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THESIS

**RUSSIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS:
FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION**

by

Donald R. Owens

December, 1992

Thesis Advisor:

Mikhail Tsypkin

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RUSSIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS:
FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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of the requirements for the degree of


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


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ABSTRACT

The recent atmosphere of cooperation in the United Nations (UN) has resulted in many nations, including the Russian Federation, proposing increases in the scope and nature of security missions that the UN should undertake. This thesis will focus on those security arrangements in the UN from the Russian perspective.

This thesis will first examine the historical policy of the former Soviet Union and discuss those aspects that relate to the emerging Russian policy in the UN, namely, the rationale behind a cooperative approach and the factors which might return Russia to those confrontational policies of its predecessor's past. This will be followed by a discussion of Russia's assumption of Soviet responsibilities in the UN and the emerging foreign policy debate within the Russian government. This thesis will then highlight the recent Russian security initiatives in the UN which include proposals for strengthen peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventive diplomacy ventures. Finally, an overview of the motivations and impediments behind Russia's renewed emphasis on strengthening security management within the UN will be presented.

Current diplomatic activity within the Russian Federation and United Nations clearly illustrates that Russia is seeking, through a cooperative approach, to expand its influence within the United Nations. However, in the future, political infighting within the Russian government will determine the extent of this cooperative policy in the UN.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL THESIS

The recent atmosphere of cooperation in the United Nations (UN) has resulted in many nations, including the Russian Federation, proposing increases in the scope and nature of security missions that the UN should undertake. This thesis will focus on those security arrangements in the UN from the Russian perspective. Specifically, this study will examine the historical policy of the former Soviet Union and discuss those aspects that relate to the emerging Russian policy in the UN, namely, the rationale behind a cooperative approach and the factors which might return Russia to those confrontational policies of its predecessor's past.

From its inception, the UN was hampered by the emerging cold war and the associated confrontational attitudes of its members. In particular, the Soviet Union's activity within the United Nations (prior to the mid-1980's) was confrontational in both nature and in practice. A study of the Soviet voting record within the Security Council, Soviet declaratory policy and Soviet participation in UN mandated missions clearly demonstrates that the Soviet government was set upon a course of confrontation within the UN.

This confrontational attitude of the Soviet Union was not without cause. This policy, while in complete agreement with ideological nature of competition between capitalism and communism, was founded on the realities of the cold war. Specifically, Soviet confrontation in the UN provided another means of

limiting the ability of the Western nations to undermine the power, position and authority of the Soviet government in the international arena.

As the Soviets' internal problems grew and became increasingly unmanageable (late 1980's) the Soviet government began to look upon the UN not as a tool for blocking the West, but as a means of increasing Soviet "breathing space" in the international arena so that they might better focus on domestic problems. By the early-1990's, the Soviets began to use the UN as a mechanism for assisting themselves in the maintenance of their security, albeit in a limited sense.

By the beginning of 1992, the Russian Federation had secured the previously held Soviet seat in the UN and more importantly in the Security Council. Since that time the Russians have continued, much like their predecessors the Soviets, to look toward the UN as a means of enhancing their security and power in the international arena. The Soviet government did this through confrontation and later through the use of cooperative ventures in hopes of favorable "*quid pro quo*" treatment. The Russians, on the other hand have used the UN to legitimize their newfound position in the "new world order." Additionally, the Russian government has attempted to further its own security by seeking to expand the peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventive diplomacy functions of the UN, which it must be noted, are controlled by the Security Council of which the Russians belong and hence influence with the use or threatened use of their veto authority.

By analyzing the Russian government's declaratory policy coupled with their current activity within the UN, one is left to believe that Russia will indeed continue to pursue a cooperative policy within the United Nations. Furthermore, most evidence suggests that Russia may embark upon a strategy of cooperation for many of the same reasons that the former Soviet Union altered its philosophy regarding the UN. These reasons are predicated on the maintenance of Russian influence, prestige, power and security in the international arena, combined with their desire to maximize the benefits of a cooperative policy, namely "*quid pro quo*" or reciprocal treatment, while minimizing the intrusion of the UN into those areas "near abroad" Russian soil.

This is not to suggest that a Russian cooperative policy in the UN is a foregone conclusion. There are many possible impediments to Russian-UN cooperation, but without a doubt the largest and most serious involves the current domestic political battle raging between liberal and conservative elements within the Russian government.

While one cannot assume that the Russian government will continue along its current liberal reforming path, it is also unlikely that the extreme Russian conservative agenda regarding the UN will manifest itself in the near term. Instead it is more likely that we will witness a measured Russian retreat from the current administration's reliance upon international organizations as a primary vehicle for international policy implementation. Instead it appears that Russia will take a more centrist approach, which emphasizes Russian unilateral activity

in domestic and "near abroad" ventures while simultaneously cooperating within the UN on those remaining international security problems. It is important to note that this movement toward a more independent policy will not be directly based on the traditional influence of the confrontational period of Soviet activity within the UN, but instead will be built upon the domestic realities of Russian "power politics."

Certainly current Russian declaratory policy and activity within the UN suggests a deep commitment to cooperation in security ventures with the other "great powers." However, the reality of domestic instability within the Russian Federation may force a more conservative approach to cooperation in international organizations. Unquestionably, a continued policy of cooperation in the UN will net the Russian Federation gains in international influence, enhanced security and most importantly aid. However, the same problems that turned the former Soviet Union toward the UN, namely; political, military and economic instability, may eventually lead the Russian Federation away from the UN.

I. AN INTRODUCTION TO CONFRONTATION AND COOPERATION IN THE UN

A. CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION: BACKGROUND

From its inception, the United Nations (UN) was hampered by the emerging cold war and the associated confrontational attitudes of its members. The optimistic attitude toward the formation of a new "United Nations Organization," in the United States, rapidly gave way to the realism that the UN could never be relied upon as the guarantor of "international peace and security."¹ As an example of this attitude, prior to the ratification of the UN Charter, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Tom Connally, felt the UN Charter was "the greatest document of its kind that has ever been formulated."² Two short years later, as the world was firmly entrenched in the confrontational aspects of the cold war, Connally felt the UN was incapable of handling complex international issues and if presented with such an issue it would become "a buck-passing arrangement, just a dodging and trimming and flim-flamming around."³

¹The UN's purpose as a guarantor of "international peace and security" is set forth in Article 1 (1) of the UN Charter.

²Quoted in Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 9.

³This statement was made in regard to allowing the UN to handle problems of communist insurgencies in Greece and Turkey. Quoted in; Joseph L Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992), 93.

The Soviet approach toward the UN as the guarantor of "international peace and security" was quite different than that of the West. The Soviets saw the UN as an organization of the "Western Powers" which was dominated by Western ideology. The Soviets' decision to join the UN was an "act of accommodation, not conviction."⁴ It is quite clear from statements made by the Soviet leadership that the Soviet Union envisioned the UN as an arena in which it would block the West from infringing upon Soviet sovereignty. This confrontational attitude was to be the primary Soviet policy for the first 40 years of the UN's existence.

As the cold war continued, it became increasingly apparent to most nations that the roots of conflict imbedded in the cold war could not (or should not) be settled in the UN. Furthermore, to hold out for this eventuality would be utter and complete folly. In the end, it appeared as if the UN would become ineffectual and unable to assume its envisioned role as "maintainer of international peace and security." George Kennan summed it up best when he wrote,

Some of the most important elements in the East-West conflict long predated the foundation of the United Nations; they were part of the world into which it was born. It is not fair to the organization today to ask it to resolve the predicaments of the past as well as the *present*... to look to such an

⁴This point is convincingly made by Alvin Z. Rubinstein in; The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953-1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964); and Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, 3rd edition (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), 310-333.

organization to resolve deep-seated conflicts of interest among those Great Powers is to ignore its limitations....⁵

It was not until the late 1980's that the UN witnessed the decreasing confrontational attitude of its member states. Soviet General-Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's call for a "comprehensive system of international security" in 1987 was the first of many attempts by individual governments towards fostering a sense of cooperation and establishing an increased role for the UN in the "maintenance of international peace and security."⁶ It remains to be seen if the Russian government will continue this Soviet policy of cooperation in the UN and indeed, "reject the hypocrisy of the conception of confrontation, of division of the world into ours and others on the basis of ideological criteria" and instead strive to "overcome the legacy of global confrontation and to dismantle the confrontational structures that remain from that time."⁷

⁵My emphasis; George F. Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1957), 27.

"This was first set forth in Mikhail Gorbachev, "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World," *Pravda*, 17 September 1987 (Reprinted in English, see; International Affairs (Moscow) 11 (November 1987): 3-11.

⁷As stated by the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, see; "Russia Cannot be Put Back in a Cell," *VREME*, 15 June 1992, 41-43 (FBIS-USR-92-086, 10 July 1992, 15).

B. CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION: THEORY AND ASSUMPTIONS

My intention is to show that Soviet policy within the UN (until the mid-1980's) was guided by the confrontational realities of the cold war. I will highlight the motivations behind Soviet policy in the UN and discuss why these motivations changed during the late 1980's leading to a more cooperative path in the UN for Soviet behavior. These motivations are important to highlight not solely because of their "interesting nature" but also because they provide us with insight into the emerging Russian policy in the world and specifically in the UN. As there were many variables behind the Soviet's new approach of cooperation in the UN so there are parallel variables in Russia's search for a "mild-mannered" foreign policy toward the West and the UN.⁸

The Russians have continued, much like their predecessors the Soviets, to look toward the UN as a means of enhancing their security while simultaneously maintaining Russian influence, prestige and power in the international arena. Consequently, while there exists serious differences between current Russian policy motivations in the UN and past Soviet policy, namely the control of ethnic

⁸The "mild-mannered" foreign policy of Russia usually implies cooperation with the West and a foundation in international law. As opposed to the "tough" foreign policy that "arouses Russian patriots' sympathies" and is associated with Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi. This tough policy is more Russo-centric and tends to limit involvement with the West; see, Yevgenii Krasnikov, "Diplomacy: Aleksandr Rutskoi has His Own Foreign Policy," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 21 May 1992, 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-100, 22 May 1992, 18-19).

violence and the search for financial assistance abroad, there are also exists a motivational continuity between the two policies, specifically with regard to the maintenance of national power, prestige and influence in the international arena.

Finally, with regard to comparing past Soviet policies with current Russian policies, there is also merit in determining the possibility of a Russian government's return to historically confrontational policies in the UN.

Through this analysis of past and present Soviet and Russian policies in the UN, I intend to show that there are many plausible reasons to assume that the Russian government will continue along the "cooperative path" in the UN. I will not only illustrate the linkage between past Soviet policies and present Russian policies but I will also describe the linkage between the structures and individuals which formulated and implemented Soviet foreign policy with those now doing so in the Russian government. In the end, I will demonstrate that there is a place in the emerging Russian foreign policy for a continuation of cooperation in the UN.

This is not to suggest, however, that a cooperative policy is guaranteed. Political instability remains the key factor in determining any future foreign policy agenda in Russia. Just as there are many reasons to assume that Russian policy in the UN will remain of a cooperative nature so there are many factors which could lead to more confrontational practices in the UN. Therefore, I will also discuss those factors which may impede a cooperative Russian policy in the UN.

The breadth of topics which the UN "remains seized of" forces me to limit this study to only those issues concerned primarily with the "maintenance of peace and security." However as one can imagine, the various "approaches to peace and security" (i.e. collective security, disarmament, trusteeship, functional theories, etc.) can, in and of themselves, be an overwhelming topic.⁹ Therefore, I will limit this study to primarily those approaches to peace and security in the UN which mandate the use of force. The increasing nature of these type of UN activities (i.e. peacekeeping missions, Gulf War involvement, economic/military embargoes and the use of force to protect humanitarian efforts) continues to illustrate the vast importance and relevance this topic has for us today.

With the end of the cold war many nations are looking toward the UN to fulfill its Charter and undertake "effective collective measures for the maintenance of international peace and security."¹⁰ This includes increasing the scope and nature of UN activities and activating many of the moribund functions of the UN and its Security Council. In most instances, the Russian government has broken from its confrontational roots to become one of the leading advocates for increasing the UN's role in international security affairs. I will discuss the various Russian initiatives regarding cooperative security measures in the UN and the

⁹For the classic description of the various "approaches to peace through international organization," see; Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th ed., (New York: Random House, 1984), 215-408.

¹⁰As set forth in Article 1 and Chapters V-VII of the UN Charter.

possible Russian motivations behind turning the UN into the "main security organization in the world."¹¹

What was the Soviet policy within the United Nations? Will Russia continue along the course of cooperation, which marked the recent policy of the former Soviet Union? What might be the major reasons that the Russian government would continue this cooperative policy? What are the impediments to a cooperative policy? These are the major questions on which this study will focus.

¹¹As was suggested by Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Boris Pankin in "The Dangers of Nationalism: The Development of the Sovereignty Principle in International Law," as delivered by Pankin to the 46th Session of the UN's General Assembly, New York, 24 September 1991 (Vital Speeches of the Day LVIII, no. 1, 15 October 1991: 7).

II. THE ROOTS OF CONFRONTATION AND THE ORIGIN OF COOPERATION

A. INTRODUCTION

Historically, the policy of the former Soviet Union within the United Nations has progressed from a strategy of confrontation to one of cooperation. This chapter will examine the historical policy of the former Soviet Union from the confrontational roots of the early cold war years to the cooperative tone of Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of "new thinking."

Soviet policy in the UN can be broken down into three basic time frames. In the first period, "Western" nations (North America, Western Europe and the Commonwealth) comprised the majority voting block. The second period saw the emergence of the "non-aligned movement," and the final period was marked by the advent of "new-thinking" within the Soviet Union. I will attempt to highlight the major points of these periods. I will also discuss why the Soviet Union embarked upon the strategy of cooperation in the UN.

Overall, the UN presented the Soviet Union with a very cost-effective means of attaining certain goals. Examples would include; the enhancement of a world communist/socialist movement, blocking Western domination in the world order, establishment of a global consensus (mostly non-aligned and Third World nations) against the "Western Powers," and recently, maintenance of their global

influence.¹² Similar to the Soviets, the Russian government may manipulate the UN as a means to enhance their power and attain international objectives without paying a heavy price (i.e. money, resources or labor). In the end, if one hopes to gain insight into future Russian policy within the UN one must thoroughly understand the history and motivations of past Soviet policy within the UN.

B. HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Soviet notion of a "United Nations Organization" was highly influenced by their limited experience with the League of Nations. The Soviets felt the League of Nations was an organization which, "legalizes robbery and violence by the strong against the weak states."¹³ The Soviet government increasingly came to believe that the League of Nations was an instrument of the Western nations, which would be used to eventually destroy the Soviet Union. A resolution of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International stated:

The League of Nations... is itself more and more becoming a direct instrument for preparing and carrying out the war against the Soviet Union. The alliances and pacts concluded under the protection of the League of

¹²In 1962, Alexander Dallin suggested a similar list of opportunities that the UN presented to the Soviet Union, these opportunities included; settlement of minor disputes, a forum for international contacts, a fact gathering/intelligence forum, a forum to win prestige and respectability and a propaganda arena. See; Dallin, "The Soviet View of the United Nations," International Organizations 16, no. 1 (Winter 1962) 25-26.

¹³Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), 15.

Nations are direct means for camouflaging preparation of war, especially war against the Soviet Union.¹⁴

In the twilight of the League's existence, as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union consolidated its domestic power, it exhibited less hostility towards the League of Nations. With the emerging power of the German nation, Stalin started to view the League as a means of blocking the threat of Nazi aggression. By 1933, he felt,

The League may act in some degree like a brake, retarding or preventing the outbreak of hostilities. If that were so, if the League were to turn out an obstacle, even a small one, that made war more difficult, while it furthered, even to a small extent, the cause of peace, then we would not be against the League.¹⁵

It was primarily with this hope of maintaining "collective security" that the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations. However, the Soviets still held to the belief that the League was a hostile organization, therefore, they must use it to enhance their security while "preserving their own personality."¹⁶

Soviet membership in the League had a short life, on December 14, 1939 the League of Nations voted to revoke the membership of the Soviet Union for its

¹⁴Ibid., 16.

¹⁵Ibid., 18.

¹⁶See Maxim Litvinov's comments on Soviet participation in the UN, The Soviet Union at the United Nations, 18-19.

aggression into Finland. This limited Soviet limited experience with the League reinforced their notion of Western aggression toward communism, and the need to maintain Soviet sovereignty and freedom of action in any international organization. It was with this historical bias that the Soviets approached the concept of a "United Nations Organization." The only useful purpose of the UN (outside of a forum for propaganda) was to ensure their own security against armed aggression and block interference in the internal affairs of the emerging "communist bloc" by the "imperialist nations." The Soviets did not want to see the UN become, much like the League had, an instrument of the West. To prevent this occurrence, they felt that instruments in the UN Charter would have to be adopted to safeguard their sovereignty.

The emergence of the Soviet Union, after World War Two, as a major world power also served to shape its view with regard to the UN. The Soviets' post-war vision of the UN seems to be dominated by three major themes. First, they felt the UN could be used effectively as a forum for communist propaganda. Andrei Kozyrev, Russian Foreign Minister, recently stated, "it will be only fair to note that the Soviet approach to the UN as it was adopted at the time [post-WWII] implied using the UN almost wholly and entirely as a propaganda forum."¹⁷

¹⁷Gennadi Gatilov and Andrei Kozyrev, "The UN Peace-Making System: Problems and Prospects," International Affairs (Moscow) 12 (Dec 1990): 80.

From the beginning, the Soviets felt admission in the UN would provide them with a major benefit. They would have an international forum for the acceleration of communist/socialist rhetoric. Prior to the actual commencement of UN activities Stalin told a group of Communist Party members, "We do not need the UN.... What we need is a stage from which we can express any opinion we want."¹⁸

The second major Soviet view of the UN during the post-war period deals with the prevention of armed aggression. Their views on this topic differed slightly with those they held at the time of the League of Nations. Similar to their feelings toward the League, they felt that decisions reached in the UN may help prevent war. However, the way in which these decisions were to be reached were drastically different than those in the League of Nations. First, any decision resolving, "any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security," will be undertaken by the Security Council, where the Soviets had the power of veto.¹⁹ Second, and more important, the Soviets felt that the UN would become a "front organization," rubber stamping proposals previously agreed upon by the major nations in secret

¹⁸Quoted in; Juliana G. Pilon, "Shattered Illusions: The UN and the USSR," Survey, 27 (Autumn/Winter 1983): 91.

