Background and Options for Nuclear Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula
Abstract
Korean affairs have unfolded rapidly in the past few years. The communist bloc has disintegrated, leaving North Korea with few supporters. South and North Korea have joined the United Nations and have signed two potentially significant inter-Korean agreements: the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation; and the Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula. President Bush has ordered the worldwide withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons, and South Korea's President Roh Tae Woo has subsequently declared that his nation is free of nuclear weapons. On January 30, 1992, North Korea belatedly signed the Nuclear Safeguards Accord (NSA) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), thereby obligating itself to undergo IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. These and other changes warrant careful consideration, with North Korea's apparent pursuit of nuclear weapons development an ominous countertrend to the more positive developments in other areas. By signing the NSA, the North has opened the way for IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities. But this is only the beginning of the end of a nuclear Korea (assuming that the North does in fact have such a program). The North Koreans must first ratify the NSA, then cooperate fully in the implementation of the inspections, and finally dismantle any nuclear fuel reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities that they may have constructed. At every step there is the possibility of delay and deception. For this reason, the nuclear question in Korea remains very much alive. This report considers North and South Korean attitudes toward nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and outlines some alternative nuclear arms-control regimes that might frame future negotiations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA260491
Entities
People
- Kongdan Oh
Organizations
- RAND Corporation