should require a full examination of the implications of the new operational concept on the tactical level of war. This

evaluation must rationally develop the linkage between the proposed operational concept and the requirements it generates at the tactical level. Existing concepts at the tactical level must then be reviewed for adequacy and revised where shortcomings exist. Finally, this revised tactical doctrine must be articulated clearly and in enough detail to support the coherent development of subordinate tactical doctrine.

Addressing tactical doctrine in this manner helps ensure that FM 100-5 remains effective as the Army's "keystone" manual for warfighting. It also takes a large step toward keeping Army doctrine "not too badly wrong."

ENDNOTES

1. The shortened term "Army" will be used for subsequent references to the U.S. Army.
2. TRADOC PAM 525-5, AirLand Operations, (Headquarters, TRADOC: Ft Monroe, VA, 1 August, 1991), p. 2-3.
3. This assertion, presented here without support, is developed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
4. Archie Galloway, "FM 100-5: Who Influenced Who?" Military Review, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army, CGSC, Mar 1986), p. 46.
5. David J. Schubert and Brian L. Cavanagh, "The RAAF Writes Its Doctrine," Airpower Journal, Vol. III, No. 2, (Summer 1989), p. 18.
6. Ibid, p. 19.
7. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 63.
8. Ibid, p. 65.
9. Jay Luvaas, "Some Vagrant Thoughts on Doctrine", Military Review, (March, 1986), p. 57.
10. The Oxford English Dictionary Being a Corrected Re-issue With an Introduction, Supplement, and a Bibliography of a New English Dictionary on Historical Principles, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), pp. 572-573, cited by Jay Luvaas in "Some Vagrant Thoughts on Doctrine", Military Review, (March, 1986), p. 56.
11. Special Regulation 320-5-1, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, (Washington D.C.: August 1950), p. 78.
12. This appears to have been partly influenced by the advent of nuclear weapons.
13. JCS PUB 1 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington D.C.: 1984) p. 119.
14. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 152.
15. Dudley W. Knox, "The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 41, Mar-Apr, 1915; p. 48-50.

16. Baron von Fraytag-Loringhoven, The Power of Personality in War, (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co., 1955), p. 67.
17. Jeffrey W. Long, The Evolution of U.S. Army Doctrine: From the Active Defense to Airland Battle and Beyond, MMAS Thesis, CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1991, p. 1.
18. U.S. Army. Field Manual 100-5. Operations. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1 July 1976, p. i.
19. Long, p. 28.
20. FM 100-5, Operations, 1986, p. i.
21. Ibid, p. 6.
22. Army Focus, (Department of the Army: Washington, D. C., June 1991), p. 47.
23. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, New York: The Free Press, 1990, p. 239.
24. Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, no. 119, (March 1974), p. 3-11.
25. It is recognized that, while the model depicts relationships rather discreetly with regard to time, the processes depicted take time to occur, often years.
26. General William Momyer quoted in Robert Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 1971), p. 197.
27. Paul Herbert, "Deciding What Has To Be Done: General William E Dupuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations", Leavenworth Papers 16 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, July 1988), p. 7.
28. Ibid, p. 7.
29. Long, p.251.
30. Herbert, p. 46-48.
31. Herbert, Chapter 5.
32. William Dupuy, "Introduction to A.P. Hill II," Transcript of remarks cited by Paul Herbert in Leavenworth Papers 16.

33. Herbert, p. 59.
34. An example of how the strategic level is treated can be found on pages 3-6, 7-8, and 7-9, where strategic level is mentioned.
35. Herbert, p. 101.
36. Long, p.36.
37. FM 100-5, 1976, 3-14 and 14-20.
38. Long, pp. 254-256.
39. Long, p. 257.
40. Romjue, John L. "From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973 - 1982." TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, (Fort Monroe, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1984), p. 32.
41. Electronic message, 261800Z February 1980, Starry to distribution, SUBJECT: The TRADOC Doctrinal Literature Program, in THD files, cited by Kevin Sheehan in "Preparing for an imaginary war? Examining peacetime functions and changes of Army doctrine," Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1988.
42. Romjue, p. 42.
43. Romjue, p. 27.
44. Long, p. 257.
45. Romjue, p. 57.
46. Long, p. 258.
47. Long, p. 258.
48. Long, p. 279-280.
49. Aaron Blumenfeld, "AirLand Battle Doctrine: Evolution or Revolution?", (Thesis Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1989), p. 71.
50. Blumenfeld, p. 71.
51. U.S. Army. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 20 August 1982), p. 2-3.
52. Ibid, p. 2-3.
53. Long, p. 278.

54. Romjue, p. 61.
55. Blumenfeld, p. 68.
56. Long, p. 279.
57. Romjue, p. 61.
58. Long, p. 279.
59. Romjue, p. 61.
60. Blumenfeld, p. 75.
61. Huba Wass de Czege, Memorandum for Reviewers of FM 100-5, 1 July 1985, SUBJECT: The Nature and Reasons for Changes in This Edition, p. 2.
62. William Richardson, Military Review, "FM 100-5: The AirLand Battle in 1986, (March 1986), p. 5.
63. FM 100-5, Operations, 1982.
64. Michael Pearlman, Memorandum for Record, 10 December 1987, SUBJECT: LTC Woode on the corps manual, p. 1.
65. Richardson, p. 5.
66. Long, p. 285.
67. Richardson, p. 7.
68. Long, p. 285.
69. Blumenfeld, p. 75.
70. Huba Wass de Czege, Memorandum for Record, 6 September 1984, SUBJECT: Transfer of FM 100-5 Proponency from Department of Tactics to School of Advanced Military Studies.
71. Wass de Czege, Memorandum for Record, 6 September 1984.
72. Wass de Czege, Memorandum for Reviewers of FM 100-5, p. 2.
73. TRADOC PAM 525-5, AirLand Operations, p. 46.
74. TRADOC PAM 525-5, AirLand Operations, Foreword.
75. TRADOC PAM 525-5, AirLand Operations, Foreword.
76. TRADOC PAM 525-5, AirLand Operations, p. 1.

77. TRADOC PAM 525-5, AirLand Operations, p. 1.

78. Telephonic interviews with unnamed officers in the Center for Army Tactics, CGSC, 11 December 91; in the Force Design Directorate of CACDA, 11 December 91; and within the FM 100-5 writing team, November 91.

79. "FM 100-5 Operations Introduction," (Precis produced by SAMS, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 October 1991), p. 3 and 8.

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