¹⁹From Article 33 (1) of the UN Charter, see; Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 161.

negotiations. Stalin envisioned this procedure to be a continuation of the current actions of the "Great Powers."²⁰

Finally, the last major post-war vision the Soviets had with regard to the UN was one in which they could shape the organization as they saw fit. Again, this view was highly influenced by their experience with the League of Nations. Similarly to the League, the Soviets wanted the UN to be subordinate to individual states' sovereignty. Furthermore, the Soviet Union did not want to be bound to any decision that a majority of lesser (Western) states had agreed upon, as was the case in the League of Nations. Stalin declared, at Yalta, that in this new organization, "he would never agree to having any action of any of the Great Powers submitted to the judgement of the small powers."²¹ The Soviet leaders also felt, "as an inter-state organization, the United Nations does not, and cannot, stand above states; it is not and cannot be a self-sufficient body, independent of states...."²² For these reasons, the Soviet Union played a major role designing the UN Charter specifically; the organization, composition and power of the UN General Assembly, Secretariat and Security Council.

²⁰For a further discussion of the "great powers" role in the UN, see; Philip E. Mosely, "The Soviet Union and the United Nations," International Organization, 19 (Summer 1965); and Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, 311.

²¹The Soviet Union at the United Nations, 22.

²²M. Lvov, "United Nations: Results and Prospects," International Affairs (Moscow) 9 (September 1965): 67.

The General Assembly would provide the broad forum for the Soviet-style propaganda. In the Assembly each country has an equal voice and vote. The Soviets sought to diminish as much of the Assembly's power as possible, since it was dominated by the "Western powers." For the Soviets, the Assembly was best served as a powerless arena, used primarily for the dissemination of their political views/ideology.

The Soviets felt, the Secretary-General and his "executive council" (the Secretariat) should be a purely administrative body with the purpose of implementing decisions of the Security Council and General Assembly. The Soviets realized they did not have the political clout or coalition to completely control the election process of the Secretary-General and therefore, sought to minimize his power.

Finally, Soviet approval of the UN Charter could only be gained if their power to control the Security Council was guaranteed by the means of an effective veto.²³ The Soviets felt (as did the other four permanent members of the Council) they must have the ability to approve or disapprove all amendments to the Charter. The Soviet Union felt,

²³To be fair, this was also representative of the view of all the major powers.

...no United Nations body, except the Security Council, can take any decisions, binding on all member states of the Organization, on any question except administrative matters and procedural questions."²⁴

The Soviets believed international organizations were only transitional. With the eventual disintegration of all capitalist states there would be no need for an organization such as the UN. In the interim, the UN was to be used as an arena of conflict to hasten the demise of the West through the "attractive" display of communist ideology. It was also to be used as a body to ensure the Soviets' continued survival, in the presence of the "imperialist threat."²⁵ The General Assembly served as an arena for Soviet propaganda, and their drive to limit the powers of the Secretary-General, coupled with their veto power in the Security Council, served to offset the Western dominance in the United Nations.

C. WESTERN DOMINANCE

From the first days of the San Francisco Conference, the activities of the UN were symbolized by the East-West conflict. This was to be the case for over forty years. The question of Polish statehood, which had been put off since the fragile compromise at Yalta, threatened to tear apart the UN in its first days. The two rival regimes contending for Polish leadership (London Poles and Lublin Poles)

²⁴"United Nations: Results and Prospects," 67.

²⁵For a more in depth discussion of this view see; "The Soviet View of the United Nations."

were being separately sponsored by the Western nations and the Soviet government. Initially, the question of Polish statehood threatened to destroy the San Francisco Conference; however, in a last minute compromise the UN delegates agreed upon an empty resolution to "affirm the hope that the Polish government would soon be formed...and send suitable delegates to San Francisco."²⁶ This compromise between the Soviets and the West marked the beginning of the cold war competition in the UN, it was also to be illustrative of the many "hollow" UN resolutions to follow.

The first meeting of the Security Council also reflected the future conflict between the Soviets and the West. The agenda item of this first meeting was the question of Soviet troop withdrawal from Iran. With the urging of the U.S., the Iranians brought a complaint to the Security Council, which stated that the Soviet Union had failed to pull its troops out of Iran as promised in September 1945. The Soviets felt there was nothing to discuss in this Pro-Western forum, and that any resolution would have to be negotiated bilaterally between Iran and the Soviet Union. In the end, the Soviets and Iranians agreed upon a resolution which amounted to a Soviet troop withdrawal in exchange for a promise from Iran to allow a Pro-Soviet, semi-autonomous government in bordering Azerbaijan.²⁷ This conflict in the Security Council was to be the first of literally

²⁶Nation Against Nation, 22.

²⁷Ibid.

hundreds of conflicts between the Soviets and the West in this UN body. These conflicts reinforced the Soviets' view that they must maintain presence and continue to participate in the UN if only to block Western imperialism.²⁸

In the post-WWII years, Soviet thinking in the UN was dominated by the view of "two camps."²⁹ On one hand you had the progressive socialist camp, and on the other was the imperialist camp of the Western powers. Furthermore, according to the Soviet Union, there was no room for neutrality or impartiality. You were either with the Soviets or against them. The Communist Party's official "organ," *Kommunist* stated;

The historical struggle taking place on the world stage in our days finds expression within the walls of that Organization [the UN], where the world is represented in all its manifold and of course contradictory complexity. Here a polarization is taking place in the course of which the forces of peace, freedom and social progress unite, while the advocates of aggression and colonial slavery doom themselves to isolation.³⁰

This concept of two camps gave way to a similar concept of "three camps," in the mid-1950's. The additional camp was comprised of the "non-aligned" countries. The Soviets felt that the struggle with imperialism would be decided

²⁸The Soviet Union was to later relearn this lesson during their absence in the Security Council when the issue of Korean aggression (1950) was addressed.

²⁹For a discussion of the evolution of the "two-camp theory" see; Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, 9-40.

³⁰"The Soviet View of the United Nations," 21.

by winning over this new camp, and isolating the West.³¹ However, in the early post-war years of the UN, the Soviets often found their "camp" to be in the minority. To ensure their own sovereignty and freedom of action, the Soviet Union always made it known that they would not be bound to any decision in the UN that threatened their survival as a state. Khrushchev frequently made this point in his public statements in the UN, and at other official functions. He once told the General Assembly, that the Soviet Union would ignore any UN decision which it felt was incompatible with Soviet interests. He stated, if the Soviet Union did not get its way it would, "uphold our interests outside this international body, outside the United Nations, by relying on our own strength."³²

This all stemmed from the fact that the UN, at this time, was dominated by a pro-Western voting majority, and was viewed by the Soviets as being openly hostile toward non-Western beliefs. There is some truth to this Soviet view, as former US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson said,

the United Nations--as an idea and as an institution--is an extension of Western ideas; of Western belief in the worth and dignity of the individual; of Western ideology. It is based on a Western parliamentary tradition. Its roots are in the Western idea of representative government. In short, it is thoroughly anti-totalitarian.³³

³¹For a more in depth discussion see; "The Soviet Union and the United Nations," 666-677.

³²"The Soviet View of the United Nations," 33.

³³Ibid., 36.

The two major weapons the Soviets used to protect their interests in the UN, during this period dominated by the West, were the veto power in the Security Council and Article 2 (7) (the non-interference clause) of the UN Charter. The non-interference clause was often the reason cited by the Soviet Union when they used their veto. According to Article 2 (7); "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."³⁴ That clause was invoked by the Soviet Union (as well as the U.S.) numerous times, regarding such topics as; the "Universal Declaration on Human Rights," the Hungarian revolt in 1956, and Czechoslovak uprising in 1968. Concerning the "Universal Declaration on Human Rights," the Soviets felt that by protecting "political groups" with their inclusion into this Declaration, the UN was infringing on the rights of all sovereign nations. Specifically Soviet delegate, Andrei Vyshinsky, explained, "the rights of human beings cannot be considered outside the prerogatives of governments, and the very understanding of human rights is a governmental concept."³⁵ Due to Soviet insistence, all references to political rights were removed from the declaration prior to its ratification.

Using similar arguments, the Soviets successfully blocked the UN from undertaking any action during the "Hungarian Revolt" in 1956. The Soviet

³⁴"Shattered Illusions: The UN and the USSR," 90.

³⁵Ibid., 91.

government stated that, "Soviet troops...had been brought in at the request of the Government of Hungary" and, therefore, this was a matter to be controlled by regional members (i.e. Soviet Union and Hungary), furthermore, they felt it was, "quite plain that this question in no way concerns the United Nations."³⁶

By itself, the veto provided the Soviets with a powerful tool to ensure that the interests of the Soviet Union and its satellites were not interfered with. Lacking a majority of votes in the UN (specifically the Security Council) the Soviets used the veto eighty times in the first decade, to block Western proposals that were viewed as being obstructions to Soviet aims.³⁷ Andrei Vyshinsky, Soviet Ambassador to the UN (and former prosecutor during the show trials), once declared that the veto was a means of self defense, he further explained,

The veto is a powerful tool. There are no such simpletons here as would let it drop. Perhaps we use it more [than other nations], but that is because we are in the minority and the veto balances power.³⁸

The Soviets' use of the veto was to take on much greater power than ever envisioned by the Western nations. The original belief in the Security Council

³⁶For a discussion of the Security Council's actions during the "Hungarian Revolt" of 1956 see; Nation Against Nation, 62-64.

³⁷Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, 312.

³⁸The Soviet Union at the United Nations, 51.

was that "parties to the dispute," could not invoke the veto.³⁹ However, the Soviets (as have many other nations, including the U.S.) have gotten around this by either denying that they are involved in the dispute or denying the existence of a dispute. In the Hungarian example, the Soviets felt the "problem" was an internal activity and there was no international dispute present. Therefore, the Soviets felt they were within the bounds of the Charter to veto proposed UN intervention into Hungary. Another limitation of the veto set forth in the UN Charter dealt with matters of procedure. The UN Charter states that "matters of procedure" cannot be vetoed.⁴⁰ However, if countries cannot come to an agreement over whether a matter is procedural, they will vote on the issue, and in this case the veto will apply. This effectively allowed the Soviet Union to employ a "double veto" to block even procedural proposals. In the mid-1960's the Security Council (without Soviet consent) effectively bypassed the double veto.⁴¹

If you had to choose one case study that typified Western dominance in the UN during this period, it would probably be the UN's role in the Korean Conflict. In January of 1950, the Soviets boycotted the Security Council to protest the seating of Nationalist Chinese representatives (instead of Communist representative) in the General Assembly. As a result the Soviet representatives

³⁹Refer to Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter.

⁴⁰Refer to Article 27 of the UN Charter.

⁴¹For a discussion of the veto and "double veto" see; Nation against Nation 163-166; Swords Into Plowshares, 141-162, and Sydney D. Bailey, The Procedure of the UN Security Council (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 200-223.

were absent when the Security Council passed resolutions denouncing the North Korean invasion of South Korea and authorizing UN intervention in Korea. The Western nations were also able to pass the "Uniting for Peace Resolution in the General Assembly, which, based on Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the UN Charter, allowed for the General Assembly (i.e. Western bloc) to take actions which ensured "the maintenance of peace and security" when there was a deadlock of the "Big Five" in the Security Council.⁴² This resolution was obviously undertaken to undermine the veto power of the Soviet Union. From the absence of the Soviet Union in the Security Council, to the "Uniting for Peace Resolution," the Soviets were out-maneuvered and out-voted.

The Korean Conflict illustrates the weakness that the Soviet Union found themselves confronted with in the UN. Although the Soviet led coalition of countries was the "most cohesive voting bloc in the UN," it found itself limited by its negligible size.⁴³ During this period of "Western dominance" the Soviets consistently found themselves in the minority in the UN's General Assembly and hence felt forced to use the veto to protect their sovereignty within the Security

⁴²Nation Against Nation, 39-41.

⁴³By 1957 of the 83 member nations in the UN only Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Ukraine and the USSR were considered to be solidly entrenched in the Soviet voting bloc. For an outstanding study of these early (pre-1960) voting blocs in the UN see; Thomas Hovet Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).

Council, for figures regarding veto's by the five permanent members in the Security Council prior to 1960 see Table 1.

TABLE 1

VETO'S IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY COUNTRY: 1945-1959⁴⁴
 (#'s in parenthesis represent percentage of veto's)

# of Veto's	USA	UK	France	China	USSR
1945-1949	0	0	2	0	43 (100%)
1950-1954	0	0	0	0	17 (100%)
1955-1959	0	2	2	1	27 (84%)

Source: The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 202-205.

This use of the veto in the Security Council by the Soviet government clearly illustrates its confrontational policy in the UN. What is not so clear is that the West, through its clear majority was able to similarly bloc Soviet initiatives

⁴⁴It should be noted that over 50% of Soviet veto's within this period were registered over questions of increasing the membership of the UN. From 1945 until 1955 the Security Council, namely, the U.S. coalition and Russia, was unable to overcome the stalemate of admitting nations which belonged to either the West or East bloc into the UN. The Soviet means of blocking application rested solely on the use of the veto, while the U.S. strategy simply relied on the inability of the Soviet Union to garner the seven necessary votes for membership recommendation from the Security Council. For a brief discussion of this stalemate see; a. LeRoy Bennett, International Organizations: Principles and Issues (Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1991), 74-77, and Swords Into Plowshares, 88-93.

through the use of a "hidden veto."⁴⁵ The relevance of this type of action can still be felt in the present day "politics" in the UN, and it must be remembered that a future Russian government may feel the need to block "aggressive Western policy" in the UN through this tried and true practice of confrontation in the Security Council. Especially when actions within the Security Council may be deemed incongruent with the future Russian national interest (whatever that might be).

While one should not be so quick as to dismiss confrontational policies based on the clash of ideologies, we should also recognize the important role that confrontational policies have with regard to the maintenance of national security in international organizations.⁴⁶ In the end, the use of the veto in the Security Council should be viewed as just another means of "protecting" national security within the United Nations.

D. SOVIET DOMINANCE AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

From 1957 forward a new voice was beginning to be heard in the UN, and that was the collective group of the "non-aligned countries." This period

⁴⁵This hidden veto entailed using Western majorities in the Security Council to prevent the Soviets from gaining necessary support for its resolutions by the practice of abstention or absence from proceedings, see; The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 223-232.

⁴⁶It should not be forgotten that this "policy of confrontation" in international organizations was surely practiced by the U.S. Administration in the 1980's, see; Allan Gerson, The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy Without Apology America at the United Nations 1981-1985 (New York: the Free Press, 1991).

witnessed the UN membership increase from 51 countries in 1945 to 82 in 1957.⁴⁷ The majority of these countries, which comprised former Western colonies, joined the non-aligned movement. By 1960, the U.S. had effectively lost its assured majority voting bloc to the non-aligned nations. Slowly the Soviets began to maneuver closer to the non-aligned movement, eventually becoming their "protector." In Khrushchev's words, the UN had become a, "struggle of the new and progressive against the old and moribund."⁴⁸ The UN was progressing from the "two camps" view to the "three camps" view and the Soviets saw themselves as not only the leader of the communist camp but also as the defacto leader of the non-aligned camp.⁴⁹ It was the Soviets' view that,

the nonsocialist countries of Asia and Africa... are nearer to the peace-loving position of the socialist states than to the aggressive position of the U.S.A. and its allies on a number of international-affairs questions.⁵⁰

The major weapon the Soviets used to fight for the support of the non-aligned countries was found in the UN's "Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence

⁴⁷M. J. Peterson, The General Assembly in World Politics, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 12.

⁴⁸"The Soviet View of the United Nations," 21.

⁴⁹For an outstanding review of Soviet activity during this period see, "Shattered Illusions: The UN and the USSR," 90-111.

⁵⁰The Soviet Union at the United Nations, 117.

to Colonial Countries and Peoples," commonly called the Committee of 24. With Soviet leadership, the Committee of 24 was able to push through the General Assembly two resolutions which would pave the way for cooperation between the Soviet Union and "National Liberation Movements (NLM's)." The first resolution stated, "all armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent people shall cease."⁵¹ The second resolution recognized the legitimate right to self-determination and independence of people under colonial rule, and authorized all states to provide "material and moral assistance" to the NLM's.⁵² Armed with these resolutions, leadership of the Committee of 24 and a very effective propaganda machine the Soviets were able to partially win the favor of the non-aligned countries and wrestle control of the General Assembly away from the West.

While the non-aligned movement was gaining strength, the Soviet government found itself embroiled in a battle to limit the strength of the UN's Secretary-General. It should be noted this battle was not new, since the first UN Conference in San Francisco, the Soviets sought to diffuse the power of the Secretary-General. This campaign was, however, heightened by the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo and the emergence of the Secretary-

⁵¹Emphasis added; "Shattered Illusions: The UN and the USSR," 92.

⁵²Ibid.

General's policy of "preventive diplomacy."⁵³ The UN peacekeeping mission to the Congo was heavily criticized by the Soviet Government.⁵⁴ The Soviets felt that Secretary-General Hammarskjold was responsible for the UN supporting the wrong party in the Congo crisis (President Joseph Kasavubu instead of the Pro-Soviet Premier Patrice Lumumba). Furthermore, Hammarskjold's actions in the UN served to block Soviet support of the Lumumba faction. This infuriated the Soviets (especially Khrushchev), and not only resulted in their refusal to finance future UN peacekeeping ventures, but from this point forward they aggressively moved to undermine the Secretary-General's personal power.

Khrushchev's, "troika proposal" was the means through which the Soviets hoped to dilute the Secretary-General's power. The Soviets proposed to replace the office of Secretary-General with, "a collective UN executive agency consisting of three persons, each representing a definite group of states."⁵⁵ These persons would be representatives from the three blocks within the UN (Western, Communist and Non-aligned). The Soviets felt they could seriously influence two

⁵³"Preventive diplomacy" was the rubric under which Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General, sought to overcome the confrontation of the Cold War and its associated stalemate within the Security Council. His plan envisioned the use of UN intervention (i.e. peacekeeping missions) into "neutral areas" with the hope of forestalling "the competitive intrusion of the rival power blocs" in such areas. The evolution of preventive diplomacy and recent Russian initiatives to bolster its use will be discussed in depth in Chapter IV.

⁵⁴For an outstanding review of Soviet objections to the Congo Mission (ONUC) see; Swords Into Plowshares, 313-333, and The Soviet Union at the United Nations, 140-151.

⁵⁵The Soviet Union at the United Nations, 153.

of the three proposed representatives, which assured their control of the Secretariat. This attempt to undermine the Secretariat was unsuccessful, but a few years later the Soviets were able to undermine the Secretariat in a more damaging manner.

It was the policy of the UN to fill positions in the Secretariat with impartial career civil servants "donated" from UN participant countries. The Soviet government, however rejected this UN policy of career civil servants. Soviet General-Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev stated, in 1961, that

the Soviet Government has now come to the conclusion that there can be no such things as an impartial civil servant in this deeply divided world, and that the kind of political celibacy which the British theory of the civil servant calls for is in international affairs a fiction.⁵⁶

In 1978 former Soviet Under Secretary General, Arkady Shevchenko, defected to the United States. He asserted that the Soviet government, through its policy of "secondment," had indeed completely rejected this concept of impartial UN civil servants. Shevchenko charged, "over a third of all communist bloc nationals in the Secretariat are officers of their respective secret police, under the direct guidance of the KGB."⁵⁷ This "secondment policy" meant that Soviet

⁵⁶"The Soviet View of the United Nations," 34.

⁵⁷"Shattered Illusions: The UN and the USSR," 94. For the first hand account of this policy see; Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1985).

diplomats to the UN were rotated frequently and kept on a very short leash. Instead of serving as impartial civil servants in the UN they were controlled by the government through the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB.

This time frame also marked the disintegration of Sino-Soviet relations. A one time ardent sponsor, in the UN, of the Peoples Republic of China, the Soviet Union became one of China's most ardent foes.⁵⁸ In many instances in the UN, since the late 1960's, the Soviets would take a more aggressive stance toward the Chinese government than they would toward the American government. This Sino-Soviet battle, was waged over numerous issues including; the Indo-Pakistani War, disarmament, detente, Indochina, and Angola. Some of the most abusive rhetoric in the UN has been conveyed between these two nations, which compete for the favor of the non-aligned movement. The Soviets have labeled the Chinese as coming from the "socialist betrayal camp," and "aspiring to the role of an imperialist jester."⁵⁹ The Chinese, on the other hand, have warned of Soviet imperialism stating,

In the current struggle against colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism, *we developing countries* must especially guard against the danger of letting

⁵⁸Some have even stressed that the USSR and China, by the 1970's, had considered each other "enemy number one," see; Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, 279.

⁵⁹William R. Feeney, "Sino-Soviet Competition in the United Nations," Asian Survey 17 (September 1977), 812.

the tiger [USSR] in through the back door while repulsing the wolf [U.S.] through the front door.⁶⁰

Overall, this period witnessed Soviet attempts to undermine the effectiveness of those UN bureaucracies and functions it could not completely control, namely, peacekeeping missions and the office of the Secretary-General.⁶¹ The Soviets also sought to strengthen their security by embracing the non-aligned movement which in the end would weaken the West's position in the UN. However, it should be remembered that even by 1971 there was "little evidence that the Soviet Union has abandoned the *mentality* of the permanent minority."⁶² A glimpse of the Soviet voting record in the Security Council clearly suggests that not until the

⁶⁰Ibid., 822; emphasis added.

⁶¹During this second period of Soviet activity within the UN (1960-1985) Soviet support of UN peacekeeping missions was limited to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) in 1973 and United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in 1974, both of which saw peacekeeping forces deployed to the Middle East. From 1974-1988 the Soviets did not support UN peacekeeping missions, see; Harold K. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1984), 176-186; and Aleksandr M. Belonogov, "Soviet Peace-keeping Proposals," Survival 32, no. 3 (May/June 1990), 206-211.

⁶²Swords Into Plowshares, 128. Claude also reminds us that, "Should the USSR ever become a champion of majority rule in the United Nations, this might well be regarded as cause for dismay rather than delight in the West--for it would be less likely to reflect a Soviet conversion to higher principles of political morality than a Soviet conviction that the Communist bloc had gained, or was on the verge of gaining, a dominate position in the United Nations," 129. Although the Soviets never completely championed complete majority rule, they certainly attained a dominate position by the late 1970's.

late 1970's had another permanent member of the Security Council overtaken the Soviet's historical reputation of "Mr. Nyet," see Table 2.⁶³

TABLE 2
VETO'S IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY COUNTRY: 1960-1985
(#'s in parenthesis represent percentage of veto's)

# of Veto's	USA	UK	France	China	USSR
1960-1964	0	1	0	0	16 (94%)
1965-1969	0	0	0	0	2 (100%)
1970-1974	7 (24%)	8 (28%)	1	4*	9 (31%)
1975-1979	15 (52%)	5	6	1	2 (7%)
1980-1984	23 (43%)	5	4	16**	5 (9%)

* Peoples Republic of China assumes position in the Security Council.

** All 16 votes cast in opposition to appointment of Secretary-General Waldheim.

Source: The Procedures of the UN Security Council, 205-208.

The rise of the non-aligned movement allowed the Soviets to gain control of the UN or at the very least deny control of the UN to the Western bloc. However, between the mid-1970's and mid-1980's the Soviets were faced with the increasing influence the Chinese had in relation to the non-aligned movement in

⁶³The term "Mr. Nyet" refers to the numerous veto's registered by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in the Security Council.

the UN. Furthermore, this period witnessed U.S. withdrawal from UN activities and instead increasingly undertake unilateral actions abroad (i.e. the Vietnam War, "invading" Latin America, intervening in Grenada, bombing Libya, and financing insurgents in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua). These factors, combined with the change in leadership in the Soviet Union and the erosion of its economy forced the Soviets to rethink their UN strategy of "confrontation with the West."

E. NEW THINKING AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The final period of Soviet policy in the UN began in the late-1980's and continued until the disintegration of the Union (December of 1991). Increasingly, the Soviets retreated from their previous policies of confrontation and conflict, and developed a policy of cooperation within the UN. On September 17th, 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev advanced this new policy in an article in *Pravda* entitled, "Realities and Guarantees for a Secure World." This new UN policy was predicated on his "new thinking" views, and called for enhancing the activities of the UN. From 1987-1991 the changing Soviet strategy in the UN was staggering. By 1990, the Soviets and the Americans were voting together on 75% of UN resolutions, this can be compared to 1981 statistics, in which their views only coincided 17.6% of the time (usually on budgetary or administrative matters).⁶⁴

⁶⁴For 1981 statistics see, Pilon, 95. For 1990 statistics refer to; Boris Pyadyshev et al., eds., "45th Session of the UN General Assembly," International Affairs (Moscow) 10 (October 1990): 64.

Furthermore, it should be noted that with the end of the cold war there has not been a single veto in the Security Council since 31 May 1990.⁶⁵

From the inception of Gorbachev's new UN policy, the usual rhetoric toward the West was conspicuously absent, Soviet officials continually down played past confrontational attitudes toward the West. Historically, the concept of international interdependence, was "totally unacceptable" to the Soviets. However, in July of 1989, Eduard Shevardnadze stated, "the confrontation between the two systems [capitalism and communism] can no longer be looked upon as the dominant tendency of the current epoch...," for him the dominant theme was, "the growing tendency towards mutual interdependence of states in world society...."⁶⁶ Even though Shevardnadze may have felt confrontation had not disappeared, he did feel it was replaced by a more dominant theme, cooperation. Furthermore, after that statement was issued, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze increasingly called for "interdependence" and dismissed the concept of two ideologically different "camps."

⁶⁵This new era of cooperation, within the UN, was highlighted in a recent report by Secretary General Boutros Ghali, see; United Nations, Secretary-General, An Agenda For Peace, (A/47/277) 17 June 1992.

⁶⁶Jonathan Haslam, "The UN and the Soviet Union: New Thinking?," International Affairs (London) 65 (Autumn 1989): 678. To be fair, Haslam was still undecided when this article was published as to "how absolute the Soviet commitment" was to "lasting accommodation with the capitalist world." He felt much of the Soviet cooperation was an attempt to seek prolonged breathing-space in international affairs.

Although this period saw the anti-West rhetoric of the Soviet Union diminish, it was most importantly marked by reversals in previous Soviet UN policies (i.e. support of peacekeeping missions, nonpayment of debts, disarmament, human rights, international law and UN organization). The UN's role in negotiating a Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan was instrumental in changing the Soviets' negative attitude toward UN peacekeeping.⁶⁷ The Soviets started to view peacekeeping as a very cost effective way of maintaining peace, and extricating themselves from very costly adventures (Afghanistan, Angola and Namibia). Since 1987, the Soviets supported all UN peacekeeping operations and were one of the leading proponents in the UN with regard to increasing the role of peacekeeping.⁶⁸ In addition to this dramatic reversal of UN peacekeeping policy, the Soviets promised to resume all funding to the UN, including peacekeeping operations.⁶⁹ By 1990 the Soviets had reduced their

⁶⁷As suggested by then Chief of the International Organizations Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev (currently Russian Foreign Minister), see; Kozyrev, "The USSR's New Approach to the UN," International Affairs (Moscow) 7 (July 1990), 16-19; and Kozyrev, "The New Soviet Attitude Toward the United Nations," Washington Quarterly, Summer 1990, 41-53.

⁶⁸For a more detailed explanation see; "Soviet Peace-Keeping Proposals," 206-211; Augustus R. Norton and Thomas G. Weiss, "Superpowers and Peace-Keepers," Survival 32 (May/June 1990): 212-220; Vladimir Petrovsky, "Towards Comprehensive Security Through the Enhancement of the Role of the United Nations," Alternative, XV, no. 2 (Spring 1990), 241-245, and Petrovsky, "United Nations Perspective: Preventive Diplomacy," in The United Nations in Conflict Management: American, Soviet and Third World Views edited by Thomas G. Weiss, (New York: The International Peace Academy, Inc., 1990), 77-82.

⁶⁹"The UN and the Soviet Union: New Thinking?," 681.

outstanding debts for peacekeeping operations from about \$200 million to \$125 million.⁷⁰

In the area of disarmament, the Soviets proposed that the UN, "certify compliance with arms-control agreements through a variety of multilateral verification means..."⁷¹ This is noteworthy in that it represents another complete reversal for the Soviets, not only regarding verification, but also in their call for a multilateral commission. Formerly, the Soviets only proposed rhetorical disarmament proposals, such as, "no first-strike agreements," or agreements that did not include meaningful verification proposals.

The largest reversal in Soviet policy dealt with UN human rights proposals. The Soviets intended to,

broaden its participation in the control mechanism for human rights at the UN and within the framework of the European process.... For us, it is of principled importance to fully bring domestic legislation and practice in the USSR in line with international commitments in this sphere.⁷²

⁷⁰Meryl A. Kessler and Thomas G. Weiss, "Moscow's U.N. Policy," Foreign Policy, 79 (Summer 1990): 99. Current Russian debt will be discussed in Chapter V.

⁷¹Emphasis added; Toby Trister Gati and Edward C. Luck, "Gorbachev, the United Nations, and U.S. Policy," Washington Quarterly, (Autumn 1988): 22. Some experts maintained that these were simply a continuation of "meaningless nuclear initiatives" on the part of the Soviets, see; Richard N. Perle, "Clarity, Arms Control, and NATO Strategy," in On Not Confusing Ourselves, edited by Andrew W. Marshall, J.J. Martin and Henry S. Rowen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 145-157.

⁷²"The USSR's New Approach to the UN," 18.

This is a complete reversal from the previous held view that human rights are a domestic concept protected by Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, hence, free of intervention from the UN. Similarly, the Soviets reversed prior policy and called for a more active Secretary-General leading the UN in a more comprehensive system of security.⁷³

F. CONCLUSIONS

Whether it was peacekeeping proposals or human rights legislation, the Soviet Union reversed many previously held positions. It seemed the Soviet policy of confrontation based on the clash of ideologies was on the way out and cooperation based on a sense of survival was on the way in.

Why the sudden change in Soviet policy in the United Nations? A major reason must have been the Soviets' previously mentioned need to seek "breathing space" in the international arena. Gorbachev's domestic commitment to reform was to take center stage of Soviet policy.⁷⁴ In order to accomplish domestic reforms the Soviets would have to retain numerous economic resources that otherwise would have been committed to Soviet foreign interests. Therefore, the Soviets saw international multilateral negotiation as a way to fill the vacuum left

⁷³See; Thomas M. Franck, "Soviet Initiative: U.S. Responses--New Opportunities for Reviving the United Nations System," American Journal of International Law, 83 (July 1989): 531-543.

⁷⁴"The New Soviet Attitude," 41-46.

by their shrinking foreign "influence."⁷⁵ Furthermore, the Soviets must have felt a need to expand the role of multilateralism in the UN to contain U.S. unilateralism abroad (i.e. Libya, Grenada, Panama, state-supported "freedom-fighters"). As Shevardnadze pointed out to the UN General Assembly,

if [the UN's] organizational aspects of countering threats to peace had been worked out, there would now be no need for individual states to act unilaterally; after all, however justified they might be, such actions provoke a mixed response and create problems for those same states and may not be acceptable to all.⁷⁶

Afghanistan provided one of the first examples of how the UN could assist the Soviets in extricating themselves from costly military/economic adventures, while still maintaining "face."⁷⁷ By increasing their influence in the UN, the

⁷⁵For similar viewpoints see; John Q. Blodgett, "The Future of UN Peacekeeping," Washington Quarterly, (Winter 1991), 210; "Moscow's U.N. Policy;" "Gorbachev, the United Nations, and U.S. Policy," and Thomas G. Weiss, ed., "America, Soviet and Third World Views About International Conflict Management," The United Nations in Conflict Management: American, Soviet and Third World Views (New York: The International Peace Academy, Inc., 1990), 30-36.

⁷⁶"The Rebirth of the U.N.," as delivered by Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze to the UN General Assembly on 25 September 1990, (Vital Speeches of the Day, LVII, no. 1, 15 October 1990: 10).

⁷⁷Kozyrev contends that the Afghanistan settlement provided the Soviets and the UN with a "detonator" which "started a peaceful chain reaction," see; "The Soviet Union and the United Nations." Recently, however, he has maintained that Gorbachev "lacked the spirit to move not in words but in deeds," see; Andrei Kozyrev, "Transformation or Kafkaesque Metamorphosis. Russia's Democratic Foreign Policy and Its Priorities," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 20 August 1992, 1, 4 (FBIS-SOV-92-167, 27 August 1992, 21).

Soviets were able to maintain a large portion of their dwindling international power and influence.

Finally, the Soviets felt that fostering a sense of cooperation with the West in the UN could open doors for them in other international organizations such as; GATT, IMF and the World Bank. In the end, renewed Soviet cooperation in the UN caused many people to reconsider the Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives, not to mention the importance of the United Nations.

Today, the Russian Government finds itself confronted not only with many of the same problems of the former Soviet Union but also struggling with new problems as well. Furthermore, many of the governmental architects of this Soviet cooperative policy toward the UN still occupy important positions in the Russian government. Will Russia continue with the cooperative policies of the recent Soviet regime or will they return to those confrontational policies of the distant past? In the early years of the UN, the Soviet Union engaged in a policy of confrontation because it found itself in the minority aligned against hostile "Western ideology." It was not until the mid-1980's, that the Soviets engaged in cooperative policies with the West, albeit, some might say, to gain "breathing space" in the international arena. It might very well be true that in the late 1980's and early 1990's the Soviets had nothing to gain by

continued policies of confrontation and isolation, and a great deal to be gained by abandoning confrontation and joining the mainstream of Western-dominated international society.⁷⁸

However, one cannot be assured that this statement holds the same relevance today. Certainly, many Russian officials deem cooperation in the international arena as the only means of rebuilding Russia and they feel that cooperation in the UN is one such vehicle. Nevertheless, because some Russians feel the West is still an adversary to be confronted, cooperative policies with historic "Western institutions," like the United Nations, are not assured.⁷⁹ While the history of Soviet involvement in the UN gives us many reasons to assume a continued cooperative policy on the part of the Russian government, current domestic reality within the Russian nation suggests that cooperation might not be a guaranteed reality.

⁷⁸Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," International Security 16, no. 3 (Winter 1991/92), 114.

⁷⁹Illustrative of this are the views of former KGB General Aleksandr Sterligov who considers "the invasion of Yugoslavia by NATO [and UN] troops and genocide against our Serbian brothers as encroachment upon Russia," see statement released by Russian National Sobor press center *INTERFAX*, 1405 GMT, 13 August 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-158, 14 August 1992, 7).

III. CHANGING OF THE GUARD

A. INTRODUCTION

After the August coup, Soviet relations entered a transitional period in the United Nations. This period witnessed a battle between the Soviet Union which was attempting to consolidate its power and the individual republics who sought to legitimize their independence in the international arena by attaining membership in the UN. The ensuing battle during this transitional period would be waged over which republics should be considered "continuer states" and which republics should be considered "successor states."⁸⁰ Russia's final emergence as the inheritor of the Soviet position within the UN came as no great shock to the international community, and was even hastened by many of the Soviet Union's "former enemies."

Nevertheless, Russia's emergence as the sole inheritor of Soviet responsibilities within the UN, and specifically the Security Council, does not automatically bring with it the guarantee of a continuation of cooperative policies. Even though many of the officials who managed Gorbachev's cooperative policy

⁸⁰"Successor states" would take on the legal commitments, international rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union, while a "continuer state" would be that single state which would assume the Soviets' "position" in all international organizations, see; "On the International Legal Status of Russia and Other Members of the CIS as Successors to the USSR," *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik*, no. 3, 15 February 1992, 28-29 (FBIS-USR-92-004-L, 29 April 1992, 1), and "Russia Debates Its Own National Interest," 43.

within the UN remain in position in the Yeltsin government, it should be emphasized that today, these officials continually find themselves under attack from elements both within and outside the Yeltsin government. At the heart of this attack are questions regarding the focus of the emerging Russian foreign policy, namely whether it should be "Atlanticist" or "Eurasian" in nature.⁸¹

This chapter will briefly highlight the Russian assumption of power within the United Nations. It will also cover those variables which will impact upon the emerging Russian policy regarding the UN, namely, the emerging foreign policy debate within the Russian nation and the individuals who are likely to draft future Russian UN policy.

The continuation of a cooperative Russian policy in the UN is dependent not only upon Russia's emergence as the inheritor of the Soviet position and power in the UN but it is also dependent upon a Russian need to cooperate. It remains to be seen if that need truly does exist.

B. RUSSIA ASSUMES THE SEAT

As early as September of 1991, Soviet officials were discussing the possibility of Russia taking over the Soviets' position in the UN, specifically, the Security

⁸¹For an outstanding discussion of these differences see; Alexander Rahr, "'Atlanticists' Versus 'Eurasians' in Russian Foreign Policy," RFE/RL Research Report, 1, no. 22 (29 May 1992), 17-22, and "Russia Looks at the World," Economist, 4 July 1992, 19-24.

Council.⁸² However, during the transition period between the Soviet Union's deterioration and the emergence of a new union structure, Soviet leadership maintained control over the UN policy. As for the former Soviet republics gaining individual membership in the UN, the Soviet leadership stated,

a common understanding has been reached among the republics that the union must keep its place in the Security Council. If the republics become members of the United Nations, they will be represented at the *General Assembly*.⁸³

Russian officials deemed it more important to work toward "preserving the union" or failing that, work toward the formation of a "renovated union" instead of establishing a separate Russian membership to the UN.⁸⁴ Furthermore, Russian officials felt that Russia would be effectively represented by the Soviet government (or any other subsequent union) in the UN. This stance was later

⁸²In early September of 1991, Soviet Foreign Ministry official, Yuri Fedotov stated that the Russian Federation could become the legitimate successor of the Soviet Union in international affairs. See; "Official on Baltic Independence, Russian Supremacy," *KYODO*, 1102 GMT, 5 September 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-173, 6 September 1991, 62-63). For an outstanding review of the events leading up to the Russian assumption of the Soviet seat within the United Nations see; Ted Daley, Russia's "Continuation" of the Soviet Security Council Membership and Prospective Russian Policies Toward the United Nations, The RAND/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies, March 1992.

⁸³My emphasis, remarks made by former First Deputy Foreign Minister, Vladimir F. Petrovsky, "Petrovsky Remarks on Republic's UN Membership," TASS, 0530 GMT, 25 October 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-208, 28 October 1991, 8).

⁸⁴Mikhail Kochetkov, "Russian Delegation Discusses UN Membership," TASS, 0750 GMT, 20 September 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-183, 20 September 1991, 2).

modified, in that the Russian government would not rule out the *possibility* of future Russian membership to the UN.⁸⁵

During this transition period, Soviet officials felt that one of their primary functions in the UN was to reassure the world that democratic transformation was proceeding smoothly within the Soviet Union. In fact, this point was the primary message delivered to the 46th meeting of the UN General Assembly by Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boris Pankin. Pankin stressed that the emerging Union of Sovereign States (later the Commonwealth of Independent States or CIS) was the rightful successor to the Soviet Union and hence would continue the Soviet policies of cooperation and goodwill in the UN.⁸⁶

In late December, with the rapid decline of the Soviet state structure, Russia surfaced as the *obvious* successor to the Soviet Union within the United Nations. On December 16th, with little apparent disagreement of the other republics of the Soviet Union, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced that Russia intended to "continue" in place of the Soviet government in the UN.⁸⁷ This announcement was followed by the CIS founding accord, signed in Alma Ata on 21 December 1991, which completely supported Russia

⁸⁵For examples of these views see comments made by the personal representative of the Russian President, Valeriy Burkov in, "Russian Delegation Discusses UN Membership," or "Kolosovskiy on UN Bid, Relations With Republics," *INTERFAX*, 1437 GMT, 13 September 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-179, 16 September 1991, 75).

⁸⁶"The Dangers of Nationalism," 5-8.

⁸⁷Russia's "Continuation" of the Soviet Security Council Membership, 4.

in its assumption of the USSR's membership in the United Nations, including permanent membership in the Security Council and other international organizations.⁸⁸

This in turn was followed by the delivery of a letter from the Russian President to the UN Secretary-General "informing him that the Russian Federation was assuming the USSR's membership in the United Nations...."⁸⁹ Based on legal advice from the UN's Secretariat, the Secretary-General forwarded this letter to all members of the UN, noting that it was "informative in nature, that it constituted reality, and that it did not require formal approval on the part of the United Nations."⁹⁰ While there were many questions involving the actual legality of these actions, the "simple logic and workability" of them probably had much to do with Russia's acceptance in the UN.⁹¹ It should also be remembered that Russia's inheritance of the Soviet seat in the Security Council was fully supported by the other members on the Council who in fact moved swiftly to ensure that Russia, as the most powerful of the Soviet Republics, retained the seat of the former Union. This move, by the Security Council, reflected the geopolitical importance of the emerging Russian republic in the international arena.

⁸⁸"On the International Legal Status of Russia," 1.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹This view is convincingly argued by Daley in Russia's "Continuation" of the Soviet Security Council Membership, 4-8.

However, the action was also undertaken quickly to forestall any possible international movement to change the existing UN Charter (i.e. reorganization of the Security Council as a whole).⁹² As Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev reminds us, the Russian government's inheritance of "the status and privileges" of Soviet government was by no means "automatic," in fact the inheritance of the USSR's position "was worked out by Russian diplomats in the closest contact with their English and other Western colleagues."⁹³ As an aside, it was through cooperation like this, between Russia and the West, that led many world leaders to speak of a new era of cooperation in the Security Council.⁹⁴

In this new era of cooperation, Russia has retained the Soviet seat on the Security Council and reaffirmed the international obligations of the former Soviet Union. As the heir apparent to the former Soviet government, which itself progressed from a policy of confrontation to one of cooperation, it will now be

⁹²It's important to note that the Security Council conferred membership upon the Russian Federation when the General Assembly was out of session. Furthermore, the Security Council did not actively seek the advice nor consent of the General Assembly. See; Paul Lewis, "West Acts to Defer U.N. Council Issue," New York Times, 3 January 1992, A4.

⁹³This has been stressed by Kozyrev in "Transformation or Kafkaesque Metamorphosis."

⁹⁴This sentiment was expressed during the Security Council summit meeting on 31 January 1992, see, "Excerpts From Speeches by Leaders of Permanent Members of U.N. Council," New York Times, 1 February 1992, 5, and the Security Council's Summit Declaration entitled "New Risks for Stability and Security," New York Times, 1 February 1992, 4.

up to the Russian government to develop a policy in this international organization.

C. NEW RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY

Predicting any sort of future in the Russian federation should be viewed as a very tenuous undertaking, simply because the Russian people and their would-be leaders are themselves unsure of the direction the country should take. This lack of vision is clearly illustrated in the ongoing battle within the Russian government regarding the formation of a foreign policy agenda. At the heart of this debate is whether or not Russian foreign policy should be primarily focused on expanding positive relations with the West (the "Atlanticist" approach) or primarily focused on relations nearer home, namely with the republics of the former Soviet Union (the "Eurasianist" approach). Until recent months the "Atlanticist" approach has completely dominated Russian foreign policy.⁹⁵

The outcome of this foreign policy debate is important in the international arena because each approach would bring with it differences regarding the establishment of a Russian policy toward the United Nations. While neither foreign policy agenda focuses on establishing overtly hostile policies toward the West, the "Atlanticist" approach certainly envisions a closer and more cooperative working relationship with the West.

⁹⁵This foreign policy was detailed to the public by Andrei Kozyrev in his article entitled "Challenge of Transformation," *Izvestiya*, 1 April 1992, 6 (FBIS-SOV-92-063, 1 April 1992, 18-21).

In January of 1991, as Russia emerged as the rightful successor to the Soviet Union its foreign policy priorities seemed to be threefold.⁹⁶ First, they sought to "safeguard the continuity" of the state. Secondly, to maintain "the legacy of the positive gains achieved by Gorbachev," namely, the cooperative relationship with the West. And finally, to seek the development of "initiatives...depending considerably on the country's internal development," in other words a policy aimed at furthering the economic and political reforms undertaken by the Russian government. Although, Kozyrev did discuss establishing a "zone of good-neighborliness" with the republics of the former Soviet Union, the primary emphasis of this emerging foreign policy was in the establishment of fruitful relations with the West.

The major reason for the domination of this Atlantic philosophy deals with Russia's initial goal of establishing a place in the international arena for an emerging Russian nation. The first and clearly most important priority of Russia's foreign policy was to see that "Russia quickly entered the world community and received recognition as one of the leading powers in the world."⁹⁷ The Russian government felt it must "show in practice that our state

⁹⁶For a discussion of these priorities see "Challenge of Transformation," and Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Sergey Yastrembski, *Expresso*, 1500 GMT, 3 April 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-065, 3 April 1992, 22-23).

⁹⁷Ednan Agayev, advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, contends that this first stage of foreign policy has indeed been completed, see; Agayev, "Russia--Above All Else," *Moskovskiy Novosti*, no. 18, 3 May 1992, 12 (FBIS-USR-92-083, 3 July 1992, 1).

has renounced all imperial ambitions and is being guided by legitimate interests."⁹⁸ Along these lines, President Yeltsin considered it Russia's obligation to

continue the constructive changes in the USSR's course of foreign policy which have been initiated in recent years. Not to alter that *direction*, not to back off from what has been done in a constructive way, but on the contrary, to enrich it and *implement* the declarations.⁹⁹

The cooperative nature of this "Atlanticist" foreign policy was born out of a need to use the Western world as a legitimizing force in the establishment of the Russian state. However, it should not be ignored that this policy of cooperation also brought with it the hope of Western financial assistance in rebuilding the Russian nation. As Russian Ambassador to the U.S., Vladimir Lukin, pointed out to the Russian people, "...the World is interdependent....We will not extricate ourselves on our own....No country in the era of interdependence has emerged from a crisis without outside assistance." Lukin maintained that it would therefore be up to the Russian leadership, through a policy of cooperation, to gain assistance from the international community to help

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Emphasis added, statement by Yeltsin in, "Russia Cannot Be Put Back in a Cell."

rebuild the Russian nation.¹⁰⁰ It was in this environment that the "Atlanticist" foreign policy would dominate.¹⁰¹

Finally, it is important to note that many key supporters of this Western oriented policy were also major supporters of a cooperative policy in the UN; namely, Russian Ambassador to the United Nations, Yulii Vorontsov, Vladimir Lukin, Andrei Kozyrev and Vladimir Petrovsky.¹⁰² In the end, this continuity of key UN/Russian officials may serve to increase the possibility of a continued policy of cooperation in the UN especially given that all of these officials supported the cooperative policies of Gorbachev regarding the United Nations.

¹⁰⁰Recently Lukin (as well as many other "Atlanticists") has modified his position and called for a foreign policy more independent from the West. He has started to emphasize a policy that is a "combination of strategic dependence and self-sufficiency." Lukin now feels that Russia's "new mission" is to become the "guarantor of stability throughout the Eurasian heartland through its own democratic revival." However, in the end he still stresses the need for a partnership with those democracies of the West. For examples of these views see; Vladimir Lukin, "America and Our Reforms: The United States Supports Russia for its Scrupulous Commitment to Democracy," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 10 September 1992, 4 (FBIS-USR-92-126, 2 October 1992, 51-54), and Lukin, "Our Security Predicament," *Foreign Policy*, no. 88 (Fall 1992), 57-75.

¹⁰¹This is not to say that this "Atlanticist" foreign policy was completely removed from the historic traditions of the Westernizing-Slavophile debate. However the desperate need for Western assistance in legitimizing an emerging nation was certainly a new and important aspect of the old debate.

¹⁰² For a brief explanation of these key personnel (with the exception of Lukin) and their ties to the UN see; Russia's "Continuation" of the Soviet Security Council Membership. For a brief discussion of Lukin's early positions regarding cooperation with the West see; Vladimir Lukin, "No Kicking the Golden Platter," interviewed by Aleksey Pozin, *Federatsiya*, no. 17, 15-21 April 1992, 5 (FBIS-SOV-92-062, 27 May 1992, 13-15), and Vladimir Lukin "Embassy's Face Must Be Updated," interviewed by Ivan Lebedev, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 1st ed., 15 April 1992, 7 (FBIS-SOV-92-074, 16 April 1992, 20-21).

As the Russian nation solidified its position as the "legitimate successor" of the Soviet state, many officials within the Russian government questioned the merits of continuing the strict "Atlanticist" approach to foreign policy. Many felt that Russia should instead establish a "Eurasian" approach to foreign policy. It was felt that since Russia was now considered a legitimate state it should turn its foreign policy aims closer to home and develop a coherent policy regarding relations with the nations comprising the Commonwealth of Independent States.

As this "Eurasianist" policy has gained strength, primarily from the nationalists and conservatives within the government, the Russian Foreign Ministry, which has continued to support an "Atlanticist" policy, has increasingly come under attack. Some of the most outspoken critics of the Foreign Ministry's Atlantic bias have been the members in Russia's parliament. These officials have accused Yeltsin's government, and more specifically his Foreign Affairs Ministry of "blindly comparing itself to the West."¹⁰³ Although the Parliament has not been alone in its attacks on the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry, it has been extremely active in calling for the resignation of Andrei Kozyrev, who is viewed as the embodiment of this misguided policy.¹⁰⁴ In addition to seeking Kozyrev's

¹⁰³Vladimir Volzhskiy, "There Will Be No Winners in This Battle. The 'War' Between Parliament and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia for Primacy in the Development of the Foreign Political Strategy Continues," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 25 July 1992, 4 (FBIS-SOV-92-103, 14 August 1992, 58."

¹⁰⁴Two of the major officials who have been rumored to succeed Kozyrev are Yulii Vorontsov (which is interesting because of his Western affiliations) and the Presidential Counselor for Political Affairs, Sergei Stankevich, who is one of the

resignation, Russian "Eurasianists" have attempted to undermine the Ministry of Foreign Affairs power by establishing a Ministry for CIS Affairs. Even though this new Ministry has yet to be developed, it was hoped that this effort toward the establishment of a new Ministry would serve to focus attention on those problems "near abroad."¹⁰⁵

An emerging "Eurasian" foreign policy does not necessarily spell the beginning of a new era of confrontation with the West or with the UN. The primary spokesman for this Eurasian policy, within Yeltsin's government, Sergei Stankevich has asserted that Russia needs a foreign policy which would be representative of "the new balance of Western and Eastern orientations."¹⁰⁶ In other words, Stankevich and the other "Eurasianists" have argued for a foreign policy which would increase the emphasis of those relationships within the CIS.¹⁰⁷ While Stankevich notes that the "Atlanticist" or Western policy is

key supporters of an "Eurasianist" foreign policy and who has continually attacked Kozyrev for not having a "clear concept of Russian foreign policy." For a brief review of these attacks see; "'Atlanticists' Versus 'Eurasians' in Russian Foreign Policy, 19-22," and Sergei Stankevich, "Opinion--Sergei Stankevich, Advisor to the Russian Federation President: So Far No One has Managed to Exclude Force From the Political Arsenal," *Izvestiya*, 8 July 1992, 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-133, 10 July 1992, 34-36).

¹⁰⁵See; Suzanne Crow, "Russia Prepares to Take a Hard Line on 'Near Abroad'," RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 32 (14 August 1992), 21-24.

¹⁰⁶Sergei Stankevich, "Russia in Search of Itself," National Interest, no. 28, Spring 1992, 48.

¹⁰⁷It should be noted that this policy of increasing relations with the CIS is certainly supported by the Russian public who overwhelmingly feel (nearly 2 to 1 when compared with the next highest nation, the U.S.) that relations with the

"rational, pragmatic and natural" because it brings with it "credit, aid and advanced technology" he feels Russia must further develop its relationship with those nations comprising of the CIS.¹⁰⁸ The emphasis is not to establish policy with regard to the republics of the former Soviet Union at the expense of a Western policy, but it is to increase the emphasis of Eurasian relationships as a whole.

While this "Eurasian" viewpoint does not necessarily bring with it a hardline stance toward the West, one cannot help but be impressed with the "Eurasianists" desire to take a hardline approach to its relations with the East. Stankevich himself asserts that it is "time for Russia to adopt a tougher tone" with those CIS nations who are violating the rights of Russian minorities residing within the republics of the former Soviet Union.¹⁰⁹ And it is this "hardline" attitude which could possibly usher in a new era of confrontation with the West. Especially if the Russian government embarks upon an overtly hostile relationship regarding its CIS neighbors under some rubric of human rights violations. However, this possibility should not be overstated. Surely, if the "Eurasianist" school of thought

CIS countries are the "main concern of the Russian Government," see; Boris Grushin, "Russian Foreign Policy: Priorities and Evaluations," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 24 July 1992, 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-102, 59).

¹⁰⁸"Russia in Search of Itself," 48.

¹⁰⁹Russian policies toward minority human rights violations will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV, as the Russian government feels this is a grave security concern for the future. For Stankevich's comments regarding this policy see; "Russia in Search of Itself," 49-51. This emerging hardline stance is also discussed in "Russia Prepares to Take a Hard Line on 'Near Abroad'."

comes to dominate Russian foreign policy the West should expect a firmer Russian policy regarding those states nearer its borders. However, this firm stance does not guarantee a confrontational Russia attitude in the UN, nor does it guarantee an unreasonable policy towards its immediate neighbors. Russia might very well modify its behavior toward the CIS if for no other reason than to avoid alienating themselves in the international arena, especially given the current Russian reliance on Western cooperation. In the end, the "return of the Russian veto" is doubtful in the near term if for no other reason than Russia's dependence on Western aid, for without this aid Russia may very well "continue to be a nation in decline."¹¹⁰

Although, conservatives in the Russian government continue to get political mileage from statements that suggest that the "United State's actions and intentions unequivocally suggest that Russia is still it potential enemy...."¹¹¹ it should be remembered that this is not the dominant feeling in the government. Most Russian officials agree that Russian foreign policy has

¹¹⁰This is forcefully argued by Taley, see; Russia's Continuation of the Security Council Membership, 16-17.

¹¹¹Eduard Volodin, "In the Planet's Mirror: Our 'Potential Ally' is Watchful," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 24 March 1992, 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-059, 26 March 1992, 27).

lost its ideological dogma and constraint and is based today, to a large extent, on Russia's practical interests primarily connected to the economic and political changes taking place in Russia.¹¹²

The remaining foreign policy debate seems to be focused on defining those practical interests. For the "Atlanticists," those interests rest primarily in the West. For the "Eurasianists," those interests are to be found much closer to home. In both cases those interests don't seem to be closely related within the old East-West debate. However, it should be mentioned that in the future one can not simply dismiss the chance of a fanatical conservative movement emerging in Russian which would seek to return to the confrontational ways of the past to "simply demonstrate national pride and independence."¹¹³ Nevertheless, Russia's current government still appears to be committed to cooperation in the UN. Andrei Kozyrev's recent pledge to continue support for the Secretary-General's proposed "Agenda for Peace," and for "the proposals which were but forwarded yesterday [21 SEP 92] by U.S. President George Bush" is one such example of this commitment to cooperation with the West within the United Nations.¹¹⁴

¹¹²Gennadii Burbulis, "Does Russia Have a Foreign Policy," interviewed by V.T. Tretyakov, *Russian Television Network*, 1445 GMT, 3 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-109, 5 June 1992, 23).

¹¹³Russia's "Continuation" of the Soviet Security Council Membership, 17.

¹¹⁴Andrei Kozyrev, speech delivered to the 46th session of the UN General Assembly in New York on 22 September 1992, *ITAR-TASS World Service*, 0955 GMT, 22 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-185, 23 September 1992, 8).

D. CONCLUSIONS

The emergence of a foreign policy debate within Russia has served to sharpen the difference between the various constituencies in the Russian federation. It has also served to illustrate the future importance of parliamentary and public opinion with regard to foreign policy decisions in Russia. As Sergei Lavrov, Chief of the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry International Organizations Administration, correctly pointed out, the Russian Parliament may indeed "have the last word" when it comes to Russian commitments in the UN.¹¹⁵ It is important to note that if in fact Russia decides upon a path of confrontation in the UN it may do so for reasons completely different than those of the previous Soviet government. Russia's path of confrontation might be pursued not because of historical East-West geo-strategic realities, but instead because of domestic political infighting which focuses on winning the support of the Russian public. Although a policy of confrontation would probably be shrouded in the language of East-West competition, at its heart would be the realities of a domestic battle for control of the nation.

If one is to thoroughly judge Russian intentions in the UN the first place to start should be in the area of security matters, for it is in this area that Russia has

¹¹⁵Sergei Lavrov, "Diplomat Speaks--United Nations: Second Wind," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 1st ed., 24 January 1992, 5 (FBIS-SOV-92-016, 29-30). The Russian Parliament's influence over matters of foreign policy was also witnessed when it "rejected" a Foreign Ministry documented submitted to them entitled "On the Concept of Russian Foreign Policy," see; "Russia Debates Its National Interests," 44-45.

been the most active and it was also in this area that the former Soviet Union was the most confrontational. Another such "litmus test" which could measure Russia's commitment to cooperation might focus on whether or not Russian diverts a portion of its scarce revenue toward repayment of its outstanding UN debts.¹¹⁶ In the end, it remains to be seen if Russia's actions will indeed be in line with its stated intentions of cooperation. Close observance of Russian activities in the UN should certainly clue observers in on Russia's true intentions.

The UN's role in the "maintenance of international peace and security" was clearly the focus of Andrei Kozyrev's recent address to the UN and it also seems to be the current focus of many other important UN members. A close study of Russian actions, initiatives and motivations in the area of security should go along way toward establishing a model for Russia's future cooperative or confrontational behavior in the United Nations.

¹¹⁶Russian officials have stated that between September 1992 and March 1993 Russian will pay the UN \$130 million to be used toward the settlement of past debts, see Kozyrev's comments to the 47th General Assembly (FBIS-SOV-92-185, 23 September 1992, 10). Unfortunately, this "litmus test" has limited application. A Russian failure to make good on its UN debts might be more indicative of an inability to pay based on the dire domestic economic conditions rather than a failure to pay based on ideological differences with the UN, as was the case with the former Soviet Union.

IV. COOPERATION IN THE MAKING: RUSSIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY SYSTEM

A. INTRODUCTION

The major concern underlying Russian foreign policy in the United Nations is found in their stated goal of furthering the positive steps undertaken by Gorbachev's reforms while simultaneously separating Russian policy from the previous "cold war" communist policy. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Vitaly Churkin stated that Boris Yeltsin is,

Presenting Russia as a *new* phenomenon in international life...fully part of the democratic world, we would like to build our relations with other countries belonging to that world as friends and maybe as allies.¹¹⁷

The continuance of this less ideologically driven approach by the Russian government has fostered an atmosphere of cooperation in the UN.¹¹⁸ This in turn has resulted in many individual nations, including Russia, proposing increases in the scope and nature of missions that the UN should undertake.

¹¹⁷Allison Mitchell, "Yeltsin, on Summit's Stage, Stresses His Russian Identity," New York Times, 1 February 1992, 5.

¹¹⁸Obviously the changing Russian ideology is not the only factor which has "fostered cooperation," but it definitely has been a major factor with regard to the newfound consensus within the Security Council.

Many of these suggestions have come in the area of conflict management (prevention, control and termination).

This chapter will examine those conflict management mechanisms in the UN that are designed to "maintain international peace and security."¹¹⁹ Specifically, this chapter will focus on UN peacekeeping, peacemaking and, to a lesser extent, peacebuilding ventures from the "Russian perspective."¹²⁰ I will highlight the basic differences between these mechanisms and also discuss how they have evolved. I will also discuss some possible reasons behind the Russian initiatives to strengthen peacekeeping and peacemaking in the UN.

Increasingly, many sovereign nations are calling upon the UN to fulfill its envisioned role as the maintainer of "international peace and security." In the end, this chapter will focus primarily on what that role might entail.

¹¹⁹The UN's primary purpose, in accordance with Article 1 (1) of the UN Charter is to "maintain international peace and security." Additionally, Article 24 of the UN Charter gives "the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."

¹²⁰The differences between peacekeeping and peacemaking forces are numerous and varied. The primary difference is that peacekeepers are inserted after a conflict has taken place and all parties to the dispute have requested their presence, furthermore, a cease-fire is usually in place when they are inserted. Peacemakers, on the other hand, are usually an offensive force inserted under the articles provided in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, hence consent is not required of the parties to the dispute prior to their insertion (for other differences see Chapter IV, section C). Peacebuilding initiatives usually do not involve the use of force.

B. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS

1. Description

History has witnessed the UN implement a variety of measures to maintain international peace and security. Some of these actions, or as I refer to them, conflict management mechanisms, have been founded on principles set forth in the UN Charter, while others have evolved through the "day-to-day" activities of the UN. Generally, most of these mechanisms can be placed in one of three categories based on the means in which they attempt to secure international peace and security.¹²¹

The first category attempts to secure peace through peaceful means, either in the form of peaceful settlement of disputes or through cooperation in resolving international problems which might lead to conflict (i.e. hunger, poverty, economic decay, environmental degradation, etc.). The UN's mechanism for peacefully settling disputes is founded on the principles set forth in Chapter VI of the UN Charter and includes a hierarchy of peaceful settlement mechanisms.¹²² The cooperative approach to peace is more or less founded on

¹²¹This is not to be confused with Harold Jacobson's categorization of conflict management mechanisms based on bureaucratic activity, namely; informational, normative, rule-creating, rule-supervisory and operational activities. My intent is to analyze the UN's activity based on broad "approaches to peace" instead of analyzing bureaucratic activity within separate UN agencies. For a discussion of Jacobson's bureaucratic activities see; Networks of Interdependence, 149-188.

¹²²This hierarchy of activities as set forth in Article 33 of the UN Charter includes; negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement. For an outstanding discussion of these activities see; International

a "functionalist" theory of conflict management in which states cooperate on technical initiatives to solve shared international problems, these measures are usually labeled as "peacebuilding" ventures.¹²³

The second "approach to peace" (or conflict management mechanism) seeks to limit an individual state's material ability to engage in confrontational policies. This usually involves the limitation of arms through disarmament measures or arms control initiatives.¹²⁴ However it can be expanded to include the limitation of an individual country's "offensive military doctrine."¹²⁵ Even though Article 26 provides for the "establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments," disarmament initiatives have historically had a limited foundation

Organizations: Principles and Issues, 97-102. For a broad discussion of the peaceful settlement "approach to peace" see; Swords Into Plowshares, 215-244.

¹²³For a discussion of the functionalist/peacebuilding approach see; Swords Into Plowshares, 378-406; Networks of Interdependence, 62-66, and Roger A. Coate and Donald J. Puchala, "Global Policies and the United Nations System: A Current Assessment," Journal of Peace Research 27, no. 2, (1990):127-140.

¹²⁴For an outstanding discussion of disarmament activities in international organizations see; International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 193-214; and Swords Into Plowshares, 286-311.

¹²⁵Russian disarmament proposals in the UN seek not only to decrease the worlds military arms inventories they also seek to win international acceptance and compliance of their doctrine of "minimum defensive sufficiency." For examples of this viewpoint see; "Excerpts From Speeches by Leaders of Permanent Members of U.N. Council," as delivered by the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, and "The Dangers of Nationalism," as delivered by Boris Pankin. For a broad discussion of "defensive doctrines" as an alternative strategy to peace and their use in international organizations see; Harry B. Hollins, Averill L. Powers, and Mark Sommer, The Conquest of War: Alternative Strategies for Global Security (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1989), 38-53 and 64-88.

in the UN's Charter.¹²⁶ Most of the initiatives to limit the material ability of states to war have been established outside the UN either through multilateral or bilateral treaties.

The final category of conflict management mechanisms that may be applied by the UN seeks to limit conflict with the threat and/or use of military force. This can be in an attempt to deter conflict through the threat of force or to maintain "peace" (or prevent conflict) with the insertion of a peacekeeping force or as a "last chance" mechanism to mandate peace with the use of a peacemaking force.

My emphasis for the remainder of this chapter will be with the evolution of this third category of conflict management mechanisms in the UN, for it is in this area that Russia has taken the lead and become one the major proponents of the use of mandated UN forces.

2. Security and Collective Action

In theory, collective *action* was to be one of the cornerstones of the UN organization. Although the UN Charter did not specifically reference the term "collective security" it did mandate a type of limited collective security

¹²⁶It should be noted that this trend toward regulating arms has recently received a boost in the UN with the emergence of the UN's Arms Trade Register. For a brief discussion of the Arms Trade Register see; William Epstein, "Write Down Your Arms," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1992, 11-12, 44.

system.¹²⁷ As stated in Article 1 (1) of the UN Charter, one of the purposes of the UN was, "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace...." However, as Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, has pointed out, historically the UN has failed to "provide a *system* for peace and security," and instead has been used as a "last resort or safety net."¹²⁸

The major problem with a collective security system is its dependence upon, "*identification of a declared common enemy*" by a collective group.¹²⁹ In the UN it is up to the Security Council to identify and mandate action against common enemies or aggressors in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This mandated action can entail anything from measures not involving force, such as political or economic sanctions, to the use of military force by the

¹²⁷Secretary-General Boutros Ghali maintains that the "essence of the concept of collective security" is contained in the UN Charter, see; An Agenda for Peace, 12. However, Jacobson is probably closer to the truth with his contention that the UN is a *limited* collective security system in that it is designed to operate "against any state other than the five permanent members of the Security Council," see; Networks of Interdependence, 145.

¹²⁸My emphasis, Sir Brian Urquhart, "The United Nations: From Peace-keeping to a Collective System." Adelphi Paper 265, International Institute for Strategic Studies (1992), 19.

¹²⁹My emphasis, see; The Conquest of War, 27.

members of the UN.¹³⁰ However, due to the cold war and lack of consensus in the Security Council (coupled with the presence of a veto), the ideals of collective security, as set forth in the UN Charter, were never realized.¹³¹

Today, even with the end of the cold war, consensus building, with regard to collective action, is still a slippery goal. Many smaller nations feel that frequent use of Chapter VII powers by the Security Council will result in unnecessary expansion of Security Council power, and eventually result in the infringement of the "great powers" on the sovereignty of others. For this reason, the smaller nations on the Security Council have been reluctant to enact those powers.¹³² However, this is not to say that Chapter VII powers won't be used in the future. Increasingly, many members of the UN have called upon the use of a more proactive military force to maintain international peace. As an example of this "great power" sentiment within the Security Council, Russia has increasingly called for the use of

¹³⁰Article 41 sets forth economic and political sanctions, while Article 42 deals with the use of military force including; "air, sea or land forces," or blockades. Furthermore, Articles 25 and 48 made these actions binding to all members of the UN if called upon to act by the Security Council.

¹³¹For a brief discussion of this theme see; International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 130-140, and Swords Into Plowshares, 245-285.

¹³²A recent example of this was the Security Council debate over the insertion of a UN peacekeeping force under the provisions of Chapter VII into Yugoslavia, see; Paul Lewis, "U. N. Votes to Send Force to Yugoslavia," New York Times, 22 February 1992, 3.

international forces capable not only of keeping peace--in other words of being in places where there already is a truce--but forces capable of *establishing or restoring peace*.¹³³

It should also be remembered that the Security Council did enact certain portions of Chapter VII with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.¹³⁴ In the end, it seems that the cold war might have removed some of the impediments to collective security but it will still be up to the Security Council to *identify* and *declare a common enemy*.¹³⁵

It has been argued that the UN has never embarked upon an ideal of collective security, instead, it has been argued that the UN has been involved in "selective security," (or collective defense) in other words, action which involves "security for some at the expense of others."¹³⁶ Usually selective security, as a

¹³³My emphasis; Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Vladimir Pasko, *Mayak Radio Network*, 1730 GMT, 28 May 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-104, 29 May 1992, 19).

¹³⁴Although, outside of Articles 39 and 40 it is unclear as to what "proactive" Articles the Security Council was working from see; Oscar Schachter, "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict," American Journal of International Law, 85 no. 3 (July 1991) 452-473.

¹³⁵For an outstanding discussion of international organizations and their use of collective security see; Swords Into Plowshares, 245-285. For a broad discussion of the merits and faults of collective security in general see; Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), 94-204.

¹³⁶"The Conquest of War," 24-26. Similarly, Inis Claude maintains that the UN "appears to be committed to a policy of *selective nonaggression*," see; Inis L. Claude Jr., "Collective Security After the Cold War," in Gary L. Guertner, ed., Collective Security in Europe and Asia, (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2 March 1992), 23-27.

policy, is much easier to implement because it does not require the consensus of all members. As the argument goes, selective security could be formulated by a limited number of members, "sold" to the group and then enacted upon by the whole body (i.e. Korea or the Gulf War).¹³⁷

In general, outside of international organizations, the ease at which selective security strategies and policy (i.e. unilateral action or actions in the name of regional alliances) can be enacted, makes it an attractive foreign policy tool. However, when a country is an active member of an international organization, like the UN, and continually undertakes policies of selective security it can eventually alienate itself in that organization. During the cold war this might have been an acceptable strategy, however, with the advent of the cooperative era in the UN this strategy might become self defeating or at the very least render the UN ineffective. In the long run, if nations wish to increasingly cooperate within the UN they may have to accept some of the inherent problems of collective security and limit their selective security practices.

3. Preventive Diplomacy

Former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld is usually credited with the implementation of preventive diplomacy policies within the UN. Historically,

¹³⁷Some have argued that since the end of the cold war the UN has become a "vehicle for a superpower like the United States or a coalition--U.S. led--to make foreign policy decisions," such as was the case in the Gulf War, see; Stephen Lewis "A Promise Betrayed," interviewed by Jim Wurst, World Policy Journal, Summer 1991, 539-549.

preventive diplomacy was established to allow for "United Nations intervention in an area of conflict outside of, or marginal to, the sphere dominated by cold war struggles."¹³⁸ In other words, preventive diplomacy was a policy used by the Secretary-General to deal with conflicts separately from the cold war. In the past preventive diplomacy was synonymous with peacekeeping ventures, however, preventive diplomacy now seems to be evolving into a more ambitious activity.¹³⁹

The declaration issued by the Security Council summit meeting on 31 January 1992 invited the Secretary-General to report back to the Security Council with his,

analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for *preventive diplomacy*....¹⁴⁰

The Secretary-General's reply, entitled "An Agenda for Peace," supported this concept of preventive diplomacy and called for

¹³⁸Swords Into Plowshares, 313.

¹³⁹It is useful to note that the first use of preventive diplomacy was used in the Congo mission (ONUC) of 1960. Moreover, the significance of recent Russian cooperation in the area of preventive diplomacy is particularly noteworthy given their predecessor's (the Soviet government) historical dislike of peacekeeping ventures (pre-1988).

¹⁴⁰My emphasis; "Security Council Summit Declaration: 'New Risks for Stability and Security'."

action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur....Preventive diplomacy requires measures to create confidence; it needs early warning based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding; it may also involve *preventive deployment* and in some situations, *demilitarized zones*.¹⁴¹

Preventive diplomacy is now being defined as detecting and resolving problems before they lead to armed conflict. Suggestions for increasing preventive diplomacy usually involve increasing the duties of the Secretary-General under Article 99.¹⁴² France has proposed that the Security Council should,

provide the Secretary-General with information on international security and give him a mandate to enter into regular contact with his counterparts, leaders of regional organizations....¹⁴³

Similarly, the Russian's have submitted a draft declaration which establishes guidelines for the improvement of "cooperation between the United

¹⁴¹My emphasis; An Agenda for Peace, 5-10. It is interesting to note that Russian officials have stated that the "Agenda for Peace" was highly influenced by the "proposals which were put forward by President Boris Yeltsin during his address at the UN security summit," see; Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by *ITAR-TASS*, 0801 GMT, 19 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-183, 21 September 1992, 15).

¹⁴²Article 99 enables the Secretary-General to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten peace," it would then be up to the Security Council to act on those "matters."

¹⁴³"Excerpts from Speeches by Leaders of Permanent Members of U.N. Council," as delivered by the President of France, Francois Mitterrand.

Nations and regional organizations.¹⁴⁴ The Russian leaders feel identification would be possible through shared intelligence between regional organizations and the UN, specifically the Secretary-General. The Russian government has also proposed the establishment of "'hot lines' to the UN headquarters, and availability to the General-Secretary of reconnaissance reports, and development of fact-finding practices."¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, Russia feels this intelligence might be used in conjunction with preemptive action which would include the use of the proposed UN Rapid Response forces.¹⁴⁶

Russia has also proposed proactive policies to identify and preempt in possible conflict areas. Russian officials contend that UN forces should be able to preempt quickly before hostilities have had a chance to break out. President Yeltsin maintains that the UN must respond quickly and decisively to dissipate regional "hot spots," he feels

¹⁴⁴Boris Sitnikov, "Russia Presents Plan for Improving UN Cooperation," *ITAR-TASS*, 0956 GMT, 20 October 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-203, 20 October 1992, 11-12).

¹⁴⁵Andrei Kozyrev, speech delivered to the 47th session of the UN General Assembly. While many of these Russian proposals seek to expand the power and influence of the Secretary-General it would appear that Russia still intends to keep most organizational power regarding security affairs rooted in the Security Council where they have significant influence and control over agenda items.

¹⁴⁶These views were first discussed by Soviet officials who now occupy important positions in the Russian/UN bureaucracies, namely Boris Pankin and Vladimir Petrovsky, see; "The Dangers of Nationalism," and "United Nations Perspective: Preventive Diplomacy," 77-82.

What is needed is action and persistence....Above all, these forces [UN rapid response forces] must be brought into action at the right time, that is, not when blood is already being spilled, but when conflicts are at their nascent stage....¹⁴⁷

Russian officials feel it is necessary to "fortify the preventive component in United Nations activity,"¹⁴⁸ to include the "use of armed force to restore peace and, if need be, to *punish*, the aggressor."¹⁴⁹

In the end, the problem with preventive diplomacy is that the consensus required to identify potential areas of conflict is much more difficult than acting against those areas. Furthermore, many of the preventive diplomacy suggestions require a large amount of regional cooperation which might not be reasonable to expect if a conflict is imminent. Finally, most nations would agree that preventive diplomacy is an outstanding policy if you have control over what is identified as a hostile intention. However, it is a completely different matter if nations have little to no control over the identification process where they might possibly be targeted as a belligerent.¹⁵⁰ By and large, the gains from effective

¹⁴⁷Boris Yeltsin, Address to the CSCE Summit 10 July 1992 in Helsinki Finland, *ITAR-TASS*, 0945 GMT, 10 July 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-133, 10 July 1992, 2).

¹⁴⁸Kozyrev speech to the 47th session of the UN General Assembly.

¹⁴⁹Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Yeveniy Menkes, *ITAR-TASS*, 0110 GMT 28, September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-188, 28 September 1992, 9).

¹⁵⁰For Russia, as well as the other permanent members of the Security Council, this control is guaranteed because of the presence of its veto. That is the primary reason why the "big five" find it much more palatable to discuss preventive diplomacy than many of the other UN members.

preventive diplomacy far outweigh the losses. However, similar to the policy of collective security, nations must be willing to abrogate some of their autonomy to the UN and the Secretary-General.

C. PEACEKEEPING & PEACEMAKING

1. Description and Background

Peacemaking finds its roots in the UN Charter. As set forth by Article 24 (1) of the UN Charter, the Security Council is given the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security...." Additionally, the members of the UN are bound by Article 25 which states that member nations must "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council...."

It is in Chapter VII that one finds the teeth of the UN's peacemaking responsibilities. Articles 39 and 40 stipulate that the Security Council "shall determine the existence of any threat to peace...," and take action against those threats. Articles 41 and 42 specify what types of actions the Security Council may take, ranging from economic sanctions to armed force. Article 43, although never enacted, sets forth the provisions for countries to make available forces, assistance, facilities, and rights of passage prior to their actual need by "special agreements."¹⁵¹ It should also be noted, the ratification of these agreements

¹⁵¹Article 43 is generally regarded as the foundation for the establishment of a standing UN force. Obviously, this Article was never enacted because of the lack of consensus of the major powers during the cold war. Secretary-General Boutros Ghali feels that if a UN standing force is to be established it will require the Security Council to "bring into being, through negotiations, the special agreements

(under Article 43) are subject to the "constitutional process" of the member states hence they are subject to the faults of domestic consensus building (which are now becoming more apparent in Russia).¹⁵² Articles 45-47 established the functions of the "Military Staff Committee" (MSC). This military staff was designed to advise and assist the Security Council on all "questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements."¹⁵³ It should be noted that similar to Article 43, the MSC exists only on paper.

The remaining articles in Chapter VII set forth requirements for the "mutual assistance" of all member nations with regard to Security Council decisions (in other words, mandatory compliance) and stipulate that all members have an "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense." However, it is important to note that this right of self-defense shall not, "in any way affect the

foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter," see; An Agenda for Peace, 12-13. For a brief description of the history of Article 43 and the use of UN forces see; Networks of Interdependence, 176-186.

¹⁵²As discussed in Chapter III, the influence of the Russian Parliament is just now being felt in the formation and application of Russian foreign policy. Therefore, while the current Yeltsin administration has been able to volunteer peacekeeping forces to the UN, and has also supported the idea of a standing UN force, in the future, parliamentary pressure may block such initiatives.

¹⁵³For a brief description of the Security Council's relationship to the MSC, see; The Procedure of the Security Council, 247-254.

authority and responsibility of the Security Council..to maintain or restore international peace and security."¹⁵⁴

The intention of these articles is to give the UN an offensive military capability to restore peace collectively in any part of the world with any size force that the Security Council chooses to employ. Arguably, the only two cases where UN peacemaking operations have occurred were in Korea in the 1950's and the recent Gulf War. However, as previously discussed, a case could be made that in these two instances a UN peacemaking force was not used. Instead, it could be argued, they were selective operations supported by a limited number of nations and given symbolic backing by the Security Council.¹⁵⁵

Due to the cold war and lack of international consensus toward "acts of aggression," the UN was unable to muster sufficient support for peacemaking and instead turned toward peacekeeping missions to contain conflict. Interestingly, even though peacekeeping missions are not mandated in the UN charter they have continued to increased in number and success (albeit on a

¹⁵⁴As set forth in Article 51, for a brief discussion of this ideal of self-defense as it relates to the UN see; "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict," 457-461, and Eugene V. Rostow, "Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense," American Journal of International Law, 85, no. 3 (July 1991), 506-516.

¹⁵⁵For examples of these arguments as they relate to the Persian Gulf War see; "Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense," 506-510, and Burns H. Weston, "Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy," American Journal of International Law, 85, no. 3, (July 1991), 516-535.

limited scale). Historically, the use of peacekeeping forces have required a certain number of preconditions, namely;

- the consent of all parties to the dispute with regard to the establishment and composition of the force (this usually includes a self-imposed cease-fire prior to the insertion of troops)
- support and mandating authority from the Security Council (although historically peacekeeping forces have also been inserted into action by the Secretary-General)
- a clear mandate for the troops from the UN, specifically the Security Council
- willingness to maintain a non-use of force policy by the peacekeepers except in the event of self-defense
- willingness of member countries to provide an adequate number of troops
- willingness of member countries (especially permanent members to the Security Council and "host nations") to provide financial and logistic support¹⁵⁶

Essentially, peacekeeping forces are impartial, primarily nonviolent in nature and are used as a peaceful interposition group between warring parties. Whereas, peacemakers are offensive in nature, punitive and are operating against an identified enemy.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶See; John Q. Blodgett, "The Future of UN Peacekeeping," Washington Quarterly (Winter 1990): 220. This article is an outstanding review of the recent attitudes regarding UN peacekeeping.

¹⁵⁷This is generally the accepted view of peacemakers, see; The Conquest of War, 27-33.

2. Russian Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Proposals

In recent years the topic of a standing UN force structure as received renewed emphasis. Almost every conceivable type of force structure has been proposed, from the historical donations of small contingents of national composed troops to the use of Gurkhas, NATO troops or standing troops varying in size from 10,000 to 500,000.¹⁵⁸

The Russian government has likewise supported the use of a standing UN force. President Yeltsin has called for a Security Council mandated, "special quick-response mechanism to insure peace and stability."¹⁵⁹ This appears to be quite similar to previous Soviet policy (late 1980's to early 1990's) which called for the use of a standing UN Rapid Response Force to be used in conjunction with the MSC.¹⁶⁰ Soviet policy during this time frame also supported;

¹⁵⁸For a good overall presentation of various force structure proposals see; "The Future of UN Peacekeeping," 215-219, and James Meacham, "From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking," International Defense Review, vol. 25 (March 1992), 217-221. For an in depth description of a possible standing UN force see; John M. Lee, Robert von Pagenhardt and Timothy W. Stanley, Strengthening United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: A Summary (Washington D.C.:International Economic Studies Institute, April 1992).

¹⁵⁹"Excerpts From Speeches by Leaders of the Permanent Members of U.N. Council."

¹⁶⁰"The Rebirth of the U.N.," as delivered by the former Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze to the UN General Assembly on 25 September 1990, (Vital Speeches of the Day, LVII, no. 1, 15 October 1990, 10-11); and "The Dangers of Nationalism," 6-8.

the formation on a mutual basis with other countries of a system of personnel training for service in the United Nations... [Soviet] logistics support for the United Nations forces... the training of national military [USSR military] contingents *detailed* for possible United Nations use...setting up an international United Nations training center for personnel to serve in United Nations troops.¹⁶¹

Today, Russian peacekeepers have been sent to participate in UN operations throughout the world, including recent deployments to Yugoslavia and Iraq.¹⁶² The Russian government has gone out of its way to justify the support of these types of peacekeeping missions as in the best interest of Russia as a developing democratic nation. Furthermore, the Yeltsin government has claimed that prevention of ethnic violence in places like Yugoslavia will go a long way toward preventing the outbreak of these "nationalist diseases" on the soil of those republics of the former Soviet Union. As an illustration of this view, Russian

¹⁶¹As suggested by Vladimir Petrovsky in 1990, see; "Towards a Comprehensive Security Through the Enhancement of the Role of the United Nations," 242-245. It should be noted that all of these Soviet initiatives have been fully supported by the current Russian government.

¹⁶²For Russian activity in Iraq see; Boris Vinogradov, "St. Andrew's Flag in the Persian Gulf," *Izvestiya*, 7 October 1992, 4 (FBIS-SOV-92-197, 9 October 1992, 12-13). For a brief explanation of Russian activity in Yugoslavia see; Suzanne Crow, "Russia's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis," RFE/RL Research Report, 1, no. 30 (24 July 1992), 31-35; Andrei Kozyrev, "The Side Russia Is on in the Yugoslav Conflict," *Izvestiya*, 9 June 1992, 1 and 4 (FBIS-SOV-92-111, 9 June 1992, 18-19); Vitaly Churkin, interviewed by Petr Orlov and Irina Zaytseva, *Moscow Central Television First Program*, 1845 GMT, 1 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-174, 8 September 1992, 16-18); and Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Viktor Levin, *Mayak Radio Network*, 1330 GMT, 17 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-182, 18 September 1992, 7-8).

Ambassador to the UN, Yulii Vorontsov, regarded the imposition of sanctions on Yugoslavia as a necessary measure, he felt;

In this situation it would seem expedient not to take exception to the proposed draft resolution as a whole and to vote for it. Such a position of ours would signify Russia's unambiguous condemnation of all actions leading to the incitement of interethnic hatred and conflicts and attempts to recarve borders and create 'ethnically pure areas,' which would be of great significance also from the viewpoint of *curbing such trends in countries of the CIS*.¹⁶³

However, the underlying reason for Russian cooperation in UN peacekeeping ventures, like Yugoslavia, was best expressed by Andrei Kozyrev when he stated that,

Russia cannot oppose the Security Council. That would jeopardize our own relations with the West and give rise to suspicions among the state of Central Europe, to say nothing of our CIS partners, who often draw parallels between Moscow and Belgrade....Support for Serbia, which is gambling on strong-arm tactics, will be perceived by our neighbors as a danger signal: that Russia is preparing to follow a similar path.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³Yulii Vorontsov, cable from Russian Ambassador in the United Nation to President Yeltsin, dated 28 May 1992, published under the heading, "Crime of the Foreign Ministry: Russians and Serbs, Know the Truth!," *Den*, no. 23 (7-13 June 1992), 1 (FBIS-SOV-92-076, 22 June 1992, 5).

¹⁶⁴Maksim Yusin, "Storm Clouds Gathering Over Belgrade. Andrei Kozyrev's Visit Was Possibly the Last Chance to Influence Serbia and Prevent International Sanctions," *Izvestiya*, 30 May 1992, 6 (FBIS-SOV-92-105, 1 June 1992, 11). This article is also noteworthy from a domestic point of view in that Kozyrev seemed to be sending a warning to "national-patriotic" forces within Russia describing what would happen if they embarked upon a policy of "ethnic-cleansing" using

As with most of Yeltsin's foreign policy agenda (formulated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the Russian handling of the Yugoslav conflict has come under harsh attack from the Russian parliament and Russian "national-patriotic" forces for its support of UN measures taken against the "fraternal brotherhood of Slavs" in Yugoslavia.¹⁶⁵ While recent opinion in Russia seems to support the government's efforts in Yugoslavia, initially the Russian Parliament felt that the Foreign Ministry acted with "excessive haste" when implementing its Yugoslav policy in conjunction with the Security Council.¹⁶⁶

The Russian government's coordination of policy with the UN regarding Yugoslavia represents just another example of the domestic infighting within Russia. However it should not be inferred from this example that cooperation with the UN has absolutely zero support with the conservative

"strong-arm tactics" in those nations "near abroad."

¹⁶⁵Russian cooperation in the UN regarding the Yugoslav conflict has included; support for sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, Yugoslav censure from the UN, support for limited military intervention (regarding the delivery of humanitarian aid), and logistics support which included the dispatching of a Russian Airborne Battalion to Yugoslavia. For examples of this support see; "Russia's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis," 31-35; Colonel A. Oliynik, "Russian Troops Land in Yugoslavia," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 18 April 1992, 1 (FBIS-SOV-92-083, 29 April 1992, 22); and Yevgeniy Menkes, "Russia Co-Authors UN Document," *ITAR-TASS*, 1037 GMT, 12 August 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-156, 12 August 1992, 9).

¹⁶⁶Sergei Chugayev, "A. Kozyrev Explains to Parliament Why Russia Joined in the Sanctions Against Serbia," *Izvestiya*, 27 June 1992, 1 (FBIS-SOV-92-128, 2 July 1992, 13). For an example of the recent conciliation between the Russian Parliament and the Yeltsin Administration regarding the Yugoslav conflict see; Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, "The Main thing Is the Interests of Russia," interviewed by Aleksy Burmistenko, *Trud*, 3 September 1992, 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-116, 11 September 1992, 29-30).

elements within the Russian government. First, Russian deployment of military forces to Yugoslavia (as well as Iran) obviously had the sanction of the Russian military, as it gives them another mission, hence another reason for being. Secondly and more important, even conservative Russian officials have stated that "Russian troops would be trained as peacekeeping forces over the next few years for possible deployment with UN peacekeeping forces."¹⁶⁷ Andrei Kozyrev's support for the creation of United Nations "rapid reaction units, consisting of special subunits from different countries, raised on a contractual basis, including forces of the permanent members of the Security Council" was also received with favor by conservative forces.¹⁶⁸

This, however, is not to suggest that all UN peacekeeping initiatives will receive one hundred percent acceptance in the Russian federation. Nor should it be construed that these peacekeeping initiatives are being forwarded solely because their humanitarian implications. Many observers have viewed Russia's peacekeeping ventures within the CIS as a sign that Russia is not completely committed to impartial peacekeeping ventures and only supports such impartial ventures to add legitimacy to their own peacekeeping initiatives within

¹⁶⁷Paraphrasing of comments made by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, see; Stephen Foye and Alfred A. Reisch, "Military and Security Notes," RFE/RL Research Report, 1, no. 31 (31 July 1992), 59-60.

¹⁶⁸Andrei Kozyrev, personal letter to United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Ghali dated 21 February 1992, *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik*, no. 6, 31 March 1992, 8-10 (FBIS-USR-92-005-L, 12 June 1992, 7-8).

the CIS. This could be illustrated by the fact that some Russian officials have voiced direct opposition to *UN peacekeeping* involvement in those areas "near abroad" the Russian federation.¹⁶⁹ It has also been pointed out that Russian armed forces might be "excessively politicized" and therefore unable to carry out impartial peacekeeping duties in CIS mandated operations. It is however, questionable whether this factor will negatively impact their ability to support UN mandated operations.¹⁷⁰

Probably the most serious allegation leveled against the Russian government with regard to its peacekeeping initiatives (within the CIS framework) is that they are merely camouflaged attempts at reimposing Russian influence over the weaker republics of the former Soviet Union.¹⁷¹ Most Russian officials have attempted to allay these fears by pointing out that these peacekeeping ventures in the CIS are conducted multilaterally with the consent and support of the UN. Moreover, the Foreign Ministry contends that these

¹⁶⁹Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, Marshal Evgenii Shaposhnikov has gone on record as supporting limited UN **involvement** in those ongoing conflicts in the republics of the former Soviet Union. However he is "categorically opposed" to UN **peacekeeping forces** becoming involved in those areas, see; Suzanne Crow, "Russian Peacekeeping: Defense, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?," RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 37 (18 September 1992), 37. On the other hand, it should be noted that some Russian officials, most importantly Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev, have shown a remarkable willingness to incorporate the UN into CIS peacekeeping ventures.

¹⁷⁰Suzanne Crow, "The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the Former USSR," RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 37 (18 September 1992), 34-35.

¹⁷¹See; "Russian Peacekeeping: Defense, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?," and "The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the Former USSR."

operations are only being undertaken because the former regime of the Soviet Union covered up and suppressed regional "time bombs" (i.e. the Dniester region, Nagorno Karabakh and the Ossetia region) which the Russian federation is now being forced to handle.¹⁷² Additionally, some Russian officials contend that these peacekeeping missions are not unusual in international affairs since they are conducted within the "entire geo-political space of the former Union" and therefore, should be considered within Russia's "sphere of vital interests" similar to the "US Monroe Doctrine in Latin America."¹⁷³

In the short run it is certainly arguable as to the motives of the Russian government regarding those peacekeeping initiatives in the CIS. However, on the whole, Russian initiatives in the UN seem to be in keeping with those of the other major powers and only indirectly related to Russia's regional peacekeeping commitments. In other words, the Russian initiatives, within the UN, are all aimed at increasing the frequency and scope of peacekeeping and peacemaking missions with the hopes of making the UN a more proactive conflict management tool for the "great powers."

¹⁷²Andrei Kozyrev, "Andrei Kozyrev: The Minefield is So Great," interviewed by Yelizaveta Pavlova, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 1st ed., 25 July 1992, 7 (FBIS-SOV-92-144, 27 July 1992, 11-12).

¹⁷³This is the contention of Evgenii Ambartsumov in "Russian Peacekeeping: Defense, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?," 38-39.

3. Sovereignty and Intervention

Historically, the topic of sovereignty has fueled numerous debates within the UN. On most occasions, when a government failed to agree with a UN decision it would state that the UN decision infringed upon the state's inherent right of sovereignty.¹⁷⁴ The supposed justification for this is found in the UN Charter, Article 2 (7) which states, "Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...." Recently, this theory was espoused in the Security Council summit meeting on 31 January 1992 when the Prime Minister of China, Li Peng, stated;

In essence, the issue of human rights falls within the sovereignty of each country....It is neither appropriate nor workable to demand that all countries measure up to the human rights criteria or models of one or a small number of countries....[China] is opposed to interference in the internal affairs of other countries using the human rights issue as an excuse.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴As was shown in Chapter II, this was definitely true of the Soviet Union during the "confrontational period" in the UN. The "non-intervention clause" of the UN Charter was used to justify Soviet and the Eastern Bloc actions when dealing with topics such as Polish statehood, Soviet troop withdrawal from Iran, the Hungarian revolt (1956), the Czech uprising (1968) and alleged human rights abuses in the USSR.

¹⁷⁵"Excerpts From Speeches by Leaders of Permanent Members of U.N. Council," New York Times, 1 February 1992, 5.

Nevertheless, the Security Council has always had the right to force a decision upon a member state, irrespective of the notion of sovereignty. As Article 2 (7) further stated, "this principle [sovereignty] shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." However, most members of the Security Council have been reluctant to intervene with an armed UN force under the guidance of Chapter VII. Historically this was due to the confrontational attitudes of the major belligerents in the cold war who lacked consensus in the Security Council. Recently, however, the Security Council has been reluctant to act because of a fear that this would set a precedent for the future use of UN force in one's own "domestic affairs."¹⁷⁶

Of all the nations in the UN, the Russian stance regarding the protection of human rights and sovereignty has probably witnessed the most startling changes. A one time champion of non-intervention the Russian government now maintains that

The principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of countries may not be used as a "safe conduct" for the violation of human rights. In our opinion, the Security Council has the right to use its authority should extraordinary humanitarian situations arise.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁶This fear is obviously much more prevalent in those nations which lack the power of the veto in the Security Council. For an example of this viewpoint see; "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict," 468.

¹⁷⁷Kozyrev letter to Ghali dated 21 February 1992.

The Russians are quick to point out, however, that their vision of human rights protection varies greatly from the traditional views of their Soviet predecessors. Russian officials remind us, regarding the subject of human rights, that

Before, it was primarily the victims of totalitarian regimes and ideologies which had to be protected. Today, more and more often a response has to be given to aggressive nationalism, which is threatening to become a new global danger.¹⁷⁸

Specifically Russia is demanding that the UN must now protect the human rights of "national minorities, those of the Russian and Russian-speaking population in the Baltics and in other former union republics, in particular."¹⁷⁹ Recently, Russian officials have stressed that the protection of minority rights is the number one priority of the Russian delegation in the UN. It is important that the Western nations keep this in mind when they analyze future Russian

¹⁷⁸Kozyrev's speech to the 47th session the UN General Assembly.

¹⁷⁹Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Yevgeniy Menkes, 20 September 1992. Some have argued that this Russian view is merely an excuse the current government is using so that it can justify a renewed policy of imperialism in the republics of the former Soviet Union. However, it can also be convincingly argued that the "virus of nationalism" is not limited to the former Soviet Union, and that the protection of minority rights is a legitimate concern of the international community, especially regarding Russian complaints in the Baltic republics. For examples of this nationalism in the "Baltics," see; Celestine Bohlen, "Estonia Rattles Its Russian Residents With Its Insistence on 'Estonization'," New York Times, 10 August 1992, A6.

peacekeeping and peacemaking proposals. Although there are many threats that the UN may be called upon to deal with, for the Russian Federation the "main threat is, of course, aggressive nationalism."¹⁸⁰

Even though Russia continues to emphasize bold proactive initiatives which seek to minimize minority rights violations by intervening into the domestic affairs of sovereign nations it should be remembered that Russian still maintains a veto in the Security Council and can therefore, still exercise its ability to protect its own domestic jurisdiction. In other words, most Russian officials would agree with the statement put forward by Eduard Shevardnadze in January of 1991 when he stated that

the most important thing is to preserve the type of order in which *all* decisions related to upholding international security are made by the UN Security Council, *in which we have a veto right....*¹⁸¹

Consequently, it appears that question of infringement upon domestic sovereignty is of vital interest to small and large nations alike, although for completely different reasons. Even though China can in no way be called a small

¹⁸⁰Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Victor Levin, *Mayak Radio Network*, 0630 GMT, 18 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-183, 18 September 1992, 8).

¹⁸¹My emphasis, quoted in; Russia's Continuation of the Soviet Security Council Membership, 13. Given the recent Russian initiatives that seek to increase the power of the Secretary-General it is important to note that most Russian officials still deem the Security Council to be the primary UN organ from which UN mandated security ventures should be controlled.

nation, it best represents that mentality with its view that "peace-keeping operations should be conducted in compliance with the principles of non-interference in internal affairs," and they should not be conducted using the "human rights issue as an excuse."¹⁸² In other words, many small nations fear that they will be unable to protect themselves from "superpower" hegemony in the Security Council.¹⁸³ On the other hand some observers feel that the large nations, specifically the permanent members of the Security Council, must be willing to curtail some of their national sovereignty, in the UN, for the general good of the international community.¹⁸⁴

This may be especially problematic for Russia with the emergence of a legitimate parliament and vocal public opposition to governmental policies. In the past, Soviet or Russian heads of state have been able to dictate foreign and domestic policy without being "checked" by the legislature or parliament (i.e. Supreme Soviet or Congress of Peoples Deputies). However, increasingly the Russian parliament has been searching for an expanded role in the government

¹⁸²For examples of these views see; Hu Yumin, "UN's Role in a New World Order," Beijing Review, (10 June 1991): 12-14; and "Excerpts from Speeches by leaders of Permanent Members of U.N. Council."

¹⁸³China with its veto obviously would have some protection in the Security Council, however, the remaining nations of the former "non-aligned" movement still fear "great power" hegemony in the UN, specifically in the Security Council.

¹⁸⁴This is the view of Sir Brian Urquhart in; "The Future of UN Peacekeeping," 213.

including in the area of foreign policy formation and implementation.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, it is unclear as to whether President Yeltsin will even be able to rally public support for increased participation in the UN.¹⁸⁶

The ever present question for the Security Council (and the Russian government) is to determine exactly where the domestic sovereignty of a nation ends and international responsibility and jurisdiction begins. It seems that if nations desire to increase UN jurisdiction and settle global disputes with a UN mandated force, they might also find themselves being called upon to surrender some of their authority (unilateral action) to the Security Council. Therefore, if Russia truly intends to increase its "collective" efforts in the UN as a foundation of its foreign policy it must decide how far it is willing to infringe upon the sovereignty of another nation, and more importantly how much sovereignty it

¹⁸⁵This newfound parliamentary influence over Russia's foreign policy (and UN policy) was most recently displayed when two members of the Parliament, Yevgeniy Ambartsumov and Oleg Rumyantsev visited the former Yugoslav Republic to gain "objective and general information" regarding Russian involvement in the crisis and to "overcome the one-sided position which the international community has adopted in the Yugoslav conflict." These members were then to report back to the Supreme Soviet with their findings. It should be mentioned that this trip was sanctioned by President Yeltsin, see; Yuriy Malinov, "Reviews Policy Mistakes on FRY," *ITAR-TASS*, 2030 GMT, 10 August 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-155, 11 August 1992, 10-11). Yevgeniy Ambartsumov's inclusion as a Russian delegate to the London Conference regarding the Yugoslav conflict is another such example of this growing influence that the Russian Parliament has in foreign affairs. For a brief review of this influence see; "The Main Thing is the Interests of Russia."

¹⁸⁶For an example of Russian public sentiment in opposition to increased UN actions see; Celestine Bohlen, "Russian Nationalists Protest Vote Against Serbia," New York Times, 8 June 1992, A6.

(the Russian President, Parliament and public) is willing to surrender to the UN through collective action agreements.

4. Missions

Overall, peacekeeping and peacemaking missions can generally fall into one of three categories; conflict prevention, conflict control and police action. Conflict prevention entails, general intelligence gathering, targeting prospective risk areas, conflict policy formation and conflict policy implementation normally through the use of some mandated force. The UN is currently ill prepared to conduct most of the general intelligence gathering functions without the voluntary aid of its member states. Although the Russians have suggested the establishment of a Military Risk Reduction Center, it is not clear if this is to serve as a complete UN intelligence gathering center or just a type of world wide NORAD system to complement their global anti-missile shield proposals.

Historically, the UN has been fairly capable of targeting prospective conflict areas, however, it has been ill suited to formulate and implement successful policy prior to the outbreak of hostilities (i.e. preventive diplomacy ventures). One conflict prevention proposal (or preventive diplomacy proposal) calls for the positioning of UN forces in nations bordering possible conflict areas.¹⁸⁷ This proposal assumes that UN forces within striking distance will deter aggression. In order for this threat to be truly credible it seems the UN

¹⁸⁷One of the primary advocates of this proposal is Vladimir Petrovsky, see his work entitled, "United Nations Perspective: Preventive Diplomacy," 77-82.

forces would have to be sizeable and interdict automatically like a "trip-wire" force.¹⁸⁸ In other words, for this force to be truly effective it must have credible capabilities and intentions. Furthermore, this force must be backed up by a credible reserve force in the event that it is overrun, especially given the fact that the "trip-wire" force is likely to be of limited size. In the end, if the UN hopes to avert hostilities it will have to do what many individual countries are incapable of doing, that is recognize a possible conflict situation and act upon it prior to its "nascent stage."

Currently, the UN seems to be quite capable of handling conflicts once they appear. Its reputation as an impressive peacekeeping force is well earned.¹⁸⁹ However, the UN may increasingly be called upon to respond to new threats including illicit drug proliferation, terrorism, environmental control and

¹⁸⁸Claude's opposition to automatic responses is noteworthy but seems to be steeped in "cold war" ideology, see; Swords Into Plowshares, 277-282. Brian Urquhart has become one of the major proponents of automatic responses, see; "The United Nations: From Peace-keeping to a Collective System," 23-24. It should be noted that President Yeltsin, while favoring preventive action, feels those measures should only be undertaken "upon a decision of the Security Council," see; "Excerpts from Speeches by Leaders Permanent Members of U.N. Council."

¹⁸⁹Even in spite of recent setbacks in the Yugoslav conflict, the UN's peacekeeping ventures have significantly increased in scope, nature and success since 1988, see; An Agenda For Peace, 14-16, and United Nations, Communications and Project Management Division Department of Public Information, United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations Information Notes, 17 January 1992. It should also be mentioned that currently, the United Nations is one of very few international organizations that can boast of any peacekeeping missions, successful or otherwise.

even disarmament control.¹⁹⁰ All of these new threats could be placed under the heading of "police actions," which means that the UN might be called upon to become the world's "policeman" with real policing responsibilities. This UN police force could become the DEA, FBI, EPA all rolled into one. Furthermore, it could be called upon to enforce previously agreed upon arms control accords or mandatory disarmament resolutions mandated in the Security Council. In other words, contrary to traditional thought, the UN may be called upon to act collectively as an instrument that "provides enforcement mechanisms for the whole body of international law."¹⁹¹

This is not to suggest that these new missions will in any way replace in importance the traditional mission of peacekeeping and possible peacemaking in the near future. Peacekeeping missions will continue to be the UN's "bread and butter" role in the area of conflict management. As a matter of fact the growing impact of the last three major UN operations (Cambodian peacekeeping

¹⁹⁰The expansion of the UN to include these missions has also been supported by the Russian government, see; Kozyrev's letter to Secretary-General Boutros Ghali dated 21 February 1992.

¹⁹¹Inis Claude maintains that collective security "is a specialized instrument of international policy in the sense that it is intended only to forestall the arbitrary and aggressive use of force, not to provide enforcement mechanisms for the whole body of international law." The recent activities of the United Nations in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict might suggest otherwise. For a discussion of traditional collective actions and its relationship to the maintenance of international law see; Swords Into Plowshares, 249-250. However, to be fair to Claude, he maintains that the UN activity in the Gulf War was a "special case" and was not an example of collective security but instead an example of "collective enforcement," see; "Collective Security After the Cold War."

mission, the Yugoslav peacekeeping mission and the Persian Gulf peacemaking mission) have led many observers to believe that the UN may in fact fulfill its envisioned role as the maintainer of "international peace and security."

5. The Future of UN Peacekeeping

Before one begins to overstate the importance of the UN with regards to conflict management it should be emphasized that even the most ambitious UN peacekeeping initiatives do not equate to conflict resolution. In fact it has been argued that peacekeeping missions merely prolong a struggle because once peacekeepers are in place the warring factions no longer have a motivation to settle the dispute. The example of the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus, where UN peacekeepers have been in place since 1964 without a resolution to the conflict, has been offered as an illustration of this point.¹⁹²

Additionally, while the peacemaking method of conflict management does go further toward resolving a conflict it is also fraught with problems. In order for peacemaking forces to be truly effective they should be inserted into a conflict with a political mandate from the Security Council which would set the terms of the conflict resolution plan. Furthermore, these forces should have the "muscle" to force compliance with UN resolutions. However, as mentioned earlier, the consensus required for the insertion of peacemaking forces is often

¹⁹²George L. Sherry, "The United Nations, International Conflict, and American Security," Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 5 (1986), 762-764. Today, many observers are using the "quagmire" in Yugoslavia as a further illustration of this point.

difficult to attain (much more so than that of a peacekeeping mission). Even though peacemaking missions have a much greater possibility of success (that is the avoidance of impasse management), they are politically more difficult to mandate than peacekeeping missions. For this reason, it appears that if peacemaking forces are to be used in the future one could expect them to be primarily relegated to the role of forcibly entering a conflict area, securing the peace militarily, and then taking up the business of a peacekeeping mission without a political resolution mandate from the Security Council.

In the era of cooperation and Security Council consensus, UN forces may be called upon to fulfill new and more complex missions. Although many consider the potential of the UN to be enormous, it remains to be seen if nations will be willing to increase the responsibility of the UN, at the expense of national sovereignty.

D. CONCLUSIONS

What does the Russian Federation gain from cooperating with the West and increasing the scope of UN security activities?¹⁹³ First, UN security forces would provide a valuable means of stemming the "virus of nationalism," that

¹⁹³For an outstanding discussion of some of the benefits of Russian cooperation in peacekeeping ventures see; "Russian Peacekeeping: Defense, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?," 39-40.

often crosses international borders.¹⁹⁴ Russia appears to be one of the leading advocates for protecting the rights of minorities within newly emerging nations (i.e. Yugoslavia, the republics of the former Soviet Union). Through cooperation with the West in the United Nations, the Russian government might be able to garner international support for containing the evils of "ethnic cleansing" which would significantly bolster its policy regarding human rights violations of Russian-speaking minorities in the CIS.

Secondly, these Russian proposals supporting the use of UN security forces (which they can partially control in the Security Council) could be an attempt to overcome their current inability to influence or control regional security forces (i.e. NATO, WEU, etc.) Boris Pankin recently stated that,

activities of newly established as well as restructured international organizations should be integrated [in the UN] in order to add stability to the pillars of comprehensive security. In this context, the role and responsibility of the *United Nations* are rapidly increasing as it *turns into the main security organization in the world*.¹⁹⁵

It is not hard to see that Russia will definitely gain international power and influence if the UN indeed becomes "the main security organization in the world,"

¹⁹⁴This was one of the major if not primary concerns that both Boris Pankin and Andrei Kozyrev described to the to the UN General Assembly, see; "The Dangers of Nationalism," 7, and Andrei Kozyrev's speech delivered to the 47th session of the UN General Assembly.

¹⁹⁵With original emphasis; "The Dangers of Nationalism," 7.

if for no other reason than they are one of only five permanent members in the Security Council and therefore, have the use of a veto as well as a significant amount of control over the Security Council's agenda.

Thirdly, Russian cooperation in these new security ventures bolsters Russian prestige and influence in the international arena. Recently, Boris Yeltsin has supported this notion that cooperation in these security matters would "strengthen Russia's international prestige."¹⁹⁶ Some have also suggested that through cooperation in UN security ventures, the Yeltsin government may also garner domestic prestige by winning a number of "small victorious wars," namely in Yugoslavia, Libya and Iraq.¹⁹⁷

Finally, many have suggested that Russian cooperation in security matters will ensure that they receive "*quid pro quo*" treatment in the Security Council.¹⁹⁸ One area in which cooperation might garner reciprocal support is in the previously mentioned case of human rights violations of Russian-speaking minorities. Given Russia's economic hardships, this "*quid pro quo*" treatment

¹⁹⁶See; "Russian Peacekeeping: Defense, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?," 40.

¹⁹⁷The notion of "small victorious wars," has its roots in early 20th century Russian politics. For a discussion of this topic see; Vladimir Kulistikov, "Boris Yeltsin Looks Abroad for Army Action To So Avert Misbehavior Back Home," New Times, no. 30 (July 1992), 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-161, 19 August 1992, 24-25).

¹⁹⁸Ambassador Chan Heng Chee, "The UN: From Peace-keeping to Peace-making," Adelphi Paper 265, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992, 33. For a general discussion of the merits of *quid pro quo* negotiation in international organizations see; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security, 16, no. 4 (Spring 1992), 143-178.

might also be rendered in an area of financial assistance which Russia could desperately use.¹⁹⁹ Certainly, a renewed confrontational attitude would make any "*quid pro quo*" arrangement a highly unlikely occurrence and given recent Russian sentiment, Western assistance is still highly desired.²⁰⁰

What ever the reasons, Russia seems to be looking toward the UN to fulfill some of its security concerns. The larger question remaining is will the rest of the world "follow suit." With the end of the cold war, the UN's chore of "maintaining international peace and security" will become increasingly complex. As member nations question the use of peacekeeping and/or peacemaking forces, they will have to concurrently question traditional notions of sovereignty. If nations desire an expansion of the UN's security envelope, including an expansion of the preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacemaking functions, they will have to find a new balance between collective action and national sovereignty.

¹⁹⁹This financial assistance would probably not come directly from Security Council mandates but would instead be received from individual members (i.e. the United States) in exchange for Russian support of Western initiatives in the Security Council.

²⁰⁰It should be mentioned that in the long run Russian "national-patriots," seeking control of the government, might receive a higher utility from arousing age old confrontational attitudes in the public arena with their traditional enemies (i.e. the U.S.) than they would through cooperation with the West. However, in the near term this still appears to be a highly unlikely eventuality.

V. CONCLUSIONS: IS RUSSIAN COOPERATION A PLAUSIBLE POLICY WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS?

There can be no doubt that prior to the mid-1980's the Soviet Union's security policy within the United Nations was confrontational in both nature and in practice. A study of the voting record within the Security Council clearly demonstrates that the Soviet Union's first priority regarding security was to ensure that the UN did not intervene into the "domestic jurisdiction" of the Soviet state. Furthermore, Soviet declaratory policy and participation within the UN further supports the notion that the Soviet government was set upon a course of confrontation within the UN. Numerous Soviet activities within the UN clearly demonstrate their confrontational nature, namely; their lack of support for UN peacekeeping missions, their "*troika*" proposal for reorganization of the office of the Secretary-General, their undermining of the Secretariat by means of a "secondment policy" of appointment and their failure to logistically and financially support the United Nations.

The confrontational attitude of the Soviet Union was not without cause. This policy, while in complete agreement with ideological nature of competition between capitalism and communism, was founded on the realities of the cold war. Andrei Kozyrev contends that "the Soviet Union was essentially in confrontation with the U.N., since totalitarianism is incompatible with the U.N.

ideals."²⁰¹ There were, however, strategic implications for this policy namely, Soviet confrontation in the UN provided another means of limiting the ability of the Western nations to undermine the power, position and authority of the Soviet government in the international arena. This strategic aspect of the Soviet policy was clearly displayed every time the Soviets held up the shield of non-interference, found in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, to protect it from Western intervention. This was especially true during the early years of the UN and receded, as the Western majority, and hence domination, decreased in the UN. During this later period the Soviets continually used a confrontational policy to antagonize the West and block them from their supposed "imperialist" tendencies while simultaneously appearing to be the guardian of the non-aligned movement.

As the Soviets' internal problems grew and became increasingly unmanageable (late 1980's) the Soviet government began to look upon the UN, not as a tool for blocking the West, but as a means of increasing Soviet "breathing space" in the international arena so that they might better focus on domestic problems. By the early-1990's, the Soviets began to use the UN as a means of assisting themselves in the maintenance of their security, albeit in a limited sense. This is most drastically illustrated by their complete reversal regarding the support for UN peacekeeping missions.

²⁰¹Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Vyacheslav Terekhov, *Interfax*, 1542 GMT, 16 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-181, 17 September 1992, 11).

By the beginning of 1992, the Russian Federation had secured the previously held Soviet seat in the UN and more importantly in the Security Council. Since that time, the Russians have continued, much like their predecessors the Soviets, to look toward the UN as a means of enhancing their security in the international arena. While the Soviets did this through confrontation and later through the use of cooperative ventures in hopes of favorable *"quid pro quo"* treatment, the Russian's first and foremost used the UN to legitimize their newfound position in the "new world order."

Russian leaders, Yeltsin included, have continually pointed to their position in the Security Council as proof that they are a legitimate "great power" in the new international arena. Whether or not this is true is arguable, but certainly the ease and speed at which "great power" status was conferred upon them by the remaining permanent members in the Security Council surely help to legitimize the Russian government's international and to a lesser extent domestic position.

What might be the reasons for Russia selecting either a confrontational or cooperative policy within the UN and what path should we expect? This is clearly one of the most important issues of this thesis. By analyzing the Russian government's declaratory policy coupled with their current activity within the UN, one is left to believe that Russian will indeed continue to pursue a cooperative policy within the United Nations. Furthermore, most evidence suggests that Russia may embark upon a strategy of cooperation for many of the

same reasons that the former Soviet Union altered its philosophy regarding the UN.

First, it is Kozyrev's, as well as many other leading Russian officials (including Yeltsin's), contention that Russia will be "able to realize [its] interests far more effectively through cooperation within the United Nations," than through the reemergence of traditional "ideological battles" with the West.²⁰² In other words, the current Russian administration believes that Russian "national interests" will be well served by the use of cooperative policies within the UN. One such example of this attitude is the increasing emphasis that Russia has placed on the importance of strengthening UN preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and even peacemaking ventures. Many Russian officials feel that increasing the roles of UN preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping will give the Russian government a means of dissipating conflict without the heavy price of intervention, which may become critical in the increasingly hostile regions of Central Eurasia and East Europe.

There can be no argument with the fact that Russia is certainly inclined toward "curing the virus of nationalism" which they feel is the cause of many of these conflicts. Additionally, one must also remember that because of its proximity, it is much harder for Russia to take an "arms length approach" to these

²⁰²Ibid.

Eurasia problems than it would be for the U.S.²⁰³ Furthermore, with its limited resources, Russia might be forced to look toward the UN for help. Underlying the Russian search for an effective policy within the UN is a belief that international organizations will, in the future, be of benefit in establishing peace. Many Russian officials agree with Andrei Kozyrev's statement that

For 73 years, we were in a state of confrontation with the whole world and nothing good came of this for our people.... The line of setting Russia up against the rest of the world under the pretext of defending its independence is a betrayal of her national interests. It is far better to defend one's state interests through cooperation with other countries, and not through setting oneself up against them. Otherwise one should not go to the UN, but to the battlefield.²⁰⁴

Secondly, many Russian officials feel that the UN presents Russia with a legitimate international vehicle for establishing Russian influence in the world arena. This is especially important given Russia's powerful position in the Security Council combined with its lack of a similarly powerful position in many other significant regional or international organizations (i.e. GATT, EC, WEU,

²⁰³Lawrence Freedman makes this point with respect to the governments of West Europe, however, I feel it is just as appropriate with regard to Russia. See; Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World," Foreign Affairs, 71, no. 1 (America and the World 1991/92): 37.

²⁰⁴Andrei Kozyrev as reported by Yevgeniy Menkes, *ITAR-TASS*, 0110 GMT, 28 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-188, 28 September 1992, 9).

CSCE, etc).²⁰⁵ Furthermore, Russia's shrinking military and economic presence abroad means that it must turn to political or diplomatic presence if it hopes to influence international actions. If for no other reason, Russia's interaction with the UN, specifically the Security Council, will in part legitimize its position as a world power. In the words of a Russian official, "we [Russia] have inherited the Soviet Union's seat on the Security Council--that demonstrates our role as a great power."²⁰⁶ Similarly, it is not hard to see that an emerging policy of confrontation or at the very least isolation would leave Russia without a say in the UN which it deems as an increasingly effective tool in the international arena. Andrei Kozyrev contends that Russia

was reduced to catastrophe by decades of isolation and confrontation with the world around. A return to that policy would revive the suspicion, the arms race, and the clamorous UN initiatives void of any real substance.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵It should be mentioned that this Russian hope that the UN will become the world's "main security organization" would also give the other permanent members of the Security Council similar power.

²⁰⁶Statement made by Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev; "Kozyrev on 'Geopolitics' in Foreign Policy."

²⁰⁷Vitalii Ganyushkin and Yevgenii Rusakov, "How Can you Say This in Russian. Russia Takes Seat in United Nations With Right to Deciding Vote. United Nations is Becoming Real Headquarters of World Politics in Our Turbulent Times Instead of Club for Ideological Struggle," *Novoye Vremya* no. 41, October 1992, 18-22 (FBIS-Sov-92-200, 15 october 1992, 11).

In the end, with an increasing number of regional security organizations, Russia would certainly benefit if the UN became the premier security organization in the world.

Thirdly, similar to the Soviet Union, Russian cooperative policies in the UN will open the doors to other international organizations (IMF, GATT, etc.) much faster than confrontational policies. Furthermore, Russia could certainly gain from the economic, environmental, health, and technical assistance that the UN's special agencies can provide. Russian officials have continued to remind the West that

we [Russia] do not have the possibility of regenerating our own economy without cooperation, without entering the world community. In a word, the pragmatic concern about our own interests requires an active global foreign policy, but realizing our interest by means of cooperation and not by means of confrontation.²⁰⁸

This statement suggests that not only does the Russian Federation need the help of the West but they also cannot afford to become enmeshed in another confrontational cold war. Therefore, the Russian government is currently much more predisposed toward cooperative "give and take" attitude in the Security Council which Russia maintains will increase the likelihood of reciprocal support from the West in the UN.

²⁰⁸ Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Yevgenii Menkes, *ITAR-TASS*, 0220 GMT, 29 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-189, 29 September 1992, 7).

Finally, Russia seems to be much more concerned with domestic reform than it does with an adventurous foreign policy. Currently, popular opinion maintains that Yeltsin has his hands full with growing public and political discontent over his domestic economic reforms and hence it would be politically and economically infeasible for him to undertake an aggressive confrontational foreign policy.

This is not to suggest that a Russia cooperative policy in the UN is a foregone conclusion. There are many possible impediments to Russian-UN cooperation but without out a doubt the largest and most serious involves the current domestic political battle raging between liberal and conservative elements within the Russian government. Although the current administration (Yeltsin, Kozyrev, Vorontsov, etc.) seems to support cooperative UN policies, a more hardline government may deem it in Russia's best interest to turn away from the UN because of its ties to the "imperialist world." A conservative government made up of radical "national-patriots" (influenced by the conservative Parliament) may blame the West (and agencies like the UN) for the country's current ills and take Russia back to the confrontational policies of the former Soviet Union.

Similarly, if the current Russian government comes to odds with the UN over "accepted norms of international practice" it might find itself on the receiving end of undesirable UN policy mandates.²⁰⁹ If this is the case, the Russian

²⁰⁹ Armed with the veto in the Security Council, Russia would be able to effectively block these UN mandates, however, Russia would find itself in

government may very well abandon its cooperative UN strategy and attempt to blunt international influence through confrontation and possibly military might.

However, this extreme Russian conservative agenda regarding the UN still appears to be very unlikely. What is more likely is a measured retreat from the current administration's reliance upon international organizations as a primary vehicle for international policy implementation. Instead it appears that Russia might take a more centrist approach, which emphasizes Russian activity in domestic and "near abroad" policy utilizing a more unilateral approach.²¹⁰

position similar to that of the Soviets in the early years of the UN. Russian unilateral intervention in a republic of the former Soviet Union stands as just one of many possible violations of "accepted norms of international behavior" that the government may embark upon. Currently, the Baltic Republics and Russia are arguing their respective views of this situation in the UN, see; Aleksandr Shalnev, "A. Kozyrev Criticizes Human Rights Violations in Estonia and Latvia From the UN Rostrum," *Izvestiya*, 24 September 1992, 4 (FBIS-SOV-92-190, 30 September 1992, 16-17); and Anatolijs Gorbunovs, Latvian Supreme Council Chairman's speech delivered to the 47th UN General Assembly in New York on 25 September 1992, *Radio Riga Network*, 1044 GMT, 25 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-189, 29 September 1992, 56-57).

²¹⁰The Foreign and Defense Policy Council, a Russian organization made up of liberal and centrist foreign policy experts and politicians, produced a report which could very possibly signal the form that this new Russian foreign policy may take, see; Foreign and Defense Policy Council, "Strategy for Russia" published under the heading "Some Theses for the Report of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 19 August 1992, 4-5 (FBIS-USR-92-115, 8 September 1992, 54-64). For a discussion of this policy and the make up of the council see; Vitalitii Tretyakov, "Between Ideals and Reality. Notes in Connection With the Publication of the 'Strategy for Russia' Theses," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 19 August 1992, 4 (FBIS-USR-92-115, 8 September 1992, 52-54); Sergei Karaganov, "It Should Not Just Be the Government That Looks for Sensible Solutions," interviewed by Georgii Ivanov-Smolenskii, *Izvestiya*, 25 June 1992, 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-133, 10 July 1992, 21-25); and "From the NG File," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 19 August 1992, 4 (FBIS-USR-92-115, 8 September 1992, 64).

While it is certainly true, in the near term, that Russia can't afford to return to the "Mr Nyet policies" of the Soviet era, they may increasingly seek a path separate from the UN in which they emphasize unilateral action to forward an emerging Russian "mission." It is important to note that this movement toward a more independent policy within the UN will not be directly based on the traditional influence of the confrontational period of Soviet activity within the UN, but instead will be built upon the domestic realities of Russian "power politics." As one prominent Russian political scientist notes,

Yeltsin faces a new fight against emboldened conservatives....[Russian] foreign policy has become hostage to the domestic policy struggle.... This is not a surrender to the restorationists, most likely, but a temporary retreat and tactical maneuver.²¹¹

In the end, while current Russian declaratory policy and activity within the UN suggests a deep commitment to cooperation with the other "great powers" the reality of domestic instability within the Russian Federation may force a more conservative approach to cooperation in international organizations. This policy

²¹¹For an outstanding discussion of this foreign policy struggle see; German Diligenskii, "Russia Lives Cheerfully From Session to Session," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, no. 39 23 September 1992, 1-2 (FBIS-USR-92-128, 7 October 1992, 59-60).

will not mark a return toward the confrontation of old, but it will certainly foster a more independent policy from the West.²¹²

Domestic political infighting within the Russian Federation is not the only factor which can be expected to limit the UN's ability to expand its role in the "post-confrontational era." There are numerous bureaucratic obstacles which the UN must overcome if it hopes to be an effective conflict management tool in the international arena. These obstacles include the ongoing debate over Security Council membership, Security Council voting procedures, bureaucratic inefficiencies and probably most importantly, the ever increasing debt crisis that now faces the UN. Suffice it to say that these obstacles, for the most part, lie outside the scope of this thesis, however, they may prove to be the most serious barriers toward the expansion of any UN activities. Vladimir Petrovsky best summed up the ability of the UN to function in the future when he stated that

There is a danger that the United Nations may become a hostage to its own popularity: The organization may not have enough money for all the ambitious programs which it is undertaking.²¹³

²¹²Many authors have pointed to certain actions within the Russian Federation which would point to a more centrist policy. The resignation or replacement of Andrei Kozyrev and his closest advisors would certainly be one such indication. For an outstanding discussion of this possibility and its effect on Russian foreign policy see, Jeff Checkel, "Russian Foreign Policy: Back to the Future?," RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 41, (16 October 1992), 15-29.

²¹³Yurii Leonov, "Nobody Doubts Russia's Greatness--So Says UN Deputy Secretary General for Political Questions Vladimir Petrovsky," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 2 September 1992, 1 (FBIS-SOV-92-172, 3 September 1992, 15). For a brief review

Although this study did not focus on United States policy in the United Nations it seems three generalities can be drawn from Russian activity in the UN with regard to U.S. national interests. First, if Russia is indeed successful in establishing the UN as the "main security organization in the world" the U.S. will be forced to come to grips with the question of how much national sovereignty it would be willing to surrender to the Security Council. Similarly, the U.S. executive branch might find itself with a problem now facing the Russian executive, namely a legislative body that is seeking to extend its influence in UN matters beyond the scope of budgetary limitation. Secondly, if Russia continues to press this cooperative path within the UN, the United States government might find itself having to increasingly support popular international measures mandated by the UN or suffer the consequences of international disdain that would accompany any U.S. veto within the Security Council. In other words, the U.S. might also become a "hostage" to the international popularity of the UN. Finally, the U.S. will have to decide how to react to a future Russian veto in the Security Council. The reemergence of such an occurrence will surely transpire and might not be dictated by a return to the confrontation of the cold war but instead might merely be a means of voicing an emerging Russian national

of the debt problem now facing the UN see; Paul Lewis, "With U.S. the Biggest Debtor, President Finds U.N. Skeptical," New York Times, 22 September 1992, 17; and A. Shalnew, "For UN Membership Status One May Not Only Incur Expenses, but Earn Money," *Izvestiya*, 23 July 1992, 5 (FBIS-USR-92-099, 5 August 1992, 79-81).

interest. At the very least it could be a tactic used by the Russian President to win support of those centrist to conservative elements in his government. Surely, one veto (on a less than significant policy position) should not be reason to fear the return of the confrontational period in the UN. However, it may very well signal that the Russian government is moving toward a more conservative approach to international relations based on the protection of national sovereignty. On the other hand, a veto that is registered by the Russian government in the face of significant U.S. lobbying pressure or the return of multiple Russian veto's in the Security Council would surely mark the return of the confrontational period.

In the end, while cooperation in the UN brings with it many opportunities it also brings with it some problems, the most significant of which is the relegation of national sovereignty. While many experts have maintained that with the end of the cold war the UN might finally now be able to fulfill its envisioned mission, the world must realize that the age old notions of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction still exist. Nations must, if they hope to expand the role of the UN, seek a new balance between sovereignty and intervention. Furthermore, these nations will have to overcome the many bureaucratic obstacles which threaten to impede any future expansion of the UN's function as the "maintainor of international peace and security." While Russian activity in the UN may go a long way toward removing the confrontation of the past, there are many other hurdles which will have to be crossed.

In conclusion, a continued policy of cooperation in the UN would net the Russian Federation gains in international influence, enhanced security and most importantly aid. However, the same problems that turned the former Soviet Union toward the UN, namely; political, military and economic instability, may eventually lead the Russia Federation away from the UN.

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